Chapter 3. Classical Demand Theory

(Part 1)

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3.A. Introduction: Take \geq as the primative

- (1) Assumption(s) on \succsim so that \succsim can be represented with a untility function
- (2) Utility maximization and demand function
- (3) Utility as a function of prices and wealth (indirect utility)
- (4) Expenditure minimization and expenditure function
- (5) Relationship among demand function, indirect utility function, and expenditure function

3.B. Preference Relations: Basic Properties


Rationality We would assume *Rationality* (*Completeness and Transitivity*) throughout the chapter.

Definition 3.B.1. The preference relation \succsim on X is rational if it possesses the following two properties:

- (i) Completeness: For all $x,y\in X$, we have $x\succsim y$ or $y\succsim x$ (or both).
- (ii) Transitivity: For all $x,y,z\in X$, if $x\succsim y$ and $y\succsim z$, then $x\succsim z$.

Monotonicity

Definition 3.B.2. The preference relation \succsim on X is monotone if $x,y\in X$ and $y\gg x$ implies $y\succ x$. It is strongly monotone if $y\geq x\ \&\ y\neq x$ implies $y\succ x$.



Monotonicity


Claim. If \succeq is strongly monotone, then it is monotone.

Example. Here is an example of a preference that is monotone, but not strongly monotone:

$$u(x_1, x_2) = x_1 \text{ in } \mathbb{R}^2_+.$$

Local Nonsatiation

Definition 3.B.3. The preference relation \succsim on X is *locally nonsatiated* if for every $x \in X$ and every $\varepsilon > 0, \exists y \in X$ such that $\|y - x\| \le \varepsilon$ and $y \succ x$.



Local Nonsatiation


Claim. Local nonsatiation is a weaker desirability assumption compared to monotonicity. If \succsim is monotone, then it is locally nonsatiated.


Example. Here is an example of a preference that is locally nonsatiated, but not monotone:

$$u(x_1, x_2) = x_1 - |1 - x_2| \text{ in } \mathbb{R}^2_+.$$

Convexity Assumptions

Definition 3.B.4. The preference relation \succsim on X is *convex* if for every $x \in X$, the upper contour set of x, $\{y \in X : y \succsim x\}$ is convex; that is, if $y \succsim x$ and $z \succsim x$, then $\alpha y + (1 - \alpha)z \succsim x$ for any $\alpha \in [0,1]$.





Convex

Nonconvex

Properties associated with convexity

(i) Diminishing marginal rates of substitution


(ii) Preference for diversity (implied by (i))

Strict Convexity

Definition 3.B.5. The preference relation \succsim on X is *strictly convex* if for every $x \in X$, we have that $y \succsim x$ and $z \succsim x$, and $y \ne z$ implies $\alpha y + (1 - \alpha)z \succ x$ for all $\alpha \in (0, 1)$.

Homothetic Preference

Definition 3.B.6. A monotone preference relation \succsim on $X=\mathbb{R}^L_+$ is *homothetic* if all indifference sets are related by proportional expansion along rays; that is, if $x\sim y$, then $\alpha x\sim \alpha y$ for any $\alpha\geq 0$.




Homothetic Preference

Quasilinear Preference

Definition 3.B.7. \succsim on $X=(-\infty,\infty)\times\mathbb{R}^{L-1}_+$ is quasilinear with respect to commodity 1 (numeraire commodity) if

- (i) All the indifference sets are parallel displacements of each other along the axis of commodity 1. That is, if $x \sim y$, then $(x + \alpha e_1) \sim (y + \alpha e_1)$ for $e_1 = (1, 0, 0, ..., 0)$ and any $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$.
- (ii) Good 1 is desirable; that is $x + \alpha e_1 \succ x$ for all x and $\alpha > 0$.

Quasilinear Preference



Quasilinear Preference

3.C. Preference and Utility

Key Question. When can a rational preference relation be represented by a utility function?

Answer: If the preference relation is continuous.

Definition 3.C.1. The preference relation \succsim on X is *continuous* if it is preserved in the limits. That is, for any sequence of pairs $\{(x^n,y^n)\}_{n=1}^{\infty}$ with $x^n \succsim y^n$ for all $n,\ x=\lim_{n\to\infty}x^n,$ $y=\lim_{n\to\infty}y^n,$ we have $x\succsim y.$


Remark. \succsim is continuous if and only if for all x, the upper contour set $\{y \in X : y \succsim x\}$ and the lower contour set $\{y \in X : x \succsim y\}$ are both closed.

Example 3.C.1. Lexicographic Preference Relation on \mathbb{R}^2

 $X=\mathbb{R}^2;\,x\succ y$ if either $x_1>y_1$ or $x_1=y_1$ and $x_2>y_2,\,x\sim y$ if $x_1=y_1$ and $x_2=y_2.$


Claim. Lexicographic Preference Relation on \mathbb{R}^2 is not continuous.

Claim. Lexicographic Preference Relation on \mathbb{R}^2 cannot be represented by $u(\cdot)$.



Lexicographic Preference

Continuous Preference Alternatively, we could use the fact that upper and lower contour sets of a continuous preference must be closed.



Proposition 3.C.1. Suppose that the preference relation \succeq on X is continuous. Then there exists continuous utility function u(x) that represents \succsim , i.e., $u(x) \ge u(y)$ if and only if $x \succsim y$.

For this course, we will only prove a simplified version of Proposition 3.C.1, which assumes that the preference relation \gtrsim is also monotone.

Remark. u(x) is not unique, any increasing transformation v(x)=f(u(x)) will represent \succsim . We can also introduce countably many jumps in $f(\cdot)$.

Claim. If $u(\cdot)$ is a continuous utility function representing \succsim , then \succsim is continuous.

Assumptions of differentiability of u(x)

The assumption of differentiability is commonly adopted for technical convenience, but is not applicable to all useful models.

Assumptions of differentiability of u(x)

Here is an example of preference that is not differentiable.

Example (Leontief Preference). $x \gtrsim y$ if and only if $\min\{x_1, x_2\} \ge x$

 $\min\{y_1,y_2\}.$ x_2 $x_1=x_2$ x_2 x_3

Leontief Preference

Implications of \succsim and u

- (i) \succeq is convex $\iff u: X \to \mathbb{R}$ is quasi-concave.
- (ii) continuous \succsim on \mathbb{R}^L_+ is homothetic $\iff u(x)$ is H.D.1.

(iii) continuous
$$\succsim$$
 on $(-\infty, \infty) \times \mathbb{R}^{L-1}_+$ is quasilinear with respect to Good $1 \iff u(x) = x_1 + \phi(x_2, ..., x_L)$

Quasiconcave Utility

Definition. The utility function $u(\cdot)$ is *quasiconcave* if the set $\{y\in\mathbb{R}_+^L:u(y)\geq u(x)\}$ is convex for all x or, equivalently, if $u(\alpha x+(1-\alpha)y)\geq \min\{u(x,u(y))\}$ for all x,y and all $\alpha\in[0,1].$ If $u(\alpha x+(1-\alpha)y)>\min\{u(x,u(y))\}$ for $x\neq y$

and $\alpha \in (0,1)$, then $u(\cdot)$ is strictly quasiconcave.

3.D. Utility Maximization Problem (UMP)

Assume throughout that preference is *rational*, *continuous*, *lo-cally nonsatiated*, and u(x) continuous.

Consumer's Utility Maximization Problem (UMP):

$$\max_{x \in \mathbb{R}_+^L} \quad u(x)$$

s.t.
$$p \cdot x \leq w$$

Existence of Solution

Proposition 3.D.1. If $p \gg 0$ and $u(\cdot)$ is continuous, then the utility maximization problem has a solution.

Existence of Solution

Here, we provide two counter examples where the solution of UMP does not exists.

Counter Examples.

(i)
$$B_{p,w}$$
 is not closed: $p \cdot x < w$

(ii) u(x) is not continuous:


$$u(x) = \begin{cases} p \cdot x & \text{for } p \cdot x < w \\ 0 & \text{for } p \cdot x = w \end{cases}$$

Walrasian demand correspondence/functions


The solution of UMP, denoted by x(p,w), is called Walrasian (or ordinary or market) demand correspondence.

When x(p,w) is single valued for all (p,w), we refer to it as Walrasian (or ordinary or market) demand function.

Walrasian demand correspondence/functions



Single solution



Multiple solutions

Properties of Walrasian demand correspondence

Proposition 3.D.2. Suppose that u(x) is a continuous utility function representing a locally nonsatiated preference relation \succeq defined on the consumption set $X = \mathbb{R}^L_+$. Then the Walrasian demand correspondence x(p,w) possesses the following properties:

- (i) Homogeneity of degree zero in (p, w) : $x(\alpha p, \alpha w) = x(p, w)$ for any p, w and scalar $\alpha > 0$.
- (ii) Walras' Law: $p \cdot x = w$ for all $x \in x(p, w)$.

Properties of Walrasian demand correspondence

Proposition 3.D.2 (continued).

(iii) Convexity/uniqueness: If \succsim is convex, so that $u(\cdot)$ is quasiconcave, then x(p,w) is a convex set. Moreover, if \succsim is strictly convex, so that $u(\cdot)$ is strictly quasiconcave, then x(p,w) consists of a single element.