Problem Set 1

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ECON 772001 - Math for Economists

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Sep. 10, 2019

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Fall 2019

1. Profit Maximization

a. Set up the Lagrangian for this problem, letting λ denote the multiplier on the constraint.

$$\mathcal{L}(y, k, l, \lambda) = py - rk - wl + \lambda * (k^a l^b - y)$$

, where 0 < a < 1, 0 < b < 1, and 0 < a + b < 1.

b. Next, write down the conditions that, according to the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, must be satisfied by the values y^* , k^* , and l^* that solve the firm's problem, together with the associated value λ^* for the multiplier.

$$\mathcal{L}_1(k^*, l^*, y^*, \lambda^*) = r - a\lambda k^{a-1}l^b = 0.$$
(1.1)

$$\mathcal{L}_2(k^*, l^*, y^*, \lambda^*) = w - b\lambda k^a l^{b-1} = 0.$$
(1.2)

$$\mathcal{L}_3(k^*, l^*, y^*, \lambda^*) = p - \lambda = 0. \tag{1.3}$$

$$\mathcal{L}(k^*, l^*, y^*, \lambda^*) = y - k^a l^b \ge 0 \tag{2}$$

$$\lambda^* \ge 0 \tag{3}$$

$$\lambda^*(y - k^a l^b) = 0. (4)$$

c. Assume that the constraint binds at the optimum (can you tell under what conditions this will be true?), and use your results from above to solve for y^* , k^* , l^* , and λ^* in terms of the model's parameters: a, b, p, r, and w.

Answer: When the complementary slackness condition (4):

$$\lambda^*(y - k^a l^b) = 0$$

must hold and be satisfied; where if $\lambda^* \geq 0$, then the constraint must bind and if the constraint does not bind, then $\lambda^* = 0$.

Since here, (1.3) indicates $\lambda^* = p \ge 0$, the constraint $k^a l^b = y$ binds.

$$y^{*}(k^{*}, l^{*}, a, b) = k^{*a}l^{*b}.$$

$$(1.1) \Rightarrow r = \lambda ak^{a-1}l^{b}$$

$$(1.2) \Rightarrow w = \lambda bk^{a}l^{b-1}$$

$$(1.3) \Rightarrow \lambda^{*}(p) = p$$

$$(1.1)/(1.2) \Rightarrow \frac{r}{w} = \frac{al}{bk}$$

$$(1.2) \Rightarrow w = bpk^{a}l^{b-1} = bp(\frac{awl}{br})^{a}l^{b-1} = pa^{a}w^{a}r^{-a}b^{1-a} * l^{a+b-1}$$

$$\Rightarrow l^{*}(a, b, p, r, w) = \sqrt[a+b-1]{\frac{a^{-a}w^{1-a}r^{a}b^{a-1}}{p}}$$

$$k^{*}(a, b, p, r, w) = \sqrt[a+b-1]{\frac{r^{1-b}b^{-b}w^{b}a^{b-1}}{p}}$$

$$y^{*}(a, b, p, r, w) = (\sqrt[a+b-1]{\frac{r^{1-b}b^{-b}w^{b}a^{b-1}}{p}})^{a}(\sqrt[a+b-1]{\frac{a^{-a}w^{1-a}r^{a}b^{a-1}}{p}})^{b}$$

- d. Finally, use your solutions from above to answer the following questions:
 - i. What happens to the optimal y^* , k^* , and l^* when the output price p rises, holding all other parameters fixed? In each case, does the optimal choice rise, fall, or stay the same?

Answer: l^* , k^* , y^* all fall if the output price p rises.

ii. What happens to the optimal y^* , k^* , and l^* when the rental rate for capital r rises, holding all other parameters fixed?

Answer: l^* rises, k^* falls if the rental rate for capital r rises, but y^* depends on the ratio of a/b because it is a product of $l^* * k^*$.

iii. What happens to the optimal y^* , k^* , and l^* when the wage rate w rises, holding all other parameters fixed?

Answer: l^* falls, k^* rises if the wage rate w rises, but y^* depends on the ratio of a/b because it is a product of $l^* * k^*$.

iv. What happens to the optimal y^* , k^* , and l^* when p, r, and w all double at the same time?

Answer: l^* and k^* double but y^* times 4 when p, r, and w all double at the same time.

2. Utility Maximization

a. Set up the Lagrangian for the consumer's problem: choose c_1 and c_2 to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint, letting λ denote the multiplier on the constraint.

$$\mathcal{L}(c_1, c_2, p_1, p_2, \lambda) = c_1^a c_2^{1-a} + \lambda * [I - (p_1 c_1 + p_2 c_2)]$$

, where 0 < a < 1.

b. Next, write down the conditions that, according to the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, must be satisfied by the values c_1^* and c_2^* that solve the consumer's problem, together with the associated value λ^* for the multiplier.

$$\mathcal{L}_1(c_1^*, c_2^*, \lambda^*) = ac_1^{a-1}c_2^{1-a} - \lambda p_1 = 0$$

$$\mathcal{L}_2(c_1^*, c_2^*, \lambda^*) = (1 - a)c_1^a c_2^{-a} - \lambda p_2 = 0.$$
(1)

$$\mathcal{L}(c_1^*, c_2^*, \lambda^*) = I - (p_1 c_1 + p_2 c_2) \ge 0.$$
(2)

$$\lambda^* \ge 0. \tag{3}$$

$$\lambda^*[I - (p_1c_1 + p_2c_2)] = 0 \tag{4}$$

c. Assume that the budget constraint binds at the optimum (again, can you tell under what conditions this will be true?), and use your results from above to solve for c_1^* , c_2^* , and λ^* in terms of the model's parameters: I, p_1 , p_2 , and a.

<u>Answer</u>: When the complementary slackness condition (4):

$$\lambda^*[I - p_1c_1 + p_2c_2] = 0$$

must hold and be satisfied; where if $\lambda^* \geq 0$, then the constraint must bind and if the constraint does not bind, then $\lambda^* = 0$. Since the constraint binds,

$$\lambda \geq 0, and$$

$$I = p_1c_1 + p_2c_2$$

$$(1) \Rightarrow \frac{p_1}{p_2} = \frac{ac_1^{a-1}c_2^{1-a}}{1 - ac_1^ac_2^{-a}} = \frac{a}{1 - a}\frac{c_2}{c_1} \Rightarrow p_1c_1 = \frac{a}{1 - a}p_2c_2$$

$$(4) \Rightarrow I = p_1c_1 + p_2c_2 = (\frac{a}{1 - a} + 1)p_2c_2 = \frac{1}{1 - a}p_2c_2$$

$$c_2^*(p_1, p_2, a, I) = (1 - a)\frac{I}{p_2}$$

$$c_1^*(p_1, p_2, a, I) = a\frac{I}{p_1}$$

$$\lambda^*(p_1, p_2, a, I) = -\frac{a^{a+1}(1 - a)^{1-a}I}{p_1p_2}$$

d. Finally, using the answer we get,

 $a = p_1 c_1^* / I$ and $1 - a = p_2 c_2^* / I$, indicating the preference parameter a is directly related to goods consumption.

3. Utility Maximization (Again)

a. Set up the Lagrangian for the consumer's problem: choose c_1 and c_2 to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint, letting λ denote the multiplier on the constraint.

$$\mathcal{L}(c_1, c_2, p_1, p_2, \lambda) = a \ln(c_1) + (1 - a) \ln(c_2) + \lambda * [I - (p_1 c_1 + p_2 c_2)]$$

, where ln denotes the natural logarithm and where 0 < a < 1 as before.

b. Next, write down the conditions that, according to the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, must be satisfied by the values c_1^* and c_2^* that solve the consumer's problem, together with the associated value λ^* for the multiplier.

$$\mathcal{L}_1(c_1^*, c_2^*, \lambda^*) = \frac{a}{c_1} - \lambda p_1 = 0$$
(1.1)

$$\mathcal{L}_2(c_1^*, c_2^*, \lambda^*) = a \ln(c_1) - \lambda p_2 = 0.$$
(1.2)

$$\mathcal{L}(c_1^*, c_2^*, \lambda^*) = I - (p_1 c_1 + p_2 c_2) \ge 0.$$
(2)

$$\lambda^* \ge 0. \tag{3}$$

$$\lambda^*[I - (p_1c_1 + p_2c_2] = 0 \tag{4}$$

c. <u>Answer</u>: When the complementary slackness condition (4):

$$\lambda^*[I - p_1c_1 + p_2c_2] = 0$$

must hold and be satisfied; so if $\lambda \geq 0$, the constrain binds at $I = p_1c_1 + p_2c_2$.

$$(1.1) \Rightarrow \frac{a}{c_1} - \lambda p_1 = 0$$

$$(1.2) \Rightarrow \frac{1-a}{c_2} - \lambda p_2 = 0$$

$$so, \frac{p_1}{p_2} = \frac{ac_2}{(1-a)c_1} \Rightarrow p_1c_1 = \frac{a}{1-a}p_2c_2$$

$$(4) \Rightarrow I = p_1c_1 + p_2c_2 = \frac{1}{1-a}p_2c_2$$

$$c_1^*(p_1, p_2, a, I) = a\frac{I}{p_1}$$

$$c_2^*(p_1, p_2, a, I) = (1-a)\frac{I}{p_2}$$

$$\lambda^*(p_1, p_2, a, I) = \frac{1}{I}$$

d. Using the answer above, we get $a = p_1 c_1^* / I$ and $1 - a = p_2 c_2^* / I$.