**Appendix**

The format of the model used in the article is as follows:

,

where, is the value of the dependent variable for each cross-sectional unit 1,2,3,…*N*, denoted by the subscript , and time period 1,2,3,…*T* is denoted by the subscript ; is a regressor observed for the unit lagged by one year; and represents the within-country-year error term. Then, refers to the lagged dependent variable (LDV), which is introduced to account for AR (1). Since sanctions are a result of state repression, to avoid the problem of reverse causality, we account for the country’s *past human rights situation* using a lag of the dependent variable at , which introduces past values of the outcome variable as an explanatory variable.

Belarus is the country most often targeted by sanctions in the region. To avoid bias in the results, I remove Belarus from the sample and re-run the analysis on a smaller sample. The results remain similar to those reported in the article (see Appendix Table 3 below). The results indicate that the threat of sanctions retains its negative effects and arms embargoes retain their positive effects. However, on the sample excluding Belarus, withholding cooperation and individual sanctions have statistically significant positive effects that were not observed on the full sample (compare with the results reported in Table 1 in the main text).

Appendix Table 4 demonstrates that individual types of sanctions are strongly correlated, and therefore must be accounted for in separate models. Appendix Table 5 reports the extent of imports and exports from/to the EU and Russia for each country in the analysis.

**Table 1.** List of EU human rights sanctions imposed on former Soviet states, 1991–2016

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Year** | **Country** | **Type of measures taken** |
| 1997–1999 | Belarus | Aid programs halted and ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) postponed |
| 1998–1999 | Belarus | Restrictive measures against certain officials |
| 2002–2003 | Belarus | Travel restrictions, ban on high-level contact (extended: 17/10/2004) |
| 2004–2008 | Belarus | Travel restrictions and freezing of assets |
| 2007– present | Belarus | EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences suspended |
| 2006–2010 | Belarus | Persons and entity admission restrictions, asset freezes and travel bans (introduced: 20/05/2006; amended: 09/07/2008) |
| 2008 | Belarus | Measures against certain officials undone; release of some frozen funds, arms embargo remained |
| 2010–2012 | Belarus | Travel restrictions against certain official and entities, arms embargo, equipment for repressions embargo, assistance withdrawal (introduced: 26/10/2010; extended: 31/12/2011; 20/06/2011; 10/10/2011; 23/01/2012; 23/04/2012) |
| 2012–2016 | Belarus | Asset freezes and travel bans (persons and entities), embargo on arms and related materiel, embargo on equipment for internal repression; ban on provision of certain services, restrictions on admission of listed persons (introduced: 17/10/2012; extended: 30/10/2013; 02/08/2014; 31/10/2014; 17/03/2015; 21/07/2015; 30/10/2015; 27/02/2016) |
| 2016 | Belarus | List of persons, entities, and bodies amended |
| 1997–2001 | Tajikistan | Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States aid suspended for human rights violations |
| 2005–2010 | Tajikistan | Postponement of the ratification of the PCA |
| 2005–2009 | Uzbekistan | Arms embargo, suspension of the PCA, aid withdrawal, restrictions on admission of certain persons (2007 visa restrictions suspended, 2009 arms embargo and other restrictions lifted) |
| 2011–2013 | Ukraine | Ratification of the Association Agreement halted due to political imprisonments of opposition leaders |
| 2014 | Ukraine | Freezing funds and economic resources of certain persons responsible for human rights violations in Ukraine, entities and bodies associated with such persons (introduced: 06/03/2014; extended: 07/02/2015; 30/05/2015; 08/03/2016; 13/12/2016)\* |
| 2014–2017 | Ukraine | Arms embargoes (introduced: 20/02/2014; lifted: 16/07/2017) |
| 1999–2008 | Turkmenistan | Suspension of aid |
| 1999– present | Turkmenistan | Postponement of ratification of the PCA |

*Note.* Adapted from K. E. Smith, “European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World,” 2014, Appendix 1; Council of the European Union, “Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1957 of 29 October 2015 amending Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Belarus,” 2015; European Commission, “Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force,” 2016, 2017a.

*\** For a timeline of restrictive measures targeting Ukrainian and Russian officials in connection with the illegal annexation of Crimea and Russian military aggression in Eastern Ukraine, see <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/history-ukraine-crisis/>. Note that only a very small portion of the sanctions was introduced due to human rights violations.

**Table 2.** Summary statistics, 1992–2016

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min. | Max. |
| Human rights situation | 312 | 0.519 | 0.191 | 0.106 | 0.875 |
| Aid suspension | 312 | 0.131 | 0.338 | 0 | 1 |
| Targeted sanctions | 312 | 0.064 | 0.245 | 0 | 1 |
| Arms embargoes | 312 | 0.054 | 0.227 | 0 | 1 |
| Withholding cooperation | 312 | 0.163 | 0.370 | 0 | 1 |
| Threat of sanctions | 312 | 0.051 | 0.221 | 0 | 1 |
| Civil war | 312 | 0.083 | 0.277 | 0 | 1 |
| International war | 312 | 0.038 | 0.193 | 0 | 1 |
| Democracy | 312 | -0.715 | 6.374 | -9 | 9 |
| Other sanctions | 182 | 0.423 | 0.495 | 0 | 1 |
| GDP *per capita* (*log*) | 312 | 7.244 | 1.046 | 4.930 | 9.651 |
| Treaties | 313 | 2.974 | 1.489 | 0 | 6 |
| ODA per capita (*log*) | 295 | 31.678 | 38.937 | 0 | 220.275 |
| Russia’s relative power | 226 | -1.305 | 17.574 | -39.181 | 49.746 |
| State capacity | 216 | -0.665 | 0.428 | -1.644 | 0.606 |
| Population (*log*) | 312 | 16.166 | 1.127 | 14.872 | 18.817 |

*Note.* Author’s calculations.

**Table 3.** The effects of sanctions on the human rights situation in the target country: excluding Belarus (ref. Table 1 in the main text)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 |
|  | *t*-2 | *t*-1 | *t*-3 | *t*-1 | *t*-1 |
| Targeted sanctions | **0.031\*\*** |  |  |  |  |
|  | **(0.01)** |  |  |  |  |
| Arms embargoes |  | **0.049\*\*\*** |  |  |  |
|  |  | **(0.01)** |  |  |  |
| Aid suspension |  |  | 0.018 |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.01) |  |  |
| Withholding coop. |  |  |  | **0.029\*\*** |  |
|  |  |  |  | **(0.01)** |  |
| Threat of sanctions |  |  |  |  | **-0.123\*\*\*** |
|  |  |  |  |  | **(0.01)** |
| Population(log) | -0.006 | -0.016\*\*\* | -0.008\*\* | -0.010\*\* | -0.006\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| GDP per capita (log) | 0.017\*\*\* | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.001 | 0.009 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Civil war | 0.133\*\*\* | 0.101\*\* | 0.029\*\* | 0.100\*\* | 0.142\*\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.01) | (0.04) | (0.06) |
| International war | -0.020 | -0.039 | -0.055 | -0.048 | -0.035 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.06) |
| State capacity | -0.012 | 0.021 | 0.028 | 0.037\* | 0.004 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Democracy | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Past practices | -0.016 | 0.045 | 0.028 | 0.039 | -0.044 |
|  | (0.13) | (0.15) | (0.10) | (0.15) | (0.11) |
| LDV human rights | -0.057 | -0.111\* | 0.108 | -0.111\* | -0.035 |
|  | (0.14) | (0.06) | (0.18) | (0.06) | (0.08) |
| ODA per capita | 0.000 | -0.000 |  | -0.000 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) |  | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Rus. relative power | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Human rights treaties | 0.006 | 0.009 | -0.002 | 0.008 | 0.008 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Constant | -0.076 | 0.182\*\* | 0.090\*\* | 0.151\* | 0.000 |
|  | (0.13) | (0.08) | (0.04) | (0.09) | (0.11) |
| Observations | 158 | 167 | 149 | 167 | 157 |
| *R*2 | 0.772 | 0.846 | 0.901 | 0.686 | 0.800 |

*Note:* Level of statistical significance: \* *p* < 0.10, \*\* *p* < 0.05, \*\*\* *p* < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses.

**Table 4.** Cross-correlation table

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Aid  suspension | Targeted sanctions | Arms embargoes | Withholding coop. | Threat of sanctions |
| Aid suspension | 1.0000 |  |  |  |  |
| Targeted sanctions | 0.5340 | 1.0000 |  |  |  |
| Arms embargoes | 0.5534 | 0.5474 | 1.0000 |  |  |
| Withholding coop. | 0.6642 | 0.5885 | 0.4168 | 1.0000 |  |
| Threat of sanctions | 0.1314 | 0.1915 | 0.2178 | 0.0641 | 1.0000 |

*Note.* Author’s calculations.

**Table 5.** Russian and EU share in foreign trade of the shared neighbourhood, 2015 (percentage of total exports and imports)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Export to**  **the EU** | **Import from**  **the EU** | **Export to**  **Russia** | **Import from**  **Russia** |
| Armenia | 29.0 | 24.0 | 15.2 | 29.1 |
| Azerbaijan | 58.9 | 32.0 | 3.6 | 15.6 |
| Belarus | 32.1 | 19.2 | 39.1 | 56.6 |
| Georgia | 29.3 | 32.6 | 7.4 | 8.1 |
| Kazakhstan | 46.6 | 21.1 | 12.3 | 32.9 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 3.3 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 17.2 |
| Moldova | 58.5 | 50.7 | 8.0 | 22.8 |
| Tajikistan | 6.3 | 4.3 | 5.1 | 17.9 |
| Turkmenistan | 4.2 | 16.4 | 0.6 | 12.3 |
| Ukraine | 34.1 | 40.9 | 12.7 | 20.0 |
| Uzbekistan | 3.8 | 16.5 | 8.4 | 20.8 |

*Note*. The data are retrieved from Eurostat, www.ec.europa.eu.

**Figure 1.** Marginal effect of sanctions on human rights by the levels of Russia’s relative power with 95% confidence intervals.

 

 



*Note.* The relative power of Russia is operationalized as the difference in the share of total trade with Russia and the EU. The illustrations visualize the marginal effects of EU sanctions on human rights when Russia’s relative power is 50, 25, 0, –25, and –50.