CS 201P Project #5— TCP/IP Attack Lab

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Computing/Cloud Platform Chosen: Google Cloud platform

seed	attacker
user1	10.9.0.6
user2	10.9.0.7
victim	10.9.0.5

Task 1: SYN Flooding Attack


Terminal - seed@shikhirsvm: ~/security/Labsetup/volumes
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
tcp 0 0 127.0.0.1:631 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN
tcp 0 0 10.128.0.2:5901 98.164.252.124:50261 ESTABLISHED
tcp 0 0 10.128.0.2:38196 108.177.111.95:443 ESTABLISHED
tcp 0 0 10.128.0.2:22 35.235.240.0:44753 ESTABLISHED
tcp 0 0 10.128.0.2:46980 54.70.104.236:443 ESTABLISHED
tcp 0 0 10.128.0.2:33984 169.254.169.254:80 ESTABLISHED
tcp 0 0 10.128.0.2:38198 108.177.111.95:443 ESTABLISHED
tcp 0 0 10.128.0.2:33990 169.254.169.254:80 ESTABLISHED
tcp6 0 0 :::5901 :::* LISTEN
tcp6 0 0 :::5902 :::* LISTEN
tcp6 0 0 :::22 :::* LISTEN
tcp6 0 0 ::1:631 :::* LISTEN
seed@shikhirsvm:~/security/Labsetup$ doscps
doscps: command not found
seed@shikhirsvm:~/security/Labsetup$ dockps
6ba2941a4ff4 seed-attacker
2f030af672b8 user1-10.9.0.6
2eb1351f3762 user2-10.9.0.7
8a5b652a7acc victim-10.9.0.5
seed@shikhirsvm:~/security/Labsetup$ docksh 6b
root@shikhirsvm:/# ls
bin dev home lib32 libx32 mnt proc run srv tmp var
boot etc lib lib64 media opt root sbin sys usr volumes


Terminal - seed@shikhirsvm: ~/security/Labsetup/volumes
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
exit
seed@shikhirsvm:~/security/Labsetup$ vim attack.py
seed@shikhirsvm:~/security/Labsetup$ ls
docker-compose.yml volumes
seed@shikhirsvm:~/security/Labsetup$ cd volumes
seed@shikhirsvm:~/security/Labsetup/volumes$ ls
attack.py synflood.c
seed@shikhirsvm:~/security/Labsetup/volumes$ cd attack.py
bash: cd: attack.py: Not a directory
seed@shikhirsvm:~/security/Labsetup/volumes$ sudo vim attack.py
seed@shikhirsvm:~/security/Labsetup/volumes$ docksh 6b
root@shikhirsvm:/# ls
bin dev home lib32 libx32 mnt proc run srv tmp var
boot etc lib lib64 media opt root sbin sys usr volumes
root@shikhirsvm:/# cd volumes
root@shikhirsvm:/volumes# ls
attack.py synflood.c
root@shikhirsvm:/volumes# gcc attack.py -o at
bash: gcc: command not found
root@shikhirsvm:/volumes# python 3 attack.py
bash: python: command not found
root@shikhirsvm:/volumes# python3 attack.py
^Z
[1]+ Stopped python3 attack.py





If the 3-way handshake completes, the state changes to ESTABLISHED, the state can be either LISTENING for awaiting connections and SYN_RECV for a half open connection.

We launch a Syn Flood attack using our custom python code, to test the attack we establish a telnet connection between User 1 and User 2.

If the attack is successful, then the telnet connection will not establish because the entire queue should be filled with spoofed half-open connection, hence it will not accept any new connections. We see that, we were easily able to connect to the server: Python is slower.

Our attack was not successful when SYN cookie was turned on. It does not allocate any resources when it receives the SYN packet, it allocates resources only if the server receives the final ACK packet, thus the SYN cookie prevents the server from SYN flood attack. This also prevents from having the queue as a bottleneck, and instead consume resources only

for the established connections. We try to use different techniques to succeed the attack but our connection always establishes.

Reducing the original value to 40 for “# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog=80” and launching about 8 different terminals and attacking from all the 8 terminals, we can slow down the connection request but it still connects.

Task 1.2: Launch the Attack Using C:




[SEED Labs] Capturing from vethe200ac7
File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help
Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/>
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info
1111… 2021-10-29 08:19:… 108.127.2.55 10.9.0.5 TCP 54 48800 → 23 [SYN] Seq=654063108 Win=20000 Len=0
1111… 2021-10-29 08:19:… 145.52.17.76 10.9.0.5 TCP 54 62445 → 23 [SYN] Seq=2425764409 Win=20000 Len=0
1111… 2021-10-29 08:19:… 135.79.248.30 10.9.0.5 TCP 54 4277 → 23 [SYN] Seq=3797396008 Win=20000 Len=0
1111… 2021-10-29 08:19:… 54.217.58.44 10.9.0.5 TCP 54 34662 → 23 [SYN] Seq=1362597502 Win=20000 Len=0
1111… 2021-10-29 08:19:… 41.198.190.30 10.9.0.5 TCP 54 1477 → 23 [SYN] Seq=1478166101 Win=20000 Len=0
1111… 2021-10-29 08:19:… 65.179.40.22 10.9.0.5 TCP 54 56415 → 23 [SYN] Seq=1367297094 Win=20000 Len=0
1111… 2021-10-29 08:19:… 254.145.249.94 10.9.0.5 TCP 54 51608 → 23 [SYN] Seq=614476089 Win=20000 Len=0
1111… 2021-10-29 08:19:… 169.145.171.65 10.9.0.5 TCP 54 19322 → 23 [SYN] Seq=1652125739 Win=20000 Len=0
1111… 2021-10-29 08:19:… 134.68.126.110 10.9.0.5 TCP 54 48711 → 23 [SYN] Seq=2199481413 Win=20000 Len=0
1111… 2021-10-29 08:19:… 116.153.104.85 10.9.0.5 TCP 54 53013 → 23 [SYN] Seq=406438157 Win=20000 Len=0
1111… 2021-10-29 08:19:… 154.149.159.89 10.9.0.5 TCP 54 16128 → 23 [SYN] Seq=3604590593 Win=20000 Len=0
1111… 2021-10-29 08:19:… 43.44.218.18 10.9.0.5 TCP 54 43903 → 23 [SYN] Seq=3402051680 Win=20000 Len=0
1111… 2021-10-29 08:19:… 13.132.132.59 10.9.0.5 TCP 54 15540 → 23 [SYN] Seq=3665585208 Win=20000 Len=0
1111… 2021-10-29 08:19:… 94.187.26.58 10.9.0.5 TCP 54 49923 → 23 [SYN] Seq=1642273125 Win=20000 Len=0
1111… 2021-10-29 08:19:… 183.214.32.15 10.9.0.5 TCP 54 63964 → 23 [SYN] Seq=1739100978 Win=20000 Len=0
1111… 2021-10-29 08:19:… 8.86.109.85 10.9.0.5 TCP 54 8867 → 23 [SYN] Seq=1124625514 Win=20000 Len=0
1111… 2021-10-29 08:19:… 44.246.150.14 10.9.0.5 TCP 54 25430 → 23 [SYN] Seq=211895837 Win=20000 Len=0
1111… 2021-10-29 08:19:… 142.111.7.58 10.9.0.5 TCP 54 25064 → 23 [SYN] Seq=1478212110 Win=20000 Len=0
1111… 2021-10-29 08:19:… 18.137.115.127 10.9.0.5 TCP 54 2682 → 23 [SYN] Seq=375600253 Win=20000 Len=0
Frame 1: 54 bytes on wire (432 bits), 54 bytes captured (432 bits) on interface vethe200ac7, id 0
Ethernet II, Src: 02:42:4a:31:df:8e (02:42:4a:31:df:8e), Dst: 02:42:0a:09:00:05 (02:42:0a:09:00:05)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 164.163.130.36, Dst: 10.9.0.5
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 53571, Dst Port: 23, Seq: 2405472260, Len: 0
0000 02 42 0a 09 00 05 02 42 4a 31 df 8e 08 00 45 00 ·B·····B J1····E·
vethe200ac7: <live capture in progress>
Packets: 1111892 · Displayed: 1111892 (100.0%)
Profile: Default


root@shikhirsvm:/# cd volumes
[SEED Labs] Capturing from vethe200ac7
File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help
Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/>
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info
1679… 2021-10-29 08:20:… 10.9.0.5 68.134.27.123 TCP 58 [TCP Retransmission] 23 → 43840 [SYN, ACK] Seq=3756298834 Ack…
1679… 2021-10-29 08:20:… 10.9.0.5 150.76.31.97 TCP 58 [TCP Retransmission] 23 → 53268 [SYN, ACK] Seq=1874779515 Ack…
1679… 2021-10-29 08:20:… 10.9.0.5 187.63.176.15 TCP 58 [TCP Retransmission] 23 → 25781 [SYN, ACK] Seq=614192033 Ack=…
1679… 2021-10-29 08:20:… 10.9.0.5 190.17.32.31 TCP 58 [TCP Retransmission] 23 → 18249 [SYN, ACK] Seq=3431845200 Ack…
1679… 2021-10-29 08:20:… 10.9.0.5 38.123.113.50 TCP 58 [TCP Retransmission] 23 → 22830 [SYN, ACK] Seq=689427562 Ack=…
1679… 2021-10-29 08:20:… 10.9.0.5 67.145.243.31 TCP 58 [TCP Retransmission] 23 → 41857 [SYN, ACK] Seq=1323804479 Ack…
1679… 2021-10-29 08:20:… 10.9.0.5 37.39.121.80 TCP 58 [TCP Retransmission] 23 → 26386 [SYN, ACK] Seq=2728325419 Ack…
1679… 2021-10-29 08:20:… 10.9.0.5 244.249.214.72 TCP 58 [TCP Retransmission] 23 → 11297 [SYN, ACK] Seq=3226629325 Ack…
1679… 2021-10-29 08:20:… 10.9.0.5 169.121.233.1 TCP 58 [TCP Retransmission] 23 → 59000 [SYN, ACK] Seq=3181400050 Ack…
1679… 2021-10-29 08:20:… 10.9.0.5 136.75.202.98 TCP 58 [TCP Retransmission] 23 → 19730 [SYN, ACK] Seq=848564021 Ack=…
1679… 2021-10-29 08:20:… 10.9.0.5 177.29.44.35 TCP 58 [TCP Retransmission] 23 → 48337 [SYN, ACK] Seq=149659482 Ack=…
1679… 2021-10-29 08:20:… 10.9.0.5 218.43.247.43 TCP 58 [TCP Retransmission] 23 → 41694 [SYN, ACK] Seq=1397329726 Ack…
1679… 2021-10-29 08:20:… 10.9.0.5 108.95.205.113 TCP 58 [TCP Retransmission] 23 → 60477 [SYN, ACK] Seq=2721429765 Ack…
1679… 2021-10-29 08:20:… 10.9.0.5 29.108.90.61 TCP 58 [TCP Retransmission] 23 → 36164 [SYN, ACK] Seq=3132849472 Ack…
1679… 2021-10-29 08:20:… 10.9.0.5 182.172.69.103 TCP 58 [TCP Retransmission] 23 → 57617 [SYN, ACK] Seq=616375736 Ack=…
1679… 2021-10-29 08:20:… 10.9.0.5 59.111.110.33 TCP 58 [TCP Retransmission] 23 → 52218 [SYN, ACK] Seq=3110989333 Ack…
1679… 2021-10-29 08:20:… 10.9.0.5 59.241.63.43 TCP 58 [TCP Retransmission] 23 → 53520 [SYN, ACK] Seq=1424584097 Ack…
1679… 2021-10-29 08:20:… 10.9.0.5 69.168.4.17 TCP 58 [TCP Retransmission] 23 → 4034 [SYN, ACK] Seq=2714371125 Ack=…
1679… 2021-10-29 08:20:… 10.9.0.5 153.102.58.100 TCP 58 [TCP Retransmission] 23 → 20058 [SYN, ACK] Seq=1734246896 Ack…
Frame 1: 54 bytes on wire (432 bits), 54 bytes captured (432 bits) on interface vethe200ac7, id 0
Ethernet II, Src: 02:42:4a:31:df:8e (02:42:4a:31:df:8e), Dst: 02:42:0a:09:00:05 (02:42:0a:09:00:05)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 164.163.130.36, Dst: 10.9.0.5
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 53571, Dst Port: 23, Seq: 2405472260, Len: 0
0000 02 42 0a 09 00 05 02 42 4a 31 df 8e 08 00 45 00 ·B·····B J1····E·



The attack is successful when we run the C code, as the packets are generated much faster compared to the previous Python program also, we have switched the Syn_Cookie value from 1 to 0.

The Telnet request fails as we have successfully flooded with the SYN packets, this can be observed in Wireshark and hence our attack is successful.

Task 1.3: Enable the SYN Cookie Countermeasure





We observe that the attack fails for both Python and the C program as we have switched on the SYN cookie mechanism again. The telnet connection is established easily.

Task 2: TCP RST Attacks on telnet Connections



We Sniff the telnet connection between user 1 and user 2, and generate our spoof RST packet. We then Attack from the Attackers container with this spoof packet and the network details of the last captured packet.



This attack sends 1 packet and results in the breakage in the connection of the previously established Telnet connection.



We observe that the attack is successful as we can break the connection by sending an RST packet from a user which is outside the telnet connection. The connection is successfully terminated by a foreign host.

Task 3: TCP Session Hijacking



We first create the spoof packet using scapy and fill in the details of the last sniffed packet from the telnet connection using wireshark.



We then create the file which we are about to delete using the malicious command.


[SEED Labs] Capturing from any
File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help
Wireshark · Packet 20110 · any
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.9.0.7, Dst: 10.9.0.6
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 23, Dst Port: 49504, Seq: 2795984126, Ack: 3194102223, Len: 21
Source Port: 23
Destination Port: 49504
[Stream index: 29]
[TCP Segment Len: 21]
Sequence number: 2795984126
[Next sequence number: 2795984147]
Acknowledgment number: 3194102223
1000 .... = Header Length: 32 bytes (8)
Flags: 0x018 (PSH, ACK)
Window size value: 509
[Calculated window size: 65152]
[Window size scaling factor: 128]
Checksum: 0x145a [unverified]
[Checksum Status: Unverified]
Urgent pointer: 0
Options: (12 bytes), No-Operation (NOP), No-Operation (NOP), Timestamps
[SEQ/ACK analysis]
[Timestamps]
TCP payload (21 bytes)
Telnet
Help
Close
any: <live capture in progress>
Packets: 22209 · Displayed: 49 (0.2%)
Profile:


seed@shikhirsvm: ~/security/Labsetup/volumes
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
dst : DestIPField = '10.9.0.6' (None)
options : PacketListField = [] ([])
--
sport : ShortEnumField = 23 (20)
dport : ShortEnumField = 49504 (80)
seq : IntField = 2795984126 (0)
ack : IntField = 3194102223 (0)
dataofs : BitField (4 bits) = None (None)
reserved : BitField (3 bits) = 0 (0)
flags : FlagsField (9 bits) = <Flag 4 (R)> (<Flag 2 (S)>)
window : ShortField = 8192 (8192)
chksum : XShortField = None (None)
urgptr : ShortField = 0 (0)
options : TCPOptionsField = [] (b'')
--
load : StrField = b'/rrm textfile.txt/r' (b'')
root@shikhirsvm:/volumes#



We then launch the attack from the Attackers container, and observe that the file we created has been removed and our attack was performed successfully.

Our session hijacking was successful and the attacker was able to gain control of the telnet connection and remove an important file from the server.