# CS 201P Project #2 — Environment Variable and Set-UID Program Lab

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Computing/Cloud Platform Chosen: Amazon Web Services

**Goal**: Following are the screenshots of the procedure followed while performing programs.

## Task 1: Manipulating Environment Variables

## Printenv or env command

#### Printenv PWD

#### Observation:

When we type in the printenv PWD command the shell returns all the environment variables present in the process.

#### **Export** and unset

```
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=changed vale
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ unset LD_LIBRARY_PATH
```

Export command is used to set the environment variables in the current process.

Unset command returns an empty string and can be used to remove the value of the environment variables.

#### Task 2: Passing Environment Variables from Parent Process to Child Process

### 1) Commented printenv:

### Output:

```
seed@ip-172-31-27-92:~/Desktop/201P$ gcc myprintenv.c
seed@ip-172-31-27-92:~/Desktop/201P$ _/a.out
seed@ip-172-31-27-92:~/Desktop/201P$ _/a.out
seed@ip-172-31-27-92:~/Desktop/201P$ __seed
SUDO_GOMMAND=/usr/bin/su seed
SUDO_USER_bubuttu
PND=/home/seed/Desktop/201P
LOGNAME=seed
HOME=/home/seed/Desktop/201P
LOGNAME=seed
HOME=/home/seed/Logname/seed/Logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/seed/logname/
```

### 2) Uncommented printenv:

## Output:

```
Seed&Lp-1/2-31-27-92:~/besktop/201P$ ./a.out
SHELL=/bin/bash
SUDO_GID=1000
SUDO_COMMAND=/usr/bin/su seed
SUDO_USR=rbin/su seed
SUDO_USR=rbin/su seed
HOME=/home/seed/Desktop/201P
LOG/AMME-seed
HOME=/home/seed
LANG=C.UTF-8
LS_COLORS=rs=0:d1=01;34:ln=01;36:mh=00:p1=40:33:so=01;35:do=01;35:bd=40;33;01:cd=40;33;01:or=40;31;01:mi=00:su=37;41:sg=30:43:ca=30;41:tw=30:42:ow=34;
42:st=37*,44:sc=01;32:*.tar=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*
```

#### Diff Command:

```
~
seed@ip-172-31-27-92:~/Desktop/201P$ diff file file2
18c18
< _=./output
---
> _=./output2
seed@ip-172-31-27-92:~/Desktop/201P$
```

#### Observation:

When we fork() the properties of the parent process is duplicated into the child process. There should be no observable differences in the environment variables of the two processes and thus the diff command shows no difference.

#### Task 3: Environment Variables and execve()

### Execve with NULL argument:

#### Output:

#### Observation:

In the first scenario we have passed NULL as an argument in the execve command, hence nothing is printed as the details are not specified.

### Execve with environ as argument:

## Output:

```
Seed@ip-172-31-27-92:~/Desktop/201P$ ./a.out
SHELL=/bin/hash
SUDO_GID=1000
SUDO_COMMAND=/usr/bin/su seed
SUDO_USR=/usr-bin/su seed
SUDO_USR=/usr-bin/su seed
SUDO_USR=/usr-bin/su seed
SUDO_USR=/usr-bin/su seed
HOME=/home/seed
HOME=/home/seed
HOME=/home/seed
HOME=/home/seed
LANG=C.UTF-8
LS_COLORS=rs=0:di=01;34:ln=01;36:mh=00:pi=40;33:so=01;35:do=01;35:bd=40;33;01:cd=40;33;01:cd=40;31;01:mi=00:su=37;41:sg=30;43:ca=30;41:tw=30;42:ow=34;42:st=37;44:se=01;32:*.tar=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.tz
```

In the second scenario we replace NULL by environ in the execve command and hence we can print the complete list of the environment variables using the same code.

## Task 4: Environment Variables and system()

Implementation of the system() and asking shell to execute:

### Output:

```
needigi-177-31-88-215:-/Desktdp/securitys _/a.out
succession_173-31-88-215:-/Desktdp/securitys _/a.out
succession_173-31-88-215:-/Desktdp/securitys _/a.out
succession_173-31-88-215:-/Desktdp/securitys _/a.out
succession_173-31-88-215:-/Desktdp/securitys _/a.out
succession_173-31-88-215:-/Desktdp/securitys _/a.out
succession_173-31-88-215:-/Desktdp/securitys _/a.out
succession_173-31-88-215:-/Desktdp
succession_173-31-88-215:-/Desktdp
succession_173-31-31-315
succession_173-31-315
succession_173-31-315
succession_173-315
succession_173-315
succession_173-315
succession_173-315
succession_173-315
succession_173-315
succession_173-31-315
succession_173-315
succession_173-3
```

In this program we observe that the system() command tells the shell to execute the /bin/sh and print out all the environment variables present in the current process.

## Task 5: Environment Variable and Set-UID Programs

Printing all the environment variables in the current process:

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help

File Edit V
```

This program prints all the environment variables in the current process by using a while loop.

Changing ownership to root and making it a set-UID program:

```
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ sudo chown root setuid.c
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ sudo chmod 4755 setuid.c
```

Changing the owner to root and modifying the Set-UID program.

Changing environment variables through export command:

```
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help

seed@ip-172-31-88-215:/home/ubuntu$ cd ..
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:/home$ cd Desktop
bash: cd: Desktop: No such file or directory
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:/home$ cd seed
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:/home$ cd seed
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:/bome$ cd seed
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop$ cd security
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ vim setuid.c
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ gcc setuid.c
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ sudo chown root setuid
chown: cannot access 'setuid': No such file or directory
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ sudo chown foot setuid.c
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ sudo chown d4755 setuid.c
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ export PATH=123
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ export LD LIBRARY PATH=abc
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ export LD LIBRARY PATH=abc
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ export MY_NAME=SHĪKHIR
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$
```

Manipulating values of the environment variables to simulate an attack.

### Output:

```
seedBig-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ export DT LIBRAY PATH=abc
seedBig-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ export DT LIBRAY PATH=abc
seedBig-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ -/Desktop/security$ -/Deskto
```

#### **Observation:**

In this program we want to check if the Set-UID programs can affect a normal user. We can export the environment variables and manipulate their values to act as a threat. By making the program a set-UID program and giving it the root access, we can see the environment

variables such as PATH and MY\_NAME being changed to a custom value but the LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH is not changed and by manipulating these values an attacker can affect a normal user and become a threat.

## Task 6: The PATH Environment Variable and Set-UID Programs

Changing the PATH environment variable in Bash:

```
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~$ cd Desktop
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop$ cd security
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ export PATH=.:$PATH
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ gcc uidd.c
```

#### Is command:

```
int main()
{
         system("ls");
         return 0;
}
```

## Malicious Code:

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help

int main()
{

    system("mkdir insteadLS");
    return 0;
}
```

#### Output:



## Observation:

We first export the PATH variable; we then manipulate its value to point it to our directory. Create and compile a system call for "Is" and then give it the root access and make it a set-UID program. We then compile a "malicious code" and save the output file as Is.

When a user runs the "Is" command in the present directory the process refers to the manipulated PATH variable and points it to our directory where the "malicious (fake) Is" command is present. Instead of listing all the files present in the folder the compiled malicious code is executed and can list all the environment variables or simply copy malicious files or even create new directories, acting as a potential attack. If linked with zshell we can run our malicious code with root privileges.

### Task 7: The LD PRELOAD Environment Variable and Set-UID Programs

Dynamic link library compiled and loading LD\_PRELOAD:

```
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ gcc myprog.c -o op7
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ ./op7
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ gcc myprog.c
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ ./a.out
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ env | grep "LD_PRELOAD"
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ export LD_PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.1.0.1
```

Running as a normal Program and a normal user:

```
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help

seed@ip-172-31-88-215:/home/ubuntu$ cd ..
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:/home$ cd seed
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop$ cd security
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop$ cd security
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ gcc myprog.c -o op7
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ ./op7
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ ./a.out
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ env | grep "LD_PRELOAD"
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ export LD_PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.1.0.1
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ ./a.out
I am not sleeping!
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ ./a.out
I am not sleeping!
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ ./a.out
```

Running as a set-UID root program, and as a normal user:

```
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ sudo chown root a.out
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ sudo chmod 4755 a.out
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ ls -l a.out
-rwsr-xr-x l root seed 16696 Oct 7 23:31 a.out
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ ./a.out
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ ./a.out
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ ./a.out
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ ./a.out
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ ./a.out
```

Running as a set-UID root program, exporting the LD PRELOAD environment variable:

```
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ sudo su root
root@ip-172-31-88-215:/home/seed/Desktop/security# export LD_PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.1.0.1
root@ip-172-31-88-215:/home/seed/Desktop/security# ./a.out
I am not sleeping!
root@ip-172-31-88-215:/home/seed/Desktop/security#
```

Running as a Set-UID user1 program, exporting the LD PRELOAD environment variable again in a different user's account:

```
root@ip-172-31-88-215:/home/seed/Desktop/security# exit
exit
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ sudo chown shikhir myprog
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ sudo chown 4755 myprog
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ ./myprog
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ ./myprog
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$
```

#### Observation:

While running as a normal program and a normal user the sleep function is overwritten by the malicious code. We also observe that while running as a set-UID root program, and as a normal user the sleep function is executed and the program sleeps for one second and then continues as the LD\_PRELOAD variable is not added. In case 3 when we export the DLL LD\_PRELOAD to the process the malicious code "I am not sleeping" is executed. In the final scenario for the user1 LD\_PRELOAD is added but the malicious code is not executed as the privileges that a normal user has are less and cannot run the overwritten file.

## Task 8: Invoking External Programs Using system() versus execve()

```
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ ./catall etc/passwd
/bin/cat: etc/passwd: No such file or directory
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:-/Desktop/security$ ./catall /@tc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:1:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:1:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mai:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/nucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:3:3:3:3:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:55534:65534:inobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:100:102:systemd Network Management,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-esolve:x:101:103:systemd Resolver,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:103:106::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
apt:x:106:111:TPM software stack,,:/var/lib/tpm:/bin/false
uuidd:x:107:112::/run/uuidd:/usr/sbin/nologin
spstedum:x:108:113::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
spstedum:x:108:113::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
spstedum:x:108:113::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
spstedum:x:108:113::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
spstedum:x:108:113::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
spstedum:x:108:113::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
        eed:::18611:0:99999:/:::
nsmasq:*:18611:0:99999:7:::
tkit:*:18611:0:99999:7:::
ups-pk-helper:*:18611:0:99999:7:::
ightdm:*:18611:0:99999:7:::
oclue:*:18611:0:99999:7:::
sbmux:*:18611:0:99999:7:::
vsh::*:18611:0:99999:7:::
      idm:*:18611:0:99999:7:::
idm:*:18611:0:99999:7:::
ieddip:172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ sudo ln -sf /bin/dash /bin/sh
ieeddip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ sudo ln -sf /bin/dash /bin/sh
ieeddip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ sudo chown root catall
ieeddip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ sudo chown root catall
ieeddip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ sudo chown root catall
ieeddip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ sudo chowd 4755 catall
ieeddip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ ./catall /etc/shadow
bin/cat: /etc/shadow: Permission denied
ieeddip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ ./catall /etc/passwd
ieeddip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/secu
      laemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
ini:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
ini:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sync
ys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
ync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
jnmes:x:5:0:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
ian:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
px:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpi/usr/sbin/nologin
ial:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
iews:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
```

We observe that the execve is safer compared to a system call, as the system expects a string as a file and the malicious code can be attached to the file name, the permission was denied under the execve command whereas complete list was presented in the case of etc/shadow while using the system call. The system call does not expect a malicious script, and reads it along with the filename input.

## **Task 9: Capability Leaking**

Creating etc/zzz and compiling the program:

```
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ vim catleak.c
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ gcc catleak.c -o catleak
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ ./catleak
Cannot open /etc/zzz
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$
```

Gaining access to etc/zzz file and the capability to write it:

```
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ sudo chown root catleak
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ sudo chown catleak
chmod: invalid mode: 'chown'
Try 'chmod --help' for more information.
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ sudo chown 4755 catleak
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ ./catleak
Cannot open /etc/zzz
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ sudo chown root catleak
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ sudo chmod 4755 catleak
seed@ip-172-31-88-215:~/Desktop/security$ ./catleak
fd is 3
$
```

We observe that the program catleak is unable to access the etc/zzz file in the normal user mode, but when root privileges are granted and it is made a set-UID program it can access the file, when the file returns to normal user mode the privileges are not completely relinquished and the file descriptor is still able to index the file, meaning that the capability to access the file has been leaked while escalating and deescalating the privileges.