

ECONOMIC FORECASTING WITH AN AGENT-BASED
MODEL
DISCUSSION ON DSGE MODEL IN THE ETRI
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INTRODUCTION

- Smets and Wouters (2007): One of the most famous Representative Agent New Keynesian (RANK) model
- Main features of Smets and Wouters (2007)
 - ① Almost all kinds of shocks (at that time) & Frictions
 - ② Evaluate which shocks matter for explaining U.S. Business-Cycle
- HANK version of Smets and Wouters
 - Smets and Wouters (2007): “Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach”
 - Bayer, Born and Luetticke (2023): “Shocks, Frictions and Inequality in US Business Cycles”

- Households (HH)
 - Income: Labor income (Wages) & Interest income (Savings)
 - Choice: Choose consumption, labor, savings and physical capital to maximize HH life-time utility
 - Individual optimality: $\text{Marginal Benefit} = \text{Marginal Cost}$
- (Intermediate Goods) Firms
 - Choice: Set prices (Monopolistic competitor), labor and capital
 - vs. Real Business Cycle (RBC) model: Stickiness on prices

HOUSEHOLD'S PROBLEM

$$\max_{\{C_t, L_t, B_{H,t}, B_{F,t}, u_t\}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left\{ \left(\frac{(C_t - hC_{t-1})^{1-\sigma_c}}{1-\sigma_c} \right) \exp \left(\frac{-(1-\sigma_c)}{1+\sigma_l} L_t^{1+\sigma_l} \right) \right\}$$

subject to the BUDGET CONSTRAINT

$$P_t C_t + P_t^X X_t + \frac{1}{R_t} B_{H,t} + \frac{1}{R_t^*} B_{F,t} \leq$$

$$W_t^{hh,nom}(h) L_t dh + R_t^k u_t \bar{K}_{t-1} + a(u_t \bar{K}_{t-1}) P_t + \frac{1}{n} \int_0^n \text{Div}(h) dh + T_t$$

$$\text{where } K_t = u_t \bar{K}_{t-1} \text{ and } C_t = \left[\gamma_c^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} C_{H,t}^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} + (1-\gamma_c)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} C_{F,t}^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} \right]$$

HOW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM: LARGRANGIAN

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathcal{L} = & \max_{\{C_t, L_t, B_{H,t}, B_{F,t}, u_t\}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left(\frac{(C_t - hC_{t-1})^{1-\sigma_c}}{1-\sigma_c} \right) \exp \left(\frac{-(1-\sigma_c)}{1+\sigma_l} L_t^{1+\sigma_l} \right) \\
 & + \Lambda_t [W_t^{hh,nom}(h) L_t dh + R_t^k u_t \bar{K}_{t-1} + a(u_t \bar{K}_{t-1}) P_t + \frac{1}{n} \int_0^n \text{Div}(h) dh + T_t \\
 & - \left(P_t C_t + P_t^X X_t + \frac{1}{R_t} B_{H,t} + \frac{1}{R_t^*} B_{F,t} \right)]
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

INTUITION

- GIVEN prices, each agent maximizes life-time reward/utility/profit subject to constraint
 - Equilibrium makes each agent's optimality be consistent
 - Inter-temporal optimization
 - Consumption - Saving: Consume today vs. Consume tomorrow
 - Basic: Consumption smoothing. Assume that you would wanna consume smoothly over time & state
 - What matters: Income, Prices
 - Income : Save (Borrow) if you are rich today (tomorrow)
 - Prices: Consume more today if it is cheaper than tomorrow
 - Higher inflation expectations: Make consume more today
 - Higher interest rate: Borrow less/Save more → Consume less → Inflation
- ↓

FIRM'S PROBLEM: MAP

- vs. Classical RBC model
 - Frictions on goods prices or wages
 - What we need(not sufficient condition): Imperfect competition → Each firm could have power to set price
 - What we need more: Frictions on price setting: Random timing for price adjustment(Calvo - Yun), Adjustment cost(Rotemberg) or Menu cost(Mankiw)
- with Classical RBC
 - Equilibrium or Market clearing

WHAT COULD WE BUY FROM EQUILIBRIUM?

- Consistency

- If not in equilibrium, it usually implies that someone could be better off
- Example: If prices are lower than equilibrium, firms can be better off by posting higher prices (+HHs would not be suffered from excess demand)

- Solving the model

- In the General Equilibrium (GE) model: Cannot solve the model due to the rank condition (coming soon)
- In the Partial Equilibrium (PE) model: Okay but should be carefully calibrated. But in the New Keynesian (NK) model, it is not usual as its spirit depends on sticky prices

- Why we cannot solve the model (why we need rank condition)?

- Requirement on identification: One set of parameter should give us only one set of solutions
- (Similar concept) In the simulation, the result should be independent of initial condition
- Fixed point: In the business cycle model, we usually consider the infinite horizon model → The model needs to be closed for each period
 - For this perspective, DRI could be one resolution

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DOMESTIC FIRM'S PROBLEM

- Each firm h 's production function: Cobb-Douglas

$$Y_t(h) = F(K_t(h), L_t(h)) = A_t K_t(h)^\alpha [Z_t L_t(h)]^{1-\alpha} - \Phi Z_t$$

where A_t : Total factor productivity (TFP), Z_t : Long-run labour-augmenting productivity factor where $Z_t = (1 + \gamma)Z_{t-1}$ and Φ : fixed cost of production in relation to labour-augmenting productivity factor

- Each firm h 's problem
 - In a goods market: Set prices as a monopolistic competitor
 - In factor markets: Demand $L_t(h)$ and $K_t(h)$
- How to solve
 - Cost minimization: Choose production factors
 - Profit maximization: Choose price $p_t(h)$

COST MINIMIZATION: CAPITAL-LABOUR RATIO

Each firm h solve the following cost minimization problem optimally:

$$\min_{L_t(h), K_t(h)} \left\{ W_t^{nom} L_t(h) + R_t^{k,nom} K_t(h) + MC_t^{nom}(h) \left[Y_t(h) - A_t K_t(h)^\alpha [Z_t L_t(h)]^{1-\alpha} + \Phi Z_t \right] \right\}$$

Solutions:

$$L_t \text{ \& } K_t : \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} R_t^{k,nom} K_t(h) = W_t^{nom} L_t(h)$$

$$MC_t^{nom} = \frac{1}{A_t} \frac{\left(R_t^{k,nom} \right)^\alpha \left(W_t^{nom} \right)^{1-\alpha}}{\alpha^\alpha (1-\alpha)^{1-\alpha}} \frac{1}{Z_t^{1-\alpha}}$$

PROFIT MAXIMIZATION: PRICE SETTING

Calvo – Yun fashion: Each firm h can reset price with probability ξ_p .

Given $\Omega_{t,t+k} = \beta \frac{\Lambda_{t,t+k}}{\Lambda_t} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+k}}$: Household's stochastic discount factor, the firm h solves the following problem optimally:

$$\max_{p_t^o, S_t, p_t^*} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \xi_p^k \Omega_{t,t+k} \left\{ \begin{aligned} & \left[p_t(h) \text{Ind}_{t,k}^p - MC_t^{\text{nom}}(h) \right] \left[\frac{1}{n} \left(\frac{p_t(h)}{P_{H,t+k}} \text{Ind}_{t,k}^p \right)^{-\theta} (A_{H,t+k}) \right] + \\ & \left[S_t p_t(h)^* - MC_{t+k}^{\text{nom}}(h) \right] \left[\frac{1}{n} \left(\frac{S_t p_t(h)^*}{S_{t+k} P_{H,t+k}^*} \text{Ind}_{t,k}^p \right)^{-\theta} (A_{H,t+k}^*) \right] \end{aligned} \right\} \quad (2)$$

Assumption: Law of one price $\rightarrow S_t p_t^*(h) = p_t^o(h)$

FISCAL & MONETARY AUTHORITY

Fiscal authority: Government spending is financed by the lump-sum tax

$$G_t + T_t = 0$$

Monetary authority: Taylor rule

$$\frac{R_t}{R} = \left(\frac{R_{t-1}}{R} \right)^{\rho_R} \left[\left(\frac{\pi_t}{\bar{\pi}} \right)^{\rho_\pi} \left(\frac{y_t}{\bar{y}} \right)^{\rho_Y} \right] \varepsilon_t^R$$

EQUILIBRIUM

GOODS MARKET CLEARING

$$Y_t(h) = A_t K_t^\alpha [Z_t L_t]^{1-\alpha} - \Phi Z_t =$$
$$\left[\left[\gamma_c \left(\frac{P_{H,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon} C_t + \gamma_x \left(\frac{P_{H,t}}{P_t^X} \right)^{-\epsilon} X_t + G_t \right] + \right. \\ \left. \frac{1-n}{n} \left[\gamma_c^* \left(\frac{P_{H,t}^*}{P_t^*} \right)^{-\epsilon} C_t^* + \gamma_x^* \left(\frac{P_{H,t}^*}{P_t^{X,*}} \right) \right] \right]$$

BONDS MARKETS CLEARING (ZERO NET SUPPLY):

$$\int_0^n B_{H,t}(j, s_{t+1}) dj = 0$$
$$\int_0^n B_{F,t}(j, s_{t+1}) dj + \int_n^1 B_{F,t}^*(j, s_{t+1}) dj = 0$$

EQUILIBRIUM: CONTINUED

LABOUR MARKETS CLEARING

$$L_t = \int_0^n L_t(h)dh = \int_0^n \int_0^n l_t(h,j)dhdj$$
$$L_t^* = \int_0^n L_t^*(f)df = \int_0^n \int_0^n l_t^*(f,j^*)dfdj^*$$

CAPITAL MARKETS CLEARING

$$K_t = \int_0^n K_t(h)dh$$
$$K_t^* = \int_0^n K_t^*(f)df$$

LABOUR MARKET

- Sticky wages

- Seller's market power to set wages → Intermediate labour union
- Friction on setting prices: Calvo fashion in this paper

- Labour union:

Households supply homogeneous labour to an intermediate labour union, which differentiates the labour services from labour varieties of type l and set wages in a Calvo fashion, selling the labour varieties of type l to labour packers

$$\max_{W_t^{nom}(l)} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (\beta \xi_w)^k \frac{\Lambda_{t+k}}{\Lambda_t} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+k}} \left\{ W_{t+k}^{nom, ind} - W_{t+k}^{hh, nom} \right\} L_{t+k}(l)$$

where $1 - \xi_w$: the union can reset the wage in the current period

LABOUR MARKET (CONTINUED)

subject to

$$L_{t+k}(l) = \frac{1}{n} \left(\frac{W_{t+k}^{nom,ind}(l)}{W_{t+k}^{nom}} \right) L_{t+k}$$

$$W_{t+k}^{nom,ind}(l) = W_t^{nom}(l) Ind_{t,k}^w$$

$$W_{t+k}^{hh,nom} = \frac{P_{t+k} \left[\frac{(C_{t+k} - hC_{t+k-1})^{1-\sigma_c}}{1-\sigma_c} \right] \exp \left(\frac{-(1-\sigma_c)}{1+\sigma_l} L_{t+k}(l)^{1+\sigma_l} \right) (\sigma_c - 1) L_{t+k}(l)^{\sigma_l}}{-\Lambda_{t+k}}$$

where $Ind_{t,k}^w$ denotes the rule for wage indexation, which is given by

$$Ind_{t,k}^w = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1 \text{ for } k = 0 \\ (\prod_{l=1}^k \gamma \pi_{t+l-1}^{\iota_w} \pi^{1-\iota_w}) \end{array} \right\}$$

where ι_w : a parameter governing the degree of this wage indexation

STICKY WAGES (ξ_w)

- Microfoundations

- Staggered contract: Annual wage contract
- Newly hired vs. Existing workers
- Stayer vs. Switcher

- Estimates/Calibration

- This paper: 0.766 (mean)
- Smets and Wouters: 0.70 (mean)/0.73 (mode)
- Other paper: 3–4 quarters on average

- Korean calibration/estimates

- Claim: Limited due to the lack of business cycle frequency wage data
- Park and Shin (2014): Give qualitative evidence but needs improvements on quantitative aspects

vs. ABM

- Labour market structure
 - ABM: Search frictions \rightarrow Probability depends on $\frac{V}{U}$
 - DSGE in this paper: No unemployment but fluctuations in total margin
- Wage determination
 - ABM:

$$w_i(t) = \bar{w}_i \min \left\{ 1.5, \frac{\min\{Q_i^S(t), \beta_i M_i(t-1), \kappa_i K_i(t-1)\}}{N_i(t) \bar{\alpha}_i} \right\}$$

SEARCH AND MATCHING IN DSGE

- Matching function (Constant Return to Scale, CRS)

$$M_t = M(U_t, V_t) \leq \min\{U_t, V_t\}$$

$$\text{Job seeker's job finding rate: } f(\theta) = \frac{1}{U} M(U, V) = M\left(1, \frac{V}{U}\right)$$

$$\text{Firm's vacancy filling rate: } q(\theta) = \frac{1}{V} M(U, V) = M\left(\left(\frac{V}{U}\right)^{-1}, 1\right)$$

- Value of each state
 - Employed workers: Wage income, expected value depends on probabilities of job separation, job switching, wage changes and etc.
 - Unemployed job seekers: Unemployment insurance benefit, expected value depends on probabilities of job finding, eligibility of U.I. benefit and etc.
 - Firms posting vacancies: Expected value of filling jobs
 - Jobs filled vacancies: Production - Wage cost + expected value

VALUE FUNCTIONS (BASIC MODEL)

- Employed workers

$$W(S) = \max \left\{ u(c_e) + \beta \left[\int (1 - \sigma) W(s') + \sigma U(S') dF(S'|S) \right] \right\}$$

- Unemployed workers

$$U(S) = \max \left\{ u(c_u) + \beta \left[\int f(\theta) W(s') + (1 - f(\theta)) U(S') dF(S'|S) \right] \right\}$$

- Value of posting jobs

$$V = -\kappa + q(\theta)J$$

- Value of filling jobs

$$J(S) = \gamma - w + \beta(1 - \sigma) \int J(S') dF(S'|S)$$

- Free entry condition

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$$V = 0$$

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- Labor market in the HANK literature

- Sticky wages with labour union: Bayer, Born and Luetticke (forthcoming)
- Search and Matching: Ravn and Sterk (2017) – Not quantitative
- Income Tax Progressivity :

$$T(y) = y - \lambda y^{1-\tau} \rightarrow D(y) = y - T(y) = \lambda y^{1-\tau}$$

- Issues on data for external calibration

- Sticky wages: High frequency wage/earnings data
- Search and Matching: Poor quality on vacancy data → Estimating matching function

- If we do not consider the search friction, then we would need to have an accurate labor supply elasticity (in DSGE)
 - With matching function, we have *few* estimates using Korean data.

- Production function → Have discussed
- Human capital accumulation in DSGE
 - Ben - Porath (Learning or Doing, BP): $h_{i,t+1} = (1 - \delta)h_{i,t} + l_i s_{i,t}^{\alpha_1} x_{i,t}^{\alpha_2} h_{i,t}^{\alpha_3}$
 - Learning by Doing (LBD): $h_{i,t+1} = (1 - \delta)h_{i,t} + l_i n_{i,t}^{\alpha_1} h_{i,t}^{\alpha_2}$
 - Korean literature: Kim (2020), Kang (2022)
- Labor productivity/Income process
 - Guvenen, McKay and Ryan (2022): “A Tractable Income Process for Business Cycle Analysis”
 $y_{i,t} = \gamma_i + z_{i,t} + \tilde{\zeta}_{i,t} + [1 + f(\gamma_i + z_{i,t})w_t + \kappa_i(t - h_i)]$
 - Issue again: Data availability