

Saving the American Dream? Education Policies in Spatial General Equilibrium

Eckert and Kleineberg (2021, Working Paper)

Shinnosuke Kikuchi 14.582 Presentation May 10, 2021

Motivation and Summary

Childhood neighborhoods matter for children's outcomes

- Local labor market access
 - Wage and returns to education + costly migration
- Local education quality
 - Local schools, neighborhood characteristics

RQ: How do these interactions shape education policy effects?

This paper: dynamic spatial GE model + policy experiments

- Policy: School funding equalization across US
 - improves social mobility but GE effects make it modest

Key Contribution

Theory: Inequality, local human capital formation, schooling: Benabou (1993, 1996), Durlauf (1996 ab), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996, 1997) etc

Empirics: Neighborhoods/school on children's education/economic outcomes:

Jackson et al (2016), Alton and Mansfield (2018), Chetty and Hendren (2018 ab) etc

Tool: Quantitative Spatial GE model:

Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) and many more

→ This paper: connect Theory to Empirics using Tool

Model and its Implication

Standard QSGE with dynastic structures

- Parents: Choose location to live/work and raise children
- Children: Choose education (high/low skill = college)

Education outcome: children of parents e in region $n \in \mathbb{N}_m$

$$\log\left(\frac{Pr(h|n,e)}{Pr(l|n,e)}\right) = \frac{1}{\sigma_E}(R(m,h) - R(m,l)) + \frac{1}{\sigma_E}Q_n^e(\{L_n^e\}, \{w_n^e\})$$

College Odds $\equiv \hat{E}_n^e$ Education Return $\equiv \hat{R}_m$ Education Quality $\equiv \hat{Q}_n^e$

$$\hat{Q}_{n}^{e} = \hat{K}_{n}^{e} + \hat{f}_{n}$$
 "Exogenous quality" Funding

Policy Experiments

College odds Skill premium Edu. quality Funding

Education outcomes:
$$\hat{E}_n^e = \hat{R}_m + \hat{K}_n^e + \hat{f}_n$$

Status-quo policy: \hat{f}_n is high

- for the high-skilled on average
- In regions with high \hat{R}_m and low \hat{K}_n^e

Policy experiment: Equalizing \hat{f}_n and see effects on \hat{E}_n^e

- Direct effect: Holding other margins (\hat{R}_m,\hat{K}_n^e) constant
 - Policy: funding are more allocated to the low-skilled
 - Positive (negative) for the low (high)-skilled

Policy Experiments

College odds Skill premium Edu. quality Funding

Education outcomes:
$$\hat{E}_n^e = \hat{R}_m + \hat{K}_n^e + \hat{f}_n$$

Policy experiment: Equalizing \hat{f}_n and see effects on \hat{E}_n^e

- Direct effect: Holding all else margins constant
- GE effect: Activate all the margins
 - Education return (skill premium), \hat{R}_m
 - Negative for all b/c the reform reduce \hat{f}_n in high \hat{R}_m
 - Exogenous education quality (accessibility), \hat{K}_n^e
 - Negative (positive) for the low (high)-skilled
 - * "Too much \hat{f}_n in low \hat{K}_n^e place" \to More \hat{f}_n to high \hat{K}_n^e
 - In response, \hat{R}_m increases in low \hat{K}_n^e place, but limited

Comments

Strengths: Roles of GE effects to quantitatively alter policy effects

Weakness: Baseline covariance of \hat{f}_n and local characteristics determines all

Extensions:

Theory

- 1. Efficiency: Optimal dynamic spatial policy
- 2. Political economy: Why status-quo? (Bothering economists' Q)
- 3. College: Policies relocating for college?
- 4. Another externality: Information frictions: "Why school?"
 - Exposure to high-skill ppl motivates schooling (Porcher 2020)
- 5. Time-horizon: Adjustments take generations. Transition?



- 6. Local demographics: Policy effects change in demographics?
- 7. Tax: Change from uniform ("10% for all") to nonlinear income tax
- 8. Causal evidence: Educational reforms in reality (if any)

Appendix

Results: Direct Effects

Parental Skill	Direct Effect	
	obability of Attending College (p.p. chang	ge)
All	1.15	
Low	3.15	
High	-0.47	
P	anel B: Effect from School Funding	
Low	(+)	
High	(-)	
Par	nel C: Effect from Education Returns	
Low	None	
High	None	
Panel D:	Effect from Exogenous Education Quality	
Low	None	
High	None	

Results: GE Effects

		General
Parental Skill	Direct Effect	Equilibrium
Panel A: Pro	bability of Atte	nding College (p.p. change)
All	1.15	0.11
Low	3.15	0.57
High	-0.47	-0.33
Pa	nel B: Effect from	m School Funding
Low	(+)	(+)
High	(-)	(-)
Pan	el C: Effect from	Education Returns
Low	None	(-)
High	None	(-)
Panel D:	Effect from Exog	enous Education Quality
Low	None	(-)
High	None	(+)