

# Decomposing the Rise of the Populist Radical Right\*

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Support for populist radical right parties in Europe has dramatically increased in the twenty-first century. We decompose the rise of the populist radical right between 2005 and 2020 into four components: changes in party positions, changes in voter attributes (demographics and opinions), changes in voters' priorities, and a residual. We merge two wide data sets on party positions and voter attributes and estimate voter priorities using a probabilistic voting model. We find that shifts in party positions and changes in voter attributes explain only a negligible part of the rise of populist radical right parties. The primary driver behind the success of these parties lies in voters' changing priorities. Particularly, voters are less likely to decide which party to support based on parties' economic positions. Instead, voters—mainly older, non-unionized, low-educated men—increasingly prioritize nativist cultural issues. This allows populist radical right parties to tap into a pre-existing reservoir of culturally conservative voters.

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The rise of populist radical right parties (PRRP) is one of the most important political developments of the twenty-first century. While PRRP were a marginal political force in European politics in the early 1990s, they currently capture around 20% of the vote, as shown in Figure 1. PRRP are increasingly present not only in parliaments but also in governments (Akkerman et al., 2016). They have meaningfully impacted policy-making on multiple issues, from immigration to welfare programs (Rathgeb and Busemeyer, 2021). In certain countries, they have significantly eroded democratic norms and institutions (McCoy and Somer, 2019).

While a growing literature has identified various factors affecting populist support (Rodrik, 2018; Noury and Roland, 2020; Mudde, 2019), there is still no consensus on what is the main explanation for the extensive rise of PRRP across Europe and which factors are only idiosyncratic (Guriev and Papioannou, 2020). Moreover, there is no agreement on the broad mechanisms behind the rise of PRRP, including how this trend is shaped by supply or demand forces (Golder, 2016). Those focused on the supply side consider how changes in party positions, such as the moderation of PRRP on certain issues, can explain the growing support for these parties (Akkerman, 2015). On the demand side, there is an ongoing debate between two potential explanations. A common view argues that voters’ *attributes* (opinions and demographics) have changed. For example, the support for PRRP may have increased because public opinion shifted in a more nativist direction (Hangartner et al., 2019). The alternative view argues that voters’ have changed their *priorities* rather than opinions. According to this argument, a substantial share of the population has always held nativist opinions—what explains the rise of PRRP is that voters have come to prioritize these opinions when deciding which party to support (Bartels, 2017; Bonikowski, 2017).

In this paper, we compare the explanatory power of these three classes of arguments: changes in party positions, changes in voter attributes, and changes in priorities. We create a new dataset linking data on party positions and voter attributes and estimate voter priorities using a probabilistic voting model. We compare the three mechanisms using a novel decomposition method for voting behavior. This descriptive method shows that of the three channels, changing priorities most strongly explain rising support for PRRP. More specifically, our analyses reveal that over the last two decades voters have prioritized cultural issues at the expense of economic issues. The explanatory power of the two other factors (changes in voter attributes and party positions) is substantially smaller.

We start by outlining a multidimensional probabilistic voting model of how party positions, voter attributes, and voter priorities co-determine each voter’s preferred party. In the model, a voter’s utility from supporting a specific party is a function of that party’s positions (supply) weighted by the voter’s individual "voting weights" (demand).<sup>1</sup> Each weight corresponds to a different party position and can be positive or negative, depending on whether the voter supports or opposes the position. Weights on positions that are more important to the voter have larger magnitudes.

The two demand channels—voter attributes and voter priorities—affect the voting decision through the voting weights. We allow the weights to vary across voters by assuming that they are a function of voter attributes. The mapping between voter attributes and the weights is determined by the voter priorities, which correspond to the parameters of the utility function. This setting of the model allows us to separately evaluate the two categories of changes in demand discussed in the literature. The first is a change in attributes, reflecting a shift in underlying opinions or in the demographic composition of voters. For instance, we expect that a shift toward more nativist opinions would increase the share of voters putting positive weights on parties’ nativist positions, and thus increase PRRP support. The second is a change in priorities, reflecting shifts in the importance, or salience, voters attach to specific positions. For example, if some voters have always held nativist opinions but these opinions have become more consequential in shaping vote choice, this would also increase PRRP support—even though the views themselves have not changed over time.

We measure party positions and voter attributes by creating a novel dataset that links the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) and the Integrated Values Survey (IVS). The CMP provides data on 56 party positions based on the share of mentions of each topic in each party manifesto. The IVS includes a rich and consistent set of voter attributes. We analyze 101 attributes over three waves: 2005-2009, 2011-2013, and 2017-2020.<sup>2</sup> Our merged dataset includes approximately 60,000 respondents in 22 countries. We classify parties as PRRP based on the PopuList dataset.

We measure voter priorities using our estimation of the voting weights. We assume that

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<sup>1</sup>This parameterization can capture the first-order approximation of any utility function that depends on party positions. Appendix A discusses the similarity between our parameterization and a bliss-point model.

<sup>2</sup>While the IVS survey data provides us with rich respondent-level information on voter attributes, it limits our ability to identify whether respondents would actually vote. Hence, we do not focus on the turnout margin, despite its importance (Guiso et al., 2017).

each weight is a linear function of the voter attributes. We define voter priorities as the parameters of these functions as they determine which positions voters prioritize given their attributes. Building on machine-learning techniques, we develop a computationally feasible method to estimate these parameters using all the available variables in our datasets.

Our estimated weights are able to quantify key differences across voters. For example, we find that green voters place larger weights on environmental protection compared to other voters. We also find that what distinguishes PRRP supporters is the large weights they place on conservative cultural positions.

With these measurements in hand, we can decompose the rise in support for the PRRP between 2005-2009 and 2017-2020 into four components: party positions, voter attributes, voter priorities, and a residual. Building on descriptive decomposition methods that were used for the study of income inequality (Juhn et al., 1993; DiNardo et al., 1996; Fortin et al., 2011) we quantify how much of the share of the overall rise in PRRP support can be attributed to each component. Specifically, we utilize our model to calculate counterfactual changes in support for PRRP when only one component shifts over time and the other three are held fixed. For instance, to estimate the voter priorities component, we calculate the counterfactual rise in support for PRRP if party positions, voter attributes, and the residuals were held fixed, and only the priority parameters would change from their values in 2005-2009 to their values in 2017-2020.

Aggregating results from all countries, changes in voter priorities drive 44.9% of the overall rise of PRRP. In contrast, voter attributes and party positions explain only 7.1% and 0.0% of the overall change in PRRP support, respectively. The reminder 48.0% is driven by the residual, which captures potential misspecification and measurement error and is driven mainly by the entry of new parties. To understand the mechanisms underlying this result, we complement the decomposition exercise with additional analyses focusing on each of these components.

First, we investigate the trends in the estimated priorities and find that voters today prioritize cultural issues (e.g., national way of life) at the expense of traditional economic issues (e.g., size of the government). That is, voters today are less likely to choose which party to vote for based on that party’s economic positions compared to the mid-2000s. Instead, we find that weights on conservative cultural positions have increased over time, especially

among males, those without a college degree, older individuals, and non-union members. This means that culturally conservative voters are now more likely to vote for a party with conservative cultural positions than they were in the past.

We then inquire into our striking finding that changes in voter attributes cannot explain most of the rise of PRRP. We analyze reduced-form trends in various voter opinions and find that while in some countries voters have adopted more culturally conservative views, in others, voters have moved in the opposite direction. In aggregate, we find almost no right-wing shift in public opinion on issues associated with PRRP. For example, in contrast to multiple media accounts, attitudes have not moved en masse toward greater opposition to immigration. This supports the hypothesis that a reservoir of populist radical right voters existed before the dramatic rise in PRRP support.

The size of the pre-existing reservoir of PRRP voters varies substantially across countries, which explains some of the geographical variation in PRRP support. We use a similar decomposition method to predict the counterfactual support that PRRP would have received in different countries if voters in all countries were facing the same choice set of parties. We find that the cross-country variation in voter attributes can partially explain why PRRP is stronger in some countries (e.g., Poland) and weaker in others (e.g., Portugal).

On the supply side, we find that while there are substantial changes in party positions over time, they are mostly inconsistent with the main supply-side hypotheses for the rise of PRRP. We rule out the hypothesis that PRRP gained substantial support across Europe by moderating some of their cultural positions ([Lancaster, 2020](#)). We also do not find support for the argument that the rise of PRRP is driven by an ideological convergence of the center-left and center-right ([Berman and Kundnani, 2021](#)), at least in the time period covered in our study. We do find evidence that left-wing parties have moved toward more progressive positions on some issues, which could fit with the claim that the left’s progressive positions have alienated voters ([Goodhart, 2017](#)). However, based on our decomposition analysis, any gain PRRP may have received by this shift is offset by the other changes in party positions.

Finally, we show that the increase in the residual is largely a result of the entry of new parties. The large residual implies that support for PRRP has grown by even more than what we would expect based only on changes in our three main components. This excessive growth is particularly strong for new entries of PRRP, which were common in this period.

The average number of PRRP in a country doubled between 2005 and 2019. The fact that new entries received more support than expected could be a result of overcoming barriers to entry that we do not model, such as voter coordination problems.

The descriptive results we report make several contributions to prior research. Establishing new empirical facts on the channels through which support for PRRP rises allows us to compare theories and reject prominent hypotheses in the literature, as well as guide future causal work on the rise of PRRP. Indeed, the first contribution of this paper is to an ongoing debate about whether the rise of PRRP reflects a shift in voters' opinions toward more nativist attitudes ([Hangartner et al., 2019](#)) or whether PRRP attract voters by changing priorities and activating pre-existing opinions ([Bartels, 2017](#)). We directly compare these explanations and show that the priority channel better fits the data.

We similarly rule out supply-side explanations for the rise of PRRPs. Recent papers argue that the rise of PRRP could stem from left-wing parties adopting more progressive cultural positions ([Zeira, 2022](#)), the convergence of the center-left and center-right ([Berman and Kundnani, 2021](#)), and PRRP adopting more centrist positions on traditional morality issues ([Akkerman, 2015](#)). We do not find evidence that a change in the positions of existing European parties is a major driver of PRRP support at least since the mid-2000s.

This paper also contributes to the literature on the causal effects of different shocks on PRRP support, including technological change ([Anelli et al., 2019](#)), financial crises ([Funke et al., 2020](#)) trade ([Colantone and Stanig, 2018b,a](#); [Autor et al., 2020](#); [Dippel et al., 2020](#)), and new media technology ([Gurieva et al., 2021](#); [Manacorda et al., 2022](#)). Our descriptive analysis complements these causal accounts by pointing to the channels through which these shocks might operate. For example, if trade shocks increased PRRP support, our results suggest this occurred by changing the priorities of voters rather than their opinions.

Finally, this paper contributes to a small literature estimating voters priorities and their implication for vote choice. While priorities have been used in recent political economy theories ([Bonomi et al., 2021](#); [Enke et al., 2022](#)), there have been relatively few studies attempting to estimate them ([Johns, 2010](#); [De Vries et al., 2013](#); [Kendall et al., 2015](#); [Sides et al., 2019](#)). Indeed, "it can be challenging to measure political priorities" using survey data ([Sides et al., 2022](#), 20). With the caveat that our estimated priorities are not causally identified, we highlight two key features of our method. First, we show how priorities vary

across voters and how they change over time. Second, our method allows us to analyze the voters' priorities on multiple party positions. Specifically, we compare voters' priorities of economic and cultural issues and provide quantitative evidence to a recent theoretical literature discussing the growing importance of cultural issues (Enke, 2020; Gethin et al., 2021; Kriesi et al., 2008; Margalit et al., 2022). Moreover, our decomposition method which uses these estimated weights is not limited to the study of PRRP and can be used to analyze various other political trends, such as the crisis of the center-left and the rise of green parties.

## 1 Voting Model

In this section, we describe our model of party support. The model provides a simple unifying framework for how party positions, voter attributes, and voter priorities co-determine each voter's party preference.

We assume a standard utility maximization framework where voters support the party that maximizes their utility. Voter  $i$ 's utility from voting for party  $j$  is a function of the party's positions weighted by her individual voting weights. Specifically, we assume the following functional form for voters' utility:

$$U_{ij} = w_i' z_j + \zeta_j + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

The  $L$ -dimensional vector  $z_j$  represents party  $j$ 's positions.  $w_i$  is a corresponding  $L$ -dimensional vector of voting weights. Each individual weight  $w_i^l$  represents the impact of the corresponding party position  $z_j^l$  on voter  $i$ 's utility. The sign of the weight is positive when the voter supports a position (i.e., utility increases when voting for a party with this position) and negative when she opposes it. The weight's magnitude (in absolute terms) measures how much the voter cares about this position compared to other positions. We use  $\zeta_j$  to capture the residual common utility from voting for party  $j$ , an unobserved party quality that increases the utility from supporting the party among all voters. This residual includes both the utility from unobserved party positions and the party's "valence"—other unobserved party qualities that affect voters' utility from supporting the party. Valence could capture factors such as the party leader's popularity or the party's historical reputation. Finally,  $\varepsilon_{ij}$  represents all unobserved idiosyncratic factors that affect voters' decisions.

We assume that the voting weights are a linear function of voter attributes:

$$w_i = x_i' \Phi + \beta \quad (1)$$

The  $M$ -dimensional vector  $x_i$  represents the observed attributes (demographics and opinions) of voter  $i$ . The  $M \times L$  matrix  $\Phi$  determines how each voter attribute affects the weights voters place on every position.  $\Phi_{ml} > 0$  means that a larger value of voter attribute  $x^m$  generates larger support for position  $z^l$ . For instance, if  $x^m$  measures voter support for redistribution and  $z^l$  measures party support for larger welfare spending, we would expect  $\Phi_{ml}$  to have a positive value. We standardize the distribution of  $x_i$  such that the  $L$ -dimensional intercept vector  $\beta$  represents the average weight of the full population.

Taken together, the utility function is a linear function of the interactions between voter characteristics and party positions. We define a vector  $\delta$  such that for each party  $j$

$$\delta_j := \beta' z_j + \zeta_j \quad (2)$$

$\delta_j$  captures the utility gain from party  $j$  that is common across voters. Hence we can write the utility as

$$U(x_i, z_j, \varepsilon_{ij}) = x_i' \Phi z_j + \delta_j + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (3)$$

The parameterization of Equation 3 can capture the first-order approximation of any functional form. This includes the standard bliss point utility functions where voters vote for the party closest to them ideologically as discussed in Appendix A. It also allows a more complex utility function, where voters vote based on multiple dimensions and where demographics, such as education, can also affect voting choices (Abou-Chadi and Hix, 2021; Gidron, 2022; Kriesi et al., 2008; Piketty, 2020).

To take this model to the data, we assume that the unobserved idiosyncratic shock  $\varepsilon_{ij}$  has an extreme value type-I distribution (Gumbel). Together with Equation 3, this assumption allows us to write the probability of voting for a party as

$$P(z_j | x_i) = \frac{\exp(x_i' \Phi z_j + \delta_j)}{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}_{c,t}} \exp(x_i' \Phi z_k + \delta_k)} \quad (4)$$



Where  $\mathcal{J}_{c,t}$  is the set of all parties that are on the ballot in country  $c$  at time  $t$ . In Section 3 we use this expression to calculate the likelihood function of the model parameters.

## 2 Data

In this section, we discuss our data on party positions and voter attributes. Throughout the paper, we focus on Europe. By limiting our analyses to Europe, we focus on PRRP that have long defined themselves in opposition to similar political developments, such as European integration, and that have formed transnational networks of cooperation in supra-national institutions, such as the European Parliament (McDonnell and Werner, 2020). Analyzing PRRP in Europe also allows us to focus on a region where these parties have particularly gained strength in recent years (Rodrik, 2018).

### 2.1 Party Positions: Comparative Manifesto Project

We characterize parties' positions on various issues using the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Volkens et al., 2020). This dataset covers the manifestos (platforms) of parties running in elections for the lower house. The CMP codes which share of the manifesto is dedicated to each topic, and for many topics details the share of positive and negative mentions. Our analysis includes all of the CMP main categories (three-digit variable names) as these variables are available across all countries and over time. A key advantage of this data is its objectivity: it relies on the texts parties produce and not on how experts perceive the parties' positions.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the dataset covers a large variety of topics, including economic issues, cultural issues, stands on globalization, national security, and foreign policy. Appendix Table A.1 presents the full list of CMP party positions.

When aggregating results from various economic or cultural positions, we restrict ourselves to using two indices of party positions, created by the CMP. The economic index measures the overall party's position on the government intervention-free market scale. It incorporates 19 party positions including positions on the welfare state, economic systems, protectionism, and regulation. The cultural index (originally called the society index) summarizes

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<sup>3</sup>An alternative data source on party positions is the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). Yet the coverage of CHES is more limited than that of the CMP, and its position measures are more subjective. Previous work suggests that the CMP measures are strongly correlated with those of CHES (Adams et al., 2019).

cultural positions on a progressive-conservative scale. It incorporates 11 party positions on issues including traditional morality, national way of life, multiculturalism, law and order, and democracy. Both indices are constructed by adding conservative party positions and subtracting liberal positions such that a high value reflects more support for a free market or more conservative cultural values. The last two columns of Appendix Table A.1 show which party positions are included in which index.

We note that the distinction between economic and cultural issues is imperfect; still it is analytically useful. Distinguishing between economic and cultural dimensions in politics is a common feature in electoral politics research (Kitschelt, 1994; Hooghe and Marks, 2018; Margalit, 2019; Norris and Inglehart, 2019). That being said, clearly, not all political issues neatly fall into one of the two categories (Cramer, 2016). For instance, opposition to European integration may lie at the intersection of economic concerns (e.g., concerns over market regulation) and cultural concerns (e.g., concerns over national identities) (Kriesi et al., 2008). Since this division leaves room for discretion, we use the indices created by the CMP to mitigate concerns about cherry-picking specific positions.

## 2.2 Voter attributes: Integrated Values Survey

We measure voter attributes using the Integrated Values Survey (IVS). The IVS is composed of two large-scale cross-national repeated surveys: the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Survey (EVS). This dataset provides several advantages for our analysis. First, it includes broad information on a variety of voter attributes including demographics, religious beliefs, social values, and opinions on various topics. Second, many of the questions in the IVS are consistently asked over time.<sup>4</sup> Third, the data covers a broad range of countries across regions of Europe.

We study the three most recent survey waves: 2005-2009, 2011-2013, and 2017-2020. We include in our study all 22 European countries that were surveyed in both the 2005-2009 and the 2017-2020 waves, and for which at least 70% of the supported parties can be matched to the CMP. Figure 2 presents the countries included in our database along with the support that PRRP received in the 2017-2020 survey and in the election closest to the survey year.

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<sup>4</sup>This feature is critical for our decomposition analysis and typically does not exist in similar datasets, such as European Social Survey.

The figure shows that we cover countries with a wide range of PRRP support spanning from 0% to over 50%. We use sampling weights in all of our analysis. Appendix Table A.2 summarizes the IVS data and Appendix B includes further details on data processing.

To estimate changes over time and provide our model with as much flexibility as possible, by default we include in our analysis all variables that appear in all three survey waves. We exclude three variables that ask directly about priorities or general positions and not about opinions, behaviors, or demographics, as we capture priorities separately in the decomposition exercise.<sup>5</sup> An additional concern is that voters’ opinions may be affected by the party they support, instead of voters choosing a party based on their opinions (Barber and Pope, 2019). This is especially common when a new government is elected and, as a result, voters immediately change their opinions on the government (Hetherington and Rudolph, 2015). Therefore, we test which opinions tend to change once parties join the governing coalition and exclude from our analysis the three most elastic variables.<sup>6</sup> Appendix Table A.3 describes the final set of 101 opinion, behavior, and demographic variables included in our data.

Our outcome variable is the respondents’ preferred party, defined as the party participants said they would vote for or the party that appeals to them most.<sup>7</sup> We were able to match 94% of respondents who expressed support for a party with CMP data (Table A.4 in the appendix). To link parties across the datasets, we use PartyFacts identifiers when they are available and harmonize parties manually based on their names in many other cases. By definition, the CMP data is measured around elections, while the IVS surveys are not necessarily conducted close to elections.<sup>8</sup> When merging the datasets, we assign to each party the CMP variables

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<sup>5</sup>These variables include a question on how do you position yourself on a left-right scale, and two questions that ask respondents to prioritize policy topics from a given subset of options. Since the subset of available options does not include the topics we estimate as most important (e.g., immigration policy, size of the welfare state, etc.) we do not use these questions to estimate priorities directly.

<sup>6</sup>For each opinion in our data, we run a linear regression where the dependent variable is the opinion and the independent variable is whether the party supported by the respondent is part of the governing coalition, as determined by the ParlGov dataset (Döring and Manow, 2020). We include party fixed effects and country-wave fixed effects. We exclude from our data the three variables most strongly affected by a party’s coalition status: ‘confidence in parliament’, ‘confidence in political parties’, and ‘confidence in government’.

<sup>7</sup>Most surveys asked participants who they would vote for and if participants said they did not know, they were asked which party they support. In the last EVS wave, participants were only asked which party appealed to them most. We use the answers to both questions to define the outcome for as many respondents as possible. However, we are limited in focusing only on voters who support a specific party and abstract from any analysis of voter turnout.

<sup>8</sup>The fact that the IVS is not conducted around elections may imply that IVS survey respondents are less informed about parties and their support may be different than the party they support around an election. On the other hand, a survey that is not conducted around an election is less likely to be affected by strategic voting and thus our sincere voting assumption is more likely to hold in the IVS data.

defined for the election closest to when the IVS survey was taken. Parties are included in the analysis if at least five respondents supported them in the IVS and if we were able to match them with CMP data five years before or after the survey was conducted. We discuss the process of merging the data in more detail in Appendix B.2. Fortunately, Appendix Table A.4 shows that we are able to match 94% of respondents who expressed support for a party with CMP data.

## 2.3 Party Classification

PRRP share several characteristics (Mudde, 2007). First, they subscribe to a nativist worldview, which considers minorities as a threat to the purity of the 'real people'. These parties are also authoritarian, understood as a "belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements on authority are to be punished severely" (Mudde, 2019, 29). And their populist politics is predicated on a moral opposition between the corrupt elites and the unified people.

We determine whether a party is a PRRP according to the PopuList, a comprehensive dataset that is updated periodically (Rooduijn et al., 2019). The dataset classifies European parties since 1989 based on experts' judgment. We define PRRP as parties that were ever classified as radical-right parties in the PopuList data, since 2005.<sup>9</sup> The PopuList also classifies parties as populist and non-populist. However, we include both populist and non-populist radical right parties in our PRRP definition for three reasons. First, there is almost a complete overlap in PopuList between the parties that are classified as populist radical right and those that are classified as (any) radical right; only a handful of parties, which represent less than 1% of the overall radical right support share in the IVS, are non-populist. Second, voters of these parties seem to share similar attributes, as we discuss below. Third, these parties are often close substitutes, and therefore, in some countries (e.g. Greece), voters shifted from populist to non-populist radical-right parties. Our results are substantively unchanged if non-populist radical right parties are excluded from our definition.

We use the CMP data to classify parties into other categories, or 'families' as they are often referred to in the political science literature (Mair and Mudde, 1998). Specifically, we define parties as left-center parties if the CMP codes them as social democratic, and right-

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<sup>9</sup>There are three cases where the PopuList classification changes over time. Since such changes are so rare, we define a party as a PRRP if the PopuList defined it as radical right in any time period.

center if the CMP codes them as liberal, Christian democratic, or conservative parties. Green and socialist parties are those that are coded as ecological or socialist, respectively.

Appendix Figure A.1 shows the similarities among voters of these party families. To create this figure we regress the support for each party on voter attributes using IVS data. We then predict the fitted value for each voter and party. For every two parties with at least fifty supporters, we calculate the correlation between the fitted values among all voters in both of the parties' countries. Red colors indicate similarities between the attributes of the voters of the two parties, while purple indicates dissimilarities. For instance, UKIP voters (last row) are particularly similar to AfD voters, such that a model that predicts support for UKIP in the UK can predict support for the AfD in Germany almost as well. We divide parties into the aforementioned categories and report the average correlations between and within each category. For this exercise, we also include two additional categories for populist left and other populists, based on the Populist classification.

Our classification of party families generates cohesive categories, with high correlations between parties in the same category. The correlation between PRRP is particularly high (0.26). The only non-populist radical-right party with at least 50 supporters in our data is "Kotelba" (Slovakia) and it is also correlated with the populist radical-right parties. This demonstrates the similarity between non-populist and populist radical-right parties. In contrast, the correlations between PRRP and parties from other categories are negative on average. The figure also demonstrates why we distinguish between populists of different stripes: voters of left- and right-wing populist parties clearly differ from each other (Rooduijn, 2018).

## 2.4 Summary Statistics

Table 1 presents summary statistics of party positions for PRRP and all other parties, based on manifestos that correspond to the 2005-2009 and 2017-2020 IVS waves. The first two rows show the average values for the economic and cultural CMP indices. Positive index values denote that a larger share of the manifesto is dedicated to right-wing positions. The table also presents the average percentage share of the manifestos dedicated to ten positions that most strongly distinguish between PRRP and non-PRRP and demonstrates clear differences between PRRP and non-PRRP parties: PRRP dedicate a substantial and increasing amount of their platforms to nationalistic topics (e.g., positive mentions of national way of life), which

other parties mention much less often.

Table 2 presents summary statistics for the demographics and opinions of the PRRP and non-PRRP voters, using the same IVS waves. As expected, PRRP supporters are more likely to be males, live in rural areas, and are less likely to hold a college degree (Gidron and Hall, 2020). They also hold significantly more culturally traditional worldviews.

### 3 Estimation

In this section, we describe how we estimate the model parameters using a two-step procedure. We first estimate the matrix  $\Phi$  mapping voter attributes to voting weights and the vector  $\delta$  of the common utility from each party. These parameters fully determine the likelihood of voting for each party (Equation 4). We estimate them using a penalized MLE, separately for each IVS wave. We then estimate  $\beta$ , the average voting weights placed on each position, and  $\zeta$ , the residuals, with a linear regression, using the estimands for  $\hat{\delta}$  from all three waves.

#### 3.1 First Step: Estimation of $\Phi$ and $\delta$

Our wide datasets imply that our parameter space is high dimensional, and therefore, we rely on machine-learning techniques to avoid overfitting. Our dataset is large since we prefer not to make any prior assumptions regarding which combination of variables is important for explaining party support. Instead, we use all available variables and let the data determine which variables are relevant. As a result, the dimension of matrix  $\Phi$  is approximately 5,000 (the number of voter attributes multiplied by the number of party positions). To avoid overfitting, we restrict the support of  $\Phi$  such that  $\|\Phi\| < c$  for some constant  $c$ . We follow recent econometric research (Athey et al., 2021), and use the nuclear norm as our matrix norm for two reasons. First, the nuclear norm is known to generate low-rank solutions. Low-rank matrices are easier to interpret and imply that the voters decide which party to support based on relatively few dimensions, as the literature suggests (Kitschelt, 1994; Poole and Rosenthal, 2001; Kriesi et al., 2008). Second, the nuclear norm generates a convex optimization problem that is computationally easier to solve.

Specifically, we estimate  $\Phi$  and  $\delta$  using a penalized maximum likelihood estimator. We

obtain the following maximization problem using the likelihood derived in Equation 4:

$$\max_{\Phi, \delta} \mathcal{L}(\Phi, \delta) + \lambda \|\Phi\| = \max_{\Phi, \delta} \sum_i \log \frac{\exp [x_i \Phi z_{j(i)} + \delta_{j(i)}]}{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}_{c(i)}} \exp [x_i \Phi z_k + \delta_k]} + \lambda \|\Phi\|$$

We estimate the parameters separately for each IVS wave. We solve this maximization problem using proximal gradient descent (Hastie et al., 2019) and choose the value of the penalization parameter  $\lambda$  using cross-validation.

### 3.2 Second Step: Estimation of $\beta$ and $\zeta$

In the second step, we use the estimands of  $\hat{\delta}$  from the first step to estimate  $\beta$ , the mean value for each voting weight, and  $\zeta$ , each party's residual. In this step, we combine information from all three waves. We assume that the residual  $\zeta_{j,t}$  is the sum of a constant component  $\eta_j$  and a time-varying component  $\nu_{j,t}$ . Hence, we can rewrite Equation 2 as

$$\delta_{j,t} = \beta_t z_{j,t} + \eta_j + \nu_{j,t}$$

Taking the difference between two consecutive survey waves, we get the following equation:

$$\Delta_t^{t+1} \delta_j = \underbrace{\Delta_t^{t+1} \beta \bar{z}_j}_{\text{Voter Priorities}} + \underbrace{\bar{\beta} \Delta_t^{t+1} z_j}_{\text{Party Positions}} + \underbrace{\Delta_t^{t+1} \nu_j}_{\text{Residual}} \quad (5)$$

Where  $\bar{\beta}$ ,  $\bar{z}_j$  represents the average value over the two periods. This equation decomposes the overall changes in  $\delta$  to the contribution of changes in voter priorities ( $\beta$ ), party positions ( $z$ ), and residuals ( $\nu$ ). Voter attributes do not affect  $\delta$  since it is defined as the common utility all voters receive from a party, regardless of their attributes. The coefficients  $\Delta_t^{t+1} \beta$  and  $\bar{\beta}$  can be estimated by regressing  $\hat{\delta}$  on  $\bar{z}_j, \Delta_t^{t+1} z_j$ .

Since the number of party positions is relatively large compared to the overall number of observations (the total number of parties in each wave) we make two additional assumptions to avoid over-fitting. First, we assume that for countries that appear in the 2011-2013 intermediate wave, the change in beta is constant over time such that  $\beta_{t+1} = \frac{\beta_{t+2} + \beta_t}{2}$ . This implies that if we sum Equation 5 for  $\Delta_t^{t+1}$  and  $\Delta_{t+1}^{t+2}$  we get

$$\Delta_t^{t+2} \delta_j = \Delta_t^{t+2} \beta \bar{z}_j + \bar{\beta} \Delta_t^{t+2} z_j + \Delta_t^{t+2} \nu_j \quad (6)$$

where the average is taken over all three periods.

Second, we use the estimation results from the first step to reduce the dimension of the estimation. We assume that the combinations of party positions that generate differences in utility among voters are the same factors that determine the average utility across all voters.<sup>10</sup> We use the singular value decomposition of  $\Phi_t$  to find the  $k$  linear combinations of party positions that generate the largest utility differences. We then reduce the dimension of  $\beta_t$  to  $k$  by restricting it to be in the span of these linear combinations. We choose  $k = 5$  though other values yield similar results. See Appendix C for more details.

### 3.3 Estimation Results: 2017-2020 Voting Weights

Using the estimated model parameters, we can calculate the voting weights placed on each party position for each voter in our data. In this section, we explore variations in voting weights in the 2017-2020 wave. In our main decomposition exercise in Section 5, we analyze the changes in these weights over time.

We calculate the weights each voter places on each party position using the estimates of the model parameters,  $\Phi$  and  $\beta$ . Each weight is a linear function of the voter attributes, based on Equation 1. The weights are measured in units of standard deviation to utility units, defined as how a one standard deviation increase in this position would affect voter utility.<sup>11</sup> We also compute aggregated weights for the two main indices of the CMP, the economic and cultural index. We take a simple average of the weights of all variables that are used in an index and flip the sign of the weights of variables that enter the index negatively.<sup>12</sup>

Appendix Figure A.2 presents the largest coefficients in the linear function between the voter attributes and their corresponding weights for the two indices. For each index, we plot the absolute value of the ten largest coefficients in the 2017-2020 wave. The patterns we uncover provide face validity to our analyses. For instance, we find that all else equal, individuals who express confidence in unions tend to reward parties with left-wing economic

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<sup>10</sup>This assumption would be violated if all voters have a strong and homogeneous taste for certain party positions. For instance, if all voters equally support parties expressing positions regarding improving the quality of the education system regardless of their attributes.

<sup>11</sup>To provide some intuition for these units, with two parties the utility is the logarithm of the odds ratio. So, for example, an increase of one utility unit is equivalent to a change from a 50/50 vote share to approximately 73/27.

<sup>12</sup>This is equivalent a single weight on the index (the utility from a change in the index), assuming that a change in the index is driven by all index positions equally.



positions (put a large negative weight on an index of right-wing economic positions). Moving to the cultural index, individuals who believe jobs should prioritize natives reward parties with right-wing cultural positions. This provides us confidence in our empirical strategy.<sup>13</sup>

Figure 3 shows that PRRP voters put more weight on conservative cultural issues compared to economic issues. We plot the the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the weights distribution separately for supporters of each party family in the 2017-2020 survey wave. The top two panels present results for the two indices and the following panels present the weights on the positions with the largest variation in weights across party categories. We find that the weights PRRP voters place on the economy index are similar to mainstream right voters. In contrast, PRRP voters care more about conservative cultural positions compared to mainstream voters. Specifically, PRRP voters put large positive weights on positive mentions of a national way of life and negative weights on positive mentions of multiculturalism.

## 4 Decomposition

We now turn to decompose the rise of PRRP into changes in party positions, voter attributes, voter priorities, and a residual. For each component, we simulate the counterfactual increase in support for PRRP if only that component changed while others remained fixed.

The statistic that we decompose is  $S_P^{t,c}$ , the share of PRRP supporters in country  $c$  at period  $t$ . This share is defined as

$$S_P^{t,c} := \int P(\Pi|x_i; \theta_t, Z_t^c, \zeta_t^c) f_t^c(x_i) dx_i$$

where  $\Pi$  is the event of supporting a PRRP.<sup>14</sup> We use  $\theta_t$  to note the set of utility parameters  $\theta_t = (\Phi_t, \beta_t)$ . We mark by  $Z_t^c = \{z_{j,t}\}_{j \in \mathcal{J}_{c,t}}$  the matrix of observed party positions, and  $\zeta_t^c = \{\zeta_{j,t}\}_{j \in \mathcal{J}_{c,t}}$  is the vector of residuals for all parties in the option set ( $\mathcal{J}_{c,t}$ ). Finally,  $f_t^c$  is the density of voter attributes at time  $t$  in country  $c$ . Using this notation, the change in PRRP support between periods  $t$  and  $t+1$  is

$$\Delta_t^{t+1} S_P^c = \int P(\Pi|x_i; \theta_{t+1}, Z_{t+1}^c, \zeta_{t+1}^c) f_{t+1}^c(x_i) dx_i - \int P(\Pi|x_i; \theta_t, Z_t^c, \zeta_t^c) f_t^c(x_i) dx_i$$

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<sup>13</sup>While the sign of most of the coefficients is in line with common perceptions, some of them are not, as expected when using multiple correlated variables (Mullainathan and Spiess, 2017).

<sup>14</sup>Formally,  $P(\Pi|x_i; \theta_t, Z_t^c, \zeta_t^c) = P(\arg \max_j U_{ij} \in \mathcal{P})$ , with  $\mathcal{P}$  noting the set of PRRP.

In order to accommodate parties' entry and exit, we include all parties that participated in either time  $t$  or  $t+1$ . We then set the residual  $\zeta_{j,t}$  to  $-\infty$  if party  $j$  does not participate or is too small to appear in our data in period  $t$ . Hence, the predicted voting share for this party would be set to zero. For parties that tried to enter but failed, setting  $\zeta_{j,t} = -\infty$  captures unobserved and unmodeled factors that prevented this party from gaining support, such as coordination failures or unpopular leaders. However, other parties did not enter because they did not try, and we attribute any voting change due to their entry to the residual component as well. To explore the implication of this assumption, in Section 6.4 we further decompose the residual components to calculate the share of the residual driven by entry.

This parameterization allows us to decompose  $\Delta_t^{t+1} S_P^c$  into the sum of four components.

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta_t^{t+1} S_P^c &= \underbrace{\int P(\Pi|x_i; \theta_{t+1}, Z_{t+1}^c, \zeta_{t+1}^c) f_{t+1}^c(x_i) dx_i - \int P(\Pi|x_i; \theta_t, Z_{t+1}^c, \zeta_{t+1}^c) f_{t+1}^c(x_i) dx_i}_{\text{Voting Priorities}} \\
&+ \underbrace{\int P(\Pi|x_i; \theta_t, Z_{t+1}^c, \zeta_{t+1}^c) f_{t+1}^c(x_i) dx_i - \int P(\Pi|x_i; \theta_t, Z_{t+1}^c, \zeta_{t+1}^c) f_t^c(x_i) dx_i}_{\text{Voter Attributes}} \\
&+ \underbrace{\int P(\Pi|x_i; \theta_t, Z_{t+1}^c, \zeta_{t+1}^c) f_t^c(x_i) dx_i - \int P(\Pi|x_i; \theta_t, Z_t^c, \zeta_{t+1}^c) f_t^c(x_i) dx_i}_{\text{Party Positions}} \\
&+ \underbrace{\int P(\Pi|x_i; \theta_t, Z_t^c, \zeta_{t+1}^c) f_t^c(x_i) dx_i - \int P(\Pi|x_i; \theta_t, Z_t^c, \zeta_t^c) f_t^c(x_i) dx_i}_{\text{Residual}}
\end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

Each component represents a counterfactual exercise where only one input changes, while the others are held fixed. The rest of this section presents details on each component.

**Voting Priorities** This demand component captures changes in the parameters  $\Phi$  and  $\beta$ . These parameters determine whether voters support or oppose each party position and how they prioritize the different party positions, given their opinions and demographics.

Voting priorities can lead to increased support for PRRP even in the absence of a major shift in either voters' attributes or the supply of parties. This can occur when certain topics become more important or salient. As evocatively argued by [Bartels \(2017\)](#), PRRP may have increased their support by activating a pre-existing reservoir of culturally conservative voters and not because of a sudden shift of mass attitudes in their direction. In Italy, for instance, [Magistro and Wittstock \(2021\)](#) argue that support for PRRP increased while anti-

immigration attitudes remained stable due to a change in the salience of anti-immigration issues. Closely related, [Sobolewska and Ford \(2020\)](#) explain that support for Brexit occurred due to the activation of pre-existing ethnonationalist attitudes and [Cantoni et al. \(2020\)](#) argue that the AfD in Germany gained support due to pre-existing demand for its nationalist positions. These are all specific examples of the general argument—not limited to the European context<sup>15</sup>—that over the last couple of decades, voters have come to prioritize cultural concerns, such as race and nationality over economic issues ([Bonikowski, 2017](#); [De Vries et al., 2013](#); [Norris and Inglehart, 2019](#); [Noury and Roland, 2020](#)).

**Voter Attributes** This demand component captures changes in  $f$ , the distribution of voter attributes  $x_i$ . This component is associated with the dominant image of the rise of the populist radical right as a political tsunami: a swift and powerful shift in public opinion toward the ethnonationalism and authoritarianism of these parties.

Such shifts in public opinion were identified in specific contexts. Examining Greek public attitudes following the refugee crisis of 2015, [Hangartner et al. \(2019\)](#) show that greater exposure to refugees fuels opposition to immigration—the positions that lie at the core of the populist radical right’s agenda. Similar findings have been documented in Austria ([Rudolph and Wagner, 2021](#)) and Norway ([Nordø and Ivarsflaten, 2021](#)) although not in some other contexts ([Cools et al., 2021](#); [Schaub et al., 2021](#)). An alternative driver of voters’ attitudes toward PRRP is trade shocks: analyzing British survey data, [Ballard-Rosa et al. \(2017\)](#) argue that people who live in regions exposed to trade shocks adopted more authoritarian values—which, in turn, nudge voters toward populist right parties and causes (such as Brexit).

Changes in voter attributes also include demographic changes. For example, the rise of PRRP could be driven by unemployment growth if unemployed workers are more likely to vote for PRRP ([Algan et al., 2017](#); [Guiso et al., 2017](#)). [Dehdari \(2022\)](#) argues that in Sweden, unemployment increases support for PRRP among low-skilled workers, and points at growing hostility toward immigrants among the less well-off as a key mechanism at work.

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<sup>15</sup>Research on support for Trump explains his electoral appeal not by changes in voters’ worldviews but rather changes in priorities and specifically the growing importance of cultural issues ([Sides et al., 2022](#)). For instance, [Sides et al. \(2019\)](#) show that the Trump candidacy captured voters who already expressed negative affect toward minority groups such as Muslim Americans and opposition to immigration. [Mason et al. \(2021\)](#) analyze rich data set collected since 2011 and show that latent animosity toward minority groups associated with the Democratic Party, such as LGBTQ persons and Black Americans, has driven voters toward Trump.

**Party Positions** This component captures changes in the supply of party positions  $Z$ , holding the voting weights (voter attributes and priorities) and the residuals fixed. We expect this component to be large if the rise of PRRP is driven mainly by supply changes.

Several supply-side hypotheses focus on changes in the PRRP themselves. PRRP could have moderated their cultural positions in order to appeal to more mainstream voters, for instance, by toning down their rhetoric on issues related to gender roles and LGBTQ rights (Akkerman, 2015; Lancaster, 2020). Alternatively, PRRP could have shifted their economic positions from neoliberal, anti-tax policies toward welfare chauvinism, understood as generous welfare benefits which exclude those who are deemed as unauthentic members of the nation (Schumacher and Van Kersbergen, 2016).

A second set of hypotheses focuses on supply changes of the mainstream parties. For instance, Berman (2021) argue that the convergence of center-left and center-right parties on economic issues during the 1990s has allowed populist challengers to capture the vote of economically discontent voters. Others claim that the left's turn toward progressive cultural positions on issues such as gender and LGBTQ rights has alienated working-class voters (Goodhart, 2017). Former leader of the German Social Democratic Party, Sigmar Gabriel, expressed this view when arguing that "Winning over the hipsters in California cannot make up for losing the workers of the Rust Belt" (Abou-Chadi and Wagner, 2020, 247).

**Residual** The residual component captures changes in the residual  $\zeta$  of all parties. Change in the residuals could generate an increase in support for PRRP in several ways. First, due to changes in unobserved party positions, either by the PRRP or their competitors. Second, due to an increase in the valence of PRRP, for example, if these parties had more charismatic leaders in recent years. Third, due to model misspecification. Fourth, and most importantly, the residual captures the entry and exit of parties from the political system, which we model as having  $\zeta_{j,t} = -\infty$ .

The order of the four components in the decomposition can affect the results as it determines whether to fix the other components to their level at the start ( $t$ ) or end ( $t + 1$ ) of the period. We set the residual as the last component, such that when calculating the counterfactuals for party positions, voter attributes, and voting priorities, the residual component is fixed to its value at  $t + 1$ . This implies that we quantify the impact of changes in our

three main components as if the new entrants already participated in the elections in time  $t$ . Otherwise, the main three components would be mechanically zero for new entrants, as support cannot grow for a party that has not entered yet ( $\zeta_{j,t} = -\infty$ ).

We set party position as the third component. We use manifestos from  $t + 1$  when the party did not exist at wave  $t$ .<sup>16</sup> Therefore, the party position component only captures changes in the position of parties that existed in both waves. Setting party positions as the third component guarantees that when calculating the counterfactuals for voter attributes and voting priorities all party positions are taken from the same time period.<sup>17</sup> We set voter priorities and voter attributes as the first and second components accordingly. However, the order of these components can be reversed and this does not significantly affect the results.

We calculate standard errors using bootstrap. In each of our 1,000 bootstrap iterations, we repeat our two-stage estimation for the resampled data. We then decompose the rise of PRRP for the resampled data, using the parameters estimated in this iteration.

## 5 Decomposition Results

Figure 4 presents our key findings: the decomposition results from all countries in our data. To create this figure, we first decompose the trends in PRRP support in each country separately, based on Equation 7. We then aggregate the results using a weighted average of all countries, where the weights are the inverse of the share of PRRP support in the 2017-2020 wave. Hence, we aggregate the contribution of each component to the rise of PRRP, as a share of the overall PRRP support in that country in 2017-2020. This weighting guarantees that the results are not driven mainly by countries with very high levels of PRRP support. In order to focus on the change in PRRP, we fix the initial support to 0% and the final support to 100%. For countries that are unavailable in the 2011-2013 wave, we impute their decomposition values as the average of the 2005-2009 and 2017-2020 waves.

Figure 4 shows that changes in voter priorities, together with the residual component, explain most of rise in support for PRRP. Taking the two periods together, voter priorities

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<sup>16</sup>There is no need to impute party positions for parties that did not exist at wave  $t + 1$  (exits), as in all counterfactuals in which positions are set to their value at  $t + 1$ , residuals are also set to their value at  $t + 1$ , which is  $-\infty$ . Hence the counterfactual support for exits will be zero regardless of their position.

<sup>17</sup>Choosing a different decomposition order would fix party positions to their value at time  $t$ . Since we impute the positions for new entrants based on their value in  $t + 1$ , we prefer fixing other party positions at the same time period and not mixing manifestos from time  $t + 1$  for new entrants and time  $t$  for other parties.

explain 44.9% of the overall increase in PRRP support, while party positions and voter attributes explain only 0.0% and 7.1%, respectively. Negative values imply that PRRP support would have been expected to decrease during this period based only on the changes in this component. The remainder of the increase is driven by the residual.

Table ?? shows the results by country. We calculate standard errors for all countries, and for the aggregated results using bootstrap. While there is variation across countries, voter attributes, as well as party positions, cannot explain the rise of PRRP in almost any country.

## 5.1 Robustness Tests

We perform several analyses to verify the robustness of our decomposition results. We start with performing a leave-country-out exercise. For each country, we estimate all model parameters without data on that country ( $\Phi_{-c}, \beta_{-c}$ ). We calculate the vectors of residuals ( $\zeta_{-c}$ ) for each party in that country, such that the predicted voting shares using these parameters would fit the data. We then decompose the rise of PRRP in that country using these parameters in Equation 7.

The results resemble those reported in our main analysis. We aggregate the results from all 18 countries with some PRRP support as before. Figure xxx presents the results. The first row in this figure represents our original decomposition results between the 2005-2009 and the 2017-2020 waves. The next row shows the same decomposition using the leave-country-out exercise. We find that xxx.

Our results remain similar when we replace our baseline model with a bliss point model. Appendix A describes a model where voters have an optimal party position (bliss point), and vote for the party whose positions are closest to that optimal point. Appendix A shows that this model is similar to the model we describe in Section 1, and explains how we estimate the parameters, and perform the decomposition in that case. Row xxx of Figure xxx show that the decomposition results are similar to the decomposition results in our main analysis. In particular, we find that the priority component (the model parameters) explains xxx% of the overall rise in support of PRRP, similar to our main results.

The decomposition results are also robust for different choices of the parameter  $k$ . This parameter sets the number of dimensions we use in the second stage of the estimation (see appendix C). In our main results, we chose  $k = 5$ . The third and fourth row of Figure xxx,

repeats our decomposition analysis when we use  $k = 3$  and  $k = 7$  in our estimation. In these specifications xxx.

The decomposition results are also similar when we only use opinions, and not demographics, as voter attributes. Theoretically, it is possible that while overall changes in attributes contribute only little to the rise of PRRP, this aggregation masks important contributions of both changes in opinions and changes in demographics that are operating in opposite directions, thus canceling one another. To test this, we estimate the model parameters and run the decomposition in a subset of the IVS that excludes all demographic variables. The results of the decomposition are shown in the fifth row of Figure xxx. We find that xxx. This suggests that opinion changes (without demographics) are not an important factor for the rise of PRRP. Therefore, it is not the case where changes in opinions and demographics are strongly affecting the support for PRRP in opposite directions.

Finally, we examine how our results change when we change the order of the decomposition. Following the discussion in section 4, we maintain the order of the last two components (party positions and residuals), and alternate the order of the first two components (voter attributes and priorities). Row xxx in figure xxx shows the results. While qualitatively our results remain similar, there is some increase of xxx% in the importance of voter attributes under this order. This result implies that there is some interaction between changes in priorities and changes in attributes. If cultural issues are not important for voting decisions, then the opinions of voters on these issues will not matter. But when cultural issues gain importance, as we will show in subsection 6.1, changes in these opinions could affect PRRP support. In subsection 6.2 we show that cultural opinions shifted in different directions in different countries. Therefore, while changes in attributes could contribute to the rise of PRRP in some countries, they actually mitigate their rise in others.

## 6 Changes in Each Component

In this section, we discuss additional evidence for the change in each component.

## 6.1 Changes in Voting Priorities

Our decomposition results show that a large share (44.9%) of the increase in support for PRRP is driven by changes in priorities. These are changes in the utility parameters, which shift the voting weights for every given set of demographics and opinions. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the rise in PRRP support is driven primarily not by a change in mass attitudes but rather by the activation of pre-existing attitudes (Bartels, 2017). In this section, we analyze in more detail how priorities changed during this period.

Figure 5 shows that since the early 2000s, voters have come to place more weight on cultural issues. To isolate the changes in priorities from the changes in voters' attributes, we fix the distribution of voters' attributes to its value in the 2017-2020 survey wave. This allows us to capture changes in weights that are driven only by changes in the utility function parameters. The left panel on Figure 5 shows that the distribution of the weights placed on the economy index became more concentrated around zero in 2017-2020. *Ceteris paribus*, the economic positions of parties have become a relatively less decisive in shaping vote choice.

In contrast, the right panel of Figure 5 shows a shift to the right in the weights placed on the cultural index. Fewer voters now place a very negative weight on the cultural index, while more voters place a positive weight. This implies that there are more voters who reward parties for holding conservative cultural positions. Similarly, there are fewer voters who penalize parties for holding conservative cultural positions.

Appendix Figure A.3 shows that the results do not depend on the choice of particular position indices. Figures A.3a and A.3b repeat the exercise in Figure 5 using two alternative definitions for the manifesto indices proposed by Prosser (2014) and Bakker and Hobolt (2013), respectively. For each index, we calculate a corresponding weights index as before, which averages the weight on each individual position, and multiply by -1 positions that enter with a minus sign. The results are qualitatively similar to the results in Figure 5.

Figure 6 shows that there is substantial heterogeneity in how priorities change. Panel A shows the shifts in the weight distribution of the Economic index and Panel B shows the same analysis for the Cultural index. For each subpopulation, we plot the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of the weight distribution. As before, we plot the distributions in 2005-2009 (blue) and in 2017-2020 (yellow), holding voter attributes fixed. The trends in the economic weights are broadly similar across sub-populations, though there are some noticeable changes (e.g.,



the priorities college graduates place on economic positions shifted to the left). In contrast, changes in cultural weights differ across subgroups. The shift in the weights placed on conservative cultural positions is driven by voters who are without a college degree, males, above the age of 66, not union members, and live in rural areas. In contrast, college graduates, females, younger voters, union members, and urban residents did not experience any similar shift to the right, and in some cases their voting weights shifted to the left.

We then directly examine whether prioritizing conservative cultural issues is driven by a reservoir of populist voters. We construct a "PRRP score" that summarizes support for PRRP positions at the individual level. We first run a LASSO regression and predict support for PRRP in the 2017-2020 survey wave based on voters' attributes. We then predict for each voter in each wave whether they would vote for a PRRP based on their attributes and define the standardized fitted value as their PRRP score.<sup>18</sup> Appendix Figure A.4 shows the covariates that are most strongly correlated with the PRRP score, including prioritizing natives and decreased confidence in the EU.

We find that voters have polarized on cultural issues, without changing their opinions. In the bottom facets of panels A and B in Figure 6 we split the sample in two based on the PRRP score of each voter. We define potential PRRP support as voters with an above-median PRRP score and find that the shift to the right of the weight distribution is only apparent for these voters. In contrast, other voters have shifted to the left.

**Reduced-Form Evidence of Changes in Voter Priorities** A major challenge in analyzing priorities is that it is hard to measure them directly. Previous work has tried to measure priorities using surveys that ask respondents to specify what are the most important challenges to the government, or the country in their opinion. These studies have found that cultural topics, and in particular immigration, have become more important to the respondents xxx. This is consistent with our findings on the growing importance of cultural topics.

However, it is possible that at the ballot, voters would prioritize different issues than the ones they mentioned as most important. In most surveys, respondents are asked more

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<sup>18</sup>We ensure that all the country indicators are taken into account in the LASSO regression by forcing the model not to penalize these variables. However, we do not use the country indicators when calculating the PRRP score since our purpose is to capture the attributes at the voter level.

generally about which topics are currently important, and are not asked directly about which issues determine their voting decision. Voters could decide who to vote based on different considerations than the ones they mention as most important for various reasons: because the surveys are not held close to elections, because of campaign efforts ?, because they expect the importance of the issue to decline with time, etc. gr Instead, we begin by analyzing a 'political ideology' question asking participants where they place themselves on a left-right political scale ranging from 1 (left) to 10 (right). One can think of this question as an exercise in dimensionality reduction. Respondents typically have opinions on various issues and this question requires them to decide what are the most important issues determining their ideology.

Figure 7 shows that changes in self-identified political ideology between 2005-2009 and 2017-2020 are much more likely to reflect cultural opinions than economic opinions. To create this figure, we first define indices of cultural and economic opinions based on survey questions. The loading of each variable in each index is determined using principal component analysis (PCA) in order to capture the common dimension between the variables composing the index.<sup>19</sup> Then, using a generalize non-parametric regression, we regress political ideology (the self-identified 1-10 left-right scale) on the culture and economy indices. This allows us to predict ideology for 10,000 combination of culture and economics. Finally, we subtract the differences in these predictions between 2005-2009 and 2017-2020. Brighter colors mean that individual in specific quantiles of the economic and culture indices are predicted to identify as more left-leaning and dark colors mean that they are predicted to identify as more right leaning. In this heat map, the color changes are primarily vertical, with darker colors appearing towards the top and lighter colors towards the bottom. This means that more culturally conservative people (the top of the figure) are now defining themselves as more right-leaning and cultural progressives are now defining themselves as more left-leaning (the bottom of the figure). In contrast, the economic index is almost not associated at all with changes in ideology. Another way to understand this figure is focusing on people who have conflicting view on culture and economics: the top-right and bottom-left corners. These individuals ideological identification is now more likely to reflect their cultural views rather than their economic views.

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<sup>19</sup>Our list of variables composing the economy and cultural indices are specific in Appendix Table A.3.

One advantage of Figure 7 is that the dependent variable, ideology, is not used in our model, and thus the figure provides independent evidence that voters are prioritizing cultural issues. However, ideology is not necessarily related to vote choice. Therefore, in Appendix Figure A.5, we focus on the correlation between the opinions of voters and the positions of parties they vote for.

We find that the correlation between cultural voter opinions and cultural party positions has grown stronger over time, compared to the correlation between economic opinions and economic positions.<sup>20</sup> This figure provides intuition to the kind of variation our model users when estimating  $\Phi$ .

Our findings in this section complement previous work regarding the growing role of priorities on cultural issues in shaping political identities and behavior. De Vries et al. (2013), for instance, analyze survey data from the Netherlands and show that since the early 1980s, political identities have become more weakly associated with voters' redistributive preferences while more strongly tied to their attitudes on immigration. In Germany, analyses of voting behavior within the period covered in our study concluded that "over the last decades, changes in society and party systems have created fertile ground for cultural issues to emerge, compete with, and even surpass traditionally predominant socio-economic issues in the struggle for attention" (Schmitt-Beck et al., 2022, 93). As summarized by Norris and Inglehart (2019), "[T]oday the most heated political issues in Western societies are cultural, dealing with the integration of ethnic minorities, immigration, and border control, Islamic-related terrorism, same-sex marriage and LGBTQ rights." Our findings provide the most comprehensive empirical documentation of the growing importance of cultural issues and its role in driving support for PRRP.

## 6.2 Changes in Voter Attributes

Our finding that both changes in opinions (e.g., growing nativism) and changes in demographics (e.g., increasing unemployment) explain a relatively small share of the increases in PRRP support challenge common narratives, which we presented in Section 4. In this section, we explore this claim in more detail using reduced-form analyses of IVS data.

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<sup>20</sup>The voter indices are created using a PCA, as described for the previous figure. The party position indices are determined using the manifesto indices used throughout the paper. Both positions and opinions are standardized at the country-wave level.

Figure 8 shows that on average voters did not move closer to the positions of PRRP since 2005. We show this using the PRRP score, which summarizes support for PRRP positions at the individual level, which we discussed in the previous section. The thick blue line shows the average value of the PRRP scores across all countries, whereas the thin grey lines show separately the trends in each country. While in specific countries there are some significant trends in public opinion toward (e.g., Hungary) and further away (e.g., Germany) from the populist radical right, there is no clear trend in aggregate. The average difference between these periods is only 2% of the difference between the average PRRP score of PRRP supporters and other voters. Hypothetically it is possible that the PRRP score increased exactly in the countries where PRRP support has been rising. However, if that would have been the case, the decomposition analysis would have found that voter attributes explain some of the rises of PRRP. This demonstrates the importance of broad comparative perspectives in the study of electoral developments such as the rise of PRRP.

Appendix Figure A.6 shows that there is no clear shift in opinions specifically among potential PRRP voters, i.e., voters with a higher PRRP score. We present the mean score among the voters at the top 5, 10, and 20 percentiles of the PRRP score distribution at each country. While there is an increase in the PRRP score among these voters in some countries, the increase does not occur in many other countries that witnessed rising PRRP support.

Examining trends in specific opinions yields similar results. Appendix Figure A.7 focuses on six specific attitudes associated with PRRP support and presents their evolution in each country and in aggregate. Once again, we find that on average, opinions on these topics are relatively stable. In some topics (homosexuality not justifiable) attitudes have become more progressive.

To verify that we are not missing important variables, in Appendix Figure A.8 we take into account all variables and present the opinions that changed the most between 2005 and 2020. Interestingly, some of the most important changes move in the opposite direction of PRRP positions. For example, voters developed less conservative opinions on traditional morality issues, such as abortion and divorce.

To summarize, this section complements the results of our decomposition exercise in challenging the common argument that the rise of PRRP can be explained by changes in voters' demographics and attitudes. Claims that the rise in support for PRRP reflects more

nativist opinions should explain why these opinions are not changing along with PRRP support.

### 6.2.1 The Reservoir of Potential PRRP Voters Across Countries

The stability of public opinion on issues associated with PRRP suggests that a pre-existing reservoir of potential PRRP voters has already existed in the past (Bartels, 2017). The size of this reservoir could vary across countries, which could explain why these parties are more successful in some countries compared to others. However, measuring the size of this reservoir across countries is challenging, as voters in different countries face different options sets nested in different political systems. For example, it is challenging to directly compare a highly fragmented system, where PRRP parties can enter parliament relatively easily, with first-past-the-post systems with a higher barrier for entry (Norris, 2005).

In this section, we use a similar decomposition exercise to measure the size of the PRRP reservoir across countries. For voters in each country, we simulate their counterfactual support for the National Front, had they faced the same choice as voters in France. In other words, we fix the parties, their positions, and the residuals, to the values in France in 2017-2020 and only allow voter attributes to differ across countries. Fixing all other components allows us to consistently compare the size of the reservoir of potential PRRP voters across countries. Formally we calculate the following counterfactual for every country  $c$ :

$$\tilde{S}_P^{t,c} = \int P(\Pi|x_i; \theta_t, Z_t^{France}, \zeta_t^{France}) f_t^c(x_i) dx_i \quad (8)$$

where  $t$  corresponds to the 2017-2020 IVS wave.

We find substantial cross-national variation in the size of the reservoir of potential PRRP voters. Figure 9 presents the counterfactual support for the National Front and finds substantial variation across countries that is consistent with the actual variation in PRRP support (see Figure 2). Potential support for PRRP is smallest in the Nordic countries and largest in Eastern Europe. While differences in voter attributes do not explain the increase in support for PRRP across time, they do explain some of the differences in support across countries.

Figure 9 demonstrates that our method can even calculate the size of the reservoir for non-European countries, such as the United States.<sup>21</sup> As expected, in the U.K. and U.S. we

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<sup>21</sup>For the U.S., we impute all variables related to the European Union to their average level in our sample.

predict much larger counterfactual support for PRRP than exists in the data, probably due to the first-past-the-post systems that put higher barriers for entry in parliament (Fujiwara et al., 2011; Norris, 2005). This suggests that these countries have a large reservoir of potential PRRP voters within the voter base of some non-PRRP.

Appendix Figure A.9 conducts a similar exercise using German parties and presents the counterfactual support for the AfD. The results are similar, demonstrating that our finding in this section is not unique to France. This result also confirms that in our main decomposition analysis, voter attributes do not drive PRRP support because the relevant attributes are relatively stable and not because we cannot measure relevant voters attributes in our data.

### 6.3 Changes in Party Positions

Our decomposition estimates reveal that changes in party positions contribute little to the rise in PRRP support since 2005, in contrast to several theories discussed in Section 4 (but see Vasilopoulou and Zur (2022)). In this section, we further investigate the role of changes over time in parties positions. To guide the discussion, Figure 10 presents changes in the two CMP indices for the five main party categories. We weigh each party by its vote share within a country and then weigh all countries equally to calculate the party positions in a given year. Since elections are typically held every few years we present five-year moving averages.

We find no evidence for convergence in the positions of political parties. Previous work has found that in the 1990s, the economic positions of mainstream parties converged. This left dissatisfied voters without clear alternatives and may have pushed them toward PRRP (Berman, 2021). The top panel of Figure 10 shows that in the time period we study, the economic positions of the center-left and center-right have in fact diverged.

There is also no evidence that PRRP gained votes by moderating their positions. On economic issues, PRRP positions remained stable over time. On cultural issues, which mainly distinguish PRRP from the other party categories, PRRP have only become more extreme, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 10. In order to better understand the shift of PRRP to the cultural right, Appendix Figure A.10 shows the trends for the five positions with the largest distinction between PRRP and other parties. The most substantial change occurred in positive mentions of a national way of life. The PRRP today dedicate almost

10% of their manifestos to this issue, compared to approximately 1%-3% among other party categories. We also find that some of the topics most widely discussed on PRRP platforms, such as negative references to the European Union, internationalism, and multiculturalism, are barely mentioned by other parties.

However, we find some support for the common claim that the left parties shifted even further to the left, which may in turn have alienated working-class voters. During our studied period, the center-left and the greens have shifted to the left on economic issues, while the socialists have shifted substantially to the left on cultural issues. Yet, all in all, the divergence on cultural issues is driven mostly by the cultural shift to the right of the PRRP.

One concern with Figure 10 is that the trend we present could also reflect changes in demand as the weights assigned to every party depend on its vote share. To isolate supply changes, in Figure A.11 we repeat the same exercise, allowing only the party positions to change over time. For every five years, we estimate the average change in positions for each party, weighing every party by its initial support in that five-year period. We then plot the cumulative change for each party category. The results are similar to those reported in Figure 10, suggesting that the trends we find in party positions occurred also within existing parties.

Taken together, the reduced form evidence rules out several, but not all, dominant supply-side hypotheses. Our decomposition results suggest changes in party positions are unlikely to be major drivers of PRRP support or are offset by the other supply-side trends discussed above.

## 6.4 Changes in Residuals

The second substantial component in our decomposition is the residual, which accounts for 48.0% of the overall increase in support for PRRP. As discussed in Section 4, this component captures changes due to various factors including changes in unobserved party positions or valence, model misspecification, and entry of new parties.

In this section, we focus on the entrance of new parties. Figure A.12 shows that the average number of PRRP doubled during the period of our study.<sup>22</sup> We decompose the residual component to measure how much of it is explained by the entry of new parties.

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<sup>22</sup>To create this figure, we use CMP data to count the average number of radical right parties that received at least 1% of the vote across all elections in the past five years and then average the result over all the countries in our sample.

We calculate the same counterfactual as before, where only the residual component changes over time, and other components are held fixed at their initial level in 2005-2009.<sup>23</sup> We then separate the overall support to PRRP ( $\Pi$ ) to support for new PRRP entries ( $\Pi_{new}$ ) and PRRP that already existed in our data in the 2005-2009 wave ( $\Pi_{exist}$ ). Formally, we decompose the residual component to the following two components:

$$\underbrace{\int P(\Pi_{new}|x_i; \theta_t, Z_t^c, \zeta_{t+1}^c) f_t^c(x_i) dx_i - \int P(\Pi_{new}|x_i; \theta_t, Z_t^c, \zeta_t^c) f_t^c(x_i) dx_i}_{\text{New Entries}} + \underbrace{\int P(\Pi_{exist}|x_i; \theta_t, Z_t^c, \zeta_{t+1}^c) f_t^c(x_i) dx_i - \int P(\Pi_{exist}|x_i; \theta_t, Z_t^c, \zeta_t^c) f_t^c(x_i) dx_i}_{\text{Remaining Residual}} \quad (9)$$

We calculate the counterfactual rise of new and existing PRRP in each country and aggregate the results as before. The "New Entries" component measures the counterfactual support for new entries, if they had the same residual as the later waves, instead of a residual of  $-\infty$  that we assigned.

Figure 11 shows that the rise of the residual component is more than fully driven by new parties. We find that on aggregate 65.6% of the overall rise of PRRP is driven by the residual growth of new parties. This is larger than the overall contribution of the residual component. This large residual for new PRRP implies that the actual growth in support for PRRP that recently entered is substantially larger than what we would expect based only on party positions, voter attributes, and voter priorities. In contrast, for existing parties, the residual is actually negative. Hence, based on party positions, voter attributes, and voter priorities we would have expected these parties to grow less.

One interpretation for the residual rise of new entries is an idiosyncratic shock, not directly driven by either supply or demand. The unexplained rise of new entries is less likely to be a supply shock since voters already had the option of supporting PRRP. There are only five countries in our data where the share of support for PRRP was virtually zero in 2005-2009 and rose to a positive value by 2017-2020: Sweden, the UK, Germany, the Czech Republic, and Estonia. In both Sweden and the UK, the Sweden Democrats and UKIP, respectively, participated in elections in the past and failed to garner substantive support. In Germany, the Czech Republic, and Estonia, while the current PRRP were formed more recently, other far-

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<sup>23</sup>Party positions are based on the first available platform for these parties, as before.



right parties attempted to enter the parliament and failed (Mudde, 2007). On the demand side, our counterfactual analysis suggests that demand for such parties already existed in 2005-2009. Yet, these parties still failed to enter. This unexplained rise of new entries could be driven by strategic considerations and coordination failures, such as voters coalescing around a party only when they anticipate that the party will have substantial support (Fredén, 2014).

## 7 Conclusions

There is no lack of explanations for the rise of the populist radical right. Our goal in this manuscript is not to introduce another factor that may increase support for these parties but rather to provide a framework for organizing existing factors into distinct categories—changes in party positions, voter attributes, and voter priorities—and assessing their explanatory power.

We find that growing priorities attached to the issues owned by the PRRP explain their growing electoral appeal. We provide empirical evidence for Bartels (2017) memorable phrasing: PRRP are not surfing into power on a wave of growing nativism and authoritarianism in public opinion; instead, these parties have proved apt at mobilizing pre-existing reservoirs of potential support. This implies that significant electoral changes can occur not only when people change their minds but also when certain issues become more important or salient.

Our analysis is not intended to answer the question of whether the root cause of support for populism is economic or cultural—as the answer is most likely "both" (Gidron and Hall, 2017). Instead, conclusively demonstrate that regardless of what are the root causes for the rise of the PRRP, the mechanism through which they operate is changes in priorities. And While changes in cultural priorities explain support for PRRP, such a change may very well be induced by developments that are primarily economic in nature. For instance, economic changes may have encouraged voters to focus on moral goods (Inglehart, 1981; Enke et al., 2022), and trade shocks may have made cultural cleavages more salient (Bonomi et al., 2021).

Additional factors likely have contributed to changes in voter priorities. While we do not find that changes in party *positions* substantively contributed to the rise of the populist radical right, it may very well be that changes in parties *discourse*—such as greater reliance on populist attacks against elites, not captured in the CMP—may have activated pre-existing

identities in ways that shifted priorities ([Bonikowski and Zhang, 2023](#)). Changes in the media echo-system have also likely played a role: as noted by leading scholars of political communication, the media can't tell people what to think—but it does impact what people think about ([Iyengar and Kinder, 2010](#)). The rise of online social media may have been especially consequential for the turn toward cultural priorities, considering that online discourse often focus on identity related concerns ([Manacorda et al., 2022](#)). Whatever the reason, the change in voters' priorities has dramatically shifted in ways that have reshaped the political map in Europe. Understanding its sources is a promising path for future research.

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
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## Figures and Tables


Figure 1: Support for Populist Radical Right Parties Over Time



*Note:* This figure shows the average vote share of PRRP in the 22 European countries in our data. Within each country, the vote share every year is calculated as the average PRRP vote share among all parties appearing in the CMP dataset in all parliamentary elections in the five years ending in that year. We then calculate the average share across all 22 countries. The grey bars mark years in which the three IVS surveys waves used throughout the paper were held.




Figure 2: Support for Radical Right Parties by Country, 2017-2020 IVS Survey Wave




*Note:* This figure shows the average PRRP support in the 2017-2020 IVS Survey Wave. The actual vote share in the closest election appears in gray in parenthesis. Note that the closest elections can occur several years before or after the survey. The PRRP support and vote share are calculated as a share of all parties supported or voted for that appear in the data.

Figure 3: Voting Weights Distribution by Party Category, 2017-2020




*Note:* This figure shows the distribution of weights voters place on the two party position indices and eight individual manifesto positions in the most recent survey wave (2017-2020) separately for supporters of different party categories. For each combination of party category and index/position, we present the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the corresponding weights distribution. We estimate the model on the 2017-2020 survey wave and for each voter calculate the weights based on her attributes using Equation 1. Weights are in standard deviation to utility units – the increase in utility for an increase of one standard deviation in the position. We aggregate individual weights into indices based on the CMP party position indices (Section 2.1). Specifically, we take a simple average of the weights on all positions used in the CMP index, multiplied by (-1) for left-wing positions. The eight individual presented positions are the ones with the largest variance in weights between supporters of the different party categories. The party categories are described in Section 2.3 and the indices components are described in Appendix Table A.1.

Figure 4: Decomposition of the Rise in Populist Radical Right Support




*Note:* This figure presents the result of our main decomposition exercise. The black bars present the share of the increase in PRRP support between 2005-2009 and 2017-2020, which we pin to 100% overall. We aggregate across all countries with a PRRP support in our data by using a weighted average of their decomposition results (that appear in Figure ??). Weights are the inverse of the share of PRRP support in the 2017-2020 wave.

Figure 5: Changes in the Distribution of Voting Weights, Holding Attributes Fixed




*Note:* This figure shows the distribution of the weights voters place on the economic and cultural indices of party positions for different waves, holding voters' characteristics fixed at their level in 2017-2020. Weights are calculated based on Equation 1, using voter attributes from the 2017-2020 IVS survey, and the estimated utility parameters for the 2005-2009 wave (blue) and 2017-2020 wave (yellow). The weight placed on an index is the average weight corresponding to each party position that comprises the index, where weights for positions that enter the index with a negative sign are multiplied by -1. Weights are in standard deviation to utility units – the increase in utility for an increase of one standard deviation in the index. The indices are discussed in Section 3.3 and their manifesto components are described in Appendix Table A.1.

Figure 6: Voting Weights by Sub-Populations, Holding Attributes Fixed




*Note:* This figure shows the sub-population distribution of the weights voters place on the economic and cultural indices of party positions for different waves. Weights are calculated based on Equation 1, using voter attributes from the 2017-2020 IVS survey, and the estimated utility parameters for the 2005-2009 wave (blue) and 2017-2020 wave (yellow). The voter attributes are held fixed at their level in 2017-2020 so the weights only change due to a change in priorities. Weights are in standard deviation to utility units – the increase in utility for an increase of one standard deviation in the index. The weight placed on an index is the average weight corresponding to each party position that comprises the index, where weights for positions that enter the index with a negative sign are multiplied by -1. The indices are discussed in Section 3.3 and their manifesto components are described in Appendix Table A.1 Potential PRRP supporters (other voters) are voters with a PRRP score above (below) the median. See Section 6.1 for further details on PRRP score.

Figure 7: Change in predicted self political identification




*Note:* The figure shows the change in the predicted self political-identification between the 2005-2009 survey wave to the 2017-2020 one as a function of voters' culture and economic opinions, as summarized by the two corresponding indexes. For each wave separately, we use a non-parametric regression model to predict self political-identification (higher values are associated with more right-wing positions), based on the voter's economic and cultural indices. We then subtract the prediction of the earlier wave from the latter. The economic and cultural indexes are xxx. The four contour lines mark the values of 0, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3.

Figure 8: Voters' PRRP Score Over Time



*Note:* This figure presents the average voters' PRRP score by survey wave. The score is calculated by running a LASSO regression predicting PRRP support. The regression is run on the most recent survey and includes all IVS variables in our final dataset, along with country fixed effects, with no penalty on the country coefficient. To calculate the PRRP score we standardize the fitted value based on the regression coefficients (excluding country) with each country-wave weighted equally. We pin the mean value in the 2005-2009 wave to zero in all countries. The gray thin lines show the trend in each country, while the blue thick line is the average across all 22 countries.


Figure 9: Counterfactual Support for the National Front by Voter Attributes



*Note:* This figure calculates the counterfactual support for the National Front in the 2017-2020 wave if French voters had the attributes of voters in other countries. We calculate the counterfactual separately for each country based on the formula in Equation 8. In all countries, we use the party positions of French parties in the 2017-2020 wave ( $Z_t^{France}$ ) along with the estimated residuals for French parties ( $\zeta_t^{France}$ ) and the model parameters that were estimated for this wave ( $\hat{\Phi}_t, \hat{\beta}_t$ ). For each country, we predict the share of National Front supporters according to the voter attributes in that country. For the U.S. sample, we impute the responses for the IVS question related to the European Union based on the sample average.




Figure 10: Changes in Party Positions Over Time



*Note:* This figure shows the changes in party position indices for five party categories (PRRP, Center-Right, Center-Left, Socialist, and Green) since 2005 using the CMP data (see Section 2.3 for classification details). Indices measure the net share of the manifesto dedicated to right-wing positions. Each index is constructed by adding conservative party positions and subtracting liberal positions such that positive values reflects more support for a free market or more conservative cultural values. The indices are discussed in Section 2.1 and their manifesto components are described in Appendix Table A.1. The figure presents the moving average values for each index and group of parties for five-year periods. Each country is weighted equally, and parties within each country are weighted by their voting shares.

Figure 11: Decomposition With New Entries



*Note:* This figure presents the result of our decomposition exercise, where the residual component is further decomposed into residual of new PRRP entries, and the remaining residuals (Equation 9). We calculate the residual component in Equation 7 separately for PRRP that appeared in our data in the first wave (2005-2009) and those that did not. The black bars present the share of the increase in PRRP support between 2005-2009 and 2017-2020, which we pin to 100% overall. We aggregate across all countries with PRRP support by using a weighted average of their decomposition results. Weights are the inverse of the share of radical right support in the 2017-2020 wave.

Table 1: CMP Descriptive Statistics

	2005-2009		2017-2020	
	PRRP	Other Parties	PRRP	Other Parties
Party Economic Positions Index	-5.9	-8.7	-6.5	-16.0
Party Cultural Positions Index	13.5	-7.8	20.2	-8.0
<b>Top 10 Distinctive Variables</b>				
European Community/Union: Negative	3.0	0.3	3.6	0.6
Internationalism: Negative	1.4	0.1	1.2	0.1
Multiculturalism: Negative	3.4	0.6	2.8	0.9
National Way of Life: Positive	5.3	1.5	11.1	2.4
Traditional Morality: Positive	2.8	1.2	3.1	0.7
Military: Positive	3.1	1.4	3.8	1.8
Law and Order: Positive	7.4	4.5	6.9	4.0
European Community/Union: Positive	0.6	2.3	0.4	1.8
Protectionism: Positive	1.2	0.1	0.9	0.5
Equality: Positive	3.3	5.8	3.1	6.8

*Note:* This table provides descriptive statistics on variables in the CMP data. The first two rows show the averages of the two party position indices and the next ten rows focus on the ten positions with the largest difference between PRRP and other parties. The first two columns present the averages of each variable in 2005-2009 and the last two columns present the averages in 2017-2020. Each variable represents the percentile share of sentences in the platform mentioning the position. The indices are net shares: the difference between the share dedicated to right-wing positions and left-wing positions. See Appendix Table A.1 for further details on each position, as well as a list of variables included in the two indices.

Table 2: IVS Descriptive Statistics

	2005-2009		2017-2020	
	PRRP Supporters	Other Parties	PRRP Supporters	Other Parties
<b>Demographics</b>				
College education	0.16	0.29	0.21	0.40
Age	45.83	50.04	51.02	52.48
Male	0.53	0.47	0.53	0.45
Right Wing	0.66	0.41	0.74	0.42
Urban	0.21	0.27	0.18	0.25
<b>Most Distinctive Opinions</b>				
Confidence in EU	-0.13	0.07	-0.53	0.04
Jobs should prioritize natives	0.46	-0.03	0.55	-0.13
Don't want immigrant neighbors	0.14	-0.08	0.55	-0.04
Confidence in press	-0.11	0.05	-0.36	0.03
Confidence in UN	-0.14	0.06	-0.42	0.03

*Note:* This table provides descriptive statistics on variables in the Integrated Values Survey data. The first two columns present the averages of each variable in 2005-2009 and the last two columns present the averages in 2017-2020. The first five rows include five main demographic variables. We define urban as living in a city with more than 100,000 people and right-wing as a self-identified ideology that is more conservative than the median. The next rows show the average of each voter opinion variable for the ten most distinctive opinions. All opinion variables are in units of standard deviations from the mean. We rank the most distinctive opinions using a variable importance exercise from a random forest prediction of whether each voter is a PRRP supporter.

# Appendix

## A Bliss Point Model

In this section, we discuss the similarities between our model and a simple bliss-point model. We then discuss how we estimate the parameters of the bliss point model for our robustness analysis in Section 5.1.

Assume that voters have a bliss point which is an affine transformation of their observables,  $Ax_i + b$ . Voters support parties that are closest to their bliss point. Formally, define the distance between two vectors of party positions as

$$\text{dist}(u, v)^2 = (u - v)'D(u - v)$$

where  $D$  is a diagonal matrix with weakly positive diagonal representing the relative importance of different party position combinations in this model. Using this distance function, we can define the bliss-point utility function as

$$U_{ij} = \text{dist}(z_j, Ax_i + b)^2 + \zeta_j + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

We define  $\Phi = -2A^T D$ , and define  $\delta_j = (z_j - 2b)'Dz_j + \zeta_j$ . We can then write the utility function as

$$U_{ij} = x_i \Phi z_j' + \delta_j$$

which is exactly the utility function we estimate in the first stage (Equation 3). Therefore, our estimation of the first stage will be identical to the case of a bliss-point model.

In contrast, our estimation of the second stage will need to adjust for accommodating quadratic terms. Specifically, we rewrite  $\delta$  as

$$\delta_{j,t} = \gamma_t z_{j,t}^2 + \beta_t z_{j,t} + \eta_j + \nu_{j,t}$$

where  $z_{j,t}^2 = ((z_{j,t}^1)^2, \dots, (z_{j,t}^L)^2)$  is the vector of party positions squared. Similar to section 3.2, taking the difference between two consecutive survey waves, we get the following equation that extends Equation 5 to the quadratic case:

$$\Delta_t^{t+1} \delta_j = \underbrace{\Delta_t^{t+1} \gamma \bar{z}_j^2 + \Delta_t^{t+1} \beta \bar{z}_j}_{\text{Voter Priorities}} + \underbrace{\bar{\gamma} \Delta_t^{t+1} z_j^2 + \bar{\beta} \Delta_t^{t+1} z_j}_{\text{Party Positions}} + \underbrace{\Delta_t^{t+1} \nu_j}_{\text{Residual}}$$

We follow a similar procedure to reduce the dimensionality of the party positions vectors, as described in Section 3.2 and Appendix C. We use the same dimension reduction technique for  $z_{j,t}$  and  $z_{j,t}^2$ : we first reduce the dimension of  $z_{j,t}$  to  $k$  as before, and we then take the squares of the reduced dimension vector. We choose  $k = 3$ , such that in total,  $\Delta_t^{t+1} \delta_j$  is a linear function of  $2k = 6$  variables, similar to the 5-dimensional  $z$  vectors we had in the linear case.

In section 5.1 we present decomposition results using the above bliss-point model. In that exercise, we estimate the parameters  $\theta_t = (\Phi_t, \beta_t, \gamma_t)$  as explained. We then decompose the rise of PRRP using Equation 7 as before. The only difference from our original decomposition is that the priority component now includes a the parameter  $\gamma$  as well.

## B Data Appendix

### B.1 Data Processing

We clean categorical variables in the IVS data to keep the number of potential categories reasonable and merge similar variables when possible. For example, we aggregate the answers to the question asking the respondent about her religion to the following variables: Protestant, Catholic, other Christian, Muslim, Jew, Hindu, Buddhist, and other.

For all variables, we impute missing values using random forests for each country-wave separately. When a value is missing for an entire country-wave, we typically exclude the variable from our final dataset. In rare cases, where the variable is available for almost all other countries in all survey waves, we impute the values for the specific missing country-wave using the nearest survey waves for that country. When the variable is available in both a proceeding and a succeeding wave, we impute the variable as a linear interpolation of the mean values in each of these waves, according to the year when each survey was taken. When the variable is available in only a proceeding or a succeeding wave, we impute the missing data as the mean value of the available wave. For the imputation process, we also use three additional survey waves conducted before 2005.

We use the data provided survey weights in all of our analyses with minor modifications. We multiply the weights by a constant for each country, such that every country would have equal weight in aggregate. In countries that had two surveys in the same wave (both EVS, and WVS) we multiply the weights in all observations by a different constant for each survey, such that both surveys will have equal weight on aggregate for this country-wave combination.

The full list of IVS variables along with the way they were coded is described in Appendix Table A.3.

### B.2 Merging Datasets

We merge party data across the various datasets using PartyFacts (Döring and Regel, 2019) when possible and manually in other cases. In order to assign party positions to parties in the IVS data, we first match each party with a party in the CMP data and then in each survey wave assign the party positions from the closest election. The closest election is determined based on the distance between the mean date when a survey was conducted in a country-year and the date when the election was conducted. We define the party position as missing if no CMP data is available five years before or after the survey.

Although an IVS wave may be composed of both an EVS wave and a WVS wave that were not necessarily conducted at same year we assign each IVS wave a single date for the merge. We do so in order to assign a single manifesto to each party. However, calculating the mean date at the EVS/WVS wave level would have changed the assigned manifesto of a party only in a handful of cases and would not have changed the set of observations we are able to match to CMP data within five years.

Overall we match 94% of the IVS respondents who supported a specific party with a manifesto within 5 years from the survey date and 92% are matched with a manifesto in the closest election to the survey date. We do not match all parties due to the following reasons: a party may not publish a manifesto, the manifesto of the party may not be coded in CMP,<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>CMP codes manifestos for parties receiving at least 1 seat in the elections for the lower house in Western

a party may run in an alliance, and a party may have existed when the survey was conducted but not during the election.

When parties change names or run in various coalitions, it is often not clear if a new party was established or whether the same party runs in a different name or constellations. We follow the CMP to deal with this issue and define unique parties according to their CMP id. The CMP also indicates when one party is a successor of another. However, there are only three pairs of parties where both the predecessor and the successor parties appear in our data and therefore we do not merge predecessor and successor parties.

## C Estimation Appendix

In this section, we discuss the dimension reduction in our second step estimation of the  $\beta$  parameter. We assume that the combinations of party positions that generate differences in utility among voters are the same factors that determine the average utility across all voters. Formally, the voting weights for every voter are given by Equation 1. Using  $\Phi_t = U_t \Sigma_t V_t^T$  to describe the singular value decomposition of matrix  $\Phi_t$ , this can be written as  $w_t(x_i) = x_i U_t \Sigma_t V_t^T + \beta_t$ . Defining  $\tilde{\beta} = \beta V$  we can write  $w_t(x) = (x_i U_t \Sigma_t + \tilde{\beta}_t) V_t^T$ . Since we restrict the nuclear norm of  $\Phi$  in the first stage, the last components of  $x_i U \Sigma$  would be close to zero (assuming the diagonal of  $\Sigma$  is ordered). Similarly, we restrict  $\tilde{\beta}$  such that only the first  $k$  components are different from zero. Therefore,  $\beta_t$  has to be a linear combination of the first  $k$  components in matrix  $V$ , such that  $\beta_t \in \text{span}\{[V_t]_k\}$ .<sup>25</sup> We choose  $k = 5$  though other values yield similar results.


We estimate the parameters of Equation 6 using a linear regression. The independent variables are the  $k$  linear combinations  $([V_t]_k)$  of  $\bar{z}_j, \Delta_t^{t+2} z_j$ . The average is taken on all survey waves available for this party, and the difference is between the 2017-2020 and 2005-2009 survey waves. We weight each party by its overall vote share. Applying the transpose linear transformation on the regression coefficients yields the parameters  $\bar{\beta}, \Delta_t^{t+2} \beta$ .

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Europe and 2 seats in elections in Central and Eastern Europe. In some cases, the platforms of parties that met these conditions in the past are also coded.

<sup>25</sup>Using the first  $k$  components in an SVD of a matrix yields the best approximation for the matrix for the Frobenius norm based on the Eckart–Young–Mirsky Theorem.


Figure A.1: Correlation Between Party Voters



*Note:* This figure presents the similarities between voters of different parties. For each party, we use a linear regression to predict support for that party based on each voter’s attributes, using data from the IVS. Then for every two parties, we calculate the correlation between the fitted values among all voters in both of the parties’ countries. For example, to find the correlation between AfD and the National Front, we estimate the correlation between the fitted probability that voters in both France and Germany will support AfD and the fitted probability that those voters will support the National Front, where both fitted probabilities are a linear prediction based only on their attributes. The labels show the average correlation between all parties in each family. We determine whether a party is PRRP based on the PopuList dataset classification of radical-right parties. We adopt the PopuList definition for the populist left and other populists. We classify the remaining parties into categories based on the CMP data as explained in Section 2.3. We present all parties in our data that received support from at least 50 respondents.




Figure A.2: Largest Coefficients Placed on the Economic and Cultural index




*Note:* This figure presents the prominent coefficients on the IVS variables generating the weights for the economic and cultural index. We calculate weights on individual party positions using Equation 1. We aggregate individual weights into indices based on the party position indices suggested by the CMP (Section 2.1). Specifically, we take a simple average of the weights on all positions used in the CMP index, multiplied by (-1) for left-wing positions. Together, this generates two linear function from the voter attributes to their weights on both indices. For each index, we present the ten largest coefficients, in absolute value. We include a (-) sign for variables with a negative coefficient.

Figure A.3: Changes in the Distribution of Voting Weights, Holding Attributes Fixed, Alternative Culture and Economics Indices

(a) Prosser (2014)




(b) Bakker and Hobolt (2013)




*Note:* This figure shows the distributions of the weights voters place on two alternative definitions for the manifesto indices proposed by (a) Prosser (2014) and (b) Bakker and Hobolt (2013), holding voters' characteristics fixed at their level in 2017–2020. Weights are calculated based on Equation 1, using voter attributes from the 2017–2020 IVS survey, and the estimated utility parameters for the 2005–2009 wave (solid blue) and 2017–2020 wave (dashed yellow). The weight placed on an index is the average weight corresponding to each party position that comprises the index, where weights for positions that enter the index with a negative sign are multiplied by -1. Weights are in standard deviation to utility units – the increase in utility for an increase of one standard deviation in the index.

Figure A.4: Covariates Most Strongly Correlated with the PRRP Score




*Note:* This figure presents the voter attributes most strongly correlated with the PRRP score. The score is calculated by running a LASSO regression predicting PRRP support. The regression is run on the 2017-2020 survey wave and includes all IVS variables in our final dataset, along with country fixed effects, with no penalty on the country coefficient. To calculate the PRRP score we standardize the fitted value based on the regression coefficients (excluding country) with each country-wave weighted equally.

Figure A.5: Correlations Between Voters' Opinions and Party Positions Over Time




*Note:* This figure....

Figure A.6: Voters' PRRP Score By Country




*Note:* This figure presents the voters' PRRP score by country and survey wave, along with the average score for the voters with the highest score. For more details on the PRRP score, see Figure 8.

Figure A.7: Evolution of Specific Opinions over Time




*Note:* This figure shows the evolution of six specific voter opinions over time. Each thin gray line shows the trend in a single country and the thick bold blue lines show the average across all 22 countries, with all countries weighted equally. We standardize the variables within each country using means and standard deviations from the 2005-2009 IVS wave. We omit Italy from the question regarding the justifiability of homosexuality since it was not asked in the country in 2005-2009. For more details on each variable see Appendix Table A.3.

Figure A.8: Opinions that Changed the Most, 2005-2020



*Note:* This figure shows the opinions that changed the most between 2005 and 2020. We run a separate regression of every opinion variable on the survey year and country fixed effects. Each dot represents the time coefficient in this regression. 95% confidence intervals are reported.


Figure A.9: Counterfactual Support for the AfD by Voter Attributes



*Note:* This figure calculates the counterfactual support for the AfD in the 2017-2020 wave if German voters had the attributes of voters in other countries. We calculate the counterfactual separately for each country based on a formula similar to Equation 8. For more details see Figure 9.




Figure A.10: Changes in Most Distinctive Party Positions Over Time




*Note:* This figure shows the average position by party category for the six positions with the largest difference between PRRP and other parties. The manifesto variables are described in Appendix Table A.1. The figure presents the moving average values for each position for five-year periods for each party category. Each country is weighted equally, and parties within each country are weighted by their voting shares.

Figure A.11: Within-Party Position Changes



*Note:* This figure shows the cumulative within-party changes of the two CMP party position indices by party category. The manifesto components that comprise each index are described in Appendix Table A.1. The figure presents cumulative average changes within each party since 2005. In particular, for each five-year period we first compute position changes at the party level. We then aggregate the change across parties and countries. Each country is weighted equally, and parties within each country are weighted by their average voting shares in the previous period. We present the cumulative change, summarizing all changes since 2005. Note that the set of parties is not identical across period. Therefore, the figure is mostly useful when analyzing the change between two consecutive periods.

Figure A.12: Average Number of PRRP by Country



*Note:* This figure shows the average number of PRRP that received at least 1% of the vote share by country. Within each country, the number of PRRP in each year is calculated as the average number of PRRP receiving at least 1% of the vote in all parliamentary elections in the five years ending that year, based on the CMP data. We then calculate the average number across all 22 countries, with all countries weighted equally.

Table A.1: CMP Party Positions

Variable	Description	CMP		Prosser (2014)		Bakker and Hobolt (2013)	
		Econ.	Soc.	Econ.	Soc.	Econ.	Lib.-Auth.
Foreign Special Relationships: Positive (per101)	Favourable mentions of particular countries with which the manifesto country has a special relationship; the need for co-operation with and/or aid to such countries						
Foreign Special Relationships: Negative (per102)	Negative mentions of particular countries with which the manifesto country has a special relationship						
Anti-Imperialism (per103)	Negative references to imperial behaviour and/or negative references to one state exerting strong influence over other states						
Military: Positive (per104)	The importance of external security and defence						
Military: Negative (per105)	Negative references to the military or use of military power to solve conflicts				-		
Peace (per106)	Any declaration of belief in peace and peaceful means of solving crises absent reference to the military				-		
Internationalism: Positive (per107)	Need for international co-operation, including co-operation with specific countries other than those coded in Foreign Special Relationships				-		
European Community/Union: Positive (per108)	Favourable mentions of European Community/Union in general						
Internationalism: Negative (per109)	Negative references to international co-operation				+		
European Community/Union: Negative (per110)	Negative references to the European Community/Union						
Freedom and Human Rights (per201)	Favourable mentions of importance of personal freedom and civil rights in the manifesto and other countries		-		-		-
Democracy (per202)	Favourable mentions of democracy as the only game in town		-		-		-
Constitutionalism: Positive (per203)	Support for maintaining the status quo of the constitution						
Constitutionalism: Negative (per204)	Opposition to the entirety or specific aspects of the manifesto country's constitution						
Decentralization (per301)	Support for federalism or decentralisation of political and/or economic power				-		
Centralisation (per302)	General opposition to political decision-making at lower political levels				+		
Governmental and Administrative Efficiency (per303)	Need for efficiency and economy in government and administration and/or the general appeal to make the process of government and administration cheaper and more efficient						
Political Corruption (per304)	Need to eliminate political corruption and associated abuses of political and/or bureaucratic power						
Political Authority (per305)	References to the manifesto partys competence to govern and/or other partys lack of such competence				+		+
Free Market Economy (per401)	Favourable mentions of the free market and free market capitalism as an economic model	+		+		+	
Incentives: Positive (per402)	Favourable mentions of supply side oriented economic policies	+				+	
Market Regulation (per403)	Support for policies designed to create a fair and open economic market	-		-		-	

Table A.1: CMP Party Positions (*continued*)

Variable	Description	CMP		Prosser (2014)		Bakker and Hobolt (2013)	
		Econ.	Soc.	Econ.	Soc.	Econ.	Lib.-Auth.
Economic Planning (per404)	Favourable mentions of long-standing economic planning by the government	-				-	
Corporatism/Mixed Economy (per405)	Favourable mentions of cooperation of government, employers, and trade unions simultaneously	-				-	
Protectionism: Positive (per406)	Favourable mentions of extending or maintaining the protection of internal markets	-				-	
Protectionism: Negative (per407)	Support for the concept of free trade and open markets	+		+		+	
Economic Goals (per408)	Broad and general economic goals that are not mentioned in relation to any other category						
Keynesian Demand Management (per409)	Favourable mentions of demand side oriented economic policies	-				-	
Economic Growth: Positive (per410)	The paradigm of economic growth	+				+	
Technology and Infrastructure: Positive (per411)	Importance of modernisation of industry and updated methods of transport and communication			-			
Controlled Economy (per412)	Support for direct government control of economy	-		-		-	
Nationalisation (per413)	Favourable mentions of government ownership of industries, either partial or complete; calls for keeping nationalised industries in state hand or nationalising currently private industries	-		-		-	
Economic Orthodoxy (per414)	Need for economically healthy government policy making	+		+		+	
Marxist Analysis (per415)	Positive references to Marxist-Leninist ideology and specific use of Marxist-Leninist terminology by the manifesto party	-				-	
Anti-Growth Economy: Positive (per416)	Favourable mentions of anti-growth politics				-		-
Environmental Protection (per501)	General policies in favour of protecting the environment, fighting climate change, and other green policies				-		-
Culture: Positive (per502)	Need for state funding of cultural and leisure facilities including arts and sport				-		-
Equality: Positive (per503)	Concept of social justice and the need for fair treatment of all people		-	-		-	
Welfare State Expansion (per504)	Favourable mentions of need to introduce, maintain or expand any public social service or social security scheme	-		-		-	
Welfare State Limitation (per505)	Limiting state expenditures on social services or social security	+		+		+	
Education Expansion (per506)	Need to expand and/or improve educational provision at all levels	-		-		-	
Education Limitation (per507)	Limiting state expenditure on education	+		+		+	
National Way of Life: Positive (per601)	Favourable mentions of the manifesto country's nation, history, and general appeals		+		+		+
National Way of Life: Negative (per602)	Unfavourable mentions of the manifesto country's nation and history		-		-		-
Traditional Morality: Positive (per603)	Favourable mentions of traditional and/or religious moral values		+				+

Table A.1: CMP Party Positions (*continued*)

Variable	Description	CMP		Prosser (2014)		Bakker and Hobolt (2013)	
		Econ.	Soc.	Econ.	Soc.	Econ.	Lib.-Auth.
Traditional Morality: Negative (per604)	Opposition to traditional and/or religious moral values		-			-	
Law and Order: Positive (per605)	Favourable mentions of strict law enforcement, and tougher actions against domestic crime		+			+	
Civic Mindedness: Positive (per606)	Appeals for national solidarity and the need for society to see itself as united					+	
Multiculturalism: Positive (per607)	Favourable mentions of cultural diversity and cultural plurality within domestic societies		-		-	-	
Multiculturalism: Negative (per608)	The enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration		+		+	+	
Labour Groups: Positive (per701)	Favourable references to all labour groups, the working class, and unemployed workers in general	-		-		-	
Labour Groups: Negative (per702)	Negative references to labour groups and trade unions	+		+		+	
Agriculture and Farmers: Positive (per703)	Specific policies in favour of agriculture and farmers						
Middle Class and Professional Groups (per704)	General favourable references to the middle class		+		-		
Underprivileged Minority Groups (per705)	Very general favourable references to underprivileged minorities who are defined neither in economic nor in demographic terms				-	-	
Non-economic Demographic Groups (per706)	General favourable mentions of demographically defined special interest groups of all kinds				-	-	

*Note:* This table presents the descriptions of all major (three-digit) CMP positions. All of these positions were included in the decomposition exercise. The third and fourth columns show which positions are part of the economic and cultural indices. The CMP indices are the primary indices used in the paper and refer to the economic and social indices suggested by the comparative Manifesto Project. Prosser refers to the economic and Social index proposed in (Prosser, 2014), Bakker and Hobolt refers to the Economic and Libertarian-Authoritarian indices proposed in (Bakker and Hobolt, 2013).

Table A.2: IVS Data

IVS Wave	Countries	Parties	PRRP	Observations	PRRP Support Share
2005-2009	22	147	19	26,140	0.11
2010-2014	7	51	6	6,373	0.12
2017-2021	22	170	28	27,097	0.18

*Note:* This table provides descriptive statistics on the final dataset analyzed. Each row represents an Integrated Values Survey wave. The observations include only respondents who were successfully matched with the Comparative Manifesto Project data. PRRP support share is the average support for PRRP taken over the 22 countries.

Table A.3: IVS Variables

Variable	Description	Coding and notes	Index
<b>Demographics</b>			
Town size	Size of town where the interview was conducted	The possible answers depended on the exact survey: {2,000 and less; under 5,000; 2,000-5,000; 5,000-10,000; 10,000-20,000; 5,000-20,000; 20,000-50,000; 50,000-100,000; 20,000-100,000; 100,000-500,000; 500,000 and more}. For every range of town size we use the log of the average of the two bounds. for the top category, for which we have no upper bound, we calculated the log of the minimum value multiplied by 8.35 (Rosen and Resnick, 1980). For Germany, the 2011-2013 wave is imputed based on the 2005-2009 and 2017-2020 waves. For Iceland, the 2005-2009 wave is imputed based on the 1999-2004 and 2017-2020 waves. For the Netherlands, the 2017-2020 wave is imputed based on the 2011-2013 wave. For the UK, the 2017-2020 wave is imputed based on the 2005-2009 wave. For the US, the 2011-2013 wave is imputed based on the 2005-2009 and 2017-2020 waves.	
Religious	"Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are..." A religious person, Not a religious person, A convinced atheist	1 = A religious person, 0 = {All other options}	
Athiest		1 = A convinced atheist, 0 = {All other options}	
Male	Respondent's sex	1 = Male, 0 = Female	
Age	"This means you are _____ years old (write in age in two digits)."	Open numeric response	
Married or living together	"Are you currently...": Married, Living together as married, Divorced, Separated, Widowed, Single	1 = {Married; Living together as married; Living apart but steady relation (married,cohabitation)}, 0 = {All other options}	
Divorced, separated, or widow		1 = {Divorced; Separated; Widowed; Divorced, Separated or Widow}, 0 = {All other options}	
Single		1 = {Single/Never married}, 0 = {All other options}	
Number of children	"How many children have you ever had", "How many children do you have - deceased children not included" (EVS 2008-2010)	Open numeric response. For the US, the 2005-2009 wave is imputed based on the 1999-2004 and 2011-2013 waves.	
Employment status	"Are you employed now or not? If yes, about how many hours a week? If more than one job: only for the main job" Scale: Yes, has paid employment = {Full time employee (30 hours a week or more); Part time employee (less than 30 hours a week); Self employed}. No, no paid employment = {Retired/pensioned; Housewife not otherwise employed; Student; Unemployed}	2 = {Full time; Self employed}, 1 = Part time, 0 = {Retired; Housewife; Students; Unemployed}	
Self-employed		1 = Self employed, 0 = {All other options}	
Retired		1 = Retired, 0 = {All other options}	
Housewife		1 = Housewife, 0 = {All other options}	
Student		1 = Student, 0 = {All other options}	
Unemployed		1 = Unemployed, 0 = {All other options}	



Table A.3: IVS Variables (*continued*)

Variable	Description	Coding and notes	Index
Other employment		1 = Other, 0 = {All other options}	
Income decile	"On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in."	1 = Lower step, 2...9, 10 = Higher step. For Portugal, the 2017-2020 wave is imputed based on the 2005-2009 wave.	
Protestant	"Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination?. If yes, which one?"	1 = Protestant, 0 = {All other options}	
Catholic		1 = Roman Catholic, 0 = {All other options}	
Muslim		1 = Muslim, 0 = {All other options}	
Other type of Christian		1 = {Other Christian (Evangelical/Pentecostal/Free church/etc.); Orthodox (Russian/Greek/etc.)}, 0 = {All other options}	
No religion/atheist		1 = Do not belong to a denomination, 0 = {All other options}	
Jew		1 = Jew, 0 = {All other options}	
Other religion		1 = {Other; Buddhist; Hindu}, 0 = {All other options}	
Education level	"What is the highest educational level that you have attained?"	The possible answers to this question depend on the survey wave. We coded education into six levels: 0 = {Inadequately completed elementary education; Not applicable/No formal education; ISCED 0/ no education; Less than primary}, 1 = {Completed (compulsory) elementary education; ISCED 1; Primary}, 2 = {Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type; Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type/Secondary; ISCED 2; Lower secondary}, 3 = {Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type/secondary; Complete secondary: university-preparatory type/full secondary; ISCED 3; Upper secondary}, 4 = {Some university without degree/higher education - lower-level tertiary; ISCED 4; ISCED 5; Post-secondary non tertiary; Short-cycle tertiary}, 5 = {University with degree/higher education - upper-level tertiary; ISCED 6, ISCED 7; ISCED 8; Bachelor or equivalent; Master or equivalent; Doctoral or equivalent}.	
Education years	"At what age did you (or will you) complete your full time education, either at school or at an institution of higher education?"	Open numeric response. Winsorized at 70. For Greece, the 2017-2020 wave is imputed from the 2005-2009 wave. For the US, the 2017-2020 wave is imputed from the 2011-2013 wave.	
<b>Behavioral</b>			
Frequency of attending religious services	"Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?"	0 = Never practically never, 1 = Less often, 2 = Once a year, 3 = Other specific holy days, 4 = Only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days, 5 = Once a month, 6 = Once a week, 7 = More than once a week.	

Table A.3: IVS Variables (*continued*)

Variable	Description	Coding and notes	Index
Member environment organization	"Now I am going to read out a list of voluntary organizations; for each one, could you tell me whether you are a member, an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?" In the 1989-1993 and 1999-2000 Waves, possible answers were Mentioned and Not mentioned. Environmental organization.	1 = {Active member; Mentioned}, 0 = {Not a member; Inactive member; Not mentioned}	
Member of labor union	Labour union		
Member of religious organization	Church or religious organization		
Member of sports organization	Sport or recreational organization, football, baseball, rugby team		
Member of artistic organization	Art, music or educational organization		
Member of political party	Political party		
Member of professional organization	Professional association		
Member of other organization	Other organization	Same as above. For Germany, the 2011-2013 wave is imputed based on the 2005-2009 and 2017-2020 waves.	
Willing to sign petition	"Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it." Signing a petition	0 = Would never do, 1 = Might do, 2 = Have done	
Willing to join boycott	Joining in boycotts		
Willing to demonstrate	Attending peaceful demonstrations		
Willing to join strike	Joining strikes	Same as above. For the US, the 2005-2009 wave is imputed based on the 1999-2004 and 2011-2013 waves.	
<b>Opinions</b>			
Respect for authority	"Here is a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind?:" Greater respect for authority	0 = Bad thing, 1 = Don't mind, 2 = Good thing	Cul.
Jobs should prioritize natives	"Do you agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree with the following statements?" When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants.	0 = Disagree, 1 = Neither, 2 = Agree	Cul.
Men job priority over women	When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women	0 = Disagree, 1 = Neither, 2 = Agree. For Greece the 2017-2020 wave is imputed based on the 2005-2009 wave.	
Prefer private business ownership	"Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between." Private vs state ownership of business	1 = Private ownership of business should be increased, 2...9, 10 = Government ownership of business should be increased	
Personal over govt responsibility	Government responsibility	1 = The government should take more responsibility, 2...9, 10 = People should take more responsibility	Econ.
Competition in markets is good	Competition good or harmful	1 = Competition is harmful, 2...9, 10 = Competition is good	Econ.
Oppose redistribution	Income equality	1 = Incomes should be made more equal, 2...9, 10 = We need larger income differences as incentive.	Econ.

Table A.3: IVS Variables (*continued*)

Variable	Description	Coding and notes	Index
Country needs strong leader	"I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?" Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections	0 = Very bad, 1 = Fairly bad, 2 = Fairly good, 3 = Very good	Cul.
Experts should decide over govt.	Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country		
Like idea of army rule	Having the army rule		Cul.
Like idea of democracy	Having a democratic political system		Cul.
Pride in nationality	"How proud are you to be of nationality of this country?"	0 = Not at all proud, 1 = Not very proud, 2 = Quite proud, 3 = Very proud, missing = Not applicable/ Foreigner/ Has not [country] nationality	Cul.
Happiness	"Taking all things together, would you say you are:	0 = Not at all happy, 1 = Not very happy, 2 = Quite happy, 3 = Very happy.	
Trust other people	"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?"	0 = Can't be too careful, 1 = Most people can be trusted	
Life satisfaction	"All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Please use this card to help with your answer."	0 = Dissatisfied, 1...8, 9 = Satisfied	
Have freedom of choice	"Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means 'none at all' and 10 means 'a great deal' to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out."	1 = None at all, 2...9, 10 = A great deal	
Importance of family	"For each of the following aspects, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is very important, rather important, not very important or not important at all" Family	0 = Not at all important, 1 = Not very important, 2 = Rather important, 3 = Very important	
Importance of friends	Friends		
Importance of leisure time	Leisure time		
Importance of politics	Politics		
Importance of work	Work		
Importance of religion	Religion		
State of health	"All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? Would you say it is..."	0 = Very poor, 1 = Poor, 2 = Fair, 3 = Good, 4 = Very good	
Importance of children's hard work	"Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five." Hard work	0 = Not mentioned, 1 = Important.	
Importance of children's responsibility	Feeling of responsibility		
Importance of children's imagination	Imagination		
Importance of children's respect	Tolerance and respect for other people		
Importance of children's thrift	Thrift saving money and things		
Importance of children's determination	Determination, perseverance		
Importance of children's religious faith	Religious faith		

Table A.3: IVS Variables (*continued*)

Variable	Description	Coding and notes	Index
Importance of children's unselfishness	Not being selfish (unselfishness)		
Importance of children's obedience	Obedience		
Importance of children's independence	Independence	Same as above.	
Don't want drug-addicted neighbors	"On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?" Drug addicts	0 = Not mentioned, 1 = Mentioned.	Cul.
Don't want different race neighbors	People of a different race		Cul.
Don't want immigrant neighbors	Immigrants/foreign workers		Cul.
Don't want homosexual neighbors	Homosexuals		Cul.
Don't want heavy-drinking neighbors	Heavy drinkers		Cul.
PreK child w/working mom suffers	"When a mother works for pay, the children suffer"	0 = Strongly disagree, 1 = Disagree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Agree strongly. For the US, the 2005-2009 wave is imputed from the wave 2011-2013 wave.	Cul.
Level of political interest	"How interested would you say you are in politics?"	0 = Not at all interested, 1 = Not very interested, 2 = Somewhat interested, 3 = Very interested	
Confidence in press	"I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?" The press	0 = None at all, 1 = Not very much, 2 = Quite a lot, 3 = A great deal	Cul.
Confidence in unions	Labor unions		Econ.
Confidence in police	The police		
Confidence in courts	The courts		Cul.
Confidence in UN	The United Nations		
Confidence in churches	The churches (mosque, temple etc.)		Cul.
Confidence in civil services	The civil services		
Confidence in major companies	Major companies		
Confidence in environmental protection organizations	Environmental organizations		
Confidence in EU	The European Union		Cul.
Confidence in armed forces	The armed forces	0 = None at all, 1 = Not very much, 2 = Quite a lot, 3 = A great deal. For Iceland, the 2017-2020 wave is imputed based on the 2005-2009 wave	Cul.
Believe in God	"In which of the following things do you believe, if you believe in any?" God	0 = No, 1 = Yes. For the US, the 2005-2009 wave is imputed based on the 1999-2004 and 2011-2013 waves	
Believe in hell	Hell		
Importance of God in life	"How important is God in your life?. Please use this scale to indicate. 10 means 'very important' and 1 means 'not at all important'"	1 = Not at all important, 2...9, 10 = Very important	
Avoiding public transit fare justifiable	"Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card." Avoiding a fare on public transport	1 = Never justifiable, 2...9, 10 = Always justifiable	
Abortion justifiable	Abortion		Cul.
Divorce justifiable	Divorce		Cul.
Accepting a bribe justifiable	Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties		

Table A.3: IVS Variables (*continued*)

Variable	Description	Coding and notes	Index
Suicide justifiable	Suicide		Cul.
Cheating on taxes justifiable	"Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card." Cheating on taxes if you have a chance	0 = Never justifiable, 1...8, 9 = Always justifiable. For Germany, the 2011-2013 wave was imputed based on the 2005-2009 and 2017-2020 waves	
Homosexuality justifiable	Homosexuality	0 = Never justifiable, 1...8, 9 = Always justifiable. For Italy, the 2005-2009 wave was imputed based on the 1999-2000 and 2017-2020 waves	Cul.
Prostitution justifiable	Prostitution	0 = Never justifiable, 1...8, 9 = Always justifiable. For Spain, the 2011-2013 wave was imputed based on the 2005-2009 and 2017-2020 waves. For the US the 2011-2013 wave is imputed based on the 2005-2009 and 2017-2020 waves	

*Note:* This table presents all IVS variables included in our data. The third column provides information on how variables were processed.

Table A.4: IVS Data Matched with CMP

	Unique Parties	Unique PRRP	Observations	PRRP Supporters
1) All data	.	.	91,425	.
2) Respondents supporting a party	353	.	63,187	.
3) Respondents matched with CMP	210	32	59,635	7,934

*Note:* This table provides descriptive statistics on the Integrated Values Survey data. The first row shows the total number of respondents in the country-waves we analyzed. The second row presents descriptive statistics for the subset of respondents supporting a specific party. The third row presents statistics for participants who supported a party that could be matched with the CMP. These are the participants included in our final dataset.

Table A.5: Decomposition Results

	Voter Priorities	Voter Attributes	Party positions	Residuals	Agg
Austria	0.085 (0.006)	-0.021 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.078 (0.009)	-0.017
Czech Republic	0.031 (0.003)	0.009 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.055 (0.005)	0.094
Denmark	0.02 (0.007)	0.023 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	0.007 (0.007)	0.051
Estonia	-0.026 (0.019)	0.012 (0.009)	-0.015 (0.004)	0.22 (0.023)	0.191
Finland	0.022 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.014 (0.003)	-0.015 (0.005)	-0.01
France	0.01 (0.006)	0.029 (0.007)	0.024 (0.005)	0.029 (0.003)	0.092
Germany	0.039 (0.003)	-0.019 (0.003)	0.013 (0.003)	0.028 (0.003)	0.061
Greece	0.046 (0.007)	-0.027 (0.005)	0.001 (0.003)	0.015 (0.006)	0.035
Hungary	0.107 (0.013)	0.051 (0.013)	0.004 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.01)	0.161
Italy	0.055 (0.009)	0.054 (0.006)	-0.092 (0.01)	0.182 (0.009)	0.199
Netherlands	0.04 (0.007)	0.035 (0.005)	0.006 (0.004)	0.042 (0.005)	0.123
Norway	-0.037 (0.008)	0.017 (0.007)	0.048 (0.004)	-0.13 (0.005)	-0.102
Poland	0.235 (0.013)	-0.065 (0.01)	-0.176 (0.015)	0.281 (0.012)	0.275
Slovakia	-0.047 (0.015)	0.041 (0.01)	0.052 (0.007)	0.111 (0.01)	0.157
Slovenia	-0.012 (0.008)	0.018 (0.01)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.039 (0.005)	-0.026
Sweden	-0.002 (0.003)	0.012 (0.002)	0.003 (0.004)	0.044 (0.003)	0.057
Switzerland	0.095 (0.008)	0.019 (0.005)	-0.053 (0.006)	-0.051 (0.008)	0.01
UK	0.025 (0.002)	-0.012 (0.002)	-0.007 (0.002)	0.049 (0.005)	0.055
Total	0.449 (0.041)	0.071 (0.022)	0 (0.017)	0.48 (0.042)	1

*Note:* This table presents decomposition results into four components for the 18 countries in our data that had any PRRP support in one of our survey waves (2005-2009,2010-2014,2017-2021). Columns (1)-(4) present the counterfactual increase in support for the PRRP in that country between the 2005-2009 and the 2017-2021 waves, based on Equation 7. Column (5) is the sum of columns (1)-(4) which is the overall increase in support for PRRP in that country in our data. The last row presents aggregated results from all countries, weighting each country by the inverse share of support for PRRP at the last wave, as in Figure 4. Standard errors are calculated using 1,000 bootstrap simulations.