Supplementary Information for "IO Endorsements, Perceived Alignment, and Public Support for Unpopular Policies"[*]

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A Survey Instrument

A.1 Treatment and Outcome Measurement

Prompt

In the following questions, we will present the policies of the Japanese government and the international reactions to them. There are no right or wrong answers, so please provide your honest opinion.

Treatment

The Japanese government raised the consumption tax from 8% to 10% starting from October 1, 2019, with the aim of supporting the existing social security system. Additionally, there are plans to further increase the consumption tax to 12% in the future. The government has explained that the purpose of this tax hike is to decrease the ratio of public debt (government borrowing) in the overall fiscal landscape.

They also emphasized that the [IMF/G7/UN] has endorsed this consumption tax increase plan, stating that it would help reconstruct Japanese fiscal conditions. (NB: Control group respondents were not shown the bolded text.)

Questions

1: If the government made such an announcement, how would your support for the current administration change? (**Outcome Government**)

2: Do you support this consumption tax increase? (**Outcome Tax**)

A.2 Pre-treatment Item for Party Identification

Question:

Many people seem to think, "In the long run, I'm leaning towards Party X." It is possible to vote for another party in the short run, but in the long run, which party would you say you lean towards? Please choose only one.

Response Options:

- Liberal Democratic Party
- Constitutional Democratic Party
- Democratic Party for the People
- Komeito
- Japanese Communist Party
- Japan Restoration Party
- Japan Innovation Party
- Social Democratic Party
- Reiwa Shinsengumi
- Other political organizations
- None
- Do not want to answer

A.3 Pre-treatment Items for Moderator Variables

A.3.1 Expertise

Question:

Do you think the following international organizations have expertise in finance and economics (i.e., have detailed knowledge and can provide effective advice)?

Organizations:

- UN (1)
- WHO (2)
- IMF (3)
- OECD (4)
- G7 (5)

Response Options:

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Prefer not to answer

A.3.2 Neutrality

Question:

Which of the following international organizations do you think is closer to statement A or statement B? Please select the one that is closer to your impression.
A: A group of independent experts separate from the interests of each country.
B: A group of politicians representing the interests of each country.

Organizations:

- UN (1)
- WHO (2)
- IMF (3)
- OECD (4)
- G7 (5)

Response Options:

- Very close to A
- Close to A

- Somewhat close to A
- Neither closer to A nor B
- Somewhat close to B
- Close to B
- Very close to B
- Prefer not to answer

A.3.3   Reflection of Japanese Government

Question:

How much do you think the intentions of the Japanese government are reflected in the decisions of the following international organizations?

Organizations:

- UN (1)
- WHO (2)
- IMF (3)
- OECD (4)
- G7 (5)

Response Options:

- Not reflected at all
- Not reflected
- Tends not to be reflected
- Neither reflected nor not reflected
- Tends to be reflected
- Reflected
- Strongly reflected
- Prefer not to answer

A.4   Survey Items for Other Covariates

A.4.1   Personal Economic Conditions ("Economy self")

Question:

Compared to a year ago, do you think your personal economic condition now has gotten better or worse?

Instructions:

Using a scale where **1** represents "Has gotten a lot worse" and **7** represents "Has gotten a lot better," please indicate your rating.

A.4.2   National Economic Conditions ("Economy society")

Question:

Compared to a year ago, do you think the economic condition of society as a whole now have gotten better or worse?

Using a scale where **1** represents "Has gotten a lot worse" and **7** represents "Has gotten a lot better," please indicate your rating.

A.4.3 Perception of Individual Tax Burden ("Tax self")

Question:

Do you think the consumption tax burden you pay is heavier or lighter than the average Japanese household?

Instructions:

Using a scale where **1** represents "light" and **7** represents "Heavy," please indicate your rating.

A.4.4 Perception of National Tax Burden ("Tax Japan")

Question:

Do you think Japan's consumption tax rate is high or low compared to other developed countries?

Response Options:

- Very high
- High
- Relatively high
- About the same
- Relatively low
- Low
- Very low
- Prefer not to answer

A.4.5 Self-reported Income ("Income")

Question:

How much is your household's annual income before taxes? Income before taxes is generally called "annual gross income." Please choose one of the following, including pensions, stock dividends, and side income.

Response Options:

- Less than 1 million yen
- 1-2 million yen
- 2-3 million yen
- 3-4 million yen
- 4-5 million yen
- 5-6 million yen
- 6-7 million yen
- 7-8 million yen

- 8-9 million yen
- 9-10 million yen
- 10-12 million yen
- 12-15 million yen
- Over 15 million yen
- Prefer not to answer

B Descriptive Statistics of the Dataset

B.1 Distribution of the Outcome Variables across Treatment Groups

Figure B.1: **Distribution of the Outcome Variable: Government Support**
These panels show the distributions of respondents' levels of support for the government, which is considering a consumption tax hike. Answers were measured on a 7-point scale, with larger numbers indicating more support (x-axis): Support (7), Somewhat support (6), Leaning towards support (5), Neither support nor oppose (4), Leaning towards not supporting (3), Somewhat not support (2), Do not support (1). Distributions are calculated for each treatment arm (G7, IMF, UN) and the control group. Those who did not answer this question are excluded from this calculation.

Figure B.2: **Distribution of the Outcome Variable: Policy Support**
These panels show the distributions of respondents' levels of support for the proposed consumption tax increase. Answers were measured on a 7-point scale, with larger numbers indicating more support (x-axis): Support (7), Somewhat support (6), Leaning towards support (5), Neither support nor oppose (4), Leaning towards not supporting (3), Somewhat not support (2), Do not support (1). Distributions are calculated for each treatment arm (G7, IMF, UN) and the control group. Those who preferred not to answer this question are excluded from this calculation.

B.2 Distribution of Self-Reported Knowledge of IOs

Figure B.3: **Distribution of Self-Reported Knowledge of IOs**
This shows the distributions of self-reported knowledge of IOs. Respondents selected from the options, "Know details about", "know roughly", "heard of the name", and "never heard of"; they could also choose to not answer (NA). In addition to the three IOs analyzed in the experiment—IMF, G7 and UN—we added two additional IOs—OECD and WHO—to compare if the IOs we examine are particularly well-known or not. Unsurprisingly, the WHO is the most well-known IO among the five due to its high profile during the COVID-19 pandemic. Compared to the WHO, the three IOs we analyze (IMF, G7, and UN) are less well-known, but the difference is not substantial. Notably, public awareness of the G7 is similar to that of the WHO.

B.3 Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Variables

Variable	Levels	n	%
Gender	Male	3197	50.0
	Female	3116	48.8
	Other	21	0.3
	NA	57	0.9
Age	19-29	1308	20.5
	30–39	1274	19.9
	40–49	1260	19.7
	50–59	1280	20.0
	60–70	1269	19.9
Education	College	3024	47.3
	Not College	3367	52.7
Income(yen)	< 2M	802	15.7
	2M–4M	1266	24.8
	4M–6M	1167	22.9
	6M–8M	771	15.1
	8M–10M	532	10.4
	10M–12M	409	8.0
	> 12M	155	3.0
Partisanship	Government	1344	22.4
	Independent	3237	53.9
	Opposition	1428	23.8

Table B.1: Descriptive summary statistics of our survey sample. The column n shows the number of respondents with the corresponding level of the variable. The column % shows the percentage of such respondents. The "Education" question asked for the final (or currently enrolled) academic level. "Income" asked for the annual household income (before tax). "Partisanship" asked for the party to which the respondent felt greatest affinity; we collapsed these into support for the current government coalition (LDP and Komeito), any opposition party, or are independent. On "Gender", NA means "No Answer."

B.4 Comparison of Demographic Variables to Population

(a) Sample   (b) Population

Figure B.4: Distribution of Age Groups in the Sample and the Japanese Population. The population distribution is current as of July 1, 2023; its data was downloaded from e–Stat, a Japanese government service (`https://www.e-stat.go.jp/stat-search/files?tclass=000001007604&cycle=7&year=20230`).

B.5   Descriptive Statistics of Moderators

Variable	mean	sd	min	max
UN Expertise	3.74	1.30	1	7
IMF Expertise	4.04	1.35	1	7
G7 Expertise	3.94	1.32	1	7
UN Neutrality	4.30	1.36	1	7
IMF Neutrality	4.02	1.22	1	7
G7 Neutrality	4.67	1.46	1	7
Reflection of Japanese Gov (UN)	3.76	1.21	1	7
Reflection of Japanese Gov (IMF)	3.85	1.14	1	7
Reflection of Japanese Gov (G7)	4.06	1.23	1	7
UN Favorability	3.98	1.02	1	7
IMF Favorability	4.02	0.88	1	7
G7 Favorability	4.17	0.98	1	7

Table B.2: Summary Statistics of Moderator Variables. This table presents the mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values of the variables used as moderators. These include respondents' perceptions of expertise, neutrality, reflection of the Japanese government's interests in international organizations, and favorability toward each IO. The original survey questions are provided in SI A.3.

C Exploration of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

C.1 Favorability to IOs

(a) **Treatment Effect Estimates by Favorability**

Figure C.1: **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Favorability to IOs.**
This figure shows the treatment effect estimates conditional on favorability towards the endorsing IOs. The left panel is for the G7, and the right panel is for the IMF. Respondents were asked, "We would like to know your impressions of the countries and organizations listed below. Please rate your level of favorability on a scale of 1 to 7." Respondents are divided into three groups: "Favorable" if their answer is above 4, "Neither" if their answer is equal to 4, and "Unfavorable" if their answer is below 4. The number of observations in each subgroup is specified under the y-axis labels.

Figure C.1 presents the treatment effect estimates conditional on favorability toward the endorsing IOs. As with other conditioning variables, respondents rated their attitudes on a 7-point scale, which we collapsed into three categories for analysis. The results indicate that the treatment effect is greater among respondents who favor the IOs. For those with favorable views, endorsements from both the G7 and IMF positively influenced support for the policy. Among neutral respondents (neither favorable nor unfavorable), the G7's endorsement still has a positive effect, but the IMF's endorsement loses significance. In contrast, the treatment effect estimates were negligible among those with unfavorable views of the IOs. These findings suggest that the effectiveness of endorsements is contingent on general favorability towards the endorsers. This is consistent with the assumption in other endorsement experiments, where the treatment effect of endorsement is equivalent to the support level of the endorsers (Bullock, Imai and Shapiro, 2011).

C.2 Perceived Severity of Japan's Fiscal Deficits

Figure C.2: **Heterogenous Treatment Effect by Respondents' Perceived Severity of Japan's Fiscal Deficits (the G7 and the IMF endorsement)**
This figure show the treatment effect estimates conditional on the degree of respondents' concern regarding Japan's fiscal deficits. The left panel shows the effect of endorsement from the G7, and the right panel shows the effect of endorsement from the IMF. Respondents' concern about Japan's fiscal deficits is measured by asking them to select the statement closest to their opinion: A) "Government bonds are being steadily absorbed, so there is no need to worry about fiscal deficits," or B) "Since the fiscal deficit is at a critical level, the issuance of government bonds should be restrained," rated on a 7-point scale. Based on their responses, respondents are divided into three groups: "Worried about Japan's Deficit" if they chose statement B, "Neither" if they chose 4, and "Not Worried about Japan's Deficit" if they chose statement A. The number of observations in each subgroup is specified beneath the y-axis labels. Please note that the x-axis scale is larger in these figures than in others.

C.3 Knowledge of IOs

An anonymous reviewer suggested that the absence of a significant treatment effect for the IMF endorsement might be due to lower public knowledge of the IMF relative to the G7. To assess this possibility, we estimate heterogeneous treatment effects based on respondents' self-reported familiarity with each IO. Figure C.3 shows treatment effect estimates for the G7 and IMF endorsements, conditional on knowledge levels. Although the subgroups with the highest and lowest familiarity are smaller compared to other subgroups analyzed in the main paper, we find that the G7 endorsement effect is larger among respondents with greater knowledge of the G7. By contrast, the IMF endorsement effect remains small and statistically insignificant even among those who report higher familiarity with the IMF. The results suggest that the IMF's weaker persuasive effect is not simply due to a lack of public awareness. Even among knowledgeable respondents, the endorsement did not sway attitudes.

Figure C.3: **Heterogenous Treatment Effect by Respondents' Knowledge of the IOs (the IMF and G7 endorsement)**
This figure shows the treatment effect estimates conditional on the level of respondents' self-reported knowledge of each IO. The left panel shows the effect of endorsement from G7, and the right panel shows the effect of endorsement from IMF. Respondents were asked, "How familiar are you with the following International Organizations?" and indicated their level of knowledge with one of the following options: "Never heard of it", "Heard the name before", "Have a general knowledge of the organization", and "Know detailed information about the organization." The number of observations in each subgroup is specified under the y-axis labels. Please note that the x-axis scale is larger in this figure than in others, which may indicate that the perceived smaller size of the effect is larger than in other figures.

D OLS Estimates with Covariate Adjustment

	Treatment: IMF		Treatment: G7		Treatment: UN	
	Estimate	95% C.I.	Estimate	95% C.I.	Estimate	95% C.I.
Treatment	0.14	(0.01, 0.27)	0.25	(0.12, 0.37)	0.06	(−0.07, 0.19)
(Intercept)	2.68	(2.59, 2.78)	2.68	(2.59, 2.77)	2.68	(2.59, 2.77)
Economy self	0.15	(0.05, 0.25)	0.15	(0.05, 0.25)	0.15	(0.05, 0.25)
Economy society	0.19	(0.09, 0.28)	0.19	(0.09, 0.28)	0.19	(0.09, 0.28)
Tax self	−0.13	(−0.21, − 0.06)	−0.13	(−0.21, − 0.06)	−0.13	(−0.21, − 0.06)
Tax Japan	−0.25	(−0.32, − 0.17)	−0.25	(−0.32, − 0.17)	−0.25	(−0.32, − 0.17)
Income	0.02	(−0.01, 0.04)	0.02	(−0.01, 0.04)	0.02	(−0.01, 0.04)
No party	−0.25	(−0.49, 0.00)	−0.25	(−0.49, 0.00)	−0.25	(−0.49, 0.00)
Other party	−0.25	(−0.53, 0.03)	−0.25	(−0.53, 0.03)	−0.25	(−0.53, 0.03)
Treatment ×						
Economy self	0.06	(−0.09, 0.20)	0.03	(−0.11, 0.18)	−0.02	(−0.16, 0.13)
Economy society	0.00	(−0.14, 0.14)	−0.03	(−0.17, 0.11)	−0.04	(−0.18, 0.10)
Tax self	0.06	(−0.05, 0.16)	−0.03	(−0.13, 0.08)	−0.01	(−0.12, 0.09)
Tax Japan	−0.03	(−0.13, 0.07)	−0.00	(−0.10, 0.10)	−0.02	(−0.12, 0.08)
Income	0.00	(−0.04, 0.04)	0.01	(−0.03, 0.05)	0.00	(−0.04, 0.04)
No party	−0.27	(−0.63, 0.08)	−0.44	(−0.79, − 0.10)	−0.35	(−0.70, − 0.01)
Other party	−0.30	(−0.70, 0.09)	−0.20	(−0.59, 0.19)	−0.35	(−0.74, 0.03)
Adj. R^2	0.17		0.17		0.17	
Num. obs.	2338		2337		2380	

Table D.1: OLS Estimate of ATE on Policy Support with Covariate Adjustments.

	Treatment: IMF		Treatment: G7		Treatment: UN	
	Estimate	95% C.I.	Estimate	95% C.I.	Estimate	95% C.I.
Treatment	0.13	(0.02, 0.25)	0.20	(0.08, 0.31)	0.12	(0.00, 0.23)
(Intercept)	2.60	(2.52, 2.69)	2.60	(2.52, 2.68)	2.59	(2.51, 2.67)
Economy self	0.25	(0.15, 0.34)	0.25	(0.15, 0.34)	0.25	(0.15, 0.34)
Economy society	0.10	(0.01, 0.18)	0.10	(0.01, 0.18)	0.10	(0.01, 0.18)
Tax self	−0.07	(−0.14, 0.01)	−0.07	(−0.14, 0.01)	−0.07	(−0.14, 0.01)
Tax Japan	−0.13	(−0.20, − 0.07)	−0.13	(−0.20, − 0.07)	−0.13	(−0.20, − 0.07)
Income	0.00	(−0.02, 0.03)	0.00	(−0.02, 0.03)	0.00	(−0.02, 0.03)
No party	−0.30	(−0.51, − 0.08)	−0.30	(−0.51, − 0.08)	−0.30	(−0.51, − 0.08)
Other party	−0.34	(−0.58, − 0.11)	−0.34	(−0.58, − 0.11)	−0.34	(−0.58, − 0.11)
Treatment ×						
Economy self	−0.05	(−0.18, 0.08)	−0.02	(−0.15, 0.12)	−0.14	(−0.28, − 0.01)
Economy society	0.10	(−0.02, 0.23)	0.04	(−0.08, 0.17)	0.07	(−0.06, 0.20)
Tax self	−0.03	(−0.13, 0.07)	−0.05	(−0.15, 0.05)	−0.03	(−0.13, 0.07)
Tax Japan	−0.07	(−0.16, 0.02)	0.00	(−0.09, 0.10)	−0.03	(−0.12, 0.06)
Income	0.01	(−0.03, 0.05)	0.00	(−0.03, 0.04)	−0.01	(−0.05, 0.03)
No party	−0.11	(−0.42, 0.19)	−0.25	(−0.56, 0.05)	−0.18	(−0.47, 0.12)
Other party	−0.22	(−0.57, 0.12)	−0.22	(−0.56, 0.12)	−0.15	(−0.49, 0.18)
Adj. R^2	0.16		0.14		0.12	
Num. obs.	2329		2337		2374	

Table D.2: OLS Estimate of ATE on Government Support with Covariate Adjustments.

In addition to the pre-registered analysis of the average treatment effects in the main text, we conduct OLS regressions with covariate adjustment using the Lin (2013) approach, where the covariates are demeaned and fully interacted with the treatment variable in the regression specification.[1] Although we did not pre-register this analysis, it addresses a concern raised

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[1] Formally, our estimator is given by

$$(\hat{\tau}, \hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{\gamma}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{\alpha}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{\delta}}) = \operatorname*{argmin}_{(\tau, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\delta})} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(Y_i - \tau D_i - (\mathsf{X}_i - \overline{\mathsf{X}})^\top \boldsymbol{\beta} - D_i(\mathsf{X}_i - \overline{\mathsf{X}})^\top \boldsymbol{\gamma} - (\mathsf{W}_i - \overline{\mathsf{W}})^\top \boldsymbol{\alpha} - D_i(\mathsf{W}_i - \overline{\mathsf{W}})^\top \boldsymbol{\delta}\right)^2,$$

by an anonymous reviewer that the effect estimates may be driven by respondents' views on redistribution through taxation, inequality, and their personal economic cost, which are likely to be correlated with partisanship and support for the government. See SI A.4 for the survey items that are used for measuring the covariates.

Tables D.1 and D.2 show the OLS estimates of the treatment effects on support for the tax increase and for the government, respectively, with covariate adjustment. The point estimates of the average treatment effects (shaded by gray) are similar to those in the main text, which is not surprising given that treatment assignment is randomized. Since covariate adjustment reduces the variance of the estimator, the estimated effects of the IMF treatment are barely significant at the 5% level, contrary to the pre-registered analysis without covariate adjustment shown in the main text. However, the lower bounds of the confidence intervals are very close to zero (.01 and .02 for the policy support and government support outcomes, respectively), and the statistical significance of neither estimate is upheld by the Benjamini-Hochberg multiple testing correction with the false discovery rate set at .05. By contrast, the effect estimates for the G7 treatment hold, as in the main analysis. We conclude that evidence for the G7 treatment is robust to covariate adjustment, and that only weak evidence for the IMF treatment is found even with covariate adjustment.

These results on the average treatment effects hold despite the fact that attitudes to consumption tax increases are generally affected by the respondents' views on economic costs and tax burden. According to the estimated coefficients, the respondents are more likely to support the hypothetical tax increase in our experimental vignette if they view their individual ("Economy self") and national ("Economy society") economic well-being positively. Respondents' support for the policy is also negatively associated with their perceptions of the tax burden ("Tax self" and "Tax Japan" in the tables). Our results show that although pre-treatment attitudes are driven by those factors, endorsement by the G7 still affects respondents' support for the tax increase.

In contrast to the pre-treatment attitudes, Tables D.1 and D.2 suggest that heterogeneity in the treatment effects by respondents' views on the economy and tax burden (as well as their income) is limited, whereas partisanship is strongly associated with the treatment effects. The bottom half of the tables indicates that almost all estimated coefficients on the interactions between the treatment and these pre-treatment covariates are not statistically significant at the 5% level. The only exception is the interaction of the UN treatment and the respondents' views on the economy ("Economy self") in the government support outcome, where the point estimate is $-.14$ and the 95% confidence interval is $(-.28, -.01)$. However, this does not pass the Benjamini-Hochberg correction with the false discovery rate at .05.

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where Y_i is the outcome variable, D_i is the treatment indicator, X_i is the vector of covariates, $\overline{\mathsf{X}}$ is the mean of the covariates, W_i is the vector of the block indicators (party identification with the government party, an opposition party, or none. The government party block is the baseline category), and $\overline{\mathsf{W}}$ is the mean of the block indicators. The average treatment effect is estimated by $\hat{\tau}$. We use the HC2 robust variance estimator, which is known to be equivalent to the design-based conservative variance estimator (Samii and Aronow, 2012).

By contrast, coefficient estimates on the interactions between the G7 treatment and partisanship block indicators are either statistically significant or large enough in magnitude that the sum of the coefficients on the interaction and the G7 treatment is statistically significant. For example, in the regression of the policy support outcome on the G7 treatment, shown in the middle of Table D.1, the interaction between the treatment and no party identification ("No party") is $-.44$ $(-.79, -.10)$. This indicates that the G7 treatment has a positive effect on respondents who identify with the government party (the baseline category), but has no effect on those who do not identify with any party (the sum of the two estimated coefficients is negative, but not statistically significant). These results confirm that heterogeneity in the treatment effects is largely driven by partisanship, which is consistent with the pre-registered analysis in the main text.

E   Table of Estimates in Main Analysis

Outcome	Treatment	Estimate	S.E.	p-value	F.D.R.
Government	IMF	0.11	0.05	0.04	0.08
Government	UN	0.07	0.05	0.19	0.23
Government	G7	0.17	0.05	0.00	0.01
Policy	IMF	0.11	0.06	0.06	0.10
Policy	UN	−0.01	0.06	0.80	0.80
Policy	G7	0.18	0.06	0.00	0.01

Table E.1: Effect Estimates, the Standard Errors, the p-values, and the False Discovery Rate in Figure 1 (Average Treatment Effects). The false discovery rate is the lowest value at which the BH procedure rejects the null hypothesis of zero effect.

Moderator Level	Outcome	Treatment	Estimate	S.E.	p-value	F.D.R.
Expertise	Government	G7	0.18	0.10	0.06	0.19
Neither	Government	G7	0.14	0.08	0.08	0.19
No Expertise	Government	G7	0.21	0.11	0.05	0.19
Expertise	Policy	G7	0.21	0.12	0.07	0.19
Neither	Policy	G7	0.16	0.09	0.06	0.19
No Expertise	Policy	G7	0.17	0.12	0.17	0.22
Expertise	Government	IMF	0.15	0.10	0.11	0.22
Neither	Government	IMF	0.08	0.08	0.31	0.37
No Expertise	Government	IMF	0.11	0.12	0.36	0.40
Expertise	Policy	IMF	0.17	0.11	0.14	0.22
Neither	Policy	IMF	0.03	0.08	0.75	0.75
No Expertise	Policy	IMF	0.19	0.14	0.16	0.22

Table E.2: Effect Estimates, the Standard Errors, the p-values, and the False Discovery Rate in Figure 2 (Heterogeneous Effects by Perceived Expertise). The false discovery rate is the lowest value at which the BH procedure rejects the null hypothesis of zero effect.

Moderator Level	Outcome	Treatment	Estimate	S.E.	p-value	F.D.R.
Not Neutral	Government	G7	0.21	0.08	0.01	0.04
Neither	Government	G7	0.14	0.09	0.11	0.34
Neutral	Government	G7	0.14	0.15	0.34	0.47
Not Neutral	Policy	G7	0.31	0.09	0.00	0.01
Neither	Policy	G7	0.12	0.09	0.17	0.42
Neutral	Policy	G7	−0.08	0.17	0.65	0.71
Not Neutral	Government	IMF	0.22	0.11	0.05	0.20
Neither	Government	IMF	0.07	0.08	0.36	0.47
Neutral	Government	IMF	0.04	0.11	0.71	0.71
Not Neutral	Policy	IMF	0.13	0.12	0.29	0.47
Neither	Policy	IMF	0.10	0.08	0.22	0.44
Neutral	Policy	IMF	0.08	0.13	0.53	0.64

Table E.3: Effect Estimates, the Standard Errors, the p-values, and the False Discovery Rate in Figure 3 (Heterogeneous Effects by Perceived Neutrality). The false discovery rate is the lowest value at which the BH procedure rejects the null hypothesis of zero effect.

Moderator Level	Outcome	Treatment	Estimate	S.E.	p-value	F.D.R.
Japan's Interest Reflected	Government	G7	0.31	0.09	0.00	0.01
Neither	Government	G7	0.19	0.08	0.02	0.06
Not Reflected	Government	G7	−0.03	0.12	0.83	0.90
Japan's Interest Reflected	Policy	G7	0.34	0.11	0.00	0.01
Neither	Policy	G7	0.18	0.09	0.04	0.10
Not Reflected	Policy	G7	−0.04	0.13	0.73	0.87
Japan's Interest Reflected	Government	IMF	0.36	0.12	0.00	0.01
Neither	Government	IMF	0.11	0.07	0.12	0.19
Not Reflected	Government	IMF	−0.06	0.11	0.54	0.72
Japan's Interest Reflected	Policy	IMF	0.27	0.14	0.05	0.10
Neither	Policy	IMF	0.13	0.08	0.12	0.19
Not Reflected	Policy	IMF	−0.01	0.12	0.92	0.92

Table E.4: Effect Estimates, the Standard Errors, the p-values, and the False Discovery Rate in Figure 4 (Heterogeneous Effects by Perceived Reflection of the Japanese Government's Interests). The false discovery rate is the lowest value at which the BH procedure rejects the null hypothesis of zero effect.

Partisanship	Outcome	Treatment	Estimate	S.E.	p-value	F.D.R.
Gov. Party	Government	G7	0.39	0.11	0.00	0.00
Independent	Government	G7	0.11	0.07	0.13	0.22
Opposition	Government	G7	0.17	0.12	0.17	0.26
Gov. Party	Policy	G7	0.50	0.14	0.00	0.00
Independent	Policy	G7	0.03	0.08	0.71	0.75
Opposition	Policy	G7	0.25	0.14	0.07	0.17
Gov. Party	Government	IMF	0.38	0.12	0.00	0.00
Independent	Government	IMF	0.12	0.07	0.10	0.20
Opposition	Government	IMF	−0.09	0.12	0.45	0.54
Gov. Party	Policy	IMF	0.38	0.14	0.01	0.02
Independent	Policy	IMF	0.10	0.08	0.22	0.29
Opposition	Policy	IMF	−0.04	0.13	0.75	0.75

Table E.5: Effect Estimates, the Standard Errors, the p-values, and the False Discovery Rate in Figure 5 (Heterogeneous Effects by Partisanship). The false discovery rate is the lowest value at which the BH procedure rejects the null hypothesis of zero effect.

Moderator Level	Outcome	Treatment	Estimate	S.E.	p-value	F.D.R.
Unfavorable	Government	G7	0.10	0.14	0.48	0.58
Neither	Government	G7	0.20	0.07	0.01	0.04
Favorable	Government	G7	0.17	0.10	0.10	0.19
Unfavorable	Policy	G7	−0.00	0.16	0.99	0.99
Neither	Policy	G7	0.21	0.08	0.01	0.04
Favorable	Policy	G7	0.26	0.12	0.03	0.10
Unfavorable	Government	IMF	0.07	0.15	0.66	0.72
Neither	Government	IMF	0.07	0.07	0.32	0.55
Favorable	Government	IMF	0.25	0.13	0.06	0.14
Unfavorable	Policy	IMF	−0.14	0.16	0.37	0.55
Neither	Policy	IMF	0.06	0.07	0.42	0.55
Favorable	Policy	IMF	0.42	0.16	0.01	0.04

Table E.6: Effect Estimates, the Standard Errors, the p-values, and the False Discovery Rate in Figure C.1 (Heterogeneous Effects by Favorability). The false discovery rate is the lowest value at which the BH procedure rejects the null hypothesis of zero effect.

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