List of Respondents to the Consultation Paper on Proposed Revisions to Guidelines on Business Continuity Management (7 March 2019)

A total of 82 submissions were received of which 9 respondents requested confidentiality of their identity, 3 respondents requested confidentiality of their submission and 26 respondents requested confidentiality of both their identity and submission.

*Respondents who requested confidentiality of their identity

#Respondents who requested confidentiality for their submitted response

Please refer to Annex B for the submissions.

- 1. AIG Asia Pacific Insurance Pte. Ltd
- 2. AL Wealth Partners Pte Ltd
- 3. Alpha Advisory Pte Ltd
- 4. Aon Singapore Pte Ltd, Aon Singapore (Broking Centre) Pte Ltd, Aon Benfield Asia Pte Ltd, Aon Hewitt Wealth Management Pte Ltd
- 5. Asia Cloud Computing Association (ACCA)
- 6. Asia Securities Industry & Financial Markets Association (ASIFMA)
- 7. Barclays Bank PLC #
- 8. Business Continuity Chapter, Singapore Computer Society
- 9. Cleartrade Exchange Pte. Ltd
- 10. Deloitte & Touche Enterprise Risk Services Pte Ltd
- 11. Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation
- 12. Eastspring Investments (Singapore) Limited
- 13. Fidelity International
- 14. Holland & Marie Pte. Ltd.
- 15. HSK Resources Pte Ltd
- 16. IG Asia Pte Ltd
- 17. Investment Management Association of Singapore
- 18. KPMG Services Pte Ltd
- 19. Life Insurance Association
 - i. AIA
 - ii. Aviva
 - iii. Etiqa
 - iv. FWD
 - v. Manulife
 - vi. NTUC Income
 - vii. Old Mutual Int'l
 - viii. Tokio Marine Life
 - ix. Transamerica Life
- 20. Lloyd's of London (Asia) Pte Ltd
- 21. Marsh (Singapore) Pte.Ltd.
- 22. Marsh Management Services Singapore Pte Ltd
- 23. Microsoft Operations Pte Ltd.
- 24. MUFG Bank, Ltd.
- 25. Old Mutual International
- 26. Oliver Wyman
- 27. Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp Ltd
- 28. Prusik Investment Management Singapore Pte Ltd
- 29. QBE Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd

- 30. Rabobank Singapore Branch
- 31. RBC Investor Services Trust Singapore Limited
- 32. REIT Association of Singapore #
- 33. RGA International Reinsurance Company
- 34. RHT Compliance Solutions Pte. Ltd
- 35. Schroder Investment Management (Singapore) Ltd
- 36. Securities Association of Singapore
- 37. Singapore Exchange Limited
- 38. SingCash Pte Ltd/Telecom Equipment Pte Ltd
- 39. Sompo Insurance Singapore Pte. Ltd.
- 40. Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation
- 41. Swiss Re Asia Pte. Ltd.
- 42. Swiss Re International SE
- 43. The Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS)
- 44. The Northern Trust Company
- 45. Transamerica Life Bermuda Ltd
- 46. Validus Reinsurance Ltd
- 47. Wells Fargo Bank
- 48. An entity *
- 49. An entity *
- 50. An entity *
- 51. An entity *
- 52. An entity *
- 53. An entity *
- 54. An entity *
- 55. An entity *
- 56. An entity *
- 57. An entity #*
- 58. An entity #*
- 59. An entity #*
- 60. An entity #*
- 61. An entity #*
- 62. An entity #*
- 63. An entity #*
- 64. An entity #*
- 65. An entity #*
- 66. An entity #*
- 67. An entity #*
- 68. An entity #*
- 69. An entity #*
- -- All Clitity #
- 70. An entity #*
- 71. An entity #*
- 72. An entity #*
- 73. An entity #*
- 74. An entity #*
- 75. An entity #*76. An entity #*
- 77. An entity #*
- 78. An entity #*
- 79. An entity #*

^{80.} An entity #*

^{81.} An entity #*

^{82.} An entity #*

Annex B Submissions to the Public Consultation

Note: This table below only includes submissions for which respondents did not request confidentiality of submissions.

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
1.	AIG Asia Pacific	Comments on the definition of business function:
	Insurance Pte. Ltd	The proposed definition of "business function" as a service that an FI ultimately provides to its customers is very wide.
		Please clarify that "customers" defined in the Guidelines means "business" customers of an FI and not other parties such as vendors, regulators etc. An FI has numerous business functions depending on which level it reviews its business functions. It may also have numerous sub-functions which support its end-to-end business function. To organise a BCP just to cover 1 business function would entail a complex plan requiring support from many sub-functions within the FI. Many of these sub-functions support most, if not all of the business functions. To include them in all the BCP for all the business functions may not be feasible or tenable.
		In view of the complexity of organising BCP for all business functions (for end-to-end service), we propose that the focus on end-to-end BCP should be on critical business functions and involve only critical sub-functions within a business function.
		The frequency of BCP to cover all business functions should also be considered in view of the above. We propose that the focus be on critical business functions where BCP should be conducted annually. For less critical or non-critical business functions, the recommendation is for a BCP to be conducted once every 2 years.
		What is MAS' expectation for the minimum performance level, noting that this is in addition to the RTO and RPO. Depending on the business line of an FI, the minimum performance level of a business function could be the RTO or RPO.
		There is requirement for FI to establish monitoring capabilities that will enable prompt detection of reduced or intermittent service availabilities and triggers for activation of contingency plans. We propose that the focus should be on critical business functions as it is not feasible for FI to implement such monitoring capabilities for all business functions. Due to the complexity in mapping out the BCP under the Guidelines, would MAS allow FI sufficient time of at least 1 year to meet the new Guidelines?
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management:
		We note the requirement for senior management to participate actively in the FI's BCM tests. Please clarify if the expectation for active participation by senior management is referring the senior management in charge of the business function and not all the senior management. To require all senior management to participate actively in all the FI's BCM is not tenable. What is MAS' expectation in terms of the core competencies and training for CMT members?
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
- 7		The guidelines require future exercises to include rehearsal of scenarios for end
		to end business function such as system down and data loss rather just physical
		relocation. This will entail more time, focus and resources from IT and more
		active participation from all stakeholders including managers. In view of these
		requirements, the focus of the end-to-end BCP should be on critical business
		functions.
		It should be noted that, for each business function, there would be numerous
		scenarios for a BCP. Please clarify there is no expectation that an FI must cover
		all the scenarios.
		Please clarify the threshold for "plausible".
		What is MAS' expectation in terms of FIs taking reasonable steps to provide
		assurance that key service providers are capable of supporting their businesses
		even in disruptions, in particular service providers which have monopoly market
		share e.g. Singpost, SingTel, PUB etc.
		In view of the annual training requirement, please clarify that online training,
		classroom training or actual BCP exercise would meet the training programme
		stated in the guidelines.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests:
		Please clarify MAS' expectations on the frequency of such BCM audits. Will it be
		annual audits or can the period between audits be stretched depending on the
		results of the prior audit and criticality of the business function?
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits:
		Please clarify if MAS require the BCM audits to take a particular form and if so,
		whether MAS will be issuing any template.
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from
		MAS:
		Regarding paragraph 3.2: Once an initial BIA has been performed, please clarify
		that a review (rather than another new BIA be performed) should be done at
		least annually and whenever there are material changes to the business
		functions and an update be made, if applicable.
		Regarding paragraph 5.9: What is MAS' expectation in terms of FIs taking
		reasonable steps to provide assurance that key service providers are capable of
		supporting their businesses even in disruptions, in particular service providers
		which have monopoly market share e.g. Singpost, SingTel, PUB etc.
		Regarding paragraph 6.4: An organisation may have many critical business
		function. To organize a test for each critical business function on top of crisis
		management and communications exercise annually may put a strain on the
		FI's resources. We would propose a timeframe of at least once every 2 -3 years.
2.	AL Wealth	Comments on the definition of business function:
	Partners Pte Ltd	We have no issues with the new definition.
		Commands on the vales and very small little on the D
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
		management: It is appropriate for the Board of Directors and the Sonier Management to be
		It is appropriate for the Board of Directors and the Senior Management to be involved in the design and implementation. The creation of a Crisis
		Management Team also makes sense.
		management ream also makes sense.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:
		•

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		Ensuring that a comprehensive risk assessment be done prior to designing the BCP would help to align the effectiveness of the BCP. Such BCP must be tailored according to not only the assessment results but the size of the company and the criticality of the services defined. We appreciate the risk based approach but if MAS could provide examples of "severe" disruption, it would make planning easier. For most FIs, the most severe disruption would be a scenario where the entire infrastructure in Singapore is disrupted (no mobile connectivity and no internet). Does MAS expect FIs to test such a scenario? Realistically, most FIs probably only design business continuity tests based on the assumption that premises not available but the internet and telecommunication (fix and/or mobile) connectivity remains accessible.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests: In principle, annual testing is a reasonable concept. As mentioned in question 2, FIs must be given a base case scenario (e.g. disruption caused by office fire; disruption caused by pandemic etc), upon which the FI can build its action plan to allow practical processes that can be usable in actual incident.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: Not all FIs especially the small sized boutique firms have their own in-house internal audit unit and most are using external providers. MAS should allow such firms to conduct the BCP and have their assessment reports be reviewed by either their sub-contracted internal or external auditor during their annual internal/statutory audit to fulfil this MAS expectation.
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from MAS: To facilitate FIs to design the appropriate policies and procedures on a risk based basis, would MAS give some guidance as to the minimum scenarios that MAS would want to see being tested?
3.	Alpha Advisory Pte Ltd	General comments: We are a small team providing M&A advice. We have no reliance on any IT infrastructure nor on any office infrastructure. Our work can be performed from any office or any location. We can, and regularly do, perform our work from home or overseas.
		Comments on the definition of business function: This question is better directed at a large institution with complex functions where the challenges of business continuity are more relevant.
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management: This question is better directed at a large institution with complex functions where the challenges of business continuity are more relevant.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP: This question is better directed at a large institution with complex functions where the challenges of business continuity are more relevant.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests: This question is better directed at a large institution with complex functions where the challenges of business continuity are more relevant.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits:

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		As noted in the general comments, we do not have a plan that could be audited.
4.	Aon Singapore Pte	Comments on the definition of business function:
	Ltd, Aon	Para 3.3. Business Continuity Objective
	Singapore	It is not clear how the minimum performance level can be determined. RTO has
	(Broking Centre)	previously been determined to be the target time for specific business function
	Pte Ltd, Aon	to be recovered. It will be difficult to quantify the minimum performance level
	Benfield Asia Pte	under the new definition. Could MAS provide some examples on how a
	Ltd, Aon Hewitt	minimum performance level may be quantified and the basis for setting a
	Wealth	threshold for minimum performance level?
	Management Pte	
5.	Ltd Asia Cloud	Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from
J.	Computing	MAS:
	Association	Section 5.8: "Where recovery arrangements rely on other stakeholders, such as
	(ACCA)	intra-group partners and third party vendors, formal service level agreements
	,	(SLAs) should be established and the appropriate redundancies agreed upon.
		This would include setting specific and measurable recovery expectations (e.g.
		RTOs), mutual participation in testing and review of SLAs on a regular basis. Fls
		are encouraged to share their business continuity objectives with key
		stakeholders to mitigate the risk of mismatched expectations. An FI should
		proactively assess the resilience of these stakeholders and involve them in its
		BCM exercises, where appropriate."
		Comment #1: We would like to highlight that Section 5.8 of the Guidelines is
		not feasible in the context of FIs' engagement of cloud service providers (CSPs).
		The requirement for recovery time objectives (RTOs) to be outlined in SLAs is
		not possible for a majority of hyperscale CSPs. This is because, such an
		obligation would imply that RTOs can be negotiated with each customer, which
		is not possible in the context of hyperscale cloud services. We therefore
		recommend that FIs instead be required to have understanding of the CSPs'
		RTOs rather than requiring RTOs to be negotiated contract terms.
		Comment #2: FIs should have the flexibility to determine the contractual terms
		appropriate for the type of services they use. Laying out the details that should
		be covered in SLAs may appear to be overly prescriptive and would not be
		feasible for FIs looking to utilise hyperscale cloud computing services. Setting
		out specific and measurable recovery expectations (e.g. RTOs), mutual
		participation in testing and review of SLAs on a regular basis is not consistent with the one-to-many nature of hyperscale CSPs. Hyperscale cloud services are
		provided on a shared responsibility model where customers have the flexibility
		to determine their back-up requirements and configure the services to meet
		their objectives. The service configuration decisions that determine a
		customer's recovery (e.g. RPO / RTO) are not made by the CSP, and are also
		likely to change over time as the FI changes its business use cases. It is therefore
		inappropriate for SLAs between the CSP and the FI to include specific recovery
		expectations (including e.g. RPO/ RTO).
		Comment #3: It is also not feasible for CSPs to contractually commit to joint
		testing of their business continuity plans (BCPs) with individual customers.
		Furthermore, the CSP has its own BCP and hence there are no components of
		the BCPs that require joint testing. The mandating of joint testing is hence not
		only impractical for hyperscale CSPs to abide by, but it also takes away from the
		intended efficiency gained by outsourcing certain services to CSPs. Similarly,
		CSPs should not be required to get involved with the BCM exercises of their FI
L		1 202 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		customers. As highlighted above, FIs and CSPs have their own BCM practices, which they can implement independently. Also, given the volume of customers, hyperscale CSPs will be unable to participate in the BCM exercises of all their FI customers.
		Comment #4: As mentioned above, hyperscale cloud services are provided to customers on a one-to-many basis, which means that the services provided operate in the same manner for all customers, and hence the SLAs for individual services are consistent across customers. Thus, in light of the above, we propose that Section 5.8 be removed in its entirety, as the relevant principles are already covered in Sections 5.7 and 5.9.
6.	Asia Securities Industry & Financial Markets Association (ASIFMA)	Comments on the definition of business function: • Scope and extraterritoriality: It is unclear from the draft Proposed Revisions to Guidelines on Business Continuity Management ("Guidelines") if and how the proposed Guidelines apply to offshore entities, third parties, etc. We strongly encourage the MAS to reconsider the extraterritorial aspect of the revised BCM Guidelines. Instead, and as mentioned in the general comments, we strongly recommend the MAS and other overseas regulatory agencies coordinate closely to devise a global approach to operational resilience. ASIFMA members generally have global business models, have cross-border operations and have entities that are regulated in multiple jurisdictions. ASIFMA members will therefore also need clarity on the applicability (if and how) of the proposed Guidelines to: a. Non-material branches of foreign banks – we suggest that these should be excluded from the applicable scope of the draft Guidelines. b. Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs): Financial institutions (FIs) rely on third party service providers including FMIs such as payment, clearing and settlement operators to ensure continuity of services to the customer. Clarity is needed on whether the end-to-end "business function" includes the FMIs and other third parties; and if so, how are the FMIs expected to be dealt with in the FI's Business Continuity Management (BCM) plan for a "business function", given that an individual FI will not have any control over the BCM planning and testing of the FMIs or third parties. (This is also related to Question 3 on the scope of the Business Continuity Plan (BCP). c. Outsourced 3rd-party providers in Singapore and overseas d. d. Discern whether the scope is functionally and/or geographically driven. Ex: functions conducting business with Singapore entities and/or Singapore based business functions.
		• Internationally consistent definitions: We recommend that there should be common definitions of terms (e.g. "service", "business function", "business process", "critical business function") to reduce potential confusion and drive international harmonization We suggest that the MAS, its peer regulators (including BoE and FCA), multilateral agencies and relevant trade associations including the GFMA collaborate so we can agree on a harmonized approach. GFMA stands ready to support and is looking forward to soon share its white paper on this topic (see General Comments). Alignment of approaches could be achieved, for example, by supporting the development by international standard setters of a lexicon of terms and concepts related to operational resilience. Indeed, divergence in definitions is already emerging. For example,

S/N Res	oondent Feedbac	from respondent
	processe to-end be a busines	Service" is a term used by BoE as an end-to-end set of business while the MAS uses the term "Business Function" to refer to an end-siness service. In the US, the term (critical) function generally refers to process, whereas the MAS defines a critical business function as and based on BoE definition, Offerings is used instead of Business
	provide fidentificatindustry,	granularity to identify business functions: We request the MAS to urther guidance on the level of granularity expected in the tion of business functions. For consistency of application across the it would be helpful if the MAS could provide an illustrative list of functions.
	a. b.	m Performance Level (MPL): MPL is a good concept to incorporate as a stop gap measure. However, he focus of the BCM program should be on long term, sustainable ecovery. Subsequently, all business continuity program outputs (RTO, esting, etc.) should be aligned to the business continuity strategy instead of the MPL. We are generally supportive of the introduction of Business Continuity
	C.	Objectives as it provides guidance to FIs that MPLs, RTOs and Recovery Point Objectives (RPO) per Business Function must be determined during BCM planning. The preference is to conduct testing by validating functional recoverability vs. ability to achieve the MPLs. The functional recoverability allows for better preparedness, increased resiliency, and ability to demonstrate capability to meet stakeholder commitment. The RTO specification on individual dependencies (staff, sites, suppliers, applications) will allow an FI to discern the prioritization of dependencies in a recovery. If the above approach is not taken, we request that the MAS provide additional guidance on the proposed MPL requirements. Specifically, more clarity is needed in relation to the definition, guidance on how an FI should determine a MPL, the desired outcome from identification, as well as the impact on the business continuity lifecycle (dependency dentifications, recovery steps, recovery objectives, etc.)
	a. b.	m Level of Output (MLO): ASIFMA members request more clarity on the definition and scope of MLO requirements (e.g. is the concept introduced across the board, is trisk based, etc.) and to all components of the BC lifecycle (e.g. applications, third parties etc) & stakeholders (e.g. all business services, critical business services, designated Critical Operations or the equivalent). Incident management processes are targeted at any component of a process that is degraded rather than across an E2E business function. This ensures that an E2E business function is not unduly degraded due
	• Referri difficult t or systen example,	o existing incident escalation criteria, i.e. within any MPL that would be separately defined. We therefore recommend leveraging the raditional incident management frameworks when considering MPLs. In the process of the consultation paper, our members deem it be determine RTOs at business function level as there may be processes that do not require the "most stringent" RTO of 2-4 hours. For a regulatory reporting process as part of a securities trading BF would a 2-4 hours RTO, but 8-12 hours or more will be more appropriate.

_	T -	October 2021
S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		We suggest that the MAS clarifies relationship between minimum level of output and impact driven function Recovery Time Objective (RTO).
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management: • Referring to para 2.9(a) of the Consultation Paper - the Board's responsibility to endorse "the Fl's BCM, as well as ensure that the framework consists of comprehensive policies, processes and procedures", we suggest the MAS to clarify the separate references to "BCM" and "framework" to avoid confusion.
		• Most ASIFMA members agree with the roles and responsibilities proposed for the Board and senior management. However, it is not realistic to expect that senior management participate actively in all BCM tests unless they have recovery strategies that they need to validate. We suggest paragraph 2.10(c) of the Consultation Paper (and the related parts of Annex B, the Revised Guidelines) be rephrased to "participate actively in the FIs BCM tests if there are recovery strategies that they need to validate."
		• In Section 4.5 in Annex B of the consultation paper, we suggest that the committee to oversee the FI's BCM can also be the Crisis Management Team (CMT) as they are responsible for managing the FI's response in executing a BCP.
		• Lastly, can the MAS confirm if "the Board's" responsibilities, in the context of non-material branches of foreign banks, can be performed by the Singapore branch's most senior executive/governance committee.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP: • (see also Question 1) We would like clarification, if a business function is expected to include third parties or FMIs that are part of the processes performed and would suggest that FMIs are not included.
		• End to End Business ("E2E") Function: E2E approach to BCPs appears to be a very effective way to assess and review processes, document risks/controls and services delivered to customers. Specifically, the initiative allows for a specialized, integrated resources to be engaged in working groups to avoid silos and missed handoffs. However, given the trend of having the offshore "centres of excellence" supporting various functions for different business lines and entities across a financial group, it would be challenging to conduct E2E BCP as per MAS requirement. We recommend a E2E requirement to be rolled out flexibly and allow for an opportunity to achieve the desired end state through alternate means.
		a. More specific guidance on the expected scope and granularity of E2E BF BCPs on top of individual business unit BCPs, is needed. Using a "custody" service as an example, the service-level BCP could potentially cover multiple geographic regions, products, and the entire product lifecycles, etc. We strongly encourage the MAS to reconsider the extraterritorial aspect of the revised BCM Guidelines. Instead, we recommend that the MAS and other overseas regulatory agencies coordinate closely to devise a global approach or to rely on substantively equivalent/deference to foreign regulatory regimes to achieve this outcome across more than one jurisdiction.

C/N	Doonousdant	October 2021
S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		 b. We are concerned that an E2E service-level BCP with its own requirements may not easily align with department level plans (e.g. an individual IT department plan would need to be adjusted to accommodate every overarching function; a trade processing system would be used E2E yet require multiple descriptions of use in the proposed business function plans). c. Thus, the preference is to further achieve the same goal in highlighting dependencies by capturing the handoffs between individual departments in an E2E process map as opposed to creating a function level plan on top of individual plans. The mapping of E2E processes and dependencies across a service delivery level is a sound principal. That and the identification of dependencies will substantively achieve the same end that the MAS seeks but leave firms the flexibility to achieve it by finding solutions that work within their existing BCM approach. Another preference/option is to achieve the same goal by building function/service oriented plans on the department level (avoids silos) with outputs to indicate lowest business requirements (most aggressive RTO/RPO/requirements) with further flexibility in building the overarching business function plan.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests: • To the extent that industry wide testing is required, we would appreciate the MAS' help to help to coordinate across FMIs. • Many global institutions adopt global testing cycles, which the Singapore
		entity needs to be in-sync with. We suggest the MAS to allow more flexibility for testing frequency so that the Singapore entity may adhere to their global calendar and avoid introducing additional risks by testing off the cycle of the FI's global calendar of tests.
		• IT Resilience Testing is covered in MAS's TRM guidelines. We recommend the MAS align the BCM and TRM requirements to ensure requirements are not duplicative. For example, data restoration from backup media is detailed under IT resilience TRM guidelines (section 8.4.4), this should be aligned with BCM testing requirements.
		• Noted in Section 6.4 in Annex B of the consultation paper that a FI should conduct a BCP test for each critical business function, at least annually. Considering that there could be a wide range of scenarios and failure modes that can be included in a BCP, it may not be possible to cover all scenarios in a single test. We recommend that a FI to be allowed to adopt a risk-based approach to the scenario to be included in the annual BCP test. This will allow greater focus on the FI's response to each specific scenario.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: • Must the BCM audit be a dedicated program audit, or can it be part of the business line function? Some jurisdictions expect a program audit.
		Does it refer to an audit of the BCP or BCM? Is such audit expected after the BCM is approved by the Board/senior management committee?
		• It would be beneficial for the industry if the MAS do not specify that "internal audit" is responsible for conducting BCM audits. We suggest that the MAS retain the broad wording as proposed and leave it up to individual organisations

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
,	•	to decide on an appropriate team to discharge the responsibility based on their
		governance structure and operations.
		It is requested that the MAS consider that different organisations have
		different structures and risk assessment processes in place to manage their
		risks. The typical audit methodology in a financial institution would take into
		consideration the different risk areas including BCM. We do not recommend
		the requirement in the draft Guidelines which would require all FIs to build a
		separate audit process and plan cantered around BCM that needs review and
		approval annually by the Audit Committee .This would be a very specific and
		narrow focus considering that there is enterprise level risks to be considered
		and managed for global FIs. We recommend that the MAS allows FIs the
		discretion to treat BCM like all other risks so that it is subject to the existing
		established audit framework instead of developing an audit solely around BCM.
		We are supportive that there should be regular BCM audit carried out for
		greater assurance that the FI's BCM is effective. The audit approach should be
		commensurate with the FI's methodology and internal risk assessment, i.e. risk
		based. Those with a higher risk rating should have their BCP audited more
		frequently, while those with a lower risk could audit less frequently.
		For BCM audits, certain reliance can also be placed on other audits and
		reviews, including non-BCM specific audits and reviews. For example, for BCM
		audits of securities trading, reliance may be placed on a non-BCM specific audit
		performed on the IT trading systems for that portion of the BCM testing. This
		will help to avoid duplication of work and help drive greater efficiency in FIs.
		Section 6.3 provides an example of testing involving operating in the absence
		of a key third party service provider. Could the MAS give more detail on its
		expectations and parameters for such tests? In line with our response to
		Question 1, an individual FI will not have any control over the BCM planning
		and testing of FMIs.
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from
		MAS:
		Implementation adherence and timeline:
		The MAS Guidelines on Business Continuity requires further detail on the
		proposed rollout timeframe and roadmap of the requirements. To achieve
		requirement readiness, it is imperative to ascertain whether the requirements
		will be implemented entirely on a proposed date or if the MAS will provide for a
		phased approach. We highly recommend a phased approach. We also seek
		further details on the factors to drive implementation and
		timeline/prioritization of deliverables to achieve adherence. If the MAS still insists on full implementation on the implementation date, ASIFMA members
		request more details on the roadmap/timeline to achieve requirement
		compliance and clarification on whether the requirements will be implemented
		across the enterprise or follow a specific cadence
		• The revised definition of business function, and mapping of E2E processes and
		dependencies across a service delivery level are fundamentally sound.
		However, given the extent of potential changes to the existing BCM programs
		and the size of the firms, such as global firms, we suggest the MAS consider
		allowing a transition/implementation timeframe of more than twelve months.

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
7.	Business Continuity Chapter, Singapore Computer Society	 3rd Party Testing Requirements: The MAS Guidelines on Business Continuity requires further clarification on the scope and the conditions of the 3rd party testing requirements. There is a significant importance placed on demonstrating ability to recover in the case of a supplier outage. As such, we recommend alignment of the third-party testing program with the FFIEC Appendix J guidance on testing requirements, scope, complexity and scenarios. Further guidance is desired if the MAS aims to align with the existing best practices and/or advise on specific requirements. We request a more complete definition of the 3rd party testing – recommending the definition is in line with the FFIEC Appendix J requirements. We request further detail on scope determinants/conditions for the 3rd party testing. There is currently no industry-wide methodology to measure the success of an RPO for business functions that involve FMIs. Therefore, we would recommend that further guidance be issued on this in consultation with FIs. Regarding Paragraph 3.2 Business Impact Analysis: This paragraph 3.2 requires Business Impact Analysis ("BIA") to be performed at least annually. We suggest to the MAS that such BIA be required for "critical" business functions only and less frequently for non-critical business functions. Regarding Paragraph 3.4 Minimum Performance Level: The minimum performance level per revised guidelines should be measurable, which may suggest that it should be a quantitative statement defining the operating level in a crisis. However, for some functions, qualitative statements may be more suitable to define what needs to be recovered. Can the MAS please clarify that the minimum performance level may be both quantitative as well as qualitative. General comments: The comments are aggregated feedback received from attendees of the Business Resiliency Exchange & Masterclasses
		Comments on the definition of business function: Of the four respondents felt that on a scale of 1 to 5 (5 being extremely difficult to implement), three rated this proposed change to have a rating of 4. One
		respondent did not rate this question. Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
		management: Of the four respondents felt that on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being already in place, 5 being extremely difficult to implement), three rated this proposed change to have a rating of 4. One respondent did not rate this question. The challenge of implementing this was the definition of the allocation of adequate staff and budget.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP: Of the four respondents felt that on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being already in place, 5 being extremely difficult to implement), two rated this proposed change to have a rating of 4, one with a rating of 5. One respondent did not rate this question.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests:

C/NI	Description	Facilities of fusion recommendant
S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		Of the four respondents felt that on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being already in place, 5
		being extremely difficult to implement), two rated as this is already in place,
		one rated this proposed change to have a rating of 4 and the remaining
		respondent rated this as 5.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits:
		Of the four respondents felt that on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being already in place, 5
		being extremely difficult to implement), there was one respondent each which
		rated this propose change as 2, 3, 4 and 5.
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from
		MAS:
		Some guidance on crisis communication with expected datelines for updates. In
		Section 6.3 of the Consultation Paper, the 5th bullet point proposes that
		exercises should include relying on power from onsite generators for a
		prolonged period. It would be good if the Authority can provide some form of
		guidance as to what is considered 'prolonged period' in Singapore's context that
		commensurate with the existing infrastructure.
		For Section 6.10 & 6.11, would the Authority consider including an expectation
		that auditors that are tasked to conduct a BCM Audit should be adequately
		trained in BCM? BCM is a distinct discipline but in practice, auditors tasked to
		do BCM audits are often IT auditors who may not have sufficient understanding
		of BCM principles. In some circumstances, financial auditors may be tasked to
		conduct BCM Audits.
8.	Cleartrade	General comments:
	Exchange Pte. Ltd	Cleartrade Exchange is agreeable to the proposed new BCM guidelines and its
		objectives in the full context with no further comments.
		, and the second
		Comments on the definition of business function:
		Agreed with no further comments
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
		management:
		Agreed with no further comments
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:
		Agreed with no further comments
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests:
		Agreed with no further comments
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits:
		Agreed with no further comments
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from
		MAS:
		CLTX has no further comments
9.	Deloitte & Touche	Comments on the definition of business function:
	Enterprise Risk	Section 2 Definition on "Critical Business Function"
	Services Pte Ltd	We note that the Section 2 of the revised guidelines on BCM defines "critical
		business function" as "a business function which, if disrupted, is likely to have a
		significant impact on an FI, whether financially or non-financially."
		We wish to suggest that the definition may be specified to consider:
		(a) Impact to the FI's resilience to a disruption; and/or
		• • • •

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent	
		(b) Recovery priorities while formulating and implementing the appropriate business recovery strategies. Critical business functions should be reinstated first in order to maintain the desired level of product, service or activity delivery.	
		Sub-section (3.2) – Critical Business Functions and Business Continuity Objectives We note that under section 3.2 of the revised guidelines on BCM, MAS may require financial institutions to " consider the impact of a disruption of thei business function on other FIs (e.g. other participants of a payment system) a	
		their customers." It may be difficult for financial institutions to evaluate and consider the impact of disruption of their business on other FIs given the differences in size, operating environment, risk management philosophy and risk appetite. As an alternative, an FI could be expected to consider how it could be impacted by disruption, either directly or indirectly (including through possible second roughfects via other FIs).	า a
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior	
		management: Section (4) – Responsibility of the Board and Senior Management We note that MAS proposed the Board and senior management to demonstr their commitment in order to build an organisational culture that embeds business continuity as part of an FI's business-as-usual ("BAU") risk management.	ate
		On that note, MAS expects the Board and Senior Management to: (a) Sub-section 4.3(a): review and endorse, "at least annually, the FI's BCM, a well as ensure that the framework consists of comprehensive policies, processes and procedures, appropriate oversight and escalation elements." (b) Sub-section 4.3(b): review and endorse, "at least annually, the FI's critical business functions, business continuity objectives and the level of residual ris is willing to accept after the relevant business continuity measures have been put in place." (c) Sub-section 4.4(b): The Senior Management should, review, at least	sk it
		annually:(i) The list of critical business functions identified and the appropriateness of their respective business continuity objectives;(ii) The key assumptions underlying the various BCPs;	
		(iii) The extent to which the FI had tested their BCPs and crisis management plans to assure itself that the FI's business continuity objectives can be achieved in a disruption;	ved
		(iv) Whether the areas of improvement identified by BCM tests are being appropriately addressed; and	
		(v) The adequacy of the FI's BCM training programme for new and existing st We appreciate that the MAS Guidelines have enunciated a risk-based approat to be taken when a financial institution implements the Guidelines, and respectfully suggest that such reviews should be applicable when there are material changes to businesses and/or business continuity strategy and approach.	
		Sub-section (4.3)(b) – Responsibility of the Board and Senior Management to review at least annually We note that the sub-section 4.3(b) may be misinterpreted as the MAS requiring the Board to "review and endorse, at least annually, FI's critical	

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
,	·	business functions, business continuity objectives and the level of residual risk it is willing to accept after the relevant business continuity measures have been put in place."
		MAS may wish to consider indicating explicitly if the expectation to review the business continuity objectives and acceptable residual risk is specific to critical business functions. We wish to also suggest to differentiate requirements specific to critical business functions and other non-critical business functions.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP: Sub-section (2.15) — "End to end BCP for each service" in addition to "BCPs at the unit, or department, level that relate more to individual process" We wish to seek guidance from MAS in the expectation to have an "end-to-end BCPs in addition to the need for BCPs at the unit, or department, level that relate to more individual processes". Such an approach could hit multiple touchpoints and result in redundancy when it comes to BCP plans and testing, (i.e. consider back end processes around Regulatory Reporting, network or application recovery, database backup and recovery that support across multiple banking products).
		We seek MAS guidance on: (a) Definition of an "end to end BCP"; and (b) An end-to-end BCP should be sufficient in addressing the needs for BCP at the unit and department level. Hence, we suggest not to duplicate by requiring BCPs at the unit or department level.
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from MAS: Section 2 Definitions on "Disruption" We note that under Section 2 of the Consultation Paper defines the term "Disruption" to mean "when the normal performance of a business function is degraded, resulting in impact to customers. A disruption is not limited to a complete non-availability of a business function, and would include intermittent service availability as well."
		We wish to highlight that the definition could be specified to capture any disruption where minimum performance levels of business functions or critical business functions couldn't be maintained/achieved as opposed to all instances of intermittent service.
10.	Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation	Comments on the definition of business function: The switch to business process is one that is fundamentally sound. However, such a shift in focus will likely cause a change to global and complex BCM programs which may be incompatible with other jurisdictional expectations. The extent of the effort necessary to implement the change is also likely to involve significant effort, and require a project which would unlikely to be achievable within a twelve-month timeframe.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP: This change incorporates the definition of "business function" established above. The mapping of end to end processes and dependencies across a service delivery level is a sound principle that should be sought. However, the changes necessary to the implementation of such an ambitious initiative will likely be longer than the proposed 12 months. In addition, the maintenance and upkeep to ensure the documentation is updated will in costs that may not be

		·
S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		fully quantified until a complete impact assessment is undertaken.
		Implementation of the change in large estates with global multi-jurisdictional
		coverage in particular could be very costly.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests:
		Testing and exercising should be based on a risk based approach that is core to
		any BCM program. The proposed prescription may not offer sufficient
		granularity to take into account the nuanced level of risks that different
		business functions provide to the sector.
11.	Eastspring	Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
11.	Investments	management:
		Paragraph 4.5 of the proposed revised BCM Guidelines sets out that "BCM is
	(Singapore)	= :
	Limited	part of an FI's broader operational resilience. Where an FI sets up a committee
		to oversee its BCM, the committee should thus be led by a senior management
		member with responsibility over its overall risk (e.g. the Chief Risk Officer)."
		As set out in paragraph 3.1 of the proposed revised BCM Guidelines, "A
		business function refers to a service provided to customers of an FI. For this
		service to be delivered, it will likely require a number of business processes to
		be performed." Further, paragraph 2 sets out the definition of "Critical Business
		Function" where BCP is required, i.e. "A business function which, if disrupted, is
		likely to have a significant impact on an FI, whether financially or non-
		financially." Given business continuity relates to the various function heads who
		have to ensure the smooth running of an FI's business operations, we
		respectfully suggest that the composition of an FI's BCM Committee be left to
		the FI's discretion as appropriate.
		the 113 discretion as appropriate.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits:
		a) It is set out under Paragraph 2.20 of the consultation paper that MAS
		proposes "for an FI to conduct BCM audits through a unit independent of the
		' '
		staff involved in the planning and execution of the BCM itself (e.g. internal
		audit)". We would appreciate MAS' confirmation that, other than independent
		BCM audits conducted by the internal audit function and external auditors,
		regular quality assurance reviews on BCM conducted by an FI's Regional Head
		Office BCM function (which is independent of the FI's staff involved in the
		planning and execution of the BCM itself), would suffice to meet this
		requirement.
		b) Paragraph 2.21 of the consultation paper sets out that "A BCM audit plan,
		comprising auditable areas for the coming year, should be developed by the FI.
		The BCM audit plan should be approved by the FI's Audit Committee. The
		frequency of BCM audits should be commensurate with the criticality of the
		business functions."
		We would appreciate MAS' clarification on whether MAS expects a yearly BCM
		audit plan to be approved by the FI's Audit Committee and for BCM audits to be
		conducted at least on an annual basis.
		conducted at least on an annual pasis.
		Mo further note that this question and a second of the AAAC/
		We further note that this question seeks comments on MAS' expectation of FIs
		to conduct "regular" BCM audits. Separately, MAS has also proposed that "the
		frequency of BCM audits should be commensurate with the criticality of the
		business functions". In this regard, we would appreciate specific guidance from
		MAS on the expected frequency of BCM audits to be conducted.
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	

C /N	5	
S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		c) In addition, paragraph 2.21 of the consultation paper further sets out that "The FI should submit the BCM audit reports to MAS upon request."
		We note from paragraph 1 of the consultation paper that MAS expects FIs "to adopt the Guidelines within a year following its publication", i.e. a transition period of one year from the issuance date is provided for FIs to adopt the revised BCM Guidelines. Given a BCM audit plan for the coming year is to be developed and approved by the FI's Audit Committee, we seek MAS' confirmation that MAS only expects the first BCM audit report to be issued in the coming year per the audit plan, after the issuance of the revised BCM Guidelines. (For example, if the revised BCM Guidelines is issued on January 2020, FIs would need to have an approved BCM audit plan for the year 2021 by the end of 2020. The first BCM audit would then be conducted and the audit report issued in 2021.)
12.	Fidelity	Comments on the definition of business function:
12.	International	We agree in principle that one should not take a silo approach when identifying business functions that are critical to the organisation. Financial institutions have generally established and conducted BCM planning and analysis along departmental lines for pragmatic reasons (e.g. ease of review and implementation). Notwithstanding, we would like to emphasise that considerable focus is being made on critical processes performed by these departments and how these processes would impact the organisation. Moreover, the interdependency between processes and steps to manage such BCM risks are tested and validated through simulation and/or table-top exercises.
		The above approaches are consistent with Principle 5 of the current MAS BCM Guidelines, which expects a financial institution to consider the interdependency risk of Critical Business Functions. We are not in favour of changing the definition of "business function" as this introduces complexity to the BCM process and creates unnecessary confusion when a financial institution implements its BCM life-cycle. To illustrate our concerns, the following are potential issues that could arise: 1) Creates confusion on the BCM ownership coverage as there will not be a single person/department responsible for performing the Business Impact Analysis (BIA), BCM planning and testing for business functions that cut across various departments. As there will be multiple owners/approvers involved, this do not necessarily ease the implementation of the BIA, BCM planning and testing. One undesired outcome would be that the ownership and approval are being rolled up to the most senior member of the organisation (e.g. CEO or COO). Moreover, for second and third lines of defence (e.g. Compliance, Risk and Audit), where they do not contribute to specific day-to-day business services/processes, it is not clear if they are required to conduct their BIA and to participate at BCM planning/testing. 2) MAS' proposed definition of "business function" is inconsistent with the expectations by most regulators at foreign jurisdictions. This could cause huge implementation challenge and operational costs to global financial institutions because they usually apply group standards on their local operating entities, and their existing BCM systems and methodology are commonly built along "department" lines. Changing their global BCM systems, methodology and templates just to meet Singapore requirements will pose practical challenges and raise the implement costs.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		Please refer our comments to Question 1. The overall recovery process is generally addressed by a financial institution's existing Incident Response and Crisis Management Plan, which are validated during the Crisis Management Team exercises.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests: MAS should allow flexibility for financial institutions to determine the types and frequency of BCM tests that commensurate with the nature and complexity of their business. Hence, we do not agree with prescribing specific types and/or frequency of BCM tests. Taking a one size fits all approach by requiring financial institutions to carry out BCM tests once every year appears contrary to MAS' usual stance of allowing financial institutions to calibrate their BCM tests using a risk-based approach.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: Internal Audit normally adopts a risk-based audit cycle methodology. Auditable entities/business functions maintained in the audit universe are regularly risk assessed to determine their risk rating, and thus audit frequencies. As per comments provided to Question 4, we are of the view that financial institutions should have the flexibility to determine the frequency of the BCM audits that commensurate with the nature and complexity of their business. We do not agree that prescribing BCM audits at frequency of least annually is necessarily the right approach.
13.	Holland & Marie	Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
	Pte. Ltd.	management: We believe that an FI's Chief Executive Officer should be responsible for crisis management, involving such other staff as the circumstances of a particular crisis may require. While any business continuity crisis would be handled pursuant to the FI's business continuity plan, other crisis should be the direct responsibility of the Chief Executive Officer. We also believe the FI's Chief Executive Officer should be specifically required to participate in the FI's BCM tests.
14.	HSK Resources Pte Ltd	Comments on the definition of business function: To provide service wholeheartedly to neighborhood residents.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests: No comments due to small operations
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits:
15.	IG Asia Pte Ltd	No comments due to small operations Comments on the definition of business function:
13.		MAS proposes to revise the definition of business function to a service that an FI ultimately provides to its customers.
		- Please provide more examples, other than the "securities trading" business function of a brokerage, to give greater guidance
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management: For many Fls, their Group board ensures appropriate governance and oversight of business continuity and there may be Group committees and CMT
		established to oversee BCM in compliance with the jurisdictional requirements

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		of the Group. For local entities that have small teams, could they satisfy the requirements as being part of the wider overall Group oversight and governance BCM framework?
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: Taking the example of small local entity offices, would the overall Group audit
		count towards fulfilling the local entity audit obligation?
16.	Investment	Comments on the definition of business function:
	Management Association of Singapore	The revised definition of business function identifies a number of business processes which in turn may identify multiple departments that own the processes. When assigning ownership to fulfil business continuity requirements (e.g. risk assessment, contingency planning), this may dilute the accountability as compared to an organizational line (e.g. by department or unit) approach. As the business nature of each FI is different, the guidelines can keep it open for FIs to choose whether to segregate by organizational lines or service that best suits its business structure. Some business functions might be missed out if the definition is based on service that an FI ultimately provides to its customer. We propose for the definition to allow FI to have the flexibility and discretion to establish business functions along organizational lines and services as long as the dependencies among processes have been captured and identified.
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
		management:
		Paragraph 2.11 We propose to remove the example of "Chief Risk Officer". The senior management member with responsibility may not necessarily be the risk officer and depends on the organisation's set up and structure. Paragraph 2.13
		Please clarify if training for CMT members conducted by internal parties is acceptable or whether engaging external professional trainers is expected. ANNEX B – Revised Guidelines on BCM
		Referring to • Paragraph 2 - "Critical Business Function" where BCP is required, i.e. "A
		business function which, if disrupted, is likely to have a significant impact on an FI, whether financially or non-financially." • Paragraph 4.5 - "BCM is part of an FI's broader operational resilience. Where
		an FI sets up a committee to oversee its BCM, the committee should thus be led by a senior management member with responsibility over its overall risk (e.g. the Chief Risk Officer)."
		Paragraph 3.1 - "A business function refers to a service provided to customers of an FI. For this service to be delivered, it will likely require a number of business processes to be performed."
		Given that business continuity relates to the various function heads who must ensure the smooth running of an FI's business operations, we suggest the composition of an FI's BCM Committee to be left to the FI's discretion as appropriate.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: Paragraph 2.20 Referring to MAS' proposal "for an El to conduct BCM audits through a unit
		Referring to MAS' proposal "for an FI to conduct BCM audits through a unit independent of the staff involved in the planning and execution of the BCM itself (e.g. internal audit)". We would appreciate MAS' confirmation on the following, please:
		a) Audits performed by external auditors would fulfil the expectation of

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		conducting regular BCM audits.
		b) Other than independent BCM audits conducted by the internal audit function and external auditors, regular quality assurance reviews on BCM conducted by an FI's Regional Head Office BCM function (which is independent of the FI's staff involved in the planning and execution of the BCM itself) would suffice as well.
		Paragraph 2.21 a) Referring to "A BCM audit plan, comprising auditable areas for the coming year, should be developed by the FI. The BCM audit plan should be approved by the FI's Audit Committee. The frequency of BCM audits should be commensurate with the criticality of the business functions."
		We would appreciate MAS' clarification on whether MAS expects a yearly BCM audit plan to be approved by the FI's Audit Committee. We further note that this question seeks comments on MAS' expectation of FIs to conduct "regular" BCM audits. Separately, MAS has also proposed that "the frequency of BCM audits should be commensurate with the criticality of the business functions". In this regard, we would appreciate specific guidance from MAS on the expected frequency of BCM audits to be conducted, such as whether it would suffice for BCM audits to be conducted at least once a year.
		b) Referring to "The FI should submit the BCM audit reports to MAS upon request." We note from paragraph 1 of the consultation paper that MAS expects FIs "to adopt the Guidelines within a year following its publication", i.e. a transition period of one year from the issuance date is provided for FIs to adopt the revised BCM Guidelines.
		Given a BCM audit plan for the coming year is to be developed and approved by the Fl's Audit Committee, we seek MAS' confirmation that MAS only expects the first BCM audit report to be issued in the coming year per the audit plan, after the issuance of the revised BCM Guidelines. (For example, if the revised BCM Guidelines is issued on January 2020, Fls would need to have an approved BCM audit plan for the year 2021 by the end of 2020. The first BCM audit would then be conducted and the audit report issued in 2021.)
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from MAS: We propose for MAS to provide more practical examples of the minimum
		performance level which must be recovered by the RTO as stated in paragraph 3.3 under ANNEX B — Revised Guidelines on BCM.
17.	KPMG Services	Comments on the definition of business function:
	Pte Ltd	With the release of the proposed revisions to Guidelines on Business Continuity Management ("BCM"), we noted that MAS has placed greater emphasis on business resiliency with regards to responding to emerging cyber threats.
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management:
		KPMG recommends that the definition of business function should not be limited to the services being provided to the customer, but should also cover supporting services, which may be critical in order to meet the requirements of the customers (e.g.: IT).

т -		
S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits:
		KPMG recommends regular audits on Business Continuity Management. The independent audit and/or expert assessment may be performed by the FI's internal auditor or external consultants. The addition of external consultants will allow some FIs that lack resources and/or skills to review BCM processes to
		augment their internal capabilities. Furthermore, the scope of the audit should include an evaluation of any outsourcing arrangement that supports critical business functions.
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from MAS:
		MAS Technology Risk Management ("TRM") Notice requires 4 hours Recovery Time Objective ("RTO") for MAS critical systems. KPMG recommends MAS to consider elaborating this requirement in the MAS Business Continuity Management ("BCM") Guidelines.
		Furthermore, we recommend MAS to: - Reference the Security Incident Response Plan requirement in MAS TRM Guidelines to the recovery process of MAS BCM Guidelines;
		- Provide guidance on the financial and non-financial impact of the business functions in the Business Impact Analysis. This should also cover (but not be limited to) operational, financial, legal and regulatory, reputational and customer impact;
		- Explicitly extend the MAS BCM requirements to the outsourced service providers supporting critical business functions.
18.	LIA (AIA)	General Comments: 1. The guidelines require clarity when differentiating the requirements for service and business functions. The term seems to be used interchangeably and confusing if we were to adhere to the guidelines. As such, we suggest that it is better to have a separate definition for service instead of lumping it all together.
		We propose to add a new definition "Service" instead of revising the definition of business function. The definition of Business Function should stay put, as it is a universal BCM term which is applicable throughout the organisation.
		A Service or Critical Service can be mapped to several business functions. A Service or Critical Service can be supported by multiple business functions. Examples of a Critical Service could be:- 1.1 Claims Processing and Payment
		 1.2 Premium Collection and Policy Payment 1.3 Call Centre and Counter Services 2. Will MAS be linking or aligning MAS Notice 127 to the business function as set out in the guidelines? For example, an application for online policy premium payments is down, would this be considered an IT incident in MAS Notice 127
		context?
		Comments on the definition of business function: 1. Annex B, Paragraph 3.1 A business function refers to a service provided to customers of an FI. For this service to be delivered, it will likely require a number of business processes to be performed.
		Not all business processes in the FI can be tagged clearly to a service provided to customers e.g. HR functions (Staff Payroll) or Administrative functions (Strategic Planning). These are departments with no interaction with customers. How should they be documented under the new proposed guidelines?

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		2. Annex B, Paragraph 3.4 Fls should ensure that the minimum performance level for each business functions is suitably defined, clear and measurable. Are there examples of the minimum performance level?
		3. Annex B, Paragraph 3.5 Fls may face scenarios where the performance of a business function is intermittent. This may arise, for example, due to intermittent network connectivity or faulty hardware, and the root cause may not be immediately apparent. To manage such scenarios, Fls should have monitoring capabilities that will enable prompt detection of reduced or intermittent service availabilities and clearly articulate triggers for the activation of contingency plans (e.g. fail over to a secondary data centre). These triggers should take reference from the minimum performance level for a given business function.
		If the main point of this paragraph is to use the minimum performance level for a given business function to trigger the activation of contingency plans or to highlight the need for established monitoring capabilities, this paragraph should focus on these points and not the type of scenario (due to intermittent network connectivity or faulty hardware).
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
		management: Paragraph 2.11 BCM is part of an FI's broader operational resilience. Where an FI sets up a committee to oversee its BCM, the committee should thus be led by a senior management member with responsibility over its overall risk (e.g. the Chief Risk Officer). In this regard, is there any expectation on how the BCM function to be set up?
		Comments on the scope of a BCP: 1. See earlier comments related to the new proposed Business Function as described in our response to Point 1.
		2. Annex B, Paragraph 5.1 BCPs are typically established at the organisational unit level (e.g. by department or unit), but should also be established at the business function level. BCPs should cover the full recovery process: immediate response to the resumption of output to minimum performance levels, and the subsequent restoration to BAU levels. This chapter focuses on business functions, but the same principles apply to unit-level BCPs.
		Having an end-to-end BCP in addition to BCPs at unit, or department, level duplicates the effort of documentation required. We suggest that if the end-to-end approach is preferred, it should form the main BCP document with supplementary material for additional areas which may not be addressed.
		3. Paragraph 2.15 We propose for FIs to review and, where necessary, enhance the robustness and comprehensiveness of their BCPs by covering the full recovery process for a given business function from immediate response to the resumption of business functions to minimum levels, and the subsequent restoration to BAU levels.
		Does Paragraph 2.15 mean:- (i) Each service is required to indicate minimum performance level or/and (ii) Each business function is required to indicate minimum performance level or/and

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		(iii) Each department is required to indicate minimum performance level i.e. multiple business functions but single minimum performance level. The paragraph indicates that MAS requires FIs to cover the full recovery process for a given business function from immediate response to resumption to BAU. Does it mean MAS also requires FIs to cover the full recovery process for a service from immediate response to resumption to BAU?
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: 1. Annex B, Paragraph 6.11 A BCM audit plan, comprising auditable areas for the coming year, should be developed by the FI. The BCM audit plan should be approved by the FI's Audit Committee. The frequency of BCM audits should be commensurate with the criticality of the business functions. We are of the opinion that a separate BCM audit plan may not be necessary as BCM should already be an auditable area which is assessed for audit coverage on a rotational basis based on the severity and likelihood of risk. We suggest that the proposed guidelines should instead require "An audit plan, comprising BCM as one of the auditable areas of the coming year, should be developed by the FI. The audit plan should be approved by the FI's Audit Committee. The frequency of BCM audits should be commensurate based on the audit risk assessment result."
		2. Annex B, Paragraph 6.11 An FI should also ensure that the scope of BCM audits is sufficiently comprehensive and includes all critical business functions.
		In regard to the scope of coverage for the audit on BCM, we suggest to revise to "An FI should also ensure that the scope of BCM audit includes the evaluation of the effectiveness of the internal controls relevant to BCM, including governance over the identification and BCM drills of the critical business functions." This would provide a proper coverage on the overall BCM controls framework including assessing whether management has governance process in place to ensure the critical business functions have been identified, sufficiently and comprehensively covered in the BCM drills.
	LIA (Aviva)	General Comments: We would like to seek clarity on some of the proposed changes so as to better understand MAS' expectations as outlined in the consultation paper. This will help in ensuring appropriate process are put in place to comply with the revised Guidelines when it takes effect. Comments on the definition of business function:
		Comments on the definition of business function: Paragraph 2.5 MAS proposes to revise the definition of business function to a service that an FI ultimately provides to its customers. We agree with the definition of "business function". However, we would like to seek clarity as there may be department(s) with processes that do not directly support any service(s) to FI customers. Is the scope of definition intended to cover this?
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management: Paragraph 2.9 To achieve this effectively in the current threat environment, we propose that the Board take on additional responsibilities to: a) Review and endorse, at least annually, the FI's BCM, as well as ensure that the framework consists of comprehensive policies, processes and procedures, appropriate oversight and escalation elements;

S/N Respond	ent Feedback from respondent
	b) Review and endorse, at least annually, the FI's critical business functions, business continuity objectives and the level of residual risk it is willing to accept after the relevant business continuity measures have been put in place; and c) Satisfy itself that adequate resources, including budget, technology, and staff are allocated to facilitate the implementation of an effective BCM. From a risk perspective, we agree on the involvement of the Board. However, we would like more clarity on the extent of involvement required by the Board in the endorsement and review of the BCM, processes and procedures.
	Comments on the scope of a BCP: MAS proposes that the BCP covers dependencies for a service, and spell out the recovery process from immediate response to minimum levels and BAU levels, and this sits on top of BCPs at the unit, or department, level that relate more to individual processes. Can the service-level BCP document be a high level BCP that maps the interdependencies of the various business processes, while the individual unit/department's BCP would be made reference to/for the detailed recovery processes and objective? The high level BCP would then be co-signed off by the various process owners in relation to the service rendered. In addition, with reference to Point 2 above, we would like to seek MAS' guidance in relation to the Board's responsibility in the review of both the overarching high-level BCP and individual department's detailed BCP.
	Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests: We agree with the proposed type and frequency of BCM tests. Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: Annex B, Paragraph 6.10 An FI should develop an audit process for greater
	assurance that their BCM is effective. Is there an expectation for FIs to develop a separate audit process in relation to BCM?
	Annex B, Paragraph 6.11 A BCM audit plan, comprising auditable areas for the coming year, should be developed by the FI. The BCM audit plan should be approved by the FI's Audit Committee. Is there an expectation to develop a separate audit plan specifically on BCM?
	In addition, further clarification on "auditable areas" in relation to BCM will give better understanding to the requirements.
LIA (Etiqa	Paragraph 2.5 MAS proposes to revise the definition of business function to a service that an FI ultimately provides to its customers.
	The proposed definition of business function only include services that FIs ultimately provide to their customer. Should the business impact analysis include back-end support functions or routine tasks that a department need to complete and meet its responsibility within FI? E.g. Information Technology, Human Capital, Procurement and etc
	Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management: Besides implementation, it is recommended that the Board shall be ultimately responsible to provide oversight and ensure the maintenance of an effective BCM programme.
	Comments on the scope of a BCP:

		[
S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		Annex B, Paragraph 5.8 Where recovery arrangements rely on other
		stakeholders, such as intra-group partners and third party vendors, formal
		service level agreements (SLAs) should be established and the appropriate
		redundancies agreed upon.
		We believe the existing SLA between FI and vendor would have covered the
		needs of FI in handling daily BAU activities. In addition, there is a challenge for
		FI to negotiate the SLA with common infrastructure providers (e.g.
		_ · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
		telecommunication providers) in terms of testing participation and recovery
		time objectives. As such, the need of having explicit SLAs to support FI's BCP is
		not necessary.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests:
		Paragraph 2.19 MAS continues to expect an FI to conduct different types of
		testing to gain the confidence that they will be able to continue to operate
		reliably, responsively, and efficiently as planned. Specifically, an FI should, at
		minimum, conduct the following annually:
		A crisis management and communications exercise involving all CMT
		members and their alternates; and
		A test relating to the BCP for each critical business function.
		Test plans should be equipped with predetermined test goals and test criteria,
		using near to realistic simulations. Since the Board is ultimately responsible for
		the implementation of BCM programme, test objectives should be approved by
		the Board to ensure proper alignment with the expectation of Board in
		reflecting to the evolving risk environment of an FI.
		It stated that communication exercise involving all CMT members and their
		alternates should be conducted annually. It is recommended that more clarity
		to be provided on the communication exercise. E.g. call-tree activation only,
		communication with external parties and etc.
		Further, the requirement in Paragraph 6.3 in Annex B on operating from a
		disaster recovery site for a defined duration may be a potential challenge to
		smaller scale FIs due to resources constraints (i.e. manpower and budget).
		These wordings should be refined to ensure the feasibility of all FIs in planning
		for upcoming BCP testing exercise. Nevertheless, it is recommended that the
		type and frequency should also be approved by Board annually to ensure
		proper alignment with the expectation of Board in reflecting to the evolving risk
		environment of an FI.
		Charlett of all 11.
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from
		MAS:
		It is observed the proposal Guidelines contain various terminologies used to
		define alternate site of primary business premise of FI (i.e. alternate site,
		disaster recovery site, recovery site, and secondary site). To avoid any confusion
		and ensure consistency, it is recommended that the same terminology is used
		throughout.
	LIA (FWD)	Comments on the definition of business function:
	•	Paragraph 2.5 MAS proposes to revise the definition of business function to a
		service that an FI ultimately provides to its customers. For this service to be
		delivered, it will likely require a number of business processes to be performed.
		For example, the "securities trading" business function of a brokerage could
		entail the following processes: (i) Trade Initiation; (ii) Trade Execution; (iii) Trade
		Capture; (iv) Trade Validation; (v) Trade Agreement; (vi) Trade Settlement; and
		(vii) Trade Reconciliation. Each process, in turn, requires specific resources and
		expertise (e.g. IT systems, personnel) to be performed.
	·	

	_	October 2021
S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		Business function could be misleading and create confusion among the
		departments. The new definition is meant on Critical Business Process which
		may be performed across three to four Business Functions. Suggest to change it
		to Critical Business Process.
		Currently, the BCP is drafted under each Department which specified the critical
		process for the department. Is our understanding correct that it is still the same
		or the BCP should be drafted as per Critical Business Process (i.e. each Critical
		Business Process required one detailed BCP)?
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
		management:
		Paragraph 2.13 An FI should review the adequacy of training for CMT members
		at least annually and ensure that they are competently prepared for their roles
		and responsibilities.
		Is the annual BCP testing sufficient to address as the training program to the
		staff? A Call Tree exercise and fire evacuation exercise for example would
		involve all of the staff including new staff, however, the specific BCP testing
		might not require all staff to perform testing in the alternate site.
		β · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:
		Paragraph 2.17 An FI should establish a formal training programme to ensure
		that all relevant personnel are familiar with their roles and responsibilities in
		relation to a BCP. The adequacy of training for all relevant staff should also be
		reviewed at least annually.
		Teviewed at least aillidaily.
		Is the annual BCP testing sufficient to address as the training program to the
		staff? A Call Tree exercise and fire evacuation exercise for example would
		·
		involve all of the staff including new staff. However, the specific BCP testing
		might not require all staff to perform testing in the alternate site.
		Comments on the type and frequency of PCM tests:
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests:
		Seek clarification with MAS on frequency of test for non-critical business
		function.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits:
		Paragraph 2.21 The frequency of BCM audits should be commensurate with
		the criticality of the business functions.
		We are of the view that the regular BCM audit frequency should depend on the
		size of the FI instead of criticality of the business functions. For example, Tier 1
		insurers should conduct the BCM audit once every 2 years and Tier 2 Insurance
		Company to conduct the audit once every 3 years.
	LIA (Manulife)	Comments on the definition of business function:
		Seek clarification from MAS on function that has no relation to customers of an
		FI.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits:
		Seek clarification from MAS on the frequency of BCM audit for an FI.
	LIA (NTUC	General comments:
	Income)	1. Annex B, Paragraph 2: Definitions – Minimum Performance Level
		We would like MAS to advise if there is any benchmark for the evaluation of
		performance level.
		2. Annex B, Paragraph 2: Definitions – Residual Risk
	1	2.7. a.m.c. b, 1 a agraph 2. Definitions Residual filsk

_		October 2021
S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		We would like MAS to advise if there is any benchmark on levels of "residual
		risks" and "extended period of time".
		Comments on the definition of business function:
		Annex B, Paragraph 3.1 A business function refers to a service provided to
		customers of an FI.
		We would like MAS to advise on the term "customers" in the definition of
		business function. Does it include both internal and external customers?
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:
		1. Annex B, Paragraph 5.11: Notification to MAS on disruption of critical
		business function
		We would like MAS to advise/share the instructions on incident notification and
		reporting to MAS.
		2. Annex B, Paragraph 5.14: Relevant portions of communication plan to align
		with the crisis communication protocols established by industry associations We would like MAS/LIA/GIA to share the crisis communication protocols
		established by the industry associations with the FIs.
		3. Annex B, Paragraph 5.18: Formal training programme and adequacy of
		training
		We would like MAS to advise/share on the benchmark for assessing training
		adequacy and examples of training programme.
	LIA (Tokio Marine	General Comments:
	Life)	Making reference to Principle 6 of the existing BCM Guidelines: "Institutions
	-,	should plan for wide-area disruptions." and Principle 7 of the existing BCM
		Guidelines: "Institutions should practise a separation policy to mitigate
		concentration risk of critical business functions."
		We note that the majority of principles 6 and 7 have been diluted from this
		proposed revision. Our company opines that these are still important principles
		that FIs should strive to uphold. In leaving principles 6 and 7 out, MAS may
		unintentionally be giving the incorrect impression that these principles are no
		longer relevant to the financial sector. These principles, for example, can be
		included in an appendix under good practices that a FI should consider as well,
		or weaved into the reorganised sections of the guidelines.
		Comments on the deficition of horizons for all and
		Comments on the definition of business function: There should be more clarity over the definition of a "business function". This is
		because stating that it is "a service that an FI ultimately provides to its
		customers" can be rather vague. Indirect services, such as the Investment
		function of an insurer, may inevitably fall outside the scope, which we believe is
		not the intention of MAS. In addition, simple and mundane services, such as the
		provision of cheque books, may be deemed "business function" under the
		revised definition.
		Our company suggests that MAS retain "business function" as it is, but to come
		up with an acronym, such as "Business Function and Interdependent Processes"
		(BFIP), to highlight (where necessary) the focus of the requirements. For
		example, for paragraph 3.2 in Annex B, it can be reworded as "In a crisis, it
		might not be practical to recover all BFIP at the earliest opportunity".
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
		management:
		Annex B, Paragraph 4.4(b)(iii)

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
	•	It may be hard to demonstrate and review the "extent to which an FI had tested their BCPs". Instead, we propose to reword the clause to "The completeness and comprehensiveness to which the FI had tested their BCPs achieved in a disruption. In addition, where there are parts that were not tested due to certain reasons, FIs are to introduce mitigating controls to reduce the risks that arise from it."
		Comments on the scope of a BCP: Paragraph 2.15 and Annex B, Paragraph 5.1 Establishing an end-to-end BCP for business functions is a good enhancement to the comprehensiveness and robustness of the current BCPs that most FIs have developed. However, it may not be practical and too complicated to establish it for each business function and interdependent process. We would like to propose clarifying this clause to be applicable only to business functions and interdependent processes that the FI deems to be critical in the provision of key services to its customers. Annex B, Paragraph 5.9 but reasonable steps should still be taken to provide assurance in disruptions.
		We propose the following changes to provide more clarity to FIs: " but reasonable steps should still be taken for FIs to satisfy themselves that key service providers can support their businesses even in disruptions. An example of such assurances includes requiring service providers to obtain relevant industry certifications."
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests: Paragraph 2.19 and Annex B, Paragraph 6.4 It may not be practical to conduct a BCP test for each critical business function annually. Instead, we propose that BCP tests be conducted to focus on different critical business functions annually, and to ensure that all critical business functions are tested over a predefined number of years.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: Paragraph 2.21 and Annex B, Paragraph 6.11 Ensuring that audits are conducted on critical business functions is a good enhancement to ensure the quality and comprehensiveness of BCPs. However, instead of having separate and standalone BCM audits on critical business functions, it would be more practical to incorporate the auditing of critical business function's BCP as part of the normal business audits that the Internal Audit Department conducts during BAU.
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from MAS: We hope that MAS can provide further guidance with regard to the level of BCM requirements FIs should put in place to ensure that their vendors uphold their responsibilities and the level of joint/combined testing that should be performed with the FI's vendors (e.g. should sub-contractors also need to be involved in joint testing?).
	LIA (Transamerica Life)	Comments on the scope of a BCP: Annex B, Paragraph 5.9 Some interdependency risks are beyond an FI's direct control to mitigate completely (e.g. unavailability of telecommunications networks, etc.), but reasonable steps should still be taken to provide assurance that key service providers are capable of supporting their businesses even in disruptions.

c 1c .	5	
S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		With respect to interdependency risks beyond FI's direct control, e.g. unavailability of telecommunications network, a general assumption in local BCM framework is that core public infrastructure such as utilities (water, electricity) and those of monopoly in nature, would remain available in event of a crisis impacting FI. It may be inefficient for individual FI to approach those service providers to assess BCM standard and their disaster recovery service level. It would be helpful if MAS could provide further guidance in terms of the extent of assurance FIs are expected to obtain from those service providers of this nature.
		Annex B, Paragraph 5.14 Relevant portions of these communication plans should be aligned with crisis communication protocols established by industry associations so that there is consistent messaging to the public in a wide-spread disruption. Suggest further guidance on relevant protocols described in paragraph 5.14.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: We would like to confirm our interpretation that the expected regularity of BCM audit can be aligned with FI's risk profile and internal audit roadmap based on risk priorities / maturity of the company, i.e. not necessarily on an annual basis.
19.	Lloyd's of London (Asia) Pte Ltd	Comments on the definition of business function: We agree that a focus on the continuity of business services is an appropriate approach for FIs that are material to the operational resilience of the financial system and may add value to other firms when considering operational resilience.
		At Lloyd's in Singapore, the continuity of services rests not only with Lloyd's but also the managing agents and brokers. Accordingly, we agree that the business function is appropriate to mean the service that the "FI provides to the customer".
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
		management:
		We agree with the board and senior management roles and responsibilities. It is important that they take ownership of the function and provide strategic direction. Currently, business continuity is signed off annually by senior management including business impact analysis data, plans and exercising. This is then fed into the overall Lloyd's business continuity function operated from London so that the Executive Risk Committee are also informed.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP: Lloyd's is fully supportive of producing business continuity plans and testing
		along critical business service lines. There are already detailed business continuity plans in place at the process level and for crisis management purposes. There is also a clear escalation process to the Corporation crisis management teams who can provide additional support. Key roles have been trained for this purpose. To ensure robustness, it is agreed that the identification of plausible scenarios and interdependencies of systems and processes through the risk assessment process will ensure an acceptable level of continuity of service provision.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests: Lloyd's has a comprehensive business continuity and crisis management testing programme in place. This includes annual remote working, crisis management
		problamme in place. This includes annual remote working, crisis management

C/AL	Docnordont	Eardhack from recognitions
S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		and business recovery exercises. A disaster recovery testing regime is in place for all critical systems in use. Information regarding the efficacy of the business continuity arrangements in place are submitted as part of the quarterly reporting to the Executive Risk Committee.
		It should be noted that the provision of end-to-end service provision is provided by a number of individual entities which will require further co-ordinated testing.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: BCM audits are an essential part of any business continuity regime. Agree with the expectation to conduct regular BCM audits.
20.	Marsh (Singapore) Pte.Ltd.	Comments on the definition of business function: While Marsh(Singapore) Pte. Ltd agrees with the definition proposed by MAS regarding critical business function (Clause2.2,2.5 &2.6), we would prefer the guideline to be non-prescriptive which allows organizations the flexibility to scope/structure their business entity for business continuity planning and documentation.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP: It is in our view that Intermittent Outages (Clause 2.7) are under the technology regime already incorporated in the TRM guideline. Business Continuity Management guideline should focus its coverage in the risk management arena dealing with accidental and sudden operational disruption/outages. Planning effort should be focused on worst case scenario.
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from MAS:
		MAS should consider sector specific guidelines, for example, Insurance Broking versus Banking and Finance. This would help focus regulation to risk.
21.	Marsh Management Services Singapore Pte Ltd	Comments on the definition of business function: For captive and SPRV insurers, the key business functions comprise insurance, claims, accounting and compliance. There is no headcount for these entities as the operations of these entities are typically outsourced to an insurance manager.
		Under the Outsourcing Guidelines, business continuity management is one of the risks identified for the Board and the senior management to review, assess and ensure that it is appropriately in place. Therefore, the Board and the senior management will need to agree the minimum performance level with the outsourced service provider.
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management:
		While it is important for the Board and senior management to have an oversight of the BCM function, given that it is outsourced, it is important that the Board and senior management are kept informed of the BCM policies of the outsourced service provider; i.e. including the type and frequency of the test. That said, as noted above, the outsourcing guidelines cover this aspect so we do not believe there is anything further required. Given the nature of captives and SPRV, they do not have public interest elements and often the potential issues from BCM events are limited due to the infrequent nature of policy issuance and a lighter regulatory touch.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
3,14	пезропист	Refer to answer in Qn#2
		Neier to answer in Quinz
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests:
		Refer to answer in Qn#2
		nerer to unswer in Quinz
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits:
		Given that the risks underwritten by captives are all in house corporate risks
		and unlikely to affect the general public who are not the stakeholders or
		interested parties of the captives, we are of the opinion that regular BCM audits
		are not required.
		Having said that, the Board and the senior management should be kept
		informed at all times of the BCM policies and plan that its service provider have
		in place to ensure there is no lapse in the continuity of their service; i.e. in the
		form of an attestation. This forms part of the annual outsourcing review that is
		conducted by the Board of the captives as we believe is sufficient for these
		types of vehicles.
		The same would apply to SPRV structures, as once they are established, there is
		limited on going transactions that are susceptible to BCM issues (as there are
	_	various failsafe's in place).
22.	Microsoft	General Comments:
	Operations Pte	Microsoft would like to thank the Monetary Authority of Singapore (the "MAS")
	Ltd.	for the opportunity to provide comments on the proposed revisions to
		Guidelines on Business Continuity Management ("BCM").
		Microsoft supports the purpose and the risk-based approach of the revised
		BCM Guidelines and views this as a positive step by MAS to highlight the
		importance of appropriate BCM by financial institutions. Accordingly, Microsoft
		has only minimal suggested revisions to the BCM Guidelines.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:
		While Microsoft agrees with the proposal by the MAS for financial institutions
		to have robust business continuity plans, the proposed Section 5.8 of the BCM
		Guidelines is not practical in the context of financial institutions' engagement of
		cloud service providers ("CSPs").
		,
		First, the obligations for RTOs to be set forth in service level agreements is not
		feasible for most hyperscale CSPs. Such an obligation implies that RTOs can be
		negotiated with each customer, which is not possible in the context of
		hyperscale cloud services.
		RTOs speak to catastrophic loss only. RTOs can vary from configuration to
		configuration and, by definition, deal with catastrophic scenarios outside of
		normal operations, and therefore should not be included in standard service
		level agreements.
		For our PaaS/laaS offering, we offer technical configuration options to give the
		customer choice in how it designs for high availability and disaster recovery.
		The RTO/RPO is always down to the design of the application by the customer.
		With respect to SeeS, our comiles are retained as a still a see
		With respect to SaaS, our service operates using an active configuration with
		immediate failovers built-in. Such a configuration allows the service to meet a
		high resilience design and cope with blackswan events such as total loss of
		datacenter(s).
<u> </u>		

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
S/N	Respondent	Hence, in this context, RTO/RPO is not considered a valid metric for evaluating active/active configurations or for services like Exchange Online, as this service is built to targets for near instant failover and zero data loss. In on-premise scenarios having clear RTO and RPO measures (at service) make sense as organizations need to understand how to manually bring the service back and/or failover to the DR site. The reason the metric makes sense in this context is that on-premise software is typically built in an active/passive configuration perhaps using offline tape backup for rollback/recovery. Accordingly we recommend that the requirement in 5.8 that the parties "set[] specific and measurable recovery expectations (e.g. RTOs) and "redundancies agreed upon" be deleted. Instead, MAS could require financial institutions understand the CSPs' RTOs/redundancies, rather than requiring that they be
		negotiated or agreed on, or put into service level agreements. Second, it is neither universally necessary nor feasible for CSPs to contractually commit to joint testing of their BCPs. A hyperscale cloud provider should design its service such that either disaster recovery is entirely the responsibility of the cloud provider or that clear instructions are provided to the FI on how to configure and use the cloud services such that disaster recovery is entirely under the FI's control. Thus with a well-designed hyper-scale cloud service no part of the disaster recovery plan is conducted together with customers, and there is no purpose served by joint testing.
		CSPs can provide FIs with information about their business continuity management programs and testing reports, as well as independent 3rd party certifications covering disaster recovery processes and evidence of compliance, e.g., ISO 22301, and SOC 2 Type II. Instead of requiring joint testing, it should be required that the FI ensure that the service providers' disaster recovery arrangements are "properly tested and verified."
		Likewise, CSPs should not be required to be involved in BCM exercises with financial institution customers. Financial institutions and CSPs have their own BCM practices in place, which they exercise independently. Given the volume of customers, CSPs would not be able to participate in the BCM exercises of all of their financial institution customers. In light of the above, we recommend for this proposed section 5.8 to be deleted
		in its entirety. The relevant principles are covered in 5.7 and 5.9.
23.	MUFG Bank, Ltd.	Comments on the definition of business function: • With reference to the definition of the "Business Function refers to a service provided to customers of an FI" in clause 3.1. We made comparisons to the International Standards on Business Continuity Management (i.e. ISO 22301) and APRA Prudential Standard CPS 232 Business Continuity Management and we noted the difference in the meaning below. Though business functions are not defined specifically in the standards, the substance that draws from the definition in the international standards is different from the interpretation written in the MAS Consultation paper. We would like to clarify if MAS has any intention to align the following standards on the definition of a "business functions". APRA Standards: "Critical business operations are the business functions" ISO 22301:

C/NI	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
S/N	Kespondent	
		"Organization – person or group of people that has its own functions with
		responsibilities, authorities and relationships to achieve its objectives."
		"Products and Services – Beneficial outcomes provided by an organization to its
		customers, recipients and interested parties."
		On clause 3.5, we noted examples of the Technology Risk Management resilience. We would like to suggest for MAS to provide more specific guidance on resilience from the BCM guidelines' perspective.
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management:
		• There are "adequacy", "relevant", "appropriateness" elements throughout the guidance. We propose that all the considerations to be consistent throughout the guidelines to avoid confusion of what is expected of an FI. For example: clause 4.4 says "Senior management should participate actively in the FI's BCM tests", clause 6.6 says "Senior management should participate in all relevant tests".
		We would also like to highlight that the reference to Para 3.5 for definition of business continuity objectives in Footnote 4 is incorrect.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP: On clause 5.1, it says that "BCPs are typically established at the organizational unit level (e.g. by department or unit), but should also be established at the business function level." "Business Functions" refers to Processes and Activities performed in the organization. We would like to clarify if MAS is expecting a Business Continuity Plan for every business function identified in the FI.
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from
		MAS: On 5.11: Per Circular SRD BCM 01/2006 indicates: "Financial institutions are reminded to inform MAS' supervisory officers immediately of the occurrence of an emergency where business operations are or will be severely disrupted, as well as once their contingency plans have been activated" We interpret 5.11 to mean that a first notification should be made immediately upon discovery of occurrence; followed by subsequent updates of mitigations implemented.
		If this is the intention, we propose for 5.11 to read: "FIs should notify MAS immediately upon discovery of the disruption of a critical business function. FIs should subsequently provide information on the assessed impact on its customers and the actions that have been taken (alternative service channels, media engagement, etc.) to MAS in a prompt manner."
		We further propose to include that: "FIs should abide by the reporting timelines set out in other relevant MAS notices. For example, Notice on Technology Risk Management [Notice No. CMG-N02], in the event of IT incidents."
24.	LIA member Old	General comments:
	Mutual International	Require clarity as to how MAS will apply these guidelines in respect of branch offices in Singapore with main offices outside of the country.
		Comments on the definition of business function: Agree with the concept and approach.
	L	1 - O

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		Use of business function to mean service is likely to cause confusion, in
		addition, function is defined differently across industries and regulators again
		creating the potential for confusion.
		Comments on the value and assessed likely of the Doord and assistant
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
		management:
		The level of oversight and requirements proposed will ensure visibility and accountability by both the Board and senior management, however
		consideration as the scale of the business should be made.
		consideration as the scale of the business should be made.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:
		The proposal to move from process to service focused will provide a clearer and
		consolidated view, however, the potential for silos remains across services.
		Consideration should be given to the ability to present an overarching view of
		the business which will:
		reduce the likelihood of the same resource being used by more than one
		service (staff, hardware)
		strengthen the ability to capture dependencies
		• identify IT systems used across services enabling financial institutions to more
		clearly prioritise key systems for impact and recovery
		Thereby increasing the ability of a FI to respond to a incident.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests:
		The requirement to test the BCP for each critical function would be onerous if
		the requirement included OMI IOM services as it would require multiple tests to
		prove each BCP. Request consideration is given for FI's to be able to
		consolidated tests proving a number of business functions/services at the same
		time. The benefit of which would reduce testing fatigue from multiple tests as
		well as giving an FI a holistic view of a full response to an incident impacting
		multiple functions.
		Comments and the conduct of months BCM and the
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: Agree
		Agree
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from
		MAS:
		In respect of industry-wide exercises and the strong encouragement to
		participate, consideration of the scale of the business and the criticality of the
		services provided against the frequency and level of participation should be
		considered by MAS.
25.	Oliver Wyman	Comments on the definition of business function:
		Definition broadly in line with what other regulators are defining it. BOT calls it
		"Business Service", MAS calls it "Business function" but the definitions are
		broadly the same in that it's a service that FIs provides to its customers.
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
		management:
		No potential issues – in line with global practice and other regulators
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:
		Introduction of an "end-to-end BCP" in addition to BCP at unit-level; while
		theoretically a good idea – there are several challenges that we foresee that
		would be good for MAS to clarify:
		What are the possible duplication of effort for "end-to-end" BCP vs unit-level
		BCPs?

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
	•	Who is the ultimate owner of this "end-to-end" BCP? It would be difficult to
		conduct or create an end-to-end BCP as you would ideally require an end-to-
		end process owner who can coordinate the hand-offs across each step in the
		process / across units in the end-to-end process
		Is the new end-to-end BCP supposed to co-ordinate which units need to
		recover sequentially vs in parallel, in order to consider the whole service
		recovered? This concept makes more sense in the context of IT recovery plans /
		contingency plans where there are certain core systems (e.g. core banking
		system & related system services) that must be recovered before front-end
		applications can recover. The IT recovery plan / contingency plan needs to be
		end-to-end in this respect and identify all the pre-requisite services that must
		be recovered before the critical application (i.e. the one that drives the critical
		business function) can recover
		business function, currectover
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests:
		Some of the suggestions that MAS have provided as example types of BCM tests
		seem reasonable; but unclear if it's realistic to expect the FI to do all of the
		more complex exercises. Also – the FI would need to be very careful if they run
		this to ensure that this doesn't cause an actual BCM incident (e.g. planned test
		for switching to alternate data centres / operating from disaster recovery site
		leads to actual issues if switch doesn't go smoothly)
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits:
		Need to clarify the scope of BCM audits to avoid duplication of work done by
		BCM team (e.g. would BCM audit conducted by Internal Audit also conduct BCP
		testing to verify BCM teams' testing results?)
		Role of BCM audit only makes sense if its job is to ensure BCPs are in place for
		all business functions and that testing takes place regularly. If it also goes into
		verifying actual test results is where it will lead to duplication of work and
		unclear the benefit / value-add of a BCM audit conducted by internal audit.
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from
		MAS:
		Other: Industry-wide exercises are becoming more common; and it would be
		useful if MAS or other industry bodies can help identify & communicate if there
		are any potential areas of systemic BCM risks due to
26.	Oversea-Chinese	Comments on the definition of business function:
	Banking Corp Ltd	1. As the definition of a business function (service) is rather vague, the Bank
		recommends using FSB guidance on identifying critical functions and critical
		shared services as a foundation to work from. Guidance Link
		http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130716a.pdf
		2. In the example given under chapter3.1, "customers" seem to refers to retail
		or corporate customers. We would like to seek clarity on whether "customers"
		includes both internal and external customers (e.g. FMIs, other banks, critical
		shared services such as HR or IT functions). Otherwise, would there be a
		definition of "customers" provided?
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
		management:
		1. The Bank seek clarification for chapter 4.4(c) on the expected role of senior
		management in the Bank's BCM tests. Does "BCM test" refer to crisis
		management exercise in this instance?
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:

		000001 2021
S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		1. The bank proposes that BCP for critical business functions should not
		duplicate downstream processes (which has its own BCP) but to capture
		pertinent information that is needed at the critical business functions.
		2. In addition, as most BC plans are part of enterprise governance, risk and
		compliance portal ample time should be given to capture the new requirements
		· · · · · · · · · · · ·
		and its implementation. We propose to set out a transition period of 24-36
		months to implement.
27.	Prusik Investment	No comments.
	Management	
	Singapore Pte Ltd	
28.	Rabobank	Comments on the definition of business function:
	Singapore Branch	Recommend that the Guidelines provide guidance on the responsibility and
		criteria used to define the risk/continuity owner of the business functions since
		now it involves multiple business processes and multiple departments.
		The state of the s
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:
		Paragraph 2.15 of the consultation paper states that "The proposed Guidelines
		will expect FIs to have in place end-to-end business continuity plans for each
		service that is delivered to their customers, thereby drawing out any internal or
		external dependencies". We are of view that such services are too many and
		broad which may not be effective. Instead, it may be more effective for the FIs
		to focus on the "critical" services that are delivered to their customers
		according to the FI's business continuity objectives.
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from
		MAS:
		Paragraph 5.11 of the proposed Guidelines states that "FIs should notify MAS
		promptly when a critical business function is disrupted". Could We
		recommend for these Guidelines to be enhanced to include the following
		_
		similar to those that have been included in MAS Notice 644:
		• Further dDetails of the reporting channels to be used (eg email, Portal, etc.)
		and format (report template) is required.
		Provide measurable term to the definition of "promptly".
		Paragraph 5.14 of the proposed Guidelines states that "Relevant portions of
		communication plans should be aligned with crisis communication protocols
		established by industry associations so that there is consistent messaging to the
		public in a wide-spread disruption". We would like to seek clarification as toon
		the "crisis communication protocols" that the Guidelines is referring to.
29.	RBC Investor	General comments:
23.		
	Services Trust	We agree on the approach and direction the regulator is suggesting and are
	Singapore Limited	currently focusing our efforts to move toward this model.
		As this is a significant departure from the previous regulation, management
		would seek to understand the proposed timeline for implementation.
		Comments on the definition of business function:
		Management agrees with the direction on "business function".
		2.6 It may be difficult to specify a single minimum performance level and it may
		change from time to time, depending on factors such as market condition,
1	ı	nature of the incident, the risk appetite of senior management and the
		prolonged extent of damage an incident to an FI.

_		33333. 2322
S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
		management:
		Management agrees that the board and senior management should have
		= = =
		oversight to the BCM program.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:
		Management agrees with the end-to-end BCPs for business function and is
		channeling resources to move toward this model.
		Comments on the type and frequency of PCM tests
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests:
		Management agrees with the proposed approach.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits:
		2.20 Management agrees with the proposed approach; this aligns with the
		three lines of defense.
		Comments on any other consets of BCM that warrant further guidence from
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from
		MAS:
		Management agrees with this approach.
30.	RGA International	General comments:
	Reinsurance	One of the biggest changes is the way the MAS want to cover business
	Company	functions. It can be challenging to actually specify minimum operating levels
	Company	across multiple departments required to fulfil what they call critical business
		functions especially if there is a reliance on departments outside of Singapore.
		The requirement for end-to-end business continuity plans for each service
		delivered to customers to include internal and external dependencies could be
		quite challenging and will need significant time and resources to implement.
		Comments on the definition of business function:
		A business function should be considered as the collection of activities,
		regardless of departmental structure, required to complete a critical business
		process.
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
		management:
		The roles and responsibilities for the Board and senior management are quite
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
		reasonable.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:
		The proposed end to end business continuity plan requirement is logical but
		could be exceedingly difficult to implement. Many popular BCM software
		solutions do not provide this functionality out of the box and these types of
		·
		plans would require either system configuration or the undesirable idea of
		building end to end BCPs outside of the FI's mainstream BCM toolkit
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests:
		The proposed type and frequency of BCM tests is reasonable
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits:
		BCM audits are often performed as part of broader business process audits
		rather than as a standalone effort. It may not be reasonable to think that an FI
		will totally reorient its customary audit plan to accommodate this idea. It could
		be possible to synthesize the BCM audit component from process audits into
		one report which would be available for senior management or MAS review.

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from
		MAS:
		It would be good to hear more of MAS expectations for FI's oversight of the continuity of key third parties.
31.	RHT Compliance Solutions Pte. Ltd	General comments:
		RHT Compliance Solutions conducted a roundtable discussion with industry members/financial institutions around the substantive issues raised in the Consultation Paper. The roundtable was attended by 125 attendees from 89 companies on 1 April 2019. Participants comprised representatives ranging from Insurers, Reinsurers, banking and capital market industries, including locally incorporated banks and Singapore branch of foreign banks.
		While we are broadly supportive of the proposal to revamp and refine the current Business Continuity Management Guideline (the "Guidelines"), we urge MAS to further consider the implications of some suggestions raised in the Guidelines.
		Our comments on the questions posed in the Guidelines are set out below and incorporate, where appropriate, inputs received from the roundtable participants.
		Comments on the definition of business function: MAS proposes to revise the definition of a "business function" to a service that a Financial Institution ("FI") ultimately provides to its "customer". Participants would like to clarify if the term "customer" includes internal-facing customers of a financial institution as well. Their main concern lies with the possibility of identifying multiple business functions that require further breaking down of processes and the supporting departments. The inclusion of internal customer may also risk over-complicating the Business Continuity Management ("BCM") process.
		We also seek clarity on the applicability of guidelines to external vendors who have been contracted by the financial institution to support a business function. For example, the diagram on Business Function shows departments and processes supporting it, but does not include external vendors.
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management: We agree with MAS that an annual attestation to the Board would help to ensure both the BCM readiness and programme comply with all the requirements from the Guidelines. As the Guidelines apply to financial institutions and would not be applicable to most outsourced providers, we would like to seek clarification whether it would be sufficient to provide the Service Level Agreement ("SLA") as part of the attestation. We think that as the requirements in para 5.8 of the Outsourcing Guidelines already encompass a rigorous risk management approach with explicit requirements can therefore be considered a satisfactory attestation. Examples of such requirements include establishing outsourcing management control groups to monitor and control the outsourced service on an ongoing basis which meets the objective of the annual attestation.

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		While triggers in relation to activation of the Crisis Management Team ("CMT") may vary according to the nature of the company business, participants would nonetheless prefer MAS to issue a guide or examples of general triggers and incidents in a company that could call for the activation of the CMT.
		In relation to the need to review the adequacy of training for CMT members at least annually and ensure that they are competently prepared, there are few such courses for senior management to attend every year and we would like MAS to clarify whether conducting tests for CMT, with lessons learnt, would suffice.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP: We understand that FIs generally already have department-level BCP and can achieve end-to-end BCP by coming together to identify dependencies. The requirement for an FI to develop a Business Function BCP is onerous and unnecessary, as it means going through the whole process of risk assessment to develop the BCP at the Business Function level. A Business Function BCP is in fact just a collection of departmental BCPs with dependencies already identified and accounted for.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests: We note that the Guidelines set out in Para 6.4 state that a crisis management exercise and tests relating to the Business Continuity Plan for each critical business function should be done annually.
		However, it was also mentioned in the same paragraph that the test and frequency of exercises should commensurate with the scale and complexity of the FI. While we agree that it is essential for a FI to conduct periodic tests to establish a concrete BCM, coordinating a joint test between the FI and all critical external vendors can be onerous and requires a lot of resources and time to plan especially for more complex operations involving multiple parties. To this end, we would like to propose to MAS to revise the annual frequency to one that is biennial or a frequency to be decided by the FIs.
		Further, we note that the guidelines require all CMT members and their alternates be involved in the annual crisis and communications exercise. We are of the view that it is unrealistic to expect that all CMT members, or all alternates to be present. In fact, in an actual crisis, a crisis management meeting should be able to convene even without all members or their alternates being present. While we understand that it is essential for all CMT members to be familiar with the crisis management exercise, we urge MAS to consider other means of ensuring this e.g. through the imposition of a quorum or requiring that all members must go through at least one CMT exercise within a defined period (e.g. two years).
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: We are supportive of MAS' intention to have an audit process in place in assuring the BCM is effective. We also understand that the frequency of the BCM audit should commensurate with the criticality of the business function.
		MAS did not determine the commencement of audit in the Guidelines. Participants were concerned about the implementation timeline for the audit as there may not be enough auditors with strong BCM knowledge and it may require time to train. It would therefore be challenging to comply within a year.

0.1	_	
S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		To this end, we would like MAS to stipulate when the first audit is to be
		expected from FIs upon the official issuance of the Guidelines.
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from
		MAS:
		We have no comments for this question.
32.	Schroder	General comments:
J 2.	Investment	FIS will be expected to adopt the Guidelines within a year following its
	Management	publication. We would like MAS to consider extending the period from 1 year to
	(Singapore) Ltd	2 years to ensure sufficient time for FIs to adopt the Guidelines.
		Comments on the definition of business function:
		We would like to obtain more guidance on the definition of "business function"
		in relation to the fund management industry. Some examples of related
		processes will be useful.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:
		We would like to obtain more guidance on the expected risk assessment
		process covered under para 5.3. Is the expectation to perform scenario based BCP?
33.	Securities	Comments on the definition of business function:
33.	Association of	We noted that the definition of business functions will be revised to refer to a
	Singapore	service that an FI ultimately provides to its customers. We would suggest that
	(CGS-CIMB	MAS considers expanding it for FIs to refer to a specific product / instrument
	Securities	that is being provided to customers. By defining a business function as a service
	(Singapore) Pte	that an FI ultimately provides to its customers
	Ltd, Charles	may force the FI to omit business critical processes such as regulatory reporting,
	Schwab Singapore	cash management, employee compensation, that are not included in the
	Pte Ltd, DBS	customer value chain but essential to business operations.
	Vickers Securities	Scoping the business function so wide as to cover a regulated activity such as
	(Singapore) Pte	securities trading will also raise questions on how to document the business
	Ltd, Gain Capital	function flow when the transactions cut across to external parties such as SGX
	Singapore Pte Ltd,	(trade section) and CDP (trade settlement) whose recovery processes, RTO, RPO
	IG Asia Pte Ltd,	etc are not disclosed. Determining the RTO for a business function defined so
	KGI Securities	widely may also prove to be problematic as the solution is not so simple as to
	(Singapore) Pte	consolidate the RTO times of all processes within the function. Consolidating
	Ltd, Lim & Tan	the RTO times of all processes within the function would be the assumption
	Securities Pte Ltd,	that all processes have encountered difficulty and require recovery which is not
	Maybank Kim Eng	realistic. Are we supposed to plan on a single process failing or multiple
	Securities Pte Ltd, OCBC Securities	processes failing?
	Pte Ltd, Phillip	Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
	Securities Pte Ltd,	management:
	Saxo Capital	Will entities that are complying to their Group BCM policies (BCM plan
	Markets Pte Ltd,	approved at Group Level) with Group oversight (aka Group CMT) be able to
	UOB Kay Hian Pte	continue to rely on the support provided by the Group if members are able to
	Ltd)	demonstrate that adequate controls are in place at Group level to meet the
	,	MAS requirements, and these controls are subject to Group oversight?
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:
		Development of overarching BCPs for each service that is delivered to
		customers in addition to BCPs at Unit or Department level would add an
		unwelcomed complexity to recovery plans that are already complicated due to
		the number of individual processes that need to be covered.

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		Such complexity does not translate well into training especially if the audience
		is of varying experiences, ranks and ages. Members find that when a crisis
		occurs, the solutions that work are the simplest because they
		are understandable. In a crisis it is counterproductive to pull out a 100-page
		BCP that cross referenced to each and every Unit's BCP.
		,
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests:
		Requirement for a test relating to each critical business function would
		functionally mean an entity with 6 regulated activities (securities trading,
		leverage forex trading, futures trading, share margin financing, shares
		borrowing and lending and custodian) would be required to
		conduct 6 separate BCP tests in a calendar year. This is akin to continuously BCP
		testing over the calendar year, involving the same units (eg Retail Dealing), in
		addition to the Industry Wide BCP and DRE exercises with SGX.
		Would it not be possible to conduct a single BCP to cover all 6 regulated
		activities at the same time?
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits:
		Conducting annual BCM Audits may be deemed too frequent. Some FIs are
		mandated by their internal policies or Group Audit policies BCM function for
		their Internal Audit to perform Observation on DRs and Crisis Management
		Simulation. DRs are conducted annually for critical systems and Crisis
		Simulation Exercise is also done yearly for Critical Business functions. Therefore,
		a full scope of BCM Audit could be done once every 2-3 years which may cover
		the adequacy of the institution's BCM Framework and how the framework is
		being implemented.
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from MAS:
		If the above suggestion in Q1 is tenable, members would like to propose for
		MAS to consider to define "critical business functions", so that our recovery
		strategies, as well as the RTO can be tailored accordingly. The criteria for any
		specific service / product to be deemed as "critical business functions" could be
		spelt out for clarity (for eg. revenue contribution, or impact to customers). The
		suggestion to have such distinction for "critical business functions" is such that
		FIs can highlight and focus on the relative priorities in a crisis situation where
		recovery of all business functions may not be practical.
34.	Singapore	Comments on the definition of business function:
	Exchange Limited	Agree with the proposed requirements.
	_	
		However, the new definition of "business function" will cut across various
		functions and units within each FI. Significant work will be necessary to review
		and refresh the existing BCM work flow, governance and documentation. We
		request that MAS provide at least 18 months for FIs to comply with the new
		guidelines.
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
		management:
		Agree with the proposed requirements.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:
		Agree with the proposed requirements.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests:

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		MAS expects that an FI, at minimum, conduct annually, "a test relating to the BCP for each critical business function". From previous clarifications with MAS, we understand that MAS's intention is that such tests need not be conducted for every element of each critical business function's BCP every year. We strongly recommend that the BCM guidelines specifically clarify that FIs can take a modular, risk-based approach to such testing, based on the FI's own risk assessment and BCM programme.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: Agree with the proposed requirements.
35.	SingCash Pte	General comments:
	Ltd/Telecom Equipment Pte Ltd	We support the MAS circulation and requirements for Financial Institutions to put in place guidelines for technology risk management and business continuity (Guidelines). Our views here cover both sets of Guidelines.
		2. There are areas that we feel the MAS may wish to consider and factor into the Guidelines:
		(a) The MAS indicates that these are Guidelines applicable to financial institutions (FIs). With the impending implementation of the Payment Services Act [PSA] which sets out applicable licensing and regulatory conditions for Payment Institutions [PIs], we seek clarification whether PIs under the PSA will be subject to the Guidelines.
		(b) We note that many PIs operate smaller scale businesses and or businesses quite different from that of a typical FI. Merchant Acquisition, for example, will require a party to be licensed under the PSA but clearly the merchant acquisition parties today may have difficulty implementing the Guidelines in full. In particular, it is envisaged that most of the PIs who are small and medium enterprises will not be able to fully execute the TRM. We believe that the MAS may need to provide for some calibration in the Guidelines to PIs or seek not to implement the Guidelines on such parties.
		(c) Where the IMDA decides that these Guidelines must be implemented by FI, we note that the Guidelines do not provide clarity on whether FIs or PIs (if the latter are expected to implement the Guidelines) are able to rely on their overall group management TRM and BCM practices. Institutions in the financial services market are increasingly less reflective of a traditional bank. Many parties in the fintech services world have origins in social media and/or other sectors where there are TRM and BCM requirements except that these may not be completely similar to those outlined in the Guidelines. However, for various reasons, these companies require their business units to adopt the overall group approach. We believe that these should also be considered as acceptable for the purpose of compliance with the Guidelines. For example, many of the potential institutions involved could have group practices relating to crisis management, BCPs, testing. These parties should be permitted to rely on their group practices than to implement new requirements.
		(d) Some of the requirements in the Guidelines also appear to mirror those in the Outsourcing Guidelines. Whilst we see the relevance of these requirements, it may be useful for the MAS to point out that where an institution already implements these aspects under the Outsourcing Guidelines, this will be sufficient for compliance with the TRM and /or BCM Guidelines. This avoids confusion.

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
3/14	Кезрописи	(e) The Guidelines require that even when usage of third party services do not
		constitute outsourcing, the institutions should access these accordingly and
		manage the risks, including proper due diligence, financial viability, track
		record, accreditation. Examples cited are power supply, interconnected parties
		etc. We believe this may not be possible in all cases. Commercially available
		services like cloud or data warehousing or even power supply are now so
		ubiquitous that to impose on these third party suppliers the same requirements
		of an Outsourced Service Provider may be impracticable.
		or an outside control to the control
		(f) Similarly, the proposal for BCP tests and CMT exercises on an annual basis
		appears impracticable especially end to end recovery and third party vendor
		participation are required. The minimum required tests should be either
		confined to core business functions and/or frequency should be left to FI to
		decide based on nature of business operation.
36.	Sompo Insurance	Comments on the definition of business function:
	Singapore Pte.	The definition of business function to a service that ultimately provides to
	Ltd.	customers may include support activities. The inter-dependency of "business
		function" in operational process in the value chain will need to be explored in
		depth.
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
		management:
		Board may not have detailed knowledge of operational processes to review and
		endorse processes/procedures. Hence, may not be the best party to evaluate
		intrinsic operational processes.
		Board of Management: Annual attestation to Board of Directors may increase
		the BCP cost and not necessarily achieve the objectives subsequently turning it into a "checkbox" exercise.
		into a checkbox exercise.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:
		Whilst proposed scope of a BCP is a good initiative, external dependencies with
		third party vendors may be susceptible to changes and may face challenges if
		vendor is not familiar with BCP regimes of FIs.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests:
		It may be helpful if MAS could propose some samples of type of BCP tests that
		are relevant to different industries.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits:
		BCM audits should commensurate the risks posed/adopt risk based approach.
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from
		MAS:
		Consider establishing a platform in sharing of information that affects multiple
		industries eg in the event of cyber attacks, is helpful as it is difficult to validate
		incomplete/unsubstantial information/news.
37.	Sumitomo Mitsui	General comments:
	Banking	Pursuant to paragraph 5.11 of the proposed BCM Guidelines, financial
	Corporation	institutions are to notify MAS promptly in the event that a critical business
		function is disrupted. As there are reporting requirements under MAS Notice
		644 as well, the bank would like to seek clarification on the notification
		requirements in the event an incident is reportable under both MAS Notice 644
		and the proposed BCM Guidelines. Similar to MAS Notice 644, the bank would
		also be grateful if MAS could provide financial institutions with the relevant
		reporting templates to facilitate ease of reporting.

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
38.	Swiss Re Asia Pte. Ltd.	Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: With reference to paragraphs 2.20 and 2.21 of the CP, we seek clarification on the following: 1. As the proposed BCM Guidelines are silent on the topic of the frequency of the BCM audits, we would appreciate if MAS could clarify its expectation in relation to the frequency of the BCM audits. 2. Paragraph 2.21 of the CP requires an FI to develop a BCM audit plan, comprising auditable areas for the coming year, should be developed by the FI. The bank's understanding is that the process of determining the audit plan for BCM and the approval of such plans to be no different from other audits as all audits would go through the same process in Internal audit. We would appreciate MAS clarification in this regard. General comments: Swiss Re Asia Pte. Ltd. (SRAL) is generally agreeable to the proposed revisions to the BCM guidelines with additional clarification needed on definition of customers and recommend flexibility to define frequency, scope and governing body of BCM. Comments on the definition of business function: The definition set out is largely agreeable, although the term 'customers' should be defined for a reinsurance company. Particularly for a reinsurance company which is B2B, as opposed to B2C for an insurance company, the regulation should be commensurate with the reinsurance business model and not be specifically tailored to the needs of retail customers. Additionally, we would recommend BIA to be conducted every three years in line with other regulators. Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management: Roles and responsibilities are agreeable with the exceptions as below: • Annually endorsing the overall BC programme – Swiss Re has a Group endorsement for the BC programme rather than instead of at the specific legal entity level. Would this fulfil suffice the requirement? • Annually endorsing the critical business functions – Given the relatively static
		The definition set out is largely agreeable, although the term 'customers' should be defined for a reinsurance company. Particularly for a reinsurance company which is B2B, as opposed to B2C for an insurance company, the regulation should be commensurate with the reinsurance business model and not be specifically tailored to the needs of retail customers. Additionally, we would recommend BIA to be conducted every three years in line with other regulators. Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management: Roles and responsibilities are agreeable with the exceptions as below: • Annually endorsing the overall BC programme – Swiss Re has a Group endorsement for the BC programme rather than instead of at the specific legal entity level. Would this fulfil suffice the requirement?
		The scope of BCPs is largely agreeable, with two main exceptions. End-to-end planning should be for key / material services to customers rather than all services to customers. Secondly, planning for specific disruptive scenarios seems less efficient and effective. Preference would be to plan for the four main effects of disruption, i.e. loss of physical infrastructure (offices), employees, IT / communications, and third party service providers.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests:

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		Largely agreeable, although FIs should be permitted to decide on the nature and frequency of tests which are most relevant to their organisation, rather than a prescribed list and schedule.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: Agree that an independent party should periodically conduct audits, but this is better placed with the BCM function so long as it is independent since their knowledge in the field would be superior.
		Additionally, we would recommend the frequency of the audit should be defined by the audit committee with discretion to decide the focus and the frequency of the audits.
39.	Swiss Re International SE	Comments on the definition of business function: The definition set out is largely agreeable, although the term 'customers' should be clearly defined for an insurance company. Additionally, we would recommend BIA to be conducted every three years in line with other regulators such as FINMA.
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management:
		Our observations are as following: • We would request clarity over which Board the paper refers to (Group vs the Singapore Legal Entity?) • Annually endorsing the overall BC programme – Swiss Re has a group endorsement for the BC programme rather than specific legal entity. Would this suffice the requirement?
		• Annually endorsing the critical business functions – Given the relatively static nature of our (insurance) business, we do not feel the need for this recommendation.
		 Satisfy itself that adequate resources are in place – It is part of the governance requirement and need not need to be explicitly mentioned. Annually review of testing & implementation of lessons learned –
		Recommend this to be at the discretion of the FI depending on the nature and complexity of business model. • Annually review over adequacy of training – We recommend the training to
		 be limited to the BCM network (e.g. IMT), rather than the whole company. Annual attestation over BCM preparedness – Attestation of any sort cannot be performed at legal entity level due to limited resources.
		Overall responsibility with CRO – recommend overall responsibility to be with branch head/manager and CRO to be an integral part of discussions and consultations.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP: The scope of BCP seems to be largely catered towards banking institutions with headquarters in Singapore. In general we have two main exceptions. End-to-end planning should be for key / material services to customers rather than all services to customers. Secondly, planning for specific disruptive scenarios seems less efficient and effective. Preference would be to plan for the four main effects of disruption, i.e. loss of physical infrastructure (offices), employees, IT / communications, and third party service providers.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests: Largely agreeable, although FIs should be permitted to decide on the nature and frequency of tests which are most relevant to their organisation, rather than a prescribed list and schedule.

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: Agree that an independent party should periodically conduct audits, but this is better placed with the BCM function so long as it is independent since their knowledge in the field would be superior.
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from MAS: The guidelines in general appear to be more targeted towards banking industry. We would request more clarity in terms of expectations from insurance/reinsurance companies esp. those with Headquarters based outside Singapore and a relatively static business portfolio.
40.	The Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS)	General comments: The ABS welcomes the opportunity to provide its comments on the proposed Guidelines on Business Continuity Management (for convenience, we refer to this as "BCMG" in this submission).
		The ABS supports the MAS's efforts to provide guidance on establishing plans to ensure that business functions can be promptly resumed following a disruption. ABS members are of the view that these proposed Guidelines will help financial institutions to strengthen their resilience to disruptions. The ABS has received a number of comments from its members and has discussed the issues raised in the consultation paper. The key points are highlighted in Annex-A. A collation of all members' comments is set out in Annex-B to this submission.
		The comments listed in Annex-A are intended to provide an overview of some of the key matters discussed and is not intended to be exhaustive. The ABS will be conducting an industry briefing for its members and should any additional issues emerge from the briefing, we will update the MAS by way of an addendum to this submission.
		In conclusion, the ABS would suggest that these proposed Guidelines be implemented on an institution by institution basis, having regard to its size, risk, structure and in consultation with its respective MAS supervisors. Given the new BCMG requirements introduced, while the design and planning could be achieved in 12 months, the implementation and testing would need more than 12 months to operationalize.
		Comments on the definition of business function: Section 3, Paragraph 3.1
		Comments: The BCMG concept of business function (BF) defined as a service to customer is understood. However, the granularity and determination of what constitutes a BF may vary between FIs within the same banking license group.
		FIs could determine their BFs at group level (e.g. investment banking or retail banking) or by business lines (e.g. FX, securities, wealth management, loans, deposit taking) or by product lines (e.g. derivatives, collateral management, cash management, loan origination).
		Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of each FI's organizational construct, the FI will determine the level of BF that is most appropriate for itself. Only thereafter will all business process, supporting systems and

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		infrastructures (hereinafter referred as Unit) be mapped to each BF and the
		end-to-end BF process view be established. ABS will offer this interpretation
		and will educate the banking industry along these lines.
		Section 3, Paragraph 3.2
		Comments:
		Assuming the proposal of BF recovery intentions (BFRI) (item 8 below) is
		accepted, it will state the recovery and risk appetite and residual risk tolerance
		of the BF. It is from this deliberation that the FI decides whether a BF will be
		considered critical business function (CBF).
		It is important to note that that once a CBF is determined, FI should identify the
		key unit level processes and systems supporting the CBF.
		ABS will offer this interpretation and will educate the banking industry along
		these lines.
		Section 3, Paragraph 3.5
		Comments:
		As technology related performance is already covered in the technology risk
		management guidelines, the performance monitoring and thresholds should
		refer to the business processes required to carry out the critical business
		functions at the acceptable levels.
		Recommendations:
		To give business process examples instead of technology examples
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
		management:
		Section 4, Paragraph 4.3, Footnote 3
		Comments: For overseas incorporated institutions in Singapore, it is suggested that the
		Board be able to delegate the responsibility (excluding accountability) to a local
		or regional committee in order to ensure a proper oversight and discharge of
		the Board's duties.
		the bould's duties.
		Recommendation:
		3 The Board may delegate the authority to make decisions to a Board
		committee but bears the ultimate responsibility. Please refer to MAS Guidelines
		on Risk Management Practices – Board and Senior management. For overseas
		incorporated institutions in Singapore, the roles and responsibilities specified
		for the Board can be performed by the relevant function responsible for BCM at
		Group/Global or Regional and/or Local committee while ensuring no conflict of
		interest.
		Section 4, Paragraph 4.3(c)
		Comments:
		By requiring the Board to satisfy itself that adequate resources including
		budget, technology, and staff are allocated, this suggests that the Board has to
		understand the operational details relating to the budget, technology and staff
		allocation. It is suggested that the paragraph be less prescriptive on the
		components (e.g. budget, technology, staff) to be considered and suffice that
		the Board just needs to be satisfied that adequate resources have to be
		allocated to the BCM programme.

c !		
S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		Instead, MAS may wish to consider placing the components in the Senior
		Management section.
		Recommendation:
		(c) Satisfy itself that adequate resources < Propose to delete ", including
		budget, technology, and staff"> are allocated to facilitate the implementation
		of an effective BCM
		Section 4, Paragraph 4.4(c)
		Comments:
		The phrase "participate actively" suggests that senior management must always
		be directly involved in BCM tests. Senior management will be involved in BCM
		tests and their reviews, but often will be present on-site as an observer (as
		opposed to direct participation in a BCM test).
		Recommendations:
		It is suggested to amend the statement to "Participate <propose delete<="" th="" to=""></propose>
		"actively"> in all relevant BCM and Crisis Management tests"
		actively with all active and active management tests
		Section 4, Paragraph 4.7(e)
		Comments:
		The specific details of the work routine required may vary significantly as it
		depends on the circumstances and severity of the crisis. It is more appropriate
		to require FI's to define the approach and have a list of consideration items
		prepared in advance and have it included in the crisis management plan. Upon
		the occurrence of a crisis, the approach and list should be considered when
		determining the required work routine to address the crisis.
		Recommendation:
		(e) Set out <propose "a="" delete="" potential="" routine"="" to="" work=""> the approach and</propose>
		items to consider when determining the required work routine in the event
		<pre><pre><pre><pre><pre><pre><pre><pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre>
		crisis.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:
		Section 5, Paragraphs 5.1 and 5.6
		Comments:
		In Singapore, FIs generally implement BCP at a unit level. This includes business
		and product line owners. The current proposed development of a procedural
		business continuity plan (BCP) at the Business Function (BF) level may give rise
		to duplication of efforts given that recovery procedures are already captured at
		the unit-level BCP. This also increases the risk of misalignment, which may
		cause conflicting instructions.
		It may be more relevant to document the BF's recovery intention. To ensure
		end-to-end focus, it is paramount that all processes and systems that support
		the BF understand the recovery expectations of the BF and to develop their
		respective unit-level BCP to meet the BF's recovery intentions.
		Components of Recovery Intentions could include the following; strategy
		owner, the BF's Recovery or Risk appetite and corresponding BCO statements
		(e.g. MPL, RTO. RPO), dependencies expectations (including intra-group
		dependency and third parties) and residual risk tolerances.
		Recommendations:
L	<u> </u>	

S/N Re	espondent	Feedback from respondent
		It is recommended to rename Business Function BCP to "Business Function Recovery Intentions" (BFRI) to better reflect the BF business priorities and intentions in the recovery process. We should avoid using "Recovery Strategies" as this has been used in other components of BCP. Components of the recovery intentions should be made clear as suggested above.
		Section 5, Paragraphs 5.2, 5.5 and 5.6 – References to "pandemics" Comments: The word "pandemic" suggests a worldwide spread of a disease. BCPs may be activated in cases of infectious disease outbreaks even on a smaller scale e.g. the country-level. Hence the "infectious disease" may be a better reference to consider.
		Recommendations: 5.2 Disruptions could be caused by malicious acts (e.g. cyber-attack, terrorism), natural occurrences (e.g. floods, infectious disease outbreaks, including pandemics) or accidents (e.g. electricity outages, failure of individual system components). Disruptions typically arise due to the diminished availability or functionality of one or more of the following factors that the business function depends on: personnel, physical infrastructure and/or IT components7. A disruption could also occur due to the failure of a key third-party service provider.8
		5.5 In this regard, an FI should develop BCPs that can address a broad range of plausible scenarios from wide-area disruptions to infectious disease outbreaks, (including pandemics). For example, the primary and secondary sites of critical business functions should not rely on the same substation for electricity. FIs with sufficient scale could also operate from multiple locations such that staff and equipment located at a secondary site will be sufficient to allow an FI to continue performing a business function even when the primary site is completely unavailable.
		5.6 FIs should establish a process to monitor news or developments on incidents that could have a downstream impact on their business functions. Lessons learned from its own near-misses, as well as incidents at other FIs or industries, can be used to enhance the institution's understanding of plausible causes of disruptions. In additional to institution-specific disruptions, an FI should also have the plans to deal with a general <pre>propose to delete</pre> "pandemic"> infectious disease outbreak in a manner consistent with the guidance issued by the Ministry of Health.
		Section 5, Paragraph 5.3 Comments: It is noted that risk assessment is mentioned under the section on BCP. Clarification is sought on whether the expectation is for a risk assessment at the BCP level or at a higher level (e.g. country-level). It is suggested that this is preferably done at the country-level given that most business functions and organization units will share the same possible causes of disruptions. Adopting it at the BCP level may not be feasible and will be especially challenging if it is required for a prompt replacement or process changes for an end-to-end BCP.
		Recommendation: To include a footnote that risk assessment can be done at country and not just BCP level.

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		Section 5, Paragraph 5.5
		Comments: The statement "broad range of plausible scenarios" could be mis-interpreted to require FI to have BCP that addressed all causes of disruptions – large or small, simple or complex. The causation list of disruptions will be exhaustive. BCM is about consequence management and having in place control measures to address outage scenarios that may materially impact the operations of the FI. Typically, the plausible outage scenarios are developed following a risk assessment process that considers the threat landscape, the risk and impact to the FI and thereafter the required outage scenarios that the FI should plan against.
		The plausible scenarios provided are wide-area disruptions and pandemics. It is noted that "disruptions" is an impact instead of a scenario.
		Recommendations: It is suggested to amend the statement as follows: 5.5 In this regard, an FI should develop BCPs that can address a broad range of plausible impact-based scenarios from wide-area disruptions to infectious disease outbreaks, (including pandemics). For example, the primary and secondary sites of critical business functions should not rely on the same substation for electricity. FIs with sufficient scale could also operate from multiple locations such that staff and equipment located at a secondary site will be sufficient to allow an FI to continue performing a business function even when the primary site is completely unavailable.
		Section 5, Paragraph 5.8
		Comments: Not every service may be governed by a formal service level agreement (SLA) and Fls may not sign agreements with all intra-group. It is suggested that the word "agreements", as opposed to SLAs, be used. It is also noted that the reference to RTOs for intra-group service providers and third-party vendors may not be necessary given that such is covered under the Guidelines on Outsourcing, revised 5 October 2018. As such, the second sentence of this paragraph can be removed.
		Recommendations: 5.8 Where recovery arrangements rely on other stakeholders, such as intragroup partners and third party vendors, formal service level agreements (SLAs) and documented agreement should be established for third party vendors and intra-group partners respectively, and the appropriate redundancies agreed upon. <propose "this="" (e.g.="" a="" and="" basis."="" delete="" expectations="" in="" include="" measurable="" mutual="" of="" on="" participation="" recovery="" regular="" review="" rtos),="" setting="" slas="" specific="" testing="" to="" would=""> FIs are encouraged to share their business continuity objectives with key stakeholders to mitigate the risk of mismatched expectations. An FI should proactively assess the resilience of these stakeholders and involve them in its BCM exercises, where appropriate.</propose>
		Section 5, Paragraph 5.16 Comments: In respect of the list of non-exhaustive components mentioned, not all components are necessarily applicable for every BCP. For instance:

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
	•	Procedures to retrieve vital records may not be applicable to all functions and
		business impacts, and may leverage data recovery measures by IT;
		Information on the recovery site may not be applicable if recovery strategies
		utilised include remotely working from home or handing over to teams in other
		locations are utilised recovery strategies in case of a loss of premises scenario;
		Coordination with external dependencies and parties may not be applicable
		to all functions; and
		'Call Tree' procedures may be separately managed, such as through HR
		automated notification systems and in such event, the details will not be
		reflected in the BCP.
		Further, the references to "detailed procedures" and "according to a
		timeframe" in point 4 of the paragraph suggests a focus on specific timeframes
		or the day to day routines, which should not be the case as the BCP should be
		focused on the broader recovery procedures.
		Recommendation:
		5.16 The following (non-exhaustive) components are expected to be included
		in the BCP, where applicable:
		Planning assumptions;
		Business continuity objectives
		· ·
		Identified recovery staff and alternates; Detailed recovery staff and alternates;
		Detailed recovery procedures <propose a<="" according="" delete",="" th="" to=""></propose>
		timeframe,"> performed by staff;
		Procedures to retrieve vital records11;
		Notification procedures, e.g. call trees procedures;
		Information on the recovery site;
		Coordination with external dependencies and parties (including authorities,
		etc.); and
		Related information or references on IT recovery, such as critical applications
		and databases and their RTOs/RPOs.
		Commonts on the time and frequency of DCM tests:
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests:
		Section 6, Paragraph 6.2
		Comments:
		"All aspects" is already encompassed in the phrase "regularly and meaningfully"
		and should be removed.
		and should be removed.
		Recommendation:
		6.2 An FI should have a formal testing programme to systemically validate
		their ability to achieve their business continuity objectives in the event of a
		disruption. The testing programme should comprise a process to regularly and
		meaningfully test12 < Propose to delete "all aspects of"> a business function's
		BCP, as well as an FI's overall crisis management plan.
		ber, as well as all 113 overall erisis management plan.
		Section 6, Paragraph 6.4
		Comments:
		The need for crisis management exercises to be conducted annually is
		acknowledged. However, it may be difficult to have every CMT member and
		their alternates participates in exercises on the same day.
		Recommendation:
		6.4 The type and frequency of exercises should be commensurate with the
		scale and complexity of the FI, with particular attention being paid to critical
		business functions. The FI should have a programme to ensure all CMT

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		members and their alternates are meaningfully involved in crisis management
		and communications exercises. At the minimum, an FI should conduct the
		following annually:
		A crisis management and communications exercise < Propose to delete"
		involving all CMT members and their alternates;"> and
		• A < Propose to delete "test relating to the BCP of each" > validation of Business
		Function Recovery Intention of critical business function.
		MAS to provide further comment on test relating to unit-level BCPs.
		Continue C. Dono annulo C. F.
		Section 6, Paragraph 6.5 Comment:
		As there is no industry standard on how to define or measure RPOs, there is a
		challenge for an FI to design the appropriate metrics for measuring quantitative
		and qualitative RPOs.
		and quantative Nr Os.
		Recommendation:
		MAS to provide a common understanding on how to measure RPOs as this will
		help FIs to design the appropriate metrics for quantitative measurement of
		RPOs.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits:
		Comments:
		Paragraphs 6.10 and 6.11 refer to the need for an audit process, audit plan and
		approval of the audit plan by the FI's Audit Committee but allow the audit
		activity to be conducted by an independent unit.
		It is not clear if the independent unit is only meant to be the Group Audit
		function or includes units (internal or external) that are not Group Audit but are independent to the BCM programme of the FI.
		It would also be useful to clarify the definition of "independent". It would be
		reasonable to assume that such units do not own the FI's BCM framework,
		programme, policy, and control standards nor do they own the actual controls.
		Recommendation:
		To clarify the meaning of "independent unit" and the definition of
		"independent".
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from
		MAS:
		1) Resilience vs Continuity
		Comments:
		We understand that the proposed BCMG only covers BCM from a consequence management perspective. Increasingly, regulators are focused on how the
		provision of key products and services can be maintained during disruptions
		and the operational resilience of an FI is just as important as its financial
		resilience. Operational resilience is often referred to the ability of FIs to
		detect/prevent, respond to, recover and learn from operational disruptions.
		While some aspects of operational resilience are not as easily implemented in
		BCM than in technology (e.g. preventative controls), the increasing threat and
		risk landscape, in particular that in relation to cyberspace, necessitate
		organisations to operate their business with resilience and not just recovery.

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		Today, a number of banks have already embarked on pro-active and pre- emptive mind-set of resilience programmes and will need time to achieve a high state of resilience against disruptions. MAS clarification is required as to the extent that BCMG should cover resilience instead of just business continuity (consequence management).
		2) Business Continuity in the aspect of Information Technology
		Comments: The proposed revisions to the BCM guidelines adopt the concepts of "business functions" and "critical business functions" and introduce the concepts of "business continuity objectives" and "minimum performance levels". Given that the Technology Risk Management Guidelines make references to information technology, guidance is sought regarding business continuity in the context of information technology (IT) recovery.
		Recommendations: It is suggested that provisions be made to connect the requirements of BCMG in TRMG. One example is the role of Business Function in the area of IT recovery and how BCO and MPL requirements configure in the context of IT. Clarification is sought on what does RPO mean in the context of data corruption.
		3) Differentiations for small and medium FIs Comments: Section 4, Paragraph 1.4 Small and Medium FIs may struggle to calibrate their BCM programme. They would want to avoid misinterpretation of the BCMG and maximize use of their scarce financial resources.
		Recommendation: Clarification is sought on how small and medium FI should calibrate their BCM programme to adhere to the BCMG given their relatively smaller scale, nature and complexity of business operations.
		4) Risk Acceptance Comments: Considering "Residual Risk" was included in the Definitions, it would be useful
41.	The Northern	to include the definition of "Risk Acceptance" as this is also referred in BCMG. General comments:
71.	Trust Company	The one year period to adopt the Guidelines may not be sufficient as there will be a need to reconcile the standards with our overseas head office to ensure alignment. We are also looking to evaluate and use a new risk management tool to streamline documentation requirements that can group different business
		processes that support a business function, and map dependencies with other entities and IT systems which may reside outside our Singapore branch. As this may take more than one year to meet the requirements, we suggest a flexible implementation timeframe that commensurate with the risks posed to the FI.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP: Paragraphs 2.16 of the Consultation paper and 5.3 of the proposed BCM Guidelines stipulate that the risk assessment process identifies possible causes of disruptions and their potential impact. On the other hand, the Business

6 /5 :		October 2021
S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		Continuity Plan (BCP) document focuses on the restoration a business function
		in the event of a disruption.
		Does MAS recommend this risk management document to be part of the BCP,
		or can this form separate processes and documents?
		D
		Paragraph 5.5 of the proposed BCM Guidelines mention that 'FI should Paragraph 5.5 of the proposed BCM Guidelines mention that 'FI should Paragraph 5.5 of the proposed BCM Guidelines mention that 'FI should
		develop BCPs that can address a broad range of plausible scenarios from wide
		area disruptions to pandemics.'
		Ma would like to have made classity and eventual as on the "hunged made of
		We would like to have more clarity and examples on the "broad range of
		plausible scenarios" as it may not be possible or practical to include an
		exhaustive list of event-based scenarios in BCPs. This would result in the BCP to
		be excessively long, impractical and lose its objectivity as each scenario may
		result in various outcomes which may be challenging for an FI to anticipate,
		particularly if the scenario occurs over a prolonged period of time.
		Based on best practices, we are of the view that BCPs should focus on recovery
		processes and resources using outcome based events that can cater to a broad
		range of scenarios. For example, the loss of facility, people, technology, service
		providers and inter-dependencies.
		providers and inter-dependencies.
		Paragraph 5.8 of the proposed BCM Guidelines mentions that 'formal Service
		Level Agreements (SLAs) should be established and the appropriate
		redundancies agreed upon.'
		redundancies agreed upon.
		We would like to confirm if this corresponds, and does not supersede
		requirements from paragraph 5.7 of the MAS Outsourcing Guidelines, on
		Business Continuity Management.
42.	Transamerica Life	Comments on the scope of a BCP:
	Bermuda Ltd	With respect to interdependency risks beyond FI direct control, e.g.
		unavailability of telecommunications network (per section 5.9, page 19 of the
		Consultation Paper), a general assumption in local BCM framework is that core
		public infrastructure such as utilities (water, electricity) and those of monopoly
		in nature, would remain available in event of a crisis impacting FI. It may
		inefficient for individual FI to approach those service providers to assess BCM
		standard and their disaster recovery service level. It would be helpful if MAS
		could provide further guidance in terms of the extent of assurance FIs are
		expected to obtain from those service providers of this nature.
		·
		Suggest further guidance on relevant protocols described in section 5.14 on
		page 21 of the Consultation Paper.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits:
		We would like to confirm our interpretation that the expected regularity of
		BCM audit can be aligned with FI's risk profile and internal audit roadmap based
		on risk priorities / maturity of the company, i.e. not necessarily on an annual
		basis.
43.	Validus	Comments on the definition of business function:
	Reinsurance Ltd	There is good rationale for defining a business function as the set of
		processes (which may span multiple departments) that result in the delivery of
		a service to a customers. This is in contrast to the current definition which
		makes business function synonymous with department. The new definition of
		business function, when performing business impact analysis, would provide for
		easier identification of the complete set of processes involved with end to end

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		service delivery and easier identification of any process gaps. This is in contrast
		to focusing on departmental-based processes, whereby a key component of a
		complex processes for delivering a service could be overlooked.
		• Organization of a husiness continuity plan (DCD) along functional as appaced
		Organization of a business continuity plan (BCP) along functional as opposed to departmental lines, however, should be optional instead of mandatory,
		given the fact that if a thorough business impact analysis (BIA) has been
		performed, both approaches should lead to the same result.
		For institutions that are going concerns, restructuring an existing BCP may
		not be a compelling value proposition and therefore something that should be
		considered as optional. However, for new entities the MAS may wish to make
		this approach mandatory using the proposed definition of business function.
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
		management:
		No issues with proposed roles and responsibilities.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP:
		Same response as Question 1
		If the proposal is to become mandatory there should be a transition period
		based on the scale of the financial institution's operations, with the more
		complex institutions having a longer period to adapt.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests:
		A crisis management and communications exercise should be performed
		once every 2 to 3 years, as opposed to annually, if there are no actual incidents
		during this period that test the crisis management response.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits:
44.	Wells Fargo Bank	No issues with the expectations. General comments:
44.	Wells Fargo Barik	Where BCM audit is conducted by a specialized team as part of the Head
		Office audit function, what are the MAS' expectations on scope and frequency
		of local audits at branches that are not considered material from a group
		perspective?
		Where BCM audits are conducted by local teams who are not specialists in the
		subject, what frequency and level of testing would the MAS expect the local
		teams (who are very small in size) to be able to perform?
		Comments on the definition of business function:
		Question 1a: The proposed definition of business function is rather broad.
		Could MAS provide clearer definition of business function?
		Question 1b: The proposed definition of "business function" may not aligned
		to industrial definitions such as Disaster Recovery Institute International (DRI).
		How would MAS propose to align this definition of "business function" in line
		with industry practices? Particularly for global FIs where there are more than
		one regulators, FIs may have it challenging to align corporate definition with MAS' definition.
		#2.6 What is MAS definition of Recovery Time Objectives (RTO) and Recovery
		Point Objectives (RPO)?
		• #2.2 Would services provided by the Branch to other WF entities such as risk
		management, HR etc defined as customers,
		• #2.6 What information is MAS expecting to be constituted within the
		"minimal performance level" for each business function?

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		• On #2.7 the requirements that "a particular business function should be supported by all systems and processes that the function depends on" is there any expectations that these "systems and processes" can rely on their recovery plans?
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management: The roles and responsibilities are clearly set out in the revised guidelines. However, these roles and responsibilities may not take into consideration the local team set up for small- to mid-sized FIs where there could be dual hatting. Would MAS consider a more principles-based approach for segregation of roles and responsibilities? • #2.9a What contents would MAS expect to be included in the material for the Board to endorse? • #2.9c In situation where services and functions are supported by corporate or
		offshore backoffice locations that reside outside Singapore, to what degree is the Board expected to obtain satisfaction that "adequate resources, including budget, technology, and staff are allocated" • #2.11 Is there expectations that the "committee to oversee its BCM" and "the committee should thus be led by a senior management" be part of the branch as due to
		Comments on the scope of a BCP: While we agree, in principle, that the requirements for BCPs are moving in the right direction, FIs may not be set up at the moment to move within a short timeframe to end-to-end BCPs. Could MAS consider including an implementation/transition timeline for this requirement? #2.15 To what depth and detail does MAS expect the end to end BCP to contain? Is the expectations for end to end BCP is only specifically for services to customers?
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests: We would like to propose that the type of BCM tests should be developed based on a risk-based approach. Where an FI is small- to mid-size, and where there are minimum critical client-facing activities, or where staff turnover is low, the type and frequency of BCM tests should reflect this nature.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: We would like to propose for BCM audits to be inter-changed with self-attestation exercises. Where FIs are small or mid sized, or where the risks are relatively low, self-attestation exercises could take place instead of regular, full-fledged audits.
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from MAS: We would like to propose for MAS to adopt a principles-based approach towards the revision of the guidelines. Where FIs are smaller in nature, these should be considered in the BCM guidelines particularly for the BCP, CMP. • #2.21 Where a FI is a global company are there alternatives to the audit committee approving the BCP audit plan?
45.	An entity *	Comments on the definition of business function: Q1. Para. 3.1 "A business function refers to a service provided to customers of an FI." Would customers refer to external customers only?

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
5,11		Q2. Para. 5.1 "While the focus here is on business functions, FIs should also conduct BIA and establish business continuity objectives at the unit-level." Are you able to clarify what it means by "unit-level" and provide some examples? Q3. Under the new definition of "business function", who will be the driving lead and how should accountability and responsibility be divided if the business process involves a few functional departments across? Q4. Are you able to provide some examples of "minimum performance level" and how it should be quantified?
		Q5. Some of the paragraphs and examples in Section 3 of the proposed BCM guidelines appear to be geared more towards "IT systems", "intermittent network connectivity", "faulty hardware" and also have similar references to IT incident management and problem management (example Para. 3.5) which is part of the MAS TRM Guidelines. Is there an overlap? Would it be better dealt with in the TRM Guidelines?
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior
		management: In relation to Para 4.6, where in a small company of less than 10, other than the Managing Director, how should the Crisis Management Team (CMT) comprising of senior management representatives be formed if the rest of the individuals are employees and not senior management? In such a case, the organization is very flat and it is not possible to have so many hierarchical layers with different roles and responsibilities for different groups relating to Senior Management, CMT, Audit Committee, and those who carry out the actual BCM recovery function. Is the MAS able to provide some guidelines on what is essential for a smaller FI setup of less than 10?
		Comments on the scope of a BCP: `In relation to Para. 5.9, where "key service providers" are mentioned, would this also relate to telco and internet service providers e.g. SingTel, Starhub,
		Singnet? I think it is quite onerous and hard for FIs to take reasonable steps to ensure that their key service providers will not falter during disruption time. In any business continuity planning, though scenarios can be thought of and plan for recovery, there is still that very small percentage of risk that would be impossible to plan for. At that point of the disruptions, it is possible that key service providers could also fail due to a coincidence.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: In relation to Para. 6.10 and 6.11, for a small FI setup of less than 10, we do not have enough senior management representatives to form an Audit Committee. Also because of the small operations, we do not have an internal audit headcount or a staff who is not involved in the planning and execution of the BCM itself (Compliance Officer is involved in the BCM planning) that is independent and is able to produce a BCM audit report. While we can understand that the Guidelines appear to be geared generally to all financial institutions which includes larger operations with larger systemaic effects, is the MAS able to provide other helpful scalable alternatives for small setups to fulfill the audit requirements within the proposed BCM Guidelines?
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from MAS: The new Guidelines have evolved to be so onerous requiring different groups of
		people for oversight, and check and balance (audit), these is possible in a large organisation. However, in a very small setup, this is not feasible practically as

_		
S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		for example, we only have 7 headcount (including management, compliance,
		accounts/admin, and broking staff). I can understand that the BCM is geared to
		all financial institutions and it is a very important aspect. For many of the
		requirements it makes sense in a large organisation and it is practically possible
		to carry it out. However, the Guidelines have become quite "textbook-based"
		for our current small setup but in reality, some of the aspects are not possible
		to have as we have a very flat structure. The MAS could perhaps provide some
		guidance for smaller setups.
10	A	Comments on the definition of business function:
46.	An entity *	
		AXA supports the revised definition of business function as a service that the FI
		will provide to its customers. However, it takes time to map out these end-to-
		end business flows and the ability to do this will also depends on the maturity
		levels of the BCM within the FI as well.
		For the implementation of this requirement, it would good if MAS can -
		1. articulate clearly on requirements for minimum compliance preferably with
		reference to the maturity levels of the FIs
		2. adopt the approach of progressive/phased compliance rather than a
		immediate full compliance upon the implementation of this requirement
		With regards to Clause 2.7 - can MAS provide further guidance / reference /
		best practice on the monitoring capabilities?
		6 to 1 to
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits:
		Proposed frequency of BCM audits to be once every 3 years
		Tropossa froquency of Zonfaulation to accommodately of yours
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from
		MAS:
		In Annex B on the revised guidelines on BCM -
		1. Refer to section 5.11, on the requirement to "notify MAS promptly" –
		a. define the criteria to notify MAS
		b. Any stipulated template to use for notification?
		c. How soon must MAS be notified?
		2. Refer to section 6.4, can MAS provide advice on what are the acceptable
		forms of BCP testing? Is desktop exercise acceptable?
47.	An entity *	General comments:
		Question on the definition of Recovery Time Objective (RTO) for BCM, this
		definition is mentioned in different guidelines of MAS, can we suggest to have a
		distinct definition for RTO for BCM purposes.
		Comments on the definition of business function:
		We agree that recovery of a business function should be cohesive and
		focused on delivery to the customer, and that a business function will likely
		require the performance of one or more business processes (in addition to
		supporting IT systems and physical infrastructure). We seek clarity and further
		guidance on what level of granularity is appropriate and how business functions
		can be categorised, such as by business type (consumer banking, business /
		wholesale banking), by product type (leveraged product, asset product), etc.
		We would like to request further examples of business functions be provided
		for this purpose.
		We hope to see the definition and guidance of this term be further enhanced
		or expanded. In cases where business processes or activities that do not
		directly support any service to customers can be classified as critical, we would
		arready support any service to customers can be classified as critical, we would

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
	·	like to have clarity on whether such functions should fall within the ambit of the proposed Guidelines.
		• We found the diagram after Para 2.7 of the Consultation Paper (page 5), illustrating the relationship between "business function" and "business process", to be clear and relevant, and suggest that it be retained in the proposed Guidelines' table of definitions under the definition of "Business Function".
		We agree with the inclusion of minimum performance levels into business continuity objectives. For clarity, please include references to processing capacity (as opposed to "level of output", which may not be applicable or meaningful in some cases).
		We expect financial utility providers to take the lead in the disclosure of their minimum performance levels not only for the benefit of FIs who have critical interdependencies with them but also to set the bar for stating minimum performance levels that are "suitably defined, clear and measurable". We would like to seek further clarity on the definition and where possible, examples provided, of defined, clear and measurable performance levels.
		• The capabilities to monitor reduced or intermittent service availabilities are part of business-as-usual (BAU) and day-to-day business monitoring and should not be confined to only the proposed BCM Guidelines or an FI's BCM framework. BAU responses for reduced or intermittent service levels are usually activated to mitigate the impact for a short period of time (and longer if the impact were less). This area of response or recovery may not necessitate the activation of BCP or contingency plans nor necessarily be within the ambit of the proposed Guidelines.
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management: • We note the detailed requirements for the Board and senior management. We understand the emphasis and the elaboration to emphasise the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management in the success and effectiveness of business continuity in the organization as well as senior management's role in overseeing crisis management in the event of a severe disrupting event.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP: • To ensure that an FI's BCP is fit-for-purpose, its BCP should take reference from the results of its risk assessment. Only then can the BCP be relevant for the risk environment in which the FI is operating. Risk assessment processes, however, should not necessarily be within the ambit of the proposed BCM Guidelines.
		MAS may wish to consider making a distinction in the proposed Guidelines to convey an understanding that BCP measures are activated only when day-to-day measures are no longer appropriate to manage the disruption.
		The process to monitor reduced or intermittent service availabilities should be part of business-as-usual (BAU) activity and not be confined only to the proposed BCM Guidelines or an FI's BCM framework. BAU responses for reduced or intermittent service levels are usually activated to mitigate the impact for a short period of time (and longer if the impact were less). This area

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
	•	of response or recovery may not necessitate the activation of BCP or
		contingency plans nor necessarily be within the ambit of the proposed
		Guidelines.
		We note that the setting of RTOs in formal SLAs with third-party vendors is
		consistent with BCM requirements stipulated in Section 5.7 Business Continuity
		Management of the MAS Guidelines on Outsourcing.
		We agree and practise understanding and partnering key stakeholders and
		vendors in business continuity planning. We would like to request flexibility for
		FIs to demonstrate their engagement with such stakeholders including aligning
		business continuity objectives and having the appropriate level of involvement
		in BCM exercises, based on the criticality of business functions or processes that
		the outsourced services are supporting.
		We seek confirmation that the Incident Reporting Template, issued by MAS
		via circular, continues to be applicable when submitting written incident
		updates to MAS. MAS may wish to consolidate the Template into the proposed
		Guidelines for completeness.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests:
		We agree with the broad principles of testing documented in the proposed
		Guidelines which are in line with BCM best practices and support the
		opportunity to participate in industry-wide exercises.
		We recognise the need to involve senior management and staff in BCM
		exercises and regular testing of crisis management and communication plans.
		Holding crisis management and communication exercises for all members of
		both the CMT as well as their alternates on an annual basis could involve a
		challenging degree of coordination, in particular where some members travel
		frequently due to their regional work coverage. Depending on the roles
		covered by the CMT members/alternates, their involvement in exercises could
		be more or less crucial. It may be adequate for either the primary member or their alternate to participate, and for both parties to have been involved within
		a few years or exercise cycles.
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from MAS:
		We note that MAS Guidelines on Outsourcing make reference to the MAS
		BCM Guidelines. With reference to BCM requirements for outsourcing, we will
		endeavour to promote adoption of industry best practices in BCM by our
		outsourced service providers (OSPs) but are mindful that OSPs have their own
		constraints and market practices (some of which are based on overseas
		practice) that limit the implementation of these practices.
		Definitions of RTO are slightly different between BCM Guidelines and TRM
		Guidelines. MAS may wish to elaborate on the difference between business
		function/process RTO and IT system RTO to minimise confusion and
		misinterpretation by Fls.
48.	An entity *	Comments on the definition of business function:
		Para 2.5
		The Bank suggests for the definition to only include financial services, and
		exclude value-added non-financial services. Business functions that do not
		result in a service that is ultimately provided to customers (e.g. Human
		Resources, Project Management) would thus not fall within the scope of BCM
		planning.

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		Para 2.6 We would like to highlight that there may be instances where the sub-processes within a business function may not run sequentially and may have RTOs that are greater than the minimum RTO/RPO at the business function level (e.g. exception handling process). In which case, it may be challenging for the business continuity objectives for that business function to be aligned to the dependant sub-processes. Would such exceptions be permissible under the new Guidelines?
		Para 2.7 It may be operationally challenging to monitor/track/detect reduced or intermittent service availabilities and tie it with the minimum performance level at business function level. We request for MAS to provide more detailed guidance on this.
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management:
		Para 2.9 (a) The Bank agrees with MAS that the Board and senior management ought to be ultimately responsible for the business continuity of their FI. However, we would like to suggest for FIs to be given the flexibility to decide on the review frequency of the BCM framework, policies, processes and procedures, in line with the FI's internal policy approval standards.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests: Para 2.19
		We agree with MAS that testing is crucial in validating an FI's BCM preparedness as it ensures an FI's response and recovery arrangements are effective and developed based on sound understanding of existing systems and processes. However, we would like to suggest for MAS to give FIs the flexibility to assess and review the necessity and frequency of such testing exercises.
		Comments on any other aspects of BCM that warrant further guidance from MAS:
		Para 1.3 In view of the complexity and coordination required to fully adopt the Guidelines, we would like to suggest an extended 18 to 24-month transition period instead of 12 months in order to ensure enough time to implement the required processes and controls holistically.
49.	An entity *	Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests: To perform testing for each critical business function annually may be challenging, especially if the exercise complexity increases. Would the MAS consider the the testing frequency for critical functions be scheduled and spread across a period of 3 years? This will enable banks to have more meaningful and comprehensive exercise planning and execution through trainings and post-mortem exercise findings/recommendations.
50.	An entity *	General comments: There is currently no industry-wide methodology to measure the success of an RPO for business functions that involve Financial Market Infrastructure. Therefore, we would recommend that further guidance be issued on this in consultation with FIs.
		Regarding minimum performance levels (MPL), incident management processes are targeted at any component of a process that is degraded rather than across

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		an end-to-end business function. This ensures that an end-to-end business function is not unduly degraded due to existing incident escalation criteria, i.e. within any MPL that would be separately defined, so we would recommend to leverage the traditional incident management frameworks when considering MPLs.
		Comments on the definition of business function: We would suggest that the MAS sets out clear definition of what constitutes a "customer". We would like clarification if a business function is expected to include OSPs, third parties or Financial Market Infrastructure (FMIs) that are part of the processes performed.
		We request that the scope be limited to critical business functions provided by the FI. If the MAS intends to extend this requirement to all business functions (including those that are non-critical) we would request an extended transition period.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP: For the business function recovery plan, we would suggest the FI be able to leverage the business entity process level recovery strategies currently in place as we expect the need to maintain plans at both a business entity process and business function level.
		We would like clarification, if a business function is expected to include third parties or FMIs that are part of the processes performed.
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests: We request that the FI should have the flexibility to decide on the type of testing and the frequency depending on the risk assessment of the critical functions.
		To the extent that industry wide testing is required, we would need MAS to help with coordinating across FMIs.
51.	An entity *	Comments on the definition of business function: o This is a major change in the way we conduct our BCP, and will require a big overhaul. We want to make sure this change is well thought-out and the objectives of this change can be implemented by FIs. o For a global organization, many functions are supported and performed by
		other locations outside of Singapore. We will need guidance how planning across these functions/locations can be integrated into a new plan based on this new definition.
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management:
		o For a global organization, managing the Business Continuity Management may be a global function supported by locations outside of Singapore. As such, oversight of the BCM is also done outside of Singapore. Does MAS consider these roles and responsibilities from a local office perspective or globally as an organization?
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests: o With the proposed definition of business function, testing such business function which is end-to-end and crosses multiple functions and multiple locations can be very problematic. An end-to-end test could involve not only resources internally to an organization, but externally with third party vendors,

_		
S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		counter parties (such as trust bank, etc.), and even our clients. From a Technology perspective, testing end-to-end will involve multiple systems and data sources, and it will require posting data from one system to another, and each of these systems may have their own restrictions for posting test data. An error could cause major data integrity issue and could cause service disruptions. Can MAS provide guidance on testing.
		can who provide galacines on testing.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: o For a global organization, auditing BCP maybe performed in different locations each time. Can MAS please clarify on the scope of BCP audit?
52.	An entity *	General comments:
52.	All ellity	This new guideline provides useful additions to the existing BCM guidelines which will significantly improve the alignment of business continuity plans with business services as well as facilitating the agility and lean initiatives currently going on the FSI industry to remain competitive in the digital age.
		However, while the organisational and human aspects of Business Continuity are generally appropriately documented and prepared, issues often arise in the technical aspects of business continuity: with their legacy systems' architecture designs inadequate for the expected SLAs or improperly tested dependancies. Considering the increasing interdependencies of FSIs through the use of open APIs and cloud providers, systemic financial reliability requires each service provider and FSI to perform at the highest levels of resilience and embrace resilience by design for their most critical business functions.
		With the rise of Agile and DevOps, organisations' technology and systems evolve at an unprecedented pace while the business functions and organisational structure are seldom modified themselves. To that extent, annual testing of crisis management and people-only scenarios of Business Continuity is appropriate, while it has become too infrequent to maintain an adapted grasp of technology changes.
		Leading organisations have embraced an approach of continuous testing of their systems' resilience through the practice of Site Reliability Engineering and Chaos Engineering. Modern BCP should adopt the core components of these practices to strengthen the resilience and risk management of their most critical functions. Such organisations drive resilience by design, by embracing an approach of continuous improvement with these practices, and the use of immutable architectures and microservices.
		To ensure a comprehensive view of the risks and adequate technical implementations, Business Continuity practitioners should be expected to understand the architecture design aspects of resiliency and consider each application's resilience factor as part of the overall application transformation strategy.
		Comments on the definition of business function: The change of business functions from organisational lines to services rendered to FI's customers is a great way to reduce the current corporate silos and facilitate the adoption of agile and lean principles.
		However, RTO and RPO are often too macroscopic and may be problematic as an objective transversal to several departments and teams. Owners of each system supporting the business function may aim for this RTO/RPO objective themselves, resulting in actual recovery times being higher than expected.

0/01		October 2021
S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		Organisations should consider defining finer-grainer active indicators for each component and process supporting the business function. Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management: 1/ Third-party risk While SLAs provide a contractual agreement for services provided, they offer no guarantee of delivery. Senior Management should acknowledge the impact if the service provider were to fail to deliver these SLAs. Where the impact for a failed SLA would be significant (e.g. long term failure or contractual challenge), the organisation should have established exit plans in place allowing to resume acceptable levels of service promptly.
		2/ Creating a culture of resilience by design Whether Business Continuity and resilience is taken into account "by design" or retrofitted on existing processes, is often driven by the company's risk culture and staff performance objectives. Senior Management should promote a culture of continuous improvement of process and systems' resilience by introducing frequent and active failure testing, and incentivising incremental improvements.
		As such, Senior Management and Board should allocate a budget for the testing of resiliency and incentive programs.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP: System automation, Continuous Delivery pipelines and virtualisation/containerization technologies have made readily available native capabilities to backup and restore systems to their last known working state. Leading practitioners are rebuilding some of their critical systems regularly to increase the confidence that restoration of services will be effective in case of real issue.
		During the business continuity risk assessment, organisations should assess 1/ their capacity to regularly rebuild their critical systems to their last known working state or to another location, and 2/ their systems' capacity for zero-downtime operations (i.e. patching, updating, rebuilding).
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests: With the increased complexity, interdependency and pace of change in technology, the risk of unplanned consequences of changes and minor failures keeps rising.
		Leading organisations are embracing continuous testing practices and key measurement metrics to ensure their systems and operations processes remain adequate at all times.
		Continuous testing practices such as Chaos Engineering help improve the overall resilience of technology ecosystems by continuously introducing failures in the system to ensure and strengthen its capacity to withstand issues. It also helps operations teams to build experience in recovery practices which are just not possible to achieve during annual exercises.
		As FIs become dependent on each other as well as on an increasing number of third-party providers, organisations should consider introducing Chaos Engineering functions to continuously test their critical functions' resilience and

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		mature their staff's expertise and confidence. Fls should also consider requiring similar practices from their critical service providers.
		FIs are also becoming increasingly software-driven organisations where change is continuous. FIs should consider tracking key resilience metrics such as MTTR (Mean Time To Recovery) and change failure rates, for each component a critical function is depending on, in order to establish a heat map of potential weaknesses.
		Learning is not only achieved through failures but from successes as well. It is particularly true for resilience by design. FIs should practice consistent "Retros" feedback to review the effects of events, even when no material impact was observed, to promote the learning of good practices.
53.	An entity *	Comments on the definition of business function: The proposed definition of "Business Function" could introduce ambiguity in interpretation, as it mis-aligns with an ordinary understanding of the term Business Function — which is commonly understood to be an organizational unit (e.g. by department or unit).
		The bank would like to seek MAS' consideration on the following: (i) Definition of "business function" to include Unit level – we understand this is a widely used term that most FIs currently refers to as Business functions
		(ii) In Section 5, rather than requiring BCPs to be for Business Functions — to consider to specify that BCPs (within the Unit) supporting the Business Functions (Service) should be established and provide aggregation and transparency to the front to back Business Function (Service) for resumption of output to minimum performance levels and the subsequent restoration to BAU levels.
		Comments on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management: The bank would like to seek MAS consideration on the following: (i) For overseas incorporated institutions, Board may delegate to relevant function responsible for BCM at Group/Global/Regional level. (ii) Specify also that Senior Management responsibilities may be delegated to relevant locational governance committees.
		This is to provide flexibility and accountability and appropriate levels and committees, commensurate with business model that typifies a large global organisation.
		Comments on the scope of a BCP: The bank already has in place unit level BCP which highlights various internal and external interdependencies between teams (front-to-back processes) in each BCP. In this regard, we would like to clarify if this would dispense the need for a "business function" (i.e. business activity per MAS' proposed definition) level BCP.
		Relating to para 5.11, the bank would like to clarify if the meaning of "prompt notification" when a critical business function is disrupted, is aligned with the current requirements set out in "instructions on incident notification and reporting to the MAS", for bringing relevant incidents to the attention of the Authority.

FEEDBACK RECEIVED ON PROPOSED REVISIONS TO GUIDELINES ON BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT

S/N	Respondent	Feedback from respondent
		Comments on the type and frequency of BCM tests: Relating to para 6.3, the bank would like to clarify if the examples provided by the MAS are baseline expectations of complex exercises to be included in a formalized BCM testing programme. If this is the intent, the bank would respectfully request the MAS to re-consider prescribing such baseline expectations within the guidelines, as FIs should be able to adopt a risk-based approach in designing its formal testing programme to systemically validate their ability to achieve their business continuity objectives in the event of a disruption.
		Comments on the conduct of regular BCM audits: The bank is generally supportive of the guideline requirement for banks to conduct regular BCM audits. However, we would appreciate further clarity on MAS' expectations on the frequency of audit.