



Red Hat Certificate System Red Hat Certificate System 9 Command-Line Tools Guide

a reference guide

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Abstract

This guide covers important command-line utilities that you can use to create, remove, and manage subsystem instances, and to create and manage keys and certificates.

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Chapter 1. The **pkispawn** and **pkidestroy** Utilities

The Certificate System includes two command-line utilities to create and remove subsystems: **pkispawn** and **pkidestroy**.

Note

In previous versions of Certificate System, installation and configuration were split into two separate tasks managed by the **pkicreate** and **pkisilent** utilities. In Certificate System version 9 and later, the single **pkispawn** utility now manages all these operations.

The **pkiremove** utility was used to remove subsystems in previous Certificate System versions. The utility is now replaced with **pkidestroy**.

1.1. The **pkispawn** Utility

The **pkispawn** utility creates a Certificate System subsystem and configures it. It supports two installation modes:

- » non-interactive mode, where the user supplies installation and configuration settings using command-line options and a configuration file
- » interactive mode, where **pkispawn** automatically prompts the user for basic information required for installation

Both installation modes can also be combined, allowing you to pass some configuration directly to **pkispawn** and let the utility prompt you for other settings interactively. For example, if you add the **-s** option to **pkispawn**, but not the **-f** option to provide a configuration file, the installation uses default configuration settings from the **/etc/pki/default.cfg** file and interactively prompts you for any additional required custom information, such as passwords.

This section provides an overview of how to use **pkispawn** to install Certificate System subsystems. For more information about **pkispawn**, see the **pkispawn(8)** man page. The man page includes various examples of **pkispawn** usage.

1.1.1. Non-interactive **pkispawn** Mode

The utility accepts only a few command-line options because the configuration parameters are supplied through a pre-created configuration file.

To create and configure a subsystem using **pkispawn**, run the utility with the following options:

the -s option

Specifies the subsystem to be created and configured: CA, KRA, OCSP, TKS, or TPS

the -f option

Specifies the path to the configuration file

For example, the following command creates a CA subsystem based on the **myconfig.txt** file:

```
# pkispawn -s CA -f myconfig.txt
```

The Configuration File for pkispawn

Certificate System stores some default configuration settings in the `/etc/pki/default.cfg` file. To create a custom configuration file that can be supplied to the `pkispawn` utility, copy `default.cfg` to a different location. Then modify the copied file to define the configuration settings you want `pkispawn` to apply to the new subsystem.

The custom configuration file takes precedence over the default `default.cfg` file. Common practice is to only store parameters that are different from the default configuration in the user-provided custom configuration file.

The `default.cfg` file is divided into several sections:

General sections

General sections contain the default and Tomcat configuration options. For example:

```
[DEFAULT]
pki_admin_password=
pki_backup_password=
pki_client_database_password=
pki_client_pkcs12_password=
pki_ds_password=
pki_replication_password=
pki_security_domain_password=
pki_token_password=
[Tomcat]
pki_clone_pkcs12_password=
```

Subsystem-specific sections

Subsystem sections contain subsystem-specific configuration options. For example:

```
[CA]
pki_admin_name=caadmin
pki_admin_email=caadmin@example.com
```

Configuration defined in later sections takes precedence over configuration in earlier sections. For example, configuration in the subsystem-specific sections takes precedence over the `Tomcat` section, which then takes precedence over configuration in the `DEFAULT` section. This behavior allows you to specify parameters shared by all subsystems in the `DEFAULT` or `Tomcat` sections, and options specific for a particular subsystem in the section for that subsystem.

Note

A copy of the `default.cfg` file is saved within the created subsystem after running `pkispawn`. The copy is then used when removing the subsystem with `pkidestroy`.

For various example custom configuration files that can be supplied to `pkispawn`, see the `pkispawn(8)` man page. For more information about `default.cfg`, see the `pki_default.cfg(5)` man page.

1.1.2. Interactive pkispawn Mode

If you do not supply any configuration options to **pkispawn**, the utility enters interactive installation mode and automatically prompts you for basic required installation options. The interactive **pkispawn** installation mode is suitable for users who are getting familiar with Certificate System. For a list of the basic options used for the interactive mode, see the **pkispawn(8)** man page.

Other configuration options are not available with the interactive installation. If you want to use advanced settings, provide a configuration file to **pkispawn** using the **-f** option, as described in [Section 1.1.1, “Non-interactive pkispawn Mode”](#).

The parameters specified during the interactive installation mode are saved in the **/etc/sysconfig/pki/tomcat/instance_name/subsystem/deployment.cfg** file.

1.1.3. Creating Multiple Subsystems Within a Single Instance

A single Tomcat instance can contain multiple subsystems. However, one instance can only contain one of each type of subsystem. For example, an instance can contain one CA and one KRA subsystem, but not two CA or two KRA subsystems.

To create an instance with multiple subsystems, run **pkispawn** multiple times and specify a different subsystem each time. For example, to create an instance with a CA and a KRA, run the **pkispawn -s CA** command and then the **pkispawn -s KRA** command.

1.1.4. Shared and Non-shared Instances

With a *shared* PKI instance, every subsystem within the shared instance uses the same instance name and ports. With a *non-shared* PKI instance, the subsystems use unique instance names and ports if the instance resides on the same machine as another PKI instance. When installing such PKI instances, define the required parameters in the **pkispawn** configuration file.



Note

An instance is always created as a non-shared instance, regardless of what type of subsystem is installed into it. An instance becomes a shared instance after a second subsystem of a different type is installed into it.

To install a shared Tomcat instance on a machine different from the machine on which the CA is installed, see the **KRA, OCSP, or TKS connecting to a remote CA** example in the **pkispawn(1)** man page for the parameters required in the KRA, OCSP, TKS, or TPS configuration file. If you want to specify a custom name for the PKI instance, also define the **pki_instance_name** parameter in the **DEFAULT** section of the file.

To install a non-shared Tomcat instance on the same machine on which the CA is installed, apart from following the mentioned configuration example, also define the unique instance names and ports. To do this, use the following parameters in the KRA, OCSP, TKS, or TPS configuration file:

```
[DEFAULT]
pki_instance_name=unique_value
pki_http_port=unique_value
pki_https_port=unique_value
[Tomcat]
pki_ajp_port=unique_value
pki_tomcat_server=unique_value
```

1.2. The pkidestroy Utility

The **pkidestroy** utility removes a subsystem from a specified Certificate Server instance. The utility can be run non-interactively or interactively.

1.2.1. Non-interactive pkidestroy Mode

To remove a subsystem using **pkidestroy**, execute the utility with the following options:

the -s option

Specifies the subsystem to be removed: CA, KRA, OCSP, TKS, or TPS

the -i option

Specifies the name of the instance from which the subsystem is to be removed

For example, the following command removes a KRA subsystem from an instance named *instance_name*:

```
# pkidestroy -s KRA -i instance_name
```

For more information about **pkidestroy**, see the **pkidestroy(8)** man page.

1.2.2. Interactive pkidestroy Mode

If you execute **pkidestroy** without any options, the utility automatically prompts you for the required information. For example, if you do not specify the **-s** option, **pkispawn** interactively prompts for the subsystem to be removed.

Chapter 2. The **pki** utility

The **pki** utility allows clients to access PKI services on the Certificate System server. The utility provides a number of commands and subcommands designed to perform various operations, such as user or group management, certificate management, profile management, and others.

To display all available **pki** commands and options, run **pki** without any arguments:

```
$ pki

usage: pki [OPTIONS..] <command> [ARGS..]
  -c <password>                      Security database password
  -d <database>                       Security database location (default:
                                         ~/.dogtag/nssdb)
  ...

Subsystems:
  ca    CA management commands
  kra   KRA management commands
  ocsp  OCSP management commands
  ...

Commands:
  client          Client management commands
  cert            Certificate management commands
  group           Group management commands
  ...
```

Some **pki** commands have subcommands. To display subcommands available with a particular **pki** command, run the command without any options. For example, to display the subcommands available with the **pki client** command:

```
$ pki client

Commands:
  client-init      Initialize client security database
  client-cert-find Find certificates in client security database
  client-cert-import Import certificate into client security
  database
  ...
```

2.1. Connection Parameters

The **pki** utility connects to the PKI server with the following parameters by default:

- » Protocol: **http**
- » Host name: **localhost**
- » Port: **8080**

You can specify custom parameters manually by adding the following options to any of the **pki** commands:

- » **-P** specifies the protocol
- » **-h** specifies the host name
- » **-p** specifies the port

For example:

```
pki -P https -h server.example.com -p 8443 cert-find
```

You can also specify the connection parameters as a URL. To do this, provide the URL in the `protocol://hostname:port` format using the **-U** option. The subsystem is determined based on the command being executed. For example, the following command lists the certificates in the CA:

```
pki -U https://server.example.com:8443 cert-find
```

2.2. Authentication

Some commands based on the **pki** utility require the user to authenticate. The utility supports authentication with the user name and password credentials or with a client certificate.

Authentication with a User Name and Password

To supply the user name, add the **-u** option to the particular **pki** command. To supply the password, use the **-W** or **-w** option; alternatively, if you do not add the password directly to the command using **-W** or **-w**, **pki** prompts for the password interactively if required.

For *batch operations*, it is recommended to use **-W** to provide the password because this option enables you to take certain security measures to protect the password, such as set system permissions, system ACLs, or SELinux policies. With **-w**, you supply the password in plain text.

For *individual command-line invocations*, it is recommended not to supply the password directly with the command and instead provide it interactively. For example, by executing the following command, the user only supplies the user name and lets **pki** prompt for the password:

```
pki -u user_name user-find
```

For more information about the described options, see the **pki(1)** man page.

Authentication with a Client Certificate

To supply the required certificate information, use the **-C** or **-c** options to specify the security database file and the **-n** option to specify the certificate nickname.

For *batch operations*, it recommended to use **-C** to pass the file because this option enables you to take certain security measures to protect the file, such as set system permissions, system ACLs, or SELinux policies. With **-c**, the file is provided in plain text.

```
pki -c security_database_password_file -n certificate_nickname user-find
```

For more information about the described options, see the **pki(1)** man page.

2.3. Paging pki Commands Output

The **pki** utility supports pagination: you can divide command outputs into several pages and then display only one specified page. Pagination is especially useful for commands that might display many results, such as the **cert-find** command.

To divide a **pki** command output into pages, use the following options when entering the command:

- » **--start** defines the index of the first entry on the page to be displayed; if you want to start with the first entry of the command output, set this option to 0
- » **--size** defines the number of entries in a page

For example, to request the first page of the **pki user-find** command with 10 entries:

```
$ pki user-find --start 0 --size 10
```

To request the second page of the output:

```
$ pki user-find --start 10 --size 10
```

2.4. Overview of the Supported **pki** Commands

This section lists some of the **pki** commands and their subcommands, as well as their functions. For more detailed information on how to use a particular **pki** subcommand, execute it with the **--help** option added. For example:

```
$ pki cert-find --help
usage: cert-find [OPTIONS...]
--certTypeSecureEmail <on|off>          Certificate Type: Secure Email
--certTypeSSLClient <on|off>            Certificate Type: SSL Client
--certTypeSSLServer <on|off>           Certificate Type: SSL Server
...
...
```

Some of the subcommands are also described in the **pki(1)** man page.

2.4.1. Client Management with **pki client**

The **pki client-*** commands enable you to manage the Certificate System client environment. For more information on these commands, see the **pki-client(1)** man page.

Client Initialization

pki client-init

Initializes a new client environment; the command creates a security database in the default certificate database directory `~/.dogtag/nssdb/`. The password for the new security database must be specified with the **-c** or **-C** option. For example:

```
$ pki -c Secret123 client-init
-----
Client initialized
-----
```



Note

This operation is optional for the administrator. When the administrator creates a new subsystem, a client security database is created automatically.

Listing Local Certificates

pki client-cert-find

Lists all the certificates in the client security database

Importing Certificates and Private Keys

pki client-cert-import

Imports the CA certificate or the client certificate from a PKCS #12 file

Example 2.1. Importing the CA Certificate from the CA Server

To download and import the CA certificate from the CA server:

```
$ pki -c Secret123 -n "CA Signing Certificate - EXAMPLE"
client-cert-import --ca-server
-----
Imported certificate "CA Signing Certificate - EXAMPLE"
```

Example 2.2. Importing the CA Certificate from a File

To import the CA certificate from a file:

```
$ pki -c Secret123 -n "CA Signing Certificate - EXAMPLE"
client-cert-import --ca-cert ca.pem
-----
Imported certificate "CA Signing Certificate - EXAMPLE"
```



Note

Importing the CA certificate is optional. If the CA certificate is not present in the client security database when connecting to the server through SSL from the command line, the user is asked whether to download and import the CA certificate from the CA server.

Example 2.3. Importing the Client Certificate and Private Key

To import the private key from a PKCS #12:

```
$ pki -c Secret123 client-cert-import --pkcs12
ca_admin_cert.p12 --pkcs12-password Secret123
-----
Imported certificates from PKCS #12 file
-----
```



Note

Importing the certificate and the private key is optional for the administrator. When the administrator creates a new subsystem, the administrator certificate and the private key are automatically stored in the client security database.

Removing Local Certificates

pki client-cert-del

Removes a local certificate

2.4.2. Certificate Management with pki cert

The **pki cert-*** commands enable you to manage certificates and certificate requests on the CA. For more information on these commands, see the [pki-cert\(1\)](#) man page.

Listing Certificates

pki cert-find

Lists all certificates

Example 2.4. Listing Only Valid Certificates

To list only certificates that are valid:

```
$ pki cert-find --status VALID
```

Example 2.5. Listing Certificates Based on a File with Search Constraints

To list certificates with search constraints defined in a file:

1. Prepare an XML file defining the search constraints. The file must follow this format:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
<CertSearchRequest>

<serialNumberRangeInUse>true</serialNumberRangeInUse>
<serialFrom></serialFrom>
<serialTo></serialTo>
```

```
<subjectInUse>false</subjectInUse>
<eMail></eMail>
<commonName></commonName>
<userID></userID>
<orgUnit></orgUnit>
<org></org>
<locality></locality>
<state></state>
<country></country>

<matchExactly>false</matchExactly>

<status></status>

<revokedByInUse>false</revokedByInUse>
<revokedBy></revokedBy>

<revokedOnFrom>false</revokedOnFrom>
<revokedOnTo></revokedOnTo>

<revocationReasonInUse>false</revocationReasonInUse>
<revocationReason></revocationReason>

<issuedByInUse>false</issuedByInUse>
<issuedBy></issuedBy>

<issuedOnInUse>false</issuedOnInUse>
<issuedOnFrom></issuedOnFrom>
<issuedOnTo></issuedOnTo>

<validNotBeforeInUse>false</validNotBeforeInUse>
<validNotBeforeFrom></validNotBeforeFrom>
<validNotBeforeTo></validNotBeforeTo>

<validNotAfterInUse>false</validNotAfterInUse>
<validNotAfterFrom></validNotAfterFrom>
<validNotAfterTo></validNotAfterTo>

<validityLengthInUse>false</validityLengthInUse>
<validityOperation></validityOperation>
<validityCount></validityCount>
<validityUnit></validityUnit>

<certTypeInUse>false</certTypeInUse>
<certTypeSubEmailCA></certTypeSubEmailCA>
<certTypeSubSSLCA></certTypeSubSSLCA>
<certTypeSecureEmail></certTypeSecureEmail>

</CertSearchRequest>
```

2. Run the **pki cert-find** command, adding the file path to the command:

```
$ pki cert-find --input filename
```

Displaying a Certificate

pki cert-show

Displays or retrieves a specified certificate

Example 2.6. Downloading a Certificate

To use **pki cert-show** to download a certificate:

```
$ pki cert-show certificate ID --encoded --output filename
```

Creating a Certificate Request

pki cert-request-profile-show and **pki cert-request-submit**

These commands can be used to create and submit a certificate request

Example 2.7. Creating and Submitting a Certificate Request

To create and submit a certificate request using **pki cert-request-profile-show** and **pki cert-request-submit**:

1. Generate a CSR:

```
$ certutil -R -d security database directory -s subject
DN -a
```

2. Use the following command to obtain a profile template:

```
$ pki cert-request-profile-show profile --output file
```

3. Edit the output file and insert the CSR into the **cert_request** attribute. For example:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
<CertEnrollmentRequest>

...
<Input id="i1">

...
<Attribute name="cert_request_type">
<Value>pkcs10</Value>
...
</Attribute>
<Attribute name="cert_request">
<Value>
MIIBZTCBzwIBADAmMRAwDgYDVQQKEwdFWEFNUExFMRIwEAYDVQQDEw1UZ

```

```

XN0IFVz
ZXIwgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAL7hYQp/g4Fb1KRd3C
jyfh8e
MFGZLbTDZcY+YBx0k43JeqIDLkGZRHpr/84hK4lgISuyXpvz8owKe12jw6
q7bP9Z
0D8AGrrJfEvAuMQrAJiMd/03U6CKF9+U/z8RjzHPXjzAK1/cIVpqnPuAQ0
MWQGmx
HkxmLYZww0hKcc9n15KPAgMBAAGgADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOBgQCtpV
2ts1Hp
w+s7ev90d2gRpmPBtNGf0z40s0pNYbDX3fGabkLFIJAWQ8arjQqToGawIh
0nZpND
UJ9hSa1gIfI+4uxYKjk6cFQAPnZeVgLg1KgELVIzYZ0Qem5NXHmRsR/Vwx
h5abzX
XeuHTCnFT0Elpva9mnR+tqe1agZwHghDwQ==
    </Value>

...
</Attribute>
</Input>

...
</CertEnrollmentRequest>

```

4. Use the **pki cert-request-submit** command to submit the request:

```
$ pki cert-request-submit filename
```

Checking Certificate Request Status

pki cert-request-show

Displays the status of the certificate request

Managing Certificate Requests



Important

Viewing or processing certificate requests must be executed with agent credentials. For information on how to authenticate when using the **pki** commands, see [Section 2.2, “Authentication”](#).

pki cert-request-find

Displays all certificate requests

pki cert-request-review

Reviews a certificate request and performs an action, such as approve or reject

Example 2.8. Reviewing a Certificate with **pki cert-request**

To use **pki cert-request-review** to review a certificate:

1. Generate a file with the specified certificate request:

```
$ pki agent authentication cert-request-review request_ID --output filename
```

2. Review the generated output file manually and edit it if required.
3. Enter one of the following actions into the command line to complete the review:

- » approve
- » reject
- » cancel
- » update
- » validate
- » assign
- » unassign

Note

You can perform the approval process in a single step by passing the required review action directly to the command using the **--action**. For example:

```
$ pki agent authentication cert-request-review request_ID --action approve
```

Revoking Certificates



Important

Revoking, holding, or releasing certificates must be executed with agent credentials. For information on how to authenticate when using the **pki** commands, see [Section 2.2, "Authentication"](#).

pki cert-revoke

Revokes the certificate

pki cert-hold

Holds the certificate temporarily

pki cert-release-hold

Releases a certificate that has been held

2.4.3. User and Group Management with pki user and pki group

The **pki user-*** and **pki group-*** commands enable you to manage users and groups. These commands require you to specify the subsystem to which the operation is to be applied. For more information on these commands, see the `pki-user(1)` and `pki-group(1)` man pages.



Important

All of these commands must be executed with administrator credentials. For information on how to authenticate when using the **pki** commands, see [Section 2.2, “Authentication”](#).

pki subsystem-user-find

Lists users

pki subsystem-group-find

Lists groups

pki subsystem-user-show

Displays details for a specified user

pki subsystem-group-show

Displays details for a specified group

pki subsystem-user-add

Adds a new user

pki subsystem-group-add

Adds a new group

pki subsystem-user-mod

Modifies an existing user entry

pki subsystem-group-mod

Modifies an existing group entry

pki subsystem-user-del

Deletes the user

pki subsystem-group-del

Deletes the group

2.4.4. Group Member and User Membership Management with pki group-member and pki user-membership

pki group-member-* commands

Commands for group member management

pki user-membership-* commands

Commands for user membership management

For a complete list of the available group member and user membership management commands, run **pki group-member** or **pki user-membership**. For more information about the commands, see the **pki-group-member(1)** and **pki-user-membership(1)** man pages.

2.4.5. Security Domain Management with pki securitydomain**pki securitydomain-show**

Displays the security domain information; for more information on this command, see the **pki-securitydomain(1)** man page.

2.4.6. Key Management with pki key-*

The **pki key-*** commands enable you to manage keys in KRA. For more information on these commands, see the **pki-key(1)** man page.

Templates**pki key-template-find**

Lists all available key templates

pki key-template-show

Displays a key template or stores the key template into a file

Example 2.9. Storing a Key Template Into a File

To store a key template into a file:

```
$ pki key-template-show retrieveKey --output retrieveKey.xml
```

Key Requests**Important**

All key requests must be executed with KRA agent credentials. For information on how to authenticate when using the **pki** commands, see [Section 2.2, “Authentication”](#).

pki key-request-find

Lists all submitted key requests

pki key-request-show

Displays a specified key request

pki key-request-review

Reviews a key request; the review process follows the same rules as reviewing a certificate request, as described in [Example 2.8, “Reviewing a Certificate with pki cert-request”](#).

Keys



Important

All key operations must be executed with KRA agent credentials. For information on how to authenticate when using the **pki** commands, see [Section 2.2, “Authentication”](#).

pki key-find

Lists all archived keys

pki key-generate

Generates a new key on the server

pki key-archive

Archives a secret specified in the command line

To archive a secret already encrypted in a template:

```
$ pki -d ~/.dogtag/pki-tomcat/ca/alias/ -c Secret123 -n caadmin
key-archive --input archiveKey.xml
```

pki key-retrieve

Retrieves a key

Example 2.10. Retrieving a Key with Random Security Parameters

To retrieve a key with randomly generated security parameters:

```
$ pki -d ~/.dogtag/pki-tomcat/ca/alias/ -c Secret123 -n caadmin
key-retrieve --keyID 0x1

Retrieve Key Information
-----
Key Algorithm: RSA
Key Size: 1024
Nonce data: rYkeh4Rb+MI=

Actual archived data:
MIICdwIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAmEwggJdAgEAAoGBALTyIeypbSGRnb8
+
P/BItA74mTdLX4eFY+fKE4hraeOV4ts+4M9qfry/FJkbMq3dpIpsxuMmGclbHEUQ
J/MfLAHgaxwVLGK8qCGB0IeY0Z7qIbGucSCLcDVp0DlsTvqftK/SJZm560Du7xXh
...
```

Example 2.11. Retrieving a Key with Custom Security Parameters

To retrieve a key with custom security parameters specified in a template:

```
$ pki -d ~/.dogtag/pki-tomcat/ca/alias/ -c Secret123 -n caadmin
key-retrieve --input retrieveKey.xml
```

pki key-recover

Recovers a key

pki key-show

Displays details for a specified key

Example 2.12. Displaying a Key When Specifying the Key ID

To display a key when specifying the key ID:

```
$ pki -d ~/.dogtag/pki-tomcat/ca/alias/ -c Secret123 -n caadmin
key-show 0x1
Key ID: 0x1
Client Key ID: test
Status: active
Algorithm: RSA
Size: 1024
Owner: kraadmin
Public Key:

MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC08pXsqW0hkZ2/Pj/wSLQ0+Jk3
S1+HhWPnyh0Ia2njleLbPuDPan68vxSZGzKt3aSKbMbJhJnJwxxFECfzHywB4Gsc
FSxivKghm9CHmNGe6iGxrnEgi3A1aTg5bE76n7Sv0iWZuejg7u8V4QmU+jBc7904
ydfTGLzZvtTVrYbgdQIDAQAB
```

Example 2.13. Displaying a Key When Specifying the Client Key ID

To display a key when specifying the client key ID:

```
$ pki -d ~/.dogtag/pki-tomcat/ca/alias/ -c Secret123 -n caadmin
key-show --clientKeyID test
Key ID: 0x1
Client Key ID: test
Status: active
Algorithm: RSA
Size: 1024
Owner: kraadmin
Public Key:

MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC08pXsqW0hkZ2/Pj/wSLQ0+Jk3
S1+HhWPnyh0Ia2njleLbPuDPan68vxSZGzKt3aSKbMbJhJnJwxxFECfzHywB4Gsc
FSxivKghm9CHmNGe6iGxrnEgi3A1aTg5bE76n7Sv0iWZuejg7u8V4QmU+jBc7904
ydfTGLzZvtTVrYbgdQIDAQAB
```

pki key-mod --status active

Activates a key. Setting the **--status** option to **inactive** deactivates the key.

2.4.7. KRA Connector Management with `pki ca-kraconnector`

The `pki ca-kraconnector-*` commands enable you to manage KRA connectors.



Important

It is required that all `pki ca-kraconnector-*` commands are directed to CA and executed as the administrator. For information on how to authenticate when using the `pki` commands, see [Section 2.2, “Authentication”](#).

`pki ca-kraconnector-show`

Displays a KRA connector

`pki ca-kraconnector-add`

Adds a new KRA connector

`pki ca-kraconnector-del`

Removes a KRA connector

2.4.8. CA Management with `pki ca`

The `pki ca-*` commands enable you to access various CA services.

Listing Profiles

`pki ca-profile-find`

Lists all CA profiles in the specified database

Displaying Profiles

`pki ca-profile-show`

Displays a specified profile in the database

2.4.9. TPS Management with `pki tps`

The `pki tps-*` commands enable you to access various TPS services.

Activities

`tps-activity-find`

Displays all TPS activities

`tps-activity-show`

Displays a specified activity

Audit

tps-audit-mod

Modifies the audit configuration

tps-audit-show

Displays the audit configuration into a file

Users

pki tps-user-find

Displays all TPS users

pki tps-user-show

Displays a specified TPS user

pki tps-user-add

Adds a new TPS user

pki tps-user-mod

Modifies an existing TPS user

pki tps-user-del

Deletes a TPS user

Profiles

pki tps-profile-find

Displays all TPS profiles

pki tps-profile-show

Displays a specified TPS user

pki tps-profile-add

Adds a new TPS profile

pki tps-profile-mod

Modifies an existing TPS profile

pki tps-profile-del

Deletes a TPS profile

Chapter 3. TokenInfo (Managing External Hardware Tokens)

This tool is used to determine which external hardware tokens are visible to the Certificate System subsystem. This can be used to diagnose whether problems using tokens are related to the Certificate System being unable to detect it.

3.1. Syntax

The **TokenInfo** tool has the following syntax:

```
TokenInfo /directory/alias
```

Option	Description
/directory/alias	Specifies the path and file to the certificate and key database directory; for example, /var/lib/pki-ca/alias .

Chapter 4. **sslget** (Downloading Files over HTTPS)

This tool is similar to the **wget** command, which downloads files over HTTP. **sslget** supports client authentication using NSS libraries. The configuration wizard uses this utility to retrieve security domain information from the CA.

4.1. Syntax

The **sslget** tool has the following syntax:

```
sslget [ -e profile information ] -n rsa_nickname [[ -p password ] | [ -w passwordFile ]] [ -d dbdir ] [ -v ] [ -V ]
-r url hostname [ :port ]
```

Option	Description
e	<i>Optional.</i> Submits information through a subsystem form by specifying the form name and the form fields. For example, this can be used to submit certificate enrollments through a certificate profile.
n	Gives the CA certificate nickname.
p	Gives the certificate database password. Not used if the -w option is used.
w	<i>Optional.</i> Gives the password file path and name. Not used if the -p option is used.
d	<i>Optional.</i> Gives the path to the security databases.
v	<i>Optional.</i> Sets the operation in verbose mode.
V	<i>Optional.</i> Gives the version of the sslget tool.
r <i>url</i>	Gives the URL of the site or server from which to download the information. Depending on how DNS and the network are configured, this can be a machine name, fully-qualified domain name, or IPv4 or IPv6 address.
<i>hostname</i>	Gives the hostname of the server to which to send the request. Depending on how DNS and the network are configured, this can be a machine name, fully-qualified domain name, or IPv4 or IPv6 address.
<i>port</i>	<i>Optional.</i> Gives the port number of the server.

4.2. Usage

It is possible to use **sslget** to submit information securely to Certificate System subsystems. For example, to submit a certificate request through a certificate profile enrollment for to a CA, the command is as follows:

```
sslget -e "profileId=caInternalAuthServerCert&cert_request_type=pkcs10
&requestor_name=TPS-server.example.com-7889
&cert_request=MIIKGTCxAIBADBFMSgwJgYDVQQKEx8yMDA2MTEwNngxMi
BTZmJheSBSZWRoYXQgRG9tYWluMRIwEAYDVQQLEwlyAHBraS10chMXHzAdBgNVBA
MTFndhdGVyLnNmYmF5LnJlZGhhC5jb20wXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAk
EAAsMcYjKD2cDJ0eKjhuaIyaC0YVh8hUzfcrf7ZJ1VyR0Qx1pQrHiHmBQbccCdQxNz
```

```
YK7rxWiR62BPDR4dHtQzj8RwIDAQABoAAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQADQQAKpuTYGP  
%2BI1k50tjn6enPV6j%2B2lFFjrYNwlYWBe4qYhm3WoA0tIuplNLpzP0vw6ttIMZ  
kpE8rcfAeMG10doUpp  
&xmlOutput=true&sessionID=-4771521138734965265  
&auth_hostname=server.example.com&auth_port=9444  
-d "/var/lib/pki-tps/alias" -p "password123" -v -n "Server-Cert cert-  
pki-tps" -r "/ca/ee/ca/profileSubmit" server.example.com:9444
```

Chapter 5. AuditVerify (Audit Log Verification)

The **AuditVerify** tool is used to verify that signed audit logs were signed with the private signing key and that the audit logs have not been compromised.

Auditors can verify the authenticity of signed audit logs using the **AuditVerify** tool. This tool uses the public key of the signed audit log signing certificate to verify the digital signatures embedded in a signed audit log file. The tool response indicates either that the signed audit log was successfully verified or that the signed audit log was not successfully verified. An unsuccessful verification warns the auditor that the signature failed to verify, indicating the log file may have been tampered with (compromised).

5.1. Setting up the Auditor's Database

AuditVerify needs access to a set of security databases (usually the auditor's personal security databases) containing the signed audit log signing certificate and its chain of issuing certificates. One of the CA certificates in the issuance chain must be marked as trusted in the database.

Auditors should import the audit signing certificate into their personal certificate and key databases before running **AuditVerify**. The auditor should not use the security databases of the Certificate System instance that generated the signed audit log files. If there are no readily accessible certificate and key database, the auditor must create a set of certificate and key databases and import the signed audit log signing certificate chain.



Note

The **signedAudit** directory kept by the subsystem is not writeable by any user, including auditors.



Important

The auditor user must be a member of one of the following:

- » the **pkiAudit** group, which is the default value of the **pki_audit_group** variable under the **[DEFAULT]** section of the **/etc/pki/default.cfg** file
- » whatever system group was identified as the audit group by overriding the **pki_audit_group** variable when the **pkispawn** utility was run to create the subsystem

To create the security databases and import the certificate chain:

1. Create a special directory in the auditor's home directory to use to perform the verification.
For example:

```
mkdir ~jsmith/auditVerifyDir
```

2. Use the **certutil** tool to create an empty set of certificate databases in the auditor's home directory.

```
certutil -d ~jsmith/auditVerifyDir -N
```

- Download the CA certificate from the CA's **Retrieval** page.

```
https://server.example.com:ca_https_port/ca/ee/ca/
```

- Import the CA certificate and log signing certificate into the databases, marking the CA certificate as trusted. The certificates can be obtained from the CA in ASCII format.

If the CA certificate is in a file called **cacert.txt** and the log signing certificate is in a file called **logsigncert.txt**, then the **certutil** is used to set the trust for the new audit security database directory pointing to those files, as follows:

```
certutil -d ~jsmith/auditVerifyDir/ -A -n "CA Certificate" -t "CT,CT,CT" -a -i /var/lib/instance_ID/alias/cacert.txt
```

```
certutil -d ~jsmith/auditVerifyDir -A -n "Log Signing Certificate"-t ",,P" -a -i /var/lib/instance_ID/alias/logsigncert.txt
```

5.2. Syntax

The **AuditVerify** tool has the following syntax:

```
AuditVerify -d dbdir -n signing_certificate_nickname -a logListFile [-P cert/key_db_prefix] [-v]
```

Option	Description
a	<p>Specifies the text file containing a comma separated list (in chronological order) of the signed audit logs to be verified. The contents of the <i>logListFile</i> are the full paths to the audit logs. For example:</p> <pre><code>/var/log/pki- ca/signedAudit/ca_cert-ca_audit, /var/log/pki- ca/signedAudit/ca_cert- ca_audit.20030227102711, /var/log/pki- ca/signedAudit/ca_cert- ca_audit.20030226094015</code></pre> <p>This file should be created in a directory which is writeable by the auditor, such as a special auditing directory like ~jsmith/auditDir.</p>
d	<p>Specifies the directory containing the security databases with the imported audit log signing certificate. This directory is almost always the auditor's own personal certificate databases in a personal directory, such as ~jsmith/auditVerifyDir/.</p>

Option	Description
n	Gives the nickname of the certificate used to sign the log files. The nickname is whatever was used when the log signing certificate was imported into that database.
P	<i>Optional.</i> The prefix to prepend to the certificate and key database filenames. If used, a value of empty quotation marks ("") should be specified for this argument, since the auditor is using separate certificate and key databases from the Certificate System instance and it is unlikely that the prefix should be prepended to the new audit security database files.
v	<i>Optional.</i> Specifies verbose output.

5.3. Return Values

When **AuditVerify** is used, one of the following codes is returned:

Return Value	Description
0	Indicates that the signed audit log has been successfully verified.
1	Indicates that there was an error while the tool was running.
2	Indicates that one or more invalid signatures were found in the specified file, meaning that at least one of the log files could not be verified.

5.4. Usage

After a separate audit database directory has been configured, do the following:

1. Create a text file containing a comma-separated list of the log files to be verified. The name of this file is referenced in the **AuditVerify** command.

For example, this file could be **logListFile** in the **/etc/audit** directory. The contents are the comma-separated list of audit logs to be verified, such as "**auditlog.1213, auditlog.1214, auditlog.1215**".

2. If the audit databases do not contain prefixes and are located in the user home directory, such as **/home/msmith/.mozilla**, and the signing certificate nickname is "**auditsigningcert**", the **AuditVerify** command is run as follows:

```
AuditVerify -d ~msmith/auditVerifyDir -n auditsigningcert -a
/etc/audit/logListFile -P "" -v
```

5.5. Results

The input file, **audit_list**, is a simple text file which gives the full path to the signed audit logs to be verified.

```
cat ~jsmith/auditVerifyDir/audit_list  
/var/lib/pki-ca/logs/signedAudit/ca_audit.20110211145833
```

If no modifications have been made to any of the files, then **AuditVerify** returns a message that all signatures are valid.

```
AuditVerify -d ~jsmith/auditVerifyDir -n "Log Signing Certificate" -a  
~jsmith/auditVerifyDir/audit_list  
  
Verification process complete.  
Valid signatures: 20  
Invalid signatures: 0
```

If there is a modification to a log file, then the signature is invalidated. In that case, **AuditVerify** says that there is an invalid signature and returns the name of the edited log file and the line number of the modification.

```
AuditVerify -d ~jsmith/auditVerifyDir -n "Log Signing Certificate" -a  
~jsmith/auditVerifyDir/audit_list  
=====  
File:  
/var/lib/pki-ca/logs/signedAudit/ca_audit.20110211145833  
=====  
Line 52: VERIFICATION FAILED: signature of /var/lib/pki-  
ca/logs/signedAudit/ca_audit.20101213141439:48 to /var/lib/pki-  
ca/logs/signedAudit/ca_audit.20101213141439:51  
  
Verification process complete.  
Valid signatures: 19  
Invalid signatures: 1
```

Chapter 6. setpin (Generating Unique PINs for Entities)

For the Certificate System to use the **UidPwdPinDirAuth** authentication plug-in module, the authentication directory must contain unique PINs for each end entity which will be issued a certificate. The Certificate System provides a tool, the *PIN Generator*, which generates unique PINs for end-entity entries in an LDAP directory. The tool stores these PINs as hashed values in the same directory against the corresponding user entries. It also copies the PINs to a text file so that the PINs can be sent to the end entities.

6.1. The setpin Command

This chapter describes the syntax and arguments of the **setpin** tool and the expected responses.

6.1.1. Editing the setpin.conf Configuration File

The **setpin** tool can use a configuration file, **setpin.conf**, to store some of its required options. Before running **setpin**, modify this file to reflect the directory information, and set the **setpin** tool to use this file by doing the following:

1. Open the **setpin.conf** file.

```
cd /usr/lib/pki/native-tools
vi setpin.conf
```

2. Edit the directory parameters in the file to match the directory installation information.

```
#----- Enter the hostname of the LDAP server
host=localhost

#----- Enter the port number of the LDAP server
port=389

#----- Enter the DN of the Directory Manager user
binddn=CN=Directory Manager

#----- Enter the password for the Directory manager user
bindpw=

#   Enter the DN and password for the new pin manager user
pinmanager=cn=pinmanager,dc=example,dc=com
pinmanagerpwd=

#   Enter the base over which this user has the power
#   to remove pins
basedn=ou=people,dc=example,dc=com

## This line switches setpin into setup mode.
## Please do not change it.
setup=yes
```

3. Run **setpin**, and set the option file to **setpin.conf**.

```
setpin optfile=/usr/lib/pki/native-tools/setpin.conf
```

6.1.2. Syntax

The **setpin** has the following syntax:

```
setpin host=host_name [ port=port_number ] binddn=user_id [ bindpw=bind_password ]
filter="LDAP_search_filter" [ basedn=LDAP_base_DN ] [[ length=PIN_length ] | [
minlength=minimum_PIN_length ] | [ maxlength=maximum_PIN_length ] ] [ gen=character_type ] [
case=upperonly ] [ hash=algorithm ] [ saltattribute=LDAP_attribute_to_use_for_salt_creation ] [
input=file_name ] [ output=file_name ] [ write ] [ clobber ] [ testpingen=count ] [ debug ] [ optfile=file_name ]
[ setup [ pinmanager=pinmanager_user ] [ pinmanagerpwd=pinmanager_password ] ]
```

Option	Description
host	<i>Required.</i> Specifies the LDAP directory to which to connect. Depending on how DNS and the network are configured, this can be a machine name, fully-qualified domain name, or IPv4 or IPv6 address.
port	Specifies the LDAP directory port to which to bind. The default port number is the default LDAP port, 389 .
binddn	<i>Required.</i> Specifies the user as whom the PIN Generator binds to the LDAP directory. This user account must have read/write access to the directory.
bindpw	Gives the password for the user ID set in the binddn option. If the bind password is not given at the command line, the tool prompts for it.
filter	<i>Required.</i> Sets the search filter for those DNs in the directory for which the tool should generate PINs.
basedn	Specifies the base DN under which to search for DNs. If this argument is not specified, the filter searches from the root.
length	Specifies the exact number a PIN must contain; the default is 6. Do not use with minlength or maxlength .
minlength	Sets the minimum length of the generated PINs. If used with maxlength , this sets the lower end of the range of the PIN length. Do not use with length .
maxlength	Sets the maximum length of the generated PINs. If used with minlength , this sets the upper end of the range of the PIN length. Do not use with length .
gen	Specifies the character type for PINs. The characters in the password can be constructed out of alphabetic characters (RNG-alpha), alphanumeric characters (RNG-alphnum), or any printable ASCII characters (printableascii).

Option	Description
case	Restricts the character cases to uppercase only; otherwise, the case is mixed. Restricting alphabetic characters to uppercase reduces the overall combinations for the password space significantly. Use case with gen .
hash	Specifies the message digest algorithm with which to hash the PINs before storing them in the authentication directory.
 Note	This should be set to none (which does not hash PINs) because the Directory Server may have restrictions on incoming hashed passwords.
	The default is sha1 , which produces a 160-bit message digest. md5 produces a 128-bit message digest. none does not hash the PINs.
saltattribute	Specifies the LDAP attribute to use for salt creation. This must be set to dn . If an attribute is set, the tool integrates the value of the attribute with each PIN and hashes the resulting string with the hash routine. For details, refer to Section 6.2.3, “How PINs Are Stored in the Directory” .
	This attribute is ignored if the hash value is set to none , which is the recommended setting.
input	Specifies the file that contains the list of DNs to process. If this is used, the tool compares the filtered DNs to the ones in the input file and generates PINs for only those DNs .
output	Specifies the absolute path to the file to write the PINs as setpin generates them. If a file is not set, then the output is written to the standard output. Regardless of whether an output file is set, all error messages are directed to the standard error.
write	Sets whether the tool should write PINs to the directory. If specified, the PINs are written to the directory as they are generated. Otherwise, the tool does not make any changes to the directory. Do not write PINs to the directory if the PINs are to be checked. The PINs can be viewed in the output file to make sure that they are being assigned to the correct users and that they conform to the length and character restrictions. For more information, see Section 6.2.2, “Output File” .

Option	Description
clobber	Overwrites pre-existing PINs, if any, associated with a DN. If this option is not used, any existing PINs are left in the directory.
testpingen	Tests the PIN-generation mode. <i>count</i> sets the total number of PINs to generate for testing.
debug	Writes debugging information to the standard error. If debug=attrs is specified, the tool writes more detailed information about each entry in the directory.
optfile	Sets the tool to read options, one per line, from a file. This allows all arguments to be put in a file, instead of typing them at the command line. One configuration file, setpin.conf , is located in the /usr/lib/pki/native-tools directory.
setup	Switches to setup mode, which allows the tool to add to the directory schema.
pinmanager	Specifies the PIN manager user that has permission to remove the PIN for the basedn specified. Used with the setup option.
pinmanagerpwd	Gives the password for the PIN manager user. Used with the setup option.

6.1.3. Usage

First, run the **setpin** command with its **optfile** option pointing to the **setpin.conf** file.

```
setpin optfile=/usr/lib/pki/native-tools/setpin.conf
```

The tool modifies the schema with a new attribute (by default, **pin**) and a new object class (by default, **pinPerson**), creates a **pinmanager** user, and sets the ACI to allow only the **pinmanager** user to modify the **pin** attribute.

Then, disable setup mode for the **setpin** command. Either comment out the **setup** line or change the value to no.

```
vim /usr/lib/pki/native-tools/setpin.conf
```

```
setup=no
```

After the setup is complete, then **setpin** can be used to generate PINs.

The following command generates PINs for all entries that have the **CN** attribute in their distinguished name in an LDAP directory named **csldap** listening on port **389**. The PIN Generator binds to the directory as **Directory Manager** and starts searching the directory from the base DN **dn=dc=example,dc=com** in the directory tree. Any existing PINs are overwritten with the new ones.

```
setpin host=csldap port=389 binddn="CN=directory manager" bindpw=password
filter="(cn=*)" basedn="dc=example,dc=com" clobber write hash=None
```

6.2. How setpin Works

The PIN Generator generates PINs for user entries in an LDAP directory and updates the directory with these PINs. To run the **setpin** command, the following five options are required:

- » The host name (**host**) and port number (**port**) of the LDAP server
- » The bind DN (**binddn**) and password (**bindpw**)
- » An LDAP filter (**filter**) for filtering out the user entries that require PINs

The **setpin** command looks like the following:

```
setpin host=csldap port=19000 binddn="CN=Directory Manager" bindpw=secret  
filter="(ou=employees)" basedn="dc=example,dc=com"
```

This example queries the directory for all the entries in the **employees** organizational unit (**ou**). For each entry matching the filter, information is printed out to standard error and to the standard output.

Note

Because the PIN Generator makes a lot of changes to the directory, it is important to use the correct filter, or the wrong entries are modified. Using the **write** option is a safeguard because no changes are made to the directory unless that option is used. This allows the PINs to be verified before any entries are modified.

The information can be written to a different output file by using the **output** option; see [Section 6.2.2, “Output File”](#) for more information. The entries returned by the LDAP search filter can be further restricted by using an ASCII input file which lists the entry DNs; only entries matching those in the file are updated. The input file is set with the **input** option. The input file is not a substitute for the LDAP directory entries; the filter attribute must still be provided. For more information about the input file, refer to [Section 6.2.1, “Input File”](#). [Figure 6.1, “Using an Input and Output File When Generating PINs”](#) shows how the input and output files work with the **setpin** tool.




Figure 6.1. Using an Input and Output File When Generating PINs

The output file contains the entry and PIN information from running **setpin**, as shown in the following example:

```

Processing: cn=QA Managers,ou=employees,dc=example,dc=com
Adding new pin/password
dn:cn=QA Managers,ou=employees,dc=example,dc=com
pin:1DWynV
status:notwritten

Processing: cn=PD Managers,ou=employees,dc=example,dc=com
Adding new pin/password
dn:cn=PD Managers,ou=employees,dc=example,dc=com
pin:G69uV7
status:notwritten
  
```

The output also contains the status of each entry in the directory. The status values are listed in [Table 6.1, “PIN Generator Status”](#).

Table 6.1. PIN Generator Status

Exit Code	Description
-----------	-------------

Exit Code	Description
notwritten	The PINs were not written to the directory because the write option was not used.
writefailed	The tool tried to modify the directory, but the write operation was unsuccessful.
added	The tool added the new PIN to the directory successfully.
replaced	The tool replaced an old PIN with a new one; this means the clobber option was used.
notreplaced	The tool did not replace the old PIN with a new one; this means the clobber option was not used.

If a PIN already exists for a user, it is not changed if the **setpin** command is run a second time. This allows new PINs to be created for new users without overwriting PINs for users who have already received a PIN. To overwrite a PIN, use the **clobber** option.

After making sure that the filter is matching the right users, run the **setpin** command again with the **write** option and with **output** set to the name of the file to capture the unassigned PINs. For details about the output file, refer to [Section 6.2.2, “Output File”](#).

6.2.1. Input File

The PIN Generator can receive a list of DNs to modify in a text file specified by the **input** argument. If an input file is specified, then the tool compares the DNs returned by the filtered to the ones in the input file and updates only those DNs that match in the input file.

The input enables the user to provide the PIN Generator with an exact list of DNs to modify; it is also possible to provide the PIN Generator with PINs in plain text for all DNs or for specific DNs.

There are two common situations when using an input file is useful:

- If PINs have been set for all entries in the user directory, and new users join the organization. For the new users to get certificates, the directory must contain PINs. PINs should be generated for only those two entries without changing any of the other user entries. Instead of constructing a complex LDAP filter, using an input file allows using a general filter, and the modified entries are restricted to the DNs of the two users listed in the input file.
- If a particular value, such as Social Security numbers, should be used as PINs, then the Social Security numbers can be put in the input file and provide those numbers as PINs to the PIN Generator. These are then stored as hashed values in the directory.

The format of the input file is the same as that of the output file (refer to [Section 6.2.2, “Output File”](#)) except for the status line. In the input file, PINs can be set for all the DNs in the file, for specific DNs, or for none of the DNs. If the PIN attribute is missing for a DN, the tool automatically generates a random PIN.

An input file looks like the following example:

```
dn:cn=user1, dc=example, dc=com
dn:cn=user2, dc=example, dc=com
...
dn:cn=user3, dc=example, dc=com
```

PINs can also be provided for the DNs in plain-text format; these PINs are hashed according to the command-line arguments.

```
dn:cn=user1, dc=example,dc=com
pin:p1229Ab

dn:cn=user2, dc=example,dc=com
pin:9j65dSf

...
dn:cn=user3, dc=example,dc=com
pin:3knAg60
```

Note

Hashed PINs cannot be provided to the tool.

6.2.2. Output File

The PIN Generator can capture the output to a text file specified by the **output** option.

The output contains a sequence of records in the following format:

```
dn: user_dn1
pin: generated_pin1
status: status1

dn: user_dn2
pin: generated_pin2
status: status2

...
dn: user_dn#
pin: generated_pin#
status: status#
```

where *user_dn* is a distinguished name matching the DN filter or listed in the input file. By default, the delimiter is a semi-colon (;) or the character defined on the command line. *generated_pin* is a string of characters of fixed or variable length, depending on the length parameters used. *status* is one of the values listed [Table 6.1, “PIN Generator Status”](#).

The first line in each record is always the DN. The subsequent lines for **pin** and **status** are optional. The record ends with a blank line, using the Unix end of line sequence (\n).

6.2.3. How PINs Are Stored in the Directory

Each PIN is concatenated with the corresponding LDAP attribute named in the **saltattribute** argument (which defaults to the entry DN, the recommended value). If this argument is not specified, the DN is used.

That string is hashed with the routine specified in the hash argument; the default algorithm is SHA-1, but this should be set to none so that it works with Directory Servers which restrict the use of incoming hashed passwords.

One byte is prepended to indicate the hash type used. The PIN is stored as follows:

```
byte[0] = X
```

The value of X depends on the hash algorithm chosen during the PIN generation process.

X	Hash Algorithm
0	SHA-1
1	MD5
45	none

The PIN is stored in the directory as a binary value, not as a base-64 encoded value.

6.2.4. Exit Codes

When the PIN Generator is finished running, it returns a result code showing how it ended. These result codes are listed in [Table 6.2, “Result Codes Returned by the PIN Generator”](#).

Table 6.2. Result Codes Returned by the PIN Generator

Result Code	Description
0	The PIN generation was successful; PINs were set for all the DNs in the specified directory.
4	The tool could not bind to the directory as the user specified in the binddn parameter.
5	The tool could not open the output file specified in the output parameter.
7	There was an error parsing command-line arguments.
8	The tool could not open the input file specified in the input parameter.
9	The tool encountered an internal error.
10	The tool found a duplicate entry in the input file.
11	The tool did not find the salt attribute specified in the saltattribute parameter in the directory.

Chapter 7. AtoB (Converting ASCII to Binary)

The Certificate System ASCII to binary tool converts ASCII base-64 encoded data to binary base-64 encoded data.

7.1. Syntax

The ASCII to binary tool, **AtoB**, has the following syntax:

```
AtoB input_file output_file
```

Option	Description
<i>input_file</i>	Specifies the path and file to the base-64 encoded ASCII data.
<i>output_file</i>	Specifies the file where the utility should write the binary output.

7.2. Usage

The example command takes the base-64 ASCII data in the **ascii_data.in** file and writes the binary equivalent of the data to the **binary_data.out** file.

```
AtoB /usr/home/smith/test/ascii_data.in  
/usr/home/smith/test/binary_data.out
```

Chapter 8. BtoA (COnverting Binary to ASCII)

The Certificate System binary to ASCII tool, **BtoA** converts binary base-64 encoded data to ASCII base-64 encoded data.

8.1. Syntax

The **BtoA** tool uses the following syntax:

```
BtoA input_file output_file
```

Option	Description
<i>input_file</i>	Specifies the path and file of the base-64 encoded binary data.
<i>output_file</i>	Specifies the path and file to which the tool should write the ASCII output.

8.2. Usage

The following example of the **BtoA** utility takes the base-64 encoded binary data in the **binary_data.in** file and writes the ASCII equivalent of the data to the **ascii_data.out** file.

```
BtoA /usr/home/smith/test/binary_data.in  
/usr/home/smith/test/ascii_data.out
```

Chapter 9. PrettyPrintCert (Printing Certificates)

The Pretty Print Certificate utility, **PrettyPrintCert**, prints the contents of a certificate stored as ASCII base-64 encoded data to a readable format.

9.1. Syntax

The **PrettyPrintCert** command has the following syntax:

```
PrettyPrintCert [-simpleinfo] input_file [output_file]
```

Option	Description
simpleinfo	<i>Optional.</i> Prints limited certificate information in an easy to parse format.
<i>input_file</i>	Specifies the path to the file containing the ASCII base-64 encoded certificate.
<i>output_file</i>	<i>Optional.</i> Specifies the path and file to which the tool should write the certificate. If this option is not specified, the certificate information is written to the standard output.

9.2. Usage

The following example converts the ASCII base-64 encoded certificate in the **ascii_cert.in** file and writes the certificate in the pretty-print form to the output file **ascii_cert.out**.

```
PrettyPrintCert /usr/home smith/test/ascii_cert.in  
/usr/home smith/test/ascii_cert.out
```

The base-64 encoded certificate data in the **ascii_cert.in** looks like the following:

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----  
MIIC2DCCAkGgAwIBAgICEAwxDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwfDELMAkGA1UEBhMCVV  
MxIzA  
hBgNVBAoTG1BhbG9va2FWaWxsZSBXaWRnZXrLCBJbmMuMR0wGwYDVQQLE  
RxawRnZX  
QgTWFrZXJzICdSJyBVczEpMCCGA1UEAxMgVGVzdCBUXN0IFRlc3QgVG  
VzdCBUXN0I  
FRlc3QgQ0EwHhcNOTkwMjE4MDMMzM5WhcNMDAwMjE4MDM0MzM5WjCBrjEL  
MAkGA1UEB  
hMCVVmxJjAkBgNVBAoTHU5ldHNjYXB1IEvbW11bmljYXRpb25zIENvcnAu  
MRUwEwYD  
VQQLEw0ZXRzY2FwZSBTVMxGDAwBEBEwhtaGFybXN1bjEfMB0GA1UEAxWa  
50ZGV2Y2  
EgQWRtaW5pcwp0frfJ00beiSSia3BuifRHBNw95ZZQR9NIxR1x5bE  
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

The certificate in pretty-print format in the **ascii_cert.out** file looks like the following:

```
Certificate:  
Data:  
Version: v3  
Serial Number: 0x100C  
Signature Algorithm: OID.1.2.840.113549.1.1.5 - 1.2.840.113549.1.1.5  
Issuer: CN=Test CA, OU=Widget Makers 'R'Us, O=Example Corporation,  
Widgets\, Inc., C=US  
Validity:
```

```

Not Before: Wednesday, February 17, 1999 7:43:39 PM
Not After: Thursday, February 17, 2000 7:43:39 PM
Subject: MAIL=admin@example.com,CN=testCA Administrator, UID=admin,
OU=IS,
O=Example Corporation,C=US
Subject Public Key Info:
Algorithm: RSA - 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1
Public Key:
30:81:89:02:81:81:00:DE:26:B3:C2:9D:3F:7F:FA:DF:
24:E3:9B:7A:24:AC:89:AD:C1:BA:27:D1:1C:13:70:F7:
96:59:41:1F:4D:21:7A:F5:C7:96:C4:75:83:35:9F:49:
E4:B0:A7:5F:95:C4:09:EA:67:00:EF:BD:7C:39:92:11:
31:F2:CA:C9:16:87:B9:AD:B8:39:69:18:CE:29:81:5F:
F3:4D:97:B9:DF:B7:60:B3:00:03:16:8E:C1:F8:17:6E:
7A:D2:00:0F:7D:9B:A2:69:35:18:70:1C:7C:AE:12:2F:
0B:0F:EC:69:CD:57:6F:85:F3:3E:9D:43:64:EF:0D:5F:
EF:40:FF:A6:68:FD:DD:02:03:01:00:01:
Extensions:
Identifier: 2.16.840.1.113730.1.1
Critical: no
Value: 03:02:00:A0:
Identifier: Authority Key Identifier - 2.5.29.35
Critical: no
Key Identifier:
EB:B5:11:8F:00:9A:1A:A6:6E:52:94:A9:74:BC:65:CF:
07:89:2A:23:
Signature:
Algorithm: OID.1.2.840.113549.1.1.5 - 1.2.840.113549.1.1.5
Signature:
3E:8A:A9:9B:D1:71:EE:37:0D:1F:A0:C1:00:17:53:26:
6F:EE:28:15:20:74:F6:C5:4F:B4:E7:95:3C:A2:6A:74:
92:3C:07:A8:39:12:1B:7E:C4:C7:AE:79:C8:D8:FF:1F:
D5:48:D8:2E:DD:87:88:69:D5:3A:06:CA:CA:9C:9A:55:
DA:A9:E8:BF:36:BC:68:6D:1F:2B:1C:26:62:7C:75:27:
E2:8D:24:4A:14:9C:92:C6:F0:7A:05:A1:52:D7:CC:7D:
E0:9D:6C:D8:97:3A:9C:12:8C:25:48:7F:51:59:BE:3C:
2B:30:BF:EB:0A:45:7D:A6:49:FB:E7:BE:04:05:D6:8F:

```

The following example command takes the ASCII base-64 encoded certificate in the **ascii_cert.in** file and writes the information contained within the certificate to the simple format output file **cert.simple**.

```
PrettyPrintCert -simpleinfo /usr/home/smith/test/ascii_cert.in
/usr/home/smith/test/cert.simple
```

The base-64 encoded certificate data in **ascii_cert.in** file looks similar to the following:

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIC2DCCAkGgAwIBAgICEAwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwfDELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxIzA
hBgNVBAoTG1BhbG9va2FWawxsZSBXaW>RnZXrZLCBJbmMuMR0wGwYDVQQLEXRXaW>RnZX
QgTWFrZXJzICdSJyBVczEpMCCGA1UEAxMgVGVzdCBUZXN0IFRlc3QgVGVzdCBUZXN0I
FRlc3QgQ0EwHhcNOTkwMjE4MDMMzM5WhcNMDAwMjE4MDM0MzM5WjCBrjELMAkGA1UEB
```

```
hMCVVVMxJjAkBgNVBAoTHU5ldHNjYXB1IENvbW11bm1jYXRpb25zIENvcnAuMRUwEwYD  
VQQLEwOZXrZy2FwZSBDTVMxGDAwBEBEwhtaGFybXN1bjEfMB0GA1UEAxWaW50ZGV2Y2  
EgQWRtaW5pcwp0frfJ00beiSsia3BuifRHBNw95ZZQR9NIXr1x5bE  
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

The simple certificate information in the **cert.simple** output file looks like the following:

```
MAIL=admin@example.com  
CN=testCA Administrator  
UID=admin  
OU=IS  
O=Example Corporation  
C=US
```

Chapter 10. PrettyPrintCrl (Printing Readable CRLs)

The Pretty Print CRL tool, **PrettyPrintCrl**, prints the contents of a certificate revocation list (CRL) in an ASCII base-64 encoded file in a readable form.

10.1. Syntax

The **PrettyPrintCrl** utility has the following syntax:

```
PrettyPrintCrl input_file [output-file]
```

Option	Description
<i>input_file</i>	Specifies the path to the file that contains the ASCII base-64 encoded CRL.
<i>output_file</i>	<i>Optional.</i> Specifies the path to the file to write the CRL. If the output file is not specified, the CRL information is written to the standard output.

10.2. Usage

The following example **PrettyPrintCrl** command takes the ASCII base-64 encoded CRL in the **ascii_crl.in** file and writes the CRL in the pretty-print form to the output file **ascii_crl.out**.

```
PrettyPrintCrl /usr/home smith/test/ascii_crl.in  
/usr/home smith/test/ascii_crl.out
```

The base-64 encoded CRL in the **ascii_crl.in** file looks like the following:

```
-----BEGIN CRL-----  
MIIBkjCBAIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADAsMREwDwYDVQQKEwh0ZXRzY2FwZTEXMBUG  
A1UEAxMOQ2VydDQwIFRlc3QgQ0EXDTk4MTIxNzIyMzcyNFowgaowIAIBExcNOTgxMjE  
1MTMxODMyWjAMMAoGA1UdFQQDCgEBMCACARIxDtk4MTINTEzMjA0MlowDDAKBgnVHRU  
EAwoBAjAgAgERFw050DEyMTYxMjUxNTRaMAwwCgYDVR0VBAMKAQEwIAIBEcNOTgxMj  
E3MTAzNzI0WjAMMAoGA1UdFQQDCgEDMCACAQoXDTk4MTEyNTEzMTExOFowDDAKBgnVH  
RUEAw0BATANBgkqhkiG9w0BQQFAAOBgQBCN8500GPTnHfImYPR0voorx7HyFz2ZsuKs  
Vb1TcemsX0NL7Dt0a+MyY0pPrkXgm157JrkxEJ7GB0eogbAS6iFbmeSqPHj8+  
-----END CRL-----
```

The CRL in pretty-print format in the **ascii_crl.out** output file looks like the following:

```
Certificate Revocation List:  
Data:  
Version: v2  
Signature Algorithm: MD5withRSA - 1.2.840.113549.1.1.4  
Issuer: CN=Test CA,O=Example Corporation  
This Update: Thu Dec 17 14:37:24 PST 1998  
Revoked Certificates:  
Serial Number: 0x13  
Revocation Date: Tuesday, December 15, 1998 5:18:32 AM  
Extensions:  
Identifier: Revocation Reason - 2.5.29.21
```

```
Critical: no
Reason: Key_Compromise
Serial Number: 0x12
Revocation Date: Tuesday, December 15, 1998 5:20:42 AM
Extensions:
Identifier: Revocation Reason - 2.5.29.21
Critical: no
Reason: CA_Compromise
Serial Number: 0x11
Revocation Date: Wednesday, December 16, 1998 4:51:54 AM
Extensions:
Identifier: Revocation Reason - 2.5.29.21
Critical: no
Reason: Key_Compromise
Serial Number: 0x10
Revocation Date: Thursday, December 17, 1998 2:37:24 AM
Extensions:
Identifier: Revocation Reason - 2.5.29.21
Critical: no
Reason: Affiliation_Changed
Serial Number: 0xA
Revocation Date: Wednesday, November 25, 1998 5:11:18 AM
Extensions:
Identifier: Revocation Reason - 2.5.29.21
Critical: no
Reason: Key_Compromise
Signature:
Algorithm: MD5withRSA - 1.2.840.113549.1.1.4
Signature:
42:37:CE:4E:D0:63:D3:9C:77:C8:99:83:D1:3A:FA:28:
AF:1E:C7:C8:5C:F6:66:CB:8A:B1:56:E5:4D:C7:A6:B1:
7D:0D:2F:B0:ED:39:AF:8C:C9:8D:29:3E:B9:17:82:6D:
79:EC:9A:E4:C4:42:7B:18:13:9E:A2:06:C0:4B:A8:85:
6E:67:92:A8:F1:E3:F3:E2:41:1F:9B:2D:24:D9:DF:4C:
2B:A1:68:CE:96:C7:AF:F7:5B:F7:3D:2F:06:57:39:74:
CF:B2:FA:46:C6:AD:18:60:8D:3E:0C:F7:C1:66:52:37:
CF:89:42:B0:D7:33:C4:95:7E:F4:D9:1E:32:B8:5E:12:
```

Chapter 11. tkstool (Managing Token Keys)

The TKS utility, **tkstool**, manages keys, including keys stored on tokens, the TKS master key, and related keys and databases.

11.1. Syntax

The **tkstool** can be used to manage certificates and keys in several different ways. The syntax for these different operations is as follows:

- » Deleting a key from a token.

```
tkstool -D -n keyname -d dbdir [-h token_name] [-p dbprefix] [-f pwfile]
```

- » Inputting shares to generate a new transport key.

```
tkstool -I -n keyname -d dbdir [-h token_name] [-p dbprefix] [-f pwfile]
```

- » Displaying the key check value (KCV) of the specified key.

```
tkstool -K -n keyname -d dbdir [-h token_name] [-p dbprefix] [-f pwfile]
```

- » Listing a specified key or all keys.

```
tkstool -L -n keyname -d dbdir [-h all | -h token_name] [-p dbprefix] [-f pwfile] [-x]
```

- » Generating a new master key.

```
tkstool -M -n keyname -d dbdir [-h token_name] [-p dbprefix] [-f pwfile]
```

- » Creating a new key database.

```
tkstool -N -d dbdir [-p dbprefix] [-f pwfile]
```

- » Changing the key database password.

```
tkstool -P -d dbdir [-p dbprefix] [-f pwfile]
```

- » Renaming a symmetric key.

```
tkstool -R -n keyname -r new_keyname -d dbdir [-h token_name] [-p dbprefix] [-f pwfile]
```

- » Listing all security modules.

```
tkstool -S -d dbdir [-p dbprefix] [-x]
```

- » Generating a new transport key.

```
tkstool -T -n keyname -d dbdir [-h token_name]
[-p dbprefix] [-f pwfile] [-z noiseFile]
```

- » Unwrapping a wrapped master key.

```
tkstool -U -n keyname -d dbdir -t transport_keyname -i inputFile
[-h token_name] [-p dbprefix] [-f pwfile]
```

- » Wrapping a new master key.

```
tkstool -W -n keyname -d dbdir -t transport_keyname -o outputFile
[-h token_name] [-p dbprefix] [-f pwfile]
```

Note

Chrysalis-ITS version 2.3 is required to support version 1.0 of the **-R** option of the **tkstool**.

Transport keys residing on Chrysalis-ITS hardware tokens created by an earlier version of **tkstool** cannot have their KCV values determined with the **-K** option of the **tkstool** because the **CKA_ENCRYPT** and **CKF_ENCRYPT** bits were not set when they were created by the previous tool.

The **tkstool** options are as follows:

Option	Description
D	Deletes a key from the token.
d	<i>Required.</i> Gives the security module database (HSM, if allowed for that operation) or the key database directory (software).
f	Gives the path and filename of the password file, if one is used.
h	Gives the token name for the token which contains the key to be managed. Some operations allow an all option to manage all keys in the token.
I	Inputs shares to generate a new transport key.
i	<i>Required with -U.</i> Gives the path and filename of the input file which contains the wrapped master key.
K	Displays the KCV of the specified key.
L	Lists the specified key or all keys.
M	Generates a new master key.
N	Creates a new key database (software).
n	<i>Required for every operation except -N, -P, and -S.</i> Gives the name of the key being managed.
o	<i>Required with -W.</i> Gives the path and filename for the file to which to output the new wrapped master key.

Option	Description
P	Changes the key database password (software).
p	Gives the prefix to the key database directory.
R	Renames a symmetric key.
r	<i>Required with -R.</i> Gives the new key name.
S	Lists all security modules.
T	Generates a new transport key.
t	<i>Required with -U and -W.</i> Gives the name of the transport key being managed.
U	Unwraps the wrapped master key.
W	Wraps the new master key.
X	Forces the database to be read/write.
z	Gives the path and filename of the noise file to generate the key.

There are two additional options which can be used with **tkstool** to get more information about the utility.

Option	Description
H	Displays the extended help information.
V	Display the version number of the tkstool tool.

11.2. Usage

1. Check the version of **tkstool** by running the following command:

```
tkstool -V
```

This should return output similar to the following:

```
tkstool: Version 1.0
```

2. Create new software databases.

```
tkstool -N -d .
```

Enter a password which will be used to encrypt your keys.

The password should be at least 8 characters long,

and should contain at least one non-alphabetic character.

Enter new password:

Re-enter password:



Note

A hardware HSM can be used instead of the software database if the **modutil** utility is first used to insert the HSM slot and token into the **secmod.db** database.

If an HSM is used, then the option **-h hsm_token** must be added to each of commands below.

3. List the contents of the local software key database.

```
tkstool -L -d .
slot: NSS User Private Key and Certificate Services
token: NSS Certificate DB

Enter Password or Pin for "NSS Certificate DB":
tkstool: the specified token is empty
```

4. Create a transport key called **transport**.

```
tkstool -T -d . -n transport
```

5. When prompted, fill in the database password, then type in some noise to seed the random number generator.
6. The session key share and corresponding KCV are displayed. Write down both of these.
7. Run the following command to produce an identical transport key; this is generally used within another set of databases which need to use identical transport keys. When this is run, multiple session key shares and KCVs are generated. Write down all of this information.

```
tkstool -I -d . -n verify_transport
```

Responses similar to the following appear:

```
Generating first symmetric key . . .
Generating second symmetric key . . .
Generating third symmetric key . . .
Extracting transport key from operational token . . .
    transport key KCV: A428 53BA
Storing transport key on final specified token . . .
Naming transport key "transport" . . .
Successfully generated, stored, and named the transport key!
```

8. List the contents of the key database again.

```
tkstool -L -d .
slot: NSS User Private Key and Certificate Services
token: NSS Certificate DB
```

```
Enter Password or Pin for "NSS Certificate DB":  
0 transport
```

9. Use the transport key to generate and wrap a master key, and store the master key in a file called **file**.

```
tkstool -W -d . -n wrapped_master -t transport -o file
```

```
Enter Password or Pin for "NSS Certificate DB":  
Retrieving the transport key (for wrapping) from the specified  
token . . .  
Generating and storing the master key on the specified token . . .  
Naming the master key "wrapped_master" . . .  
Successfully generated, stored, and named the master key!  
Using the transport key to wrap and store the master key . . .  
Writing the wrapped data (and resident master key KCV) into the  
file  
called "file" . . .  
  
wrapped data: 47C0 06DB 7D3F D9ED  
                  FE91 7E6F A7E5 91B9  
master key KCV: CED9 4A7B  
(computed KCV of the master key residing inside the wrapped  
data)
```

10. List the contents of the software key database again.

```
tkstool -L -d .
```

```
slot: NSS User Private Key and Certificate Services  
token: NSS Certificate DB
```

```
Enter Password or Pin for "NSS Certificate DB":  
0 wrapped_master  
1 transport
```

Note

The order of the keys is not important, and some systems may display the keys in a different order.

11. Use the transport key to generate and unwrap a master key called **unwrapped_master** stored in a file called **file**.

```
tkstool -U -d . -n unwrapped_master -t transport -i file
```

```
Enter Password or Pin for "NSS Certificate DB":  
Retrieving the transport key from the specified token (for  
unwrapping) . . .  
Reading in the wrapped data (and resident master key KCV) from the  
file  
called "file" . . .
```

```
wrapped data: 47C0 06DB 7D3F D9ED
               FE91 7E6F A7E5 91B9
master key KCV: CED9 4A7B
(pre-computed KCV of the master key residing inside the
wrapped data)
```

Using the transport key to temporarily unwrap the master key to recompute its KCV value to check against its pre-computed KCV value . . .

```
master key KCV: CED9 4A7B
(computed KCV of the master key residing inside the wrapped
data)
master key KCV: CED9 4A7B
(pre-computed KCV of the master key residing inside the
wrapped data)
```

Using the transport key to unwrap and store the master key on the specified token . . .

Naming the master key "unwrapped_master" . . .

Successfully unwrapped, stored, and named the master key!

12. List the contents of the key database to show all keys.

```
tkstool -L -d .

slot: NSS User Private Key and Certificate Services
token: NSS Certificate DB

Enter Password or Pin for "NSS Certificate DB":
0 unwrapped_master
1 wrapped_master
2 transport
```

13. Delete a key from the database.

```
tkstool -D -d . -n wrapped_master

Enter Password or Pin for "NSS Certificate DB":
tkstool: 1 key(s) called "wrapped_master" were deleted
```

14. List the contents of the key database again to show all keys.

```
tkstool -L -d .

slot: NSS User Private Key and Certificate Services
token: NSS Certificate DB

Enter Password or Pin for "NSS Certificate DB":
0 unwrapped_master
1 transport
```

Chapter 12. CMCRequest (Creating CMC Requests)

The CMC Request utility, **CMCRequest**, creates a CMC request from one or more PKCS #10 or CRMF requests. The utility can also be used to revoke certificates.

12.1. Syntax

The **CMCRequest** command uses a configuration file (**.cfg**) as a parameter. The **.cfg** file must include the path to the file of the formatted CMC request:

```
CMCRequest /path/to/file.cfg
```

For revocation requests, the **revRequest.enable** parameter must be set to **true**, and related parameters must contain the appropriate information.

The **.cfg** file contains the following parameters:

Parameters	Description
numRequests	The total number of PKCS #10 or CRMF requests. In some cases, the value of this parameter can be 0. For example, numRequests=1 .
input	The full path and filename of the PKCS #10 or CRMF request, which must be in base-64 encoded format. Multiple filenames are separated by white space. This parameter is a required if the value for numRequests is greater than 0. For example, input=crmf1 .
output	<i>Required</i> . The full path and filename for the generated binary CMC request. For example, output=cmc .
nickname	<i>Required</i> . The nickname of the agent certificate used to sign the full CMC request. For example, nickname=CS Agent-102504a's 102504a ID .
dbdir	<i>Required</i> . The full path to the directory where the cert8.db , key3.db , and secmod.db databases are located. This is usually the agent's personal directory, such as their browser certificate database in the home directory. For example, ~jsmith/.mozilla/firefox .

Parameters	Description
password	Required. The token password for cert8.db , which stores the agent certificate. For example, password=secret .
format	The request format, either pkcs10 or crmf . For example, format=crmf .

The following .cfg file parameters set CMC controls:

Parameters	Description
confirmCertAcceptance.enable	If set to true , then the request contains this control. If this parameter is not set, the value is assumed to be false . For example, confirmCertAcceptance.enable=false .
confirmCertAcceptance.serial	The serial number for the confirmCertAcceptance control. For example, confirmCertAcceptance.serial=3 .
confirmCertAcceptance.issuer	The issuer name for the confirmCertAcceptance control. For example, confirmCertAcceptance.issuer=cn=Certificate Manager,ou=102504a,o=102504a,c=us .
getCert.enable	If set to true , then the request contains this attribute. If this parameter is not set, the value is assumed to be false . For example, getCert.enable=false .
getCert.serial	The serial number for the getCert control. For example, getCert.serial=300 .
getCert.issuer	The issuer name for the getCert control. For example, getCert.issuer=cn=Certificate Manager,ou=102504a,o=102504a,c=us .
dataReturn.enable	If set to true , then the request contains this control. If this parameter is not set, the value is assumed to be false . For example, dataReturn.enable=false .

Parameters	Description
dataReturn.data	<p>The data contained in the dataReturn control.</p> <p>For example, dataReturn.data=test.</p>
transactionMgt.enable	<p>If set to true, then the request contains this control. If this parameter is not set, the value is assumed to be false.</p> <p>For example, transactionMgt.enable=true.</p>
transactionMgt.id	<p>The transaction identifier for transactionMgt control. VeriSign recommends that the transaction ID should be an MD5 hash of the public key.</p>
senderNonce.enable	<p>If set to true, then the request contains this control. If this parameter is not set, the value is assumed to be false.</p> <p>For example, senderNonce.enable=false.</p>
senderNonce.id	<p>The ID for the senderNonce control.</p> <p>For example, senderNonce.id=testing.</p>
revRequest.enable	<p>If set to true, then the request contains this control. If this parameter is not set, the value is assumed to be false.</p> <p>For example, revRequest.enable=true.</p>
revRequest.nickname	<p>The nickname for the certificate being revoked.</p> <p>For example, revRequest.nickname=newuser's 102504a ID.</p>
revRequest.issuer	<p>The issuer name for the certificate being revoked.</p> <p>For example, revRequest.issuer=cn=Certificate Manager,ou=102504a,o=102504a,c=us.</p>
revRequest.serial	<p>The serial number for the certificate being revoked.</p> <p>For example, revRequest.serial=75.</p>

Parameters	Description
<code>revRequest.reason</code>	<p>The reason for revoking this certificate. The allowed values are <code>unspecified</code>, <code>keyCompromise</code>, <code>caCompromise</code>, <code>affiliationChanged</code>, <code>superseded</code>, <code>cessationOfOperation</code>, <code>certificateHold</code>, and <code>removeFromCRL</code>.</p> <p>For example, <code>revRequest.reason=unspecified</code>.</p>
<code>revRequest.sharedSecret</code>	<p>The shared secret for the revocation request.</p> <p>For example, <code>revRequest.sharedSecret=testing</code>.</p>
<code>revRequest.comment</code>	<p>A text comment for the revocation request.</p> <p>For example, <code>revRequest.comment=readable comment</code>.</p>
<code>revRequest.invalidityDatePresent</code>	<p>If set to <code>true</code>, the current time is the invalidity date for the revoked certificate. If set to <code>false</code>, no invalidity date is present.</p> <p>For example, <code>revRequest.invalidityDatePresent=false</code>.</p>
<code>identityProof.enable</code>	<p>If set to <code>true</code>, then the request contains this control. If this parameter is not set, the value is assumed to be <code>false</code>.</p> <p>For example, <code>identityProof.enable=false</code>.</p>
<code>identityProof.sharedSecret</code>	<p>The shared secret for <code>identityProof</code> control.</p> <p>For example, <code>identityProof.sharedSecret=testing</code>.</p>
<code>popLinkWitness.enable</code>	<p>If set to <code>true</code>, then the request contains this control. If this parameter is not set, the value is assumed to be <code>false</code>.</p> <p>For example, <code>popLinkWitness.enable=false</code>.</p>
<code>LraPopWitness.enable</code>	<p>If set to <code>true</code>, then the request contains this control. If this parameter is not set, the value is assumed to be <code>false</code>.</p> <p>For example, <code>LraPopWitness.enable=false</code>.</p>

Parameters	Description
<code>LraPopWitness.bodyPartIDs</code>	The space-delimited list of body part IDs for the <code>LraPopWitness</code> control. For example, <code>LraPopWitness.bodyPartIDs=1</code> .

12.2. Usage

Once a simple CMC Request, which contains a PKCS#10 request, has been generated, send it to the CA. The easiest method is to use the end-entities pages:

1. Open the end-entities services pages.

```
https://server.example.com:9444/ca/ee/ca/
```

2. Select the `caCMCUserCert` profile.
3. Paste in the CMC request.

Alternatively, use `HttpClient` to post it to the profile.

1. Run the `AtoB` tool to convert the base-64-encoded PKCS #10 request to binary.
2. Use the `HttpClient` utility to send the request.

There are several profiles where the CMC request can be sent, including `/ca/ee/ca/profileSubmitCMCFull` and `/ca/ee/ca/profileSubmitCMCSimple`. The profile must be specified in the `HttpClient` configuration.

12.3. Output

The `CMCRequest` command generates a certificate request depending on the parameters in a `.cfg` file. The parameters in [Example 12.1, “CMC Request .cfg File”](#) are used to create the request in [Example 12.2, “CMC Request Output”](#).

Example 12.1. CMC Request .cfg File

```
#Usage: CMCRequest <configuration file>
#For example, CMCRequest CMCRequest.cfg

#The configuration file should look like as follows:

#numRequests: Total number of PKCS10 requests or CRMF requests.
numRequests=1

#input: full path for the PKCS10 request or CRMF request,
#the content must be in Base-64 encoded format
#Multiple files are supported. They must be separated by space.
#input=pkcs10.i
#input=govReq2.txt
input=myCMC.txt
```

```

#output: full path for the CMC request in binary format
output=/tmp/cfu/cmcReq.myCMC

#nickname: nickname for agent certificate which will be used
#to sign the CMC full request.
#nickname=CMS Agent Certificate
#nickname=cfuAgent-ca2's SjcRedhat Domain jaw ca2 ID
nickname=CA Administrator of Instance pki-ca-0124's SjcRedhat Domain
0124 ID

#dbdir: directory for cert8.db, key3.db and secmod.db
dbdir=/tmp/cfu/

#password: password for cert8.db which stores the agent
#certificate
password=netscape

#format: request format, either pkcs10 or crmf
format=crmf

#confirmCertAcceptance.enable: if true, then the request will
#contain this control. Otherwise, false.
confirmCertAcceptance.enable=false

#confirmCertAcceptance.serial: The serial number for
#confirmCertAcceptance control
confirmCertAcceptance.serial=3

#confirmCertAcceptance.issuer: The issuer name for
#confirmCertAcceptance control
confirmCertAcceptance.issuer=cn=Certificate Manager,c=us

#getCert.enable: if true, then the request will contain this
#control. Otherwise, false.
getCert.enable=false

#getCert.serial: The serial number for getCert control
getCert.serial=3

#getCert.issuer: The issuer name for getCert control
getCert.issuer=cn=Certificate Manager,c=us

#dataReturn.enable: if true, then the request will contain
#this control. Otherwise, false.
dataReturn.enable=false

#dataReturn.data: data contained in the control.
dataReturn.data=test

#transactionMgt.enable: if true, then the request will contain
#this control. Otherwise, false.
transactionMgt.enable=false

#transactionMgt.id: transaction identifier. Verisign recommend
#transactionId to be MD5 hash of publicKey.
transactionMgt.id=

```

```

#senderNonce.enable: if true, then the request will contain this
#control. Otherwise, false.
senderNonce.enable=false

#senderNonce.id: sender nonce
senderNonce.id=

#revRequest.enable: if true, then the request will contain this
#control. Otherwise, false.
revRequest.enable=false

#revRequest.nickname: The nickname for the revoke certificate
revRequest.nickname=newuser's 102504a ID

#revRequest.issuer: The issuer name for the certificate being
#revoked.
revRequest.issuer=cn=Certificate Manager,c=us

#revRequest.serial: The serial number for the certificate being
#revoked.
revRequest.serial=61

#revRequest.reason: The reason for revoking this certificate:
#                  unspecified, keyCompromise, caCompromise,
#                  affiliationChanged, superseded,
#                  cessationOfOperation,
#                  certificateHold, removeFromCRL
revRequest.reason=unspecified

#revRequest.sharedSecret: The sharedSecret
revRequest.sharedSecret=

#revRequest.comment: The human readable comment
revRequest.comment=

#revRequest.invalidityDatePresent: if true, the current time will be
#the
#                               invalidityDate. If false, no
#invalidityDate
#                               is present.
revRequest.invalidityDatePresent=false

#identityProof.enable: if true, then the request will contain
#this control. Otherwise, false.
identityProof.enable=false

#identityProof.sharedSecret: Shared Secret
identityProof.sharedSecret=testing

#popLinkWitness.enable: if true, then the request will contain
#this control. Otherwise, false.
#If you want to test this control, make sure to use CRMFPopClient
#to generate the CRMF request which will include the
#idPOPLinkWitness attribute in the controls section of the
#CertRequest structure.

```

```

popLinkWitness.enable=false

#LraPopWitness.enable: if true, then the request will contain this
#control. Otherwise, false.
LraPopWitness.enable=false

#LraPopWitness.bodyPartIDs: List of body part IDs
#Each id is separated by space.
LraPopWitness.bodyPartIDs=1

```

Example 12.2. CMC Request Output

CMCRequest CMRequest.myCMC.cfg

```

cert/key prefix =
path = /tmp/cfu/

```

The CMC enrollment request in base-64 encoded format:

```
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```

```
rnvusCg63idr4WLiEP92dXZEpiS1m0bCXnK0F2Vi0CX7VM8X2iHQVK0oIQzovs1  
Kc+xt/5p/Hy9vFDF+Lyf5dBnT3Rsct/T+Z1pNnHeS5bnv28oxXRdSnnrPPEEVdq2  
jj+k1hje4b1aIVuEyGgcWr1nyZXSei4nY0WDmEv/Lgox6o+QyVEmLMydWj8G5d0  
XreQZYke9+XS60FNah8fFVLW+GCeqtkCAwEAAaOBqDCBpTAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTX  
QGW6RiLSfwMeoMi/C638DSp0ezAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQE  
AwIBxjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU10BlukYi0n1jHqDIvwut/A0qdHswQgYIKwYBBQUHAQEE  
NJA0MDIGCCsGAQUFBzABhiZodHRwOi8vcGF3LnNqYy5yZWRoYXQuY29t0jkx0DAV  
Y2Evb2NzcDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAA0CAQEAEfEaydNIzE06cUEnw9Q3aLf5UcRQ  
/K+wggfvtBN33moQD6Z6Mm0GiQh/s2bgwDtYgoCnwhkLlpQggZZ2R/Q4b7LV5tzH  
B1+v40LZsc4bQ6BPkUIX5gz0CZNJiN1M4Bc+tg92MWIYKj5zHr6yghiJATr87vBY  
UxeUOTH7d5i9X6TICsf8AEb50WMFPaoW9GctTwelVY1gg56dFC3wY81bdEBr0SID  
l1lW97WuoPU+Jh10A0AANcY10h5j9fy0lsqcdUxhPQUsTq20u20jp0rh0Aw6CHpQ  
3S4rYJSg7MEbI3lQFOapAf0qr11e3kfgogoIEQmh00rjpUnQc+9C71/gDGCA Tw  
ggE4AgEDMFYwUTEeMBwGA1UEChMVU2pjUmVkaGF0IERvbWFpbAwMTI0MQ8wDQYD  
VQQLEwZwa2ktY2ExHjAcBgNVBAMTFUNlcnPZmljYXR1IEF1dGhvcml0eQIBBjAJ  
BgUrDgMCGgUAoD4wFwYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQoGCCsGAQUFBwwCMCMGCSqGSIB3DQEJ  
BDEWBBTJWrAxeErsabiWVokJhrYe802AXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASBgJSrhYMo  
smKomXTGaczIjvhYj7IsCUgbpPMqzfhQh511X2b5hL3hkWaMDD19eo2HGZYoE9Lr  
6RoIMNs8FCN8F6F8eBzRK1kZTEA+3nXB7gnYVbxrwJrIm2htyTgphu6/yck0wCH9  
0g2BekSHQsJ7V7abP04U0VBIUAocJmHw1LnQ
```

The CMC enrollment request in binary format is stored in /tmp/cfu/cmcReq.myCMC .

Chapter 13. CMCEnroll (Performing CMC Enrollments)

The CMC Enrollment utility, **CMCEnroll**, is used to sign a certificate request with an agent's certificate. This can be used in conjunction with the CA end-entity CMC Enrollment form to sign and enroll certificates for users.

13.1. Syntax

This utility has the following syntax:

```
CMCEnroll -d directory_containing_agent_cert -n certificateNickname -r certificateRequestFile -p certificateDB_passwd [-c comment]
```

Option	Description
d	The directory containing the cert8.db , key3.db , and secmod.db files associated with the agent certificate. This is usually the agent's personal directory, such as their browser certificate database in the home directory.
n	The nickname of the agent certificate that is used to sign the request.
r	The filename of the certificate request.
p	The password to the NSS certificate database which contains the agent certificate, given in -d .

Note

Surround values that include spaces with quotation marks.

13.2. Usage

Signed requests must be submitted to the CA to be processed.

1. Create a PKCS #10 certificate request using a tool like **certutil**.
2. Copy the PKCS #10 ASCII output to a text file.
3. Run the **CMCEnroll** command to sign the certificate request. If the input file is **request34.txt**, the agent's certificate is stored in the **~jsmith/.mozilla/firefox** directory, the certificate common name for this CA is **Certificate Manager Agents Cert**, and the password for the certificate database is **1234pass**, the command is as follows:

```
CMCEnroll -d "~jsmith/.mozilla/firefox" -n "Certificate Manager Agents Cert" -r "/export/requests/request34.txt" -p "1234pass"
```

The output of this command is stored in a file with the same filename and **.out** appended to the filename.

4. Submit the signed certificate through the CA end-entities page.

- a. Open the end-entities page.
 - b. Select the CMC Enrollment profile form.
 - c. Paste the content of the output file into the first text area of this form.
 - d. Remove -----BEGIN NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- and -----END NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- from the pasted content.
 - e. Select **Certificate Type User Certificate**, fill in the contact information, and submit the form.
5. The certificate is immediately processed and returned since a signed request was sent and the **CMCAuth** plug-in was enabled.
 6. Use the agent page to search for the new certificate.

13.3. Output

CMCEnroll takes a standard PKCS #10 certificate request and signs it with an agent certificate. The output is also a certificate request which can be submitted through the appropriate profile.

```
# CMCEnroll -d ~jsmith/.mozilla/firefox -n "CA Administrator of Instance
pki-ca Example Domain ID" -r pkcs10.i -p secret
cert/key prefix =
path = .
-----BEGIN NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----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```
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 TwggE4AgED
MFYwUTEeMBwGA1UEChMVU2pjUmVkaGF0IERvbWFpbAwMTI0MQ8wDQYDVQQLEwZw
a2ktY2ExHjAcBgNVBAMTFUNlcnRpZmljYXR1IEF1dGhvcm10eQIBBjAJBgUrDgMC
GgUAoD4wFwYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQoGCCsGAQUFBwwCMCMGCSqGSIB3DQEJBDEWBQa
be8HVhF1o9FP9E2tjf0MkdmuQDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASBgdAXIZgffFWv9GcLd
+yRET7H0gi1uTAiWwRoV2KZ0hbDowuNsAMHu5k4oic8wcOC0yAvWS/9o64RPG96f
QKLHrAa8CJ3hqzDl3xa0uNF/iJWM4R47136DRhW9cCA1qFH3FyiUcwBdGd5R8DrE
r+ce2ZSTtI2Jpif83w7Ro5VqSMMN

-----END NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----

Chapter 14. CMCRresponse (Parsing a CMC Response)

The CMC Response utility, **CMCRresponse**, parses a CMC response received by the utility.

14.1. Syntax

The CMC Response utility uses the following syntax:

```
CMCRresponse -d directoryName -i /path/to/CMCRresponse.file
```

Options	Description
d	Specifies the path to the cert8.db directory. This is usually the agent's personal directory, such as their browser certificate database in the home directory.
i	Specifies the path and filename of the CMC response file.

The parsed output is printed to the screen.

14.2. Usage and Output

The entire purpose of **CMCRresponse** is to parse a CMC response. As explained in [Chapter 12, CMCRrequest \(Creating CMC Requests\)](#), a CMC request is generated and then submitted to a CMC profile which returns a response in the CMC format. In one common use case, a tool like **HttpClient** is used to submit a request and then retrieve the response. That response is sent to **CMCRresponse** to parse.

The first step is to create the **.cfg** file which will be used to by **HttpClient** to submit the request.

```
#host: host name for the http server
host=server.example.com

#port: port number
port=9444

#secure: true for secure connection, false for nonsecure connection
secure=true

#input: full path for the enrollment request, the content must be in
binary format
input=/tmp/cfu/cmcReq.myCMC

#output: full path for the response in binary format
output=/tmp/cfu/cmcResponse.myCMC

#dbdir: directory for cert8.db, key3.db and secmod.db
#This parameter will be ignored if secure=false
dbdir=/tmp/cfu

#clientmode: true for client authentication, false for no client
authentication
```

```
#This parameter will be ignored if secure=false
clientmode=false

#password: password for cert8.db
#This parameter will be ignored if secure=false and clientauth=false
password=netscape

#nickname: nickname for client certificate
#This parameter will be ignored if clientmode=false
nickname=

#servlet: servlet name
servlet=/ca/ee/ca/profileSubmitCMCFull
```

That configuration file is then passed to **HttpClient**, which received the binary CMC response.

```
# HttpClient HttpClient.cfg

Total number of bytes read = 2667
handshake happened
Total number of bytes read = 2287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```

```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```

The response in binary format is stored in /tmp/jsmith/cmcResponse.myCMC

The last part of the **HttpClient** response shows where the CMC response file is located, and that file can be used by **CMCResponse**. When **CMCResponse** parses the file, it shows the pretty-print version of the response.

```
# CMCResponse -d . -i cmcResponse.myCMC
Certificates:
  Certificate:
    Data:
      Version: v3
      Serial Number: 0x1A
      Signature Algorithm: SHA256withRSA - 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11
      Issuer: CN=Certificate Authority,OU=pkic-ca,O=SjcRedhat Domain
0124
      Validity:
        Not Before: Tuesday, March 8, 2011 8:41:30 AM PST
      America/Los_Angeles
        Not After: Sunday, September 4, 2011 9:41:30 AM PDT
      America/Los_Angeles
        Subject: CN=x
        Subject Public Key Info:
          Algorithm: RSA - 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1
          Public Key:
            Exponent: 65537
            Public Key Modulus: (1024 bits) :
              E1:65:C4:84:14:8D:EF:62:A3:56:1E:C1:C8:1F:F0:43:
              AD:C5:47:2E:E1:CD:BA:27:EE:48:4D:1F:83:28:AB:34:
              0C:08:EC:8C:15:45:E0:7F:23:66:F5:35:64:B2:AA:1D:
              BE:F4:F6:08:15:E4:9C:56:35:EF:87:BA:7D:19:4E:C6:
              98:B2:F8:A7:E4:DD:A7:1D:D8:0F:52:55:AE:E9:9B:9F:
              A5:B6:B8:6B:CC:7F:C5:20:37:1F:0E:C4:58:24:B8:AC:
              B7:67:DA:21:77:7D:31:A1:38:BF:84:42:A8:0C:AC:54:
              5C:DE:81:63:DD:D4:3F:02:8B:43:B1:69:A3:D4:43:BD
      Extensions:
        Identifier: Authority Key Identifier - 2.5.29.35
        Critical: no
        Key Identifier:
          D7:40:65:BA:46:22:D2:7D:63:1E:A0:C8:BF:0B:AD:FC:
          0D:2A:74:7B
        Identifier: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1
        Critical: no
```

```

Value:
  30:34:30:32:06:08:2B:06:01:05:05:07:30:01:86:26:
  68:74:74:70:3A:2F:2F:70:61:77:2E:73:6A:63:2E:72:
  65:64:68:61:74:2E:63:6F:6D:3A:39:31:38:30:2F:63:
  61:2F:6F:63:73:70

Identifier: Key Usage: - 2.5.29.15
  Critical: yes
  Key Usage:
    Digital Signature
    Non Repudiation
    Key Encipherment
Identifier: Extended Key Usage: - 2.5.29.37
  Critical: no
  Extended Key Usage:
    1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2
    1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4

Signature:
  Algorithm: SHA256withRSA - 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11
  Signature:
    43:17:41:5A:FA:1C:E7:FD:12:29:41:9D:5A:F8:6C:E0:
    D3:EA:53:57:17:E1:F8:E3:51:6F:2D:7D:A9:8B:5F:29:
    37:EC:AE:CF:64:CF:DF:E3:02:2C:A3:7E:CE:B9:05:10:
    3B:FB:6E:19:1D:3E:F0:4A:01:0F:C3:5F:14:9C:06:70:
    C2:DB:D5:72:1F:47:FD:A7:FC:D7:6A:4E:64:FA:A9:19:
    EE:09:24:F8:B9:C4:01:12:D1:3C:AD:89:05:61:94:39:
    67:6D:8D:F1:03:C1:8E:23:6F:A0:EE:6A:B3:C5:FD:C4:
    CC:E6:6C:9A:E3:4B:23:70:18:91:E5:50:10:CB:87:2A:
    A0:54:BC:DD:97:CD:14:C9:CA:05:40:F3:E9:F2:F8:B8:
    FF:ED:BF:7B:5F:85:15:15:23:B4:68:0D:13:56:1C:E4:
    37:6B:4D:E4:93:DE:1E:67:03:FB:92:86:D4:11:1E:3F:
    1F:CD:28:C4:FF:4E:F3:13:23:05:73:F2:00:98:25:77:
    C5:69:22:40:AD:AE:1C:90:6B:60:12:85:61:51:19:ED:
    82:50:EA:C3:BF:AB:F9:54:76:FD:C7:E7:1E:98:A8:45:
    8C:AA:A1:09:87:1A:EE:E8:F4:61:1C:A5:3C:59:E1:02:
    BB:E6:79:3B:EC:1F:21:AE:C1:38:28:F3:F8:05:6F:2C

  FingerPrint
Certificate:
  Data:
    Version: v3
    Serial Number: 0x1
    Signature Algorithm: SHA256withRSA - 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11
    Issuer: CN=Certificate Authority,OU=pkki-ca,O=SjcRedhat Domain
0124
    Validity:
      Not Before: Monday, January 24, 2011 3:56:12 PM PST
    America/Los_Angeles
      Not After: Thursday, January 24, 2019 3:56:12 PM PST
    America/Los_Angeles
      Subject: CN=Certificate Authority,OU=pkki-ca,O=SjcRedhat
Domain 0124
      Subject Public Key Info:
        Algorithm: RSA - 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1
        Public Key:
          Exponent: 65537
          Public Key Modulus: (2048 bits) :
            D9:51:67:F6:FC:14:59:FF:F0:58:15:5D:78:38:B1:C4:

```

```

AE:CD:38:19:EB:5F:EE:A6:27:B6:CE:DD:27:FE:16:36:
78:C4:58:87:5D:AD:96:87:17:93:AE:16:60:44:44:BC:
A0:05:2C:5F:29:60:C7:E8:67:39:5D:CA:5A:7D:BC:45:
82:84:45:9D:F0:EA:8E:33:AA:5C:29:1A:71:9E:98:4D:
48:EB:13:94:01:61:F9:06:C3:AE:7B:EE:B0:28:3A:DE:
27:6B:E1:62:E2:10:FF:76:75:76:44:A4:8B:35:9B:46:
C2:5E:72:8E:17:65:62:A3:40:97:ED:53:3C:5F:68:87:
41:52:8E:A0:84:33:A2:FB:25:29:CF:B1:B7:FE:69:FC:
7C:BD:BC:50:C5:F8:BC:9F:E5:D0:67:4F:74:6C:72:DF:
D3:F9:9D:69:36:71:DE:4B:96:E7:BF:6F:28:C5:74:5D:
4A:79:EB:3C:F1:04:54:3A:B6:8E:3F:A4:D6:18:DE:E1:
BD:5A:21:5B:84:C8:68:1C:29:6A:E5:9F:26:57:49:E8:
B8:9D:8D:16:0E:61:2F:FC:B8:28:C7:AA:3E:43:25:44:
98:B3:32:75:68:FC:1B:97:74:5E:B7:90:65:89:1E:F7:
E5:D2:E8:E1:4D:6A:1F:15:52:D6:F8:60:9E:AA:D9

Extensions:
Identifier: Authority Key Identifier - 2.5.29.35
    Critical: no
    Key Identifier:
        D7:40:65:BA:46:22:D2:7D:63:1E:A0:C8:BF:0B:AD:FC:
        0D:2A:74:7B
Identifier: Basic Constraints - 2.5.29.19
    Critical: yes
    Is CA: yes
    Path Length Constraint: UNLIMITED
Identifier: Key Usage: - 2.5.29.15
    Critical: yes
    Key Usage:
        Digital Signature
        Non Repudiation
        Key CertSign
        Crl Sign
Identifier: Subject Key Identifier - 2.5.29.14
    Critical: no
    Key Identifier:
        D7:40:65:BA:46:22:D2:7D:63:1E:A0:C8:BF:0B:AD:FC:
        0D:2A:74:7B
Identifier: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1
    Critical: no
    Value:
        30:34:30:32:06:08:2B:06:01:05:05:07:30:01:86:26:
        68:74:74:70:3A:2F:2F:70:61:77:2E:73:6A:63:2E:72:
        65:64:68:61:74:2E:63:6F:6D:3A:39:31:38:30:2F:63:
        61:2F:6F:63:73:70

Signature:
Algorithm: SHA256withRSA - 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11
Signature:
    11:F1:1A:C9:D3:48:CC:43:BA:71:41:27:C3:D4:37:68:
    B7:F9:51:C4:50:FC:AF:B0:82:07:EF:B4:13:77:DE:6A:
    10:0F:A6:7A:32:63:86:89:08:7F:B3:66:E0:C0:3B:58:
    82:80:A7:C2:19:0B:96:94:20:81:96:76:47:F4:38:6F:
    B2:D5:E6:DC:C7:07:5F:AF:E3:42:D9:B0:2E:1B:43:A0:
    4F:91:42:17:E6:0C:E8:09:93:49:88:D9:4C:E0:17:3E:
    B6:0F:76:31:62:18:2A:3E:73:1E:BE:B2:82:18:89:01:
    3A:FC:EE:F0:58:53:17:94:39:31:FB:77:98:BD:5F:A4:
    C8:0A:C7:FC:00:46:F9:D1:63:05:3D:AA:16:F4:67:2D:

```

```
4F:07:A5:55:89:60:83:9E:9D:14:2D:F0:63:CD:5B:74:  
40:6B:D1:22:03:97:59:56:F7:B5:AE:A0:F5:3E:26:1D:  
4E:03:40:00:35:C6:25:3A:1E:63:F5:FC:8E:96:CA:9C:  
75:45:E1:3D:05:2C:4E:AD:8E:BB:6D:23:A4:EA:E1:D0:  
0C:3A:08:7A:50:DD:2E:2B:60:94:A0:EC:C1:1B:23:79:  
50:14:E6:A9:01:F3:AA:AE:5D:5E:DE:47:E0:A2:0A:08:  
20:44:26:84:E3:AB:8E:95:27:41:CF:BD:0B:B9:7F:80
```

FingerPrint

```
Number of controls is 1  
Control #0: CMCStatusInfo  
OID: {1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 1}  
BodyList: 4164110943  
Status: SUCCESS
```

Chapter 15. CMCRvoke (Signing a Revocation Request)

The CMC Revocation utility, **CMCRvoke**, signs a revocation request with an agent's certificate.

15.1. Syntax

This utility has the following syntax:

```
CMCRvoke -ddirectoryName -hpassword -nnickname -iissuerName -
serialNumber -mreasonToRevoke -ccomment
```



Important

Do not have a space between the argument and its value. For example, giving a serial number of 26 is **-s26**, not **-s 26**.



Note

Surround values that include spaces in quotation marks.

Option	Description
c	Text comments about the request.
d	The path to the directory where the cert8.db , key3.db , and secmod.db databases containing the agent certificates are located. This is usually the agent's personal directory, such as their browser certificate database in the home directory.
h	The password to access the NSS database containing the agent's certificate.
i	The issuer name of the certificate being revoked.
m	The reason the certificate is being revoked. The reason code for the different allowed revocation reasons are as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » 0 - Unspecified. » 1 - Key compromised. » 2 - CA key compromised. » 3 - Affiliation changed. » 4 - Certificate superseded. » 5 - Cessation of operation. » 6 - Certificate is on hold.
n	The nickname of the agent's certificate.
s	The decimal serial number of the certificate being revoked.



Note

Surround values that include spaces in quotation marks.

15.2. Testing CMC Revocation

Test that CMC revocation is working properly by doing the following:

1. Create a CMC revocation request for an existing certificate. For example, if the directory containing the agent certificate is `~jsmith/.mozilla/firefox/`, the nickname of the certificate is `CertificateManagerAgentCert`, and the serial number of the certificate is `22`, the command is as follows:

```
CMCRevoke -d"~jsmith/.mozilla/firefox/" -n"Certificate Manager Agent Cert" -i"cn=agentAuthMgr" -s22 -m0 -c"test comment"
```

2. Open the CA's end-entities page.
3. Select the **Revocation** tab.
4. Select the **CMC Revoke** link in the menu.
5. Paste the output from the **CMC Revoke** operation into the text box. Remove the `-----BEGIN NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----` and `-----END NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----` lines from the pasted content.
6. Click **Submit**.
7. The results page displays that certificate 22 has been revoked.

15.3. Output

CMCRevoke generates a revocation request that is signed by an agent's certificate, so the output returned is in the format of a certificate request. For example:

```
# CMCRevoke -d"~jsmith/.mozilla/firefox" -n"CA Administrator of Instance pki-ca Example Domain ID" -i"CN=Certificate Authority,OU=pki-ca,O=Example Domain" -s22 -m6 -hsecret -c"test comment"
cert/key prefix =
path =
-----BEGIN NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----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```

```
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-----END NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----

```

Chapter 16. CRMFPopClient (Sending an Encoded CRMF Request)

The **CRMFPopClient** utility is a tool to send a Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) request to a Certificate System CA with the request encoded with proof of possession (POP) data that can be verified by the CA server. If a client provides POP information with a request, the server can verify that the requester possesses the private key for the new certificate.

The tool does all of the following:

1. Has the CA enforce or verify POP information encoded within a CRMF request.
2. Makes simple certificate requests without using the standard Certificate System agent page or interface.
3. Makes a simple certificate request that includes a transport certificate for key archival from the KRA.



Note

Key archival is done automatically based on whether a **transport.txt** file (containing the KRA's transport certificate) is in the directory from which the command is run. If the file is present, then the archival is automatically performed; if it is not, then no archival is attempted.

The **transport.txt** must have the entire base 64-encoded transport certificate on a single line with the header and footer removed.

16.1. Syntax

There are two syntax styles for the **CRMFPopClient** utility, depending on the intended use.

This is for sending a simple certificate request to a CA:

```
CRMFPopClient token_password profile_name host port username requester_name pop_option
subject_dn [ OUTPUT_CERT_REQ ]
```

This is for printing the certificate request to stdout, without sending it to a CA:

```
CRMFPopClient token_password pop_option OUTPUT_CERT_REQ subject_dn
```

Option	Description
<i>token_password</i>	The password for the cryptographic token.
<i>profile_name</i>	The CA profile to which to submit the request.
<i>host</i>	The hostname of the CA instance. Depending on how DNS and the network is configured, this can be a machine name, fully-qualified domain name, or IPv4 or IPv6 address.
<i>port</i>	The non-SSL port of the Certificate System CA.
<i>username</i>	The Certificate System user for whom the certificate request is issued.
<i>requester_name</i>	The name of the person or entity who is requesting the certificate.

Option	Description
<i>pop_option</i>	Sets the type of POP request to generate; since this can generate invalid requests, this option can be used for testing. There are three values: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ POP_SUCCESS. Generates a request with the correct POP information; the server verifies that the information is correct. ➢ POP_FAIL. Generates a request with incorrect POP information; the server rejects this request if it is submitted. This is used to test server configuration. ➢ POP_NONE. Generates a CRMF request with no POP information. If the server is configured to verify all the POP information, then it rejects this request. In that case, it can be used to test the server configuration.
<i>subject_dn</i>	The distinguished name of the requested certificate.
OUTPUT_CERT_REQ	Prints the generated certificate request to the screen. This is optional when the CRMF POP request is sent to a CA, but it is required when the command is used simply to return the request.

16.2. Usage

CRMFPopClient has two different methods of handling the requests it generates: it can send it directly to a CA or it can simply print the request to stdout.



Important

A file named **transport.txt** containing the transport certificate in base-64 format *must* be created in the directory from which the utility is launched. This file must be available for archival to a KRA. If the file is present, then the tool picks up this file automatically and performs the key archival.

The **transport.txt** must have the entire base 64-encoded transport certificate on a single line with the header and footer removed.

Sending a request to a CA

The following example generates a CRMF/POP request, has the server verify that the information is correct, and prints the certificate request to the screen:

```
CRMFPopClient secret caUserCert host.example.com 1026 CaUser jsmith
POP_SUCCESS CN=MyTest,C=US,UID=CaUser
```

Printing the request to stdout

A request can simply be printed to stdout. This can be useful if the certificate request is going to be submitted to an external CA or directly through the CA's web services pages. Processing the request, in this case, requires additional manual steps:

1. Use **CRMFPopClient** to generate the request, encoded with POP data.

```
CRMFPopClient secret POP_SUCCESS OUTPUT_CERT_REQ
CN=MyTest,C=US,UID=CaUser
```

2. Copy the request that is printed to the screen.

```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```

3. Open the CA's end-entities pages.

```
https://server.example.com:9444/ca/ee/ca/
```

4. Submit the request to any profile which supports CRMF/POP requests.

16.3. Output

When the **CRMFPopClient** command is run successfully, the CA sends back the base 64-encoded version of the certificate request and the HTML page that would have been returned had the request been submitted through the CA web forms.

```
CRMFPopClient password caUserCert test.example.com 9180 joeCRMF joeCRMF
POP_SUCCESS "CN=joeCRMFarchiveTest,C=US, UID=joeCRMF" OUTPUT_CERT_REQ
```

Proof Of Possession Utility....

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Generating Legal POP Data.....

Signature completed...

Generated Cert Request:

```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```

```
DEdau50jksj0/LHPheeFUIaf4+SamE5SUMcEJH9R2p9dqZN8JpvgCYn+h8rjKnIM
5mKstkJt0j42mwizvphkaxIMZdrTSbfC0QjCmkjP2yI3F5QbOoowZ9REH4BMLqRU
SLTu2xgVrw==
```

End Request:

Server Response.....

<!-- --- BEGIN COPYRIGHT BLOCK ---

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--- END COPYRIGHT BLOCK --- -->

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"

"http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">

<html>

```
<script type="text/javascript">
errorReason="Request Deferred - defer request";
requestListSet = new Array;
requestList = new Object;
requestList.requestId="284";
requestListSet[0] = requestList;
errorCode="2";
</script>
```


Certificate Profile

<p>

<table border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"
background="/ca/ee/graphics/hr.gif"
width="100%">

<tr>

<td> </td>

</tr>

</table>


```
<script language=javascript>

var autoImport = 'false';

if (errorCode == 0) { // processed
    document.write('Congratulations, your request has been processed
successfully
');
    document.writeln('<P>');
    for (var i = 0; i < requestListSet.length; i++) {
        document.write('Your request ID is ');
        document.write('<B>' +requestListSet[i].requestId+'</B>.' );
        document.writeln('<P>');
    }
    document.writeln('<b>');
    document.writeln('Outputs');
    document.writeln('</b>');
    document.writeln('<P>');
    document.writeln('<table width=100%>');
for (var i = 0; i < outputListSet.length; i++) {
    document.writeln('<tr valign=top>');
    document.writeln('<td>');
    document.writeln('<FONT size="-1" face="PrimaSans BT, Verdana,
sans-serif">');
);
    document.writeln('<li>');
    document.writeln(outputListSet[i].outputName);
    document.writeln('</FONT>');
    document.writeln('</td>');
    document.writeln('<tr valign=top>');
    document.writeln('</tr>');
    document.writeln('<td>');
    if (outputListSet[i].outputSyntax == 'string') {
        document.writeln(outputListSet[i].outputVal);
    } else if (outputListSet[i].outputSyntax == 'pretty_print') {
        document.writeln('<pre>');
        document.writeln(outputListSet[i].outputVal);
        document.writeln('</pre>');
    }
    document.writeln('</td>');
    document.writeln('</tr>');
}
document.writeln('</table>');
document.writeln('<p>');
document.writeln('<table width=100%>');
    document.writeln('<tr valign=top>');
    document.writeln('<td>');
    document.writeln('<FONT size="-1" face="PrimaSans BT, Verdana,
sans-serif">');
);
    document.writeln('<li>');
    document.writeln('Certificate Imports');
    document.writeln('</FONT>');
    document.writeln('</td>');
    for (var i = 0; i < requestListSet.length; i++) {
        document.writeln('<tr valign=top>');
```

```

        document.writeln('<td>');
if (autoImport == 'true') {
    // only support one certificate import
    var loc = "getCertFromRequest?requestId="+ requestListSet[i].requestId
+
"&importCert=true";
    document.write("<iframe width='0' height='0' src='"+loc+"'"
</iframe>");}
} else {
    document.writeln('<form method=post action="getCertFromRequest">');
if (navigator.appName == "Netscape") {
    document.writeln('<input type=hidden name=importCert value=true>');
} else {
    document.writeln('<input type=hidden name=importCert value=false>');
}
    document.writeln('<input type=hidden name=requestId value=' +
requestListSet[i].requestId + '>');
    document.writeln('<input type=submit name="Import Certificate"
value="Import Certificate">');
    document.writeln('</form>');
}
    document.writeln('</td>');
    document.writeln('</tr>');
}
document.writeln('</table>');
} else if (errorCode == 1) { // not submitted
    document.write('Sorry, your request is not submitted. The reason is "' +
errorReason + '".');
} else if (errorCode == 2) { // pending
    document.write('Congratulations, your request has been successfully ');
    document.write('submitted. ');
    document.write('Your request will be processed when an authorized
agent ');
    document.writeln('verifies and validates the information in your
request.');
    document.writeln('<P>');
    for (var i = 0; i < requestListSet.length; i++) {
        document.write('Your request ID is ');
        document.write('<B><a href="checkRequest?requestId=');
        document.write(requestListSet[i].requestId);
        document.write('"'+requestListSet[i].requestId+'</a></B>.');
        document.writeln('<P>');
    }
    document.write('Your can check on the status of your request with ');
    document.write('an authorized agent or local administrator ');
    document.writeln('by referring to this request ID.');
} else if (errorCode == 3) { // rejected
    document.write('Sorry, your request has been rejected. The reason is "' +
errorReason + '"');
    document.writeln('<P>');
    for (var i = 0; i < requestListSet.length; i++) {
        document.write('Your request ID is ');
        document.write('<B>' +requestListSet[i].requestId+ '</B>.');
        document.writeln('<P>');
}

```

```
    }
} else { // unknown state
    document.write('Sorry, your request is not submitted. The error code is
" ' +
errorReason + '".');
}
</script>
</font>
</html>
```

Chapter 17. ExtJoiner (Adding Certificate Extensions to Requests)

The Certificate System provides policy plug-in modules that allow standard and custom X.509 certificate extensions to be added to end-entity certificates that the server issues. Similarly, the Certificate Setup Wizard that generates certificates for subsystem users allows extensions to be selected and included in the certificates. The wizard interface and the request-approval page of the agent interface contain a text area to paste any extension in its MIME-64 encoded format.

The text field for pasting the extension accepts a single extension blob. To add multiple extensions, they must first be combined into a single extension blob, then pasted into the text field. The **ExtJoiner** tool joins multiple extensions together into a single MIME-64 encoded blob. This new, combined blob can then be pasted in the wizard text field or the request-approval page of the agent interface to specify multiple extensions at once.

17.1. Syntax

The **ExtJoiner** utility has the following syntax:

```
ExtJoiner ext_file0 ext_file1 ... ext_fileN
```

Option	Description
ext_file#	Specifies the path and names for files containing the base-64 DER encoding of an X.509 extension.

17.2. Usage

ExtJoiner does not generate an extension in its MIME-64 encoded format; it joins existing MIME-64 encoded extensions. To join multiple custom extensions and add the extensions to a certificate request using **ExtJoiner**, do the following:

1. Find and note the location of the extension program files.
2. Run **ExtJoiner**, specifying the extension files. For example, if there are two extension files named **myExt1** and **myExt2** in a directory called **/etc/extensions**, then the command would be as follows:

```
ExtJoiner /etc/extensions/myExt1 /etc/extensions/myExt2
```

This creates a base-64 encoded blob of the joined extensions, similar to this example:

```
MEwwLgYDVR0lAQHBCQwIgYFKoNFBAMGC1GC5EKDM5PeXzUGBi2CVyLNCQYFU  
iBakowGgYDVR0SBBMwEaQPMA0xCzAJBgNVBAYTA1VT
```

3. Copy the encoded blob, without any modifications, to a file.
4. Verify that the extensions are joined correctly before adding them to a certificate request by converting the binary data to ASCII using the **AtoB** utility and then dumping the contents of the base-64 encoded blob using the **dumpasn1** utility. For information on the **AtoB** utility, see [Chapter 7, AtoB \(Converting ASCII to Binary\)](#). The **dumpasn1** tool can be downloaded at <http://fedoraproject.org/extras/4/i386/reposdata/repocheck/dumpasn1-0-20050404-1.fc4.html>.

- Run the **AtoB** utility to convert the ASCII to binary.

```
AtoB  input_file output_file
```

where *input_file* is the path and file containing the base-64 encoded data in ASCII and *output_file* is the path and file for the utility to write the binary output.

- Run the **dumpasn1** utility.

```
dumpasn1output_file
```

where *output_file* is the path and file containing the binary data. The output looks similar to this:

```
0 30 76: SEQUENCE {
 2 30 46: SEQUENCE {
    4 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER extKeyUsage (2 5 29 37)
    9 01 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
   12 04 36: OCTET STRING
     : 30 22 06 05 2A 83 45 04 03 06 0A 51 82 E4 42 83
     : 33 93 DE 5F 35 06 06 2D 82 57 22 CD 09 06 05 51
     : 38 81 6A 4A
     :
 50 30 26: SEQUENCE {
    52 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER issuerAltName (2 5 29 18)
    57 04 19: OCTET STRING
      : 30 11 A4 0F 30 0D 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13
      : 02 55 53
      :
  :
0  warnings, 0 errors.
```

If the output data do not appear to be correct, check that the original Java™ extension files are correct, and repeat converting the files from ASCII to binary and dumping the data until the correct output is returned.

- When the extensions have been verified, copy the base-64 encoded blob that was created by running **ExtJoiner** to the Certificate System wizard screen, and generate the certificate or the certificate signing request (CSR).

Chapter 18. GenExtKeyUsage (Adding the Key Usage Extension to a Request)

The **GenExtKeyUsage** tool creates a base-64 encoded blob that adds **ExtendedKeyUsage** (OID 2.5.29.37) to the certificate. This blob is pasted into the certificate approval page when the certificate is created.

18.1. Syntax

The **GenExtKeyUsage** tool has the following syntax:

```
GenExtKeyUsage [true|false] OID ...
```

Option	Description
true false	Sets the criticality. true means the extension is critical; false means it is not critical. The criticality value is used during the certificate validation process. If an extension is marked as critical, then the path validation software must be capable of interpreting that extension.
<i>OID</i>	The OID numbers that represent each certificate type selected for the certificate.

Chapter 19. GenIssuerAltNameExt (Adding the Issuer Name Extension to a Request)

The **GenIssuerAltNameExt** creates a base-64 encoded blob that adds the issuer name extensions, **IssuerAltNameExt** (OID 2.5.29.18), to the new certificate. This blob is pasted into the certificate approval page when the certificate is created.

19.1. Syntax

The **GenIssuerAltNameExt** tool uses parameter pairs where the first parameter specifies the general type of name attribute which is used for the issuer and the second parameter gives that name in that format. The tool has the following syntax:

GenIssuerAltNameExt *general_type# ... general_name# ...*

Parameter	Description
<i>general_type</i>	Sets the type of name. It can be one of the following strings: <ul style="list-style-type: none">» RFC822Name» DNSName» EDIPartyName» URIName» IPAddressName» OIDName» X500Name

Parameter	Description
<code>general_name</code>	<p>A string, conforming to the name type, that gives the name of the issuer.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ For RFC822Name, the value must be a valid Internet mail address. For example, <code>testCA@example.com</code>. ➤ For DNSName, the value must be a valid fully-qualified domain name. For example, <code>testCA.example.com</code>. ➤ For EDIPartyName, the value must be an IA5String. For example, <code>Example Corporation</code>. ➤ For URIName, the value must be a non-relative URI following the URL syntax and encoding rules. The name must include both a scheme, such as http, and a fully qualified domain name or IP address of the host. For example, <code>http://testCA.example.com</code>. ➤ For IPAddressName, the value must be a valid IP address. An IPv4 address must be in the format <code>n.n.n.n</code> or <code>n.n.n.n,m.m.m.m</code>. For example, <code>128.21.39.40</code> or <code>128.21.39.40,255.255.255.00</code>. An IPv6 address uses a 128-bit namespace, with the IPv6 address separated by colons and the netmask separated by periods. For example, <code>0:0:0:0:0:13.1.68.3, FF01::43, 0:0:0:0:0:13.1.68.3,FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFF:FFFF:255.255.255.0, and FF01::43,FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FF00:0000</code>. ➤ For OIDName, the value must be a unique, valid OID specified in dot-separated numeric component notation. For example, <code>1.2.3.4.55.6.5.99</code>. ➤ For X500Name, the value must be a string form of X.500 name, similar to the subject name in a certificate. For example, <code>cn=SubCA, ou=Research Dept, o=Example Corporation, c=US</code>.

19.2. Usage

The following example sets the issuer name in the **RFC822Name** and **X500Name** formats:

```
GenIssuerAltNameExt RFC822Name TomTom@example.com X500Name cn=TomTom
```

Chapter 20. SubjectAltNameExt (Adding the Subject Alternative Name Extension to a Request)

The **GenSubjectAltNameExt** creates a base-64 encoded blob to add the alternate subject name extension, **SubjectAltNameExt** (OID 2.5.29.17), to the new certificate. This blob is pasted into the certificate approval page when the certificate is created.

20.1. Syntax

The **GenSubjectAltNameExt** tool uses parameter pairs where the first parameter specifies the type of name format, and the second parameter gives that name in the specified format.

This tool has the following syntax:

GenSubjectAltNameExt *general_type# ... general_name# ...*

Parameter	Description
<i>general_type</i>	Sets the type of name that is used. This can be any of the following strings: <ul style="list-style-type: none">» RFC822Name» DNSName» EDIPartyName» URIName» IPAddressName» OIDName» X500Name

Parameter	Description
<i>general_name</i>	<p>A string, conforming to the specified format, of the subject name.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ For RFC822Name, the value must be a valid Internet mail address. For example, testCA@example.com. ➤ For DNSName, the value must be a valid fully-qualified domain name. For example, testCA.example.com. ➤ For EDIPartyName, the value must be an IA5String. For example, Example Corporation. ➤ For URIName, the value must be a non-relative URI following the URL syntax and encoding rules. The name must include both a scheme, such as http, and a fully qualified domain name or IP address of the host. For example, http://testCA.example.com. ➤ For IPAddressName, the value must be a valid IP address. An IPv4 address must be in the format n.n.n.n or n.n.n.n.m.m.m.m. For example, 128.21.39.40 or 128.21.39.40, 255.255.255.00. An IPv6 address uses a 128-bit namespace, with the IPv6 address separated by colons and the netmask separated by periods. For example, 0:0:0:0:0:0:13.1.68.3, FF01::43, 0:0:0:0:0:13.1.68.3, FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:255.255.255.0, and FF01::43, FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FF00:0000. ➤ For OIDName, the value must be a unique, valid OID specified in dot-separated numeric component notation. For example, 1.2.3.4.55.6.5.99. ➤ For X500Name, the value must be a string form of X.500 name, similar to the subject name in a certificate. For example, cn=SubCA, ou=Research Dept, o=Example Corporation, c=US.

20.2. Usage

In the following example, the subject alternate names are set to the **RFC822Name** and **X500Name** types.

```
GenSubjectAltNameExt RFC822Name TomTom@example.com X500Name cn=TomTom
```

Chapter 21. HttpClient (Sends a Request over HTTP)

The HTTP Client utility, **HttpClient**, sends a CMC request (created with the CMC Request utility) or a PKCS #10 request to a CA.

21.1. Syntax

This utility takes a single **.cfg** configuration file as a parameter. The syntax is as follows:

```
HttpClient /path/to/file.cfg
```

The **.cfg** file has the following parameters:

Parameters	Description
host	The hostname for the Certificate System server. Depending on how DNS and the network are configured, this can be a machine name, fully-qualified domain name, or IPv4 or IPv6 address. For example, host=server.example.com .
port	Any port number for Certificate System server. For example, port=9443 .
secure	true for an HTTPS connection, false for an HTTP connection. For example, secure=true .
input	The full path and filename for the enrollment request, which must be in binary format. For example, input=cmcReqCRMFBin .
output	The full path and filename for the response in binary format. For example, output=cmcResp .
dbdir	The full path to the directory where the cert8.db , key3.db , and secmod.db databases are located. This parameter is ignored if secure=false . For example, dbdir=/usr/bin .
clientmode	true for client authentication, false for no client authentication. This parameter is ignored if secure=false . For example, clientmode=true .
password	The password for the cert8.db database. This parameter is ignored if secure=false and clientauth=false . For example, password=secret .
nickname	The nickname of the client certificate. This parameter is ignored if clientmode=false . For example, nickname=CS Agent-102504a's 102504a ID .
servlet	The URI of the servlet that processes full CMC requests. The default value is /ca/profileSubmitCMCFull . For example, servlet=/ca/profileSubmitCMCFull .

Chapter 22. OCSPClient (Sending an OCSP Request)

The OCSP request utility, **OCSPClient**, creates an OCSP request conforming to RFC 2560, submits it to the OCSP server, and saves the OCSP response in a file.

22.1. Syntax

The **OCSPClient** tool has the following syntax:

OCSPClient *host port dbdir nickname serial_number or filename output times*

Option	Description
<i>host</i>	Specifies the hostname of the OCSP server. Depending on how DNS and the network are configured, this can be a machine name, fully-qualified domain name, or IPv4 or IPv6 address.
<i>port</i>	Gives the end-user port number of the OCSP server.
<i>dbdir</i>	Gives the location of the security databases (cert8.db , key3.db , and secmod.db) which contain the CA certificate that signed the certificate being checked.
<i>nickname</i>	Gives the CA certificate nickname.
<i>serial_number or filename</i>	Gives the serial number or, alternatively, the name of the file containing the request for the certificate that's status is being checked.
<i>output</i>	Gives the path and file to which to print the DER-encoded OCSP response.
<i>times</i>	Specifies the number of times to submit the request.

Chapter 23. PKCS10Client (Generating a PKCS #10 Certificate Request)

The PKCS #10 utility, **PKCS10Client**, generates a 1024-bit RSA key pair in the security database, constructs a PKCS#10 certificate request with the public key, and outputs the request to a file.

PKCS #10 is a certification request syntax standard defined by RSA. A CA may support multiple types of certificate requests. The Certificate System CA supports KEYGEN, PKCS#10, CRMF, and CMC.

To get a certificate from the CA, the certificate request needs to be submitted to and approved by a CA agent. Once approved, a certificate is created for the request, and certificate attributes, such as extensions, are populated according to certificate profiles.

23.1. Syntax

The **PKCS10Client** tool has the following syntax:

```
PKCS10Client -p certDBPassword -d certDBDirectory -o outputFile -s subjectDN
```

Option	Description
p	Gives the password for the security databases.
d	Gives the path to the security databases.
o	Sets the path and filename to output the new PKCS #10 certificate in base 64 format.
s	Gives the subject DN of the certificate.

Chapter 24. PKCS12Export (Exports Certificates and Keys from a Database)

The **PKCS12Export** simply dumps all of the certificates and corresponding keys in an NSS security database to a specified .**p12** output file.

24.1. Syntax

```
PKCS12Export -d /path/to/cert-directory -p keydb-password-file -w pkcs12-password-file -o output-file.p12
[ -debug ]
```

Parameters	Description
-d	Gives the full path to the NSS databases which contain the certificate to export.
-o	Gives the name of the file to output the exported certificate to.
-p	Gives the full path and filename of a file containing the password to access the NSS security databases.
-w	Gives the full path and filename of a file to use to set the password to access the output file.
-debug	Turns on debugging output to stdout.

24.2. Usage and Output

The **PKCS12Export** command exports each certificate in the database into the .**p12** output file. When the **-debug** option is used, the certificate nickname for each certificate is printed to stdout as the operation proceeds. (Otherwise, there is no output from the command.)

```
# PKCS12Export -debug -d /var/lib/pki-ca/alias -p dbpwd.txt -w p12pwd.txt
-o master.p12
PKCS12Export debug: The directory for certdb/keydb is .
PKCS12Export debug: The password file for keydb is dbpwd.txt
PKCS12Export debug: Number of user certificates = 5
PKCS12Export debug: Certificate nickname = ocspSigningCert cert-ca
PKCS12Export debug: Private key is not null
PKCS12Export debug: Certificate nickname = subsystemCert cert-ca
PKCS12Export debug: Private key is not null
PKCS12Export debug: Certificate nickname = caSigningCert cert-ca
PKCS12Export debug: Private key is not null
PKCS12Export debug: Certificate nickname = Server-Cert cert-ca
PKCS12Export debug: Private key is not null
PKCS12Export debug: Certificate nickname = auditSigningCert cert-ca
PKCS12Export debug: Private key is not null
```

Chapter 25. revoker (Sending Revocation Requests)

The **revoker** utility sends revocation requests to the CA agent interface to revoke certificates. To access the interface, **revoker** needs to have access to an agent certificate that is part of the subsystem group that is acceptable to the CA.

The **revoker** tool can do all of the following:

- » Specify which certificate or a list of certificates to revoke by listing the hexadecimal serial numbers.
- » Specify a revocation reason.
- » Specify an invalidity date.
- » Unrevoke a certificate that is currently on hold.

25.1. Syntax

The **revoker** utility has the following syntax:

```
revoker -s serialNumber -n rsa_nickname [[ -p password ] | [ -w passwordFile ]] [ -d dbdir ] [ -v ] [ -V ] [ -u ] [ -r reasoncode ] [ -i numberOfHours ] hostname [ :port ]
```

Option	Description
s	Gives the serial numbers in hexadecimal of the certificates to revoke. A hexadecimal serial number, for example, is like 0x31 , or multiple serial numbers can be listed separated by commas, such as 0x44, 0x64, 0x22 .
n	Gives the agent certificate nickname.
p	Gives the certificate database password. Not used if the -w option is used.
w	<i>Optional.</i> Gives the path to the password file. Not used if the -p option is used.
d	<i>Optional.</i> Gives the path to the security databases.
v	<i>Optional.</i> Sets the operation in verbose mode.
V	<i>Optional.</i> Gives the version of the revoker tool.
u	<i>Optional.</i> Unrevokes a certificate, meaning that certificate status is changed from on hold to active.
r	Gives the reason to revoke the certificate. The following are the possible reasons: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » 0 - Unspecified (default). » 1 - The key was compromised. » 2 - The CA key was compromised. » 3 - The affiliation of the user has changed. » 4 - The certificate has been superseded. » 5 - Cessation of operation. » 6 - The certificate is on hold.

Option	Description
i	Sets the invalidity date in hours from current time for when to revoke the certificate.
hostname	Gives the hostname of the server to which to send the request. Depending on how DNS and the network are configured, this can be a machine name, fully-qualified domain name, or IPv4 or IPv6 address.
port	<i>Optional.</i> Gives the agent's SSL port number of the server.

25.2. Output

Without using the verbose option (**-v**), **revoker** returns an exit code of 0, without any additional output the standard I/O.

With the **-v** option, the command shows the GET request sent to the CA agent interface and then the results (in an HTML page) that is returned.

```
# revoker -d . -s 0x17 -n "CA Administrator of Instance pki-ca Example Domain" -p secret -v -r 6 -i 1 server.example.com:9443

GET /ca/doRevoke?
op=doRevoke&revocationReason=6&invalidityDate=1299187797000&revokeAll=(| (certRecordId%3D0x17))&totalRecordCount=1 HTTP/1.0
port: 9443
addr='server.example.com'
family='2'
Subject: CN=server.example.com,OU=pki-ca,O=Example Domain
Issuer : CN=Certificate Authority,OU=pki-ca,O=Example Domain
-- SSL3: Server Certificate Validated.
Called mygetclientauthdata - nickname = CA Administrator of Instance pki-ca Example Domain ID
    mygetclientauthdata - cert = 8da87b8
    mygetclientauthdata - privkey = 8de65a8
PR_Write wrote 143 bytes from bigBuf
bytes: [GET /ca/doRevoke?
op=doRevoke&revocationReason=6&invalidityDate=1299187797000&revokeAll=(| (certRecordId%3D0x17))&totalRecordCount=1 HTTP/1.0

]
do_writes shutting down send socket
do_writes exiting with (failure = 0)
bulk cipher RC4, 128 secret key bits, 128 key bits, status: 1
connection 1 read 9000 bytes (9000 total).
these bytes read:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
Content-Type: text/html
Date: Thu, 03 Mar 2011 22:29:58 GMT
Connection: close

<!-- --- BEGIN COPYRIGHT BLOCK ---
```

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--- END COPYRIGHT BLOCK --- -->

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"

"http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">

<HTML>

<HEAD>

<TITLE>Revocation Result</TITLE>

<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">

<SCRIPT LANGUAGE="JavaScript">

```
var header = new Object();
var fixed = new Object();
var recordSet = new Array();
var result = new Object();
var httpParamsCount = 0;
var httpHeadersCount = 0;
var authTokenCount = 0;
var serverAttrsCount = 0;
header.HTTP_PARAMS = new Array();
header.HTTP_HEADERS = new Array();
header.AUTH_TOKEN = new Array();
header.SERVER_ATTRS = new Array();
header.dirEnabled = "no";
header.error = null;
header.revoked = "yes";
header.totalRecordCount = 1;
var recordCount = 0;
var record;
record = new Object();
record.HTTP_PARAMS = new Array();
record.HTTP_HEADERS = new Array();
record.AUTH_TOKEN = new Array();
record.SERVER_ATTRS = new Array();
record.error=null;
record.serialNumber="17";
recordSet[recordCount++] = record;
record.recordSet = recordSet;
result.header = header;
result.fixed = fixed;
result.recordSet = recordSet;
```

```

</SCRIPT>

<BODY bgcolor="white">
<SCRIPT type="text/javascript">
//<!--
function toHex1(number)
{
    var absValue = "", sign = "";
    var digits = "0123456789abcdef";
    if (number < 0) {
        sign = "-";
        number = -number;
    }

    for(; number >= 16 ; number = Math.floor(number/16)) {
        absValue = digits.charAt(number % 16) + absValue;
    }
    absValue = digits.charAt(number % 16) + absValue;
    return sign + '0x' + absValue;
}

function toHex(number)
{
    return '0x' + number;
}

if (result.header.revoked == 'yes') {
    document.write('<font size="+1" face="PrimaSans BT, Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">');
    document.writeln('Certificate Revocation Has Been Completed</font>
<br><br>');
    if (result.recordSet.length == 0 && result.header.totalRecordCount > 0) {
        document.writeln('<font size="-1" face="PrimaSans BT, Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">');
        document.write('All requested certificates were already revoked.');
        document.writeln('</font><br>');
    } else if (result.recordSet.length == 1) {
        if (result.recordSet[0].error == null) {
            document.writeln('<font size="-1" face="PrimaSans BT, Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">');
            document.writeln('Certificate with serial number <b>' +
                            toHex(result.recordSet[0].serialNumber) +
                            '</b> has been revoked.');
            document.writeln('</font><br>');

            document.writeln('<font size="-1" face="PrimaSans BT, Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">');
            if (result.header.updateCRL && result.header.updateCRL == "yes") {
                if (result.header.updateCRLSuccess != null &&
                    result.header.updateCRLSuccess == "yes") {
                    document.writeln('The Certificate Revocation List has
been successfully updated.');
                } else {

```

```

        document.writeln('The Certificate Revocation List
update Failed');
            if (result.header.updateCRLSuccess != null)
                document.writeln(' with error '+
result.header.updateCRLError);
            else
                document.writeln('. No further details
provided.');
        }
    } else {
        document.writeln(
            'The Certificate Revocation List will be updated '+
            'automatically at the next scheduled update.');
    }
document.writeln('</font><br>');
/*
    if (result.header.dirEnabled != null &&
result.header.dirEnabled == 'yes') {
        document.writeln('<font size="-1" face="PrimaSans BT,
Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">');
        if (result.header.certsUpdated > 0) {
            document.write('Directory has been successfully
updated.');
        } else {
            document.write('Directory has not been updated. See
log files for more details.');
        }
        document.writeln('</font><br>');
    }
*/
} else {
    document.writeln('<font size="-1" face="PrimaSans BT, Verdana,
Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">');
    document.writeln('Certificate with serial number <b>' +
                    toHex(result.recordSet[0].serialNumber) +
                    '</b> is not revoked.<br><br>');
    document.writeln('Additional Information:');
    document.writeln('</font>');
    document.writeln('<blockquote>');
    document.writeln('<font size="-1" face="PrimaSans BT, Verdana,
Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">');
    document.writeln(result.recordSet[0].error);
    document.writeln('</font>');
    document.writeln('</blockquote>');
}
} else if (result.recordSet.length > 1) {
    document.writeln('<font size="-1" face="PrimaSans BT, Verdana,
Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">');
    document.write('The following certificates were processed to
complete revocation request:');
    document.writeln('</font>');

    document.writeln('<blockquote>');
    document.writeln('<font size="-1" face="PrimaSans BT, Verdana,
Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">');
    var revokedCerts = 0;

```

```

        for(var i = 0; i < result.recordSet.length; i++) {
            if (result.recordSet[i].error == null) {
                revokedCerts++;
                document.writeln(toHex(result.recordSet[i].serialNumber)
+ ' - revoked<BR>\n');
            } else {
                document.write(toHex(result.recordSet[i].serialNumber) +
' - failed');
                if (result.recordSet[i].error != null)
                    document.write(': ' + result.recordSet[i].error);
                document.writeln('<BR>\n');
            }
        }
        document.writeln('</font>');
        document.write('</blockquote>');

        if (revokedCerts > 0 && result.header.dirEnabled != null &&
result.header.dirEnabled == 'yes') {
            document.writeln('<font size="-1" face="PrimaSans BT,
Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">');
            if (result.header.updateCRL && result.header.updateCRL ==
"yes") {
                if (result.header.updateCRLSuccess != null &&
                    result.header.updateCRLSuccess == "yes") {
                    document.writeln('The Certificate Revocation List has
been successfully updated.');
                } else {
                    document.writeln('The Certificate Revocation List
update Failed');
                    if (result.header.updateCRLSuccess != null)
                        document.writeln(' with error ' +
                            result.header.updateCRLError);
                    else
                        document.writeln('. No further details
provided.');
                }
            } else {
                document.writeln(
                    'The Certificate Revocation List will be updated '+
                    'automatically at the next scheduled update.');
            }
            document.writeln('<br>');
/*
            if (result.header.certsUpdated > 0) {
                if (result.header.certsUpdated ==
result.header.certsToUpdate) {
                    document.write('Directory has been successfully
updated.');
                } else {
                    document.write('Directory has been partially
updated. See log files for more details.');
                }
            } else {
                document.write('Directory has not been updated. See log
files for more details.');
            }
*/
        }
    }
}

```

```

*/
    document.writeln('</font><br>');
}
}

} else if (result.header.revoked == 'pending') {
    document.write('<font size="+1" face="PrimaSans BT, Verdana, Arial,
Helvetica, sans-serif">');
    document.writeln('Revocation Request Has Been Submitted</font><br>
<br>');
} else if (result.header.revoked == 'rejected') {
    document.write('<font size="+1" face="PrimaSans
connection 1 read 1249 bytes (10249 total).
these bytes read:
    BT, Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">');
    document.writeln('Certificate Revocation Has Been Rejected</font>
<br><br>');
    if (result.header.error != null) {
        document.writeln('<font size="-1" face="PrimaSans BT, Verdana,
Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">Additional information:</font>');
        document.writeln('<blockquote>');
        document.writeln('<font size="-1" face="PrimaSans BT, Verdana,
Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">');
        document.writeln(result.header.error);
        document.writeln('</font>');
        document.writeln('</blockquote>');
    }
} else {
    document.write('<font size="+1" face="PrimaSans BT, Verdana, Arial,
Helvetica, sans-serif">');
    document.writeln('Revocation Request Cannot Be Completed</font><br>
<br>');
    if (result.header.error != null) {
        document.writeln('<font size="-1" face="PrimaSans BT, Verdana,
Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">Additional information:</font>');
        document.writeln('<blockquote>');
        document.writeln('<font size="-1" face="PrimaSans BT, Verdana,
Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif">');
        document.writeln(result.header.error);
        document.writeln('</font>');
        document.writeln('</blockquote>');
    }
}
//-->
</SCRIPT>
</BODY>
</HTML>

connection 1 read 10249 bytes total. -----

```

Chapter 26. tpsclient (Debugging the TPS)

The **tpsclient** tool can be used for debugging or testing the TPS. The **tpsclient** imitates the Enterprise Security Client and can give debug output or emulate enrolling and formatting tokens without having to use tokens.

The **tpsclient** tool is launched by running the command **tpsclient**. The tool has no options. Running this opens a shell which allows specific commands to be directed toward the **tpsclient**.

```
tpsclient
```

```
Registration Authority Client
'op=help' for Help
Command>
```

tpsclient and the TPS need to agree on a set of symmetric keys to establish a secure channel. They are both configured with a mutual default token, which has the default key set (**version 1**) which contains three keys: authentication key, Mac key, and key encryption key (KEK). The TPS subsystem understands and accepts the default key set.

The default key values for each are set to **0x40 0x41 0x42 0x43 0x44 0x45 0x46 0x47 0x48 0x49 0x4a 0x4b 0x4c 0x4d 0x4e 0x4f**, 16 bytes. The default configuration is shown by running the **token_status** option within the **tpsclient** command shell.

```
Command>token_status
token_status
Output> life_cycle_state : '0'
Output> pin : 'password'
Output> app_ver : '00010203' (4 bytes)
Output> major_ver : '0'
Output> minor_ver : '0'
Output> uid : '00010203040506070809' (10 bytes)
Output> msn : '00000000' (4 bytes)
Output> key_info : '0101' (2 bytes)
Output> auth_key : '404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f' (16 bytes)
Output> mac_key : '404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f' (16 bytes)
Output> kek_key : '404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f' (16 bytes)
Result> Success - Operation 'token_status' Success (8 msec)
Command>
```

If the TPS is configured to use a new master key, then the **tpsclient** must also be reconfigured, or it cannot establish its connection to the TPS.

1. Get the new key set data to input into **tpsclient**. The default key set must be stored in the TKS, and the master key must be added. Do this by editing the TKS mapping parameter in the TKS **CS.cfg** file:

```
tks.mk_mappings.#02#01=nethsm1:masterkey
```

This configuration instructs the TKS to map the master key named **masterkey** on the **nethsm1** token to the **#02#01** key.

2. Enable key upgrade in the TPS by editing the update symmetric keys parameter in the TPS **CS.cfg** file:

```
op.format.tokenKey.update.symmetricKeys.enable=true
op.format.tokenKey.update.symmetricKeys.requiredVersion=2
```

This setting instructs the TPS to upgrade the token from version 1 to version 2 during the **tpscient** format operation.

- Format the token using **tpscient**, as follows:

```
tpscient
Command>op=token_set cuid=a00192030405060708c9 app_ver=6FBBC105
key_info=0101
Command>op=token_set auth_key=404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
Command>op=token_set mac_key=404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
Command>op=token_set kek_key=404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f

Command>op=ra_format uid=jsmith pwd=password num_threads=1
new_pin=password
```

The CUID can be any 10-byte string; it affects how the TKS computes the new key set for **tpscient**.

Note

Because it can be tedious to type each operation and parameter through the command line, it is possible to create an input file and then point the **tpscient** command to the file. For example:

```
tpscient < /tmp/input.txt
```

[Example 26.1, “Example tpscident Enrollment Input File”](#) and [Example 26.2, “Example tpscident Format Input File”](#) both list examples for an input file.

The command prompt will return any output given by **tpscient** during the operation and the final result of the command.

- After running the format operation, **tpscient** prints the new key set in the standard output. Save the new values in a new **tpscient** input file. The input file can then be used with a production TPS server.

tpscient can be used for formatting operations or for enrollment operations. The sample input file for an enrollment operation is shown in [Example 26.1, “Example tpscident Enrollment Input File”](#).

Example 26.1. Example tpscident Enrollment Input File

```
op=var_set name=ra_host value=server.example.com
op=var_set name=ra_port value=7888
op=var_set name=ra_uri value=/nk_service
op=token_set cuid=00000000000000000001
      msn=01020304 app_ver=6FBBC105 key_info=0101 major_ver=0 minor_ver=0
op=token_set auth_key=404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
```

```
op=token_set mac_key=404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
op=token_set kek_key=404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
op=ra_enroll uid=jdoe pwd=password new_pin=password num_threads=1
```

The sample input file for an enrollment operation is shown in [Example 26.2, “Example tpsclient Format Input File”](#).

Example 26.2. Example tpsclient Format Input File

```
op=var_set name=ra_host value=server.example.com
op=var_set name=ra_port value=7888
op=var_set name=ra_uri value=/nk_service
op=token_set cuid=000000000000000000000001
    msn=01020304 app_ver=6FBBC105 key_info=0101 major_ver=0 minor_ver=0
op=token_set auth_key=404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
op=token_set mac_key=404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
op=token_set kek_key=404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
op=ra_format uid=jsmith pwd=secret new_pin=newsecret num_threads=1
```

Note

The host value can be an IPv4 address or an IPv6 address, if one is configured for the host.

26.1. Syntax

The **tpsclient** tool has the following syntax:

```
tpsclient op=operation options
```

Table 26.1. tpsclient Operations

| Operation | Description | Options |
|------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|
| op=help | Brings up the help page, which lists all usage and options for the tpsclient tool. | N/A |
| op=debug filename= <i>filename</i> | Enables debugging. | <i>filename</i> sets the debug file. |

| Operation | Description | Options |
|-----------------|---|--|
| op=ra_enroll | Tests certificate enrollments. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ uid gives the user ID of the user running. ➢ pwd gives the password corresponding to the user ID. ➢ num_threads sets the number of threads to use ➢ secureid_pin gives the token password ➢ keygen set whether server-side key generation is enabled. |
| op=ra_reset_pin | Resets the token PIN. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ uid gives the user ID of the user running. ➢ pwd gives the password corresponding to the user ID. ➢ num_threads sets the number of threads to use ➢ secureid_pin gives the token password ➢ new_pin sets the new PIN (token password). |
| op=ra_update | Updates the applet. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ uid gives the user ID of the user running. ➢ pwd gives the password corresponding to the user ID. ➢ num_threads sets the number of threads to use ➢ secureid_pin gives the token password |
| op=token_set | Sets the token value. | The usage with this operation is <i>name=value</i> , which sets the token name and description. |
| op=token_status | Returns the current token status/ | N/A |
| op=var_get | Gets the current value of the variable. | This has the usage name=name , where <i>name</i> is the variable being checked. |
| op=var_list | Lists all possible variables. | N/A |
| op=var_set | Sets variable values. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➢ name sets the name of the variable. ➢ value sets the value of the named variable. |

Chapter 27. KRATool (Rewrapping Private Keys)

Some private keys (mainly in older deployments) were wrapped in SHA-1, 1024-bit storage keys when they were archived in the *Key Recovery Authority (KRA)*. These algorithms have become less secure as processor speeds improve and algorithms have been broken. As a security measure, it is possible to rewrap the private keys in a new, stronger storage key (SHA-256, 2048-bit keys).

Note

Because the **KRATool** utility can export private keys from one KRA, rewrap them with a new storage key, and then import them into a new KRA, this tool can be used as part of a process of combining multiple KRA instances into a single KRA.

27.1. Syntax

The **KRATool** utility can be run to rewrap keys, to renumber keys, or both.

The syntax for rewrapping keys:

```
KRATool -kratool_config_file /path/to/tool_config_file
  -source_ldif_file /path/to/original_ldif_file
  -target_ldif_file /path/to/newinstance_ldif_file
  -log_file /path/to/tool_log_file
  [-source_pk1_security_database_path /path/to/nss_databases
   -source_storage_token_name /path/to/token
   -source_storage_certificate_nickname storage_certificate_nickname
   -target_storage_certificate_file /path/to/new_ASCII_storage_cert
   [-source_pk1_security_database_pwdfile /path/to/password_file]]
  [-source_kra_naming_context name -target_kra_naming_context name]
  [-process_requests_and_key_records_only]
```

The syntax to renumber keys:

```
KRATool -kratool_config_file /path/to/tool_config_file
  -source_ldif_file /path/to/original_ldif_file
  -target_ldif_file /path/to/newinstance_ldif_file
  -log_file /path/to/tool_log_file
  [-append_id_offset prefix_to_add | -remove_id_offset prefix_to_remove]
  [-source_kra_naming_context name -target_kra_naming_context name]
  [-process_requests_and_key_records_only]
```

| Option | Description |
|----------------------|-------------|
| Mandatory parameters | |

| Option | Description |
|----------------------------|--|
| -kratool_config_file | Gives the complete path and filename of the configuration file used by the tool. This configuration process tells the tool how to process certain parameters in the existing key records, whether to apply any formatting changes (like changing the naming context or adding an offset) or even whether to update the modify date. The configuration file is required and a default file is included with the tool. The file format is described in Section 27.2, “.cfg File” . |
| -source_ldif_file | Gives the complete path and filename of the LDIF file which contains all of the key data from the <i>old</i> KRA. |
| -target_ldif_file | Gives the complete path and filename of the LDIF file to which the tool will write all of the key data from the <i>new</i> KRA. This file is created by the tool as it runs. |
| -log_file | Gives the path and filename of the log file to use to log the tool progress and messages. This file is created by the tool as it runs. |
| Optional parameters | |
| -source_kra_naming_context | Gives the naming context of the original KRA instance, the DN element that refers to the original KRA. Key-related LDIF entries have a DN with the KRA instance name in it, such as <i>cn=1,ou=kra,ou=requests,dc=alpha.example.com-pki-kra</i> . The naming context for that entry is the DN value, <i>alpha.example.com-pki-kra</i> . These entries can be renamed, automatically, from the old KRA instance naming context to the new KRA instance naming context. |
| | While this argument is optional, it is recommended because it means that the LDIF file does not have to be edited before it is imported into the target KRA. |
| | If this argument is used, then the -target_kra_naming_context argument must also be used. |

| Option | Description |
|--|---|
| -target_kra_naming_context | <p>Gives the naming context of the new KRA instance, the name that the original key entries should be changed to. Key-related LDIF entries have a DN with the KRA instance name in it, such as <code>cn=1,ou=kra,ou=requests,dc=omega.example.com-pki-kra</code>. The naming context for that entry is the DN value, <code>omega.example.com-pki-kra</code>. These entries can be renamed, automatically, from the old KRA instance to the new KRA instance naming context.</p> <p>While this argument is optional, it is recommended because it means that the LDIF file does not have to be edited before it is imported into the target KRA.</p> <p>If this argument is used, then the <code>-source_kra_naming_context</code> argument must also be used.</p> |
| -process_requests_and_key_records_only | <p>Removes configuration entries from the source LDIF file, leaving only the key and request entries. While this argument is optional, it is recommended because it means that the LDIF file does not have to be edited before it is imported into the target KRA.</p> |
| Rewrap parameters | |
| -source_pkic_seurity_database_path | <p>Gives the full path to the directory which contains the NSS security databases used by the <i>old</i> KRA instance.</p> <p>This option is required if any other rewrap parameters are used.</p> |
| -source_storage_token_name | <p>Gives the name of the token which stores the KRA data, like <i>Internal Key Storage Token</i> for internal tokens or a name like <i>NHSM6000-OCS</i> for the hardware token name.</p> <p>This option is required if any other rewrap parameters are used.</p> |
| -source_storage_certificateNickname | <p>Gives the nickname of the KRA storage certificate for the <i>old</i> KRA instance. Either this certificate will be located in the security database for the <i>old</i> KRA instance or the security database will contain a pointer to the certificate in the hardware token.</p> <p>This option is required if any other rewrap parameters are used.</p> |

| Option | Description |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| -target_storage_certificate_file | Gives the path and filename of an ASCII-formatted file of the storage certificate for the <i>new</i> KRA instance. The storage certificate should be exported from the new KRA's databases and stored in an accessible location before running KRATool . |
| | This option is required if any other rewrap parameters are used. |
| -source_pki_security_database_pwdfile | Gives the path and filename to a password file that contains only the password for the storage token given in the - source_storage_token_name option. |
| | This argument is optional when other rewrap parameters are used. If this argument is not used, then the script prompts for the password. |
| Number offset parameters | |
| -append_id_offset | Gives an ID number which will be prepended to every imported key, to prevent possible collisions. A unique ID offset should be used for every KRA instance which has keys exported using KRATool . |
| | If -append_id_offset is used, then do not use the -remove_id_offset option. |
| -remove_id_offset | Gives an ID number to remove from the beginning of every imported key. If -remove_id_offset is used, then do not use the -append_id_offset option. |

27.2. .cfg File

The required configuration file instructs the **KRATool** how to process attributes in the key archival and key request entries in the LDIF file. There are six types of entries:

- » CA enrollment requests
- » TPS enrollment requests
- » CA key records
- » TPS key records
- » CA and TPS recovery requests (which are treated the same in the KRA)

Each key and key request has an LDAP entry with attributes that are specific to that kind of record. For example, for a recovery request:

```
dn: cn=1,ou=kra,ou=requests,dc=alpha.example.com-pki-kra
objectClass: top
objectClass: request
```

```

objectClass: extensibleObject
requestId: 011
requestState: complete
dateOfCreate: 20110121181006Z
dateOfModify: 20110524094652Z
extdata-kra--005ftrans--005fdeskey:
3#C7#82#0F#5D#97GqY#0Aib#966#E5B#F56#F24n#
F#9E#98#B3
extdata-public--005fkey:
MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDu6E3uG+Ep27bF1
yTwvwIDAQAB
extdata-archive: true
extdata-requesttype: netkeyKeygen
extdata-iv--005fs: %F2%67%45%96%41%D7%FF%10
extdata-requestversion: 8.1.0
extdata-requestortype: NETKEY_RA
extdata-keyrecord: 1
extdata-wrappeduserprivate:
%94%C1%36%D3%EA%4E%36%B5%42%91%AB%47%34%C0%35%A3%6
F%E8%10%A9%B1%25%F4%BE%9C%11%D1%B3%3D%90%AB%79
extdata-userid: jmagne
extdata-keysize: 1024
extdata-updatedby: TPS-alpha.example.com-7889
extdata-dbstatus: UPDATED
extdata-cuid: 40906145C76224192D2B
extdata-requeststatus: complete
extdata-requestid: 1
extdata-result: 1
requestType: netkeyKeygen
cn: 1
creatorsName: cn=directory manager
modifiersName: cn=directory manager
createTimestamp: 20110122021010Z
modifyTimestamp: 20110122021010Z
nsUniqueId: b2891805-1dd111b2-a6d7e85f-2c2f0000

```

Much of that information passes through the script processing unchanged, so it is entered into the new, target KRA just the same. However, some of those attributes can and should be edited, like the CN and DN being changed to match the new KRA instance. The fields which can safely be changed are listed in the configuration file for each type of key entry. (Any attribute not listed is not touched by the tool under any circumstances.)

If a field *should* be edited — meaning, the tool can update the record ID number or rename the entry — then the value is set to true in the configuration file. For example, this configuration updates the CN, DN, ID number, last modified date, and associated entry notes for all CA enrollment requests:

```

kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest.cn=true
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest.dateOfModify=true
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest.dn=true
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest.extdata.keyRecord=true
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest.extdata.requestNotes=true
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest.requestId=true

```

If a line is set to true, then the attribute is processed in the LDIF file. By default, all possible attributes are processed. Setting a line to false means that the **KRATool** skips that attribute and passes the value unchanged. For example, this leaves the last modified time unchanged so that it doesn't update for when the **KRATool** runs:

```
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest.dateOfModify=false
```

Note

Key enrollments, records, and requests all have an optional notes attribute where administrators can enter notes about the process. When the **KRATool** runs, it appends a note to that attribute or adds the attribute with information about the tool running, what operations were performed, and a timestamp.

```
extdata-requestnotes: [20110701150056Z]: REWRAPPED the 'existing
DES3 symmetri
c session key' with the '2048-bit RSA public key' obtained from the
target s
torage certificate + APPENDED ID offset '100000000000' + RENAMED
source KRA
naming context 'alpha.example.com-pki-kra' to target KRA naming
context 'ome
ga.example.com-pki-kra' + PROCESSED requests and key records ONLY!
```

This information is very useful for both audit and maintenance of the KRA, so it is beneficial to keep the **extdata.requestNotes** parameter for all of the key record types set to **true**.



Important

Every parameter line in the default **kratool.cfg** must be present in the **.cfg** file used when the tool is invoked. No line can be omitted and every line must have a valid value (true or false). If the file is not properly formatted, the **KRATool** will fail.

The formatting of the **.cfg** file is the same as the formatting used in the instance **CS.cfg** files.

A default **.cfg** file is included with the **KRATool** script. This file (shown in [Example 27.1, “Default kratool.cfg File”](#)) can be copied and edited into a custom file or edited directly and used with the tool.

Example 27.1. Default kratool.cfg File

```
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest._000=#####
#####
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest._001=##      KRA CA Enrollment Request
##
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest._002=#####
#####
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest._003=##
##
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest._004=##  NEVER allow 'KRATOOL' the
```

```

ability ##
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest._005=## to change the CA 'naming
context' ##
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest._006=## data in the following
fields:      ##
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest._007=##
##
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest._008=## extdata-auth--
005ftoken;uid      ##
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest._009=## extdata-auth--
005ftoken;userid  ##
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest._010=## extdata-updatedby
##
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest._011=##
##
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest._012=## NEVER allow 'KRATOOL' the
ability ##
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest._013=## to change CA 'numeric' data
in    ##
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest._014=## the following fields:
##
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest._015=##
##
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest._016=## extdata-requestId
##
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest._017=##
##
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest._018=#####
#####
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest.cn=true
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest.dateOfModify=true
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest.dn=true
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest.extdata.keyRecord=true
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest.extdata.requestNotes=true
kratool.ldif.caEnrollmentRequest.requestId=true
kratool.ldif.caKeyRecord._000=#####
#
kratool.ldif.caKeyRecord._001=## KRA CA Key Record
##
kratool.ldif.caKeyRecord._002=#####
#
kratool.ldif.caKeyRecord._003=##
##
kratool.ldif.caKeyRecord._004=## NEVER allow 'KRATOOL' the ability
##
kratool.ldif.caKeyRecord._005=## to change the CA 'naming context'
##
kratool.ldif.caKeyRecord._006=## data in the following fields:
##
kratool.ldif.caKeyRecord._007=##
##
kratool.ldif.caKeyRecord._008=## archivedBy
##
kratool.ldif.caKeyRecord._009=##
##
kratool.ldif.caKeyRecord._010=#####

```

```

#
kratool.ldif.caKeyRecord.cn=true
kratool.ldif.caKeyRecord.dateOfModify=true
kratool.ldif.caKeyRecord.dn=true
kratool.ldif.caKeyRecord.privateKeyData=true
kratool.ldif.caKeyRecord.serialno=true
kratool.ldif.namingContext._000=#####
#####
kratool.ldif.namingContext._001=##          KRA Naming Context Fields
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._002=#####
#####
kratool.ldif.namingContext._003=##
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._004=## NEVER allow 'KRATOOL' the ability
to ##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._005=## change the CA 'naming context'
data ##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._006=## in the following 'non-KeyRecord /'
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._007=## non-Request' fields (as these
records ##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._008=## should be removed via the option
to ##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._009=## process requests and key records
only ##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._010=## if this is a KRA migration):
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._011=##
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._012=## cn
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._013=## sn
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._014=## uid
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._015=## uniqueMember
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._016=##
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._017=## NEVER allow 'KRATOOL' the ability
to ##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._018=## change the KRA 'naming context'
data ##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._019=## in the following 'non-KeyRecord /'
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._020=## non-Request' fields (as these
records ##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._021=## should be removed via the option
to ##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._022=## process requests and key records
only ##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._023=## if this is a KRA migration):
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._024=##
##

```

```

kratool.ldif.namingContext._025=##           dc
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._026=##           dn
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._027=##           uniqueMember
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._028=##           #
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._029=## NEVER allow 'KRATOOL' the ability
to ## change the TPS 'naming context'
data ## in the following 'non-KeyRecord /
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._031=## non-Request' fields (as these
records ## should be removed via the option
to ## process requests and key records
only ## if this is a KRA migration):
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._035=##           #
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._036=##           uid
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._037=##           uniqueMember
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._039=##           #
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._040=## If '-source_naming_context'
## original source KRA naming
context' ## and '-target_naming_context'
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._042=## renamed target KRA naming context'
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._043=## options are specified, ALWAYS
## require 'KRATOOL' to change the
kratool.ldif.namingContext._045=## KRA 'naming context' data in ALL
## the following fields in EACH of
kratool.ldif.namingContext._046=## the following types of records:
of ##           caEnrollmentRequest:
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._047=##           #
the ##           dn
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._048=##           #
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._049=##           #
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._050=##           caEnrollmentRequest:
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._051=##           #
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._052=##           dn
##

```

```

kratool.ldif.namingContext._053=## extdata-auth--005ftoken;user
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._054=## extdata-auth--005ftoken;userdn
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._055=## caKeyRecord:
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._056=## dn
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._057=## recoveryRequest:
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._058=## dn
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._059=## tpsKeyRecord:
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._060=## dn
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._061=## tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest:
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._062=## dn
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._063=## dn
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._064=## tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest:
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._065=## dn
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._066=## dn
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._067=## dn
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._068=## tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest:
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._069=## dn
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._070=## dn
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._071=## dn
##
kratool.ldif.namingContext._072=#####
#####
kratool.ldif.recoveryRequest._000=#####
#
kratool.ldif.recoveryRequest._001=## KRA CA / TPS Recovery Request ##
kratool.ldif.recoveryRequest._002=#####
#
kratool.ldif.recoveryRequest.cn=true
kratool.ldif.recoveryRequest.dateOfModify=true
kratool.ldif.recoveryRequest.dn=true
kratool.ldif.recoveryRequest.extdata.requestId=true
kratool.ldif.recoveryRequest.extdata.requestNotes=true
kratool.ldif.recoveryRequest.extdata.serialnumber=true
kratool.ldif.recoveryRequest.requestId=true
kratool.ldif.tpsKeyRecord._000=#####
##
kratool.ldif.tpsKeyRecord._001=## KRA TPS Key Record
##

```

```

kratool.ldif.tpsKeyRecord._002#####
##kratool.ldif.tpsKeyRecord._003=##
##kratool.ldif.tpsKeyRecord._004=## NEVER allow 'KRATOOL' the ability
##kratool.ldif.tpsKeyRecord._005=## to change the TPS 'naming context'
##kratool.ldif.tpsKeyRecord._006=## data in the following fields:
##kratool.ldif.tpsKeyRecord._007=##
##kratool.ldif.tpsKeyRecord._008=## archivedBy
##kratool.ldif.tpsKeyRecord._009=##
##kratool.ldif.tpsKeyRecord._010#####
#
kratool.ldif.tpsKeyRecord.cn=true
kratool.ldif.tpsKeyRecord.dateOfModify=true
kratool.ldif.tpsKeyRecord.dn=true
kratool.ldif.tpsKeyRecord.privateKeyData=true
kratool.ldif.tpsKeyRecord.serialno=true
kratool.ldif.tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest._000#####
#####
kratool.ldif.tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest._001=## KRA TPS Netkey Keygen
Request ##
kratool.ldif.tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest._002#####
#####
kratool.ldif.tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest._003=##
##kratool.ldif.tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest._004=## NEVER allow 'KRATOOL' the
##kratool.ldif.tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest._005=## ability to change the
##kratool.ldif.tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest._006=## TPS 'naming context' data
in ##
kratool.ldif.tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest._007=## the following fields:
##kratool.ldif.tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest._008=##
##kratool.ldif.tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest._009=## extdata-updatedby
##kratool.ldif.tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest._010=##
##kratool.ldif.tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest._011#####
#####
kratool.ldif.tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest.cn=true
kratool.ldif.tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest.dateOfModify=true
kratool.ldif.tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest.dn=true
kratool.ldif.tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest.extdata.keyRecord=true
kratool.ldif.tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest.extdata.requestId=true
kratool.ldif.tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest.extdata.requestNotes=true
kratool.ldif.tpsNetkeyKeygenRequest.requestId=true

```

27.3. Examples

The **KRATool** performs two operations: it can rewrap keys with a new private key, and it can renumber attributes in the LDIF file entries for key records, including enrollments and recovery requests. At least one operation (rewrap or renumber) must be performed and both can be performed in a single invocation.

Example 27.2. Rewrapping Keys

When rewrapping keys, the tool needs to be able to access the *original* NSS databases for the source KRA and its storage certificate to unwrap the keys, as well as the storage certificate for the new KRA, which is used to rewrap the keys.

```
KRATool -kratool_config_file "/usr/share/pki/java-tools/KRATool.cfg" -
source_ldif_file "/tmp/files/originalKRA.ldif" -target_ldif_file
"/tmp/files/newKRA.ldif" -log_file "/tmp/kratool.log" -
source_pki_security_database_path "/tmp/files/" -
source_storage_token_name "Internal Key Storage Token" -
source_storage_certificate_nickname "storageCert cert-pki-kra" -
target_storage_certificate_file "/tmp/files/omega.cert"
```

Example 27.3. Renumbering Keys

When multiple KRA instances are being merged into a single instance, it is important to make sure that no key or request records have conflicting CNs, DNs, serial numbers, or request ID numbers. These values can be processed to append a new, larger number to the existing values.

For the CN, the new number is the addition of the original CN plus the appended number. For example, if the CN is 4 and the append number is 1000000, the new CN is 1000004.

For serial numbers and request IDs, the value is always a digit count plus the value. So a CN of 4 has a serial number of 014, or one digit and the CN value. If the append number is 1000000, the new serial number is 071000004, for seven digits and then the sum of the append number (1000000) and the original value (4).

```
KRATool -kratool_config_file "/usr/share/pki/java-tools/KRATool.cfg" -
source_ldif_file "/tmp/files/originalKRA.ldif" -target_ldif_file
"/tmp/files/newKRA.ldif" -log_file "/tmp/kratool.log" -
append_id_offset 10000000000
```

Example 27.4. Restoring the Original Numbering

If a number has been appended to key entries, as in [Example 27.3, “Renumbering Keys”](#), that number can also be removed. Along with updating the CN, it also reconstructs any associated numbers, like serial numbers and request ID numbers. Undoing a renumbering action may be necessary if the original number wasn't large enough to prevent conflicts or as part of testing a migration or KRA consolidation process.

```
KRATool -kratool_config_file "/usr/share/pki/java-tools/KRATool.cfg" -
source_ldif_file "/tmp/files/originalKRA.ldif" -target_ldif_file
"/tmp/files/newKRA.ldif" -log_file "/tmp/kratool.log" -
remove_id_offset 10000000000
```

Example 27.5. Renumbering and Rewrapping in a Single Command

Rewrapping and renumbering operations can be performed in the same invocation.

```
KRATool -kratool_config_file "/usr/share/pki/java-tools/KRATool.cfg" -
source_ldif_file "/tmp/files/originalKRA.ldif" -target_ldif_file
"/tmp/files/newKRA.ldif" -log_file "/tmp/kratool.log" -
source_pki_security_database_path "/tmp/files/" -
source_storage_token_name "Internal Key Storage Token" -
source_storage_certificate_nickname "storageCert cert-pki-kra" -
target_storage_certificate_file "/tmp/files/omega.cert" -
append_id_offset 100000000000
```

27.4. Usage

This procedure rewraps the keys stored in one Certificate System 7.1 KRA and stores them in a Certificate System 8.1 KRA. This is not the only use case; the tool can be run on the same instance as both the source and target, to rewrap existing keys, or it can be used simply to copy keys from multiple KRA instances into a single instance without rewrapping the keys at all.

1. Prepare the new KRA instance and machine.

- a. Install and configure a new Red Hat Certificate System 8.1 KRA instance.



Important

Set the storage key size and type to 2048-bit and RSA.

- b. Stop the new KRA.

```
[root@newkra ~]# service pki-kra stop
```

- c. Create a data directory to store the exported key data from the old KRA.

```
[root@newkra ~]# mkdir -p /export/pki
```

- d. Export the public storage certificate for the new KRA to a flat file in the new data directory:

```
[root@newkra ~]# certutil -L -d /var/lib/pki-kra/alias/ -n
"storageCert cert-pki-kra" -a > /export/pki/newKRA.cert
```

- e. Stop the Directory Server instance for the new KRA, if it is on the same machine.

```
>[root@newkra ~]# service dirsrv stop
```

- f. Export the configuration information for the new KRA.

```
[root@newkra ~]# /usr/lib[64]/disrv/slapd-instanceName/db2ldif
```

```
-n newkra.example.com-pki-kra -a /export/pki/newkra.ldif
```



Important

Be sure that the LDIF file contains a single, blank line at the end.

2. Export and prepare the key data from the old KRA instance.

- a. Create a data directory to store the exported key data.

```
[root@oldkra ~]# mkdir -p /export/pki
```

- b. Export the information from the original KRA instance using a tool like

[root@oldkra ~]# db2ldif. This is done as part of the 7.1 to 8.1 migration steps in the [KRA chapter of the Migration Guide](#).

- c. Copy the LDIF for the exported data into the data directory, and update the data file for change the archiving CA.

```
[root@oldkra ~]# cp /path/to/rhcs80-pki-kra.ldif /export/pki
```

```
[root@oldkra ~]# sed -i -e "s/^archivedBy:  
kra_trusted_agent/archivedBy: CA/g" alpha.ldif
```

- d. Stop all of the Certificate System servers on the machine.

- e. Copy the NSS databases to the data directory. For example, for a 7.1 KRA:

```
[root@oldkra ~]# cp -p /opt/redhat-cs/alias/cert-instance-  
kra-cert8.db /export/pki/cert8.db
```

```
[root@oldkra ~]# cp -p /opt/redhat-cs/alias/cert-instance-  
kra-key3.db /export/pki/key3.db
```

```
[root@oldkra ~]# cp -p /opt/redhat-cs/alias/secmod.db  
/export/pki/secmod.db
```

- f. Copy the **KRATool** to the machine with the old KRA instance and pull in all its dependencies. For 7.x systems, include the **nsutil.jar** and **cmsutil.jar** files (these files are already available in 8.0 systems). For example:

```
[root@oldkra ~]# mkdir -p /usr/share/pki/java-tools
```

```
[root@oldkra ~]# mkdir -p /usr/share/java/pki
```

```
[root@oldkra ~]# cd /usr/share/java/pki
```

```
[root@oldkra ~]# sftp root@newkra.example.com  
sftp> cd /usr/share/java/pki  
sftp> get nsutil.jar  
sftp> get cmsutil.jar  
sftp> get cstools.jar  
sftp> lcd /usr/share/pki/java-tools
```

```
sftp> cd /usr/share/pki/java-tools
sftp> get KRATool.cfg
sftp> lcd /usr/bin
sftp> cd /usr/bin
sftp> get KRATool
sftp> quit
```



Important

The machine must have Java 1.6.0 installed.

- g. For 7.1 KRAs. Create a symlink from the older **ldapjdk.jar** file to the new 8.x location.

```
[root@oldkra ~]# ln -s /opt/redhat-
cs/bin/cert/jars/ldapjdk.jar /usr/share/java/ldapjdk.jar
```

- h. Open the data directory.

```
[root@oldkra ~]#cd /export/pki
```

- i. Copy the file with the public storage key from the new KRA machine to the old KRA machine. For example:

```
[root@oldkra ~]# sftp root@newkra.example.com
sftp> cd /export/pki
sftp> get newKRA.cert
sftp> quit
```

- j. If necessary, edit the default **KRATool.cfg** file to use with the tool. The default file can also be used without changes.

- k. Run the **KRATool**; all of these parameters should be on a single line.

```
[root@oldkra ~]# KRATool -kratool_config_file
"/usr/share/pki/java-tools/KRATool.cfg"
      -source_ldif_file /export/pki/rhcs80-pki-kra.ldif
      -target_ldif_file /export/pki/old2newKRA.ldif
      -log_file /export/pki/kratool.log
      -source_pki_security_database_path /export/pki
      -source_storage_token_name 'Internal Key Storage
Token'
      -source_storage_certificate_nickname 'storageCert
cert-pki-kra'
      -target_storage_certificate_file
/export/pki/newKRA.cert
      -append_id_offset 100000000000
      -source_kra_naming_context "oldkra.example.com-pki-
kra"
      -target_kra_naming_context "newkra.example.com-pki-
kra"
      -process_requests_and_key_records_only
```

The command prompts for the password to the token stored in the original databases.

When it is done, the command creates the file specified in **-target_ldif_file**, **old2newKRA.ldif**.

- I. Copy the LDIF file over to the new KRA machine. For example:

```
[root@oldkra ~]# scp /export/pki/old2newKRA.ldif
root@newkra.example.com:/export/pki
```



Important

Be sure that the LDIF file contains a single, blank line at the end.

3. If multiple KRA instances are being merged, then their data can be merged into a single import operation. Perform step [2](#) for every KRA which will be merged.

Specify unique values for the **-target_ldif_file** to create separate LDIF files, and specify unique **-append_id_offset** values so that there are no collisions when the LDIF files are concatenated.

4. On the new KRA machine, import the LDIF file with the old key data.

- a. Open the data directory.

```
[root@newkra ~]# cd /export/pki
```

- b. Concatenate the new KRA configuration LDIF file and every exported LDIF for the old KRA instances. For example:

```
[root@newkra ~]# cat newkra.ldif old2newKRA.ldif >
combined.ldif
```

- c. Import the LDIF into the Directory Server database for the Certificate System 8.1 KRA instance.

```
[root@newkra ~]# /usr/lib[64]/disrv/slapd-instanceName/ldif2db
-n newkra.example.com-pki-kra -i /export/pki/combined.ldif
```

- d. Start the Directory Server instance for the new KRA.

```
[root@newkra ~]# service dirsrv start
```

- e. Start the new KRA.

```
[root@newkra ~]# service pki-kra start
```

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Appendix A. Revision History

Note that revision numbers relate to the edition of this manual, not to version numbers of Red Hat Certificate System.

| | | |
|-----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| Revision 9.0-1 | Wed Sep 16 2015 | Aneta Petrová |
|-----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|

Async update to include documentation for shared and non-shared instances

| | | |
|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| Revision 9.0-0 | Fri Aug 28 2015 | Tomáš Čapek |
|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------------|

Version for Red Hat Certificate System 9 release