Proximity-Gated Biometric Access Controller

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Problem

- Critical facilities (BTS shelters, POP/DC rooms, outdoor cabinets, racks) rely on badges/PINs that are easily cloned; phone readers are often susceptible to relay attacks.
- Cloud-dependent controllers block access during outages or weak backhaul, forcing insecure overrides.
- Biometrics frequently centralize templates, raising privacy/compliance exposure.
- Security teams lack tamper-evident, queryable logs for audits and incident response.

Solution (overview)

Proximity–Gated Biometric Access Controller is an **edge** access controller that enforces **two factors by design**:

- A registered smartphone first passes BLE cryptographic attestation (ECDH/AES-GCM; nonces/counters; signed policy).
- Only then is the fingerprint sensor enabled; the match runs locally/offline.

Security hardening: anti-relay timing windows, secure boot + secure element, debug lockout, and **tamper-evident (hash-chained) logs**.

Technology & Integrations

- Interfaces: OSDP Secure Channel / Wiegand, relays/dry-contact.
- CAN/LIN for elevators, lockers and vehicle ECUs.
- Templates encrypted at rest; privacy by design (no template export).
- Admin console + mobile wallet: provisioning, guest passes, revocation.
- **SIEM** export for SOC workflows; offline continuity and fail–secure behavior.

Security details

- BLE attestation: ECDH key agreement, AES-GCM session, monotonic counters, signed policy bundles.
- Proximity—gated flow prevents fingerprint use unless phone attests within allowed latency window.
- Secure boot, key storage in **secure element**, debug interfaces locked.
- All events (attest, match, tamper) chained into a tamper-evident log; exportable for audit.

Market (context)

- \bullet Global Physical Access Control: \sim \$10–11B; high single-digit CAGR.
- Fingerprint access control: \sim \$4–5B; low–to–mid–teens CAGR.
- Near-term reachable niche via integrators/OEMs across RU/CIS, CEE, GCC, India: $\sim $300-500M$ (company estimate).

Competitors & Differentiation

Competitor	Strengths	Our differentiation
HID (Signo + Mobile Access)	Biometric reader $+$ mobile cre-	Enforced 2FA: prox -
	dentials	<pre>imity-gated biometric; anti-relay timing; offline decision; tamper-evident</pre>
		logs; OSDP + CAN/LIN
Suprema (BioEntry)	$\begin{array}{lll} {\sf Rugged} & {\sf fingerprint} & + & {\sf LFD}; \\ {\sf BLE/RFID} & & & & \\ \end{array}$	Crypto proximity \rightarrow enables sensor; local template protection; signed policies
IDEMIA (MorphoWave)	High–throughput contactless fingerprint	Compact controller for standard doors/lockers/vehicle ECUs; offline security; broader I/O

Results to date

- Architecture & security design v2; authentication sequence and test plan.
- Two Indian **patent applications filed** (published): proximity–gated biometrics; BLE anti–relay timing.
- TRL 3–4; preparing EVT prototype; partners/integrators identified.

Business model

- Hardware controller per point (door/rack/cabinet).
- Annual per-device license for premium security features/updates.
- SaaS: admin console, audit retention, SIEM connectors (per device/user).
- Managed service (Access–as–a–Service) option; OEM/white–label royalties.

Pilot proposal (example)

- **Sites:** 1–2 remote facilities + 1 POP/DC room (or doors/racks/lockers/elevator enable).
- Integrations: OSDP/Wiegand panel, relays; optional CAN/LIN; SIEM feed.
- **Deliverables:** pilot kits, install & test scripts, KPI report with recommendations.

Pilot KPIs

- Unlock latency P50/P95.
- FAR/FRR with PAD (presentation attack detection).
- Offline endurance ≥ 72 hours.
- Anti–relay rejection rate; tamper–to–alert ≤ 5 s.
- Interoperability success (OSDP/Wiegand/CAN-LIN); SIEM event quality.

Contact

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Patents (published, India): 202511074713 A; 202511073065 A