

1.Virustotal

I started analyzing the malware file by uploading it to Virustotal.com to check if it is reputed or not.


Below is the screenshot of the result. From this its seen that most of the AV engines identify it by Trojan Autolt Script.



In the Details tab, we can see the hash values and the file type is Javascript.




I also checked the 'mur.exe' application in Virustotal which was used to execute the malware file eam-wna. mur.exe was also found to be suspicious.



Next, I started doing the statis analysis of file mure.exe as below.


2. PeID

I used this to find if the file was packed or not and as seen it is unpacked as the EP section is .text



3.CFF Explorer

Used this tool to find details about the executable such as file type/ original filename, hash values and also see the imported directories as seen in below screenshot. These 16 directories in turn call various APIs.



	mur.exe							
D	Module Name	Imports	OFTs	TimeDateStamp	ForwarderChain	Name RVA	FTs (IAT)	
File: mur.exe								
☐ ☐ Dos Header ☐ ☐ Nt Headers	szAnsi	(nFunctions)	Dword	Dword	Dword	Dword	Dword	
Nt Headers File Header	W5OCK32.dll	22	0008DCEC	00000000	00000000	0008DD9C	00082794	
☐ ☐ Optional Header	VERSION.dll	3	0008DC90	00000000	00000000	0008DDEA	00082738	
■ Data Directories [x] ■ Section Headers [x] ■ Import Directory ■ Resource Directory ■ Address Converter ■ Dependency Walker ■ Hex Editor ■ Identifier ■ Import Adder ■ Quick Disassembler ■ Rebuilder ■ Resource Editor	WINMM.dll	3	0008DCDC	00000000	00000000	0008DE2A	00082784	
	COMCTL32.dll	11	0008D5E4	00000000	00000000	0008DF2C	0008208C	
	MPR.dll	4	0008D930	00000000	00000000	0008DF96	000823D8	
	WININET.dll	14	0008DCA0	00000000	00000000	0008E0BC	00082748	
	PSAPI.DLL	4	0008D9A8	00000000	00000000	0008E11C	00082450	
	USERENV.dll	4	0008DC7C	00000000	00000000	0008E182	00082724	
	KERNEL32.dll	159	0008D6B0	00000000	00000000	0008EA86	00082158	
	USER32.dll	160	0008D9F8	00000000	00000000	0008F554	000824A0	
	GDI32.dll	35	0008D620	00000000	00000000	0008F764	000820C8	
	COMDLG32.dll	2	0008D614	00000000	00000000	0008F796	000820BC	
	ADVAPI32.dll	34	0008D558	00000000	00000000	0008FA3E	00082000	
	SHELL32.dll	14	0008D9BC	00000000	00000000	0008FB56	00082464	
	ole32.dll	20	0008DD48	00000000	00000000	0008FCE4	000827F0	
l	ole32, ull	20	00000070	00000000	00000000	0000FCE4	000027F0	

4.Strings


This tool was used to find for printable strings in executable file mur.exe. Below is the screenshot of the result. We can see that this exe contacted autoitscript.com and other information.


```
Strings.txt - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
strings v2.51
Copyright (C) 1999-2013 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com
!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
Rich
.text
`.rdata
@.data
.rsrc
@.reloc
;5$
HZH
HZH
KD3
{D9{ ∨
;s r
_^t
DZH
v)vw3
?~)v
G;{
tNh
F$S3
```

```
Strings.txt - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
```

5. PEView


In the below screenshot, under the 'Value' column is the names of some of the imported APIs grouped by DLLs.






6. Process Explorer

Using this we could find the possible processes created after running the malware from the command line. As seen in below screenshot, mur.exe starts running followed by a couple of other processes(iexplorer.exe and wuaclt.exe) getting created following it.





ile Options View Process Find F	teln						
		€					
Process	CPU	Private Bytes	Working Set	PID	Description	Company Name	VirusTotal
System Idle Process	76.00	0 K	16 K	0			
∃ System	2.00	0 K	212 K	4			
Interrupts	< 0.01	0 K	0 K	n/a l	Hardware Interrupts and DPCs		
smss.exe		164 K	372 K	360 1	Windows NT Session Mana	Microsoft Corporation	The server nam
csrss.exe	2.00	1,808 K	4,508 K	708	Client Server Runtime Process	Microsoft Corporation	The server nam
🖃 🥼 winlogon.exe		12,640 K	11,176 K	732 1	Windows NT Logon Applicat	Microsoft Corporation	The server nam
□ services.exe	1.00	1,712 K	3,576 K		Services and Controller app	Microsoft Corporation	The server nam
₩ VBoxService.exe		2,252 K	3,560 K	992 1	VirtualBox Guest Additions S	Oracle Corporation	The server nam
		3,084 K	4,780 K	1040	Generic Host Process for Wi	Microsoft Corporation	The server nam
wmiprvse.exe		1,940 K	4,816 K	1444		Microsoft Corporation	The server nam
svchost.exe		1,756 K	4,164 K	1132	Generic Host Process for Wi	Microsoft Corporation	The server nam
	2.00	13,056 K	21,752 K	1272	Generic Host Process for Wi	Microsoft Corporation	The server nam
wscntfy.exe		608 K	2,212 K	880 1	Windows Security Center No	Microsoft Corporation	The server nam
🦥 wuaucit.exe	8.00	6,388 K	6,264 K	3428	Automatic Updates	Microsoft Corporation	Hash submitted
svchost.exe		1,208 K	2,980 K	1320	Generic Host Process for Wi	Microsoft Corporation	The server nam
svchost.exe		1,684 K	4,308 K	1484	Generic Host Process for Wi	Microsoft Corporation	The server nam
spoolsv.exe		3,340 K	4,660 K	1612	Spooler SubSystem App	Microsoft Corporation	The server nam
alg.exe		1,188 K	3,516 K	956	Application Layer Gateway S	Microsoft Corporation	The server nam
savedump.exe		2,208 K	2,744 K	824 1	Windows NT Save Dump Uti	Microsoft Corporation	The server nam
sass.exe		3,824 K	5,832 K	832	LSA Shell (Export Version)	Microsoft Corporation	The server nam
∃ 👰 explorer.exe		15,268 K	21,908 K	1840	Windows Explorer	Microsoft Corporation	The server nam
		7,400 K	9,108 K	1984	VirtualBox Guest Additions Tr	Oracle Corporation	The server nam
procexp.exe		15,528 K	6,892 K	248	Sysinternals Process Explorer	Sysinternals - www.sysinter	The server nam
Procmon.exe	9.00	8,516 K	14,372 K	456 (Process Monitor	Sysinternals - www.sysinter	The server nam
□ cmd.exe		2,012 K	2,604 K	1048	Windows Command Processor	Microsoft Corporation	The server nam
mur.exe		1,260 K	3,792 K	3028	Autolt v3 Script	Autolt Team	The server nam
iexplore.exe		1,596 K	3,248 K	1432			
C7F824.exe		2,792 K	5,228 K	1460			



7. Process Monitor


From the processes getting created above, I filtered using the PID of process iexplorer.exe and observed that it was doing multiple operations such as creating files, reading registry keys and loading dlls.





8. ApateDNS

To check if there are any network connections made by this malware, I used ApateDNS and found that it contacted domain toopolex.com multiple times.



9. Wireshark

After this, I used Wireshark to capture network packets and find the IP address of the domain toopolex.com. The IP address found was 169.254.255.255.

```
1 0.000000 169, 254, 182, 191 169, 254, 255, 255 BROWER DamaIn/Workgroup Announcement WORKGROUP, NT Workstation, Domain Enum 2 9, 99887 169, 254, 182, 191 169, 254, 255, 255 NBNS Name query NB TOOPOLEX.COM.ODO 3 10, 43633 169, 254, 182, 191 169, 254, 255, 255 NBNS Name query NB TOOPOLEX.COM.ODO 5 11, 986102 169, 254, 182, 191 169, 254, 255, 255 NBNS Name query NB TOOPOLEX.COM.ODO 5 11, 986102 169, 254, 182, 191 169, 254, 255, 255 NBNS Name query NB TOOPOLEX.COM.ODO 5 11, 986102 169, 254, 182, 191 169, 254, 255, 255 NBNS Name query NB TOOPOLEX.COM.ODO 5 13, 786477 169, 254, 182, 191 169, 254, 255, 255 NBNS Name query NB TOOPOLEX.COM.ODO 5 NAME QUERY NB
```

10.Resource Hacker

Tool used to compile and decompile. Below is the information I found.

```
| Resource Hacker - mur. exe | Resource Hacke
```

