
MALWARE ANALYSIS TERM PROJECT


Initial malware execution command line: mur.exe eam-wna

1. Multi-stage (multiple processes) activity:


To begin with, top-down approach was followed to analyze the given malware. The malware was run from the command line and using Process Explorer, the PIDs of the processes it created were captured. Multi-stage process activity was observed as below-



- The 1st mur.exe creates a 2nd mur.exe and terminates itself as seen below-




- Then, the 2^{nd} mur.exe creates two new proceses called Reg.Svcs. It is observed that when the 2^{nd} Reg.Svcs process is created, it is in suspended state for few seconds before becoming active.



2. Domain name, exfiltrated strings

When the malware was executed from the command line as in above section, ApateDNS was set up to capture any possible network activity. It was observed that the malware communicates with the domain toopolex.com which is its command and control server.



- Below is the screenshot of exfiltrated strings-

```
Strings.txt - Notepad.
 File Edit Format View Help
strings v2.51
Copyright (C) 1999-2013 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com
!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
Rich
.text
`.rdata
@.data
.rsrc
@.reloc
;5$
HZH
HZH
KD3
{D9{ v
;s r
_∧t
DZH
v)vw3
?~)v
G;{
tŃĥ
F$53
```

```
Strings.txt - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
 1#SNAN
 SKIP
THEN
Any
Arabic
Armenian
 Avestan
Balinese
Balinese
Bamum
Bengali
Bopomofo
Braille
Buginese
Buhid
Canadian_Aboriginal
Carian
```

```
File Edit Format New Heb

\text{Vc} at end of pattern
unnecognized character follows \
unnecognized contains the contains the contains \
unnecognized character follows \
unnecognized character after (? or (?-
poSIX named classes are supported only within a class

missing) \
unnecognized character after (? or (?-
poSIX named classes are supported only within a class

missing) \
unnecognized character after (? or (?-
poSIX named classes are supported only within a class

missing) \
unnecognized character after (? \
unne
```

RaiseException

MulDiv

GetVersionExW

GetSystemInfo

InterlockedIncrement

InterlockedDecrement

WideCharToMultiByte

IstropyW

MultiByteToWideChar

lstrlenW

lstrempiW

GetModuleHandleW

QueryPerformanceCounter

VirtualFreeEx

OpenProcess

VirtualAllocEx

WriteProcessMemory

ReadProcessMemory

CreateFileW

SetFilePointerEx

ReadFile

WriteFile

FlushFileBuffers

TerminateProcess

CreateToolhelp32Snapshot

Process32FirstW

Process32NextW

SetFileTime

GetFileAttributesW

FindFirstFileW

FindClose

DeleteFileW

FindNextFileW

MoveFileW

CopyFileW

CreateDirectoryW

 ${\sf RemoveDirectoryW}$

SetSystemPowerState

QueryPerformanceFrequency

FindResourceW

LoadResource

LockResource

SizeofResource

EnumResourceNamesW

OutputDebugStringW

GetLocalTime

CompareStringW

DeleteCriticalSection

EnterCriticalSection

LeaveCriticalSection

3. Analysis of 1st mur.exe

The PID of this process was captured using Process explorer and it was used as a filter to check the file and process activity using ProcMon.

- It was observed that this process reads extensively from eam-wna file as seen in below sreenshot.

Process Name	PID Operation	Path	Result	Detail
@mur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\desktop.ini	SUCCESS	Offset: 0, Length: 62
@mur.exe		C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\desktop.ini		. Offset: 0, Length: 4,294,967,295
@mur.exe	2872 CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\desktop.ini	SUCCESS	
@mur.exe	2872 CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Directory, Synchronize, Disposition: Open, Options: Directory, Synchronous IO Non-
@mur.exe	2872 🔂 QueryDirectory	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Filter: eam-wna, 1: eam-wna
@mur.exe	2872 🛃 CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe	SUCCESS	
@mur.exe	2872 CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Read, Disposition: Open, Options: Synchronous IO Non-Alert, Non-Directory File, Attributes
@mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 0, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🛃 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 65,516, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 131,032, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 196,548, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 262,064, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🖳 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 327,580, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 393,096, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 📑 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 458,612, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🖳 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 524,128, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 589,644, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 655,160, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🗟 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 720,676, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 786,192, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🖳 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 851,708, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 917,224, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🗟 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 982,740, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,048,256, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,113,772, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,179,288, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,244,804, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,310,320, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,375,836, Length: 65,536
amur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,441,352, Length: 65,536
	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,506,868, Length: 65,536
Amur.exe	2872 🖳 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1.572,384, Length: 65,536
amur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,637,900, Length: 65,536
Amur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,703,416, Length: 65,536
amur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1.768.932, Length: 65.536
amur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,834,448, Length: 65,536
amur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1.899.964, Length; 65,536
amur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,965,480, Length: 65,536
amur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,030,996, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2.096.512, Length; 65.536
amur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam·wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,162,028, Length: 65,536
amur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,227,544, Length: 65,536
amur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2.293.060, Length: 65.536
amur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam·wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,358,576, Length: 65,536
amur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,424,092, Length: 65,536
Amur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam·wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,489,608, Length: 65,536
amur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,555,124, Length: 65,536
amur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,620,640, Length: 65,536
amur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,686,156, Length: 65,536
mur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,751.672, Length: 65,536
amur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,817,188, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 ReadFile 2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,882,704, Length: 65,536 Offset: 2,948,220, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	zorz 📺 Headhile	C. ADucuments and Settings (Fengl/Application Data)(sbe)(eam-wha	SULLESS	Oliset, 2,340,220, Lerigir, 63,036

@mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,572,864, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 📑 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,638,400, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,703,936, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 💁 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,769,472, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🛃 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,835,008, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🛼 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,900,544, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 1,966,080, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 💁 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,031,616, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🛃 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,097,152, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,162,688, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 📑 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,228,224, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🛃 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,293,760, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 📑 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,359,296, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,424,832, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 💁 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,490,368, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🛃 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,555,904, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🛃 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,621,440, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 💁 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,686,976, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🛃 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,752,512, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🛃 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,818,048, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,883,584, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 💁 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,949,120, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🛃 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,014,656, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🛃 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,080,192, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,145,728, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 💁 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,211,264, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🛃 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,276,800, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🋃 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,342,336, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🌉 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,407,872, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🛃 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,473,408, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 🛃 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,538,944, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,604,480, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam·wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,670,016, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam·wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,735,552, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,801,088, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,866,624, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,932,160, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam·wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,997,696, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 ♣ReadFile 2872 ♣ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 4,063,232, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam·wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 4,128,768, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam·wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 4,194,304, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe	2872 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	Offset: 4,259,840, Length: 65,536 Offset: 4,325,376, Length: 65,536
@mur.exe		C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SUCCESS	
@mur.exe	2872 🖳 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\eam-wna	SULLESS	Offset: 4,390,912, Length: 65,536

- The process also reads file oio.ppt at different offesets from which we can infer that this is significant file used in malware execution.

7:01:31.3398280 PM @mur.exe	2872 🗟 QueryStandard	II C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	AllocationSize: 434,176, EndOfFile: 430,304, NumberOfLinks: 1, DeletePending: False, Directory: False
7:01:31.3399538 PM @mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 0, Length: 65,536
7:01:31.3452840 PM @mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 65,536, Length: 65,536
7:01:31.3577264 PM @mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 131,072, Length: 65,536
7:01:31.3651799 PM @mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 196,608, Length: 65,536
7:01:31.3706660 PM @mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 262,144, Length: 65,536
7:01:31.3758315 PM @mur.exe	2872 🗟 ReadFile	E:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 327,680, Length: 65,536
7:01:31.3821158 PM @mur.exe	2872 🗟 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 393,216, Length: 37,088
7:01:31.3952289 PM @mur.exe	2872 🗟 CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	
7:01:31.4036339 PM @mur.exe	2872 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\mur.exe	SUCCESS	Offset: 234,496, Length: 4,096, I/O Flags: Non-cached, Paging I/O, Synchronous Paging I/O

- A file was seen to be created with a random name, and WriteFile operation takes place to the file which means something is being written in this file, the length of which is 94,147 bytes. The temporary file name for this particular malware execution is HWWEC.

7:01:31.4876664 PM @mur.exe	2872 - CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\HWWEC	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Read/Write, Disposition: OpenIf, Options: Synchronous IO Non-Alert, Non-Directory File, Attributes: N. ShareMode: Read, Write, Delete, AllocationSize: 0, OpenResult: Cre.,
7:01:31.4883701 PM @mur.exe	2872 A QueryStandard	I C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\HWWEC	SUCCESS	AllocationSize: 0, EndOfFile: 0, NumberOfLink:: 1, DeletePending: False, Directory: False
7:01:31.4884847 PM @mur.exe	2872 - ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\HWWEC	END OF FILE	Offset: 0, Length: 65,536
7:01:31.4888246 PM @mur.exe	2872 WriteFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\HwWEC		Offset: 0, Length: 94,147
7:01:31.4890289 PM @mur.exe	2872 🔂 CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\HWWEC	SUCCESS	
7:01:31.4892850 PM @mur.exe	2872 🗟 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\HWWEC	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 5/7/2022 7:09:08 PM, LastAccessTime: 5/7/2022 7:09:08 PM, LastAccessTime: 5/7/2022 7:09:08 PM, CastAccessTime: 5/7/2022 7:09:08 PM, CastAccessTim
7:01:31.4893457 PM @mur.exe	2872 🗟 CreateFile	C:V	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Directory, Synchronize, Disposition: Open, Options: Directory, Synchronous IO Non-Alert, Attributes: n/a, ShareMode: Read, Write, AllocationSize: n/a, OpenResult
7:01:31.4894007 PM @mur.exe	2872 🖳 QueryDirectory	C:\Documents and Settings	SUCCESS	Filter: Documents and Settings, 1: Documents and Settings

- Looking at the chronology of the File Activity, it can be suspected that the data that is being written in the temporary file, is the result of the read operations and possibly subsequent calculations carried out by the malware.

2872	ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 0, Length: 65,536
2872	ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 65,536, Length: 65,536
2872	ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 131,072, Length: 65,536
2872	ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 196,608, Length: 65,536
2872	NeadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 262,144, Length: 65,536
		C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt		Offset: 327,680, Length: 65,536
		C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt		Offset: 393,216, Length: 37,088
2872	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	
		C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\mur.exe		Offset: 234,496, Length: 4,096, I/O Flags: Non-cached, Paging I/O, Synchronous Paging I/O
		C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\mur.exe		Offset: 369,664, Length: 4,096, I/O Flags: Non-cached, Paging I/O, Synchronous Paging I/O
2872	CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\HWWEC		Desired Access: Generic Read/Write, Disposition: OpenIf, Options: Synchronous ID Non-Alert, Non-Directory File, Attributes: N, ShareMode: Read, Write, Delete, AllocationSize: 0, OpenResult: Cre
		C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\HWWEC		AllocationSize: 0, EndOfFile: 0, NumberOfLinks: 1, DeletePending: False, Directory: False
		C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\HWWEC		Offset: 0, Length: 65,536
		C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\HWWEC		Offset: 0, Length: 94,147
2872	CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\HWWEC	SUCCESS	
		C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\HWWEC	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 577/2022 7:09:08 PM, LastAccessTime: 577/2022 7:09:08 PM, LastAccessTime: 577/2022 7:09:08 PM, ChangeTime: 577/2022 7:09:08 PM, AllocationSize: 94,208, EndOfFile: 94,147
2872	CreateFile	C/	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Directory, Synchronize, Disposition: Open, Options: Directory, Synchronous IO Non-Alert, Attributes: n/a, ShareMode: Read, Write, AllocationSize: n/a, OpenResult

- This process is responsible for spawning a child process called **mur.exe** using the commandline as highlighted in the screenshot below. Looking at the commandline, we can conclude that the 1^{st} mur.exe uses the above generated file to launch the 2^{nd} mur.exe.

The 2nd mur.exe takes the file created by the 1st mur.exe as commandline argument. When checked if that file was still present or not in the directory, it was not found which means it was a temporary file and most probably it had been deleted.


7:01:05.6594321 PM @mur.exe 7:01:05.6596944 PM @mur.exe 7:01:05.6702111 PM @mur.exe	2872 III Thread Create 2872 III Thread Esk 2872 III Coad Image C:\\WINDOWS\switem32\uxtheme.dl	SUCCESS SUCCESS SUCCESS	Thread ID: 2890 Thread ID: 2890, User Time: 0.0000000, Kernel Time: 0.0000000 Image Barse Oxfoot/0000, Image Size: 0.438000
7:01:05.6774215 PM @mur.exe 7:01:06.2715191 PM @mur.exe	2872 A Load Image C:\WINDOWS\system32\setupapi.dl C:\WINDOWS\system32\MSCTFIME.IME	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x77920000, Image Size: 0x3000 Image Base: 0x755c0000, Image Size: 0x28000
7:01:31.4973637 PM mur.exe 7:01:33.0277208 PM mur.exe 7:01:33.0283938 PM mur.exe	2872 Tip Process Create C-VD ocuments and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\mur.exe 2872 Tip Thread Exit 2872 Process Exit	SUCCESS SUCCESS	FID. 39%. Command Inc. 10:Nocuments and Gettings/Empt/Application Data bothorus even 0:ND0CUME=11-Empt/APPLIC=11/bb4PV/WEC Thread ID: 297%. User Time: 0.5407776, Kernel Time: 0.0070108 Ex Status: 0. User Time: 0.5507920 seconds, Kernel Time: 0.0001084 seconds; Private Bittes: 1.216,512, Peak Private Bittes: 3,727,360, Working Set 4,000,464, Peak Working Set 6,639,61

The above commandline sets the difference between the 1st mur.exe and 2nd mur.exe as the command line for each is different and hence they have a different behaviour.

The mur.exe executable itself does not change. This was verified by checking the hash value of the execuatble before and after running the malware. And they were found to be same.

- Few Anti-debugging/Sandbox evasion techniques were found while debugging the code, starting with setting the break point at CreateProcessW
- 1. Many instances were found where Sleep API was called This function is usually used for sandbox evasion. By delaying its execution beyond this timeframe malware can hide its malicious actions and activities from the sandbox. As a result of this, some malware has evolved to detect these patches as an additional indicator of an analysis/sandbox environment. This is done by taking a timestamp, going to sleep, and checking the timestamp upon waking up. If the time difference from the previously taken timestamp is substantially different than the time the malware was programmed to sleep, the malware will avoid or adjust its execution.

```
.text:00416A45
                                                        call ds:Sleep
call ds:Sleep
.text:00416A91
.text:00416ADF
.text:00416B31
.text:0042C605
                                                        call ds:Sleep
call ds:Sleep
call ds:Sleep
.text:0042D855
                                                        call ds:Sleep
.text:0042DCC5
                                                        call ds:Sleep
                                                       call ds:Sleep
call ds:Sleep
call ds:Sleep
call ds:Sleep
call ds:Sleep
call ds:Sleep
text:0042DE22
 text:0042E125
.text:0043321D
                                                       call ds:Sleep
.text:0043457F
.text:004345BB
.text:004345FA
.text:00436A6E
.text:00436A86
.text:00443AA3
.text:00443B31
                                                        call ds:Sleep
.text:00445D94
                                                                   edi. ds:Sleep
                                                        call edi; Sleep
mov edi, ds: Sleep
call edi; Sleep
call edi; Sleep
text:00445D90
.text:00445DC9
.text:00445DD1
.text:00445DF4
.text:00451762
                                                         call ds:Sleep
```



2. Also, a couple of instances were found where IsDebuggerPresent API was called – It is perhaps the simplest anti-debugging method. This function detects if the calling process is being debugged by a user-mode debugger. If the current process is running in the context of a debugger, the return value is nonzero.

```
.text:0040D7R4
                                                               1pBuffer
.text:0040D7B5
                                           104h
                                  bush
                                                              ; nBufferLength
.text:0040D7BA
                                           ds:GetCurrentDirectoryW
                                  .
call
.text:0040D7C0
                                  push
.text:0040D7C1
                                  call
                                           sub 402190
.text:0040D7C6
                                  call
                                           ds:IsDebuggerPresent
.text:0040D7CC
                                           eax, eax
loc 42E141
                                  test
.text:0040D7CE
                                  jnz
.text:0040D7D4
                                                1
```

- This process also supports the functionality to shutdown / reboot the system. It uses many different APIs for this purpose such as:

1. InitiateSystemShutDownExW

2. SetSystemPowerState

```
loc_433456:
                                                           ; CODE XREF: sub_4333A3+6A1j
                                   eax, 1
                       push
push
call
                                                           : fForce
                                   eax ; fSuspend
ds:SetSystemPowerState
                       pop
mov
pop
retn
                                   ebx
                                   esp, ebp
ebp
                                                           ; CODE XREF: sub_4333A3+6F<sup>†</sup>j
1oc_433469:
                                  eax ; fForce
eax ; fSuspend
ds:SetSystemPowerState
ebx
                       push
                       push
call
                       pop
mov
pop
retn
                                   esp, ebp
ebp
sub_4333A3
```

3. ExitWindowsEx

```
.text:00433400;
.text:00433400 loc_433400:
.text:00433400 loc_433400:
.text:00433400 loc_433400:
.text:00433400 jz short loc_433456
.text:00433410 cnp ebx, 400
.text:00433412 jz short loc_433469
.text:00433417 jnz short loc_433427
.text:00433417 jnz short loc_433427
.text:00433410 push 0 ; dwReserved
.text:00433410 push ebx uFlags
.text:00433410 call ds:ExitWindowsEx; Logoff/Restart/Shut down
.text:00433410 push ebx uFlags
.text:00433410 push ebx call ds:ExitWindowsEx; Logoff/Restart/Shut down
.text:00433420 pop ebx
.text:00433420 pop ebp
.text:00433420 retn
```

4. Analysis of 2st mur.exe

In reference to the child process created by 1st mur.exe as seen in below screenshot, the PID of this child process was applied as filter in Process Monitor for further analysis.



-It was seen that this process reads extensively from mur.exe which probably could be its parent process. Also, it reads many offsets from oio.ppt file



7:01:34.0480465 PM @mur.exe	3976 🌺 CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Read, Disposition: Open, Options: Synchronous IO Non-Alert, Non-Directory File, Attributes: N, ShareMode: Read, Write, Delete, AllocationSize: n/a, OpenResult: Opened
7:01:34.0482019 PM @mur.exe	3976 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 0, Length: 65,536
7:01:34.0489036 PM @mur.exe	3976 QueryStandard	IC:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	AllocationSize: 434,176, EndOlFile: 430,304, NumberOfLinks: 1, DeletePending: False, Directory: False
7:01:34.0490210 PM @mur.exe	3976 🖳 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 0, Length: 65,536
7:01:34.0543175 PM @mur.exe	3976 🖳 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 65,536, Length: 65,536
7:01:34.0596734 PM @mur.exe	3976 🖳 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 131,072, Length: 65,536
7:01:34.0650040 PM @mur.exe	3976 🖳 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 196,608, Length: 65,536
7:01:34.0699125 PM @mur.exe	3976 🖳 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 262,144, Length: 65,536
7:01:34.0745848 PM @mur.exe	3976 🖳 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 327,680, Length: 65,536
7:01:34.0880712 PM @mur.exe	3976 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Offset: 393,216, Length: 37,088
7:01:34.0981730 PM @mur.exe	3976 🖳 CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	

- The temporary file created HWWEC does not exist anymore in the directory as it could have been deleted. To confirm this, FileActivity tab of ProcessMonitor was explored and it was found that the file was indeed deleted.




- It was observed that this process spawns two other processes with name Reg.Svcs using different command lines as highlighted in below screenshot. The $1^{\rm st}$ Reg.Svcs uses the same temporary file that was used launch the $2^{\rm nd}$ mur.exe process.

- This process is involved in process replacement or process hollowing. It occurs when a malware unmaps (hollows out) the legitimate code from memory of the target process, and overwrites the memory space of the target process (e.g., svchost.exe) with a malicious executable.


Following are steps that shows the evidence.


Using Ollydbg, breakpoint was set at CreateProcessW, WriteProcessMemory, GetThreatContext, SetThreatContext, VirtualAllocEx.

1- Virtual Allocation of memory takes places for the creation of the process.




2. Now, the Reg.svcs process is created in the suspended state.






3. Again the virtul allocation of memory takes place, but this time it is for the malware executable.








4. Now, the WriteProcessMemory function is executed. Here, the Address is the start of RAM for the Reg.Svcs process and the buffer contains the PE file. Below is the output of the buffer if we follow it in dump.




It was observed that this function executes multiple times and in each execution, it writes each section of the malware executable at the given address.












5. Next, GetThreatContext function is called to retrieve the thread context of the specified thread.



6. After this, SetThreadContext is executed to point the entrypoint to a new code section that it has written.




7. And Finally, the malicious Reg.svcs gets created whose command line has same temporary file name as that was used to launch the 2^{nd} mur.exe.




5. Analysis of 1st Reg.svcs Process

After this process was spawned by 2^{nd} mur.exe, using the PID from process explorer, this executable's activity was looked upon from Process Monitor.

- From the Network tab, it can be concluded that this process is responsible for some kind of network activity.
- The domain it is getting connected to is tooplex.com. This was confirmed by setting a breakpoint at Ws32.connect API and following the stack from where it is called from to see the input arguments it taken in.




Also, it was observed that once internal gateway was set in ApateDNS, this process tries to establish a connection with other Ips along with toopolex.com domain. Possibly, when it finds that the DNS is not resolving, it tries to reach the hard coded IPs which are possibly present in the malware's executable.




- Since, this process is involved in network activites, there would exist send and receive functions. In OllyDbg, breakpoints were set at these functions to observe the behaviour of the malware in little more detail. Below are some details-

Here, a breakpoint was set at receive function to see what the malware send to the netcat.




Below is the information that it sent to netcat which actually it would send to toopolex.com.

- Below highlighted SQL query and content such as %s logins.json, signons were found when the LoadLibraryW API was hit which hints that some kind of data exfiltration is taking place.



- This process was also found to be involved in information collection and data exfiltration. Below is screenshots of some data that is exfiltrated.
- 1. Cryptographic machine guid- Observing the chronology of below events, it looks like the process is reading the value of the registry key which is the Machine GUID, creating a temporary file and writing the data into it and later deleting the file and clearing tracks. This is how maybe the information is sent to the command and control server. toopolex.com



2. Computer name- FENG COMPUTER

RegSvcs.exe	696 RegOperKey HKLM\System\CurrentControlSe\ControlScomputerName	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read
RegSvcs.exe	696 KRegOpenKey HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ComputerName\ActiveComputerName	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read
RegSvcs.exe	696 FregQueryValue HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ComputerName\ComputerName	SUCCESS	Type: REG_SZ, Length: 28, Data: FENG-COMPUTER
RegSvcs.exe	696 RegCloseKey HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ComputerName\ActiveComputerName	SUCCESS	
RegSvcs.exe	696 RegCloseKey HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\ComputerName	SUCCESS	

- 3. Saved Credentials from applications-
- a. As seen in the below screenshot, the process is querying to multiple applications and trying to read the login data.

_			
RegSvcs.exe	696 🛃 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data	SUCCESS
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\Comodo\Dragon\User Data\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen		PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen		PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataComodo\Dragon\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\MapleStudio\ChromePlus\User Data\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌉 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\MapleStudio\ChromePlus\User Data\Default\Web Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌉 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataMapleStudio\ChromePlus\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataMapleStudio\ChromePlus\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Web Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataGoogle\Chrome\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataGoogle\Chrome\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\Nichrome\User Data\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\Nichrome\User Data\Default\Web Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataNichrome\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataNichrome\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\RockMelt\User Data\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🋃 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\RockMelt\User Data\Default\Web Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌉 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataRockMelt\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🅕 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataRockMelt\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🖳 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\Spark\User Data\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌉 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\Spark\User Data\Default\Web Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataSpark\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataSpark\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🛃 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\Chromium\User Data\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌉 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\Chromium\User Data\Default\Web Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataChromium\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSivcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen		PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\Titan Browser\User Data\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌉 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\Titan Browser\User Data\Default\Web Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataTitan Browser\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataTitan Browser\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌉 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\Torch\User Data\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\Torch\User Data\Default\Web Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSives.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataTorch\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataTorch\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\Yandex\YandexBrowser\User Data\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\Yandex\YandexBrowser\User Data\Default\Web Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌉 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataYandex\YandexBrowser\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🋃 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataYandex\YandexBrowser\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌉 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\Epic Privacy Browser\User Data\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\Epic Privacy Browser\User Data\Default\Web Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🋃 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataEpic Privacy Browser\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌉 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataEpic Privacy Browser\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\CocCoc\Browser\User Data\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🗟 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\CocCoc\Browser\User Data\Default\Web Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataCocCoc\Browser\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application DataCocCoc\Browser\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🗟 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\Vivaldi\User Data\Default\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\Vivaldi\User Data\Default\Web Data	PATH NOT FOUND
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\vivaldi\Login Data	PATH NOT FOUND

b. Process is trying to read from all the below highlighted files related to FTP.

RegSvcs.exe RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\JaSFtp12\data\settings\sshProfiles-j.jsd	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\JaSFtp12\data\settings\ftpProfiles-j.jsd	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\JaSFtp13\encPwd.jsd	PATH NOT FOUND	
■ RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\JaSFtp13\data\settings\sshProfiles-j.jsd	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🖳 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\JaSFtp13\data\settings\ftpProfiles-j.jsd	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\JaSFtp14\encPwd.jsd	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\JaSFtp14\data\settings\sshProfiles-i.jsd	PATH NOT FOUND	
☐RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\JaSFtp14\data\settings\ftpProfiles-i.isd	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\Automize7\data\settings\ftpProfiles-i.isd	PATH NOT FOUND	
BedSycs eye	696 A QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\Automize8\data\settings\ftpProfiles-i.isd	PATH NOT FOUND	
BegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\Automize9\data\settings\ftpProfiles-i.jsd	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 A QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\Automize10\data\settings\ftpProfiles-j.isd	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 A QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\Automize11\data\settings\ftpProfiles-j.isd	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\Automize12\data\settings\ftpProfiles-j.isd	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔂 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\Automize13\data\settings\ftpProfiles-j.jsd	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\Automize14\data\settings\ftpProfiles-i.isd	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\FTPInfo\ServerList.xml	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\FTPInfo\ServerList.cfg	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 KRegOpenKev		NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Maximum Allowed
RegSvcs.exe	696 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\Staff-FTP\sites.ini	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access, Indamidin Asorred
RegSvcs.exe	696 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\BlazeFtp\site.dat	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 RegOpenKey		NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Query Value
RegSvcs.exe	696 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\Fastream NETFile\Mv FTP Links	PATH NOT FOUND	Desired Access, query value
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔂 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\GoFTP\settings\Connections.txt	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🕏 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\Estsoft\ALFTP\ESTdb2.dat	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 A QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\DeluxeFTP\sites.xml	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 A QueryOpen	C:\WINDOWS\wex ftp.ini	NAME NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 A QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\wcx ftp.ini	NAME NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🖟 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\wcx. ftp.ini	NAME NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🕏 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\reng\wcx_rtp.ini C:\Documents and Settings\reng\Application Data\GHISLER\wcx_ftp.ini	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe		C:\Documents and Settings\reng\Application Data\anisten\wcx_rtp.ini C:\Program Files\FTPGetter\Profile\servers.xml	PATH NOT FOUND	
	696 QueryOpen		PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe RegSvcs.exe	696 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\FTPGetter\servers.xml		
Heg5vcs.exe	696 🔂 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\WS_FTP\WS_FTP.INI	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔂 QueryOpen	C:\WINDOWS\WS_FTP.INI	NAME NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe RegSvcs.exe	696 🔂 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Local Settings\Application Data\INSoftware\NovaFTP\NovaFTP.db	PATH NOT FOUND	
Heg5vcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\WINDOWS\wex_ftp.ini	NAME NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\wcx_ftp.ini	NAME NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe RegSvcs.exe	696 🔂 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\wcx_ftp.ini	NAME NOT FOUND	
Heg5vcs.exe	696 🔂 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\GHISLER\wcx_ftp.ini	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe RegSvcs.exe	696 🔂 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\SmartFTP	NAME NOT FOUND	
Heg5vcs.exe	696 KRegOpenKey		NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Maximum Allowed
RegSvcs.exe	696 KRegOpenKey		NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Maximum Allowed
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\FreshWebmaster\FreshFTP\FtpSites.SMF	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\FTP Now\sites.xml	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\Odin Secure FTP Expert\QFDefault.QFQ	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🗟 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\Odin Secure FTP Expert\SiteInfo.QFP	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\NCH Software\ClassicFTP\FTPAccounts	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Maximum Allowed
RegSvcs.exe	696 KRegOpenKey		NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Maximum Allowed
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔂 QueryOpen	C:\Program Files\WinFtp Client\Favorites.dat	PATH NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\WINDOWS\32BitFtp.TMP	NAME NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌺 QueryOpen	C:\WINDOWS\32BitFtp.ini	NAME NOT FOUND	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🔜 QueryOpen	C:\FTP Navigator\Ftplist.txt	PATH NOT FOUND	

4. Reading System Language

Process Name	PID Operation	Path	Result	Detail
RegSvcs.exe	696 🍂 RegQueryValue	HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\MultiUlLanguageId	NAME NOT FOUND	Length: 256
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌊 RegQueryValue	HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\MultiUlLanguageId	NAME NOT FOUND	Length: 256
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌊 RegQueryValue	HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\MultiUlLanguageId	NAME NOT FOUND	Length: 256
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌊 RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\LanguagePack	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Query Value
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌊 RegEnum Value	HKLM\SDFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\LanguagePack	SUCCESS	Index: 0, Name: SURROGATE, Type: REG_DWORD, Length: 4, Data: 2
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌊 RegEnumValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\LanguagePack	NO MORE ENTRIES	Index: 1, Length: 220
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌊 RegCloseKey	HKLM\SDFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\LanguagePack	SUCCESS	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌊 RegQueryValue	HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\MultiUlLanguageId	NAME NOT FOUND	Length: 256

5. ProfileLists


RegSvcs.exe	696 KRegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ProfileList	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read
RegSvcs.exe	696 🍂 RegQueryValue	HKLM\SDFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ProfileList\DefaultUserProfile	SUCCESS	Type: REG_SZ, Length: 26, Data: Default User
RegSvcs.exe	696 🌋 RegCloseKey	HKLM\SDFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ProfileList	SUCCESS	
RegSvcs.exe	696 🍂 RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ProfileList\S-1-5-21-602162358-839522115-1060284298-1003	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read
RegSvcs.exe	696 KRegQueryValue	HKLM\S0FTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ProfileList\S-1-5-21-602162358-839522115-1060284298-1003\ProfileImagePath	SUCCESS	Type: REG_EXPAND_SZ, Length: 84, Data: %SystemDrive%\Documents and Settings\Feng
■ BegSycs exe	696 et BeaCloseKeu	HKLM\SDFT\V\ABF\Microsoft\\Windows NT\Currenf\ersign\Profilel ist\S-1-5-21-602162358-839522115-1060284298-1003	SUCCESS	

- There were encryption/encoding APIs found while debugging the process in OllyDbg which confirms that this process has this capability. Below were the APIs-
- a. *CryptEncrypt* was found at 77DEE340. This accepts text or container data and returns container data as a binary file named <u>encrypted.data</u>
- b. *CryptBinaryToStringA* was found at 77AB4020. This function converts an array of bytes into a formatted string.


- Apart from this, Keylogging APIs were also found while debugging in OllyDBG which confirms that this process has keylogging capabilities. Below were the APIs-
- a. *GetAsyncKeyState* was found at 7E42A78F. This function gives information about the key, whether the key was pressed up or down at the time when the function is called. In simple words, it will check whether a key is pressed or not.
- b. *GetWindowLongW* was found at 7E4188A6. This retrieves information about the specified window. The function also retrieves the 32-bit (DWORD) value at the specified offset into the extra window memory
- c. *GetKeyState* was found at 7E429ED9. It checks if a keyboard key or mouse/joystick button is down or up. Also retrieves joystick status.
- d. GetKeyboardState was found at 7E42D226. It retrieves the status of the specified virtual key.


6. Analysis of 2nd RegSvcs.exe

The command line it uses for its creation is different from the 1st RegSvcs.exe. Below is the screenshot of the difference- This PID of the process in this run is 1296. It uses the same command line as the 2nd mur.exe



Loading its PID in the ProcessMonitor, it is observed that, the Regsvcs.exe was replaced with the filename as in the below screenshot and possibly deleted later for which there is no substantial evidence found. For this reason, if we try to look up for the exe in the directory, it cannot be located.





- The process is reading multiple offsets of the temporary file that was generated by 2nd mur.exe

RegSvcs.exe	3668 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\OHSWT	SUCCESS	Offset: 65,516, Length: 28,631
RegSvcs.exe	3668 🖳 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\OHSWT	END OF FILE	Offset: 94,147, Length: 36,864
RegSvcs.exe	3668 🖳 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\OHSWT	SUCCESS	Offset: 94,127, Length: 20
RegSvcs.exe	3668 🖳 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\OHSWT	END OF FILE	Offset: 94,147, Length: 61,440
RegSvcs.exe	3668 🖳 CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\OHSWT	SUCCESS	_
RegSvcs.exe	3668 🖳 CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\OHSWT	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Read, Dis
RegSvcs.exe	3668 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\OHSWT	SUCCESS	Offset: 0, Length: 65,536
RegSvcs.exe	3668 🗟 CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Execute/Traverse
RegSvcs.exe	3668 🖳 CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe	SUCCESS	
RegSvcs.exe	3668 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\OHSWT	SUCCESS	Offset: 65,536, Length: 28,611
RegSvcs.exe	3668 🗟 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\OHSWT	END OF FILE	Offset: 94,147, Length: 65,536
RegSvcs.exe	3668 🔜 ReadFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\OHSWT	END OF FILE	Offset: 94,147, Length: 65,536
RegSvcs.exe	3668 🖳 CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\OHSWT	SUCCESS	

- It creates a file named spd and deletes it later.

RegSvcs.exe	3668 CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\spd	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Delete, Disposition: Open, Options: Non-Directory File, Opt
RegSvcs.exe	3668 🖳 QueryAttributeTagFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application D ata\sbe\spd	SUCCESS	Attributes: A, ReparseTag: 0x0
RegSvcs.exe	3668 SetDispositionInformationFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\spd	SUCCESS	Delete: True
RegSvcs.exe	3668 🖳 CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application D ata\sbe\spd	SUCCESS	
RegSvcs.exe	3668 🖳 QueryDirectory	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe	NO MORE FILES	
RegSvcs.exe	3668 🖳 CloseFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe	SUCCESS	
RegSvcs.exe	3668 🖳 CreateFile	C:\Documents and Settings\Feng\Application Data\sbe\oio.ppt	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Read, Disposition: Open, Options: Synchronous IO Non-Alert, Non-

- It is observed that this process queries multiple registry keys. Once such interesting finding is shown below-



→ A registry key is created HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

This key contains commands that will be run each time a user logs on. (not at boot time)

- \rightarrow Then a value to the key is set under the name of WindowsUpdate. The value that is set is the command line used to execute the 1st mur.exe.
- → Lastly the registry is closed with all SUCCESS values which means this registry key is successfully created and its value is set.

From the above activity, we can therefore conclude that every time the user logs in the machine, mur.exe eam-wna malware is automatically run at the start time.

So, possibly the purpose of 2nd RegSvcs.exe is to make sure that the malware does not leave the user machine and make it difficult to find this malicious registry key as it is set under a genuine WindowsUpdate name.