CS628A Assignment 1 (Design Document)

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1 Simple Upload/Download

1.1 User Structure

```
type User struct {
 Username
                                             // Username need not be encrypted with symmetric
                string
   kev
                [] byte
                                             // Argon2(password), given, password has high
 SymmetricKey
   entropy
 PrivateKev
                userlib . PrivateKey
                                            // Encrypted with the Symmetric Key
 FileKevs
                map[string] FileCredentials // Indexed by filename to FileSharingKey
                                            // Indexed by filename to file's metadata index
 MetadataIndex map[string]string
                                             // H(username + SymmetricKey + PrivateKey +
 HMAC
                [] byte
   FileKeys)
```

```
type FileSharingKey string // HashValue of (Owner.SymmetricKey + uuid as salt)
type FileCredentials struct {
    MetaDataIV [] byte
    FileKey FileSharingKey
}
```

User struct stores all the credentials of user, and this structure is encrypted with SymmetricKey (\equiv Argon2(password)) to assure confidentiality. We use HMAC to check integrity. It needs to be updated regulary, since FileKeys may change. FileKeys acts like a hashMap which stores FileSharingKey that is used to encrypt Block.Content.

Data Struct will be directly stored in Marshalled form in DataStore. Any person (or Datastore itself) who wishes to access the Users or Files or FileBlocks firstly has to Unmarshal this structure, then access its fields.

1.2 InitUser, GetUser

When a user is created, a new pair of Pub/Priv Keys are generated and the PrivKey is stored in encrypted form in User struct, **EDIT1:** while PubKey is stored in KeyStore. When GetUser is called, the given Argon2(password) is used to Decrypt the whole User Struct, verify integrity with HMAC and return the values accordingly.

1.3 Store File and AppendFile

```
type MetaData struct {
 Owner
                   string
                                      // hash(LastEditByUserName)
  LastEditBy
                   map[string][] byte // Map from hash(username) to encrypted filename for that
  FilenameMap
    user (encrypted with symmetric key of that user)
                                      // HashValue(Owner + FilenameMap[Owner] + uuid nonce)
  GenesisBlock
                   string
  GenesisUUIDNonce uuid.UUID
  LastBlock
                             HashValue(LastEditBy + FilenameMap[LastEditBy] + uuid nonce)
                   string //
                   uuid.UUID
 LastUUIDNonce
 LastBlockIV
                   [] byte
 HMAC
                   byte // HMAC(key = FileSharingKey, Data = Owner, LastEditBy, LastEditTime
     GenesisBlock, GenesisBlockNonce, LastUUIDNonce, LastBlock)
```

This stores the complete metadata about the various blocks created by a user. When StoreFile is called, we generate a GenesisUUIDNonce and use it to create a HashValue, which is used to index into the FileBlocks map of Data Struct. To maintain confidentiality, we use hashedValues instead of direct usernames. Similarly, whenever the user performs an AppendFile operation, a new Block is created and LastUUIDNonce and LastBlock is updated.

```
// Block is encrypted by the FileSharingKey
type Block struct {
Owner string
Content [] byte
PrevBlockHash string
PrevBlockIV [] byte
HMAC [] byte
}
```

Suppose Alice creates new file "foobar". Filename is hashed (confidentiality) and this hash is used to index into User.FileKeys where a newly generated FileSharingKey is created. This acts like a Symmetric Key for encrypting/decrypting a "MetaData". A GenesisBlock is created which, which is indexed by HashValue (Owner + FilenameMap [Owner] + uuid as nonce) into the Data.FileBlocks map. The content of Block is encrypted with CFBEncryption (key=FileSharingKey) which is owned by the Owner.

When we AppendFile(), a new Block is created, MetaData.LastUUIDNonce is generated & LastBlock is filled with HashValue(LastEditBy + FilenameMap [Owner] + uuid as nonce) and stored in Data.FileBlocks map.

2 Sharing/Revoking

2.1 ShareFile() and ReceiveFile()

EDIT2: struct for sharingRecord is defined

```
type sharingRecord struct {
    MetadataIndex string
    MetadataIV [] byte
    FileKey [] byte
    UUIDnonce uuid.UUID //Random nonce to include in signature
    RSAsignature [] byte //signature to verify identity of sender
}
```

The User.FileKeys map stores the currently used FileSharingKey for a certain filename (indexed with hash(filename)). Suppose Bob wants to share a file ("foobar") with Alice. He encrypts "foobar" FileSharingKey with Alice's public key (which he fetched from keystore), and digitally signs this with his own private key to maintain confidentiality and integrity (communication medium is insecure). Alice, upon receiving this verifies signature, and decrypt the message with her PrivateKey, to get the FileSharingKey which was used to encrypt "foobar"s MetaData.

When Alice calls ReceiveFile(), and assigns some new name (say "slowmo") to this file, she keeps track of "slowmo" in MetaData.FilenameMap (indexed with hash("slowmo"). This hashing is done so as to ensure that Bob doesn't knows what name Alice calls her file (and vice-versa).

If now Alice appends something, she will call AppendFile, which will update LastEditBy (with the hash("Alice")). The rationale behind not storing "Alice" directly into LastEditBy is that if Bob revokes access at sometime later, and then gives access to Charlie, Charlie should't be able to know that Alice once had access to this file, hence ensuring confidentiality.

2.2 RevokeFile()

Note: In our design, we don't allow anyone except the Owner to revoke access to the shared file. Only the owner can revoke accesses that too of all the other persons in one go.

For Revoking the access, Owner (say Bob) changes the FileSharingKey itself. He will have to generate a

new FileSharingKey, then use the older key to decrypt all Blocks, then re-encrypt them with new key. Finally, once this is done, Bob will re-encrypt the MetaData with his new Key, thereby blocking access to Alice completely of any read/write that she was able to perform earlier.

The above design ensures that sharing is "transitive" meaning if Bob shares with Alice and Alice shares with Charlie, all three of them access the same file, albeit with their own file-names.