


Ten Minute Review of Crypto Primitives

CS 628A

Pramod Subramanyan

What is a MAC?



MAC: message authentication code

Hash function:

The Swiss army knife of crypto

Popular examples:

- MD5 (has weaknesses, shouldn't be used)
- SHA-1, SHA-256

Typical construction:
“Merkle-Damgård”



Ralph Merkle

Hash function:

- takes any string as input

- fixed-size output (we'll use 256 bits)

- efficiently computable


Security properties:

- collision-free

- hiding (preimage resistance)

- puzzle-friendly

Merkle-Damgård construction



- Break input into blocks (say 512 bits)
Pad the last block
- Apply “compression function” to message block together with output of previous stage
- Compression function designed to look really hairy
- IV = initialization vector

Hash-based MAC

Q. Is a $\text{Hash}(k \parallel \text{msg})$ a secure MAC?

A. No! “Length-extension attack”

Knowing $f_k(\text{msg})$ (i.e., $f(k \parallel \text{msg})$) lets adversary compute $f_k(\text{msg} \parallel \text{app})$ without knowing the key


Homework: verify this

How to fix: HMAC

$$\text{HMAC}(k, m) = H(\underbrace{k \oplus z_1}_{\text{key}} \parallel \underbrace{H(k \oplus z_2 \parallel m)}_{\text{digest}})$$

z_1 and z_2 are constants


Block ciphers




Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption

Question: What is the problem with ECB?

Same input block results in the same output block




Counter (CTR) mode encryption




Q: Why do we need the nonce?

A: Almost as bad as ECB without the nonce

Counter (CTR) mode decryption



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode decryption

RSA function

Large random primes

- Alice generates $N = pq$ and e relatively prime to $(p-1)(q-1)$
- Euclid's algo to find d s.t.
 $ed \% (p-1)(q-1) = 1$
- Publishes (N, e) . Keeps (d, p, q) secret

- $\text{RSA}(N, e, x) = x^e \% N$
 $\text{RSA}(N, d, y) = y^d \% N$

Inverses

Trapdoor permutation

- Permutation
Easy to compute
- Hard to invert
Except if trapdoor is known

RSA Encryption – OAEP encoding

n : RSA modulus length

m : message


000: padding

r : random nonce


G : PRG

H : hash function

k_0, k_1 : 128 bits



Strawman SSL




- Alice gets public key of webserver from CA
- Sends session key encrypted using this pubkey
- Server and alice communicate using this key

Problems with this protocol?

- What if server private key is compromised?

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange



- p is a prime, g is called a generator
- After exchange, both parties know $g^{ab} \bmod p$
- More importantly, nobody else knows g^{ab}
- This holds even if privkey is compromised **in future**
- Satisfies property of forward secrecy