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DEFENCE
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DEFENCE
1901/6/3

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

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Subject:

*Lord Kitchener's
Report*

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SECRET

1907/6/3

DEFENCE

DOWNGRADED

RESTRICTED

J. M. G.
27/9/17,

MEMORANDUM ON THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA.

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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

PART I. RECOMMENDATIONS.

PART II. THE TRANSITION PERIOD.

PART III. THE FIXED DEFENCES. (CONFIDENTIAL).

DEFENCE
1901/6/3

the country effectively if the force provided under it is efficiently trained, organised and equipped. It must however be distinctly recognised that a national force maintained at a high standard of efficiency can only be produced by the work of years, and that such work must be steady and continuous; any divergence from the policy decided on may, and probably will, lead to chaos and useless expenditure of money.

If plans and essential preparations have been deferred until an emergency arises, it will then be found too late to act because the strain of passing from peace to war will entirely absorb the energies of all engaged, even when every possible contingency has been foreseen.

Before putting these recommendations forward, I have carefully considered their financial aspect, and the burden that will thereby be thrown on the country for its defence. The annual cost when the force would be in full working order after passing through the less costly transition period, works out to practically the same as the total sum contemplated under the Defence Bill viz. £1,742,000.

I have divided my subject into -

Part I. Recommendations.

Part II. Transition period.

Part III. Fixed Defences, which is confidential.

In concluding these introductory remarks I sincerely hope that the organisation I have proposed in Part I, may meet the requirements of Australia in forming an efficient national force for the defence of the country; and I shall always take the greatest interest in the future of the national forces of Australia, and hope to be able to give the Commonwealth Government at any time such further assistance as may be in my power.

MELBOURNE,

12th February, 1910.

Kitchener
J.W.

in Part I of this paper, have been devised to meet the principal defects I observed, and to enable these camps of exercise in the future, to be really instructional as well as a thorough test of the work done during the year in their home training.

Success in any technical career can only be achieved after a thorough elementary grounding, and this is perhaps more marked in the military than in any other profession. The A.B.C. must be carefully studied and practiced so as to understand how to learn properly, as well as how to teach. It is only by correcting mistakes on the spot and clearly explaining their nature and results, as well as how they should be avoided, that practical instruction can be given in camps both to officers and men.


The training I saw in the camps indicated that there was a distinct tendency to go too fast and to neglect essential preliminaries of training for more advanced studies which the troops engaged were not capable of carrying out properly.

The conclusion I have come to is shortly that the present forces are inadequate in numbers, training, organisation, and munitions of war to defend Australia from the dangers that are due to the present conditions that prevail in the country, as well as to its isolated position.

The danger of want of population and consequent ineffective occupation in many parts of the country is in my opinion a most serious existing condition in Australia, as it may greatly imperil the stability of the present state of affairs in the Commonwealth. I feel however that this is so well known and recognised that I need not emphasize it further.

I would also mention that railway construction has, while developing the country, resulted in lines that would appear to be more favourable to an enemy invading Australia than to the defence of the country. Different gauges in most of the States isolate each system, and the want of systematic interior connection makes the present lines running inland of little use for defence, though possibly of considerable value to an enemy who would have temporary command of the sea.

The new Defence Act will give sufficient numbers to defend
the

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

DEFENCE
1907/6/13
SECRET

In compliance with the invitation of the Commonwealth Government to visit and inspect the existing military forces and system in Australia, and subsequently to give them the benefit of my experience and advice regarding the development of their latest scheme of defence, I reached Port Darwin on the 21st December and have since visited military camps in every State.

The Minister of Defence kindly arranged for the assembly of troops in these camps on dates to meet my convenience, and, although the season was perhaps exceptionally trying and not the most suitable for both the men and their employers, good musters were everywhere obtained.

My best thanks are due for the facilities afforded me on all occasions to see the troops and fixed defences, as well as for the assistance given me by General Hoad and all the senior Australian officers in my study of the existing military system and local conditions in this country.

Having had considerable experience of Australians working in the field during the South African War, I was not surprised to find what excellent material existed amongst the young manhood of Australia from whom the defenders of their country must come. I noticed in the camps the great keenness displayed by all ranks in rendering themselves proficient, and in applying the military knowledge they had acquired to the practical conditions of work on the manoeuvre ground.

In these days however, excellent fighting material and the greatest zeal, though indispensable adjuncts, are not of themselves sufficient to enable a force to take the field against thoroughly trained regular troops with any chance of success.

I do not intend to criticise in any detail what I saw in the various camps of exercise, but a great part of my suggestions for the training and organisation of the Australian Citizen Forces

in

P A R T I.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

Strategical
considera-
tions.

It is an axiom held by the British Government that the Empire's existence depends primarily upon the maintenance of adequate and efficient naval forces. As long as this condition is fulfilled, and as long as British superiority at sea is assured, then it is an accepted principle that no British dominion can be successfully and permanently conquered by an organised invasion from oversea.

But in applying this principle to Australasia, considerations of time and space cannot be disregarded. The conduct of a great war depends upon the calculated and proper combination of naval, military and diplomatic forces; and it is quite conceivable that in the future, as in the past, national considerations may require the concentration of British naval forces in one or other theatre of operations. It follows that, in seas remote from such a concentration, the British naval forces may find themselves for the moment inferior in force to an actual, or potential, enemy. In such a situation, although our ultimate superiority at sea might not be a matter of doubt, some time might elapse before our command of the sea was definitely assured in all waters. It therefore becomes the duty of all self governing Dominions to provide a military force adequate, not only to deal promptly with any attempt at invasion, but also to ensure local safety and public confidence until our superiority at sea has been decisively and comprehensively asserted. For this reason it has recently been agreed that the ~~home~~ home forces of the United Kingdom should be so organised as to compel an enemy contemplating an invasion to make the attempt on such a scale as to be unable to evade

evade our naval forces. The same arguments apply to Australasia, and its land forces should be calculated and organised on this basis.

Strength required.

In estimating the strength of the land forces necessary to meet this requirement, three principal factors should be considered -

(a) The great ocean distances which lie between Australia and the territory of any possible enemies.

(b) The armed strength and power of transportation over sea of any conceivably hostile nation.

(c) The vast extent, and railway communication, of the Australian Continent which covers an area of 2,948,366 square miles, and possesses a coast line of 12,210 miles; as contrasted with the smallness of its population, 4,275,000 souls of whom 1,295,000 are males of a fighting age.

Consideration of these factors leads me to estimate the land forces required at 80,000 fighting troops. Of these numbers, half would be required to secure the larger cities and defended ports from attack, and so to maintain the public confidence and national credit, while the other half would be free to operate as a mobile striking force anywhere in Australia.

But the best defence is generally by taking the offensive, and there should therefore be no difference in the enrolment, organisation and equipment of any unit.

Organisation of force.

The Defence Bill 1909, which has just been passed by the Commonwealth Parliament, gives effect to the principle that every citizen should be trained to defend his country, and I therefore propose to base

the

the following advice as to the manner in which the force of 80,000 fighting men should be enrolled, organised and trained on the principle embodied in that Act, which is designed to call into existence a National Citizen Force.

In my opinion the Forces should be organised as:-

21 Brigades of 4 battalions each..... 84 battalions of infantry.

28 regiments of Light Horse

49 four gun field batteries, and

7 four gun heavy and howitzer batteries, the whole totalling 224 guns.

7 Communication companies and 14 field companies of engineers.

Departmental troops to be provided in proportion.

The peace and war establishments of units are given in detail in Tables V and VI, but the rank and file may be summarized as :-

	<u>Rank and file</u>	
	Peace	War
Battalion	750	1001
Regiment of Light Horse.....	350	470
Battery.....	130	146

The peace establishment would be found from the 80,000 trained soldiers, and the augmentation to war establishment will be provided by the addition of the recruits, and the 25-26 year men.

In this connection I wish to explain that, while taking the Defence Acts 1903-1909 as the basis of my proposals, I have departed from the training periods therein prescribed because -

(a) While the cadet training is valuable as a preparation, it cannot, in my opinion, replace recruit training which is/ necessary preliminary to the production of an efficient and trained citizen soldier.

For this reason I class the 18-19 year men as recruits, over and above the peace establishment of 80,000, but

liable

liable to be put in the ranks in war.

(b) Soldiers to be efficient should be exercised in camp annually, otherwise the men lose the incentive to home training, the habit of working in units, of moving and living in numbers, and of ready obedience to orders.

For this reason I advise that camp training in time of peace should be extended and I consider that, having regard to the natural military aptitude of the Australian, favoured by the conditions of his civil life, the training should consist of six clear days annually, i.e. from a Monday to a Saturday inclusive, in addition to all home training.

I am of opinion that, if fully utilized under thoroughly competent officers, this training will meet requirements up to the 25th year. In the 25th-26th year a muster parade would suffice.

The training required by law, over and above home training, would then stand:-

For junior cadets, 12 to 14 years.....120 hours.

For senior cadets, 14 to 18 years.....equivalent to
16 days.

Recruit training, 18 to 19 years.....16 days,
of which to be in camp.

Trained soldiers, 19 to 20 years.....16 days,
of which to be in camp.

20-21	}
21-22	}
22-23	{
23-24	{
24-25	}

years.....6 days in camp.

25-26 yearsMuster parade
only.

Reserves. after which they will be, for the period mentioned in Clause 60 of the Act, available as reservists.

On this basis the yearly quotas enrolled in the Citizen Force would be:-

Table I.

TABLE I.

YEARLY QUOTAS ENROLLED IN THE CITIZEN ARMY.

Years	Infantry	L.Horse	Artillery	Total	Engineers and departments.
18-19	12,500	1,950	1,450	15,900	1,175
19-20	11,800	1,850	1,370	15,020	1,125
20-21	11,200	1,750	1,320	14,270	1,075
21-22	10,700	1,650	1,240	<u>13,590</u>	1,025
22-23	10,200	1,600	1,190	<u>12,990</u>	975
23-24	9,800	1,500	1,130	12,430	925
24-25	9,300	1,450	1,050	11,800	875
Total 19-25	63,000	9,800	7,300	80,100	6,000
				80,100	775
25-26	9,200	1,400	1,000	11,600	850

Note. In the above table, an annual wastage of 5% is allowed for mortality, medical unfitness, absence and other casualties.

Principles
regarding
enrolment.

The first and imperative principle for the enrolment and maintenance of these 80,000 men as an efficient citizen force, is that the nation as a whole should take a pride in its defenders, insist upon the organisation being real and designed for war purposes only, and provide the means for properly educating, training and equipping their officers and men.

Unless these requirements be met, no military system can be devised which will be other than an illusion and a source of waste of public funds.

The

The second principle for a successful citizen force is a complement of the first. The force must be an integral portion of the national life. The citizen should be brought up from boyhood to look forward to the day when he will be enrolled as fit to defend his country; and he should be accustomed to practise those habits of self denial, of devotion to, and emulation in, the execution of his duty, of reticence, and of prompt obedience to lawful authority which are essential to the formation of patriotic and efficient citizen soldiers.

These considerations show how completely a citizen force should be kept outside party politics. Political feeling in an army is always a serious drawback to efficiency and may become a danger to the State.

Recruits should be drawn impartially from all portions of the country, and from the whole of the community; and upon the manner in which the reciprocal obligations of the nation to the force, and of the citizen soldier to the nation are brought home to the citizen, to what and shares will depend the value of the armed strength of Australia.

Registration and exemptions

The application of these principles entails a complete and thorough registration of the youths of the country, and the adoption of a system whereby those moving from one part of the country to another will be traced and required to continue their training.

The question of exemptions will also arise and in this there are, I think, two broad guiding factors:-

- (a) That the welfare of the family should not be prejudiced.
- (b) That the State should get the best men available.

Factor

Factor (a) points to the exemption of those who are the sole or main support of their family, such as the only or eldest son of a widow, or of a man who is himself incapable of earning a livelihood for those dependent upon him.

Factor (b) demands the exclusion from the Citizen force of all criminals, and should restrict the selection of annual quotas to those males who are physically the fittest of their year, and therefore the most eligible for the honour of serving their country. This question will no doubt, as necessity arises, be fully considered by the Government.

The division of the country into "areas." In my judgment the only way to satisfactorily organise and train a citizen force of the nature about to be created in Australia is to divide the country into areas from which the national force will be drawn. Each area should be designed to provide a definite proportion of a fighting unit; and should be in charge of a thoroughly trained permanent instructional officer assisted by one or two non commissioned officers.

By this means a trained officer will be supplied to live permanently amongst a definite number of the citizen forces whose military proficiency will entirely depend on his efforts to assist them in home training, as well as in maintaining the military spirit of self denial, and esprit de corps amongst not only those who are under training, but also the whole community. He will thus be readily available on all occasions to assist both officers and men in his area in their endeavour to render themselves efficient defenders of their country, and when the unit that he has trained joins its battalion, and the battalion its brigade, each will vie with the other and in this way promote a healthy spirit of emulation and competition in the force which will foster and encourage true and real efficiency.

The

The estimation of the good services of these officers themselves will depend upon the comparison between the units provided by the various areas.

Ten areas should form one group under the supervision of a superior instructional officer, who becomes the Brigade Major in time of war. Similarly, each unit would then have a permanent instructional officer as adjutant - the remainder taking charge of the depots left to supply the wastage of the field force from reservists.

It is obvious that the extent of the "area" which can be satisfactorily trained by an instructional officer will depend upon the density of the population, and therefore upon the time taken for the officer to reach the places where the soldiers assemble for home training as opportunity offers. It is also necessary to fix the relation of the "area" to the unit of the force, and for this purpose I have taken the infantry battalion as the standard to govern all estimates.

After consideration of these principles I have come to the conclusion that in the cities two, and in the country three, "areas" should be allowed per battalion of infantry with a due proportion of other arms.

In this connection may I repeat that the whole success of the citizen force depends upon the thoroughness and amount of the home training under the area officer.

A project (Table II) based on the information now available has been prepared shewing the division of Australia into 215 areas. It is merely an example of what might be done, and on further investigation variations will probably be necessary. To these ~~with~~ there is no objection provided there is no departure from the guiding principle that the "area" produces its definite quota of the force and is the sole charge of one permanent officer.

215
33
645
645
7095
71595

215
300
64500
7095
71595

TABLE II

TRAINING AREAS AND TROOPS ALLOTTED THERETO.

Area Nos.	Bat- tal- ions	Light Horse Squad- rons	Field Artil- lery Squad- rons	Field Arti- lery Battys.	Engin- eer Com- panies	Army Ser- vice Corps	Field Ambu- lances	--
1 to 3	1	2		1	1	-	-	-
4 " 6	1	2		-	-	1	-	-
7 " 9	1	2		-	-	-	-	-
10 " 12	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	-
(Group I)	4	7	2	1	1	1	1	-
13 to 15	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
16 " 18	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
19 " 20	1	1	1	-	-	1	-	-
21 " 22	1	1	-	1	-	-	1	{ Details for forts.
(Group II)	4	4	3	1	1	1	1	{
23 to 24	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	{ Details for forts.
25 " 27	1	1	1	-	-	1	-	{
28 " 30	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	{
31 " 33	1	2	1	-	-	-	-	{
(Group III)	4	5	3	1	1	1	1	
34 to 36	1	2	1	-	-	-	-	-
37 " 39	1	2	-	1	-	-	1	-
40 " 42	1	2	-	-	-	1	-	-
43 " 45	1	2	1	-	-	-	-	-
(Group IV)	4	8	2	1	1	1	1	-
46 to 47	1	1	2	1	-	-	-	-
48 " 50	1	3	-	-	-	-	1	-
51 " 53	1	3	-	-	-	1	-	-
54 " 55	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
(Group V)	4	8	3	1	1	1	1	-

Area Nos.	Battalions	Light Horse Squadrons	Field Artillery Batys.	Engineer Companies	Army Service Corps Coys.	Field Ambulances	--
56 to 58	1	1	1	-	1	-	-
59 " 60	1	2	1	1	-	-	-
61 " 63	1	3	-	-	-	1	-
64 " 65	1	2	1	-	-	-	-
(Group VI)	4	8	3	1	1	1	-
66 to 67	1	-	1	-	-	1	} Details for forts.
68 " 69	1	1	1	-	-	-	
70 " 71	1	-	1	1	-	-	
72 " 73	1	-	-	-	1	-	
(Group VII)	4	1	3	1	1	1	-
74 to 75	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
76 " 77	1	-	1	1	-	-	-
78 " 79	1	-	1	-	1	-	-
80 " 81	1	-	-	-	-	1	-
(Group VIII)	4	-	2	1	1	1	-
82 to 83	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
84 " 85	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
86 " 87	1	-	-	1	-	-	-
88 " 89	1	-	-	-	1	1	-
(Group IX)	4	-	2	1	1	1	-
90 to 91	1	1	1	1	-	1	-
92 " 93	1	-	-	-	1	-	-
94 " 95	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
(96a 96b " 97) Broken Hill	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
(Group X)	4	1	3	1	1	1	-
98 to 100	1	2	1	-	1	-	-
101 " 103	1	2	1	-	-	-	-
104 " 106	1	3	1	1	-	1	-
107 " 109	1	3	-	-	-	-	-
(Group XI)	4	10	3	1	1	1	-
110 to 112	1	3	1	-	-	1	-
113 " 115	1	3	1	-	1	-	-
116 " 118	1	3	1	1	-	-	-
119 " 121	1	3	-	-	-	-	-
(Group XII)	4	12	3	1	1	1	-

Area Nos.	Bat-tal-ions	Light Horse Squad-rons	Field Artil-ler-y Batys.	Engin-eer Com-panies	Army Service Corps Covs.	Field Ambu-lances.	--
122 to 124	1	4	-	-	-	-	-
125 " 126	1	1	1	-	1	-	{ -Details for
127 " 128	1	-	1	-	-	1	forts
129 " 130	1	1	1	1	-	-	Melbourne. }
(Group XIII)	4	6	3	1	1	1	-
131 to 133	1	4	-	-	-	-	-
134 " 136	1	4	1	-	-	-	-
137 " 138	1	-	1	-	1	-	{ Melbourne.
139 " 140	1	-	-	1	-	1	{
(Group XIV)	4	8	2	1	1	1	-
141 to 143	1	3	-	-	-	-	-
144 " 145	1	-	1	1	-	1	Rendigo.
146 " 148	1	2	1	-	-	-	-
149 " 150	1	-	1	-	1	-	Melbourne.
(Group XV)	4	5	3	1	1	1	-
151 to 153	1	3	-	-	-	-	-
154 " 156	1	3	1	-	-	-	-
157 " 158	1	1	1	-	1	1	{ Ballarat.
159 " 160	1	-	1	1	-	-	{
(Group XVI)	4	7	3	1	1	1	-
161 to 163	1	3	1	-	-	-	-
164 " 166	1	3	1	-	-	-	Details for
167 " 168	1	-	-	1	1	-	forts.
169 " 170	1	-	1	-	-	1	Melbourne. }
(Group XVII)	4	6	3	1	1	1	-
171 to 172	1	-	1	-	-	-	{
173 " 174	1	-	-	1	-	-	Melbourne.
175 " 176	1	-	1	-	-	-	{
177 " 178	1	-	-	-	1	1	{
(Group XVIII)	4	-	2	1	1	1	-

Area Nos.	Bat-tal-ions	Light Horse Squad-rons	Field Artil-ler-y Batys.	Engin-eer Com-pa-nies	Army Service Corps Coys.	Field Ambu-lances	--
179 to 181	1	2	-	1	-	-	-
182 " 184	1	2	1	-	-	1	-
185 " 187	1	2	1	-	1	-	-
188 " 190	1	2	1	-	-	-	Details for forts.
(Group XIX)	4	8	3	1	1	1	-
191 to 193	1	-	-	1	-	-	-
194 " 196	1	1	1	-	1	-	-
197 " 199	1	1	1	-	-	1	} Details for forts.
200 " 202	1	2	1	-	-	1	-
(Group XX)	4	4	3	1	1	1	-
203 to 205	1	1	-	1	-	-	-
206 " 208	1	1	1	-	-	-	-
209 " 211	1	1	-	-	1	1	-
212 " 214	1	1	1	-	-	-	Details for forts.
(Group XXI)	4	4	2	1	1	1	-
TOTAL... ...	84	112	56	21	21	21	-

The Permanent Instructional officer in charge of the area.

The duties of the officer in charge of an "area" would include:-

- (a) The inspection of the junior cadets training in the schools.
- (b) The organization and training of the senior cadets.
- (c) The enrolment, equipment and training of the adult from 18 to 19 years of age.
- (d) The equipment, organization and training of the trained soldier from 19 to 25 years of age.
- (e) The supervision of the registration of all male inhabitants under clause 142 of the Act.
- (f) The maintenance of lists of males 25-26 years of age who have just completed their training.
- (g) Communication to other areas of all changes of residence of men under training with particulars of their military proficiency.
- (h) Information regarding the numbers, residence and classification of the reserve men in the areas and the organization and maintenance of rifle clubs.
- (i) A thorough acquaintance with the inhabitants of his area.

In all these matters, except registration and enrolment he would be assisted by the officers of the citizen forces of the area.

Detailed instructions for the guidance of area officers should be drawn up, and should, amongst other things, require a monthly statement from each area of the progress made in registration, enrolment, organization, equipment and home training of the citizen forces under his charge.

The essential importance of these duties to the nation, will make the area officer the keystone of the citizen force, whose organization and fitness for war will chiefly depend upon the education and training received in the "area".

Under this system, it is evident that the responsibilities of the area officer will make it a national necessity that he should be a carefully selected man, thoroughly grounded and trained in his profession, and scientifically educated. No social considerations, no influence, nothing but efficiency should be allowed to affect the selection and promotion of these officers.

Their work should be judged by results alone.

The selection and education of suitable men for these instructional duties will thus be the foundation of a proficient citizen force. They should be taken young, given a complete military education, calculated to make them good leaders, strict disciplinarians, and thoroughly competent officers; brought up to realise that their career depends upon the ability to do their duty and on that alone.

In the United States of America, the military college of West Point sets an example of a severe and thoroughly military training imposed by a Democratic Government, and I should advise that Australia can only expect to produce officers of the type required by the establishment of a military college similar in ideals, if not altogether in practice, for that will vary with national characteristics, to West Point.

Hitherto it would have been difficult to find employment for the graduates of such a primary military educational establishment, but I have carefully examined this point and find that now it has been decided to create a national force, there will be ample posts to be filled by the graduates of a military college.

The area officer should have reasonable prospects of promotion and there must be systematic supervision of his work; for these reasons I have already advised that over every ten areas, a supervising officer be appointed who would in war time become the staff officer of the Infantry Brigade drawn from his group. In addition, as now, district staffs will be required in the six military districts of the Commonwealth, officers will be wanted for the Central Administration and for the permanent troops.

Formation
of a Staff
Corps.

My recommendation is that a Staff Corps be formed to provide the officers for all these requirements, areas, district and headquarter staffs and permanent troops.

This Staff Corps should be entirely drawn from the military college, and its members should further be sent abroad to study, and be attached to, the other land forces of the British Empire; so that an officer of this Staff Corps would be the equal, if not superior, in military education to the officers of any

army in the world.

The proposed organization contemplates the formation of 215 areas which are required to produce a fighting force of 80,000 men. The officers in charge of each of these areas may be of the rank of Captain or Lieutenant; in addition 22 Majors will be required, one to supervise every ten areas; the six district staffs require 25 officers, mostly of field rank; headquarters will absorb 12; the military college 8, and the permanent forces (on the present scale) 48.

To allow for officers being absent in other British Dominions, on attachment to or studying other armies, at staff colleges, on leave &c., 6 per cent of subalterns, Captains and Majors should be added. In this way an establishment of 350 officers for the Staff Corps is reached and their distribution by ranks and duties is shown in Table III below:-

TABLE III.

Distribution by ranks and duties of Staff Corps Officers.

Duty	Lieu- ten- ants	Capt- ains	Majors	Lt. Col	Col onels	Total
Area officers for -						
215 areas	151	64	-	-	-	215
In charge of 10 areas	-	-	22	-	-	22
Permanent Forces	25	11	5	3	1	48
District staff for 6 districts	-	6	10	6	3	25
Central administra- tion at headquarters	-	1	6	3	2	12
Military college	1	4	1	1	1	8
Spare for sick, on special courses, at- tached to other armies	10	4	6	-	-	20
Totals	190	90	50	13	7	350

If men of the right stamp are to be attracted to the corps, the pay of each rank must be good, and in this connection it must be remembered that the circumstances of an officer's services prevent, and rightly so, his participation in commercial ventures. For the Staff Corps to be successful, its officers must concentrate all their energies on their profession, and their pay should therefore be sufficient not only for their keep while serving but also to ensure to them a competence when retired.

In view of these conditions, I recommend rates of pay shown in Table IV, with the proviso that in each rank a compulsory deduction should be made, sufficient to assure an adequate provision for maintenance on retirement.

TABLE IV.

Proposed pay of the Staff Corps Officers.

Ranks	Establishment Number	Pay per annum
Colonel	7	£800 to £900
Lieutenant-Colonels	13	£700 to £800
Majors	50	£550 to £650
Captains	90	£375 to £450
Subalterns	190	£250 to £350

Military college.

I have shown that 350 officers are required for the Staff Corps, and I shall now discuss the organization of a military college to maintain that Corps.

Taking 20 years as the average service of an officer, it appears that after the Staff Corps is up to establishment the yearly output required from the College will be about 18 cadets. The minimum length of course required to efficiently ground a cadet in his profession is three years.

As has already been pointed out, strict selection should be enforced from the moment a boy becomes a cadet.

To allow for the necessary process of elimination, and also for those boys who may show proficiency for some other branch of the public service, I advise that 30 cadets be the annual entry; adding 10 per cent to this number for casualties, and the figure $33 \times 3 = 99$, say 100, cadets is reached as the establishment of the College.

The age of entry should be not less than 17 nor more than 19.

I consider that the method of entry into the college should be as follows:-

Candidates should be selected from the most capable of the senior cadets, each area officers submitting the name of his best cadet to the Major in charge of 10 areas, who will then examine these 10 cadets and forward 5 names through the district headquarters who will state their recommendations if any, to the Central Administration. The latter will then select from the names received, double the number required and will refer the ultimate selection from these last to an authority to be determined by Government. This authority might be a Board of Examiners, or the Inspector General, or the Commandant of the College.

A Cadet having joined the College, his parents should pay £80 per annum for board, lodging, books, clothing, equipment and instruction; except in the case of a cadet obtaining a scholarship of which there should be twenty for the whole College.

Until the Staff Corps is up to establishment, the full output from the College will be required; once that stage is passed, or in the case of a student showing proficiency for a career other than a military one, he might be excused from military service on the following condition, that he serves and is efficient as an officer in the national force for 12 years, and attends training, as may be laid down, and that during these 12 years he will perform any special military duty required of him at any time by the Central Administration.

During the course, the Cadet must be kept under strict discipline, and taught to keep himself physically and mentally fit. Any cadet unlikely to make an efficient officer, or lacking in the personality necessary to influence and command men, should be removed.

On the completion of his course at the College, the Cadet should be given his commission and sent either to India for a winter training, i.e., October to April, or to the United Kingdom for a summer training, i.e. April to October, as an attached officer to a British regiment. On return he should do one year's duty under the best Instructional officer available in an area, in order to learn how best to conduct registration and to promote home training in the area. He should then be fully capable to take over charge of an area.

It will be evident that the Director of such a College must be a man of exceptional qualifications, well educated and accustomed to do his duty fearlessly and thoroughly. He should be supplied with two Assistant Directors and an Adjutant of similar qualifications to himself, and a staff of professors to teach the curriculum which should be based on that of West Point. From the estimates at the end of this part it will be seen that the establishment and cost of such a college, when in full working order will be £15,050.

Any political interference with the management of such an institution in which disciplinary training forms an important part, and the efficiency of which is so essential to the defence of Australia, should be strictly avoided.

The Citizen Officer.

While the Staff Corps will provide the trained instructor, the leadership of the Citizen Force will depend on the Citizen officer, and it is therefore all important that he should be of the most promising material available, chosen young and selected solely for his capacity for leadership and military knowledge, and devotion to duty. Every opportunity must be taken to educate him in the spare moments of his civil business and accordingly means of instruction should be available at or near his home.

Once selected, the welfare of the force requires that officers should serve more continuously and for longer periods than their men, and in this way repay the nation for the trust reposed in them.

A consideration of these requirements leads to the conclusion that:-

(a) The citizen officer should be appointed as early as possible in his military career, so that he may, at the most receptive time of his life, study his duties as an officer and develope his qualifications for imparting instruction and leadership of men.

(b) It should be understood that the acceptance of a commission entails a liability to serve as an officer for at least 12 years, but such a liability would not interfere with free movement from place to place in Australia; nor with resignation should the Governor-General be pleased to accept it; nor, subject to the exigencies of the service, with the privilege of leave on private affairs to visit countries outside Australia.

Appointment. I agree with the principle laid down in the Defence Act, that in Citizen Forces all promotions should be from the ranks, but in order to get young officers, I advise that for this purpose, service in the ranks of senior cadets should count. The ordinary procedure to be followed in the appointment of an officer would then generally be:-

The area officer would nominate suitable senior cadets as sub-lieutenants in the Cadet Corps; such rank to carry no pay, nor command outside the cadets. During the first year of their adult training, these sub-lieutenants should be on probation as Lieutenants in the Citizen Forces. When approved by the Battalion commander, and after passing the necessary tests, their names would be submitted, through the usual channels, for commissions.

As regards (b), the commission would then be granted on the declaration of the officer that he is willing to serve for 12 years. Under this system it is estimated that an officer would obtain his first commission between the ages of 18 and 20, would reach the rank of Captain about 26, and of Major about 30, or 32, i.e. when his 12 years service is about to expire. Above the

rank of Major no obligation to serve should be necessary; zealous officers would remain in order to command their battalions or regiments, and subsequently brigades.

A Citizen officer elected to any Parliament should be at once seconded.

The instruction of a Citizen officer will be in the first instance afforded to him at or near his home by the instructional officer who will take special care that the officers of his unit are thoroughly taught in all the regimental work of the unit to which they belong. In addition to this instruction, special courses for technical subjects should be arranged by the district staffs, and the proficiency attained by the officer going through any of these courses be specially noted in his favour. Moreover, as these officers will doubtless have their evenings free for study, an excellent means for bringing the whole force together and of giving instruction in military subjects would be the free circulation of a military magazine which should be edited by and published under the direction of the Head-quarters Staff. The same Agency should undertake a system of correspondence which has proved to be of value in India whereby answers are given to questions on military subjects, papers are set, duly corrected and returned, strategical and tactical problems are explained, discussed and corrected.

During the training period of his arm, 16 or 24 days as the case may be, the citizen officer should receive good emoluments, and I advise that the pay of a subaltern for this period should be increased to £1 per diem; the other ranks being raised in proportion. The rates for each rank would then be:-

	£ s d
Subaltern	1. 0.0
Captain	1.10.0
Major	2. 0.0
Lieutenant Colonel	2.10.0
Colonel	3. 0.0

No pay should be allowed for attendance at schools of instruction, but bonuses sufficient to cover expenses should be granted to those officers who pass through the courses

The Citizen soldier.

satisfactorily, and attain the standard of qualification,

The Australian Citizen soldier experiences much of military value in the every day conditions of his civil life. He is generally a good rider, active, lithe and intelligent. As a cadet he is taught to shoot and learns the rudiments of drill and passing through his recruit adult training he joins the force as an efficient soldier. Much will undoubtedly depend on the amount of training that through self denial and devotion to his duty, the citizen soldier performs at or near his home and, if this is done, in my opinion he will be able to subsequently maintain his efficiency as a soldier under the training that has been proposed in this paper.

av.

Throughout the period of service, the citizen soldier must remember that he is discharging a duty to his country and that the pay he receives is not a wage, but an allowance to assist him in the discharge of his duty. I therefore think that the rates of pay laid down in the Act are adequate and, as under my proposals, training will continue, after the 20th year, I consider that the pay of the soldier in all subsequent years should be at the rate laid down for the 19-20 year, namely 4/- per diem.

Citizen non-commissioned officers.

When, however, a citizen soldier is selected for, and is ready to assume the responsibilities of a non-commissioned officer, the case is different. He is doing more than his country absolutely requires and he should therefore receive higher rates of pay, up to 8/- a day for a Sergeant.

The selection and training of the non-commissioned officer will be primarily the work of the citizen officer. Promising non-commissioned officers should be sent to schools for further technical training on the same conditions as the citizen officer; they should be encouraged to extend their services, and are of course eligible for commissions.

The establishment and organization of units.

The establishments of the regular army have hitherto been the standard for Australia, and this principle should be observed in the formation of the Citizen forces.

In its application however, local conditions may require slight variations; for instance, bandsmen are not necessary for a citizen force, drummers and buglers will supply all that is necessary; the details left at the base need not be so many.

battalion of
Infantry I should therefore recommend that the combatant war establishment of a battalion of citizen infantry be fixed at 29 officers and 1,001 other ranks, organized as follows:-

TABLE V.

Establishment of a battalion of infantry.

	Offi- cers.	Warrant and E.C.Os	Drummers and Buglers.	Rank and file
Head-quarters	4	9	-	18
M.G.Section	1	1	-	15
8 Companies	24	40	16	880
Details to be left in areas	-	4	-	18
	29	54	16	931
				1,001

In working out the details it must be remembered that in the ranks will be found tradesmen of all kinds, such as shoemakers, tailors and pioneers.

The establishment of 29 officers should be maintained in peace and war; that of the other ranks will vary as follows:-

Peace establishment	750
Recruits	143
25-26 year trained men	108
War establishment	1,001

Regiment
of Light
Horse.

Similarly a regiment of Light Horse would be organized in:-

TABLE VI.

Establishment of a regiment of Light Horse.

	Offi- cers	Warrant & N.C.Os	Trump- eters	Rank and file
Head-quarters	4	12	-	15
M.G.Section	1	1	-	11
4 Squadrons	24	60	8	356
Left in areas	-	3	-	4
	29	76	8	386
				470

which should be reached as follows:-

Peace establishment	350
Recruits	70
25-26 year men	50
War establishment	470
	=====

Battery of Artillery The battery would of course vary slightly with the nature of the gun; but for the four gun 18pr.battery, the present war establishment of 5 officers and 146 other ranks seems suitable.

The battery would then reach its war strength as follows:-

Peace establishment	130
Recruits	16
	=====
	146
	=====

Leaving ten recruits and eighteen 25-26 year men per battery (i.e. a total of 1,568) to form the nucleus of ammunition columns.

Training. The training of the citizen soldier may be divided into two parts, the home training which will take place all the year round in the vicinity of the men's homes under the Staff Corps or the Citizen officers of the area, and the camp training which will be annually held in the neighbourhood, and will generally consist of a Brigade of infantry with a proportion of other arms. In order to sustain the interest of the force, the instruction given should be of a progressive nature. The soldier should annually be taught the proper practical methods of carrying out some new exercise as well as being tested in what he has learnt before. Thus a fresh exercise would be studied every year in the area, and practically tested at the camp. When this has been done, the exercise to be studied during the next year should be initiated and explained.

This method of training naturally necessitates a systematized arrangement by which each soldier is gradually taught on the ground how to carry out all the duties of his arm.

For battalion and regimental training, the assembly of the quotas from two or three areas becomes necessary, and this home training can be done at week ends. In ordinary years there will be no necessity to go beyond brigade training which requires the assembly of quotas from ten areas. The selection of the time

and place for these annual camps will be the work of the brigade Major who should consult the convenience of employers and of the men.

Every year, three or more brigades should be selected for concentration so as to practice Commanders, Staffs and Railways in dealing with large bodies of troops. These concentrations should be specially arranged for by the Government on the advice of the Military Board.

Training should consist of all that is essential to good marching, accurate controlled shooting and the combination of all arms in attack and defence;

Throughout, the principles contained in the manuals of the Regular Army should be followed, but they must be applied with intelligence and with due regard to the local conditions of personnel, ground and composition of the force. Land will be required to properly and satisfactorily carry out this work, and in the selection of its site two often conflicting conditions must be reconciled - one that it should be close to cities in order that units and brigades will lose no time on the road, and the other that it should be large enough for manoeuvres. The Act gives power to manoeuvre over country at will, but where central large training grounds can be established in each State, there are many advantages in now doing so before the population thickens and all ground is taken up. Such localities would be used for the annual trainings, and where possible might be made available for the breeding of artillery horses.

Mobilization. Thoroughly thought out and practical plans for mobilization and concentration are required before the Citizen Force can be considered prepared for war.

Preparation for mobilization is primarily the work of the General Staff who recommend the lines to be followed and advise where, and in what quantities, the munitions for war of the various units should be stored. Concentration can only be satisfactorily effected when the railway and military authorities are in the closest touch and work in absolute harmony. To secure this co-operation, I advise that a War Railway Council be formed as in the case in the United Kingdom, composed of the Chief Railway Commissioner from each State under the Presidency of the

Quartermaster General of the Citizen Forces, and with an officer of the Head-quarters Staff as Secretary.

District Staffs.

It only remains to consider the Staff organization suitable to administer, control and inspect the Citizen Force.

The organization of military districts with their Commandants and Staffs should continue; but District Commandants should be made to decide all questions which are within their powers. In no other way can decentralisation be efficiently carried out, and it is preferable to run the risk of an occasional mistake rather than to encourage unnecessary dependence on head-quarters.

Head-quarters Staff.

Accepting the Military Board system as I find it in Australia, I consider that its work requires careful allotment and no subject, other than a matter of military policy, should be left before the Board if solely in the department of one Member who has power to deal with it. It should seldom be necessary to refer such questions as details of dress, saluting stations, loans of camp equipment, sick leave, dates of rifle matches, forms to be used for requisition, claims covered by regulation, &c., to the Board. The Military members of the Board should remember that on their advice on military subjects the administration of the forces greatly depends, and should therefore give their opinions on strictly military grounds, avoiding all political influences, and be prepared to maintain their view under all circumstances. They will thus by their carefully considered advice afford great assistance to the Minister of Defence.

Consultative Members should not, in my opinion, be added to the Board.

Department Inspector General.

The recommendations contained in this part of my paper and based on the Defence Act of 1909, will require constant and careful supervision to get the best results.

Factories of war materiel are projected, contracts for harness, clothing &c., will be placed locally, and independent inspection of their methods and products will be essential to good and economical administration.

For these reasons I recommend that the appointment of Inspector General be continued, and that he be supplied with a Staff adequate to carry out the duties of the department, and that he should be directly under the Minister.

The duties of the department would be:-

- (a) The examination of the state of preparedness for war of the Citizen Force.
- (b) The inspection of camps.
- (c) The examination of the results attained by the systems of classification, enrolment, registration, organization and training of the cadets, the permanent and citizen forces and their transport.
- (d) The periodical examination of explosives, guns and all warlike stores on Commonwealth charge, and the inspection of all factories and contract supplies.
- (e) Such further enquiries as the Minister might direct.

Under the conditions which exist in Australia, it would appear to me advisable that the Inspector General should be appointed President of the Board dealing with the promotion of officers above the rank of Major, and should advise on the qualifications of field officers for appointment to the command of battalions, regiments, brigades and districts.

It would seem sufficient to provide at first for:-

1. Inspector General who, with an Assistant would be responsible for the department and for the inspection of the state of preparation for war, the troops and systems.

1. Inspector of warlike stores, factories and contracts.

Such clerical staff as is required.

However suitable these recommendations may be to the requirements of the country, a great deal must depend on the burden which they will impose upon its financial resources. I have therefore calculated what the annual cost of the citizen force would be when all the proposals have reached fruition and would be in full working order. Naturally during the transition period the cost of the force would be less than this forecast, but it must be remembered that a considerable amount of non-recurring expenditure in the shape of guns and munitions of war should be obtained during this transition period, the upkeep of

Estimated
military
Budget.

which has been fully allowed for in my estimate.

The Staff Corps.

The Staff Corps composed of 350 officers at the rates of pay that I have suggested amounts to a total annual cost of £142,000; there will be, in addition, the cost of the permanent services, and the 400 warrant officers and non-commissioned officers required in the areas. These under the new rates will amount to £234,000 making a total of £376,000.

The Citizen Force

The pay of the new Citizen force has been estimated on the training periods proposed in my paper and is calculated as follows:-

Table VII

Pay of new Citizen troops.

Rank	Artillery and Engineers						Other Arms					
	1st year		2nd year		Each of following years		1st year		2nd year		Each of following years	
	Days	Rate	Days	Rate	Days	Rate	Days	Rate	Days	Rate	Days	Rate
Under Sergeant.....	17..	3/-	17	4/-	13	4/-	8	3/-	8	4/-	6	4/-
Sergeants.....					.25.	.8/-					.16	.8/-
Lieutenants.....					.25	.20/-					.16	.20/-
Captains.....					.25	.30/-					.16	.30/-
Majors.....					.25	.40/-					.16	.40/-
Lt-Colonels.....					.25	.50/-					.16	.50/-
Colonels.....					.25	.60/-					.16	.60/-

Although the number of days in camp decreases after the second compulsory year, officers and sergeants have to attend the full number in order to train 1st and 2nd year men.

The training of the new Citizen troops will thus cost:-

Pay and horse allowances.....	£276,000
Rations during continuous training.....	38,000
Forage during continuous training.....	15,000
Transport of troops.....	78,000
Clothing, service pattern only.....	100,000
Horse hire and local transport.....	25,000
Miscellaneous.....	15,000
Total ..	£547,000

I would estimate the cost of the proposed military college to be:-

Table VIII

MILITARY COLLEGE

Estimated cost for 100 cadets, of whom 20 hold free scholarships.

Personnel

	£
1..... Director. Brigadier General.....	1,200
1..... Assistant Director Responsible for (A) Science of war, Military history and tactics, and (B) Organization, military law and administration.	1,000
1..... " " (c) Military engineering, topography and civil surveying	700
4..... Instructors at £500 each.....	2,000
(a) Garrison artillery	
(b) Field Artillery	
(c) Military engineering, topography and civil surveying	
(d) Light Horse and Infantry	
1..... Adjutant and Quartermaster (also instructor in signalling).....	400
5..... Staff Sergeant instructors.....	1,000
2..... Military clerks.....	350
	 Civil Staff
6..... Lecturers at £500 each.....	3,000
(a) Mathematics	
(b) Modern languages (two)	
(c) General History and English	
(d) Chemistry, mineralogy, geology, and physical science.	
(e) Drawing (including mechanical)	

Fees for lectures in special subjects, hygiene, veterinary etc	200
Maintenance of apparatus, books and materials	900
Fees to local practitioners for medical attendance.....	200
Incidentals, postage, telegrams, etc.....	500
Uniforms for cadets (free).....	600
Travelling expenses of officers and families, and double pay to prevent lapse in duties (average 1 per year)	900
Ammunition - gun and S.A.-for practice.....	1,000
Catering and domestic services at £50 per cadet.....	5,000
6.... Day of 1 farrier at £200, 5 stablemen at £150 and maintenance of 50 horses at £30 etc.	2,500

27

Deduct payment of £80 per annum by 80 cadets, 20 holding free scholarships

21,450

6,400
£15,050

(The first cost of land, buildings, furniture and horses etc. is not included)

Instructional
Grant.

For the instruction of the citizen officer outside the military college, I have allowed £4,000 made up of:-

The free circulation of a military magazine -
1 number per month - would cost annually
up to.....£1,200

1 Clerk.....200

Postage, prizes for problems and essays -
and incidentals.....300

Cost of materials, other publications,
and articles from outside sources
(say).....300

Total....£2,000

In addition

Staff for special courses for
Citizen Officers.....2,000

£4,000

Summary.

The other items of the estimate work out at almost the same as that estimated in the fourth year of the Government scheme, except that with increased training, more gun and small arm ammunition will be required, and I have therefore added £44,000 to that estimate.

By estimating £100,000 for miscellaneous, a margin of safety has I think been allowed.

The total cost can thus be summarized at £1,884,000 as below.

Table IX
Summary of annual cost in 7th year of proposed scheme.

	Estimated cost in 7th year of proposed scheme.
Staff Corps.....	£ 142,000
Permanent services.....	234,000
<u>New Citizen troops</u>	
Pay, allowances and camp expenditure...	547,000
New Military College.....	15000
Home instruction of the Citizen officer..	4,000
<u>Compulsory cadet training</u>	
Junior and senior organizations, includ- ing all stores required.....	161,000
<u>Reserves.</u>	
Members of rifle clubs etc.....	126,000
<u>Fixed defences</u>	
Material only, construction of works being provided from the "New Works" vote.....	40,000
<u>Mobile armament</u>	
Field artillery and machine guns, with vehicles harness and all stores...	60,000
Small arms.....	85,000
Ammunition - gun and S.A.....	136,000
General equipment.....	84,000
New works and buildings, rent repair and maintenance.....	150,000
Miscellaneous.....	100,000
Total	<hr/> £1,884,000

P A R T II

THE TRANSITION PERIOD.

If the system I have recommended in Part I is accepted by the Commonwealth Government, a period of transition must elapse before it comes into complete working order, during which much may be done to make or mar the scheme.

It would therefore be of great importance that the working out of the details during this time should be placed in charge of one or more officers who thoroughly understand the scope and the spirit of the system for the land defence of Australia which I have proposed.

It will be easily realised that proposals may be made which would prejudice in the future the efficient working of the new organization, though in themselves momentarily expedient. I think it is therefore essential that all schemes should be tested in the light of their utility to the full grown citizen force, and when found wanting in that respect, should only be given effect to as purely temporary measures, to be discontinued as soon as the development of the new Citizen Force allows.

Areas.

A great deal of preparatory work may be done in the areas where registration will give the most suitable limits and organization, and in which the young men should be got together in their respective classes with as little delay as possible.

I would therefore recommend that the posts of area officers should be temporarily filled by the most suitable available militia and volunteer officers, as well as by the existing permanent instructional staff. As regards the former, areas convenient to their civil avocations might be chosen and an adequate salary given for the work. By

the efficient performance of their duties, they will obtain valuable experience which will doubtless qualify them for the future command of battalions, regiments and brigades.

The process of merging the existing units into the national citizen force will be gradual, and I should advise that the designations and historical associations of the present regiments should be continued under the new system, in which each regiment should have a territorial title as well as a number. In this way the esprit de corps of the militia and volunteers would be transmitted to the new Citizen Force.

Officers.

I do not consider that any of the officers now serving should be transferred to the Staff Corps which ought to be entirely formed from the graduates of the military college, but in order to enable the officers appointed to areas during the transition period to give instruction to the new force, I would put such officers, when necessary, through a short course in the duties of an area officer. For this purpose I have put in the estimates funds sufficient to provide additional instructors.

Warrant and non commissioned officers.

Australia now maintains 229 instructional staff warrant and non commissioned officers; eventually about 400 will be required.

During the transition stage, the existing warrant and non commissioned officers should be distributed throughout the areas and supplemented by the most suitable appointments that can be made.

If these proposals are thoroughly carried out, the completely trained Staff Corps officer will find his area mapped out, the registration complete, the various classes, from junior cadets upwards, formed and he should thus take over a going concern, only requiring the guidance which he, by reason of his thorough military grounding, can give, to raise each quota of the national force.

to the high standard of efficiency which I hope the
people of Australia will always demand of their milit-
ary forces.

S T R I C T L Y C O N F I D E N T I A L

P A R T III

F I X E D D E F E R C E S

DEFENCE

SECRET

S T R I C T L Y C O N F I D E N T I A L

P A R T III

F I X E D D E F E N C E S

FENCE
1901/6/3
REPORT

During my tour I have inspected the fixed defences of Australia, and have considered whether strategical conditions justify the retention of all these fixed defences, or require the construction of any new ones.

Starting from my point of arrival, I would make the following remarks:-

PORT DARWIN

Under present conditions, the strategical value of Port Darwin lies in its being a cable landing place. That of itself is not, in my opinion, sufficient to justify the construction and maintenance of fixed defences. But, as the Northern Territory develops, and when through railway communication with the other portions of the Commonwealth has been established, the importance of Port Darwin will be so greatly increased from the commercial, and strategical points of view, that it will be sound policy to provide fixed defences to protect the port against attack. When that time comes, works can be constructed effectively and economically.

I would recommend two batteries each of 2 - 6" Mark VII guns, one on the East Point and other on the West Point of the entrance. These two points are 6,000 yards in advance of the ~~open~~ so that in this way the channel would be covered, and a hostile vessel kept at such a distance that she could do no harm to either the settlement, its docks or the shipping in the harbour.

I believe that the neighbourhood of Emery Point has been suggested as the site of a battery, but any such project would, in my opinion, give less effective defence and attract an enemy's fire on to the settlement and harbour.

THURSDAY ISLAND

Regarded merely as a harbour of refuge and a

coaling station for the navy, I am very doubtful whether the importance of Thursday Island justifies the maintenance of the present or proposed fixed defences. But the real importance of fortifications in this neighbourhood, appears to depend upon whether, by means of a small armament, the Prince of Wales Channel can be kept open for British vessels under effective gun fire, whilst the other channels between the mainland and New Guinea, which are now insufficiently charted and reported to be extremely dangerous for any large ships, can be effectively closed by the judicious use of mines. It is evident that if this be possible, and local enquiries indicated that it is so, the strategical importance of being able to deny the passage of an enemy's fleet between New Guinea and the mainland is considerable and would in my opinion justify the following armaments :-

On Goode Island, one 9.2" B.L. gun on Hill 323 where Leyds Signal Station at the western end of the Island now stands, to command the Prince of Wales Channel, and Endeavour Strait with long range fire.

Two of the existing 6" B.L. guns from Green Hill, Thursday Island, on Hill 194 below and to the west of the Lighthouse, so as to command the Western entrance to Normanby Sound.

On Thursday Island, one of the existing 6" B.L. guns from Green Hill to replace the 4.7 Q.F. gun at Milman Hill so as to command the Eastern entrance to Normanby Sound.

If the present hulk is abolished, and a coaling station established on Gonde Island, I understand that in certain conditions of weather it would be inconvenient for ships to lie alongside a pier on the southeast side. There is however deep water close up to the north of the Island, and the neck is so low and narrow that by means of a tramway, coaling operations could take place on either side according to the wind.

TOWNSVILLE

Under present conditions the fixed defences of Townsville, are valueless and their maintenance a waste of money, because the shallow waters of Cleveland Bay will prevent warships of any size or power approaching within a distance of 8,000 yards of the town. Nor could it be improved by a battery on Hawkings Point, Magnetic Island. The only form of attack which Townsville need fear is by landing parties from the boats of a cruiser, and the best form of defence to meet such an attack is by mobile rifle, machine and field gun fire.

Under the Defence Act 1909, Townsville should supply its quota to the Citizen Forces, and I recommend that the necessary garrison should be provided from this quota, and that it should consist of not less than:-

4 Companies of Infantry with 2
maxim guns.

2-15 pr. field guns with detachments.

BRISBANE

Fort Lytton commands the entrance to the Brisbane river and seems all that is required, unless in the future, it is found advisable to place batteries in the neighbourhood of Caloundra Point, where the approaches to Moreton Bay appear to contract within effective range of the shore.

NEWCASTLE

I inspected Sheppard's Hill, Fort Scratchley, the proposed site for a battery at Stockton, and viewed Knobbys from the sea.

I have no remarks to make regarding the site for the 6" Mark VII guns at Fort Scratchley.

As regards the Stockton site, the position which was marked by a red flag was so close to the

entrance of the harbour that a cross fire on the entrance would not be so effective as seems possible, while the enemy's fire at, and missing, the battery would fall amongst the shipping in the harbour. I accordingly inspected another site near the old mine shaft about 1,000 yards further north, and 1,400 yards from the harbour entrance, and saw from there still another possible site on the higher ground 1,200 yards further to the north and about 3,000 yards from the harbour entrance. Either would in my opinion be an improvement on the present selection, but their merits should be discussed after accurate surveys have been made, foundations examined and projects for a battery on each site prepared.

So far as can now be said, the choice should depend on the command of the battery, the facilities for range finding, good foundations for gun emplacements, the amount of fire which can be brought on the harbour entrance, the comparative isolation of the sites, and the facility with which each can be connected up with the other defences.

Knobbys partially masks the fire from Fort Scratchley. To guard against this danger, it would be well to examine the possibility of siting two 4.7" guns at Knobbys, so as to bring a direct fire on any night attack. These guns are available in Australia and the expense of emplacing them would be trifling.

SYDNEY

From its strategical position in the Pacific Ocean, Sydney must, I think, be considered as the principal naval base in Australian waters, and as such would form the objective of any hostile fleet which might attempt to secure for itself, however temporarily, the command of the sea. It is essential that the dockyards and arsenals of the Australian fleet should be so protected by land defences that the navy is in no way needed for their defence, nor subjected to any anxiety as regards their safety. Given then that Sydney would be the objective

of a hostile fleet, the question arises as to whether it should be defended against battleships or merely against an unarmoured cruiser raid. In the latter case, I have nothing to suggest as regards the Sydney defences, but if on consideration the former is found sufficiently weighty to guard against, then I consider that two 9.2" B.L. guns should be sited on North Head and that the possibility of an enemy using Botany Bay should be prevented.

Any attempt at landing a force from a hostile fleet would be adequately met by the garrison which will be maintained at Sydney under the Defence Act.

PORT PHILLIP - MELBOURNE.

The only strategical importance of Port Phillip lies in the fact that it is the Port of Melbourne, and in view of the natural advantages given by the difficult and narrow entrance, commanded on either side by good gun positions, I consider the proposed defences mounting seven .6" Mark VII guns will satisfy all present requirements. In my opinion there is no occasion to mount any 9.2" guns. The existing number and variety of guns and batteries are far more than Port Phillip requires. The old guns will do no harm and they might be left in their emplacements, but no money should be spent on replenishment of their ammunition and stores.

FREMANTLE.

The existing defences at Fremantle, though rather cramped, are quite modern and well adapted to protect the Fort against Cruiser attack.

ALBANY.

This wonderful harbour is naturally very defensible and could be made almost impregnable by siting

guns in a central prominent position, west of the entrance to the Inner Harbour. Considering however that the importance of Albany has been greatly diminished by the establishment of Fremantle as the Port of West Australia, I think that the only reason for its defences would be to deny the Port to any cruiser or fleet engaged in attacking our commerce. For this the present defences suffice and might be maintained.

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These harbours, in my opinion, are sufficiently defended under existing conditions.

Garrisons of fixed defences.

The importance of efficiency in coast defence work is so great, that, in view of the complexity of modern armaments, I recommend that as far as possible the Artillery and Engineer garrisons of the defended ports be constituted of permanent troops. The strength necessary will depend upon the manning tables for each Port, and all that I can now advise is that never more than one relief of the manning tables should be drawn from the Citizen Forces.

(12)

[SECRET.]

MEMORANDUM

ON THE

FIXED DEFENCES

OF

AUSTRALIA,

BY

FIELD MARSHAL VISCOUNT KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM,
G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., ETC.

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MEMORANDUM.

1. During my tour I have inspected the fixed defences of Australia, and have considered whether strategical conditions justify the retention of all these fixed defences, or require the construction of any new ones.
2. Starting from my point of arrival, I would make the following remarks :—

PORT DARWIN.

3. Under present conditions, the strategical value of Port Darwin lies in its being a ~~capable~~ landing place. That of itself is not, in my opinion, sufficient to justify the construction and maintenance of fixed defences. But, as the Northern Territory develops, and when through railway communication with the other portions of the Commonwealth has been established, the importance of Port Darwin will be so greatly increased from the commercial and strategical points of view that it will be sound policy to provide fixed defences to protect the port against attack. When that time comes, works can be constructed effectively and economically.

4. I would recommend two batteries, each of two 6-in. Mark VII. guns, one on the east point, and the other on the west point of the entrance. These two points are 6,000 yards in advance of the town, so that in this way the channel would be covered, and a hostile vessel kept at such a distance that she could do no harm to either the settlement, its docks, or the shipping in the harbor.

5. I believe that the neighbourhood of Emery Point has been suggested as the site of a battery, but any such project would, in my opinion, give less effective defence, and attract an enemy's fire on to the settlement and harbor.

THURSDAY ISLAND.

6. Regarded merely as a harbor of refuge and a coaling station for the Navy, I am very doubtful whether the importance of Thursday Island justifies the maintenance of the present or proposed fixed defences. But the real importance of fortifications in this neighbourhood appears to depend upon whether, by means of a small armament, the Prince of Wales Channel can be kept open for British vessels under effective gun fire, whilst the other channels between the mainland and New Guinea, which are now insufficiently charted and reported to be extremely dangerous for any large ships, can be effectively closed by the judicious use of mines. It is evident that if this be possible, and local inquiries indicated that it is so, the strategical importance of being able to deny the passage of an enemy's fleet between New Guinea and the mainland is considerable, and would in my opinion justify the following armaments :—

7. On Goode Island, one 9·2-in. B.L. gun on Hill 323, where Lloyd's Signal Station at the western end of the Island now stands, to command the Prince of Wales Channel, and Endeavour Strait with long range fire.

8. Two of the existing 6-in. B.L. guns from Green Hill, Thursday Island, on Hill 194 below, and to the west of the Lighthouse, so as to command the western entrance to Normanby Sound.

9. On Thursday Island one of the existing 6-in. B.L. guns from Green Hill to replace the 4·7 Q.F. gun at Milman Hill so as to command the Eastern entrance to Normanby Sound.

10. If the present hulk is abolished, and a coaling station established on Goode Island, I understand that in certain conditions of weather it would be inconvenient for ships to lie alongside a pier on the south-east side. There is, however, deep water close up to the north of the Island, and the neck is so low and narrow that by means of a tramway coaling operations could take place on either side, according to the wind.

TOWNSVILLE.

11. Under present conditions the fixed defences of Townsville are valueless, and their maintenance a waste of money, because the shallow waters of Cleveland Bay will prevent warships of any size or power approaching within a distance of 8,000 yards of the town. Nor could it be improved by a battery on Hawkings Point, Magnetic Island. The only form of attack which Townsville need fear is by landing parties from the boats of a cruiser, and the best form of defence to meet such an attack is by mobile rifle, machine, and field gun fire.

12. Under the *Defence Act* 1909, Townsville should supply its quota to the Citizen Forces, and I recommend that the necessary garrison should be provided from this quota, and that it should consist of not less than—

- 4 Companies of Infantry with 2 Maxim guns.
- 2 15-pr. field guns with detachments.

BRISBANE.

13. Fort Lytton commands the entrance to the Brisbane River and seems all that is required, unless in the future it is found advisable to place batteries in the neighbourhood of Caloundra Point, where the approaches to Moreton Bay appear to contract within effective range of the shore.

NEWCASTLE.

14. I inspected Sheppard's Hill, Fort Scratchley, the proposed site for a battery at Stockton, and viewed Knobbys from the sea.

15. I have no remarks to make regarding the site for the 6-in. Mark VII. guns at Fort Scratchley.

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
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

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SKETCH PLAN
PORTION OF
AUSTRALIA
showing Battalion Districts
and Training Areas
Scale 100 miles to inch
Railways shown ——



XII
34
35
XIII
XIV
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


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