

# Climate Policy and Banks' Portfolio Allocation

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# Research question

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  - Implication for financial stability
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  - Implication for financial stability
  - Depending on their response, the transition can be accelerated or slowed
- This paper's strategy
  - Combine UK banks' regulatory large exposure data with climate policy stringency
  - **Exploit their exposures to countries with different climate policy stringency**

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  - **Less-exposed** banks cut lending to brown sectors more than **highly exposed** banks
  - At the extreme, highly exposed banks **increase** lending to brown sectors

Transition risk may “**concentrate**”: brown gets browner, green gets greener

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- 3 Other countries' climate policies create spillovers in lending
  - E.g., when the U.S. tighten policy, banks increase brown lending to the U.K.

If climate policy is not **coordinated**, climate-finance leakage occurs

# Comments overview

- 1** Measuring transition risk exposure
- 2** Measuring climate policy stringency
- 3** Some minor comments

# Comments 1: Measuring transition risk exposure

- To compute TEC (and TAC),



$$TEC_{b,j,t} = \sum_k TEC_k \times EXP_{b,k,j,t}$$

- Banks exposed to the same industries have the same TEC, regardless of country
- E.g., TEC/TAC rationale for electricity production sector Alessi and Battiston (2022)
  - TEC: Share of the production of electricity from fossil fuels
  - TAC: Share of the production of electricity from renewable sources



# Comments 1: Measuring transition risk exposure

## ■ TEC and TAC for major European countries in 2023



## ■ Huge heterogeneity in the “true” TEC and TAC

- The interpretation of changes in exposure should be done with care
- Lower TEC/CPRS  $\neq$  lower “true” transition risk exposure

# Comments 1: Measuring transition risk exposure

- **Suggestion 1:** S&P Trucost Environmental data
  - A global firm-level dataset covering 20,000 companies
  - Includes Scope 1, Scope 2, and Scope 3 GHG emissions
  - Easily accessible through WRDS and mergeable with Compustat Global
  - Aggregate the data by country, sector, and year  $\implies$  measure of exposure

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## ■ **Suggestion 2:** Check robustness using “true” TEC/TAC

- For some industries, you can find actual data which follows the TEC/TAC rationale

## Comments 2: Measuring climate policy stringency

- CCPI climate policy index

- Performance rating by climate and energy policy experts within each country
- ~ 450 experts for 63 countries + EU (CCPI 2025)

- Caveats

- 1** In many countries, there are only 1-2 experts, and there is turnover over the years  
⇒ Since this paper uses  $\Delta CCPI_j$ , dynamic consistency is important
- 2** How should we quantitatively interpret a one-unit increase in CCPI?  
⇒ A one-unit increase in Norway could be different from a one-unit increase in Korea

## Comments 2: Measuring climate policy stringency

- **Suggestion:** to use a quantitatively interpretable, objective measure
- World Bank Carbon Pricing Dashboard (WB CPD)
  - Information about carbon taxes and emissions trading systems around the world
  - Carbon price, coverage, and government revenue from carbon pricing
  - Period: 1990- & Coverage: 82 jurisdictions
- Government revenue from carbon pricing to GDP would be useful
- The policy coverage of the CCPI is much broader than that of the WB CPD

# Minor comments

- 1 Location of firms is based on where they are incorporated
  - Dataset focuses on large exposures  $\Rightarrow$  large multinationals as counterparts
  - Location of headquarters  $\neq$  location of production
  - **Suggestion:** drop the manufacturing sector and check robustness

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- There may also be exposure through supply chains
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## 3 Lower TEC share: reallocation or capital outflow?

- Shifts to low-TEC sectors or capital outflows reduce TEC share
- Strict climate policy  $\Rightarrow$  capital outflows?
- **Suggestion:** Run the same regressions using the CPRS ratio



# In a nutshell

- Great contribution to an important area of research!
- I believe tightening the measurement would improve the paper
- I hope my comments are helpful

**Thank you!**

# References I

**Alessi, Lucia and Stefano Battiston**, "Two sides of the same coin: Green Taxonomy alignment versus transition risk in financial portfolios," *International Review of Financial Analysis*, 2022, *84*, 102319.