Financial Constraints and Misallocation in the Intangible Economy

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Research question

Intangible assets have become important in modern economies

- Questions:
 - 1 Intangible intensive firms \Longrightarrow more financially constrained?
 - 2 If so, what are the macro implications, particularly for aggregate productivity?

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credit spread = f(\text{default probability}(+), \text{recovery ratio}(-))
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- Collateral value → lender recovery ratio
- Nonlinear GMM \rightarrow 42% tangible vs. \sim 0% intangible

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- Literature 1: Model-based calibration
 Khan and Thomas (2013), Ottonello and Winberry (2020), Clymo and Rozsypal (2023)...
- Literature 2: Direct evidence from bankrupt firms
 Kermani and Ma (2020, 2023)...

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Develop a flexible and intuitive method to estimate collateral value

- 2 Lower collateral value reduces aggregate productivity
 - Channel 1: productivity distribution (extensive margin)

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collateral value \downarrow \implies debt \downarrow \implies default \downarrow from low z firms \implies more low z firms aggregate productivity \downarrow
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- Channel 2: allocative efficiency (intensive margin)
 - ightharpoonup With zero collateral values, credit spread depends only on the PD (and z)
 - ▶ High z firms are (relatively) less constrained \implies more resources to high z firms

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Identify a new channel linking financial frictions to higher productivity

Comments overview

- 1 Productivity decomposition and its interpretation
- 2 Intangible assets as collateral and UK bankruptcy reform
- 3 Are intangible intensive young firms more constrained?

■ Olley-Pakes (statistical) decomposition

$$\sum_i \omega_i z_i = \bar{z} + \sum_i (z_i - \bar{z})(\omega_i - \bar{\omega})$$

	Intan friction	No intan friction
	$(\alpha^I = 0)$	$(\alpha^I = \alpha^T)$
TFP Intan	1.0059	1.0313
Ave TFP Intan	0.9601	1.0105
Cov Intan	0.0458	0.0208

■ Higher OP covariance ⇒ higher allocative efficiency (and higher TFP)?

■ In general, aggregate TFP ≠ weighted average of micro TFP (Baqaee and Farhi (2020))

$$\mathit{TFP} = rac{\mathsf{Y}}{\mathsf{K}^{ heta}\mathsf{L}^{
u}}
eq \sum_{i} \omega_{i} \mathsf{z}_{i}$$

■ OP covariance has misleading interpretation

■ Example: 3 firms,
$$y = zI^{\alpha}$$
, $\alpha = 1/2$, $\bar{L} = 1$

Firm	Α	В	С	TFP	OP Cov
Z	1	2	3		
/ *	0.071	0.286	0.643	3.742	0.571

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- I*: efficient allocation of resources (marginal products are equalized)
- I: the most productive firms take all the resources
- Higher OP covariance does not imply higher allocative efficiency or TFP

■ My suggestion: Use a more interpretable decomposition of aggregate TFP Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Baqaee and Farhi (2020), Kochen (2022)

$$log(TFP) := log(Y) - \theta \times log(K) - \nu \times log(L)$$

$$= \underbrace{log(TFP^e)}_{\text{efficient}} + \underbrace{log(\frac{TFP}{TFP^e})}_{\text{allocative efficiency}},$$

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where

$$TFP = \frac{\sum_{i} z_{i}^{\frac{1}{1-\theta-\nu}} MPK_{i}^{\frac{\theta}{1-\theta-\nu}} MPL_{i}^{\frac{\nu}{1-\theta-\nu}}}{\left(\sum_{i} z_{i}^{\frac{1}{1-\theta-\nu}} MPK_{i}^{\frac{1-\nu}{1-\theta-\nu}} MPL_{i}^{\frac{\nu}{1-\theta-\nu}}\right)^{\theta} \left(\sum_{i} z_{i}^{\frac{1}{1-\theta-\nu}} MPK_{i}^{\frac{\theta}{1-\theta-\nu}} MPL_{i}^{\frac{1-\theta}{1-\theta-\nu}}\right)^{\nu}}$$

$$TFP^{e} = \left(\sum_{i} z_{i}^{\frac{1}{1-\theta-\nu}}\right)^{1-\theta-\nu}$$

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- Lenders recover through the going-concern value (US: Chapter 11; UK: administration)

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- Lenders recover through the going-concern value (US: Chapter 11; UK: administration)
- Well-developed reorganization framework for insolvent businesses
 - \implies Cash-flow based debt and intangibles as collateral are more prevalent Lian and Ma (2021), Kermani and Ma (2020)
- What about UK?

- World Bank Doing Business: prevalent reorganization in both US and UK
- Cash-flow based debt from Schularick (2021)

Share of total non-financial business debt by type, 2013-2018

Countries	Asset-Based	Cash Flow-Based
United Kingdom	17.6%	68.9%
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- UK seems to have a decent reorganization framework...
- What about $\hat{\alpha}^I = 0$ in this paper? A puzzle?
 - Small vs. large firms? ⇒ you can actually estimate it!

■ UK Enterprise Act 2002: facilitate the reorganization of insolvent businesses

"...to promote a culture of company rescue..."

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- Came into force on September 15, 2003
- How does α_I changes before and after the reform for different size of firms?
 - Estimate PD for private firms with Moody's RiskCalc model Falkenstein et al. (2000)
- You can use your model to study an interesting policy reform!

Comment 3: Intangible young firms and financial constraint

- Intangible young firms are less constrained than their tangible counterparts
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- Intangible young firms are less constrained than their tangible counterparts
 - young firms use uncollateralized loan + intangible firms are more productive (less PD)
- Interesting, as intangible young firms have been regarded as the most constrained Caggese and Pérez-Orive (2022),Bøler et al. (2023)
- Test this directly! Do intangible young firms have lower credit spreads?

In a nutshell

- Great contribution to an important area of research
- The estimation method would help discipline the model and guide further research
- I hope my comments are helpful

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