**The Credit-Driven Business Cycles in Korea :**

**How Important is the Credit Supply Channel?**

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**Abstract**

This paper analyzes the dynamics between credit (household debt) and economic growth in Korea from 2000 to 2020. We show that they have intertemporal trade-off relationship empirically as previous cross country studies suggest. In order to show that the relationship works mainly through credit (loan) supply channel, we use 3-stage least squares method. The result shows that in the loan market where there is an oversupply incentive, the changes in the lending attitude of banks due to macroprudential regulations by the policy authorities, who are concerned with excessive movement of credit, explain a substantial part of household debt fluctuations and the resulting economic activity. The credit supply channel is shown to explain the 72% sensitivity of growth over the next two years to the household debt ratio.

Key words: credit, household debt, macroprudential regulation, lending attitude

JEL code: G32, G33, G34

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**1. Introduction**

Before the GFC, the consensus in macroeconomics was that credit was the veil of economic fluctuations (Woodford 2003; Kiyotaki 2011). However, after the crisis, it was widely accepted that the rapid increase in private credit increased the possibility of an economic recession, occasionally accompanied by a financial crisis, threatening the real economy and financial stability (Schularick·Taylor 2012; Mian·Sufi 2014; Mian et al. 2017).

In Korea, the relationship between private credit and economic growth has also continued to be of interest to the central bank and academia since 2000. This is because, private credit, mainly household debt, has been increasing rapidly, fluctuating around the trend ever since. Corporate debt is also showing a sharp rise in recent years. The household debt ratio increased by 49.1%p (51.9%→101.0%) over the past 21 years, and the corporate debt ratio increased by 6.6%p in the fourth quarter of 2020 compared to the same period last year.

This paper empirically analyzes the dynamics between private credit and economic growth in Korea from 2000 to 2020, and then tries to find out the main channel to explain the results. Specifically, it tries to answer the following two questions:

1. How is the surge in private credit related to future growth slowdown?
2. If the surge in private credit is related to future growth slowdown, what is the main channel to explain this?

This paper confirms the robustness of the results of previous studies by presenting the empirical analysis that the rapid increase in household debt is related to the subsequent growth slowdown using Korea's macro-variable data since 2000. In particular, it is worth noting that in the most of the previous studies, the sample period of most of the target countries includes the banking crisis experiences, whereas that of this paper does not include ones. This is an important feature of this paper. The causes of banking crises are diverse and could be the factors other than credit surges (e.g. capital outflows) as is usually observed in reality. If so, the true degree of the trade-off between the period of credit expansion and growth could be less than the previous studies suggest.

Another characteristic of this paper is that credit cycles are analyzed by identifying the loan demand-led phase and supply-led phase (shifts of the loan demand and supply curves). It is important to identify credit demand and credit supply in finding the causes of credit fluctuations and measuring their effect on the quantity of credit. This is because the trend and cyclical change in credit is found out to be mainly due to the supply side rather than the demand side in previous studies on a number of countries. Specifically, the credit cycle is divided into four phases and analyzed according to the direction of quantity (household debt ratio) and price (household loan interest rate).

Finally, this paper explains the increase in household debt and the subsequent slowdown in growth as the result of the endogenous interactions between lenders (banks) and policy authorities with different incentives. Such interactions affect growth through credit fluctuations and consumption-oriented aggregate demand channels. Specifically, the macroprudential intervention of the policy authorities to achieve financial stability is suggested as the cause of the change from the optimistic attitude of the lenders to the pessimistic one. This can be seen as a new contribution in light of the fact that Mian et al. (2017) and others, who put emphasis on the adjustment of the behavioral bias of lenders as a cause generating credit and economic cycles, failed to provide a specific reason why then such adjustment happens. Therefore, the explanation presented in this paper can be interpreted in the form of combining the financial friction theory while complementing the weaknesses of the behavioral bias theory. It is suggested that the endogenous interaction between banks and policy authorities acts as a shock of lending constraints, which slows aggregate demand and leads to a subsequent slowdown in growth.

**2. Literature Review**

A number of empirical studies have analyzed that the surge in private credit is closely related to the boom-bust of the real economy (Mian et al.(2017), IMF(2017), Greenwood et al.(2021), Bordalo et al.(2017), Greenwood et al.(2016), López-Salido et al.(2017)). In many countries, a period of rapid increase in private credit was accompanied by an economic boom, but after that, a phenomenon of rapid economic deterioration was observed.[[1]](#footnote-1) This paper refers to this as the intertemporal tradeoff between credit and economic growth. In particular, the rapid increase in private credit preceded the major banking crisis.[[2]](#footnote-2)

Studies explaining the negative relationship between the surge in private credit and future growth are classified into theories based on financial friction and those based on behavioral finance.

**2.1 Financial Friction-Based Theory**

These type of studies focuses on the effect of amplification and propagation of negative shocks due to imperfections in financial and real markets. Bernanke·Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki·Moore (1997), Eggertsson·Krugman (2012), etc. are representative studies using the financial friction model, and Fisher (1933)’s theory of debt deflation is also an early form of the financial friction model.

When a negative shock to the economy occurs exogenously, firms and households experience a decrease in their net assets, which limits borrowing, which reduces investment and consumption, thereby amplifying the effect of the shock.

This view is advantageous in explaining the process of the deterioration of the real economy, but it has the disadvantage of not being able to identify the cause and frequency of exogenous shocks.

**2.2 Behavioral Finance-Based Theory**

This kind of theory focuses on the process of shaping and reversing the beliefs or expectations of a borrower or lender (investor) so as not to rely on exogenous assumptions of the shock. For early studies in this regard, see Minsky (1977) and Kindleberger (1978). They focus on i) why investors become overly optimistic, ii) what endogenously reverses this optimism and cripples credit markets, and iii) what the macroeconomic effects are.

For example, during credit extension periods, lenders tend to underestimate the risk of default on borrowers (Greenwood et al. 2016) and maintain an overly optimistic outlook on the future economic situation (Mian et al. 2017), but if on average, the economy falls short of this, a reversal in sentiment occurs. This tendency is usually referred to as behavioral bias in the behavioral finance literature. Bordalo et al. (2017) introduce the concept of a diagnostic expectation formation to explain the tendency of investors’ over-reliance on the current economic status news. From this point of views above, the shock is endogenous due to the irrational expectations of economic agents.

Although there are logical differences between the two approaches to analyzing the relationship between credit and economic fluctuations, in reality, the mechanisms of the two theories can be viewed as complementary to each other. it can be seen that the theory based on financial friction is suitable to explain the process in which the entire economy becomes vulnerable and the process in which shocks spread when a shock occurs, and the behavioral finance approach is suitable to explain the process in which the credit market psychology is reversed and the shock itself occurs.

**3 The Empirical Relationship Between Credit and Economic Growth in Korea**

**3.1 Empirical Methodology**

We analyzes the relationship between the change in the private debt ratio over the two-year (8th quarter) and output growth rate through the following regression equation

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(2)

DRW000011c82ef4 : *t*기에서 *t+h*기까지의 연평균 성장률(DRW000011c82ef6 )

DRW000011c82ef8 : *t*기 전전년동기대비 연평균 가계부채비율 증감(DRW000011c82efa )

DRW000011c82efc : *t*기 전전년동기대비 연평균 기업부채비율 증감(DRW000011c82efe )

DRW000011c82f00 : 경제적 통제변수 벡터

DRW000011c82f02 : 기술적 통제변수 벡터

stands

When h = 0, the equation analyzes the contemporaneous relationship between the change of the private debt ratio and the output growth rate. When h = 8), it checks whether the change in the private debt ratio is predictive for the average annual growth rate for the next two years. As control variables with economic significance, changes in 10-year Treasury yields (compared to the same period 2 year ago) and changes(difference between 10-year and 1-year U.S. Treasury yields) in the spread of long-term and short-term U.S. Treasury yields (compared to the same period 2year ago) are considered. From the perspective of the Korean economy, which is a small open economy, the yield on U.S. Treasury bonds and long-term spreads, which represent overseas interest rates, are important exogenous variables.

The historical level value of the growth variable is used as a technical control variable to solve the spurious regression problem.

The explanatory variable including the increase or decrease in the private debt ratio is a stable time series (I(0)), while the two-year average growth rate, which is the dependent variable, includes the unit root.

If a regression analysis consisting of a dependent variable with I(1) and an explanatory variable with I(0) is performed, the problem of false regression occurs because the unit root is included in the residual (Stewart 2006)

Prevent the problem of pseudoregression by borrowing the idea of Hamilton (2018) and setting the historical level value of the growth variable as a control variable.

Two regression equations were simultaneously estimated through the least squares method (OLS), and statistical inference was performed through the block bootstrap method in consideration of the autocorrelation of potential error terms and the correlation between error terms. Both the dependent variable and the explanatory variable have high persistence, so it is highly likely that the error term has an autocorrelation.

Considering economic fluctuations, it is highly likely that a correlation exists between the current growth rate and future growth rates that are not explained by the same explanatory variable. In case of statistical inference through bootstrap method, block size was set to 8 and bootstrap replication was performed 30,000 times.

**3.2 Results**

In our analysis of the Korean economy since 2000, it is estimated that household debt and economic growth show an intertemporal tradeoff. A 1%p (year-on-year, annual average) increase in the household debt ratio is related to 0.3%p (annual average) growth during the same period, but a slowdown in growth of 0.3%p (annual average) is predicted for the next two years. See columns (3) and (4) in the table 1.

[Table 1]

This means that growth accompanied by excessive household borrowing has to pay for future growth slowdown. This also suggests that the rational expectation-based permanent income hypothesis is inappropriate to explain the empirical relationship between household debt and economic growth, and an alternative theory is needed to explain it. Under the permanent income hypothesis, an increase in debt should be associated with an increase in future growth rate because households increase consumption through borrowing when their future income is expected to increase permanently. Even if the forecast period is extended to 3 years (h=12), the trade-off between household debt and the period of economic growth is still valid.

However, the negative sensitivity of the increase in the household debt ratio to future growth over the past two years showed a gradual easing after peaking in two years (h=8). The household debt sensitivity of real GDP also showed a pattern similar to that of real GDO.(<Figure 1>)

[Figure 1]

It was analyzed that corporate debt and growth did not show a trade-off between periods.

Even if corporate bonds are included in corporate debt, the result is the same, which is presumably because the proportion of corporate bonds in corporate debt (20% level, average for 2015-2020) is relatively low.

The increase in the corporate debt ratio showed a negative correlation with economic growth during the same period, but it was estimated that it was not statistically significant with the subsequent growth rate. When GDP is used as a growth variable, the corporate debt-to-equity ratio sensitivity estimate has a negative (-) value, but is not statistically significant.

This is considered a result of reflecting the fact that after the financial crisis, financial institutions' loans were concentrated on households rather than corporations. Considering these points, it can be seen that the economic fluctuations after the financial crisis are more related to household debt than to corporate debt.

When the household debt ratio increases, consumption expenditure also increases, but then slows down again.

A 1%p (2-year average) increase in the household debt ratio is related to 0.6%p (annual average) private consumption growth during the same period, but a decrease of 0.5%p (annual average) private consumption is predicted for the next two years. When looking at consumption expenditures by type, consumption expenditures for durable goods, non-durable goods, and services all showed a trade-off between household debt and a statistically significant period. The magnitude of the trade-off was most prominent in durable goods consumption expenditure. A 1%p increase in the household debt ratio was related to an increase in durable goods consumption expenditure of 1.2%p during the same period, but a 1.7%p decrease in durable goods consumption expenditure was predicted thereafter.

**4 How Important is the Credit Supply Channel?**

**4.1 Identification of supply and demand-driven phases**

In order to understand the results of the previous section, that is, “the increase in the household debt ratio is related to the subsequent slowdown in growth,” it is necessary to look at the causes of the increase in the household debt ratio in terms of loan demand and supply.

If lenders' behavioral bias is a meaningful channel, an increase in the household debt ratio should show a significant correlation with loan supply. This is because behavioral bias causes a shift in the loan supply curve by changing the loan supply attitude. On the other hand, if the financial friction theory is an important channel, it is not important whether the increase in the household debt ratio is due to supply or demand for loans. Considering this point, we identified and analyzed credit fluctuations into loan demand-led phase and supply-led phase (movement of loan demand and supply curves). This is in consideration of the fact that the trend and cyclical surge in credit in previous studies targeting a number of countries is mainly due to the supply side rather than the demand side. After identifying the peaks and troughs of quantity and price, we defined diastolic and systolic respectively. This is described in Dupraz et al. (2021) used the peak/trough identification method. Quantity and price The household debt ratio was divided into four cyclical periods (① demand-driven expansion, ② demand-led contraction, ③ supply-led expansion, and ④ supply-led contraction) through the expansion and contraction phases, respectively. As a result of applying this method, the following points were found.[[3]](#footnote-3)

[Figure 3]

1. A supply-led expansion and a demand-led expansion of the household debt ratio occur alternately.
2. Until the early 2010s, there is a period in which the household debt ratio decreases, repeating the pattern of supply-led expansion → demand-led expansion → supply-led contraction → demand-led contraction.
3. However, from 2013, supply-led and demand-led expansion took place alternately, and the household debt ratio continued to increase.

**4.2 Characteristics of cyclic fluctuations**

**4.2.1 Loan attitude (supply) has the nature of cyclical fluctuations.**

Household loan attitudes, which are proxy variables for loan supply, change with a time lag (2~3 years), and the predictability of such loan attitudes is judged to be the result of endogenous interactions between banks and policy authorities.

The household loan attitude index, a variable that represents changes in loan supply (supply curve shift), exhibited predictable (2~3 year cycle) fluctuations.The results are similar to those of Favilukis et al. (2013) using credit standards as a proxy for loan supply to analyze changes in housing prices.

This indicates that when the current household loan attitude is accommodative, after 2-3 years, the household loan attitude will change to tighter.

[Figure 4]

Due to the interaction between banks and policy authorities with different incentives, the household loan attitude index appears to exhibit cyclical fluctuations (mean regression).

In the case of banks, they have an incentive to expand supply mainly on mortgage loans due to profit maximization, de-internalization of externalities, and behavioral convenience.

Considering the historical LTV level, mortgage loans are a means of achieving low risk and stable returns, and interbank loan competition for top-line expansion is in line with banks' profit maximization.

Another factor to consider when making decisions on loan behavior is that banks have no incentive to consider negative externalities caused by the surge in household debt.

A typical example of negative externality is a phenomenon in which the income of other households also decreases (aggregate demand externality) when borrowing households reduce their consumption expenditure during a credit contraction period, and a phenomenon in which the value of collateralized assets of neighboring households also decreases (pecuniary externality) when collateralized assets are sold (pecuniary externality) However, the bank does not take this into consideration when making a loan decision. On the other hand, banks tend to underestimate the downside risk during household debt expansion (Greenwood et al. 2016).

In the case of Korea, it was found that banks tend to forecast more accommodative than actual lending attitudes (optimistic outlook bias) despite policy authorities' regulations. When the household debt ratio rises sharply, the policy authorities take a policy response, which causes banks to anticipate a tighter household loan attitude. However, the realized loan attitude is more austere than the bank's forecast, showing a negative correlation between the two-year increase in the household debt ratio and the forecast error.

[Figure 5]

Policy authorities have been responding to the negative externalities of household loans through a series of macroprudential policies after learning about the negative externalities caused by excessive corporate debt through the foreign exchange crisis. It has experienced the economic cost of financial instability from the foreign exchange crisis. This is because the foreign exchange crisis (1998) accompanied by bank bankruptcies severely damaged the real economy by limiting credit access and causing additional corporate bankruptcies.

Evidence of learning evidence is that the Bank of Korea's economic outlook is analyzed to partially reflect potential risks to the real economy due to household debt. ▪ When the household debt ratio increases, the Bank of Korea's real GDP forecast for t+2 years tends to decrease. However, it seems that there is an insignificant positive relationship between the increase in the household debt ratio and the forecast error.

[Figure 6]

As the importance of macroprudential policies has been highlighted, centered on BIS (Crockett 2000; Borio 2003), Korean policy authorities have been implementing measures to prevent financial instability caused by the surge in household debt since 2002. In fact, macroprudential regulations have been concentrated in the late supply-led expansion period and early demand-led expansion period, when the household debt ratio is rapidly increasing.

[Figure 7]

**4.2.2 Changes in loan attitude (supply) act as an important determinant of cyclical changes in the household debt ratio.**

If the household debt ratio rises sharply (compared to the previous year), the household debt ratio tends to slow down and decrease (compared to the previous year) two years later. A 1%p (annual average) increase in the past household debt ratio is analyzed to contribute to a decrease of 0.44%p (annual average) for the next two years. Here, 0.44%p is the average regression coefficient of the change in the household debt ratio in a two-year cycle.

[Figure 8]

The degree to which changes in loan attitude (supply) caused by endogenous interactions between banks and policy authorities contribute to cyclical changes in household debt ratio (mean regression) was analyzed through two-stage regression analysis. The methodology of López-Salido et al. (2017) was used. In the case of a sharp increase in the household debt ratio, the first-stage regression analysis was estimated as follows under the hypothesis that the policy authorities will respond with macroprudential regulations with a time lag, and accordingly, banks' lending attitudes will be strengthened.

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DRW00003b9c1695 : *t*기에서 *t+8*기까지의 가계 대출태도지수 추세변화

: *t-8*기에서 *t*기까지의 가계부채비율 증감(전전년동기대비, 연평균)



A two-step regression analysis was carried out as follows under the hypothesis that the strengthening of loan attitudes (reduction of loan supply) due to regulations would cause a slowdown or decrease in the household debt ratio.

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DRW00003b9c16b6 : *t*기에서 *t+8*기까지의 대출태도지수 추세변화 1단계 예측치

As a result of the analysis, it appears that the change in loan supply caused by the interaction between banks and policy authorities explains to a large extent the cyclical change in the household debt ratio (mean regression). A 1%p (annual average) increase in the household debt ratio over the past two years appears to predict a slowdown in the household debt ratio of 0.42%p (annual average) for the next two years through changes in loan supply.

[Figure 9]

**4.2.3 Loan supply channels account for much of the trade-off between household debt and periods of growth.**

The reduced loan attitude (supply) due to the strengthening of regulations by the policy authorities and the resulting slowdown in the household debt ratio lead to a slowdown in growth accompanied by sluggish aggregate demand. In other words, the loan supply path appears to be an important path to explain the negative relationship between household debt and future growth.

The path of loan supply (interaction between banks and policy authorities) where the household debt ratio affects future growth can be explained through the following conceptual diagram.

[Figure 10]

Banks expand loan supply (supply-led expansion period) for reasons such as profit maximization, de-internalization of externalities, and behavioral convenience, and accordingly, the household debt ratio increases. A surge in the household debt ratio triggers intervention by policymakers to lower the risk of financial instability. Reinforcement of regulations by policy authorities causes a decrease in lending attitudes (supply), which leads to a slowdown in the household debt ratio and a slowdown in growth. Since the household debt ratio and growth show a positive (+) correlation in the same period, a cyclical change in the household debt ratio suggests a cyclical change in growth.

In order to estimate the degree of influence of the household debt ratio on future growth through this route, the previous 1st and 2nd regression equations and the additional (3rd) regression equations are estimated. Previously, (increase and decrease in the household debt ratio in period t) was used as the explanatory variable, but here, instead of the two-step regression equation (increase or decrease in household debt ratio in two years, in which the increase or decrease in household debt ratio in period t is predicted through the loan supply channel), is used as the explanatory variable. .

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DRW00003b9c16d4 : *t*기에서 *t+8*기까지의 연평균 성장률

DRW00003b9c16d6 : 대출공급 경로를 통한 *t*기 가계부채비율 증감의 *t+8*기 조건부 가계부채비율 증감 예측치(2단계 회귀식 결과)

DRW00003b9c16d8 : *t+8*기의 통제변수

The sensitivity of growth after two years ( ) was estimated for the conditional forecast ( ) of the increase and decrease in the household debt ratio after 2 years due to the interaction between banks and policy authorities. The sensitivity of the growth rate after 2 years (t+8) to the 1%p increase in the household debt ratio (compared to the same period of the previous year) in the t period explained by the loan supply route is measured by ()%p.

▪ (Step 1 regression coefficient) Shows the sensitivity to the trend change of the household loan attitude index in the t+8 period to the 1%p increase in the household debt ratio in the t period.

▪ (Two-step regression coefficient) Indicates the sensitivity of the increase or decrease of the household debt ratio in the t+8 period to a 1 unit increase in the trend change of the conditional household loan attitude index in the t+8 period.

The importance of the loan supply path is evaluated by comparing the sensitivity estimate ( ) above and the sensitivity of future growth ( ) to the household debt ratio estimated in the basic model (Section Ⅲ).

An increase in the household debt ratio causes a slowdown in future 1) GDO, 2) consumer spending, and 3) facility investment through loan supply channels.

Looking at the specific figures, the increase in the household debt ratio of 1%p (annual average) over the past two years leads to the following results over the next two years (annual average) through this route.

① 0.2%p growth slowdown, ② 0.4%p consumption expenditure slowdown, ③ 1.0%p slowdown in facility investment.

Considering the share of facility investment in the service industry (approximately 41% of total facility investment, as of 2020), this path suggests that it is related to consumption-oriented aggregate demand.

Next, the loan supply route appears to explain to a large extent the negative relationship between the household debt ratio and future real economic activity (the result of Section III). The loan supply route explains the 72% sensitivity of growth (based on GDO) over the next two years to the household debt ratio. In addition, the loan supply route explains the sensitivity of consumer spending by 78%, so growth slowdown is accompanied by a slowdown in aggregate demand.

[Table 2]

**5 Concluding Remarks**

Through an analysis of Korea from 2000 to 2020, this paper shows that credit (household debt) and economic growth had an intertemporal trade-off between periods. This suggests that the subsequent slowdown in growth has to be paid for the excessive credit and economic growth today.

This also means that when policy authorities consider credit and macroprudential policies for the purpose of the stabilization of economic growth and financial stability, they should consider the intertemporal effects on growth of such policies.

In addition, based on previous studies that identify the supply side of credit as the main cause of the credit cycle, this study measures the importance of the credit supply channel in the cyclical fluctuations in the household debt ratio in Korea.

This paper shows that the credit supply channel works as follows. In the loan market where there is an oversupply incentive of banks, the change in the lending attitude of banks due to macroprudential regulations by the policy authorities, who are concerned with excessive movement of credit, explain a substantial part of household debt fluctuations and the resulting economic activity. . The credit supply channel is shown to explain the 72% sensitivity of growth over the next two years to the household debt ratio. The existence of this channel is evidence of the effectiveness of macroprudential policies.

On the other hand, it should be noted that, if the appropriateness and timeliness of the regulatory strength is overlooked, the implementation of regulations may amplify economic fluctuations. At the same time, it is necessary to induce the market participants to form their expectations for credit and asset markets rationally by improving the predictability and consistency of prudential regulations.

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| <Appendix> Definition of Variables | |
| Name | Descriptions |
| *Distress50* | A dummy variable which equals one if the cumulative losses exceed half of paid-capital and zero otherwise. |
| *DistressResolution* | A dummy variable that equals one when a firm successfully restructures its debt (i.e., its *Distress50* turns changes from 1 to 0), and zero otherwise. |
| *NoAdDummy* | A dummy variable that equals one when a firm designated as administrative issues by KRX successfully turns around and zero otherwise. |
| *ROA* | Net income scaled by the book value of total assets |
| *ChgDummy* | A dummy variable that equals one when the change in the largest shareholder between time t-1 and time t+1 occurs and zero otherwise. |
| *PPRate* | Rate of common stocks issued due to private placement, calculated as the number of new common stock issued divided by number of common stocks issued before the private placement |
| *SwapDummy* | A dummy variablethat equals one if a private placement to the third party takes place due to the debt-equity swap and zero otherwise. |
| *AssetTurnover* | Sales scaled by total assets |
| *Size* | Log of total assets |
| *PPE* | PP&E scaled by total assets |
| *EBITDA* | Earnings before interest scaled by total assets |
| *R&D* | R&D expense scaled by total assets |
| *RDDummy* | A dummy variable that equals to one for firms that report positive levels of R&D and zero otherwise. |
| *Leverage* | Total debt scaled by total assets |
| *SalesGrowth* | Firm’s deviation from the industry-average sales growth based on two-digit Korean Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC) code |
| *GA* | A dummy variable that equals to one when a firm is from a large business group and 0 otherwise, based on the list of large business groups designated by the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) every year |
| *SurvivalProb* | The probability of successful resolution, calculated from Cox regression ring interval *t*, defined as the difference between initial distress period. |
| *CFReturn* | Sales less cost of goods sold, less selling and administrative expenses, plus depreciation and goodwill amortization all deflated by total asset |

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| <Table 1> Firm-level characteristics by distress outcome, change in control and private placement |
| |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | |  | | | | | | | | |  | 2002.1/4~2020.4/4분기 | | | |  | 2012.1/4~2020.4/4분기 | | |  | h = 0 | h = 8 | h = 0 | h = 8 |  | h = 0 | h = 8 | | 설명변수 | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |  | (5) | (6) | | 가계부채비율 증감  (전전년동기 대비) | 0.36\*  (0.19 0.52) | -0.29\*  (-0.49 -0.10) | 0.34\*  (0.24 0.45) | -0.31\*  (-0.48 -0.14) |  | 0.24\*  (0.01 0.48) | -0.35\*  (-0.54 -0.11) | | 기업부채비율 증감  (전전년동기 대비) | -0.19\*  (-0.32 -0.06) | -0.04  (-0.20 0.10) | -0.11\*  (-0.19 -0.02) | -0.00  (-0.14 0.14) |  | 0.46\*  (0.23 0.67) | 0.04  (-0.24 0.26) | | 미국채금리10년물증감  (전전년동기 대비) | 0.59  (-0.08 1.27) | -1.43\*  (-2.21 -0.63) | 0.84\*  (0.33 1.34) | -1.12\*  (-1.83 -0.38) |  | 3.16  (-1.26 6.71) | -4.43\*  (-9.30 -0.60) | | 미국채금리스프레드증감(전전년동기 대비) | 0.16  (-0.27 0.61) | 0.40  (-0.10 0.94) | -0.13  (-0.48 0.21) | 0.25  (-0.25 0.74) |  | -2.53  (-6.01 1.66) | 4.13\*  (0.42 8.93) | | 기술적 통제 여부 |  |  | ✓ | ✓ |  | ✓ | ✓ | | adj. R2 | 0.41 | 0.34 | 0.67 | 0.47 |  | 0.71 | 0.90 | | 주: 1) 스프레드는 10년물과 1년물의 금리 차이  주: 2) 상수항과 DRW00003be409c8의 계수 추정치는 생략  주: 3) 괄호 안의 수치(·)는 block bootstrap 표준오차에 근거한 90% 신뢰구간을 나타냄  주: 4) \*는 *p-value*<0.1를 나타냄 | | | | | | | | |

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| <Table 2>  ► **추정 결과 비교** | **GDO** | **GDP** | **소비지출** | **설비투자** |
| 공급경로 민감도 (DRW000026942680 ) | -0.22\*  (-0.52 -0.04) | -0.15\*  (-0.40 -0.01) | -0.37\*  (-0.81 -0.08) | -0.98\*  (-2.48 -0.06) |
| 기본 모형 민감도 (DRW000026942682 ) | -0.31\*  (-0.48 -0.14) | -0.24\*  (-0.40 -0.07) | -0.47\*  (-0.70 -0.23) | -1.51\*  (-2.36 -0.66) |
| 공급경로 기여도(%) | 72% | 64% | 78% | 65% |
| 주: 1)(·)는 OLS 추정치의 block bootstrap 90% 신뢰구간  주: 2) \*는 *p*<0.10 의미  주: 3) 공급경로 기여도는 공급경로 민감도/기본모형 민감도×100으로 계산 | | | | |

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| This table reports the summary statistics, including number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 25th percentile, median, and the 75th percentile of variables used in the analyses. The data corresponds to Korean public and private for the period 2000-2019. All variable definitions are described in the Appendix. | | | | | | |
| Variable | N | Mean | Std Dev | p25 | Median | p75 |
| Dependent variables | | | | | | |
| *DistressResolution* | 74,981 | 0.342 | 0.474 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| *ROA* | 74,981 | -0.247 | 2.589 | -0.275 | -0.113 | -0.011 |
| *NoAdDummy* | 2,130 | 0.377 | 0.485 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| *CFReturn* | 74,981 | -0.026 | 0.127 | -0.009 | 0.000 | 0.021 |
| Measure of transfer of control | | | | | | |
| *ChgDummy* | 74,981 | 0.698 | 0.459 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Measure of equity private placement | | | | | | |
| *PPRate* | 74,981 | 0.156 | 16.461 | 0.000 | 0.170 | 0.271 |
| Measure of debt-equity (DE) swap | | | | | | |
| *SwapDummy* | 74,981 | 0.114 | 0.318 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Control variables | | | | | | |
| *AssetTurnover* | 74,981 | 1.055 | 1.369 | 0.397 | 0.798 | 1.271 |
| *Size* | 74,981 | 18.614 | 1.778 | 17.488 | 18.369 | 19.465 |
| *PPE* | 74,981 | 0.292 | 0.200 | 0.124 | 0.281 | 0.433 |
| *EBITDA* | 73.150 | -2.809 | 15.755 | -0.305 | -0.016 | 0.075 |
| *R&D* | 74,981 | 0.018 | 0.068 | 0.000 | 0.002 | 0.017 |
| *RDDummy* | 74,981 | 0.644 | 0.479 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| *Leverage* | 74,981 | 0.464 | 0.450 | 0.269 | 0.451 | 0.618 |

<Figure 1>

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| **예측기간 별 GDO의 가계부채 민감도1)** | **예측기간 별 GDP의 가계부채 민감도1)** |
| EMB00003be40b1d | EMB00003be40b1e |
| 주: 1)회귀계수 DRW00003be40b3d의 추정치로 가계부채비율 1%p 증가 시 GDO(혹은 GDP)가 DRW00003be40b3f%p 변동하는 것으로 해석이 가능  주: 2)2002.1/4∼2020.4/4분기  주: 3)음영은 90% 신뢰구간을 나타냄  자료: 한국은행, 저자 추정 | |

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| **예측기간 별 GDO의 기업부채 민감도1)** | **예측기간 별 GDP의 기업부채 민감도1)** |
| EMB00003be40a5d | EMB00003be40a5e |
| 주: 1)회귀계수 DRW00003be40ab9의 추정치로 기업부채비율 1%p 증가 시 GDO(혹은 GDP)가 DRW00003be40abb%p 변동하는 것으로 해석이 가능  주: 2)2002.1/4∼2020.4/4분기  주: 3)음영은 90% 신뢰구간을 나타냄  자료: 한국은행, 저자 추정 | |

<Figure 2>

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| **가계부채와 소비의 기간 간 상충관계** |
| EMB00003be40b4f |
| 주: 1)2000.1/4∼2020.4/4분기  주: 2)막대는 90% 신뢰구간을 나타냄 |

<Figure 3>

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| **가계부채비율1)과 가계대출금리2)** |
| EMB000026942668 |
| 주:1)2000.1/4∼2021.2/4분기  :2)실질 가계대출금리(예금은행 신규취급액 기준) |

<Figure 4>

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| **가계 대출태도지수의 평균회귀(2년)** | **가계 대출태도지수의 평균회귀(3년)** |
| EMB000026942669 | EMB00002694266a |
| 주: 1)2000.1/4∼2020.4/4분기  주: 2) 대출태도지수가 (+)는 완화, (-)는 긴축을 의미  주: 3) (·)는 OLS 추정치의 Newey-West 표준오차, \*\*\*는 *p*<0.01을 의미  자료: 한국은행, 한국은행 보도자료, 저자 계산 | |

<Figure 5>

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| ***t*기 가계부채비율 증감과 *t*기의 *t*+1기 조건부 가계 대출태도지수 전망** | ***t*기 가계부채비율 증감과 *t*+1기**  **가계 대출태도지수 예측오차** |
| EMB00002694266d | EMB00002694266e |
| 주: 1)2002.1/4∼2020.4/4분기  주: 2) t기 예측오차는 t기 대출태도 확정치에서 전기의 t기 대출태도 전망치를 차감하여 계산  주: 3) (·)는 OLS 추정치의 Newey-West 표준오차, \*\*\*는 p<0.01, \*\*는 p<0.05를 의미  자료: 한국은행, 한국은행 보도자료, 자체 추정 | |

<Figure 6>

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| **가계부채비율 증감과 *t*+2년 BOK 경제전망** | **가계부채비율 증감과 *t*+2년 경제전망오차** |
| EMB00002694266f | EMB000026942670 |
| 주: 1)2008∼2020년  주: 2) 한국은행은 2008년부터 경제전망시계를 2년으로 확장  자료: 한국은행, 한국은행 보도자료, 저자 추정 | |

<Figure 7>

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| **가계 대출태도지수 추세변화1)의 추이2)와 주요 거시건전성 규제3)** |
| EMB000026942671 |
| 주: 1)누적 가계 대출태도지수의 전전년동기대비 증감으로 정의  : 2)2001.4/4∼2020.4/4분기(가계 대출태도지수 추세변화)  : 3)원숫자(①~⑳)는 주요 거시건전성 규제 발표 시기를 나타냄  : 4)2000.1/4∼2021.2/4분기(가계부채비율 순환기)  자료: 한국은행, 금융위·금감원 보도자료, 자체 시산 |

<Figure 8>

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| **가계부채비율의 평균회귀1)** |
| EMB0000124c36fd |
| 주: 1)2000.1/4∼2020.4/4분기  자료: 한국은행, 자체 추정 |

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| **1단계 추정결과** | **2단계 추정결과** |
| EMB000026942675 | EMB000026942676 |
| 주: 1)2000.1/4∼2020.4/4분기  주: 2) (·)는 OLS 추정치의 block bootstrap 표준오차, \*\*\*는 *p*<0.01를 의미  자료: 한국은행, 한국은행 보도자료, 저자 계산 | |
| 대출공급 경로를 통한 가계부채와 성장 간의 기간 간 상충관계 | |
| EMB000026942679 | |

1. Mian et al. (2017) analyzed 30 countries from 1960 to 2012, and IMF (2017) expanded the analysis target to 80 countries. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The major banking crises by country preceded by a surge in private credit are as follows:

   US(1929~1933, 2008), UK(1991), Sweden(1991), Spain(1972), Japan(1992), South Korea(1998). Norway(1987). See Schularick·Taylor(2012); Mian·Sufi(2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The cyclical fluctuations in the household debt ratio identified by this method are generally consistent with indicators such as the household debt ratio gap and household debt growth rate. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)