National Versus Ethnic Identification in Africa: Modernization, Colonial Legacy, and the Origins of territorial Nationalism

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Research Note

NATIONAL VERSUS ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION IN AFRICA

Modernization, Colonial Legacy, and the Origins of Territorial Nationalism

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WEAK nationalism is commonly blamed for a host of problems in sub-Saharan Africa, including protracted civil wars, chronic political instability, and economic underdevelopment. As Paul Collier puts it: "a society can function perfectly well if its citizens hold multiple identities, but problems arise when those subnational identities arouse loyalties that override loyalty to the nation as a whole."[1] The general assumption, then, is that attachment to the state-defined national identity is not just weak but is also weak *relative* to subnational ethnic attachment. Despite the ubiquity of this assumption, there has been very little comparative empirical research on territorial nationalism in Africa. This article takes a first step in that direction by utilizing public opinion data to describe patterns of national identification relative to ethnic group identification within and across sixteen African countries. By establishing the correlates of relative group identification, the article offers insight into the origins of territorial nationalism in Africa.

While the empirical study of territorial nationalism in Africa has been rare, theoretically derived expectations abound. When African states gained independence, there was great optimism that national unity would surely follow from economic and political modernization. This optimism was founded on classic modernization theories, which argued that processes of "modernization"—including urbanization,

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[1] Collier 2009, 52.

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universal education, access to mass media, and industrialization—give rise to national identification at the expense of ethnic and other communal forms of subnational group identification.[2] When ethnic group identification did not immediately wane and, in some cases, even seemed to grow stronger, a second generation of modernization theory, largely focused on Africa, was proposed. These scholars theorized that the intense competition over resources that resulted from modernization was more likely to engender ethnic identification than to destroy it, resulting in greater fragmentation rather than national unity.[3] While these two theoretical traditions are not necessarily incompatible in terms of modernization's impact on *absolute* levels of group identification—it may be that political and economic modernization leads to an increase in both national and ethnic group identification—they do generate competing expectations about the effect that modernization should have on the *relative* importance of national and ethnic identities in contemporary African societies.

A third theoretical tradition rejects the expectation that modernization in Africa will engender national identification, on the grounds that African states emerged in a fundamentally different way than did the European states on which classic modernization theory was based.[4] In particular, the territorial borders of African states were carved out by colonial powers without regard for existing patterns of group identification.[5] Partly as a result of the colonial partition, African states are among the most ethnically diverse in the world, with many ethnic groups split into multiple states, thereby producing a context in which national unity could be hard to foster.[6] Further, both the experience of colonial rule by a particular foreign power and the form of the anticolonial struggle have also been said to account for patterns of group identification.[7] In short, a diverse literature asserts a form of "African exceptionalism," expecting that the colonial legacy of African states is paramount for understanding variation in contemporary territorial nationalism.

To evaluate the impact of modernization and colonial legacies on group identification, this study takes advantage of individual-level survey data on national versus ethnic identification from a representative

[2] Deutsch 1953; Gellner 1964; Weber 1979; Gellner 1983; Anderson 1991.
[3] Melson and Wolpe 1970; Bates 1983.
[4] Kedourie 1970; Davidson 1992.
[5] Herbst 1989.
[6] Young 1976.
[7] Mazrui 1983.

sample of citizens in sixteen African countries. The use of a relative measure of national and ethnic group identification, rather than a focus on absolute levels, increases the interpersonal comparability of responses, incorporates the constructivist acknowledgment of multiple identities, and is theoretically justified given the competing expectations of the impact of modernization on group identification. Individual-level data on relative group identification are combined with a novel compilation of ethnic group and state-level data in order to estimate the impact of modernization and colonial legacy on national identification relative to ethnic identification within a multilevel model.

The results lend support to classic modernization theories by showing that living in urban areas, having more education, and being formally employed in the modern sector are all positively correlated with identifying with the nation above one's ethnic group. Further, greater economic development at the state level is also associated with greater national identification, once Tanzania is excluded as an outlier. Thus, these findings are more consistent with classic modernization theories than the expectations derived from second-generation modernization theory. In terms of colonial legacy, the results indicate that purported obstacles to national unity in Africa—highly diverse states and partitioned ethnic groups—are actually associated with higher levels of national versus ethnic identification.

I thus conclude that the colonial origins of African states, including the resulting diversity and partition of their societies, have not made them immune to the unifying effects of modernization. This is very important in light of what we know about the impact of increased national identification on rates of interethnic cooperation,[8] the promotion of intergroup trust,[9] support for minority-favoring policies,[10] levels of economic redistribution,[11] and the likelihood of ethnic conflict.[12] Because strong national identification may have these and other implications for African states, it is important to understand the factors that are associated with greater national identification relative to subnational ethnic identification.

These findings bring new data to bear on long-standing debates in the literature on territorial nationalism and ethnic politics in Africa. This is a crucial contribution to the study of territorial nationalism,

[8] Miguel 2004; Charnysh, Lucas, and Singh 2013.
[9] Robinson 2013.
[10] Transue 2007.
[11] Shayo 2009.
[12] Sambanis and Shayo 2013.

as past studies have often lamented the lack of empirical data on national identification.[13] However, because the data are attitudinal, cross-sectional, and from a limited, nonrandom sample of African countries, the results are susceptible to social desirability bias, endogeneity, and nonrepresentativeness. These limitations are discussed at length in a section below and are addressed empirically where possible. Despite their limitations, the data allow for a set of findings that both answer important outstanding questions and motivate several directions for future research.

Modernization and National Identification

There is near consensus among scholars that widespread, state-based national identification is a modern phenomenon; that is, while nationalist ideologies may have existed before the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, mass identification with large political units did not.[14] To explain the rapid increase in national identification across Europe, classic modernization theorists posited that processes of modernization—including urbanization, universal education, access to mass media, industrialization, and the advent of wage labor—led to a reduction in various forms of parochial attachment.[15] Such attachments were then replaced by greater identification with the territorially defined state, ultimately eliminating ethnic differences through cultural homogenization.[16]

The expectation that political, economic, and social modernization would inevitably lead to national integration was a great comfort to nationalist leaders on the eve of African independence. The polities inherited from colonial predecessors were extremely diverse ethnically and most lacked a strong territorially defined national consciousness: many African leaders thus saw the national integration of their diverse populations as crucial to their survival.[17] The general optimism of this period is captured well by Sekou Toure's prediction that "in three or

[13] See, for example, Hobsbawm 1990; Herbst 2000; and Young 2004.

[14] Many define nationalism as the political doctrine that state and cultural boundaries should be congruent (Gellner 1983), with a resulting focus on the study of irredentism, succession, and civil war. By contrast, the less studied phenomenon of "national identification" refers to the feelings of affection, loyalty, and identification with the group of people living within a state. Primary attachment to one's ethnic group, by contrast, is referred to as "ethnic identification." Others have distinguished these two phenomena as civic nationalism and ethnonationalism (Hutchinson 1994). I focus here on the strength of national identification relative to subnational ethnic identification, which Young 2004 refers to as "territorial nationalism."

[15] Durkheim 1893; Parsons 1960; Gellner 1964; Apter 1965.

[16] Bendix 1964; Deutsch 1953; Eisenstadt 1973; Weber 1979; Anderson 1991.

[17] Smock and Bentsi-Enchill 1975.

four years, no one will remember the tribal, ethnic, or religious rivalries which, in the recent past, caused so much damage to our country and its population."[18]

Such expectations for African nationalism were built upon classic theories of modernization.[19] Urbanization was expected to contribute to national integration by breaking the ties between mobile individuals and their tribal homelands and by creating a truly national arena in which citizens of different cultural backgrounds could interact. Centralized education and mass media would increase national identification by fostering a shared national language and referencing a common, territorially defined national history. Increased industrialization, or at least a decline in subsistence agriculture, and the implementation of a monetary economy were expected to reduce the degree to which individuals relied on subnational networks to access land and livelihood.

For classic modernization theorists, then, the process of modernization would not only promote greater national identification but would also concurrently reduce identification with subnational, parochial groups. Thus, as pointed out by Walker Conner, the ultimate goal of state-based national unity would require just as much nation-destroying (of ethnic nations) as nation-building (of state-based nations).[20] Similarly, James Coleman defined the emergent African nation not as a multiethnic society but rather as a "post-tribal, post-feudal terminal community which has emerged from the shattering forces of disintegration that characterize modernity."[21] In short, *classic modernization theory predicts that modernization will increase national identification at the expense of ethnic group identification.*

Two main categories of objection have been raised to the expectation that modernization in Africa will lead to greater national unity. The first category of arguments focuses on the role of modernization in increasing *ethnic* identification, rather than national identification. The second focuses on the unique historical experience of African states, and on colonialism in particular, suggesting that the relationship observed in Europe between modernization and nationalism is either not applicable in Africa or is secondary to the effects of colonialism.

[18] Toure 1959, 28.
[19] Coleman 1954; Smock and Bentsi-Enchill 1975.
[20] Connor 1972.
[21] Coleman 1954, 405.

Modernization and Ethnic Identification

On the heels of postcolonial optimism about the transformative powers of modernization, both African nationalists and scholars of African politics began to question the notion that modernization would inevitably lead to unified nations. In fact, many argued the exact opposite, namely, that political and economic modernization were likely to *intensify* ethnic divisions within African states. This tradition has subsequently been referred to as "second-generation modernization theory."[22]

Second-generation modernization theorists first pointed out that ethnic and other communal identities, often considered vestigial by classic modernization theorists, were themselves as modern as the territorially defined nations that would supposedly replace them. In fact, they argued, the creation of contemporary ethnic categories arose in response to increased modernization in Africa.[23] Urbanization and the modern economy brought members of different ethnic backgrounds together, but instead of promoting interethnic cooperation and assimilation, the situation led to fierce competition for the spoils of modernization. Disagreements over the particular language to be used, or the curriculum to be taught, meant that mass media and universal education became ethnic battlegrounds rather than means to national integration. The introduction of wage labor created yet another scarce resource for which individuals, increasingly organized along ethnic lines, competed. The central argument for second-generation modernization theorists, then, is that modernization creates new incentives for competition within the state and that such competition will be primarily fought along ethnic lines.[24] Thus, they expect that *processes of modernization will lead to an overall increase in the degree of ethnic identification in African states, at the expense of national identification.*

Second-generation modernization theory also has implications for which ethnic groups should be most sensitive to such competition. Daniel Posner has argued that because only some groups are numerous enough to engage in such competition effectively, *ethnic identification should be strongest among larger ethnic groups*.[25] While size is arguably the strongest indicator of a group's political utility, *members of any ethnic*

[22] Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010.

[23] Melson and Wolpe 1970; Connor 1972; Bates 1983; Calhoun 1993.

[24] Bates 1983 argues that such competition will be ethnically organized because both the spoils of modernization and ethnic groups tend to be geographically concentrated.

[25] Posner 2004b.

group that has been politically mobilized—those deemed to be "politically relevant"[26]—*are expected to have a greater inclination to identify ethnically.*

Ben Eifert, Edward Miguel, and Posner have provided empirical support for the impact of modernization on ethnic identification across African states by showing that individuals working in the modern sector are more likely to choose their ethnic identity over a religious or occupational identity.[27] However, their data are not able to assess the impact of modernization on ethnic identification *relative to* national identification. While strong ethnic attachment is not incompatible with national identification, national integration requires that loyalty to the territorial nation supersede subnational ethnic loyalties—the outcome evaluated in this article.

In sum, from the two modernization literatures, we get predictions that absolute levels of both national identification and ethnic identification should increase with modernization. But the two theories make competing claims as to the relative impact that modernization will have on national *versus* ethnic forms of group identification, which ultimately determines the net impact of modernization on national integration in Africa.

Colonial Legacy and National Identification

A second objection to the expectation that modernization will increase national identification in Africa is driven by concerns about applying models of European nationalism to African states, which arose in a way fundamentally different from the processes that gave rise to European states.[28] Such arguments focus mainly on the colonial origins of modern African states, the legacy left by the colonial partition of the continent, and the years spent under colonial rule, with the expectation that these factors matter as much as, if not more than, modernization.

The first obstacle to applying European expectations to the African continent is that national identities in Europe arose within state borders that, while every bit as "arbitrary" as those found in the postcolonial world, were the product of endogenous processes within those borders, generating what's been termed "vertical legitimacy."[29] By contrast, the borders in Africa were mostly determined by European colonial powers without regard for existing patterns of group identification.[30] This

[26] Posner 2004a.
[27] Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010.
[28] Davidson 1992.
[29] Englebert 2002.
[30] Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Herbst 1989.

partition, in the terms coined by Clifford Geertz, led to "suffocation"—the amalgamation of multiple ethnic groups within a single state—and "dismemberment"—the partition of single ethnic groups into two or more states.[31]

The African continent was already among the most culturally diverse in the world due to its large size, long history of human inhabitance, heterogeneous ecologies, and North-South geographic orientation.[32] But this high degree of diversity was reproduced, or even exacerbated, at the state level by the colonial disregard for existing patterns of political and social organization when carving up the continent. Because, by and large, postcolonial political leaders accepted colonial boundaries at independence,[33] an already diverse continent was divided into equally diverse states. The result of such diversity is that the citizens of most African states lack a common indigenous language, shared historical memories, or similar cultural traditions—the classic building blocks of a coherent national identity.[34] If the high degree of ethnic diversity within African states—the result of both geography and colonial partition—is a major impediment to national identification, then *more ethnically diverse states should exhibit lower levels of national identification relative to ethnic identification*.

In addition to creating culturally diverse states, the colonial partition divided many cultural groups into more than one colony, and subsequently into multiple states, leading to the "dismemberment" of ethnic groups. Such partition is thought to have had profound effects on the likelihood of successful nation-building, because it calls into question the legitimacy of the territorial state and potentially creates incentives to redraw state borders.[35] If such ethnic groups see a state that does not contain all its members as illegitimate, then *members of partitioned groups should identify less with their national group, relative to their ethnic group, than should members of intact groups*.

Beyond the effects of partition, many scholars have argued that colonial rule also exacerbated the salience of any ethnic differences present,

[31] Englebert, Tarango, and Carter 2002.

[32] Diamond 1994; Michalopoulos 2012; Laitin, Moortgat, and Robinson 2012.

[33] Herbst 1989.

[34] Gellner 1983; Horowitz 1985.

[35] Bienen 1983; Asiwaju 1985; Englebert 2002. While most of the literature on ethnic group partition anticipates that it will have a negative impact on national integration, this is not always the case. For example, Miles and Rochefort 1991 find that members of the Hausa ethnic group on both sides of the Niger-Nigeria border identify more with their respective states than as Hausa. They argue that it is precisely among such partitioned groups that state-based differences in education, language, and currency are so apparent. In other words, sharing an ethnic culture across state boundaries may enhance national identification, as any differences are attributed to the different nations.

through the processes of indirect rule and ethnic favoritism.[36] The use and degree of such policies varied among the colonial powers, however, with the British being the most likely to use, and most extreme in their use of, ethnic categorization.[37] In addition, unlike the French, the British did not attempt to homogenize the colonial population and, instead, followed a policy of reifying local languages and customs.[38] If the salience of subnational differences persisted past the colonial period, we should expect *former British colonies to have lower levels of national relative to ethnic identification than non-British colonies*.

Finally, there is one consequence of colonialism that is thought to have led to higher levels of national identification in African states—anticolonial struggles. These anticolonial campaigns often exploited a national rhetoric to unify individuals from different cultural groups against a common enemy.[39] This was especially true where the anticolonial struggle culminated in war, since the experience of war in and of itself is also thought to increase state-based national identification.[40] For both these reasons, we should expect that *states that fought anticolonial wars will exhibit stronger national versus ethnic identification than states that did not fight an anticolonial war*.[41]

While these impacts of colonial legacy are typically advanced as explanations for weak nationalism in Africa as compared with the rest of the world, if the effects are real, then the same factors should also explain variation in national relative to ethnic identification *within* Africa.

[36] Horowitz 1985; Laitin 1986; Hechter 2000.

[37] Mazrui 1983; Mazrui and Tidy 1984; Young 1985.

[38] Mazrui and Tidy 1984. While the British and the French possessed the largest number of colonies in Africa, there were, of course, other European colonial powers. The Portuguese colonized Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique; Germany possessed Burundi, Cameroon, Namibia, Tanzania, and Togo until the end of World War I; the Belgians ruled Congo and, later, Rwanda and Burundi; and Italy colonized Eritrea and Somalia. Unfortunately, with only sixteen countries in the sample, there is not enough variation to explore the differential impacts of all of these different colonial powers. Because of the British proclivity for the use of indirect rule, the comparison between former British colonies and all others is the most relevant for understanding the impact of colonial rule on national relative to ethnic identification.

[39] Mazrui 1983; Neuberger 2000.

[40] Howard 1978.

[41] While it is possible that preexisting strength of identification with the nascent nation played a role in motivating armed resistance, most accounts of anticolonial wars have attributed variation in violence across colonies to the strategic considerations of the colonial ruler (Young 1994), the presence of European settlers within the colony (Stein 2013), or the geographical feasibility of insurgency (Wantchekon and García-Ponce 2011), rather than variation in underlying nationalist fervor. Thus, a positive correlation between an anticolonial war and national over ethnic identification today is likely to be largely due to the long-term effects of war on group identification.

Empirical Strategy

The literature review above suggests eight hypotheses across the three classes of theories, summarized and numbered in Table 1.

Most of the existing literature relating modernization and colonialism to group identification is primarily theoretical and macrohistorical, due to a lack of systematic data on group identification. A major contribution of this article is its use of cross-national data on national versus ethnic identification at the individual level, collected across sixteen African states. I combine these individual-level survey data with indicators of modernization and colonial legacy across three levels of observations: individual, ethnic group, and country. I then assess the impact of these variables on national versus ethnic identification within a multilevel regression framework.

Data

Individual-level survey data are employed from the third round of Afrobarometer data collection,[42] which are available for sixteen sub-Saharan African countries: Benin (2005), Botswana (2005), Ghana (2005), Kenya (2005), Lesotho (2005), Madagascar (2005), Malawi (2005), Mali (2005), Mozambique (2005), Namibia (2005), Nigeria (2005), Senegal (2005), South Africa (2006), Tanzania (2005), Uganda (2005), and Zambia (2005).[43]

Dependent variable: national versus ethnic identification

Respondents were asked to "suppose that you had to choose between being a [Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.] and being a [respondent's ethnic group].[44] Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached

[42] Afrobarometer 2008.

[43] Data were also collected in Cape Verde and Zimbabwe, but Cape Verde is not included because of its small population size and lack of precolonial inhabitation, and Zimbabwe is not included because the question on national and ethnic identification was not asked.

[44] The relevant ethnic groups for each country were predetermined by Afrobarometer and respondents chose their own ethnic group from that predetermined list in a prior question. In Botswana and Lesotho, ethnic response categories representing subtribes within the Tswana (Mokgatla, Mokwena, Mongwato, Mongwaketse, Motlokwa, Morolong, Molete, Mmirwa, Motawana, and Mohurutshe) and Sotho (Bakoena, Basiea, Bahlakoana, Batsoeneng, Batloung, Bataung, Baphuthing, Batebele, Bakhatla, Makholokoe, Makhoakhoa, Banareng, Mapele, Bakubung, and Mchegu) ethnic groups were recoded to the ethnic group level for comparability across countries. More than 95 percent of the respondents across the sixteen countries categorized themselves as a member of one of the provided ethnic groups, with only 4.5 percent specifying that they belonged to some "other" ethnic group. However, more than 60 percent of those who chose "other" were from Tanzania: almost half of all Tanzanians chose "other" when asked which tribe they belonged to. For those individuals, I was unable to determine the characteristics of their ethnic group (such as size, degree of partition, political relevance), resulting in those respondents being dropped from analyses with ethnic group-level variables. However, this is unlikely to

TABLE 1
EXPECTED EFFECTS ON NATIONAL VERSUS ETHNIC GROUP IDENTIFICATION

Independent Variables	*Classic Modernization Theory*	*2nd-Generation Modernization Theory*	*Theories of Colonial Legacy*
Modernization (Urbanization, Industrialization, Education)	H1: +	H2: –	
Ethnic Group Size		H3: –	
Political Mobilization of Ethnic Groups		H4: –	
Degree of Ethnic Diversity			H5: –
Partition of Ethnic Groups			H6: –
British Colonialism			H7: –
Anticolonial Wars			H8: +

to?" Possible responses included "only ethnic," "more ethnic than national," "equally national and ethnic," "more national than ethnic," or "only national." Thus, national group identification was measured relative to ethnic group identification.

The use of a *relative* measure of national and ethnic group identification offers a number of advantages. First, a relative measure allows for greater comparability across respondents.[45] If Afrobarometer had instead asked about absolute levels of national and ethnic identification using a rating scale to capture the strength of identification with each social category separately, we would need to assume that different respondents map intensity of identification onto the response scale in a comparable way. In contrast, the relative measure asks whether identification with one identity group (the nation) is weaker or stronger than identification with a different identity group (the ethnic group), a question that is meaningfully comparable across different absolute levels of identification. Thus, we can compare relative strengths of group identification across individuals without worrying about measuring or comparing absolute levels; that, in turn, increases the validity and reliability of the data.[46] Second, a relative measure of national and ethnic group identification is consistent with constructivist accounts of

bias the results, since these individuals were still asked to compare their strength of national relative to ethnic attachment, and such respondents showed patterns of national identification that were virtually identical to those whose ethnic group was included in the Afrobarometer list (89 percent versus 87 percent).

[45] Brady 1985.

[46] Olson, Goffin, and Haynes 2007; Goffin and Olson 2011.

identity. In particular, a relative measure recognizes that individuals hold multiple identities and that the relative importance of those different identities is more meaningful than the importance of any one in isolation.[47] Third, this relative measure captures the latent variable that we care about more than an absolute measure could, namely, the *relative* importance of the nation vis-à-vis ethnicity.

The distribution of answers to this relative measure of national and ethnic group identification is presented in Table 2. More than 70 percent of respondents answered that they felt either "only national," or "equally national and ethnic," with the latter category as the modal answer. Because these two categories seem to be the most normatively appealing ways for individuals to answer the question on group identification, I dichotomize the indicator in order to capture the strongest signal in the data, and in order to make the interpretation of the results more straightforward. Thus, national versus ethnic identification is operationalized as identifying with the nation-state *more* than with one's ethnic group ("national over ethnic" and "national only").[48]

Across all sixteen countries, 41 percent of the 22,155 respondents identify more strongly with their nation than with their ethnic group. Figure 1 shows the percentage of respondents that are coded as "territorial nationalists" within each country. Tanzania is an outlier, with 88 percent of respondents identifying nationally.[49] Due to its outlier status, all analyses will be reported with and without Tanzanian respondents.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

H1 and H2 assess the impact of modernization on national versus ethnic identification and can be evaluated at both the country level and the individual level. In other words, we can assess whether individuals within more modernized states are more likely to identify nationally than ethnically, as well as whether modernized individuals are more likely to identify nationally than less modernized individuals within the same country.

[47] Chandra 2001.

[48] The results are robust to using the original five-point scale (see Table A.1 of the supplementary material; Robinson 2014). I focus on the results for the dichotomous measure of national over ethnic identification for ease of interpretation.

[49] Tanzania is 2.6 standard deviations above the mean in terms of the proportion of respondents identifying with their nation over their ethnic group, and 2.4 standard deviations above the mean in its average ranking of the five categorical responses. Tanzania's outlier status is not due solely to so many respondents choosing "other" as their ethnic group (see fn. 44)—87 percent of those whose ethnic group was on the list still identify with the nation over their ethnic group.

TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL RELATIVE TO ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION

	N	*Percent*
Ethnic Only	1,256	5.7
Ethnic over National	2,378	10.7
Equally Ethnic and National	9,352	42.2
National over Ethnic	2,389	10.8
National Only	6,780	30.6
Total	22,155	100.0



FIGURE 1
VARIATION IN NATIONAL OVER ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION ACROSS COUNTRIES

At the state level, degree of modernization is proxied by the natural log of per capita gross domestic product in 2005.[50] At the individual level, modernization is operationalized as living in an urban area, having formal education, and being employed in the formal sector, all of which were collected by Afrobarometer enumerators. Urban locales were identified by Afrobarometer country directors and their designation was part of the sampling stratification. Education level was self-reported, measured on a nine-point scale ranging from no formal schooling to postgraduate education. Formal sector employment was determined by combining two questions: the first asked whether the individual received a wage, and the second asked for the specific occupation. The occupational categories were split into formal (military/police, clerical worker, businessperson, professional worker, civil servant, teacher, and so on) and informal (subsistence farmer, informal manual laborer, herder, housewife, and so on): individuals receiving a wage and employed in the formal sector were coded as formal sector employees. Because all three of these factors are more likely among males than females in all sixteen countries, I include an indicator for being male so that any observed effects of modernization at the individual level will not be conflated with gender.

H3, H4, and H6 are best assessed at the ethnic group level by evaluating whether members of larger, more politically mobilized, and partitioned ethnic groups are less likely to identify nationally relative to ethnically. Ethnic group-level variables come from two sources.[51] Ethnic group size is measured as the proportion of the total population within a country that the group makes up, and data come from country census data available online through the Joshua Project.[52] Because the distribution of group size is positively skewed (that is, there are many more small groups than large groups), analyses use the normally distributed natural log of ethnic group size. The coding of ethnic group political mobilization comes from the data compiled by Posner[53] from secondary

[50] Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012. In order to reduce the possibility of reverse causality (with greater national identification increasing economic growth), results are also presented with GDP/capita measured in 1999 (Table A.2 in the supplementary material; Robinson 2014).

[51] Matching Afrobarometer ethnic group categories to other data sets required some additional coding. First, many of the ethnic group names listed in Afrobarometer did not match the group names in other data sets, as the same groups are often called by different names when they straddle international borders (Asiwaju 1985) and local spellings can be quite different from English spellings. Thus, I assembled a list of alternative names for each ethnic group using Ethnologue (Gordon 2005) and the Joshua Project (US Center for World Mission 2010)—an Evangelical-oriented online database of ethnic group demographics based on country census data. I then used the resulting concordance to match Afrobarometer-listed ethnic groups with other data on ethnic group characteristics.

[52] US Center for World Mission 2010.

[53] Posner 2004a.

sources and is operationalized as an indicator of whether each ethnic group in a country is considered "politically relevant."[54] Finally, members of partitioned groups are coded as such if 30 percent or more of the total population of their ethnic group are not citizens of the same country. Again, these data come from country census data available through the Joshua Project.

Evaluations of H5, H7, and H8 require data on the degree of ethnic diversity, former colonial power, and anticolonial war experience at the country level. Measures of ethnic diversity and colonial ruler come from the data set compiled by James Fearon and David Laitin.[55] For diversity, I use both the commonly employed Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) index, which represents the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the same country are from different ethnic groups, as well as a measure of ethnic homogeneity that takes the value of the proportion of the population comprised by the largest ethnic group. The following ten countries are coded by Fearon and Laitin as former British colonies: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia; Kenya, Madagascar, and Mozambique are coded as having fought an anticolonial war.[56]

Multilevel Analysis

To determine whether and how indicators of modernization and colonial legacy at the state, ethnic group, and individual level are related to an individual's likelihood of identifying more strongly with the nation than with the ethnic group, I use a three-level linear probability model with random intercepts estimated at the ethnic group and state levels.[57]

[54] The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set offers an alternative coding of political mobilization (Cederman, Min, and Wimmer 2009). Using EPR data, groups are deemed politically relevant if they are included in the EPR data set and are not coded by EPR as "irrelevant." The two different measures of political relevance are correlated at 0.46 ($p < 0.001$) across the 274 ethnic groups, with most discrepancies coming from groups coded as politically organized by EPR but not by Posner. The EPR coding is utilized in a robustness test, producing similar results (Table A.13 of the supplementary material; Robinson 2014).

[55] Fearon and Laitin 2003.

[56] South Africa and Namibia could arguably be coded as having fought anticolonial wars as well. Results are also presented when they are coded as such in Table A.3 of the supplementary material; Robinson 2014.

[57] The results are very similar using a multilevel logistic regression (Table A.4 in the supplementary material; Robinson 2014). The findings are also robust to modeling each of the levels separately. Table A.5 of the supplementary material reports the results of a linear probability model, including only individual-level variables and either country or ethnic group fixed effects. Table A.6 of the supplementary material reports results for ethnic group level variables with country fixed effects and standard errors clustered by ethnic group. Finally, Table A.7 of the supplementary material presents the results of regressing the proportion of respondents choosing national over ethnic identity on state-level variables; Robinson 2014.

This model is able to incorporate predictors at all three levels into a single model and takes account of the nested nature of the data: individuals are nested within ethnic groups that are nested within countries. Thus, the probability that an individual identifies more strongly with his or her national group than with his or her ethnic group is modeled as a function of formal employment, education level, urban location, and gender at the individual level (level 1), ethnic group size, political relevance, and group partition at the ethnic group level (level 2), and income per capita, ethnic diversity, British colonialism, and anticolonial war experience at the state level (level 3).

The level 1 (individual level) model can be formally written as:

$$Y_{ijk} = \pi_{0jk} + \pi_{1jk}\, Urban_{ijk} + \pi_{2jk}\, Edu_{ijk} + \pi_{3jk}\, FormEmp_{ijk} + \pi_{4jk}\, Male_{ijk} + \varepsilon_{ijk},$$

where Y_{ijk} is the individual-level indicator of national identification over ethnic identification for individual i, from ethnic group j, in state k; π_{0jk} is the individual-level intercept; π_{1jk} through π_{4jk} are the coefficients for the four individual-level variables; and ε_{ijk} is the individual-level error term.

In the level 2 model, ethnic group-level variables are included in order to model the individual-level intercept as a function of ethnic group characteristics:

$$\pi_{0jk} = \beta_{00k} + \beta_{01k}\, GrpSize_{jk} + \beta_{02k}\, Partition_{jk} + \beta_{03k} PolRel_{jk} + r_{0jk},$$

where β_{00k} is the ethnic group-level intercept, β_{01k} through β_{03k} are coefficients on ethnic group characteristics, and r_{0jk} is random error at the ethnic group level.

Similarly, the ethnic group-level intercept is modeled as a function of state-level characteristics in the level 3 model:

$$\beta_{00k} = \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{001} Income_k + \gamma_{002} ELF_k + \gamma_{003} BritColk_k + \gamma_{004} AntiColWar_k + u_{00k},$$

where γ_{000} is the state-level random intercept, γ_{001} through γ_{004} are coefficients on country characteristics, and u_{00k} is random error at the state level.

The three levels can be combined into a single, multilevel model with both fixed and random components:

$$Y_{ijk} = \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{100}Urban_{ijk} + \gamma_{200}Edu_{ijk} + \gamma_{300}FormEmp_{ijk} + \gamma_{400}Male_{ijk} + \gamma_{010}GrpSize_{jk} + \gamma_{020}Partition_{jk} + \gamma_{030}PolRel_{jk} + \gamma_{001}Income_{k} + \gamma_{002}ELF_{k} + \gamma_{003}BritCol_{k} + \gamma_{004}AntiColWar_{k} + \varepsilon_{ijk} + r_{0jk} + u_{00k}.$$

Results and Discussion

Before discussing the results of the full model, it is useful to evaluate the value of modeling the data hierarchically. To do this, I first run a simple variance-components model, which estimates the proportion of the total variance that is explained by country and ethnic group membership. As this proportion approaches zero, the value of modeling the data hierarchically decreases. As a general rule of thumb, if the proportion of the variance explained by higher levels of aggregation is greater than 5 percent, the nested nature of the data cannot be ignored.[58] In the case of national relative to ethnic identification, differences across ethnic groups account for 8 percent of the variance, while differences across countries account for 12 percent of the variance. Thus, a multilevel model is justified empirically. Table 3 presents the results of the multilevel linear probability model that includes the fixed-effects components at all three levels, for the full sample (model 1) and excluding Tanzania (model 2). Models 3 and 4 present the results using the alternative measure of ethnic diversity.

Modernization and Relative Group Identification

Classic modernization theories predict that the coefficients on income per capita at the state level and on urbanization, education, and formal employment at the individual level should be positively related to national over ethnic identification (H1 and H2). By contrast, second-generation modernization theories would predict negative coefficients for all these variables.

As seen in Table 3, the data are more consistent with classic modernization theories. Across all model specifications, the impact of income at the state level is positive. When Tanzania is excluded from the sample, the impact is both highly statistically significant and substantively important. Holding all other variables at their means, the predicted probability of national over ethnic identification increases from 32 percent

[58] Bacikowski 1981; Goldstein 2003.

TABLE 3
A MULTILEVEL LINEAR MODEL OF NATIONAL OVER ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION, WITH COUNTRY AND ETHNIC GROUP RANDOM INTERCEPTS

	National over Ethnic Identification	*(1) Full Sample*	*(2) Excluding Tanzania*	*(3) Full Sample*	*(4) Excluding Tanzania*
Country-Level IVs	Ln of GDP/Capita, 2005	0.032	0.066**	0.076*	0.089***
		(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.041)	(0.022)
	Ethnic Fractionalization	0.227	0.069		
		(0.233)	(0.138)		
	Ethnic Homogeneity			−0.556***	−0.338***
				(0.215)	(0.130)
	British Colony	−0.064	−0.098*	−0.092	−0.121***
		(0.107)	(0.058)	(0.078)	(0.041)
	Anticolonial War	0.120	0.148*	0.049	0.118**
		(0.140)	(0.076)	(0.098)	(0.049)
Group-Level IVs	Ln of Ethnic Group Size	0.015*	0.018**	0.016*	0.022**
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
	Ethnic Group Partition	0.052**	0.057**	0.057**	0.071***
		(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)
	Politically Relevant Ethnic Group	−0.028	−0.039	−0.026	−0.037
		(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Individual-Level IVs	Formal Employment	0.027***	0.027***	0.027***	0.027***
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
	Level of Education	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
	Urban Residence	0.025***	0.026***	0.025***	0.026***
		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
	Male	0.032***	0.031***	0.032***	0.031***
		(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
	Constant	0.027	−0.086	0.153	−0.033
		(0.392)	(0.220)	(0.261)	(0.139)
	Country–Level RI (σ^2)	0.035	0.009	0.018	0.003
		(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.002)
	Ethnic Group–Level RI (σ^2)	0.012	0.013	0.012	0.012
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
	Country-Level Observations	16	15	16	15
	Ethnic Group-Level Observations	246	228	246	228
	Individual-Level Observations	20,141	19,478	20,141	19,478

*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; multilevel linear models with individuals as the unit of analysis; country and ethnic group-level random intercepts

in the poorest quarter of countries to 50 percent in the richest quarter of countries (model 1). However, this effect is smaller and statistically insignificant when Tanzania is included in the sample (model 2). Tanzania's influence is driven by the fact that it is an outlier not only in terms of the average degree of national relative to ethnic identification but also in terms of the relationship between income and relative group identification.[59] While across the other fifteen countries there is a positive bivariate relationship between income and national identification, Tanzania lies far off the regression line, with both extremely high levels of national identification and a relatively low level of economic development.[60]

All indicators of modernization at the individual level are also positive and statistically significant predictors of national over ethnic identification. On average, formal employment increases the likelihood of identifying in national terms by three percentage points, living in an urban area increases the likelihood by three percentage points, and each additional year of education increases the likelihood by one percentage point. For an individual who is not formally employed, lives in a rural setting, and has no formal schooling—characteristics that match almost 50 percent of the sample—the likelihood that he or she will identify with the nation over the ethnic group is estimated as 39 percent when all other variables are set at their means. By contrast, formally employed high school graduates living in urban areas—who make up 6 percent of the sample—are expected to identify nationally 50 percent of the time, representing a 28 percent increase in national relative to ethnic identification. Further, these effects are not due simply to gender differences. While males are indeed more likely to be educated, formally employed, and living in urban areas, as well as

[59] Note that the variance of the country-level random intercepts decreases dramatically when Tanzania is excluded from the sample (Table 3, model 2).

[60] Tanzania thus represents both an extreme case, due to its very high level of territorial nationalism, and a deviant case, given that the state-level variables that do a good job predicting levels of national over ethnic identification for other cases do a poor job explaining Tanzania. In the state-level model presented in Table A.7 of the supplementary material, Tanzania is identified as a deviant case using standard postregression diagnostics. Table A.8 of the supplementary material reports the influence of each country observation on each of the four state-level variables in the form of difference in beta scores (DfBeta) (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 1980; Fox 1997; supplementary material at Robinson 2014). For income per capita, ethnic diversity, and British colonialism, Tanzania has a DfBeta score larger than the rule-of-thumb cutoff ($2/\sqrt{n}$) signaling its influence. Plots of residuals versus fitted values (Figure A.1 in supplementary material) and residuals versus quintiles of a normal distribution (Figure A.2 in the supplementary material) further demonstrate the degree to which Tanzania is an anomalous case. Finally, Tables A.9 and A.10 present the full model, dropping each of the sixteen countries in turn. Only the omission of Tanzania leads to drastic differences in the estimates—because Tanzania is such a deviant case and because there are only fifteen countries total in each regression, any sample that includes Tanzania produces similar results. Robinson 2004.

being more likely to identify nationally, the effects of individual-level modernization are robust to controlling for gender. Thus, the results show that indicators of modernization at both the state and the individual level are positively related to national relative to ethnic identification, a finding that is consistent with classic modernization theories and at odds with second-generation modernization theories.[61]

Additional expectations derived from second-generation modernization theories—namely, that group size (H3) and ethnopolitical mobilization (H4) should be negatively related to national over ethnic identification—are also not borne out by the data. Instead, as can be seen in all models of Table 3, group size is positively related to national relative to ethnic identification: as the relative size of a group increases within a country, members of that group are increasingly likely to identify with the nation over their ethnic group.[62] This is in contrast to the expectations of second-generation modernization theories, which would predict such groups to be the most likely to identify ethnically, since they are large enough to successfully engage in ethnic-based competition. Instead, we see that their members are more likely to identify nationally, suggesting that a different mechanism may be at work. For example, as a group makes up a larger proportion of the population within a state, its members may see the national identity as one and the same as their ethnic identity, leading to an overall increase in national relative to ethnic identification. The only pattern consistent with second-generation modernization is that politically mobilized ethnic groups are less likely

[61] As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the mechanism relating modernization to ethnic mobilization by second-generation modernization scholars may operate at the ethnic group level rather than at the individual level. To evaluate this, Table A.11 in the supplementary material (Robinson 2014) includes an average measure of an ethnic group's members' perceptions of relative economic standing and average measures of education, formal employment, and urbanization for each ethnic group. The results show that the better one's ethnic group is (perceived to be) doing economically, compared with other groups in the country, the more likely one is to identify nationally over ethnically. In terms of average education, employment, and urbanization, only education shows a negative sign, but none of the three measures are statistically significant. Together, these results further undermine the claim that modernization at the ethnic group level is associated with stronger attachment to the ethnic group compared with attachment to one's nation.

[62] When ethnic group size is allowed to have a nonlinear relationship with group identification by including a quadratic term (Table A.12 of the supplementary material; Robinson 2014), the results indicate a nonmonotonic convex relationship. This means that national over ethnic identification rates are increasing with ethnic group size up to a point, and then they are decreasing with ethnic group size after a certain threshold size. Based on the estimates presented in A.12, this threshold size is 0.37. Thus, for members of ethnic groups that make up less than 37 percent of the population—which is the case for 92 percent of respondents and all but 3 of the 274 ethnic groups—members of larger groups are more likely to identify nationally. It is only among the few groups that make up more than 37 percent of the population (Chewa of Malawi, Sesotho of Lesotho, and Tswana of Botswana) where we see the negative relationship between group size and national over ethnic identification that is predicted by Posner 2004b.

to identify nationally relative to ethnically, but this difference does not reach statistical significance in any model specification.[63]

In sum, these results provide evidence in favor of classic modernization theories, which anticipate increased national over ethnic identification with modernization. The data do not allow us to reject the second-generation modernization prediction that *absolute* levels of ethnic identification are also increasing with modernization; but we can conclude that modernization is increasing national identification at a higher rate than ethnic identification, resulting in a positive net effect on national relative to ethnic group identification.

Colonial Legacy and Relative Group Identification

Holding modernization constant, theories that focus on the long-term effects of colonial legacy in shaping relative group identification in Africa expect that ethnic diversity (H5), ethnic group partition (H6), and British colonialism (H7) should be negative predictors of national relative to ethnic identification and that having fought an anticolonial war (H8) should exhibit a positive relationship.

Contrary to expectation, the effect of ethnic diversity, as measured by the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization index (ELF), is instead positive, although not statistically significant in any specification (models 1 and 2 of Table 3).[64] Interestingly, the measure of ethnic homogeneity—population share of the largest ethnic group—is a statistically significant *negative* predictor of national versus ethnic identification, following the same trend, that individuals in more diverse states are more likely to identify with the nation over their ethnic group (models 3 and 4 of Table 3). Thus, it may be that when a country contains multiple cultural groups—which all the states in the sample do—having a dominant group is threatening to smaller groups, which fear that national integration will ultimately demand cultural assimilation to that larger group. This could explain part of Tanzania's nationalism success: with its largest group consisting of only 12 percent of the population, it has no dominant ethnic group. In short, there is no evidence that ethnic diversity undermines national integration in Africa; if anything, the results suggest that ethnic homogeneity is more detrimental to nation-building.

[63] This null result also holds using the Ethnic Power Relations data set codings (Table A.13 in the supplementary material; Robinson 2014).

[64] In a larger worldwide sample, Masella 2013 reports a positive and statistically significant relationship between levels of ethnic fractionalization and the proportion of respondents who identify first and foremost with the nation.

Colonial legacy theories also predict that ethnic group partition is problematic for engendering a common national identity. By contrast, the results show that being a member of a partitioned ethnic group is instead positively related to identifying with the territorially defined nation over one's ethnic group.[65] This result is consistent with findings from the Nigeria-Niger border, where members of the partitioned Hausa ethnic group exhibited stronger identification with their respective state-based identities than with their ethnic group.[66] William Miles and David Rochefort argue that this is because the reality of national differences is particularly salient among partitioned peoples. There are at least two other potential mechanisms relating partition to greater attachment to the nation. It could be that members of partitioned ethnic groups feel that they have more to prove and thus need to show more loyalty to the state in order to gain access to resources. Alternatively, the relationship could be driven by members of partitioned groups whose coethnics make up a substantial proportion of the population in the neighboring country. For example, the Yoruba of Benin and the Tswana and Sotho of South Africa are among the most nationalist groups in their respective countries, and each is coethnic with a group that makes up a significant proportion of the population in a neighboring country (Nigeria, Botswana, and Lesotho, respectively). Thus, it may be that for such unevenly partitioned groups, the ethnic identity becomes so strongly affiliated with one state that the members of that group living in other states do not see themselves as legitimate members of the ethnic group and instead identify nationally. These two explanations cannot be disentangled within the current data set, but they suggest avenues for future research. Regardless of the mechanism, though, the results clearly demonstrate that ethnic group partition is not an obstacle to fostering greater national relative to ethnic identification.

Finally, in line with expectations from the literature, there is evidence that British colonialism has a negative effect on national unification, while anticolonial war experience has a positive effect, although both

[65] These results are robust to coding partitioned groups by setting the threshold at 30 percent or above or when using a continuous measure of degree of partition (Tables A.14 and A.15 of the supplementary material; Robinson 2014). At lower thresholds for defining partitioned groups (for example, 1 percent, 10 percent, or 20 percent of the group outside a given state), the effect of partition on national identification fails to reach statistical significance. Of the 179 ethnic groups represented within Afrobarometer by ten or more respondents, 54 (30 percent) are coded as partitioned using the 30 percent threshold.

[66] Miles and Rochefort 1991. However, since levels of state versus ethnic identification among the Hausa were not compared with other groups that were not partitioned, Miles and Rochefort's evidence could not determine whether partition increased or decreased national identification relative to ethnic identification.

effects are statistically significant only when Tanzania is excluded from the data set, and even then only marginally so. Still, the results lend some empirical support to qualitative arguments based on the importance of colonial heritage and anticolonial opposition in shaping long-term patterns of group identification.

In short, there is very little evidence that Africa's colonial legacy serves as an obstacle to national integration, with only British colonialism posing any negative influence. In fact, the legacies touted as impediments to widespread national identification in Africa—ethnic diversity and cultural partition—are, if anything, *positively* related to national over ethnic identification within African countries. Taken together, these findings cast doubt on the supposition that the colonial origins of African states pose insurmountable barriers to the emergence of widespread territorial nationalism among their citizens.

Limitations

The results outlined above are consistent with the expectations derived from classic modernization theory and largely inconsistent with regard to both second-generation modernization theories and expectations of African exceptionalism due to colonialism. However, a number of limitations exist in the use of attitudinal measures of group identification, the comparison of those attitudes cross-sectionally, the limited sample size, and the focus on some factors at the expense of others. In the following sections, I address each of these concerns empirically, to the degree possible, and discuss how these limitations influence the interpretation of the findings.

Social Desirability Bias

Public opinion scholars have long recognized that the process of collecting survey data is itself a social interaction and is thus subject to the kinds of social pressures governing interpersonal interactions more broadly.[67] Given most people's desire to make a good impression on others, the social component of survey data collection introduces the possibility of social desirability bias—the tendency for survey respondents to answer questions in order to portray themselves in a positive light.[68] Social desirability bias is lessened by removing the interviewer from the data collection process (by using self-administration)[69] or by ensuring

[67] Converse and Schuman 1974; Berinsky 1999.
[68] Crowne and Marlowe 1964.
[69] Sudman and Bradburn 1974; Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000.

respondent privacy from bystanders.[70] However, in contexts where self-administration is difficult due to illiteracy and privacy is limited by communal living situations, these problems are likely to be exacerbated.[71]

The Afrobarometer data used in this article were collected through face-to-face interviews; thus, sensitive questions are likely to suffer from social desirability bias. In the context of many African countries, "tribalism" is seen as normatively bad.[72] To the degree that national relative to ethnic identification is a norm-ridden issue, social desirability may be a concern in the Afrobarometer survey data used here. To address this concern, I look at two situations in which we would expect social desirability to be most pronounced—when bystanders are present during the interview and when a respondent is interviewed by a noncoethnic enumerator.

Afrobarometer interviewers were asked to code for the presence of bystanders for each interview.[73] Across the full sample, only 60 percent of respondents were interviewed in complete privacy, with 7 percent accompanied by a spouse, 12 percent by children, 17 percent by "a few others," and 3 percent by "a small crowd." While the presence of others is strongly associated with self-reported national over ethnic identification ($t = 8.45$, $df = 22, 136$, $p < 0.001$), the relationship is contrary to expectations: individuals interviewed in the presence of bystanders are significantly *less* likely to identify more with the nation than with their ethnic group (38 percent as compared with 44 percent for those interviewed privately). This negative effect holds when included in the main multilevel specification, but—most important for the question at hand—controlling for bystander presence does not influence the estimates on the other independent variables (see Table A.16 in the supplementary material).[74]

The influence of others may depend, however, on who they are. Scholars have found that rates of national over ethnic identification are higher among Afrobarometer respondents interviewed by noncoethnics,[75] a pattern that is consistent with race-of-interviewer effects in US survey data attributed to social desirability bias.[76] In the data used here, a majority

[70] Aquilino 1993; Aquilino, Wright, and Supple 2000.
[71] Chauchard 2013.
[72] Adida et al. 2013.
[73] Interviewers were asked the following for each interview conducted: "Were there any other people immediately present who might be listening during the interview?"
[74] Robinson 2014.
[75] Adida et al. 2013; Kasara 2013.
[76] Hyman et al. 1954; Hatchett and Schuman 1975; Reese et al. 1986; Anderson, Silver, and Abramson 1988.

of respondents (61 percent) were interviewed by an enumerator from an ethnic group other than their own.[77] When an indicator of interviewer coethnicity is included in the main specification (Table A.17 of the supplementary material),[78] the results are unchanged except that the state-level indicators for British colonialism and anticolonial war lose statistical significance, in part because of the reduced sample size for which data are available on interviewer ethnicity.

Thus, while social desirability surely influences the measure of national relative to ethnic identification, the main results reported in this article are not diminished by controlling for contexts in which we would expect social desirability to be most apparent.

The Contextual Nature of Identity

It is by now well established that social identities, including both nationality and ethnicity, are socially constructed.[79] One of the most important insights of this constructivist understanding of identity is that the relative importance of different identities is sensitive to context. For example, longitudinal data from the United States show that self-reported primary group identification changes considerably over time, with a particularly large shift after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.[80] We should similarly expect that relative group identification in African states also shifts in response to contextual factors.

Given my focus on the (relatively) stable impacts of modernization and colonial legacy, what does the contextual nature of group identification imply for my measure of national versus ethnic identification? It is likely that more ephemeral factors at the state, ethnic group, and individual level all influence the way in which respondents self-identify at the moment they are interviewed by an Afrobarometer enumerator. At both the state and the ethnic group levels, many of these contextual factors will be accounted for in the random intercepts and will not introduce bias so long as they are uncorrelated with the independent variables included. When contextual factors are correlated with the independent variables, though, such factors may bias the results.

At the country level, national elections may increase the salience of ethnicity if political parties mobilize voters along ethnic lines. Existing evidence from Africa indeed demonstrates that ethnic identification increases in the run-up to presidential elections, especially in close

[77] Data on interviewer ethnicity were collected by Adida et al. 2013 but do not include data for Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, or Tanzania.

[78] Robinson 2014.

[79] For a review of this literature, see Chandra 2012.

[80] Kuo and Margalit 2009.

races.[81] While that evidence pertains only to the salience of different subnational identities—explicitly excluding national identities[82]—the finding is relevant here because national identification is measured relative to ethnic identification. Further, while the timing of elections vis-à-vis Afrobarometer data collection is unlikely to be systematically related to the country-level independent variables, the competitiveness of the election may very well be. To guard against the possibility that national election timing and competitiveness are driving the country-level results, the results are reported with the inclusion of the proximity to an election, the competitiveness of that election, and their interaction.[83] The results, reported in Table A.19 of the supplementary material, show that the main findings are largely robust to controlling for this contextual factor.[84] In the full sample, election competitiveness is negatively associated with national relative to ethnic identification, but this is likely to be driven by Tanzania having one of the least competitive elections (see Table A.18 of the supplementary material).[85] When Tanzania is excluded, election proximity has a negative relationship with national over ethnic identification, but the interaction between proximity and competitiveness is positive. While the cross-sectional nature of the data used here cannot offer a strong test of the causal impact of elections on national relative to ethnic identification, the data are inconsistent with the contention that election contexts are driving the results on modernization or colonial legacy.

At the ethnic group level, a contextual factor that is potentially important for national relative to ethnic identification, and likely to be correlated with the ethnic group-level variables, is whether an ethnic group holds political power. In particular, it is plausible that holding power drives up national identification and that larger groups are more likely to hold power, a pattern that would call into question the reported positive relationship between ethnic group size and national over ethnic identification. Whether or not an ethnic group is in power is coded

[81] Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010.

[82] Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010 use the following question to measure the importance of ethnic identities relative to other subnational identities: "We have spoken to many [people in this country, country X] and they have all described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, religion, race, and others describe themselves in economic terms, such as working class, middle class, or a farmer. Besides being [a citizen of X], which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?"

[83] These data were collected by the author and are summarized in Table A.18 of the supplementary material; Robinson 2014.

[84] Robinson 2014.

[85] Robinson 2014.

two ways: ethnicity of the head of state and expert codings.[86] However, both measures of ethnic power are unrelated to national over ethnic identification, their inclusion does not change the main results, and the ethnic group-level variables of interest are not conditional on one's ethnic group holding power (Tables A.20 and A.21 of the supplementary material).[87]

Finally, a respondent's expressed identification with the nation relative to her ethnic group was undoubtedly influenced by any number of idiosyncratic occurrences just prior to her Afrobarometer interview. This type of contextual variation at the individual level simply adds noise to the data, making it harder to detect any systematic patterns. In order for such occurrences to systematically bias the data, it would need to be the case that certain types of individuals (urban, educated, employed) are more likely to find themselves in the types of contexts that make them more likely *in the moment* to identify nationally over ethnically. But this is wholly consistent with the argument of this article: modernization may increase national over ethnic identification by simply making individuals more likely to find themselves in contexts where attachment to the nation overpowers subnational ethnic group attachment.

Endogeneity

The data used here are cross-sectional: they report the characteristics and viewpoints of individuals across sixteen countries at one period in time. In order to use these data to say something about the origins of group identification, I am essentially treating differences across individuals, ethnic groups, and countries as proxies for over-time differences within cases. Like all research based on a cross-sectional sample, then, this study is vulnerable to endogeneity and omitted variable bias. A more definitive test of the impact of modernization on group identification would employ longitudinal data, but, unfortunately, data on national relative to ethnic identification in Africa (or elsewhere, for that matter) are not yet available for a long enough period of time to do such an analysis. In the meantime, these data offer us the first opportunity to evaluate the correlation between modernization and features

[86] The author coded the ethnic group of the head of state at the time that the Afrobarometer survey was conducted, and ethnic groups were coded as being in power if the current head of state was from that ethnic group. The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set aggregates expert codings of which ethnic groups hold political power; Cederman, Min, and Wimmer 2009. Using these data, respondents were coded as belonging to an ethnic group in power if their ethnic group was a "senior partner" or "junior partner" in the EPR data set.

[87] Robinson 2014.

of colonialism, on the one hand, and national relative to ethnic group identification, on the other hand, in nationally representative samples. While they may not allow for strong causal identification, there are three principal reasons why the correlations presented here are nonetheless valuable.

First, simple correlations can help to adjudicate between theories that make opposite predictions about how two variables will be related. In this article, the correlation between indicators of modernization and group identification helps to evaluate the *competing* claims over the impact that modernization should have on the *relative* importance of national and ethnic identities in Africa. Thus, while a causal relationship between modernization and increased national over ethnic identification is not definitively established, the positive correlation presented does increase our confidence in classic modernization theory vis-à-vis second-generation modernization theories.

Second, a focus on causal identification is most called for once a robust correlation has been identified, and it is not yet clear if that correlation is due to a true causal relationship, reverse causality, or an omitted variable. For example, a major piece of scholarship in political science called into question the assumption that economic development *causes* democratization just because we observe positive correlations between economic growth and democratic governance.[88] Similarly, future work will be tasked with teasing out the causal mechanisms giving rise to the relationship between modernization and group identification in Africa, as well as how ethnic group partition and ethnic homogeneity impact relative group identification. For now, however, the correlations reported in this article take an important first step in understanding what shapes group identification in Africa.

Third, by valuing causal identification over all else, we, as a discipline, risk limiting the scope of acceptable research in ways that undermine our understanding of important political phenomena. In particular, an insistence on causal identification may result in an excessive focus on small, marginal effects of exogenous independent variables at the expense of studies that attempt to explain large amounts of variation in the outcomes that motivate our discipline.[89] Thus, there is great value in applying data, however imperfect, to theory, in order to establish the existence, direction, and size of relationships between theoretically relevant factors and given outcomes of interest. It is in this vein that the

[88] Przeworski et al. 2000.
[89] Laitin 2013.

present study is of value and should motivate continued research on the *causes* of increased nationalism in Africa and elsewhere.

Limited Sample

At the individual and ethnic group levels, the data used in this study are plentiful, with over 20,000 observations at the individual level and almost 250 ethnic groups with sizable representation in the data set. However, at the country-level, there are only sixteen observations (and only fifteen when Tanzania is excluded). As a result, the estimates of state-level correlates of national over ethnic identification are fairly imprecise, reducing the ability to detect weak relationships. However, this should serve to increase our confidence that any state-level indicators that are significantly correlated with group identification in such a small sample are truly consequential.

A related limitation at the state level is that the sixteen countries included do not constitute a representative sample of African countries. Afrobarometer collects data only in countries that are at least nominally democratic and where there is no ongoing civil conflict. While one might expect different *levels* of national relative to ethnic identification in less democratic or more unstable countries, it is not clear that we should expect different *relationships* between indicators of modernization, colonial legacy, and group identification. Nevertheless, the results of this study may generalize only to other peaceful and democratic countries, which is itself a large and growing segment of African states.

The Role of Policy

This article has focused on the role of large-scale social transformations—economic modernization and colonialism—rather than on political agency in explaining patterns of group identification in Africa today. This focus is partly motivated by an appreciation of the importance of structure in determining the success of policy: as has been brilliantly shown for the case of France, the political will to turn "peasants into Frenchmen" only succeeded once economic and political modernization had occurred.[90]

However, this does not mean that policy has played no role in shaping national relative to ethnic identification in Africa. In fact, the inability to account for Africa's most successful nation—Tanzania—based on modernization and colonial legacy speaks directly to the importance of policy. While Tanzania looks no different from the other states at the individual

[90] Weber 1979.

and ethnic group levels, it is an extreme outlier at the state level. As the most nationalist state in the sample, Tanzania runs counter to all predictions: it is very poor, highly ethnically diverse, a former British colony, and did not fight an anticolonial war. This suggests that there are state-level conditions that are not considered here that are very important for explaining variation in national relative to ethnic identification.

Existing work suggests three such conditions—all of them the result of nation-building policy—that have contributed to high levels of national identification in Tanzania: the widespread use of a single common language (Kiswahili), the nationalist content of primary school education, and the equitable distribution of state resources in the early postindependence era.[91] That nation-building policies also have an impact on national relative to ethnic identification in Africa should not detract from the finding that economic modernization and colonial legacies also play a role. Instead, the case of Tanzania suggests that future research should aim to identify variation in the form and use of such policies across African countries and then evaluate their relative success. Capturing the role of nation-building policies would undoubtedly explain much of the remaining variation in national over ethnic identification at the state level.

Conclusions

Widespread identification with a territorially defined nation first arose in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe alongside mass education, industrialization, and urbanization. Classic modernization theories sought to connect these two historic phenomena, laying out arguments for why modernization leads to increased national identification and decreased subnational identification. However, skepticism that the same pattern should be expected among young African states undergoing economic and political modernization has been widely expressed by those expecting modernization to be a fragmenting force in Africa and by those claiming African exceptionalism based on colonial legacy. One scholar goes so far as to characterize the quest for African nation-states as "the black man's burden."[92] Despite this skepticism, this article finds that the same processes credited with the creation of European nations are also related to greater national versus ethnic identification in contemporary Africa. These findings suggest that modernization in

[91] Miguel 2004.
[92] Davidson 1992.

Africa increases national identification above and beyond any increase in ethnic identification and that, similar to the experience in Europe, political and economic modernization has ultimately unified the citizens of African states more than it has divided them.

In addition, the purported barriers to national integration endemic to postcolonial societies turn out to be positively related to national identification across the states in this sample. First, ethnic diversity at the country level is not strongly associated with group identification—a pattern that runs counter to the general assumption that diversity undermines national integration in Africa—and ethnic homogeneity is actually associated with *weaker* national over ethnic identification. Thus, it may be that in multicultural states, a supraethnic national identity is most easily fostered in the absence of ethnic dominance; and, in the absence of complete homogeneity, creating a common national identity may be easiest in highly heterogeneous populations. Second, the effect of ethnic group partition resulting from artificial colonial boundaries is *positively* related to national over ethnic identification. While partition may have a host of negative consequences for members of an ethnic group,[93] the emergence of primary loyalty to their respective states does not appear to be one of them. Thus, this study finds little evidence that widespread national identification with African states is destined for failure due to the consequences of their colonial origin.

These findings make a number of important contributions to the study of nationalism and ethnic politics, in Africa and also beyond. First, they provide empirical evidence that speaks to a long-standing debate over the impact of modernization on the development of national consciousness, using individual-level data from contemporary Africa. The use of public opinion data is crucial, as state-based nationalism—widespread identification with the territorially defined nation—is fundamentally a mass phenomenon. The empirical focus on the young states in Africa both increases the scope of classic studies of nationalism and provides an excellent opportunity for testing them in a context where widespread nationalism is not yet ubiquitous.

Second, the results reject the expectation of African exceptionalism based on the legacy of European colonialism and the pessimistic notion that the African nation-state is doomed to fail. While recognizing that each continent, country, region, and community has a unique trajectory, these findings nonetheless suggest that African populations are not immune to the general association between economic development and

[93] Asiwaju 1985.

national integration. Despite the postcolonial inheritance of "artificial" colonial borders, high levels of diversity, and cultural partition—or, as the results suggest, perhaps because of them—territorial nationalism in Africa prevails.

Third, the findings reported here speak to the literature on why weak states persist in Africa. It is certainly true that there are many factors contributing to the persistence of African states that have nothing to do with mass nationalist sentiment, including internationally recognized statehood and legal sovereignty,[94] the benefits that emerge domestically from such international recognition,[95] the success of neopatrimonial networks of patronage,[96] and the lack of viable alternatives.[97] But it is also likely that widespread loyalty to territorially defined nation-states, above and beyond allegiance to subnational ethnic communities, also contributes to the persistence of African states—a possibility proposed by Crawford Young[98] and proven plausible by the findings reported here. However, the results should not be interpreted as evidence of an inevitable and irreversible march toward ever stronger territorial nationalism. Identity politics in Africa, as elsewhere, is constantly reshaped in response to changing political and social realities. For example, we may see more localized forms of group identification arise in response to the rapid and widespread political and fiscal decentralization across Africa.[99]

Finally, the findings in this article suggest several directions for future research. Substantively, Tanzania's high rate of territorial nationalism suggests an important role for policy and political agency, which was not analyzed here, in shaping citizens' strength of group identification. Future research should thus empirically evaluate the relative effectiveness of different programs across the continent, including new language policies in South Africa,[100] the use of *ingando* solidarity camps in Rwanda,[101] and the creation of Kenya's National Cohesion and Integration Commission[102]—all policies aimed at promoting national unity. Methodologically, the use of a *relative* measure of group identification in this article conferred a number of advantages, including comparability across respondents and suitability to the theoretical

[94] Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Jackson 1993.
[95] Englebert and Hummel 2005; Englebert 2009.
[96] Sandbrook 1972; Jackson and Rosberg 1984.
[97] Herbst 1989.
[98] Young 2004.
[99] Geschiere 2009.
[100] Davis 2013.
[101] Chi 2005.
[102] Chuma and Ojielo 2012.

questions at hand. However, future research should aim to develop reliable, uncoupled measures of *absolute levels* of group identification, as well, in order to allow investigations into whether and how strength of national identification and strength of ethnic identification are related to each other and which factors explain variation in each independently. Finally, the purpose of this research was to understand the impact of modernization and colonial legacies on contemporary rates of national relative to ethnic group identification. But we care about such group identification only to the extent that it is consequential for political, social, and economic outcomes. Thus, ongoing work should focus not only on the causes of national identification in Africa but also on its implications for intergroup relations, social cooperation, and economic development.

Supplementary Material

Supplementary material for this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org.10.1017/S0043887114000239.

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