Clients and Communities

Adam Michael Auerbach

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CLIENTS AND COMMUNITIES
The Political Economy of Party Network Organization and Development in India's Urban Slums

By ADAM MICHAEL AUERBACH*

I. Introduction

THE slums of Gandhi Nagar and Gautam are situated just east of Bhopal's central market. Both slums were settled in the late 1970s by poor rural migrants eager to find work in the growing capital city of Madhya Pradesh, India.[1] Despite their proximity and similar origins, the two slums have diverged remarkably in their development. The residents of Gandhi Nagar have experienced three decades of underdevelopment. Roads are unpaved and without proper drainage. Even those alleyways laid with cobblestones are almost impassable during the monsoon. Lacking regular waste removal, the settlement is strewn with trash. The provision of water is erratic. Naveen, the informal leader of Gandhi Nagar, has fought with the municipality to improve the conditions of the settlement, but lacking strong ties to politicians and political parties, his claims have largely been dismissed.

Gautam differs strikingly from Gandhi Nagar in its internal political organization and history of political party support. Party networks pervade Gautam. Developmental deficiencies are taken up by parties and

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[1] The names of slums and individuals have been changed to ensure the anonymity of research subjects.

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their local leaders, all eager to capture the votes of the settlement. The developmental consequences of these political machines are readily apparent. Roads in Gautam are paved and lighted, above ground drainage pipes line the slum, a community center has been constructed, and the municipality provides adequate water.

Gandhi Nagar and Gautam illuminate a larger puzzle in urban India. Despite a shared context of informality and clientelistic politics, slums are not uniformly underdeveloped and marginalized. Instead, the level of basic public infrastructure and services, such as drinking water, paved roads, proper sanitation and waste removal, streetlights, and schools, varies widely across them. This uneven development provokes a fundamental question in comparative political economy: why are some vulnerable communities able to demand and secure development from the state while others fail?

I find that party networks significantly influence the ability of poor urban communities to secure development from the state. In slums with dense party networks, competition among party workers generates a degree of accountability in local patron-client hierarchies that encourages development. Dense party networks further afford slums political connectivity. I demonstrate econometrically that slums with such networks have higher quality roads, more street lighting, and greater access to municipal trash collection and medical camps. The density of party networks exhibits a stronger influence on community development than alternative factors—social capital, ethnic fractionalization, resources for collective action, or the intensity of electoral competition. The presence of multiparty networks, however, may attenuate the positive influence of party network density. Interviews with elites and survey data suggest that politicians are less likely to extend services to slums with multiparty networks because opposing networks can enjoy the services and even take credit for their provision. Within settlements, partisan competition can also create perverse incentives for rival networks to undermine each other's development efforts.

This article contributes to research on clientelism, distributive politics, and the political economy of development. Studies on clientelism often implicitly assume that patron-client networks are uniform across the political space under study and that when elections come, networks are in place to distribute patronage and monitor voters.[2] In contrast,

[2] A rich body of literature documents the role of brokers and party machines in facilitating clientelistic exchanges and access to the state: Oldenburg 1987; Auyero 2001; Manor 2000; Nichter 2008; Krishna 2002; Krishna 2011; Stokes et al. 2013. This scholarship, however, has largely overlooked variation in the presence, density, and partisan balance of patron-client networks across communities and the resulting divergences in democratic responsiveness and development facing people residing in those communities.

this article demonstrates that clientelistic networks vary in their density and partisan balance across communities, with important consequences for the provision of public services. This article also moves beyond the study of episodic practices of vote buying during elections.[3] Instead, I investigate the more protracted forms of bargaining for public infrastructure and services that unfold among residents, party workers, and politicians.

Clientelism has been found to be associated with negative outcomes in development and governance.[4] In turn, research has focused on why clientelism persists and the conditions under which it gives way to programmatic distribution.[5] Within larger "patronage democracies,"[6] however, there is considerable variation in clientelistic practices, democratic responsiveness, and development.[7] This article takes the level of analysis down to the community—urban slums—and investigates variation in party linkages and development across a population often portrayed as inescapably locked in dependent, clientelistic relations with politicians.

India, the world's largest democracy and arguably its most ethnically diverse society, provides an ideal setting in which to examine clientelism and development in informal urban settlements. Almost a billion people now reside in slums worldwide, and sixty-five million of them currently live in India's.[8] Within the next two decades, almost half of the population in India will live in cities—a demographic trend that now defines much of the developing world.[9] Concurrently, economic inequality is rising in cities, leaving behind the poor in India's vast and unregulated informal economy.[10] As urban India climbs past rural India in population, the manner in which the urban poor organize themselves and interact with the state will increasingly shape the nature of democracy and development in India.

Beyond India, the scope conditions of the theory outlined in this article are few and have a broad geographic reach—poor urban com-

[3] Much of the literature on clientelism focuses on the exchange of mundane, particularistic goods—cash, liquor, clothing, and food—for votes. For prominent examples, see Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Nichter 2008; and Stokes 2005.

[4] Clientelism has been associated with weak democratic institutions and lower public goods provision (Keefer 2007); is harmful to associational activity and democratization (Fox 1994), and is collective action and social capital (Putnam 1994); and is contrasted with programmatic distribution (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007) and accountability (Stokes 2005).

[5] Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes et al. 2013.

[6] Chandra 2004.

[7] See Heller 2000 and Sinha 2005 for studies on subnational variation in democratization and economic growth in India. See Wantchekon 2003 for an experimental study on clientelistic appeals in Benin.

[8] Office of the Registrar General and Census Commisioner 2013.

[9] Sankhe et al. 2010.

[10] Kohli 2012, 127–30.

munities in contexts defined by weak formal institutions, multiparty competition, and clientelistic politics. These conditions describe slums in developing democracies as diverse as Bangladesh, Brazil, and Ghana.

This article draws on original survey data and ethnographic fieldwork to examine the influence of party networks on local development. I administered a household survey across eighty slums in the north Indian cities of Jaipur and Bhopal. Settlements were selected through a multistage random sampling procedure that was stratified on both population and geographic area. Approximately one out of every twenty households was surveyed in each of the sampled settlements, yielding a total of 1,925 households. The survey instrument was designed after fifteen months of ethnographic and archival research in the same two cities. To measure the density and balance of party networks, I constructed party membership lists from official rosters and extensive interviews with party workers. I uncovered a total of 513 party workers across the eighty slums. Maps were also created with satellite images that depict the location of community development assets. Along with the survey, these maps provide accurate measures of several public services. The resulting data set allows me to statistically examine the influence of party networks on development while assessing the relative impact of alternative factors.

This article focuses on a specific, pervasive, and vulnerable type of slum—squatter settlements, which are spontaneous, low-income areas that are constructed by residents in a highly decentralized and unplanned manner. Squatters establish these settlements on government lands or private plots under murky legal ownership. Squatter settlements are uniformly underdeveloped and lack formal property rights at the initial period of their establishment. The shared origins of these settlements in conditions of illegality, informality, and underdevelopment, and the recent nature of their emergence throughout India, afford unique analytical leverage over questions of political organization and development.

The article is organized as follows: I first elucidate the puzzle of uneven development across India's slums and subsequently examine the strategies that slum residents use to secure development. I then present a theory of party network organization and development, followed by an introduction to the case cities and a more detailed description of squatter settlements. To ground the theory, I present two ethnographic case studies that illustrate the mechanisms of the theoretical framework, and then I turn to the econometric findings, address issues of

historical sequencing and causality, and conclude with the contributions of the article.

II. The Puzzle of Uneven Development across Urban Slums

Over sixty-five million people reside in India's slums. These individuals exist in a context defined by weak formal institutions, pervasive material poverty, ambiguous land tenure, informal economic activity, and for many, the constant risk of eviction. Despite these conditions, slums in India reveal substantial divergence in their levels of infrastructural development and access to public services. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics from a stratified random sample of eighty slums in the state capitals of Bhopal (Madhya Pradesh) and Jaipur (Rajasthan). The settlements demonstrate remarkable variation in a range of goods and services. While some slums have paved roads, sewers, piped water, and municipal trash collection, other slums have none of these goods and services and persist at the same level of underdevelopment as at the time of their initial settlement. Most settlements exist somewhere in-between, remaining only partially developed.

Scholars have examined how the urban poor gain access to public services,[11] draw on social networks to obtain employment,[12] develop social capital,[13] and experience upward mobility.[14] Related studies have examined urban vote buying[15] and the effects of land titling on household investments, welfare, and occupational choices.[16] A study by Saumitra Jha and his coauthors investigated informal leadership in Delhi's slums and the strategies that slum dwellers use to access public services and the state.[17] Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork and a household survey, they discovered that leaders play a key role in facilitating access to the state, particularly in recently established settlements and for those who are less wealthy and less well connected. These studies have made important contributions to the understanding of urban informality. The predominant focus in most of these studies on the individual or household, however, cannot fully capture the factors that drive variation in development across settlements.

Politicians think of slums as spatially defined and named communi-

[11] Edelman and Mitra 2007; Harriss 2005.
[12] Mitra 2010.
[13] Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi 2004.
[14] Krishna 2013; Lall, Suri, and Deichmann 2006.
[15] Breeding 2011.
[16] Field 2007; Lanjouw and Levy 2002.
[17] Jha, Rao, and Woolcock 2007.

TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS[a]

	Minimum	*Maximum*	*Mean*	*SD*
Percent paved road coverage	0 (14)	100 (24)	67.74	38.51
Percent sewer line coverage	0 (34)	100 (2)	23.97	32.08
Streetlights per 1,000 people	0 (24)	25.22	5.34	5.51
Percent household access to municipal trash collection	0 (8)	100 (1)	39.15	26.88
Percent household access to government medical camps	0 (8)	95	27.71	17.92
Percent households with piped water	0 (27)	100 (1)	33.28	35.55

[a] The number of slum settlements is in parentheses.

ties with distinct social groups, histories, and developmental deficiencies that can be taken advantage of for electoral gain. In the provision of public services, the iterative, dyadic relationship is between the politician and the settlement. The exchange is not contingent on an individual's vote, but rather on a politician's best sense of the aggregate voting behavior of the settlement and the partisan ties of its leaders. Public services are extended to parts of or entire settlements, not to particular individuals or households. Individuals can enjoy the delivered goods irrespective of their personal vote. The unit of analysis in this article, therefore, is the slum settlement.

Other studies approach the urban poor as a larger economic class struggling to improve its material conditions and tenure security.[18] Partha Chatterjee refers to this area of struggle as "political society"—a space in which the poor make demands on the state through mass politics and political parties, as opposed to civil society and formal legal procedures.[19] While concepts like subaltern and political society do shed some light on the position of the urban poor, these categories prevent a nuanced understanding of the variety of organizational responses that different slum settlements have to the politics of the city. They also obscure variation in the success of some settlements to attract development while others do not.

Ethnographic studies have placed the analytical focus on the slum settlement and have examined processes of community organization and development.[20] Without comparative research across a large number of slums, these studies have limited explanatory power over why

[18] See Amis and Kumar 2000; Benjamin 2000.
[19] Chatterjee 2004.
[20] Auyero 2001; Gay 1994.

some communities are more successful than others in securing development. I combine ethnography with a large survey to gain leverage over processes of organization and development.

III. Securing Development in India's Slums

Slum improvement in India is highly politicized and discretionary. Elected representatives at the municipal, state, and national levels receive discretionary budgets that can be drawn on to finance development in their constituencies. There are also funds for various poverty-reduction initiatives at the municipal and state levels in addition to central programs that encourage development in slums.[21] But funding is limited and some slums must be prioritized over others. Consequently, patterns of development reflect the political interests of officials and elected representatives.

Solutions to everyday problems—a broken water tap, weathered roads, blackouts, mounting gang violence, and clogged drains—are also highly politicized. Officials face a dizzying number of citizen claims, especially by residents of slums who often do not pay user charges or taxes. Intervention by politicians is necessary to get things done in a timely manner. I asked a local official in Jaipur if and how political intervention is important to government responsiveness. He responded that without political involvement, paperwork and applications usually "wander" in the office for a long time and are then sent back to lower levels for reassessment. He said that a phone call or letter from a politician is necessary to move things along.[22] Bureaucrats have incentives to entertain these requests for their own professional advancement. Rigid or defiant bureaucrats face political transfer to undesirable locations and departments.

How do slum dwellers in India secure development?[23] This section examines the demand side of development and presents three strategies that slum residents use to secure development. These strategies were observed during the ethnography and then incorporated into the survey.

The first strategy is internal self-provision by residents themselves, without the assistance of the state. I encountered many such efforts during my fieldwork. Residents collected money for public light bulbs,

[21] Programs include the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (http://jnnurm.nic.in), and Rajiv Awas Yojana (http://mhupa.gov.in/ray/ray_index.htm).

[22] Author interview, Jaipur, June 14, 2011.

[23] On citizen claim-making in developing democracies, see Corbridge et al. 2005; Houtzager and Acharya 2011; and Kruks-Wisner 2014.

paved over potholes, and replaced community water taps. Neighbors dug channels to remove wastewater in those areas without proper drainage. Due to infrequent or absent municipal trash collection, groups swept waste into areas designated for trash. Thirty-one percent of the respondents (592 of 1,925) stated that people in their community engaged in such activities.[24] Of these 592 individuals, 387 claimed that community leaders were at least sometimes involved. The self-provision of development, then, is not uncommon, and when communities do engage in these activities, leaders are often involved.

A second strategy of community development is group claim-making, which focuses on getting the attention of politicians and officials to improve the community.[25] Group claim-making was the most common strategy I observed during my fieldwork. An acute developmental problem would arise, and in response, a group of residents would go to their municipal councillor or a local official. Usually, after several hours of waiting, the group would be given the opportunity to voice their grievances. A significant 80 percent of respondents (1,543 of 1,925) noted that residents of their slum would gather in groups to meet politicians and officials.[26] As with self-provision, group claim-making is most often conducted under the presence of leadership. Sixty-five percent (996 respondents) of those who acknowledged group claim-making also stated that a community leader was at least sometimes involved.

A third strategy is collective protest. Such events are contentious and cause public disruption. Residents will block roads and march on government buildings. In some protests, effigies are burned and property is destroyed. Collective protest is more common than efforts of self-provision, though less common than group claim-making. Thirty-eight percent of respondents acknowledged that their settlement had protested to improve development. Of the 735 respondents, 582 stated that leaders were involved in "most" or "some" of the protest events.[27]

People in India's slums tend to seek community development in groups and position their collective action toward the state. The internal self-provision of development is not absent, although it is relatively

[24] Respondents were asked, "Sometimes people in slums are able to improve their community without the help of the government. In this slum, have people ever collected money or organized to fix something, build something new, or generally improve the community?"

[25] On claim-making strategies in north India, see Kruks-Wisner 2014.

[26] Respondents were asked, "Do people in this slum ever gather together in groups to meet political leaders or officials to ask for development or solve a problem in the slum?"

[27] Respondents were asked, "Have people here ever participated in a protest to get development for the slum, like roadblocks, picketing, or a demonstration?"

uncommon. This is not necessarily due to a deficiency of cooperation; rather, many of the most important forms of development require professional expertise and significant resources. The state is the chief provider of these goods and services. Efforts to secure development are therefore oriented toward representatives and officials. As I elaborate in this article, the density and partisan balance of local party networks affect the level of success that residents have in these efforts.

IV. Party Networks and Clientelism at the Margins of the State

Clientelism—the contingent, iterative relationship between politicians and voters in which goods, services, and protection are exchanged for political support—is striking in its persistence across a diverse range of developing democracies.[28] Perhaps the most common faces of clients are those of the urban poor. Scholars have uncovered numerous cases of the urban poor embedded in face-to-face exchange networks with politicians and brokers.[29] In such contexts, access to goods and services is facilitated through complex, vertical networks of intermediaries.[30]

In India's slums, party workers represent the most grassroots manifestation of these networks. Based on party rosters and extensive interviews with party workers, I enumerated a total of 513 party workers across the eighty sampled slums. Residents look to party workers to mediate their demands, as workers possess a degree of connectivity to politicians and officials.

I argue that divergences in development partially emerge because not all slums are equally positioned to make demands through vertical party channels. This article reveals startling unevenness in the presence, density, and partisan balance of party organizational networks across slums. Some settlements are flush with party workers and are connected to politicians through defined organizational hierarchies. Other settlements have only a few party workers, and some exhibit a complete lack of party networks.

In a slum, there are a certain number of party workers, w, living within the settlement. To be counted as a party worker, an individual had to be an official member of the party and possess a distinct rank within the larger party organizational hierarchy.[31] Residents who were

[28] For an overview of the literature on clientelism, see Hicken 2011.

[29] Auyero 2001; Gay 1994; Harriss 2005; Jha, Rao, and Woolcock 2007.

[30] See Thachil 2011 for a study on an alternative to clientelism in India—everyday social service provision by embedded party organizations and their affiliates.

[31] See Appendix C in Auerbach 2015 for a description of party organizations.

party supporters but held no organizational positions were not counted. *Party network density* is measured in the following manner:

$$\textit{Party Network Density} = \left(\frac{w}{\textit{population of slum}}\right) \times 1{,}000. \quad (1)$$

The per capita distribution of party workers is highly unequal across settlements. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics. The average slum has approximately two party workers per one thousand people, with a one standard deviation of 1.5 workers. Seventeen of the eighty sampled slums are devoid of party workers, while the most saturated slums have six party workers per one thousand people.

A related concept is the balance of party representation in slums. Party workers may all belong to the same party, creating a situation of one-party dominance, or several parties may be represented, creating a degree of multiparty balance. I measure *party representational balance* as follows:

$$\textit{Party Representational Balance} = \left(\frac{1}{\Sigma_{pj^2}}\right) - 1, \quad (2)$$

where p is the proportion of workers in the slum from party j. Because Jaipur and Bhopal exhibit two-party competition, scores are bound between 0 and 1, with a score of 0 representing one-party dominance and a score of 1 representing a fifty-fifty split. Considering only those slums with party workers (n = 63), the average *party representational balance* score is 0.43, with a one standard deviation of 0.42. Twenty-seven of the sampled slums have party workers from just one party. At the other extreme, four of the sampled slums have a perfect fifty-fifty representational split.

Slum settlements in India vary remarkably in their degree of party network density and representational balance. Unevenness in patron-client networks has gone largely unnoticed—and unexamined—in studies of clientelism. I leverage this unevenness to examine the impact of patron-client networks on community development.

V. Party Networks, Competition, and Development

This article argues that slums with dense party networks are better positioned to demand development from the state than those settlements in which party networks are sparse or absent. The mechanisms operating between party networks and development are *competition*, *informal*

TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES

Variables	*Minimum*	*Maximum*	*Mean*	*SD*
Party network density	0	6.37	1.85	1.56
Party representational balance (n = 63)	0	1	0.43	0.42
Population	349	23811	2480.76	3231.69
Log population	5.86	10.08	7.36	0.92
Settlement age (in years)	10	62	32.80	9.49
City (Jaipur = 0; Bhopal = 1)	0	1	0.5625	0.50
Average education	0	3.25	1.61	0.67
Average household monthly income per capita	0.67	1.93	1.31	0.30
Caste diversity	0	0.97	0.79	0.17
Religious diversity	0	0.5	0.16	0.16
Regional diversity	0	0.78	0.30	0.22
Community social capital	−4.60	4.02	3.41e−08	1.75
Municipal ward electoral competition	3.28	37.91	13.27	6.68
State constituency electoral competition	9.80	25.16	15.23	4.21
Ratio of slum population to ward slum population	0.73	100	19.79	22.41
Central land	0	1	0.26	0.44
Private land	0	1	0.10	0.30
Percent households with land titles	0	88.89	9.46	21.38

accountability, and *political connectivity*. This section presents the theoretical framework.

Aspiring slum leaders are aware of the material benefits associated with party leadership.[32] To reap these rewards, individuals must build a large and loyal following. Similarly, to join a party organization and move up the ranks, leaders need to demonstrate a strong hold on voting behavior in the settlement. A slum leader's following is the currency of exchange to obtain patronage and protection from politicians. To attract residents, slum leaders engage in activities they refer to as *samajik seva*, or "social work." Such social work might involve assisting residents in securing ration cards, dealing with police cases, resolving disputes, and presenting the needs of the slum to politicians. These everyday acts of problem solving and brokerage provide a stream of rents for leaders who can attract a following.

[32] Delivering one's vote bank during elections can be lucrative. A party worker in Jaipur admitted that during one election, he was able to make roughly INR 30,000, an amount equal to six months of income for many of his neighbors. A more regular source of money is service as an intermediary, facilitating access to goods and services—for a price.

Informal accountability is generated from below, where rumors and the threat of withdrawing support by residents are sanctioning mechanisms that keep leaders in check.[33] Residents of urban slums are not isolated like their rural counterparts who are limited to one or a few patrons in a village. Particularly in slums with dense party networks, residents have options in deciding which leaders to seek help from and follow. Leaders who secure development and organize against evictions can build a loyal following. Those who can expeditiously and cheaply help residents secure state services will surpass leaders who drag their feet or charge exorbitant rates.

Slums are information-rich environments, perpetually abuzz with rumors and gossip. If word spreads that a party worker is underperforming or transgressing on residents, that worker will likely face reputational effects that diminish his or her base of support. Indeed, the rumor mill of a slum makes any moment a potential referendum. Party workers in slums with dense networks must watch their behavior lest they lose their following to another worker.

From above, politicians and higher party officers have electoral incentives to monitor the behavior of party workers in slums—and they do.[34] Workers are the face of the party in communities. The front doors of leaders' homes are emblazoned with party symbols. Flags fly above their homes, and everyday conversations are littered with partisan promotions. Residents associate leaders with the party to which they belong. Egregious acts of extortion, corruption, and violence reflect poorly on the party brand. As one senior politician in Jaipur put it, "Sometimes [we] talk to the common people and [ask] if this man is doing a good job. If they tell us that, no, he always takes money from us whenever we ask for help, we kick him out."[35]

Slum settlements with dense party networks also possess the organizational capacity and political connectivity to demand development from the state. Vertical party integration connects workers to the highest levels of party leadership at the city and state levels. Party workers in slums meet with politicians, often on a daily basis, to seek guidance with individual and slumwide problems. Slums with sparse or absent party networks are politically isolated. As one party worker in Bhopal put it, "Politicians are the ones running the government, appointing

[33] See Tsai 2007 for a seminal study on the production of local accountability in nondemocratic contexts.

[34] Stokes et al. 2013 find similar evidence of monitoring in Argentina and Venezuela.

[35] Author interview, Jaipur, February 11, 2011.

people. So when you become part of a party, then you can meet the government officers easily . . . it will help me get things for my community."[36]

Underdevelopment and threats of eviction provide rich opportunities for party workers to harness a slum's *lokshakti*, or people power, to expand and invigorate their following. Party networks will organize residents to demonstrate in front of government offices and block roads. During interviews, politicians sometimes referred to this as a settlement's "agitation power." Political parties have the capacity to rally residents for organized and sustained protest.

In slums with dense party networks, then, the electoral compulsions of political parties, material self-interest of party workers, and daily needs of residents converge to generate an incentive structure that encourages development. Workers have incentives to secure development in order to maintain and expand their following.[37] Dense party networks also afford a degree of political connectivity that can be leveraged in dealings with politicians and officials.

The presence of multiparty networks adds a unique dynamic to local competition. Over half of the sixty-three slums with party networks in this study have some degree of multiparty representation. Partisan competition among these party workers is intense. The ability to engage in brokerage is largely conditional on having one's party in power. Without access to politicians, leadership becomes difficult, threatening to erode a leader's base of support. The cumulative effects of losing elections can therefore mean a reduction in access to patronage and rents.

Multiparty representation intensifies competition in a settlement and may increase accountability and responsiveness among workers through the mechanisms outlined above. My fieldwork, however, presented several reasons to be less optimistic about partisan competition. Party organizations can internalize the externalities of intraparty competition through shared electoral interests and hierarchical discipline, but multiparty networks have no such mechanisms. Competing networks have incentives to undermine each other's efforts, even at the expense of development. Party networks seek to demobilize and capture the followers of the competing network. While rumors are the everyday

[36] Author interview, Bhopal, July 2, 2012.

[37] Ermakoff 2011 argues that patrimonial relations can produce collective capacity when the incentive structures of patrons and clients promote self-regulation and accountability. Two factors that promote self-regulation are competition for nodes in the hierarchy and the threat of exit. Shami 2012 finds that rural patrons can encourage collective action among peasants when the latter have access to roads. Connectivity introduces competition, compelling patrons to provide goods or lose clients.

artillery in these confrontations, violence is also employed. The presence of multiparty networks can serve to fragment slums, undermining the scale and intensity of collective action and in turn, development.

Interviews with politicians illuminated a second reason why multiparty networks might undermine development. I asked a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) in Bhopal why some settlements are prioritized for development over others. He replied, "Where did you get good votes? The other factor is your workers, if they are strong, if they are able to convince you, you give work priority of that place." I asked him to clarify what he meant by "good votes." He responded, "Where you get majority votes, those areas automatically get priority."[38] This sentiment was echoed by another MLA in Jaipur: "Wherever [the politician] gets more votes, more supporters, that will be his priority area."[39]

The composition of party workers in a settlement is an easy way for politicians to observe the partisan leanings of that settlement. Party workers decorate slums with posters in support of their party. Protests organized by rival workers have an unmistakable party branding, complete with flags and chants in support of their party. The presence of rival workers is a signal that the settlement is not fully committed. It means that rival networks are working to undermine the politician's reputation, steal votes, and take credit for development projects. If politicians observe opposition workers in a settlement, they might allocate projects to more loyal slums.

Partisan competition, therefore, may reverse or reduce the positive influence of *party network density*. In the econometric analysis below, I interact *party network density* with *party representational balance* to examine the impact of multiparty networks on local development.

VI. Research Sites and Population of Inference

The fieldwork and survey for this article were conducted in the north Indian cities of Jaipur, Rajasthan, and Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. Jaipur and Bhopal share many similarities that make them an appropriate pairing. Both cities are roughly the same size—three million and two million people, respectively—and are the administrative capitals of their states. Jaipur and Bhopal were princely states before independence in 1947 and have dilapidated and densely populated "old cities" at their

[38] Author interview, Bhopal, July 7, 2012.
[39] Author interview, Jaipur, July 26, 2012.

core and more recent urban sprawl at the peripheries. In Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, the two major parties in competition are the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Indian National Congress (INC). Both cities exhibit a similar ratio of municipal representatives to population, with seventy-seven wards in Jaipur and seventy wards in Bhopal. Jaipur and Bhopal, among other cities, have also been selected by the government of India for two major urban development initiatives—the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission and Rajiv Awas Yojana—and are undergoing considerable change in infrastructure development and poverty alleviation efforts.

The urban poor reside in a diversity of informal housing. This article specifically focuses on *squatter settlements*.[40] Excluded from the analysis are posteviction resettlement colonies and rural villages located within municipal boundaries. Because the old cities in Bhopal and Jaipur emerged in a historically distinct manner from their contemporary squatter settlement counterparts, they too were omitted from the sample frame, and consistent with the Census of India, settlements with fewer than three hundred people were excluded. The inclusionary consideration for the sample was whether or not the settlement initially arose in the postindependence period through squatting and continues to demonstrate the defining characteristics of squatter settlements—spontaneous, resident-built settlements void of centralized planning. Subsequent success or failure in securing development serves as the outcome variable and was therefore not a consideration in sampling.[41]

VII. Qualitative Vignettes

The following two ethnographic vignettes of Ram Nagar and Ganpati provide a more grounded picture of party organization and development. The purpose of the vignettes is to illustrate historical sequencing and the mechanisms of the theory. Both Ram Nagar and Ganpati were settled in eastern Jaipur, just a kilometer apart, around 1980. Both lacked infrastructure and public services at the time of their establishment. They have shared the same labor markets and state assembly constituency since their establishment and are located on land admin-

[40] Squatter settlements are "mainly uncontrolled low-income residential areas with an ambiguous legal status regarding land occupation; they are to a large extent built by the inhabitants themselves using their own means and are usually poorly equipped with public utilities and community services. . . . They proliferated with the rapid growth of cities in the less developed countries after the Second World War." UN-Habitat 1982, 15.

[41] See Appendix A in Auerbach 2015 for a full discussion of how squatter settlements are defined and identified in this study.

istered by the forest department. The two slums do exhibit important demographic differences. I argue that the most significant difference for development lies in their political organization.

Ram Nagar

The roughly one thousand residents of Ram Nagar live between a government building and a middle-class neighborhood. The community is divided socially between a caste group from southern Rajasthan and a tribal group from Madhya Pradesh. Residents are well integrated into the local economy. They sell herbal medicines, drive auto rickshaws, weave bamboo threshers, and hold musical performances in nearby housing colonies. Children scour for waste that can be resold.

Two individuals have emerged as leaders in the slum: Varun and Rajesh. Both Varun and Rajesh migrated to Ram Nagar with the initial wave of squatters in the early 1980s. Rajesh's seventh-grade education and bold nature separated him from his neighbors and propelled him to the position of settlement leader. His authority was cemented in 1985, when he was invited on stage with a politician and introduced as the leader of Ram Nagar. Like Rajesh, Varun became a focal point for help among his tribal group because of his relatively higher education and confidence in dealing with officials. Although Varun is acknowledged as a leader in Ram Nagar, his influence is mostly confined to his tribe.

Both leaders perform a range of problem-solving activities. Rajesh carefully stores the ration cards of residents and helps to keep them up to date. He also brought an employment program to the slum that involves building rickshaws having pedal-generated electricity. Rajesh put an end to several illegal activities in the settlement and demanded a replacement for a negligent schoolteacher. Varun fought for a primary school in the early 2000s. After much effort, a one-room schoolhouse was constructed. He additionally demanded that his tribe be included in Rajasthan's official list of tribes—an important condition for eligibility for government programs. Both leaders demonstrate awareness of government programs and provide information for residents.

Rajesh and Varun have spent countless hours in government offices and have sent dozens of letters to various departments demanding land titles, infrastructural development, and inclusion in government programs for the poor. Both leaders have stored all official correspondence since 1982. Together, the documents tell a story of systematic dismissal and marginalization. A 2006 letter to the state government articulates the sense of futility that accompanies years of fruitless effort:

> We . . . and many other poor people . . . have to tolerate heat, cold, rain, and many other problems. We sell herbs, drive rickshaws, make swings, play drums, and make wooden trays. We have been staying here for the last 30 to 35 years. We . . . here for so many years, request the government for help. We do not get any attention and have been to offices many times and as a result, it has all become a headache. We request [Ram Nagar] should be rehabilitated, and wherever that is, we should get land titles. We poor people shall always be obliged.[42]

For two decades of leadership and support for the BJP, Rajesh has been given an organizational position at the ward level. Varun does not have a party position. Consequently, the level of party network density in Ram Nagar is low. Political parties have never once organized residents to protest for development. Rajesh and Varun do not have the political connections to push representatives into releasing funds for development.

In its thirty years of existence, the infrastructural development extended to Ram Nagar is negligible. Residents have dug makeshift channels to establish some semblance of drainage, but wastewater quickly erodes the sides of the channels, requiring constant maintenance. The municipality rarely collects solid waste. Instead, residents throw garbage in what has become a trash dump that flanks the western side of the slum. Without any bathroom complexes, residents resort to open defecation. Rajesh has been able to secure a couple of water taps in exchange for the slum's votes. A few streetlights have also been placed in the slum, though only one works, leaving most of the slum in darkness at night. Just after the 2008 state elections, Rajesh wrote to the winning candidate: "Sir, we request you . . . to kindly provide roads, drainage pipes, land titles, bathrooms, and settle the slum in an organized way. . . . You said earlier that roads and drainage in [Ram Nagar] would be given through your development fund." Yet nothing has been done. Residents still confront the same development challenges that faced their parents.

Ganpati

With over twenty thousand residents, Ganpati is one of the larger slums in Jaipur. Migrants hail from states throughout north India. Caste and religious diversity is high. Residents engage in occupations commonly associated with the urban poor; they are rickshaw drivers, construction workers, butchers, rag pickers, and small-shop owners. Cottage indus-

[42] Letter written by Rajesh on behalf of the residents of Ram Nagar to the state government of Rajasthan, 2006.

tries can be found throughout the slum, producing everything from cigarettes to wedding invitations.

In the mid-1980s, Ganpati faced the same developmental problems as Ram Nagar. Both settlements had no public infrastructure.[43] Older women in Ganpati recount having to roam neighboring colonies in search of water and reusable waste. During this early period in Ganpati's history, political parties began to cultivate partisan leadership. Party workers were not placed in Ganpati by political parties, but instead had migrated there like other residents, and then emerged as leaders after demonstrating an ability to get things done. Over time, competition for the votes of the slum grew intense, and party workers began to vie with one another to build a following for themselves and their party.

Today, party networks percolate into all corners of Ganpati. Workers from the party in power at the state and municipal levels are eager to exploit political connections to advance the interests of the slum—and in the process, their own status and material well-being. Opposition party networks are ready to point to inadequacies in the current government and to protest for better conditions. The ward councillor lives within the slum itself. A history of sustained "social work" in Ganpati propelled him to fame and ultimately a party ticket. The BJP president of the ward sits at the apex of the BJP network. Beneath him, dozens of BJP workers with assorted positions extend the reach of the party to each corner of the slum. In all, I enumerated 147 party workers in the settlement, giving Ganpati a *party network density* score six times larger than that of Ram Nagar.

Party workers in Ganpati enjoy high levels of connectivity with politicians. This is attested to by the BJP network's written correspondence with politicians, officials, and party officers. With a high rank in the party and letterhead stationary bearing the lotus flower of the BJP, the president is able to communicate directly with representatives and officials. An excerpt from a party document exemplifies the network's capacity and connectivity:

> Today, a meeting will be held with the entire group of workers. Ward members [of the BJP] will lead the meeting and the agenda will concern development work. A team will be formed and the ward councillor will play the leading role in the group.[44]

Whenever a threat confronts Ganpati or a developmental deficiency emerges, political parties call meetings in which workers are given in-

[43] See Appendix A in Auerbach 2015 for a photograph of this early period in Ganpati.
[44] Meeting notes taken by BJP ward president in Ganpati slum, Jaipur, December 29, 2005.

structions on how to gather crowds and promote the party. Newspaper accounts and the stories of residents tell of a number of protest movements in the history of the slum. Residents have been organized to fight for water, electricity, land titles, roads, drainage, and even for speed bumps after children died playing in the chaotic traffic beside the slum. The following newspaper excerpt illustrates the role of political parties:

> Under the leadership of [a] former minister and BJP leader . . . slum dwellers organized a traffic jam at [Ganpati] bypass to protest about various issues. . . . The gathering was addressed by BJP workers and from [local municipal councillors]. They demanded repairing the damaged roads, immediate discontinuation of heavy vehicle movement on the road, removing biases in development work, and resettling [Ganpati] in an organized way at the same spot. The gridlock continued from 10 am until 2 pm in the afternoon. . . . Police officers tried to appease the BJP leaders who were organizing the traffic jam. But the hundreds of people who were jamming the traffic opened the roads only after the meeting was over.[45]

Party workers strive to increase their political clout and access to rents by expanding their following. Partisan competition across rival networks in Ganpati, however, is particularly intense. Each network seeks to undermine the other. In response to the protest described above, Congress workers distributed a pamphlet to weaken the mobilization efforts of BJP workers:

> A few BJP leaders, with personal selfish motto, are misleading the people with deceptive statements, whereas in their eight years of rule, they neither got the [road] repaired even once, nor did they work toward the planned settlement of slum dwellers. So much so, they collected money from you for this purpose but did nothing concerning this issue, which is not fair. . . . Congress has always adopted the process of development. Block Congress Committee, [Ganpati] requests you not to be enticed by these people.[46]

While Ganpati's uneven topography makes it a difficult place to develop, it has nevertheless secured a high level of development. Nearly all roads are paved. Streetlights keep a majority of the serpentine alleyways well lighted. Every morning, water is provided through community taps. No fewer than thirty-six water tanks supplement the piped water. A drainage channel has been constructed in front of the slum to

[45] *Dainik Navajyoti*, January 12, 2002.

[46] Block Congress Committee pamphlet distributed in Ganpati slum, Jaipur, undated (but given the content of it, I place it in the early 2000s).

remove wastewater. The only major infrastructural good missing during my fieldwork was sewers.

VIII. Data and Variables

The survey data used below is drawn from a stratified random sample of eighty slums in Jaipur and Bhopal. Lists of slums were first gathered from government departments and then reduced to the population of squatter settlements through a combination of field visits, interviews with officials, and examinations of satellite images.[47] The final sample frame totaled 115 squatter settlements in Jaipur and 192 in Bhopal. Settlements were stratified into population quintiles and area zones, and then eighty were randomly selected across the two cities. With satellite images, settlements were divided into clusters of roughly twenty households. Similar to a design in which every *n*th household is sampled along a street, households were sampled across the clusters to deliberately maintain approximate distances, thereby ensuring a spatially representative sample. Sampled households were marked on the satellite images and assigned to enumerators. This procedure resulted in 1,925 surveyed households.[48]

Party networks were measured by drawing on several sources of information. First, I collected party membership rosters from district and local party organizations. These lists were uneven in their quality and comprehensiveness. When possible, I gathered rosters from the slum leaders themselves. Most important to the measurement of party networks were the interviews I conducted in all eighty settlements with local party workers to fill out the lists and ensure their accuracy and completeness. This process yielded a comprehensive list of 513 party workers.[49]

Six development indicators serve as the outcome variables in this article. Two of these indicators, paved roads and streetlights, were measured with satellite imagery and traverse walks. A small team and I surveyed every area of the eighty sampled slums and noted the location of these goods on the satellite images.[50] The remaining indicators, medical camps, trash collection, piped water, and sewer connections, were measured with the survey instrument.[51]

[47] These lists include both officially recognized and unrecognized settlements. The total number of slums was 648, with 273 in Jaipur and 375 in Bhopal.

[48] A detailed outline of the survey methodology can be found in Appendix A in Auerbach 2015.

[49] See Appendix C in Auerbach 2015 for a discussion on measuring party networks.

[50] The measure of paved roads includes the provision of *patthar farshikaran,* or flat stone tiles.

[51] Survey respondents were asked to state the source of their drinking water and the location and infrastructural quality of where they urinate or defecate. Respondents were also asked if municipal

An interdisciplinary literature provides several alternative explanations for local development. Scholars have found evidence that ethnic heterogeneity can undermine cooperation and development.[52] Ethnic diversity may introduce conflicting social norms and behavioral expectations, as well as incentives for politicians to encourage violence as a vote-seeking strategy. In a context of weak formal institutions, we would expect diversity to have a negative relationship with development. Respondents were asked to state their caste (*jati*), religion, and region of origin. Social fragmentation scores were then calculated along these three cleavages.

Another alternative explanation is social capital.[53] Survey respondents were asked eight questions that probed their perceptions of inter-household trust and cooperation.[54] Using principal component analysis, I derived an underlying factor among the responses and constructed a measure of social capital for each settlement.

The material resources of residents may influence collective action and the size of rents. I measure material resources as the average household monthly income per capita of settlements. Stated household monthly incomes were placed in larger bins. The average household monthly income is approximately INR 7,000 (US $140), with a one standard deviation of INR 1,500 (US $30). Average household monthly income per capita is approximately INR 1,400.

Education levels might also be critical in relation to slum improvement. Better-educated residents may be more likely to engage in collective action, more aware of their beneficiary status under government programs, and better able to use civil society to secure development. Furthermore, education, as a factor in the consumption of information, has been found to be important for accountability.[55] Responses to the level of education achieved were placed in bins.[56] The average education level of respondents was five years of schooling with a one standard deviation of five years.

The size of settlement populations is another potentially important factor. Increasing community size might undermine collective action

workers remove trash from respondents' settlements and if a government medical camp had been held in their settlement within the past year.

[52] See Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Banerjee, Iyer, and Somanathan 2005; and Habyarimana et al. 2011.

[53] Krishna 2002; Putnam 1994; Varshney 2003.

[54] For comparability with other research on social capital, the questions mirror those from the World Bank's Social Capital Assessment Tool and from Krishna 2002. Appendix D in Auerbach 2015 lists the survey questions.

[55] See Pande 2011.

[56] 0 = no formal education; 1 = 1–4 years of education; 2 = 5–7 years; 3 = 8–10 years; 4 = higher secondary; 5 = college degree; 6 = graduate or professional degree.

due to its influence on free riding or monitoring.[57] On the other hand, increasing size might encourage development by expanding the scale of protest and the size of a slum's "vote bank." Slum populations were calculated using existing survey data, area calculations based on satellite imagery, and approximations of population density.

Party systems and the intensity of electoral competition have been found to influence public expenditures in India.[58] Using electoral data from municipal elections (since 1994 in Jaipur and 1999 in Bhopal) and state legislative assembly elections (since 1980), I calculated the vote margins between winners and runners-up. Since the larger data set is cross-sectional, I averaged the scores across elections. Settlements were then matched to the average competition scores for the constituencies in which they are located.

Four additional controls are used in the econometric analyses. First, the land-ownership category on which a slum is located may have important effects on development. I aggregate land categories into three groups—central government land, private land, and state or municipal land. State and municipal representatives have discretion over developmental activities on state and municipal land, yet face more legal obstacles in delivering development to slums on central government land. Second, I control for the percentage of respondents in each settlement that claimed possession of formal land titles. Third, I control for the age of settlements. Fourth, I control for the ratio of a slum's population to the total slum population in its municipal ward. In wards with many slums, competition across settlements for resources may reduce the amount of development for some of those settlements.

IX. Econometric Models and Results

I now estimate the influence of *party network density* and *party representational balance* on the provision of infrastructure and public services. The regressions take the following form:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 PND_i + \beta_2 PRB_i + \beta_3 PND_i^* PRB_i + \delta X_i + \varepsilon_i, \qquad (3)$$

where y is the good or service under examination. The explanatory variables of interest are *party network density* (*PND*), *party representational balance* (*PRB*), and their interaction. X_i is a vector of control variables. The results are displayed in Tables 3, 4, and 5.[59]

[57] Agrawal and Goyal 2001; Olson 1971.

[58] Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004; Saez and Sinha 2010.

[59] Robust standard errors are reported. I also present bootstrapped standard errors in Appendix E, Table E10, in Auerbach 2015. Results are robust to the latter specification.

TABLE 3
OLS MODELS FOR PAVED ROADS AND STREETLIGHTS

	Paved Roads (%)			*Streetlights (per 1,000 Residents)*		
Variables	*M1*	*M2*	*M3*	*M4*	*M5*	*M6*
Party network density	6.716***	6.664***	9.952***	1.153***	1.159***	1.093
	(2.456)	(2.480)	(3.388)	(0.330)	(0.330)	(0.719)
City (Jaipur = 0;	20.49*	25.18*	45.28***	−7.674***	−5.651***	−5.991***
Bhopal = 1)	(10.44)	(12.74)	(10.16)	(1.224)	(1.333)	(1.798)
Log population	18.35***	17.51***	17.70***	−0.102	0.347	0.552
	(4.803)	(5.521)	(4.668)	(0.699)	(0.771)	(0.822)
Settlement age	0.0758	0.172	0.0501	−0.0274	−0.00779	−0.00362
	(0.471)	(0.498)	(0.364)	(0.0411)	(0.0506)	(0.0643)
Average education	7.152	1.929	−1.607	1.191	0.307	0.757
	(7.617)	(8.894)	(7.695)	(0.724)	(0.776)	(1.428)
Average household monthly income per capita	−7.970	−9.592	15.69	0.653	0.436	0.861
	(15.86)	(15.90)	(10.74)	(1.484)	(1.647)	(1.993)
Caste diversity	−30.22	−15.45	−31.88	−0.487	−0.162	−4.636
	(24.20)	(25.42)	(20.54)	(3.318)	(3.889)	(3.392)
Religious diversity	17.71	8.402	8.612	4.615	4.523	5.497
	(24.84)	(25.80)	(24.00)	(3.195)	(3.227)	(4.524)
Regional diversity	−1.101	−1.942	−13.00	−0.523	−1.497	−2.236
	(18.95)	(20.13)	(14.87)	(2.131)	(2.457)	(3.407)
Central land		0.924	16.65**		1.193	1.209
		(10.32)	(7.001)		(1.421)	(1.535)
Private land		−8.577	−21.76		0.321	0.739
		(17.46)	(16.45)		(1.361)	(1.671)
State constituency electoral competition		−0.434	−0.550		−0.0832	−0.0495
		(0.974)	(0.916)		(0.110)	(0.134)
Municipal ward electoral competition		−0.687	−0.391		0.118	0.111
		(0.572)	(0.551)		(0.0741)	(0.0906)
Community social capital		1.121	5.603***		0.657**	0.815**
		(2.686)	(1.929)		(0.327)	(0.397)
Ratio of slum population to ward slum population		−0.166	−0.339**		−0.000055	0.00554
		(0.202)	(0.165)		(0.0207)	(0.0219)
Land titles		0.252*	0.266**		0.0188	0.0108
		(0.131)	(0.118)		(0.0193)	(0.0272)
Party representational balance			27.95*			−1.792
			(14.29)			(2.397)
Party network density * Party representational balance			−11.74**			0.144
			(4.537)			(1.052)
Constant	−73.43*	−55.06	−79.81**	6.185	2.033	3.252
	(41.11)	(51.33)	(38.59)	(4.603)	(4.736)	(5.965)
Observations	80	80	63	80	80	63
R^2	0.376	0.422	0.648	0.606	0.654	0.677

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; robust standard errors are in parentheses

TABLE 4
OLS MODELS FOR HOUSEHOLD ACCESS TO PIPED WATER AND MUNICIPAL TRASH REMOVAL

	Piped Water (%)			*Trash Removal (%)*		
Variables	*M7*	*M8*	*M9*	*M10*	*M11*	*M12*
Party network density	1.818	1.520	5.846	3.078*	2.895**	2.904
	(3.035)	(3.049)	(4.966)	(1.628)	(1.410)	(2.167)
City (Jaipur = 0;	−35.46***	−28.81***	−19.62*	36.89***	49.55***	59.38***
Bhopal = 1)	(8.294)	(9.536)	(11.39)	(5.581)	(7.759)	(6.663)
Log population	2.445	2.635	3.858	3.433	5.727*	5.593
	(4.880)	(5.266)	(6.530)	(2.990)	(3.255)	(3.553)
Settlement age	−0.144	−0.0761	0.273	0.428*	0.446	0.633*
	(0.444)	(0.478)	(0.473)	(0.251)	(0.273)	(0.342)
Average education	9.473	5.619	6.713	−1.550	−8.324	−14.13**
	(5.735)	(5.895)	(8.118)	(4.678)	(6.902)	(6.361)
Average household	13.25	9.069	30.66***	13.23	10.96	16.31**
monthly income	(11.02)	(11.24)	(9.423)	(9.201)	(9.062)	(7.557)
per capita						
Caste diversity	4.290	7.086	-36.24	−18.59	−10.64	−14.35
	(24.25)	(25.77)	(23.18)	(16.36)	(20.65)	(32.34)
Religious diversity	−5.456	−10.39	11.62	16.68	16.26	14.30
	(22.77)	(22.93)	(24.59)	(13.76)	(13.66)	(18.99)
Regional diversity	−29.25	−24.66	−45.97**	5.010	−4.399	−10.30
	(18.48)	(18.61)	(19.92)	(11.52)	(10.95)	(10.55)
Central land		−9.355	−9.359		7.940	8.329
		(10.08)	(9.519)		(5.075)	(5.253)
Private land		−6.618	−0.687		8.516	5.280
		(11.61)	(11.76)		(6.909)	(7.197)
State constituency		−0.130	0.514		0.164	0.276
electoral competition		(0.981)	(1.072)		(0.576)	(0.580)
Municipal ward		−0.0520	0.0368		0.599	0.657**
electoral competition		(0.516)	(0.575)		(0.422)	(0.269)
Community social capital		1.170	0.476		4.790**	7.041***
		(2.170)	(2.495)		(2.140)	(1.943)
Ratio of slum		−0.0117	0.0845		0.0218	−0.0221
population to ward		(0.182)	(0.133)		(0.119)	(0.134)
slum population						
Land titles		0.360**	0.390**		0.172*	0.236**
		(0.141)	(0.185)		(0.0958)	(0.0951)
Party representational			1.365			1.394
balance			(16.93)			(11.07)
Party network density *			−4.295			−0.206
Party representational			(6.503)			(3.613)
balance						
Constant	10.29	14.99	−24.37	−31.00	−60.12**	−65.24*
	(37.29)	(48.40)	(57.35)	(21.20)	(28.50)	(32.66)
Observations	80	80	63	80	80	63
R^2	0.414	0.478	0.658	0.494	0.601	0.724*

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; robust standard errors are in parentheses

TABLE 5
OLS MODELS FOR HOUSEHOLD ACCESS TO SEWER LINES AND GOVERNMENT MEDICAL CAMPS

	Sewer Lines (%)			*Medical Camps (%)*		
Variables	*M13*	*M14*	*M15*	*M16*	*M17*	*M18*
Party network density	−0.623	−1.504	−0.966	2.136*	2.577**	5.791***
	(2.375)	(2.201)	(2.883)	(1.191)	(1.289)	(1.928)
City (Jaipur = 0;	−16.44**	−12.65	−15.07	−11.75***	−7.065	−12.64**
Bhopal = 1)	(7.014)	(8.269)	(10.09)	(4.199)	(5.412)	(6.060)
Log population	8.981*	12.65***	12.68**	3.742	3.064	7.150**
	(4.623)	(4.438)	(5.857)	(2.261)	(2.753)	(3.234)
Settlement age	0.389	0.573	0.937**	−0.180	−0.194	−0.367
	(0.435)	(0.524)	(0.458)	(0.185)	(0.252)	(0.278)
Average education	5.176	4.313	10.83	3.558	4.480	6.189
	(4.727)	(4.860)	(7.107)	(3.531)	(3.673)	(4.841)
Average household	24.74**	17.06	28.44**	−2.408	−1.549	−0.498
monthly income	(11.85)	(11.98)	(13.31)	(6.261)	(6.352)	(6.627)
per capita						
Caste diversity	−51.66*	−69.58**	−109.8***	−6.892	−16.47	−33.57
	(29.57)	(31.40)	(23.31)	(22.02)	(22.16)	(26.37)
Religious diversity	25.89	23.50	28.06*	13.35	17.54	33.99*
	(19.29)	(15.69)	(16.33)	(12.52)	(13.58)	(17.08)
Regional diversity	−8.833	4.864	−0.786	5.172	7.702	17.39**
	(13.96)	(15.10)	(15.38)	(8.097)	(8.414)	(8.336)
Central land		−26.80***	−27.88***		−1.579	0.0323
		(6.827)	(7.146)		(4.711)	(4.375)
Private land		−2.429	3.091		−3.487	−4.261
		(14.61)	(16.76)		(5.557)	(7.475)
State constituency		0.579	0.606		−0.765*	−0.322
electoral competition		(0.781)	(0.734)		(0.449)	(0.449)
Municipal ward		0.649	0.586		0.460	0.279
electoral competition		(0.434)	(0.542)		(0.334)	(0.303)
Community social capital		0.810	−0.577		0.0837	0.123
		(2.044)	(2.446)		(1.658)	(1.575)
Ratio of slum		0.0335	0.0306		0.186**	0.217**
population to ward		(0.144)	(0.133)		(0.0857)	(0.0842)
slum population						
Land titles		0.280	0.214		0.0539	0.0132
		(0.169)	(0.188)		(0.0816)	(0.0855)
Party representational			−4.436			−5.143
balance			(13.07)			(9.988)
Party network density *			−1.307			−5.402
Party representational			(4.397)			(3.835)
balance						
Constant	−46.08	−71.23*	−70.69*	7.851	15.47	−7.570
	(36.92)	(36.19)	(41.80)	(18.79)	(25.49)	(27.73)
Observations	80	80	63	80	80	63
R^2	0.341	0.510	0.666	0.265	0.370	0.467

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; robust standard errors are in parentheses

In Tables 3–5, I examine the influence of *party network density* on development with reference to those models that exclude representational balance. *Party network density* is statistically significant in explaining variation in four of the six development indicators. An additional party worker per one thousand residents is associated with one additional streetlight per one thousand residents. Given a densely populated cluster of two hundred houses, an additional streetlight is significant for security. An increase of one party worker per one thousand residents is associated with a 6.66 point increase in the percentage of roads that are paved. A one standard deviation change in *party network density*, then, is associated with a 10.39 percent increase in paved roads. *Party network density* also has a statistically significant association with municipal trash collection and the provision of government medical camps. An additional party worker per one thousand residents is associated with an increase in the percentage of households reporting access to municipal trash collection by 2.90 percent and an increase of 2.58 points in the percentage of those reporting access to medical camps.

I now turn to the interactive effect of *party network density* and *party representational balance* on development.[60] I focus on the marginal effects of *party network density* conditional on the range of values for representational balance. The coefficient on representational balance cannot be substantively interpreted by itself, since it cannot exist, by definition, without party networks. Marginal-effects plots are presented in Figure 1(a–f).[61] The figure suggests that representational balance has mostly negative conditional associations with development, although most interactions are statistically insignificant through some or all of the range of the variable.

The marginal effect of *party network density* on paved road coverage, conditional on *party representational balance*, decreases as the value of representational balance rises. A similar relationship holds with respect to the provision of government medical camps. These associations are statistically significant up to a representational balance score of 0.5, at which point the associations lose statistical significance. *Party representational balance* also has a negative conditional influence on sewer connections and piped water, though the associations are statistically insignificant. The marginal effects of *party network density* are positive throughout the full range of representational balance scores, with the

[60] Models estimating the interaction between party network density and party representational balance include only the sixty-three settlements with party networks.

[61] Marginal effects plots were created with the Stata code produced by Berry, Golder, and Milton 2012.



Marginal Effects of PN Density on % Paved Roads, Conditional on PR Balance
(a)



Marginal Effects of PN Density on Streetlights per 1,000 Residents, Conditional on PR Balance
(b)



Marginal Effects of PN Density on % Household Access to Piped Water, Conditional on PR Balance
(c)



Marginal Effects of PN Density on % Access to Trash Removal, Conditional on PR Balance
(d)



Marginal Effects of PN Density on % Household Access to Sewer Connections, Conditonal on PR Balance
(e)



Marginal Effects on PN Density on % Access to Government Medical Camps, Conditional on PR Balance
(f)

FIGURE 1
MARGINAL EFFECTS OF PARTY NETWORK DENSITY, CONDITIONAL ON PARTY REPRESENTATIONAL BALANCE

exception of sewer connections. *Party representational balance*, therefore, may not negate the influence of network density but instead diminishes its positive magnitude.

The marginal effect of *party network density* on streetlight coverage, conditional on *party representational balance*, slightly increases as *party representational balance* rises. This association is significant throughout most of the range of values for *party representational balance*.

In sum, the results point toward a positive association between *party network density* and development. Settlements with denser party networks tend to have higher levels of public services. *Party representational balance* has a mixed influence both in direction and significance on development. As a conditioning variable, *party representational balance* exhibits a slight positive and significant association with streetlights. But in relation to the remaining indicators, *party representational balance* has a negative conditional influence, and in most of those interactions, the influence is statistically insignificant throughout most or all of the range. Even this modest evidence of an attenuating impact is provocative. Politicians might extend projects to settlements that have few or no rival party workers. This is an important area for future research.

As for the other right-hand side variables, *central land* exhibits a significant negative relationship with sewer coverage (Table 5). Given the capital-intensive nature of sewers, this relationship may reflect the difficulty for politicians in circumventing central government laws. *Settlement age*, *average education*, and *average household monthly income per capita* lack explanatory power across the models.

Equally surprising was the lack of a strong association between electoral competition (*state constituency electoral competition* and *municipal ward electoral competition*) and development. Electoral competition lacks explanatory power in all models except for the provision of medical camps. A one standard deviation decrease (4.21) in average vote margins in state elections is associated with a 3.22 point increase in the percentage of respondents reporting access to government medical camps (Table 5). These findings run against the grain of the literature in political economy that posits a positive effect of electoral competition on development.[62]

The explanatory power of social capital was limited to the provision of streetlights and trash collection. This is a provocative finding in light of the literature on social capital. Such studies focus primarily

[62] See Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004 and Saez and Sinha 2009.

on horizontal interactions among individuals. In the context of slums, residents can collectively act toward some developmental ends; however, residents alone cannot provide many of the most significant forms of development. Studies that limit the analytical focus to decentralized forms of collective action may overlook the convergence of local and extralocal variables that drive variation in slum development.

A final, remarkable result is the lack of a significant negative influence of social diversity on development. While *caste diversity* is negatively associated with the provision of sewer lines (Table 5), diversity is otherwise lacking in explanatory power. We would expect the impact of social diversity on development to be negative given the larger context of weak formal institutions in slums. The relationship is instead undetermined.

I examine several alternative model specifications and robustness checks.[63] First, to address the clustering of outcomes at 0 and 100 with some of the development indicators, I use Tobit models and fractional logit models, transforming the indicators into proportions for the latter specification. The results hold for the two models.[64] Second, to ensure that the results are not partially driven by outliers, I use robust regression with Huber weights and an MM regression technique that weighs observations by their degree of influence. I also run regressions with only those settlements that have party networks. The results are broadly robust to these specifications.[65]

Ethnic identities might influence the provision of public services through their composition in settlements, rather than in levels of fractionalization. I therefore examine variables measuring the percentage of scheduled caste (SC) and scheduled tribe (ST) residents in each settlement and the percentage of Muslim residents in each settlement. The coefficient on the percentage of SC and ST residents is not significant across the indicators. The coefficient on the percentage of Muslim residents is significant and positive in relation to streetlights, presenting only weak evidence of an association between religious composition and development.[66]

Proximity to centers of political power in the city might have an impact on the trajectory of development in settlements. I therefore

[63] See Appendix E in Auerbach 2015 for a discussion of the alternative models and robustness checks.

[64] See Tables E5, E6.1, and E6.2 in Auerbach 2015.

[65] See Tables E7, E12, and E13 in Auerbach 2015. In the Huber and MM regressions, p-values on party network density hover just above 0.10 in relation to trash removal. Results are otherwise robust across the three model specifications.

[66] See Tables E11.1 and E11.2 in Auerbach 2015.

run regressions that include variables for the distances between slums and the district collectorate, state assembly, and center of the old city. Distances lack significance across the indicators, with the exception of streetlights, where the distance to the state assembly exhibits a negative association and *p*-value of 0.09. A preponderance of evidence suggests that proximity to sites of political power does not influence service provision.[67]

To address the issue of multiple hypothesis testing—that the probability of falsely rejecting at least one null hypothesis grows with the number of statistical tests conducted—I calculate adjusted *p*-values and sharpened *q*-values to control for the false discovery rate (FDR). This approach controls for the expected proportion of false rejections.[68] *Party network density* continues to exhibit significance at conventional levels in relation to paved roads, streetlights, municipal trash collection, and government medical camps. I also create summary indices for the development indicators, reducing the number of tests conducted and providing a more general assessment of *party network density*'s relationship with community development. *Party network density* is positive and significant in its association with the summary indices at the 0.05 level.

X. Causality, Historical Sequencing, and the Origins of Party Networks

The data used in this article are observational in nature. *Party network density*, moreover, is not the result of randomized treatment. Concerns over endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity are therefore important and cannot be dismissed. While identification is a looming challenge with observational data, qualitative fieldwork can provide insights into context, mechanisms, and processes that jointly improve our understanding of causality. Confidence in the statistical relationships can be strengthened along two fronts, each of which I discuss in this section. First, I examine historical sequencing in the organization and development of slum settlements. The order, nature, and timing of events reduce concerns of reverse causality—that party workers are attracted to more developed settlements. Second, I discuss the origins and spread

[67] See Table E15 in Auerbach 2015.

[68] As Anderson notes, "FDR formalizes the trade-off between correct and false rejections and reduces the penalty to testing additional hypotheses" (Anderson 2008, 1487). Given eighty observations, the greater power afforded by FDR procedures make them the most appropriate adjustment strategies. See Anderson 2008 and Benjamini, Krieger, and Yekutieli 2006 on multiple hypothesis testing, and Appendix E in Auerbach 2015 for a detailed discussion.

of party networks. Investigating these related themes are important for interpreting the econometric findings of the study and assessing the potential for unobserved variables to confound the results.

Historical Sequencing and Causality

The average slum settlement in the sample is 32.8 years old, with a one standard deviation of 9.49 years. All sampled settlements were absent of infrastructure and public services at the time of their founding.[69] Collected photographs and interviews with residents and officials established that these were barren lands prior to squatting. For example, describing the initial conditions of his settlement, one resident in Bhopal noted, "The roads were mud, there were no drains; there was nothing."[70] A leader of another settlement similarly recalled, "There was nothing. …The area was entirely a field [*maedan*]."[71] In the sequencing of events, all sampled slums began with the same developmental conditions. The initial squatters did not self-select into areas with higher levels of services, as the vacant lands upon which they squatted were uniformly undeveloped.

All but one of the eighty sampled settlements was established before the start of India's decentralization reforms in the early 1990s and the provision of discretionary funds for elected representatives (which began in 1993), as well as before the start of major urban development programs in the 2000s. This is an analytically salient point.[72] By the time that infrastructure was used as a clientelistic tool, most slums had already reached their population capacity and demographic character and had begun processes of community organization and the development of political linkages. The origins of community organization predate the extension of most public services, providing a degree of leverage over questions of organization and development.

Party workers are recruited from slums, live within those slums, and exclusively engage in leadership activities for local residents. Party workers are not dispatched to settlements by party organizations, nor do they independently rove among settlements to offer their services. Not once in twenty months of fieldwork did I observe party workers moving among settlements—either placing themselves in developed

[69] The initial absence of infrastructure is a defining feature of squatter settlements. See Appendix A in Auerbach 2015 for a full discussion on and photographs of the initial establishment of squatter settlements.

[70] Author interview, Bhopal, September 2, 2011.

[71] Author interview, Bhopal, September 23, 2012.

[72] Most development prior to this period was limited to the provision of shared water taps and electricity connections. See Mitra 1988 and Bhatnagar 2010 on slum development in the two cities.

settlements to enjoy public services or in worse-off settlements to capitalize on a demand for leadership. Instead, workers emerge from, and are deeply embedded in, the social networks of their particular settlement; to leave the slum is to leave behind the social ties from which they derive authority. These individuals moved to slums with other residents and built followings afterward. A majority of the party workers I encountered did not initially intend to become leaders, but fell into the position after demonstrating leadership qualities to other residents. These realities of slum leadership remove concerns that party workers are drawn toward more developed settlements, thereby introducing reverse causality.

In the absence of randomized treatment or a compelling instrumental variable, statements of causality must necessarily be modest and circumscribed; however, given the complex, time-intensive processes of organization and development in urban slums, this is an unavoidable limitation. Experimental manipulation of local authority would probably lack the duration of treatment and intracommunity legitimacy to be externally valid, and the paucity of reliable historical data on informal urban settlements limits our ability to trace these patterns temporally. Still, the timing and nature of slum development provide considerable reason to conclude that the observed statistical relationships can be explained through the theoretical framework.

The Origins and Spread of Party Networks

I encountered a common narrative of leadership formation during my ethnographic fieldwork. Soon after erecting their shanties, residents face the looming threat of eviction and a range of developmental problems. In response, one or a few individuals come to the fore and bring the concerns of the settlement to officials and politicians. Residents gravitate toward these nascent leaders because they possess qualities—literacy, charisma, and courage before "big men" outside the settlement—that allow them to get things done. Leaders often hold occupations that place them at the center of community social life—store managers, tea-stall owners, and heads of cottage industries. Some hold occupations that provide a degree of connectivity to the formal, outside world—municipal clerks, watchmen, public sweepers, and chauffeurs for officials. In their dealings with the state, these individuals are eventually acknowledged by officials and politicians as possessing *namcheen*, or social prominence, in their settlements.

The construction of leadership in India's slums is from the bottom up, with local support and legitimacy in place before individuals are

absorbed into party networks. As one state minister in Bhopal explained to me, "If someone has guts to lead certain people, if he has guts to come to the MLA and the concerned officers for work and raise a voice for their problems, then he automatically becomes leader of the slum. . . . It lies in him only, in the person. What we do if we see that this man is good, and he is interested in development and is a reasonable person, and doesn't put unreasonable demands in front of you, we try to push him, to help him, to make him come up, if he is of our thinking, our principals, so we promote him."[73]

Party positions are scarce and coveted. Hundreds of party supporters in an urban area aspire to positions, but there can be only one president and a limited number of members within a committee at any given level—booth, ward, block, district, and state. This is an important fact because it precludes the possibility that these networks can endlessly proliferate in any space where individuals desire positions. Party positions are scarce by design; otherwise they cease to hold value—access to patronage, political connectivity, and local fame—and provide the capacity for parties to impose compliance among members.

To investigate the uneven spread of party networks across settlements, I place *party network density* and *party representational balance* on the left-hand side of the regression equation.[74] The results show a lack of statistical significance for a majority of the right hand-side variables. The age of settlements, land ownership categories, property rights, average income and education of residents, distances to important centers of political power, and electoral competition at the ward and state constituency levels are insignificant.

The right-hand side variables that are statistically significant are the size of settlements and levels of ethnic diversity. Larger and more diverse settlements—along the lines of religion and region of origin—tend to have more dense and balanced party networks. These correlations provide a provocative path for future inquiry, particularly the association between ethnic diversity and party networks. High levels of ethnic diversity increase the fragmentation of informal leadership in settlements. I observed in my ethnographic fieldwork that this process of leadership formation and fragmentation occurs in the early stages of a settlement's history and precedes the extension of party networks. Over time, parties seek to bring settlement leaders into the party fold, and settlements with multiple nodes of authority—competing with one another to build a larger and more loyal following of residents—

[73] Author interview, Bhopal, July 7, 2012.
[74] Results are presented in Table E24 in Auerbach 2015.

produce dense party networks. Ethnic diversity, then, may help to generate informal accountability and encourage development in a settlement through the division of authority and the rise of dense, competitive party networks. Population, moreover, may influence the uneven spread of party networks by providing electoral incentives for parties to allocate more patronage resources in large "vote bank" slums. I control for population and social diversity in the main regressions of the study.

Definitively ruling out the possibility of unobserved variables confounding the results is not possible in an observational study, but the fact that we obtain consistent and statistically significant results for *party network density* after accounting for theoretically important potential confounders lends confidence to the findings. A next step for future research is to endogenize party networks and trace their deeper historical origins.

XI. Conclusion

Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork and original survey data, this article demonstrates that the density of party networks influences the ability of slum residents to demand and secure development from the state. In slums with dense party networks, competition among leaders generates a degree of accountability and organizational capacity that encourage development. Political connectivity also facilitates the demands of residents. I additionally find evidence that the presence of multiparty networks can attenuate the positive impact of density. Politicians might be less likely to extend infrastructure to slums with multiparty networks because residents can enjoy these goods regardless of their vote. Interparty competition additionally generates perverse incentives for rival networks to undermine each other's development efforts.

Scholarship on clientelism has overlooked unevenness in the presence, strength, and partisan balance of patron-client networks across communities. This article contributes to studies of clientelism by measuring the density and partisan balance of patron-client networks across a large number of communities and by investigating the conditions under which these networks encourage development. An important objective for future research is to endogenize party networks and explain both their deeper origins and why they vary so dramatically across space.

Research on local development often places the analytical focus on decentralized forms of cooperation. The findings herein suggest that social capital is not a panacea. For many of the most important public

services, vertical party linkages are of primary importance. Decentralized theories of collective action, then, should incorporate vertical networks to understand the provision of public services in contexts like urban slums.

The scope conditions of the theory outlined in this article are few: poor urban settlements in contexts defined by clientelism, informality, and multiparty competition. Spatial variation in slum development exists globally. UN-Habitat, for instance, highlights significant regional variation in slum development. Scholars have also pointed to variation in slum development within particular cities.[75] With a global population of one billion, an important research agenda is to understand how slum dwellers organize to demand and secure development from the state.

International institutions and governments are working across the developing world to improve the conditions of slum dwellers. A central component of these efforts is the sustained participation of communities. The findings herein suggest that community organization alone may be insufficient to help residents secure many of the most basic public services. As long as the provision of development is politicized and discretionary, clientelistic networks will continue to be a factor in determining the developmental trajectory of poor urban communities.

Supplementary Material

Supplementary material for this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org.10.1017/S0043887115000313.

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[75] For examples, see UN-Habitat 2006, Gay 1994, and Dosh 2010.

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