Autocracies and the International Sources of Cooperation

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Abstract

Under what conditions do autocracies peacefully settle disputes? This study argues that as autocracies become more central in the network of liberal institutions such as Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), they are less likely to initiate a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID). As a state becomes more democratic, the effect of centrality within the PTA network on the peaceful dispute settlement dissipates. This is because greater embeddedness in the PTA regime is associated with enhanced transparency for autocracies, which allows autocracies to mitigate *ex ante* informational problems in dispute resolution. Using a dataset of MID initiation from 1965-1999, this study finds robust empirical support for the aforementioned hypothesis. Moreover, the results are substantively significant as well. Further analysis into the causal mechanisms at work provides evidence in favor of the information mechanism. The results suggest that an autocrat's structural position within the international system can help to peacefully settle its disputes.

"We have set two goals for China's future development. The first is to double the 2010 GDP and per-capita income of urban and rural residents and build a society of initial prosperity in all respects by 2020. The second is to turn China into a modern socialist country that is prosperous, democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious by the middle of the century."

- Xi Jinping (Current President of the People's Republic of China), *Statement made after concluding the Australia-China FTA*

What does the rise of China–an autocracy–mean for international cooperation? Several scholars and policy-makers have expressed concern over whether a "peaceful rise" is at all possible (Mearsheimer, 2014). Recent events in the South-China Sea suggest that optimism over a peaceful rise may be overstated. Yet, China is also simultaneously enmeshing itself in international economic institutions such as the World Trade Organization, Preferential Trade Agreements, and Bilateral Investment Treaties. Is this a sign that China might actually be committed to peace and stability?

More broadly speaking, under what conditions do autocratic polities peacefully settle international disputes? The evidence accumulated under the Democratic Peace literature would suggest that the conditions are slim (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Oneal et al., 1996; Doyle, 1997; Oneal and Russett, 1997; Russett and Oneal, 2001). Recent work, however, shows that the relationship between domestic institutions and international conflict is much more nuanced (Weeks, 2008, 2012; Colgan and Weeks, 2015; Mattes and Rodriguez, 2014). Domestic institutional variation *within* autocracies can explain how some autocracies are no more conflict-prone than democracies. In addition to domestic institutional variation, autocracies also vary in the degree to which they are embedded in international institutions as well. I argue that this component–which has been overlooked by most scholars–can help to explain why some autocracies are more cooperative than others.

How does the embeddedness of a state within liberal international institutions interact with domestic regime type to engender aggressive foreign policy outcomes? I argue that as autocracies become more central or embedded within the network of liberal institutions such

as Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), they are less likely to initiate Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs). For democracies, the effect of centrality within the PTA network on the propensity of a state to initiate a MID is relatively smaller. Moreover, I argue that these results can be explained via an Information Revelation mechanism. Given uncertainty over capabilities, enhanced transparency resultant from greater embeddedness in the PTA regime allows states to settle on a peaceful bargain equilibrium rather than the less efficient militarized dispute equilibrium. Since the scope of transparency improvements are higher in autocracies than in democracies, the benefits of PTA centrality for international cooperation should be greater for autocracies than democracies.

Empirical analysis of a dataset of directed-dyads and MID initiation from 1965-1999 supports my hypothesis. Moreover, the results are substantively significant. Moving from one standard deviation below the mean PTA centrality to one standard deviation above the mean PTA centrality for autocracies decreases the risk of MID initiation by 70% for dyads that have a particularly acute predilection toward international conflict and this effect decreases as the state becomes more democratic. In my models, the magnitude of this substantive effect is on par with the main effect of democracy as well as the effect of oil wealth on conflict propensities. My results remain robust to a battery of control variables, sampling choices, and econometric modeling techniques. Furthermore, my analysis provides evidence in favor of the hypothesized causal mechanism: (1) PTA centrality is associated with enhanced transparency and the magnitude of this effect is declining with increased levels of democracy and (2) greater transparency is associated with lower probabilities of dispute initiation.

My findings suggest that international variables interact with domestic-level variables in theoretically interesting and empirically significant ways. Indeed, the results of this paper support the contention made by Chaudoin, Milner, and Pang (2015) that international relations is complex and that these complex interactions between the international system and domestic politics should be taken seriously. Complementing the work of several scholars who unpack variation within autocratic regimes, I show that variation in an autocrat's involvement with international

institutions can also help us to understand conflict initiation in autocracies (Weeks, 2008, 2012; Colgan and Weeks, 2015; Mattes and Rodriguez, 2014).

Why Do States Fight?

Why do states fight? This, ostensibly, simple question has perplexed scholars of international security since the age of Thucydides. Answers to this question have focused on a variety of factors: human nature, great leaders, domestic politics, and certain aspects that characterize the international system. In this paper, I focus on how two types of explanations that have taken hold in the current literature–domestic politics and the international system–can interact in theoretically interesting and empirically important ways to explain why some autocratic states are more peaceful than others.

One of the main explanations that scholars point to is the role of domestic institutions. Particularly, this argument points to role that regime type plays in either pacifying or militarizing states. This literature, commonly known as the Democratic Peace literature, argues that democracies tend not to fight (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Oneal et al., 1996; Doyle, 1997; Oneal and Russett, 1997; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999; Russett and Oneal, 2001). As one scholars puts it, "the absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations" (Levy, 1989). This finding, having survived multiple operationalizations, empirical specifications, and econometric models, is now a standard control variable in the literature.

How does democratic regime-type operates to pacify international relations? One of the main mechanisms that scholars point to when explaining the democratic peace focuses on the role of audience costs in constraining leaders and helping them to signal their resolve (Fearon, 1994). Importantly, this audience cost mechanism relies on the assumption that there is a significant deal of uncertainty over each leader's willingness to go to war. Proponents of the audience cost theory suggest that the greater ability that a leader's relevant domestic audience

has to punish leaders who lose disputes or escalate crises, the more we learn about the leader's resolve (Fearon, 1995). Thus, the potential for domestic audiences to punish leaders for losing disputes or escalating crises reveals information that helps states to settle their disputes without going to war. Several scholars have tested and found evidence for this audience costs explanation (Eyerman and Hart Jr., 1996; Partell and Palmer, 1999; Gelpi, 2001; Tomz, 2007; Trager and Vavreck, 2011). There are important caveats to audience cost theory as well. Slantchev (2006) and Potter and Baum (2014) argue that the ability for leaders to generate audience costs depends on freedom of the media.

This mechanism, however, is not without significant debate. Several studies, both empirical and case-studies, do not find significant evidence for this audience cost mechanism (Rosato, 2003; Snyder and Borghard, 2011; Downes and Sechser, 2012; Gartzke and Lupu, 2012; Trachtenberg, 2012). Even more concerning for those theorists who argue that the democratic advantage lies in the audience cost mechanism is the recent work that further unpacks variation in regime-type. This strand of the literature argues that certain types of autocrats are also able to generate audience costs. Moreover, these types of autocratic regimes that can generate audience costs are just as peaceful and able to signal their resolve as their democratic counterparts (Weeks, 2008, 2012). The upshot is that autocracies may not actually be disadvantaged at signaling their resolve.

Those interested in how domestic-level variables affect a state's willingness to fight also point to economic mechanisms, which form the basis of the Capitalist Peace explanation. This explanation, moreover, splits into two strands. The first argues that liberal economic systems complement the pacifying effects of democracy (i.e., "The Kantian Peace"). In this strand of the literature, scholars contend states that trade more with each other are less likely to go to war because the opportunity cost of war (in terms of forgone trade) makes war less likely to become an equilibrium outcome (Oneal et al., 1996). Again, this variable–finding extensive empirical validation in the literature–has become a standard control variable in any quantitative analysis of conflict.

The second take on the Capitalist Peace argues that liberal economic policies actually supplant and explain away the Democratic Peace finding. These scholars maintain that analyses of the effect of democracy on MID initiation omits the role of other forms of liberal economic policies such as open capital markets (Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer, 2001; Gartzke and Li, 2003). Once accounting for this omitted variable, the Democratic Peace finding either diminishes in substantive importance or in statistical significance.

While domestic-level explanations do help us to gain some empirical leverage over the question as to why states fight, scholars also look to system-level factors as well. The first major tradition of system-level theorists–the Neorealists–argue that the anarchical nature of the international system makes the distribution of power within the system the primary determinant of conflict (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2014). This set of theories, however, relies on the assumption that states are fundamentally undifferentiated except on their military capabilities. Given this assumption, Neorealists argue that because states cannot trust the intentions of other states, changes in the military capabilities of each state can lead to security dilemmas and arms races–both of which can contribute to violence between states (Jervis, 1978; Acharya and Ramsay, 2013). Moreover, rapid power shifts also lead to a phenomenon known as preventive war where a country strikes against the rising state because the initiator country views the target's rise as potentially threatening to its own position in the system (Gilpin, 1981; Debs and Monteiro, 2014).

Challenging the Neorealist camp is the Constructivist school of thought. Rather than seeing preferences as exogenous to the system, Constructivists see identities and interests as fundamentally a product of the system Wendt (1992). Interaction within the international system can change the identities and preferences of states, which can subsequently make them more or less peaceful depending on who they are interacting with and how they they perceive their interactions with each other. Communities of democratic or liberal states tend not to fight each other because they socialize each other into a shared democratic identity (Risse-Kappen, 1996; Risse, 2000). Critics of the Constructivist school of thought maintain that this set of explana-

tions cannot be empirically tested against the data because norms and identities are notoriously difficult to measure.

To fill this hole, a new set of explanations looks at how the network structure of international relations and interdependence–something that can be empirically tested–can account for the presence or absence of peace. Network theorists argue that the structure of political and economic relations amongst states shapes the propensity of states to engage in violent disputes. For the most part, network theorists argue that as states become more ensconced in alliance, trade, and institutional networks, the less likely they are to resort to using military force to resolve disputes. (Dorussen and Ward, 2008; Maoz, 2009; Kinne, 2012; Dorussen and Ward, 2010; Lupu and Traag, 2013; Kinne, 2014). Other scholars find, however, that states that maintain certain prestigious positions or that have have large disparities in network status are more likely to initiate MIDs (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006, 2008, 2012).

When Images of International Relations Collide

In this section, I show how insights from international as well as domestic political explanations can be integrated to generate new hypotheses regarding the determinants of international conflict. In this paper, I argue that elements of the liberal peace such as international institutions and democratic regime type can interact to pacify autocratic states. As such, I hone my attention in on one such liberal international institution that has proliferated since the end of World War II: PTAs. Particularly, I argue that greater embeddedness in the PTA network helps autocratic states to solve their cooperation problems and that this effect diminishes as a state becomes more democratic. I focus on embeddedness instead of a simple count of PTAs because I am interested in the way in which one state's PTA memberships relative to other states' PTA memberships generate empirical predictions. In particular, I argue that the enhancements in the informational environment as a result of greater PTA centrality allows autocrats better be able to resolve their disputes with other states. While alternative mechanisms such as Lib-

eral Ideology and Capitalist Peace might also explain the effect of PTA centrality on conflict, I demonstrate that the theoretical links are tenuous.

Borrowing from the bargaining theory of war, I argue that the Information Revelation mechanism implies that embeddedness within PTA networks helps autocrats to reveal vital economic information that might help to resolve disputes before they break out into actual armed conflict. My argument rests on several assumptions. First, I assume that states have imperfect information over each others' capabilities and resolve, armed conflict might become an equilibrium outcome (Fearon, 1994). Second, I assume that the use of military force is relatively inefficient to peaceful bargaining in deciding the allocation of a disputed prize such as territory, economic resources, foreign policy outcomes, etc. (Powell, 2004; Debs and Monteiro, 2014). Third, I assume that economic transparency reduces the imperfect information problem and helps states to better infer capabilities (Fearon, 1995).

It is important to note one particular caveat to this assumption. Debs and Weiss (2014) show how greater transparency actually might create perverse incentives to escalate disputes because leaders face reputational incentives in light of a better informed domestic audience. There are two reasons why this does not disrupt my theory. First, Debs and Weiss (2014) focus on the observability of domestic political debate and not the degree to which other states can infer capabilities from observing a government's economic information. Second, they also argue that transparency works through a domestic audience cost channel. My argument does not depend on the saliency of audience costs; rather, I focus on the ability of states to infer capabilities *ex ante*.

The final assumption that I make is that greater embeddedness in the PTA regime is associated with greater transparency and that this effect is contingent on the state's regime type. Since democracies already have a predisposition toward releasing policy-relevant economic data, there is a reduced scope for the Information Revelation mechanism to be in operation for democracies (Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland, 2011). For autocracies, however, they might become more willing to reveal vital policy-relevant data in order to gain the benefits of the PTA

regime (Rodrik, 1992; Baccini and Urpelainen, 2012). Thus, the effect of greater centrality in the PTA network on transparency should be greater in autocracies than democracies.

Putting all of these assumptions together, the story now goes as follows. Given uncertainty over the capabilities of a potential conflict initiator, we might observe an inefficient equilibrium where the initiator uses force rather than striking a peaceful bargain. This is because for bargaining to work between the potential initiator and the target state, the target state must be able to distinguish whether the initiator has a credible capability to forcibly take the disputed prize. When information over of the initiator's capabilities are uncertain, the target state may fail to reach peaceful bargain when the disputed prize is of sufficiently high value to the target state and it is difficult to infer the initiator's capability to carry out a military campaign. This logic would suggest that uncertainty over capabilities should lead to greater use of military force by the initiator state in equilibrium because the target state fails to agree to a peaceful bargain.

As the information environment improves, the target state becomes better able to infer capabilities. The upshot is that we should see peaceful bargains occurring more often in equilibrium as transparency of policy-relevant economic data increases. If embeddedness in the PTA regime is indeed associated with greater transparency and the effect is larger in autocracies than democracies, than we should expect that greater PTA centrality should reduce the likelihood of the initiator state resorting to arms to resolve disputes.

This mechanism leads me to the following hypothesis:

H1: Greater centrality in the PTA network should be associated with lower propensities to initiate conflict and that this effect is decreasing as a state becomes more democratic.

Alternative Mechanisms

There are several alternative mechanisms that might be at work. I argue, however, that there is little reason to believe that these are actually in operation. I glean two major alternative mechanisms from the literature: Liberal Ideology and Capitalist Peace.

PTA centrality might also differentially impact the probability of peaceful dispute settle-

ment conditional on domestic regime type through a Liberal Ideological mechanism. Greater centrality within the network of liberal international institutions might also show an increasing willingness to buy into liberal ideologies that emphasize peaceful dispute settlement. Since democracies are more likely to have liberal norms that emphasize peaceful rather than violent solutions to settle domestic disputes, being brought into a liberal international community adds little added-value (Doyle, 1986, 2005). For autocracies, however, being ensconced into liberal communities might help them to settle disputes–at least internationally–in a matter consistent with liberal values such as diplomacy and international law. Thus, we might expect autocracies to initiate fewer MIDs as they become more embedded in liberal international institutions such as PTAs. But this is probably not at work because this mechanism requires states to be a part of a socialization process. Many PTAs, however, neither carry regular meetings amongst their members nor do they have a functioning secretariat to facilitate socialization (Gray, 2015). Thus, the scope for this Liberal Ideology mechanism to be at work is slim.

The Capitalist Peace explanation as articulated by Gartzke (2007) suggests that PTA network position and regime type might pacify autocracies. The story goes as follows. For countries that are more open and market-oriented on average (generally democracies), they tend to use aggressive military actions less often because it sends an adverse signal to domestic economic actors. Because democracies tend to be open-market economies relative to autocracies, there is a reduced scope for PTA centrality to move democracies toward more internal market liberalization (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff, 2002). Autocracies, however, have more domestic economic institutions to reform and thus they stand more to gain when becoming more embedded in PTA networks, which are designed to liberalize a state's economy. But Dafoe and Kelsey (2014) provides evidence that there are narrow scope conditions under which this mechanism is active. Thus, its unlikely that this mechanism explains the majority of the effect of PTA embeddedness on conflict propensity.

In the following section, I test my main hypothesis using regression analysis. Furthermore, I probe each causal mechanism using dynamic error correction models. I find that there is robust

support for my main hypothesis and that my results are likely a product of the hypothesized informational channel and not the Liberal Ideology nor the Capitalist Peace mechanisms.

Empirical Strategy

The empirical goal is to ascertain the network conditions needed for autocrats to peacefully resolve international disputes. While much of the previous discussion on domestic institutions and PTA network positions was monadic in nature, a simple country-year analysis would be inappropriate in capturing dyad level effects such as alliance relationships, trade relations, and geography that might also be correlated with network positions. Thus, I employ a directed-dyad set-up to model monadic, dyadic, and system-level effects on MID initiation.

For the crux of the analysis, I employ Maoz (2005)'s recoding of the dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) dataset which indicates whether State A (the Challenger) either threatened, displayed, or used military force against the official government of State B (the Target). The final dataset used for the statistical analysis in this paper consists of a dichotomous indicator of whether a Challenger state initiated a MID against a Target state and spans the years 1965-1999. I include a number of control variables for my main statistical models, which are described below. Summary statistics can be found in Table 4 of the Online Appendix.

To assess the interaction between regime-type and PTA network centrality, I estimate a logit model with heteroskedastic robust and standard errors clustered by directed-dyad since the dependent variable is dichotomous. In the robustness section, I also include the lagged value MID initiation to account for other dependencies that might arise from the data following Dafoe (Dafoe, 2014). Moreover, I account for temporal dependence by including the number of years since the Challenging state initiated a MID against the Target state as well as its cubic splines (Beck, Katz, and Tucker, 1998). My results remain unchanged if splines are replace with time, time squared, and time cubed as suggested by Carter and Signorino (2010). While Green, Kim, and Yoon (2001) suggest using a dyad fixed effects model, both Beck and Katz

(2001) and Oneal and Russett (2001) warn against this approach. The dyad fixed effects estimator assumes that inferences cannot be made from dyads that never go to war with each other, which would throw out over 95% of my data. Rather, I aim to explicitly model dyad-specific dependencies as much as possible. In the robustness checks, I use a number of different estimators including rare events logit and a bootstrapped logit to assess if my results are driven by my econometric modeling choice. Importantly, my results remain unchanged when using these different estimating approaches.

Explanatory Variables

My main hypothesis is that the effect of embeddedness in the PTA network on the probability of MID initiation is conditional on the domestic regime type of the Challenging state. I operationalize these concepts in the following ways.

Regime Type: I operationalize a country's regime-type using the Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) democracy indicator (hereby referred to as CGV), which is a dichotomous indicator of a country's domestic regime type. The CGV indicator classifies democracies as regimes where "governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections" and non-democratic as the residual category Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010, p. 69). Following the conventional wisdom, I expect this variable to be negatively associated with MID initiation. Additionally, my results remain unchanged when substituting the CGV indicator with the continuous Polity scale.

Centrality: To capture centrality within the PTA network, I use Hafner-Burton and Montgomery's measure of a state's degree centrality within the PTA network, which is a simple measure of the count of shared PTA memberships with other states in year t standardized by the total number of PTAs in year t (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2008). I expect the main effect of this variable to be negatively associated with MID initiation. The interaction, however, between PTA centrality and domestic regime-type should be positively associated MID initiation. That is, the negative effect of PTA centrality on MID initiation should be small for

democracies relative to autocracies.

Control Variables

The literature on international conflict suggests a number of control variables. Moreover, these control variables might also correlate with either regime type or centrality within the PTA network.

Military Power: Scholars point out that a state's military capabilities are a significant determinant of its willingness to use military force to settle disputes. This is largely shaped by the amount of resources available to that state, which I proxy with the lagged value of real GDP of the Challenger and Target state in trillions of 1996 U.S. dollars. The data are taken from Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2008). Importantly, economic size might also correlate with regime type as well as a state's position within the PTA network. The results do not change if I use each side's raw military capabilities instead. Because military disputes can also be shaped by balance of power dynamics, I include the Challenger's share of dyadic military capabilities as well. Finally, I account for major and minor power dyads by including an indicator variable for each combination of dyads with minor-minor dyads as the base category.

Geography: Geographic proximity also shapes international conflict. States adjacent to each other have lower costs to project power and might also have more disputes over territory or resources. Thus, I include an indicator variable if the Challenger and Target state are contiguous. I also include a variable that measures the natural log of the distance between each side's capitals (Stinnett et al., 2002).

Alliances: In addition to geographic proximity, geopolitical proximity is also a significant determinant of MID initiation. Gowa (1999) provides evidence that the effect of regime type on international conflict might instead be shaped by shared strategic interests rather than factors intrinsic to democracies. To account for this potential confounder, I include the similarity of the Challenger and Target's global alliance portfolio as a proxy for shared strategic interests.

Target Regime Type: Though this study focuses on the Challenger's regime type, one

must also take into account the Target's regime type. Scholars have found significant evidence of democratic clustering, which might bias my results (Gleditsch, 2002; Gleditsch and Ward, 2006; Gibler and Tir, 2014). Thus, I include the CGV indicator for whether the Target state is democratic. The inclusion of the Target state's regime type does not change my results.

Alternative Explanations

There are two main alternative explanations that might explain my results as well. Failure to account for these potentially confounding explanations might bias my results.

The Kantian Tripod: One of the major theories posited by the literature is that shared Inter-Governmental Organization (IGO) membership and liberal commercial ties in addition to a state's regime type help to explain the liberal peace. If a state's centrality within liberal international institutions is an artifact of joint IGO membership and trade dependence, then my results would be biased upwards when excluding these variables from my statistical models. To test my hypothesis against this competing explanation, I include the number of shared IGO memberships as well as Gleditsch (2004)'s measure of dyadic trade dependence in Model 2 of Table 1. The results remain robust to using the weak-link operationalization as suggested by Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum (2003) and Russett and Oneal (2001) or individually including each side's trade dependence on the other.

Network Structure: Another alternative explanation might be that PTA centrality and regime type are shaped by other features of the PTA or IGO network that simultaneously influence a state's propensity to initiate a MID. Following the work of Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, I include a measure of whether the Challenger and Target states share a PTA membership, a measure if they inhabit the same PTA cluster and a measure of the size of the Challenger state's PTA cluster (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006, 2012). Moreover, Kinne (2013) shows that convergence in the structural similarity of each state's IGO network reduces the likelihood that a Challenging state initiates a MID (Kinne, 2013). I account for this relationship by including the five year lag of the dyad's structural IGO network similarity as it

might account for a state's embeddedness within the PTA network–a subset of the larger IGO network.

In the final model (Model 4), I include all significant regressors from the Kantian Tripod and Network Structure explanations. Additionally, I include a binary indicator variable if the challenger state is a primary fuel exporter. I define primary fuel exporters as states where fuel exports are more than one-third of their net exports. My results remain unchanged if I use a continuous measure of fuel exports as well. Since Ross and Voeten (2013) find evidence that petro-states are associated with greater levels of economic integration and that their centrality in the IGO network is nonlinear in oil income, it might be the case that petro-state status is a confounder whose exclusion biases my results toward my hypothesize. It might also be the case, however, that petro-states are actually more aggressive (Colgan, 2010; Colgan and Weeks, 2015). As a result, my results might be biased away from my hypothesis if I were to exclude petro-state status.

Results

I argue that the effect of PTA centrality on reducing MID initiations should be greater for autocracies that for democracies. The results across all models bear out this prediction at significance levels of $p<0.05$ or greater.

Model 1 of Table 1 begins by estimating a parsimonious model that includes regime type, PTA centrality, and their interaction in addition to the baseline control variables that capture factors such as military power, geography, alliances, and democratic clustering. In this model, the coefficient on the main effects of regime type and PTA centrality are both negative and statistically significant at the $p<0.001$ and $p<0.05$ levels respectively. The interaction term, as hypothesized, is also positive and statistically significant at the $p<0.001$ level as well. All control variables generally perform as expected and consistent with the literature.

Model 2 of Table 1 takes into account the Kantian variables that might also explain my results. Importantly, my results remain statistically significant at the $p<0.001$ level. Moreover,

Table 1: Directed-Dyad Analysis of MID Initiation, 1965-1999

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Model 1: Baseline	Model 2: Kantian Tripod	Model 3: Network	Model 4: Full Specification
PTA Centrality (Side A)	-3.542*	-8.154***	-5.473**	-7.533***
	(1.583)	(1.598)	(2.080)	(1.696)
Democracy (Side A)	-0.557***	-0.818***	-0.538***	-0.583***
	(0.140)	(0.138)	(0.150)	(0.142)
PTA Centrality*Democracy (Side A)	3.581*	7.313***	5.294**	7.040***
	(1.708)	(1.731)	(2.019)	(1.779)
Democracy (Side B)	-0.129	-0.323*	-0.0948	-0.192
	(0.124)	(0.130)	(0.119)	(0.127)
Number of Shared IGO Memberships		0.0449***		0.0258***
		(0.00491)		(0.00579)
Dyadic Trade Dependency (Lower)		-57.86***		-45.20**
		(15.25)		(15.26)
Network convergence over 5 years			-1.873***	-2.042***
			(0.405)	(0.431)
Overlapping PTA Membership			0.434***	0.316**
			(0.119)	(0.118)
Same Hierarchical PTA Cluster			-0.0907	
			(0.104)	
PTA Cluster Size (Side A)			0.00220	
			(0.00199)	
Oil Exporter (Side A)				0.511***
				(0.108)
Geographic Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Economic Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Military Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	539472	536652	452415	452415

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Models estimated using logit with heteroskedastic robust standard errors and errors clustered by directed dyad.

Geographic, economic, and military controls as well as the constant have been suppressed for ease of presentation.

the coefficients on all of the terms significantly increase in magnitude which indicates that the exclusion of the Kantian explanation actually introduces a downward bias on the coefficients of interest. While the term on trade dependence is negatively and statistically significant, which is consistent with conventional explanations of the liberal peace, the coefficient on the number of shared IGO memberships is actually positive and statistically significant–a finding that a number of other studies have unexpectedly found as well. Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004) find similar anomalous results. This may be because states that are politically engaged in the international system have more disputes and might simultaneously join more IGOs. Future work might be fruitful in unpacking this anomalous finding.

Model 3 of Table 1 goes on to test how other aspects of PTA and IGO networks might account for my findings. Again, the signs and direction on the variables of interest remain the same and statistically significant at the $p<0.001$ level. Consistent with Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2006), the coefficients on joint PTA cluster membership and the Challenger's PTA cluster size are respectively negative and positive, but they do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Like Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2012), I also find that joint PTA membership is positively associated with MID initiation, but this is also likely due to omitted factors such as international political engagement. The coefficient on the structural equivalence of IGO networks is negative and statistically significant, consistent with Kinne (2013), indicating that greater similarity in the structure of each state's IGO network is associated with a reduction in MID initiation.

Finally, Model 4 of Table 1 estimates the MID initiation by only including variables from each alternate explanation that are statistically significant. Importantly, my main results hold with the correct signs and maintain statistical significance at the $p<0.01$ level or greater. In line with the literature, petro-states seem to be more aggressive in their foreign policy as indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficient on oil-exporter status (Colgan, 2010). Empirical analysis seems to indicate support for my hypothesis.

Because my hypothesis constitutes an interaction term, mere statistical significance on in-

Figure 1: Marginal Effect of PTA Centrality Conditional on Democracy Level



teraction term and its constituent components is not enough to generate credible inferences; instead, one must assess the substantive impact of the interaction effect in light of the main effects as well (Braumoeller, 2004; Brambor, Clark, and Golder, 2006). Moreover, since this paper employs a directed-dyad analysis where there are a large amount of observations, my results might just be picking up small and substantively uninteresting effects.

First, I plot the marginal effect of PTA centrality while varying the level of democracy in Figure 1. For ease of interpretation, I replace the CGV democracy indicator and estimate Model 4 of Table 1 with the continuous Polity scale from -10 to 10 instead. On the vertical axis is the marginal effect of PTA centrality. On the horizontal axis is the Polity scale. Figure 1 provides evidence that the effect of PTA centrality on the propensity to initiate militarized conflicts is indeed conditional on a state's level of democracy. Figure 1 shows that as a state becomes more democratic, the pacifying effect of PTA centrality on conflict initiation reduces.

Furthermore, I use *CLARIFY* to simulate the substantive impact of the hypothesized interaction effect between regime type and PTA centrality King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000). Using a dyad that might be particularly conflict prone, I use the estimates from Model 4 of Table 1 to simulate the impact of a change in PTA centrality from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean value for PTA centrality conditional on regime type. I model a conflict prone dyad as being one with contiguous borders and where the Challenger is a minor-power and the Target is a major power with all other variables set to their means because this is the most policy-relevant and theoretically interesting case to investigate. The results indicate that for autocratic regimes, this effect reduces the likelihood that it initiates a MID by 70%. For democracies this reduction is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The magnitude of this effect is similar to the main effect of regime type as well as petro-state status. Thus, the evidence indicates that the effect of a state's position in the PTA network on its willingness to violently settle disputes depends on its domestic regime type and that this effect is substantively meaningful.

There are also a few econometric issues to take note. First, the dataset that I use for this analysis is the actual *population* of all MIDs between 1965 and 1999. Thus, traditional notions of statistical inference and statistical significance do not make as much sense until we take into consideration the idea of a superpopulation. Thinking of this dataset as one sample from a superpopulation of potential worlds where MIDs are distributed across time and units, one can use bootstrapping sampling procedures to determine if this particular population reflects the superpopulation. Bootstrapped estimation works by randomly sampling from the population (in this case, the population of MIDs), running the estimator on each sample, and then calculating the sampling distribution of coefficients as well as their associated standard errors. Using a bootstrapped logit estimation procedure with 500 replications, I report the results of the procedure in Table 5 of the Appendix. Importantly, my main explanatory variables maintain the correct coefficient directions and statistical significance at conventional levels.

Second, it is important to note that the non-random selection of states into PTAs might bias

my results. It may very well be the case the most peace-oriented autocracies–an unobservable feature–are the ones that also select into being more embedded in PTA networks. Should this be a problem, then this would indeed threaten any inferences that I can make from the data. Fortunately, a regression of my explanatory variables on the residuals indicates that the explanatory variables are not significantly correlated with the residuals. Thus, it seems that the selection problem does not seem to significantly bias my results.

Robustness Checks

I also carry out an extensive battery of robustness checks with the results available in Tables 6, 7, and 8 of the Appendix. Importantly, none of these tests substantively change my results:

- Using a rare events logit estimator as recommended by King and Zeng (2001)
- Accounting for region fixed-effects
- Recoding the dependent variable to be only fatal MIDs
- Replacing the CGV indicator with the continuous Polity scale
- Restricting the sample to dyads deemed to be politically relevant
- Limiting the sample to only minor power challengers
- Controlling for other system-level variables such as Cold War status and system size
- Dropping all allied dyads from the sample
- Dropping Warsaw Pact countries from the sample since their foreign policies are not independent
- Replacing splines of the dependent variable with time fixed effects
- Including the lagged dependent variable as suggested by Dafoe (2014)

Causal Mechanisms

While the above analysis gives us a high-level overview of the data, it does not help us to identify which causal pathways are at work. In this section, I test the hypothesized mechanisms that might be driving my results. My analysis provides correlational evidence that the main results are likely to be driven by the informational mechanism rather than the ideological or market-based channels. Moreover, I test the second implication of my theory–that greater transparency should lead to a lower likelihood of MID initiation–and find support for that as well.

To test the posited mechanisms, I sequentially estimate the effect of my main interaction variable as well as its constituent components on each dependent variable using a dynamic error correction model (De Boef and Keele, 2008). This model estimates the short and long run impacts of an independent variable on each dependent variable. Specifically, this model estimates the impact of the first difference (short run) and lagged value (long run) of each independent variable on the first differenced transformation of the dependent variable. By taking this approach, one controls for the impact of country-specific and year-specific effects through taking the first difference. The advantage of this model is that it helps to appropriately specify the impacts of variables on equilibrium outcomes in addition to limiting the bias that may result from weakly endogenous regressors (De Boef and Keele, 2008).

First, the empirical implication of the Informational Mechanism suggests that as autocrats become more embedded in PTA networks, they should also become more transparent as well. To test this mechanism, I use data from Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland (2011), which measures how willing a government is to release policy-relevant economic information. Higher values suggest greater transparency. Broadly speaking, greater willingness to reveal such information suggests that governments should be better able to mitigate any uncertainty issues that may hinder cooperation. If this mechanism is at work, it should be the case that autocrats become increasingly transparent as they become more central in the PTA network. Thus, the coefficient on PTA centrality should be positive while the interaction term of democracy and PTA centrality should be negative for Model 1 of Table 2.

Second, the Liberal Ideology mechanism suggests that as autocrats become more central in the PTA network, they also become more liberal in their ideologies. I use data taken from Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2015), which measures how much a state buys into the concept of a liberal world order, to test the liberal ideology mechanism. More positive values suggest greater liberal foreign policy preferences. If greater acceptance of a liberal world order implies that such states should also be less likely to use military force to settle disputes, then it might be the case that autocrats that are highly embedded in the PTA network become more likely to accept the concept of a liberal world order. This mechanism implies that the coefficient on PTA centrality should be positive the interaction term of democracy and PTA centrality should be negative for Model 2 of Table 2.

Third and finally, the Capitalist Peace mechanism suggests that autocrats that are more central in the PTA network should also be more economically liberalized. While this mechanism would suggest that one look at trade openness as a measure of economic liberalization, this variable is likely endogenous with PTA centrality as well as its interaction. Thus, I look to a slightly more indirect measure of liberalization–financial liberalization–because it is potentially less likely that endogeneity would be a problem. I use data taken from Chinn and Ito (2008), which measures how restricted a country's international financial policies are, to test this mechanism. Moreover, Gartzke (2007) uses the number of financial restrictions as identified by the IMF, which is actually a component of the Chinn-Ito index. For this variable, greater values are associated with more financial liberalization. As a result, the coefficient on PTA centrality should be positive and the interaction term should be negative for Model 3 of Table 2.

Table 2 provides evidence that my hypothesis is driven by the informational pathway rather than the liberal preferences or market liberalization channels. Model 1 of Table 2 shows that PTA centrality is associated with enhanced transparency for autocrats in the long-run and that this effect diminishes for democracies as predicted by the Informational Mechanism. For the Liberal Ideology mechanism, Model 2 of Table 2 shows that PTA centrality seems to actually be negatively associated with liberal ideology. For democracies, however, greater PTA centrality

Table 2: Potential Causal Mechanisms

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Model 1: DV=HRV Transparency Index	Model 2: DV=Ideal Point	Model 3: DV=Chinn-Ito Capital Account Index
HRV Index (Lagged)	-0.0569***	-0.00318	0.0120
	(0.00740)	(0.0164)	(0.0383)
HRV Index (FD)		0.0724	0.0730
		(0.0702)	(0.0746)
Ideal Point (FD)	0.00993		0.0862
	(0.00942)		(0.0458)
Ideal Point (Lagged)	0.00351*	-0.0330***	0.00366
	(0.00146)	(0.00411)	(0.0124)
Chinn-Ito index (Lagged)			-0.0433***
			(0.00605)
PTA Centrality (FD)	0.0105	-0.00609	0.121
	(0.0269)	(0.104)	(0.207)
PTA Centrality (Lagged)	0.102*	-0.315**	-0.420
	(0.0401)	(0.0963)	(0.250)
Democracy (FD)	-0.000782	0.0110	-0.182
	(0.00824)	(0.0371)	(0.108)
Democracy (Lagged)	0.00552	0.0124	0.00501
	(0.00298)	(0.00914)	(0.0243)
PTA Centrality*Democracy (FD)	-0.122	0.418**	0.885*
	(0.0640)	(0.146)	(0.366)
PTA Centrality*Democracy (Lagged)	-0.132**	0.377***	0.716**
	(0.0395)	(0.0984)	(0.264)
Oil Exporter (FD)	0.000701	-0.0152	0.0339
	(0.00396)	(0.0208)	(0.0570)
Oil Exporter (Lagged)	0.00261	-0.0295***	0.0141
	(0.00346)	(0.00679)	(0.0204)
Economic IOs (FD)	0.00288***	0.00508	0.0134*
	(0.000792)	(0.00264)	(0.00584)
Economic IOs (Lagged)	-0.000102	0.000161	0.00130
	(0.000103)	(0.000335)	(0.000769)
Observations	3682	3682	2823

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Models estimated using a dynamic error correction model. Standard errors adjust for hetereoskedasticity and are clustered by country.

Alliance Similarity with the US, Civil War, Real GDP, and the Constant term have been suppressed for ease of presentation.

has a slight positive effect on liberal ideology. Finally, Model 3 of Table 2 does not seem to provide evidence in favor of the Capitalist Peace mechanism. PTA centrality does not seem to be associated with greater levels of financial openness for autocrats while centrality is associated more financial openness for democracies. Thus, the evidence presented here seems to suggest that my hypothesis works through the informational channel rather than the ideological or liberalization channels.

If the Information Revelation mechanism really is at work, then the observable implication should be that more transparent states should be less likely to initiate MIDs. Is this really the case? To test this implication of my hypothesized mechanism, I re-estimate my statistical model of conflict initiation from Table 1 and replace PTA centrality and its interaction with regime type with Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland (2011)'s transparency index because transparency is post-treatment to PTA centrality. Additionally, if it is the case that the transparency index also correlates with the transparency of domestic political debate, then the index should actually be correlated with increased MID initiation because of the reputational incentives put forth by Debs and Weiss (2014). Furthermore, my analysis controls for the primary determinant of transparency–democracy–reducing concerns of selection bias. Table 3 presents my results.

Results from Table 3 validate the second implication of my theory. Across all models, the coefficient on the transparency index is negative and statistically significant at least the $p<0.01$ level. Moreover, these results are substantively significant. Using the results of Model 4 of Table 3, the effect of moving from one standard deviation below the mean transparency level to one standard deviation above is nearly twice the magnitude of democracy and on par with the effect of oil exporter status. This suggests that in spite of the potentially perverse effects that transparency might have on conflict initiation, the benefits of greater certainty over capabilities outweighs any reputational effect.

Table 3: The Relationship between Transparency and MID Initiation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Model 1: Baseline	Model 2: Kantian Tripod	Model 3: Network	Model 4: Full Specification
HRV Transparency Index (Side A)	-0.504**	-0.988***	-0.706***	-0.875***
	(0.190)	(0.188)	(0.193)	(0.201)
Democracy (Side A)	-0.402**	-0.529***	-0.273*	-0.270*
	(0.126)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)
Democracy (Side B)	-0.100	-0.239	-0.0525	-0.124
	(0.126)	(0.133)	(0.124)	(0.134)
Number of Shared IGO Memberships		0.0438***		0.0257***
		(0.00496)		(0.00603)
Dyadic Trade Dependency (Lower)		-63.94***		-47.33**
		(15.96)		(15.99)
Network Convergence over 5 Years			-1.852***	-2.026***
			(0.404)	(0.425)
Overlapping PTA Membership			0.397***	0.172
			(0.118)	(0.114)
Same Hierarchical PTA Cluster			-0.0931	
			(0.105)	
PTA Cluster Size (Side A)			0.00426*	
			(0.00167)	
Oil Exporter (Side A)				0.504***
				(0.111)
Geographic Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Economic Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Military Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	539472	536652	452415	452415

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Models estimated using logit with heteroskedastic robust standard errors and errors clustered by directed dyad.

Geographic, military, and economic controls as well as the constant are suppressed for ease of presentation.

Conclusion

How does a state's embeddedness in liberal international institutions shape the likelihood that it uses military force to settle disputes? In this paper, I provide evidence that the probability of MID initiation reduces as a state becomes more embedded in liberal international institutions such as PTAs. This effect depends, however, on a country's domestic political institutions. While embeddedness in international institutions helps autocracies to peacefully resolve disputes, the effect of centrality within the PTA network decreases as states become more democratic.

Further analysis of the causal mechanisms at work provide evidence that the beneficial effects of PTAs on MID initiation is likely to be a product of the Information Revelation channel. I show that PTA centrality is associated with enhanced transparency, the magnitude of the effect decreases with higher levels of democracy, and higher levels of transparency are associated with lower MID initiation probabilities. I do not find evidence that alternate channels such as Liberal Ideology and Capitalist Peace mechanisms explain my results.

My results speak to the broader debate about the sources of the "democratic advantage" in international cooperation. Many scholars argue that democracies are better able to cooperate because of certain domestic institutional advantages that help them to reveal information. Though this point is debated, my results suggest that autocrats need not have audience cost or electoral mechanisms to engender cooperative outcomes. International institutions can help fill in such gaps as well. In addition to investigating the role that certain domestic factors play in helping or hindering international cooperation, my results suggest that scholars should also look to how international factors can substitute for domestic institutions to engender peaceful dispute resolution.

Going back to this study's motivating example, my results also speak to policy makers that might be concerned about the rise of China, an autocracy, in world politics. For example, does China's rise in the international system entail a more dangerous environment for its neighbors? My results suggest that this may not be the case. As China becomes more central in the trade

agreement network by successfully concluding treaties such as the Asia-Pacific Agreement, the China-Korea-Japan Korea Free Trade Agreement, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, we may see that China is less likely to resort to force when settling its foreign policy disputes.

A Online Appendix

Table 4: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
MID Initiation	0.001	0.037	0	1	679931
PTA Centrality (Side A)	0.054	0.089	0	0.594	666927
Democracy (Side A)	0.383	0.486	0	1	626305
PTA Centrality*Democracy (Side A)	0.034	0.093	0	0.594	626305
Democracy (Side B)	0.377	0.485	0	1	561804
Number of Shared IGO Memberships	20.744	10.229	0	100	629076
Dyadic Trade Dependency (Lower)	0	0.003	0	0.299	646372
Network convergence over 5 years5	-0.002	0.11	-0.561	0.77	522166
Overlapping PTA Membership	0.195	0.396	0	1	666927
Oil Exporter (Side A)	0.151	0.358	0	1	652287
Contiguous	0.025	0.157	0	1	679931
Log(Distance b/w Capitals)	8.108	1.38	0	9.420	679931
Real GDP (Side A)	0.019	0.58	-0.156	8.256	663429
Real GDP (Side B)	-0.001	0.544	-0.156	8.256	663429
S-Score Alliance (Weighted)	0.694	0.264	-0.421	1	679931
Side A's Proportion of Dyadic Capabilities	0.552	0.353	0	1	679931
Major Power/Major Power Dyad	0.001	0.031	0	1	679931
Minor Power/Major Power Dyad	0.031	0.175	0	1	679931
Major Power/Minor Power Dyad	0.034	0.182	0	1	679931

Table 5: Bootstrapped Directed-Dyad Analysis of MID Initiation, 1965-1999

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Model 1: Baseline	Model 2: Kantian Tripod	Model 3: Network	Model 4: Full Specification
PTA Centrality (Side A)	-3.542**	-8.154***	-5.473**	-7.533***
	(1.363)	(1.437)	(1.919)	(1.693)
Democracy (Side A)	-0.557***	-0.818***	-0.538***	-0.583***
	(0.100)	(0.110)	(0.120)	(0.124)
PTA Centrality*Democracy (Side A)	3.581*	7.313***	5.294**	7.040***
	(1.473)	(1.526)	(1.814)	(1.763)
Democracy (Side B)	-0.129	-0.323***	-0.0948	-0.192
	(0.0886)	(0.0956)	(0.0975)	(0.101)
Number of Shared IGO Memberships		0.0449***		0.0258***
		(0.00398)		(0.00479)
Dyadic Trade Dependency (Lower)		-57.86***		-45.20**
		(14.80)		(14.67)
Network convergence over 5 years			-1.873***	-2.042***
			(0.361)	(0.411)
Overlapping PTA Membership			0.434***	0.316**
			(0.112)	(0.114)
Same Hierarchical PTA Cluster			-0.0907	
			(0.0941)	
PTA Cluster Size (Side A)			0.00220	
			(0.00201)	
Oil Exporter (Side A)				0.511***
				(0.0973)
Geographic Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Economic Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Military Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	539472	536652	452415	452415

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Models estimated using bootstrapped logit with heteroskedastic robust standard errors and errors clustered by directed dyad. The bootstrap resampling uses 500 replications. Results do not substantively vary with changes in the number of replications.

Geographic, military, and economic controls as well as the constant are suppressed for ease of presentation.

Table 6: Robustness Checks 1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Model 1: Rare Events Logit	Model 2: Polity Scores	Model 3: Only Politically Relevant	Model 4: Only Minor Power Challengers	Model 5: Region Fixed Effects
PTA Centrality (Side A)	-7.485***	-3.857***	-8.170***	-9.098***	-8.831***
	(1.696)	(1.096)	(1.920)	(1.770)	(2.064)
Democracy (Side A)	-0.582***		-0.430**	-0.654***	-0.503***
	(0.142)		(0.134)	(0.151)	(0.150)
PTA Centrality*Democracy (Side A)	7.044***		7.207***	7.657***	9.200***
	(1.779)		(2.035)	(2.018)	(2.149)
Democracy (Side B)	-0.190	-0.170	-0.0453	0.00984	-0.173
	(0.127)	(0.124)	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.124)
Number of Shared IGO Memberships	0.0257***	0.0228***	0.0143**	0.0264***	0.0242***
	(0.00579)	(0.00615)	(0.00519)	(0.00600)	(0.00578)
Dyadic Trade Dependency (Lower)	-44.58**	-44.50**	-19.46	-41.66*	-42.86**
	(15.26)	(15.19)	(10.11)	(18.91)	(16.32)
Network convergence over 5 years	-2.036***	-1.965***	-1.963***	-1.858***	-1.714***
	(0.431)	(0.424)	(0.449)	(0.469)	(0.447)
Overlapping PTA Membership	0.315**	0.302**	0.0831	0.176	0.382**
	(0.118)	(0.116)	(0.110)	(0.123)	(0.119)
Oil Exporter (Side A)	0.511***	0.547***	0.352**	0.422***	0.204
	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.116)
Polity Score (Side A)		-0.0240**			
		(0.00851)			
PTA Centrality*Polity Score (Side A)		0.319**			
		(0.106)			
Middle East					1.245***
					(0.196)
Africa					0.808***
					(0.211)
Asia & Oceania					0.235
					(0.228)
Americas					0.699***
					(0.197)
Geographic Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Economic Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Military Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Observations	452415	468009	48910	435382	452415

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Models estimated using logit with heteroskedastic robust standard errors and errors clustered by directed dyad.

Geographic, economic, and military controls as well as the constant have been suppressed for ease of presentation.

Table 7: Robustness Checks 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Model 1: Political Engagement	Model 2: Revolutionary Leaders	Model 3: Cold War and System Size	Model 4: Dropped Allied Dyads	Model 5: Drop Warsaw Pact
PTA Centrality (Side A)	-7.457***	-8.640***	-5.337**	-8.782***	-7.532***
	(1.784)	(1.728)	(1.676)	(2.029)	(1.698)
Democracy (Side A)	-0.575***	-0.325*	-0.485***	-0.787***	-0.587***
	(0.159)	(0.151)	(0.137)	(0.177)	(0.142)
PTA Centrality*Democracy (Side A)	6.988***	8.269***	5.488**	9.493***	7.059***
	(1.825)	(1.798)	(1.791)	(2.087)	(1.768)
Democracy (Side B)	-0.192	-0.182	-0.118	-0.299*	-0.195
	(0.127)	(0.137)	(0.125)	(0.152)	(0.127)
Number of Shared IGO Memberships	0.0262***	0.0260***	0.0234***	0.0272***	0.0255***
	(0.00600)	(0.00626)	(0.00588)	(0.00772)	(0.00579)
Number of Political IGOs	-0.00197				
	(0.0158)				
Dyadic Trade Dependency (Lower)	-45.35**	-45.02**	-50.69***	-14.46	-44.60**
	(15.36)	(15.45)	(15.31)	(12.18)	(15.19)
Network convergence over 5 years	-2.042***	-1.986***	-2.097***	-2.589***	-2.047***
	(0.431)	(0.429)	(0.457)	(0.421)	(0.433)
Overlapping PTA Membership	0.315**	0.289*	0.256*	0.282	0.326**
	(0.119)	(0.125)	(0.117)	(0.155)	(0.118)
Oil Exporter (Side A)	0.515***	0.0243	0.542***	0.643***	0.513***
	(0.106)	(0.253)	(0.109)	(0.128)	(0.108)
RevolutionaryLeader		0.860***			
		(0.115)			
Oil Exporter (Side A)		0.413			
		(0.253)			
Post-Cold War			-0.160		
			(0.115)		
Natural log of system size			-2.663***		
			(0.441)		
Democratizing (Lagged)					0.0534
					(0.252)
Geographic Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Economic Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Military Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	452415	452415	452415	419000	451929

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Models estimated using logit with heteroskedastic robust standard errors and errors clustered by directed dyad.

Geographic, military, and economic controls as well as the constant are suppressed for ease of presentation.

Table 8: Robustness Checks 3

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Model 1: Time Fixed Effects	Model 2: Lagged DV	Model 3: Only Technical/Geographic Controls	Model 4: Only Technical Controls
PTA Centrality (Side A)	-8.467***	-7.511***	-6.633***	-3.998*
	(2.261)	(1.698)	(1.452)	(1.641)
Democracy (Side A)	-0.500**	-0.582***	-0.365**	-0.555***
	(0.174)	(0.142)	(0.129)	(0.152)
PTA Centrality*Democracy (Side A)	7.209**	7.018***	6.715***	4.098*
	(2.340)	(1.779)	(1.635)	(1.815)
Democracy (Side B)	-0.0317	-0.191		
	(0.164)	(0.127)		
Number of Shared IGO Memberships	0.0138	0.0259***		
	(0.00715)	(0.00574)		
Dyadic Trade Dependency (Lower)	-59.20**	-45.26**		
	(20.15)	(15.25)		
Network convergence over 5 years	-1.178*	-2.040***		
	(0.547)	(0.431)		
Overlapping PTA Membership	0.288	0.315**		
	(0.155)	(0.118)		
Oil Exporter (Side A)	0.766***	0.512***		
	(0.143)	(0.109)		
Geographic Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Economic Controls	YES	YES	NO	NO
Military Controls	YES	YES	NO	NO
Lagged DV		0.0507		
		(0.178)		
Observations	452415	452415	626305	626305

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Models estimated using logit with heteroskedastic robust standard errors and errors clustered by directed dyad.

Geographic, military, and economic controls as well as the constant are suppressed for ease of presentation.

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