A Change is Gonna' Come

The Persistent Effect of the US Civil Rights Movement on Political Attitudes

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Abstract

Social movements can engender significant societal change. Often times, change takes the form of formal institutions or the development of competing political parties. Can historical social movements also continue to shape a nation's contemporary politics outside of these more formalized channels? I argue that social movements can not only beget institutional change, but also long-run, attitudinal change. Using the case of the US Civil Rights Movement, I develop a new theory in which protests can shift political attitudes and that these attitudes persist through a cultural transmission mechanism. Evidence from county and individual-level data indicates support for the theory. Counties that experienced Civil Rights protests between 1960 to 1965 are associated with an approximately 6% increase in Democratic Party vote shares today. Using an instrumental variables strategy, I provide evidence that the empirical relationship between protests and contemporary vote shares is causal. Moreover, whites from counties that experienced Civil Rights protests are more likely to identify as Democrats, more likely to support affirmative action, and less likely to indicate racial resentment toward blacks in America. My argument and results highlight how social movements can have persistent impacts on a nation's contemporary politics.

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1 Introduction

Social movements are generally associated with periods of massive political and economic change. These movements may engender democratization such as the case with the Solidarity movement in Poland, enfranchise racial minorities as seen with the Anti-Apartheid movement in South Africa, or hasten decolonization as with the Quit India movement in colonial India. Often times, these periods of massive social upheaval tend to be followed by formal institutional change allowing these movements to lock in their demands past the immediate life of the movement.

Can social movements continue to shape national politics outside of formal institutional mechanisms? I argue that social movements can engender long-term political change through an attitudinal mechanism as well. My argument rests on two main theoretical foundations. First, instances of collective action by the protest movement can generate ideational change amongst the target public. Second, historical ideational change persists long after a social movement's life through a system of intergenerational transmission of beliefs. Together, these theoretical premises suggest that we should expect to see social movements to shift ideology in the long-run.

To illustrate my argument, I focus on the case of the American Civil Rights movement. This case provides us with theoretical and empirical leverage for several reasons. First, the US Civil Rights movement was a watershed moment in United States history making it of particular relevance for studying the long-term ramifications of historical social movements. Second, the US Civil Rights movement was not only focused on institutional change and the end of Black disenfranchisement, but also concerned with fundamentally reshaping American values. Third, the Civil Rights movement no longer exists in any organized form such as a political party making this potentially a hard case to find persistent attitudinal effects.[1]

Using cross-sectional, historical data on US Civil Rights protests during 1960-1965, I find that counties with Civil Rights protest activity tend to be more liberal today as proxied by contemporary Democratic Party vote shares. These aggregate results are robust to the inclusion of a number of potential historical confounders, dependent variable specification, state fixed effects, and non-parametric estimation. Moreover, I show that counties with Civil Rights protest activity did not have differential voting trends prior to 1960 alleviating concerns of omitted variables bias. To assess the sensitivity of my results to selection on unobservables,

[1]One exception to this is that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) does still exist. Ming Francis (2014) shows, however, that the NAACP has focused on undermining white supremacy through litigation rather than waging a public opinion campaign.

I conduct a sensitivity test developed by Blackwell (2014) and find that such a selection process would have to be about 5 to 6 times more powerful than protest activity as well as other major observable confounders such as urbanization, percent black, and income levels. Given the historical literature on the Civil Rights Movement, it is unlikely that the most plausible selection story–that protestors targeted liberal counties–would explain away the entirety of my findings (McAdam, 1999; Arsenault, 2006; Mickey, 2015). To verify that the results are causal, I utilize an instrumental variables identification strategy as well. Leveraging historical variation in the geographic distribution of World War II manufacturing spending as an "encouragement" for Civil Rights protests, I find that the relationship between historical Civil Rights protests and contemporary voting behavior is causal (Wright, 2013).

Moving to the analysis of the causal mechanisms, I find evidence in support of attitudinal change resultant from Civil Rights protests. Whites today tend indicate more support for affirmative action and display less racial resentment against Blacks in counties that experienced civil rights protest activity in the 1960s than counties that did not experience protest activity during that time period. While there is some evidence that protests led whites to migrate away from protest-affected counties, this channel is insufficient to explain the entirety of the effects that I find. Together, my analyses provide evidence that social movements can induce long-term political change.

My argument and results speak to several literatures in political science and economics. For those interested in American politics, my argument and evidence complements recent work by Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (2015, 2016) on the legacy of slavery in America. They find that the institution of slavery continues to have an effect on contemporary American politics through a cultural channel. Similarly, I show that demonstrations of collective action can also create persistent cultural change. The important caveat that I find is that the attitudes propped up by the Jim Crow racial order as Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (2016) find can be reshaped through instances of non-violent mobilization by African Americans. Broadly speaking, this paper speaks to those interested in the politics of race in America (Key, 1984; King and Smith, 2005; Skowronek, 2006; King and Smith, 2008; Tesler, 2013; King and Smith, 2014). My results imply that mass political movements can have a persistent impact on racial politics.

My results also speak to the literature in political economy on the persistent effects of historical shocks on contemporary economics and politics (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Nunn, 2008; Dell, 2010; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Michalopoulos and Pappaioannou, 2011; Voigtlander and Voth, 2012; Ashraf and Galor, 2013; Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn,

2013; Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2014). While many of these studies focus on the ways in which institutional shocks can generate cultural change, I demonstrate how non-institutional shocks–namely, mass social movements–can also shift attitudes (Jha, 2013). This suggests that studying other social movements outside of the American context and other non-institutional sources of political change such as demographic shocks can help elucidate the ways in which the past links to the present (Erikson and Stoker, 2011; Woodberry, 2012).

The remaining portion of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of US Civil Rights Movement. Next, Section 3 outlines a new theory of how social movements can engender persistent attitudinal change. Section 4 details and discusses the results of both a selection on observables and instrumental variables design identification strategy. Following that, Section 5 uses individual-level survey data to demonstrate further support for the mechanisms behind the theory. Finally, Section 6 discusses the implications of this study for American political development, social movements, and economic history.

2 A Brief History of the US Civil Rights Movement

The Civil Rights Movement was a watershed moment in United States history. Over the course of a decade, millions of predominantly African American citizens fought against racial discrimination and virtual disenfranchisement from the American political system. While African Americans were guaranteed the right to vote and hold office following the American Civil War, in practice the de facto system referred to as Jim Crow made it quite difficult for African Americans to participate in US politics especially in the US South. The Jim Crow laws enforced white supremacy in the US South by racially segregating public spaces, levying hurdles to voting through poll taxes and literacy tests, as well as violent intimidation among many other things.

Following World War II, African Americans increasingly demanded equal treatment under the law. Initial efforts mainly focused on launching legal attacks against the Jim Crow system. One of the main groups leading this legal strategy was the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). After a protracted legal battle against the system of racially segregated public schools, the NAACP eventually helped overturn racial segregation of public schools in the landmark Supreme Court case Brown v Board of Education of Topeka (1954).

While African Americans initially used the legal system to enhance their rights, organizers switched over to a prodigious campaign of systematic non-violent civil resistance (McAdam,

1999). Between 1954 and 1968, African Americans, in tandem with other minorities and whites, participated in hundreds of instances of collective action against the system of de jure discrimination that existed primarily in the South. After several high-profile protest events including the Montgomery Bus Boycott, Greensboro Sit-ins, Freedom Rides, and the March on Washington, the US Congress eventually passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, which banned discrimination on the basis of race in employment practices, voter registration, and housing respectively.

Despite having been politically and economically oppressed for much of the history of the United States, the Civil Rights Movement seems to have transformed the landscape racial relations for African Americans in the United States in just a matter of a few decades. While these transformations did take the form of formal institutional changes as mentioned before, one might also suspect that this movement could have also changed American political culture. In the following section, I outline two, plausible ways through which social movements such as the US Civil Rights Movement can change political attitudes in the long-run. After that, I test the reduced-form impact of both theories on political outcomes today in addition to more narrowly testing the empirical implications of each described mechanism.

3 Theory

How can protests that happened over half a century ago continue to shape political attitudes today? In this section, I highlight two mechanisms through which we might expect historical protest activity to shape present-day political attitudes. The first mechanism suggests that protests directly change political attitudes for the cohort that came of age during the Civil Rights Movement. Following models of cultural transmission of beliefs, older generations pass on their values to their children thus allowing for attitudinal persistence. The second mechanism suggests that protests in a given county caused conservative whites to move away from that county while liberal whites stayed in or moved to these areas. This ideological sorting continues to persist to today resulting in protest areas being more liberal today.

3.1 Civil Resistance and Long-Run Attitudinal Change

For the intergenerational transmission mechanism to work, protests should have changed attitudes for the initial cohort that witnessed the Civil Rights Movement in person. Particularly, being spatially proximate to these protests should move individuals within the cohort

that experienced these protests further to the left particularly on racial issues. Wasow (2015) finds evidence that areas with more nonviolent civil rights protest activity were associated with higher democratic party vote shares during the 1960s and 1970s. These more liberal beliefs, then, persist until today through a process of intergenerational transmission of political attitudes where the initial cohort invests in instilling these values in their children (Boyd and Richerson, 2005).

Specifically, this argument follows in two steps. First, protests and specifically the Civil Rights Movement, should actually induce attitudinal change amongst the target population. In a study most closely related to this one, Wasow (2015) finds that peaceful Civil Rights protests seemed to have increased Democratic Party vote shares while violent ones led to reductions in Democratic Party vote shares in the 1964, 1968, and 1972 US Presidential elections. Moreover, Gillion (2012) finds that minority-led protests such as the ones that occurred during the Civil Rights Movement also changed Congressional voting behavior toward the preferences of the protestors. More generally speaking, scholars have found that major protest movements are generally successful in moving individual's closer to the protest group's preferences as seen with the cases the Tea Party Movement and Latino immigration protests in the United States (Madestam et al., 2013; Wallace, Zepeda-Millan, and Jones-Correa, 2014; Branton et al., 2015).

Protests, especially peaceful ones, can shift political preferences of the target population through a number of psychological, sociological, and informational mechanisms. Building on psychological and sociological theories of political identity provided by Olzak, Shanahan, and West (1994), Lee (2002), and Enos (2014), Wasow (2015) argues how demonstrations of peaceful action can engender empathy from the in-group toward the out-group by invoking national identities that transcend racial ones. The literature on political psychology and persuasion also demonstrates that even the types of treatments that do not amount to a massive social movement such as the Civil Rights movement can durably shift political attitudes. Broockman and Kalla (2016) find that even a short conversation related to discrimination against transgender persons can make individuals more sympathetic toward transgender rights and that these effects persist for a significant amount of time. Similarly, Paluck and Green (2009) and Arias (2016) find that media programs aimed at shifting attitudes toward government and gender were successful in doing so. Given that the Civil Rights Movement waged a massive effort at shifting the minds of Americans, we should expect that some of these psychological mechanisms should be operating perhaps even more acutely as protestors quite explicitly invoke symbols and cues that provide a more vivid understanding about the state of the world (Pe-

tersen and Aarœ, 2013). On the informational end, Chenoweth and Stephan (2012) argue and show how nonviolent civil resistance provide evidence to the target public about the group's true intentions. By engaging in peaceful resistance such as sit-ins, protest rallies, boycotts, and civil disobedience, protestors provide information about their willingness to bargain as well as the sincerity of their demands (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2008). As a result, the target public updates their beliefs about the protesting group leading to attitude change. Thus, protests have several different channels through which they can influence political preferences and public opinion.

The second step of my argument relies on a system of intergenerational transmission of cultural beliefs. Boyd and Richerson (2005) and Tabellini (2008) provide models of cultural evolution that demonstrate how parents have incentives to inculcate their children with cultures and attitudes similar to the parents'. Particularly, the literature on political economy and cultural economics provides significant cross-national, empirical evidence as to the way in which historical shocks–institutional and technological–can generate cultures and beliefs that persist into contemporary times. For example, Voigtlander and Voth (2012) show how exogenous variation in pogroms against Jews during the Black Death led to persistent anti-semitism in pogrom affected areas in Germany. Moreover, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (Forthcoming) find that areas that were free cities during the Medieval Ages now tend to have higher levels of civic capital. In the case of Africa, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) find that ethnic groups that experienced greater levels of historical slave exports are now less trusting of each other. Moving to the case of South Asia, Jha (2013) provides evidence as to how Medieval trading ports in South Asia creating cultures of cooperation between Hindus and Muslims that persist until today. Finally, Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) show how the adoption of the plough led to divergent gender norms across societies.[2]

Recently, scholars have shown how various cultures and attitudes persist in the American case as well. Several scholars have found evidence demonstrating the persistence of a "Culture of Honor" in the US South, which was driven by immigration of Scots-Irish into the US South (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996; Grosjean, 2014; Dafoe and Caughey, Forthcoming). Recently, Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (2015, 2016) argue and provide evidence on how the historical legacy of slavery continues to shape White attitudes toward African Americans and a culture of disenfranchisement for African Americans. Several studies also point out how US military service also generate persistence of political attitudes and beliefs. Specifically, Erik-

[2] Ross (2008), in a similar vein, provides evidence how the development of oil as an industry shaped gender norms in the Middle East.

son and Stoker (2011) show how individuals whose draft lottery numbers were low enough to prevent them from serving in the Vietnam War became more liberal and anti-war than their counterparts who served and that these beliefs persisted well after the end of the war. Moreover, Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015) show how a culture of military service can be intergenerationally transmitted using data from military service in major 20th century US theaters.

The upshot of these two building blocks to my argument suggests that there is a plausible path for Civil Rights protests to lead to persistently different political attitudes. In short, areas that experienced Civil Rights protests in the early 1960s where the vast majority of protests were peaceful in nature shifted political attitudes to become more liberal on racial issues. These attitudes not only persisted amongst the initial target generation, but were also passed down to subsequent generations. Thus, we should be able to detect the political effects of the Civil Rights Movement even until today.

A few brief anecdotes on the legacy of the Civil Rights movement in the US South–where racism was particularly overt through the Jim Crow system–provide some suggestive evidence that individuals might have actually changed their attitudes toward African Americans. Writing about the ways in which the Civil Rights movement impacted ordinary farmers in the South, historian Jason Sokol recounts the experience of one such individual:

> When the civil rights movement tore through the southern landscape in the 1950s and 1960s, it challenged the attitudes of millions, undermined their customs, and upended their ways of life. It even penetrated the minds of old farmers like Wilson. "I began to get a lot older before I began to realize." He attributed fundamental changes in his racial beliefs to the civil rights movement. "Honest to God when I was a kid, I believed that junk," Wilson recalled in 1974. "I changed ... an awful lot of my attitude ... toward matters of race." Wilson did not count his experience as unique; he glimpsed similar changes in many of his neighbors. "These ... farmers around here...and their wives, not all of them but by and large, they have come a long damn way." (Sokol, 2007, pg. 3)

These types of changes were also present among some of those who were actively complicit in the Jim Crow racial order. Gavin Wright recounts the experience of Joe Smitherman, mayor of the infamous Selma, Alabama: "My hands are as dirty as the others. I ordered the arrest of Dr. King. We were wrong. I did it. I'm sorry." (Wright, 2013, pg. ?) While these statements are only from two individuals who lived through the Civil Rights movement, they demonstrate

that the Civil Rights movement seemed to at least have opened their eyes toward the plight of African Americans in the United States. Of course these stories are only anecdotes and do not allow us to assess whether these changes are truly indicative of a wider shift in attitudes in areas affected by the Civil Rights movement. To determine whether these types of changes in beliefs might have been part of a more systematic process of attitude change, I rely on the econometric analysis provided in Section 4.

3.2 Racial Threat and Political Polarization

The major alternative mechanism that would explain the persistence of the US Civil Rights Movement on contemporary American politics suggests a much more bleak story. This alternative mechanism suggests that the Civil Rights Movement lead to racial sorting via white out-migration–a story consistent with the racial threat literature in American politics (Key, 1984; Enos, 2010; Hopkins, 2010; Komisarchik, 2015; Enos, 2016). For the migration mechanism to work, protests should have induced attitudinal sorting. Since not all whites developed favorable attitudes towards African Americans during the Civil Rights Movement, it could be the case that the more steadfastly conservative whites migrated out of counties with Civil Rights protest activity. While there are no direct studies of the impact of the Civil Rights movement on white migration, Nall (2015) shows how the development of the interstate highway system during the 1950s and 1960s–the same time period as the bulk of the Civil Rights Movement–induced more affluent and conservative whites to move to the suburbs leading to both racial and partisan segregation. This suggests that it is at least plausible that the development of this highways system reduced the costs of moving away from protest areas. Finally, these residential patterns must also persist until today.

The first step of this argument suggests that Civil Rights protests should have led to a specific kind of racial segregation that was partisan in nature. While several scholars present evidence that the protests had a net positive impact on political attitudes in the short-run, Whites, especially in the South, had a complicated relationship with the Civil Rights Movement (Sokol, 2007). Indeed, sit-ins, demonstrations, and general civil disobedience on behalf of the African American population provoked often violent backlash from Southern Whites (McAdam, 1999; Mickey, 2015). Given White opposition to the dismantling of the white supremacist Jim Crow institutions, these protests could have led to the migration of conservative Whites away from these protest affected areas to areas such as the suburbs–provided that the costs of moving were not prohibitively high.

Next, these conservative Whites who moved away must have stayed in these new locations until today. Given the development of the interstate highway system and the broader phenomenon that scholars point to as "White Flight", it is certainly plausible that the Whites who did move away from protest affected areas continue to live in the city suburbs (Seligman, 2005; Nall, 2015). It is unclear whether the phenomenon of "White Flight" can explain the results that I find since much of it happened well before the time period that I analyze (Nall, 2015). Moreover, Mummolo and Nall (Forthcoming) show that partisan motivations for geographic sorting do little to explain the reasons why individuals decide to move suggesting that these sorting effects should be small relative to the attitudinal change effects. The results that I present in Section 5 demonstrate that this is indeed the case. The effects of protests on racial sorting at the county-level are small and are insufficient to explain why Civil Rights protests continue to shape American politics today.

These mechanisms lead me to the following hypotheses:

H1: Counties that experienced historical Civil Rights protest activity should be more liberal today relative to non-protest counties.

H2a: Individuals residing in counties that experienced historical Civil Rights protest activity should be more liberal on racial issues today relative to non-protest counties.

H2b: Counties that experienced historical Civil Rights protest activity should have had greater rates of white out-migration relative to non-protest counties.

4 Research Design

4.1 Data Sources and Variables

4.1.1 Democratic Party Vote Shares

To test my argument, I rely on several data sources. For the county-level analysis of contemporary Democratic Party (left-party) vote shares, I rely on data taken from David Leip's Atlas of US Presidential Elections. The data aggregate presidential election vote shares for each major presidential candidate in the United States. Moreover, the sample reports data at the county level across all 50 states. In this paper, I utilize data from the 2008 and 2004 elections.

For the main empirical analysis, I create a measure of Democratic Party presidential vote

shares at the county level by taking the number of votes for Barack Obama in 2008 divided by the total number of votes cast in each county in the 2008 election. I take this measure as a proxy for contemporary liberalism. To check that my results are not an artifact of the 2008 Presidential Election data, I also re-run my analyses on the county level Democratic Party vote shares in 2004.[3]

4.1.2 Civil Rights Protests

The logic of my argument suggests that demonstrations of collective-action in the form of civil rights protests, could have long-term political consequences. For the purposes of this paper, I use data from the Dynamics of Collective Action dataset, which records demonstrations of collective action from 1960-1965 using newspaper articles from the *New York Times*.[4] From this data, I extract all civil rights protest events from the years 1960-1965. I stop the data collection on civil rights protests in 1965 with the passage of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 1965 so that my results do not pick up any institutional changes brought about by the VRA. Finally, I map the city of each protest onto that city's respective county so as to generate county-level aggregates.[5]

I primarily operationalize my main independent variable–civil rights protests–as a binary indicator variable for whether a given county received a protest "treatment" to facilitate ease of interpretation. As a robustness check, I also re-run my main analyses using the number of protests in each county and the natural logarithm of the number of protests as well. On average, approximately 9% of all counties in the United States received a protest "treatment". Figure 1 shows the distribution of protests across counties from 1960 to 1965.

4.2 Empirical Strategy

4.3 Selection on Observables

To assess whether historical civil rights protest activity is associated with contemporary Democratic Party vote shares, I estimate a series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions that rely on a selection on observables assumption–that protests are "as-if" random conditional

[3] The results remain unchanged when re-running the analysis with the 2004 Presidential Election vote shares as the outcome variable.

[4] The data can be accessed at http://web.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/.

[5] `Python` script to replicate this procedure can be found on the author's `GitHub` page.

Figure 1: The Geographic Distribution of Civil Rights Protests, 1960-1965



on a set of pre-treatment covariates–to identify the causal effect of historical protests on contemporary voting behavior. This is, obviously, a particularly strong assumption to make since groups do not protests randomly. Importantly, I demonstrate with a sensitivity test that my results do not rely on this assumption and that the most plausible type of confounding is likely to lead this design to underestimate the effect of protests. While these estimates do not get at the specific mechanisms behind my theory, they do link Civil Rights protests to contemporary outcomes of particular political and substantive interest. Thus, I estimate a series of OLS equations of the following form:

$$Vote_i = \beta Protest_i + \gamma X_i + \delta S_i + \epsilon_i \tag{1}$$

Unpacking the notation, $Vote_i$ represents the Democratic vote share in county i in 2008. Importantly, β captures the effect of having a $Protest$ in county i on contemporary Democratic vote shares.[6] The coefficient γ on X_i captures the effect of historical pre-treatment control variables such as a county's percent urban population, percent black population, median household income, and Democratic Party vote share in 1960 among other socioeconomic and demographic covariates taken from the 1960 and 1962 United States Census (Haines, N.d.).[7] The term δS_i captures a vector of state-level fixed effects. These state-level fixed effects are important for identification since much of the Jim Crow system in the South was implemented at the state-level. Finally, the term ϵ_i represents a Gaussian error term with mean 0. For the OLS estimates, I use heteroskedastic robust standard errors.

For the main OLS results, the key identifying assumption is that conditional on the pre-treatment historical confounders and the inclusion of state fixed effects is that there no unobserved confounding. That is, the assignment of $Protest$ should be plausibly exogenous conditional on these confounders. Adjusting for the main confounders such as urbanization, percent black, and income should remove the main economic and demographic factors that simultaneously influence protests and contemporary vote behavior (Robertson, 2007; Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland, 2015). Moreover, adjusting for the baseline Democratic Party vote share in 1960 should remove some of the confounding that could occur from protestors targeting areas based on underlying political values.[8] To explore the plausibility of this assumption, I use a number of robustness checks such as including a more exhaustive set of historical con-

[6] In essence, this captures the mean extensive margin of civil rights protests on contemporary vote shares.

[7] The data can be found at ICPSR.

[8] While controlling for Democratic Party vote share in 1960 is imperfect in the sense that the Democratic Party in 1960 is different from the Democratic Party now, the sensitivity analyses suggest that targeting based on political characteristics of a county are unlikely to explain away the entire result.



Figure 2: Effect of historical Civil Rights protests on contemporary Democratic Party vote shares. From left to right, I include successive historical controls for state fixed effects, percent black, median income, Democratic Party vote share, and percent urbanization.

trol variables, and a sensitivity analysis as suggested by Blackwell (2014). Importantly, my results are quite insensitive to the inclusion of additional potential confounders as well as the sensitivity analysis to the selection on observables assumption.

Across all specifications in Figure 2, I find that historical civil rights protests are associated with an increase in present day Democratic Party vote shares. This result is both statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level and substantively significant. OLS estimates with the full set of covariates indicate that counties that experienced civil rights protest activity from 1960-1965 are associated with approximately a 6% increase in contemporary Democratic Party vote shares. In terms of the relative distribution of contemporary Democratic Party vote shares, the effect is equivalent to a one-half standard deviation increase in vote shares. These results indicate that there is suggestive evidence of a persistent impact of civil rights protests on contemporary liberalism in the United States.

Taking a closer look at the coefficient on $Protest$, we see that the simple bivariate relationship (conditional on state fixed effects) suggests an 11 percentage point increase in contemporary Democratic Party vote shares. Once adding in controls for the share of the African American and urban population, the coefficient on $Protest$ stabilizes to around a 6 percentage point increase in contemporary Democratic Party vote shares across columns 3-5 in Figure 2. As a validity check, the historical control variables tend to perform in the expected direction. Areas with a higher black population historically, that are more urban, and that are more poor than their counterparts tend to vote more Democratic.[9]

In general, these estimates confirm Wasow (2015) who finds that nonviolent civil rights protests are associated with an increase in Democratic Party vote shares in the 1960s and 70s. Interestingly, my estimates seem to be about 5 times larger than Wasow (2015), which could be resultant of differences in data sources and empirical strategies. Nevertheless, my results corroborate the extant short-run evidence on the impact of the Civil Rights movement and add to the literature by demonstrating the long-run impacts of these protests. Despite having no formal, contemporary organization today, the US Civil Rights movement seems to have a persistent impact on American politics.

4.3.1 Robustness Checks

While I provide OLS evidence consistent with my main argument in the previous section, there are a number of empirical issues that might still remain. First, it might be the case that my main results are picking up something peculiar about the 2008 US Presidential Election. To guard against this possibility, I re-run the models presented in Table 6 replacing the outcome variable with Democratic Party vote shares in 2004 instead. Across all models presented in Table 7 in the Online Appendix, I find that my results are not driven by the particularities of the 2008 US Presidential Election.

Next, one might be concerned that the historical covariates included in the main OLS regressions are not an exhaustive list of potential observable confounders. As such, I run additional estimates that include controls for percent black squared, percent labor force in agriculture, unemployment rate, median age, median years of schooling for persons age $25+$, and percent occupied housing. I report the results with these extra set of controls in Column 1-6 of Table 8 in the Online Appendix. Importantly, the coefficient stays significant at the $p < 0.01$ level with the magnitude remaining stable at approximately 6%. Even when conditioning

[9] Results in tabular form can be found in Table 6 in the Online Appendix.

on these extra historical confounders, my results remain stable and significant indicating that the effect of protests seems to be robust to selection on observables.[10]

One of the key identifying assumptions in the main OLS estimates is that–conditional on pre-treatment historical covariates and state fixed effects–the assignment of $Protest$ should be exogenous to the outcome variable. An implication of this assumption is that we should not be able to detect any significant, differential pre-trends in Democratic Party vote shares in $Protest$ "treated" versus non-"treated" counties in 1960.[11] I report results testing this assumption in Columns 1-4 of Table 9 in the Online Appendix. While protest activity seems to also pick up differential pre-trends in Columns 1-3 of Table 9, conditioning on median income eliminates the pre-trend. The lack of statistical significance for the $Protest$ variable on Democratic Party vote share in 1960 once conditioning on income levels indicates that $Protest$ "treated" and non-"treated" counties do not exhibit differential pre-trends that might explain away my results. These results, then, indicate the plausibility of the OLS identification assumption.

Another criticism of my empirical approach is the operationalization of my independent variable into a binary indicator variable rather than a continuous one. As such, I re-estimate the main OLS results replacing the binary $Protest$ variable with $Log(Protests+1)_i$. Columns 1-5 of Table 10 in the Online Appendix demonstrate that my results hold when using $Log(Protests)$, which also diminishes the influence of outliers. Again, my results remain positive and statistically significant across all specifications.

While I demonstrate that my results are not particularly sensitive to independent variable operationalization or adjusting for additional potential confounders, a major threat to inference is that there are unobservable confounds that simultaneously affect protests and contemporary Democratic Party vote shares. Another strategy I employ to assess the sensitivity of my main OLS results to the selection on observables assumption is a test outlined by Blackwell (2014). This test assesses the sensitivity of a treatment effect to unobserved confound by examining how large of an effect such an unobservable would have to be to explain away the entirety of the estimated treatment effect. I show the results of the sensitivity checks in Figures 3 and 4.

Figures 3 and 4 both provide evidence that the main OLS results are not particularly sensitive to selection on unobservables. Specifically, Figure 3 provides evidence that the strength

[10] I also use a permutation test that flexibly controls for all of these potential confounders using a boosting regression algorithm shown in Figure 5. The results remain identical to the regression results presented in Table 8.

[11] This is akin to the parallel trends assumption in a difference-in-differences design.



Figure 3: Sensitivity of OLS Results to Selection on Unobservables: Raw Confounding



Figure 4: Sensitivity of OLS Results to Selection on Unobservables: Variance Explained by Confounding

of the raw confounding must more than 3 times greater than the effect of the binary $Protest$ "treatment" in order to explain away my results. That is, the unobservable confound must have an effect on contemporary Democratic Party vote shares that is roughly equivalent to 25% increase or about a two standard deviation increase. Moreover, Figure 4 suggests that the unmeasured confounding would have to explain approximately 35% of the residual variance in order to explain away my results. Relative to the other covariates included in the analysis such as urbanization and income (indicated by ticks on the horizontal-axis), this unobservable would have to be about 5 or 6 times larger relative to these major observable confounds. This seems implausibly large given that some of the major determinants of protests such as percent black, income, and urbanization have much smaller levels of confounding. Together, these two sensitivity checks provide evidence that selection on unobservables would have to be extremely strong relative to the $Protest$ "treatment" making it quite unlikely that my estimated effect is entirely driven by some unobservable confound.

Given the historical setting, it is difficult to think of an unobservable confound that have such a large effect. While the most plausible story is that protestors simply selected areas that were more liberal back then, this goes at odds with much of the historical literature on the Civil Rights movement; rather, historians point out that protestors seemed to target areas where racism was especially pernicious (McAdam, 1999; Arsenault, 2006; Mickey, 2015). That is, protestors seemed to have engaged in collective action precisely where their grievances were acute. Since protestors seemed to have targeted the most conservative areas, it is more likely the case that the selection on observables identification strategy is downward biased. Therefore, I argue that is plausible that my results indicate support for a causal relationship between historical protests and contemporary political attitudes.

4.4 Instrumental Variables

While the results of the sensitivity analyses as well as the historical literature suggest that my results are unlikely to be explained by unobserved confounding, protestors did not protest randomly. One of the main difficulties with making causal inferences about the effect of protests is that this form of collective action follows a strategic logic. Thus, most proximate causes of Civil Rights protests are likely to be endogenous in the short-run invalidating these variables as a potential instrument for protest. Following in the steps of recent works on the political economy of collective action, I look to plausibly exogenous historical variation that could serve as a quasi-experimental "encouragement" for Civil Rights protests (Voigtlander

and Voth, 2012; Satyanath, Voigtlander, and Voth, Forthcoming).

Several historians highlight how the economic spending boost driven by World War II may have partially laid the groundwork for the Civil Rights Movement (Arnesen, 2002; Gilmore, 2009; Wright, 2013). Particularly, Wright (2013) argues that the spending shock during World War II incentivized many African Americans to move to urban areas allowing them to be linked more closely to each other thus facilitating opportunities for collective action after the war. World War II and the resultant manufacturing shock generated by the entire nation's mobilization for war can be seen as ignorable (conditional on underlying capacity for a county to engage in war production) with respect to both Civil Rights protests during the 1960s and contemporary Democratic Party vote shares since the spending shock from the war was statistically independent of the potential outcomes of both protests and contemporary Democratic Party vote shares. Moreover, I argue that the primary channel through which the spending shock generated by World War II shapes contemporary Democratic Party vote shares and political attitudes is through the effects of the Civil Rights Movement. While it is certainly the case that war spending may influence contemporary Democratic Party vote shares through other economic channels, it is unlikely these channels undermine the validity of the war spending instrument. One of the main channels through which war spending might violate the exclusion restriction is through an income effect where counties that experienced a major shock in war spending are now richer compared to counties that did not. Given the available evidence on income and conservative voting, this violation would actually put downward pressure on the instrumental variables estimates since richer areas tend to vote more conservatively (Gelman, 2008; Marshall, 2016*b*). Keeping in mind the strengths and limitations of World War II spending as an instrument, I proceed to estimate the following set of equations using Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) to recover the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) of protests conditional on complying with the instrument.

$$Protest_i = \lambda Log(WarSpending)_i + \gamma X_i + \delta S_i + \eta_i \tag{2}$$

$$Vote_i = \beta Log(\widehat{Protests})_i + \gamma X_i + \delta S_i + \epsilon_i \tag{3}$$

For the 2SLS estimating equations, the coefficient λ represent the effect of the log of military and industrial manufacturing spending from World War II.[12] On average, each county

[12]To preserve counties with zero spending, I use the transformation $Log(WarSpending + 1)_i$. Using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation instead does not substantively change the results.

received about $8.2 million in war spending with a standard deviation of $33 million. To avoid bias generated from the coarsening of a treatment, opt to use $Log(Protests)$ instead of an indicator for $Protest$ (Marshall, 2016*a*).[13] The coefficient γ on X_i captures the effect of historical demographic control variables such as a county's population and urbanization and geographic controls for topography, latitude, and longitude. The term δS_i captures a vector of state-level fixed effects. Finally, the terms η_i and ϵ_i represent a Gaussian error terms with mean 0. For inference, I use heteroskedastic robust standard errors.

Table 1: Effect of Historical Civil Rights Protests on Democratic Presidential Vote Share, Instrumental Variables

	Log(Protests)	Democratic Vote Share, 2008	Democratic Vote Share, 2004
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Log(Total War Spending)	0.025**		
	(0.005)		
Log(Protests)		0.071**	0.043*
		(0.024)	(0.021)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Geographic Controls	✓	✓	✓
1940 Demographic Controls	✓	✓	✓
Model	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
	First Stage	Second Stage	Second Stage
First Stage F-Stat		25.101	25.101
N	2,960	2,960	2,960

$^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

The results from Table 1 demonstrate that historical Civil Rights protests caused affected counties to vote for the Democratic Party at higher rates in both the 2008 and 2004 elections. The results indicate that moving from no protests to one major protest increased vote shares for the Democratic Party in the 2008 and 2004 elections by approximately 5 and 3% respectively. To assuage concerns over weak instruments, Column 1 of Table 1 shows that war spending is positive and statistically significant with the F-statistic for instrument relevance

[13] The results remain in the same direction and remain statistically significant when using the dichotomous $Protest$ variable, but the point estimate becomes much larger in magnitude.

in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 well above the suggested value of 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997; Stock and Yogo, 2005). Keeping in mind that this empirical exercise recovers the LATE of protests conditional on complying with the war spending instrument, the estimated effects are quite similar to the effects recovered from the selection on observables strategy. While this instrumental variables strategy certainly has its limitations, it serves as encouraging sign that historical Civil Rights protests have a robust, persistent effect on political attitudes.[14]

5 Causal Mechanisms: Attitudes and Sorting

5.1 Individual-Level Analysis of Political Attitudes

Thus far, I present robust evidence in support of my argument that counties that experienced Civil Rights protest activity between 1960-1965 should now be more liberal than counties that did not experience historical Civil Rights protests. These results, however, are quiet on the mechanisms posited in this paper. Despite having no formal remnants of the Civil Rights movement left today, I argue that this movement continues to influence American politics today through attitudinal change with regards to race.

To get at the hypothesized causal mechanism, I perform a number of empirical tests to provide support for this channel. Using pooled, individual-level survey data from the 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), I estimate a number of equations with measures of racial liberalism–support for affirmative action and racial resentment toward blacks–as the outcome variables using both the selection on observables and the war manufacturing spending instrumental variables design (Ansolabehere, 2012; Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen, 2016). Additionally, I aggregate the outcome variables of interest to the county-level for simplicity of variance estimation (Green and Vavreck, 2008). Again, the "treatment" of interest is the indicator of whether a county i experienced historical Civil Rights protest activity. Since the theory deals with the effects of protests on the target population–whites–I subset the the CCES data to be only respondents who indicated their race as white.

I operationalize each outcome variable as follows using the same scheme as Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (2016). First, I measure an individual's support for the Democratic Party by creating a dichotomous measure for whether an individual identifies with the Democratic

[14] Furthermore, these results are robust to using war spending per capita instead though the estimates do become more imprecise since the first-stage relationship weakens.

Party. Next, I measure an individual's support for affirmative action. Whites who responded that they "somewhat support/strongly support" affirmative action receive a value of 1 while whites not falling into either of those categories receive a value of 0. Additionally, I also measure a respondent's level of racial resentment. The CCES has two questions that get at this: (1) "The Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors." and (2) "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class." Individuals can indicate whether they strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree for each statement. I use the racial resentment index used by Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (2016) to aggregate these two questions into one index that runs from one to five with higher vales indicating more racial resentment toward African Americans. Thus, less racial resentment would take the form of a negative correlation between protests and the probability that someone agrees/disagrees with each question respectively. I aggregate these responses up to the county level to generate proportions or means of individuals who express a particular racial attitude.

Table 2: Effect of Historical Civil Rights Protests on Political Attitudes, OLS

	Prop Democrat	Affirm. Action	Racial Resentment
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Protest	0.035^{**}	0.023^{**}	-0.113^{**}
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.030)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
1960 Controls	✓	✓	✓
N	2,838	2,838	2,505
R^2	0.271	0.149	0.209

$^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

Table 3: Effect of Historical Civil Rights Protests on Political Attitudes, Instrumental Variables

	Log(Protests)	Prop Democrat	Affirm. Action	Racial Resentment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log(Total War Spending)	0.210**			
	(0.029)			
Log(Protests)		0.029**	0.011**	−0.057**
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.010)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Model	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
	First Stage	Second Stage	Second Stage	Second Stage
First Stage F-Stat		247.003	247.003	240.418
N	2,596	2,596	2,596	2,317

$^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

I present the OLS and IV results in Tables 2 and 3 respectively. Across all of the outcome variables, I find that historical Civil Rights protests have a causal effect on racial attitudes among whites in the direction consistent with the theory.[15] From the OLS specifications presented in Table 2, I find that whites from counties that experienced historical Civil Rights protests are now about 4% more likely to identify as Democrats, 2% more likely to indicate support for affirmative action, and display about a 1/6 standard deviation decrease in racial resentment. Similarly for the 2SLS specifications presented in Table 3, a one standard deviation increase in protests relative to zero protests causes whites to increase support for the Democratic Party by about 5%, support for affirmative action by about 2%, and decrease their racial resentment by about 1/7th of a standard deviation. These results also indicate that my results on Democratic Party vote shares are not just picking up increase political activity among African Americans post-VRA enfranchisement since these attitudinal effects are present amongst whites. While these effects on attitudes are modest, they are nonetheless substantively important especially given that the Civil Rights Movement occurred more than 50 years ago.

5.2 Analysis of White Migration

Another plausible mechanism that might explain my findings is that Civil Rights protests actually led to white out-migration. This subsequently led racial and partisan polarization. Thus, Civil Rights protests may not actually continue to shape contemporary American politics through attitudinal change; instead, the Civil Rights Movement may have actually led to more polarization, which would explain why $Protest$ "treated" counties are now more liberal than their non-"treated" counterparts today.

To test this mechanism, I use county-level migration data to estimate the effect of Civil Rights protests on white out-migration (Winkler et al., 2013).[16] If it is the case that my results are driven by racially-based partisan sorting, then we might expect protests to lead to white out-migration from these protest counties. Thus, I estimate OLS equations with the main independent variable being the $Protest$ indicator in addition to historical confounders and state-fixed effects with net white migration between 1960 and 1970 as the dependent variable.

I present the results of this analysis in Table 4. While I do not find that counties that experienced Civil Rights protests had differential white migration levels in 1960, I do find

[15] The results for the 2SLS specifications do become considerably less precise once adding in 1940-level demographic controls, but the signs of the coefficient of interest remain in the correct direction.

[16] The data can be found at http://www.netmigration.wisc.edu/.

Table 4: Effect of Historical Civil Rights Protests on White Migration, OLS

	Net White Migration, 1960	Net White Migration, 1970		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Protest	−39.079	−138.221**	−112.812**	−112.665**
	(33.264)	(45.163)	(35.417)	(34.311)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
1960 Base Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Net White Migration in 1960			✓	✓
1960 Full Controls	✓			✓
N	2,989	3,003	2,998	2,989
R^2	0.320	0.312	0.579	0.610

$^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

that protest-affected counties seemed to have generated a modest degree of net white out-migration in 1970s. In expectation, counties that experienced Civil Rights protests had about a 1/6th increase in net white out-migration in the 1970s. For this to invalidate the theory on attitudinal change, this out-migration must also lead to changes in Democratic Party vote shares in 2008. Results from a mediation analysis following Imai et al. (2011) show that the proportion of the effect of protests on contemporary Democratic Party vote shares mediated by net white migration in the 1970s is statistically indistinguishable from zero with the point estimate being quite small.[17]

In sum, the results from the empirical exercises in this section demonstrate that the Civil Rights Movement continues to shape contemporary American politics. Moreover, the evidence seems to suggest that the results are primarily driven through attitudinal change rather than racial or partisan polarization. I show that whites from counties that experienced histor-

[17] Results from the mediation analysis can be found in Figure 6 in the Online Appendix. For the mediation analysis to produce valid estimates of the Average Controlled Mediated Effect (ACME) of net white migration in 1970s, one must make an assumption of sequential unconfoundedness. That is, conditional on some covariates X, the treatment is unconfounded and that conditional on some covariates X and the treatment, the mediator is also unconfounded. It should be noted that this is a strong assumption to make. Nonetheless, the near zero point estimate of the ACME suggest that the confounding would have to be inordinately large.

ical Civil Rights protests are now more likely to identify with the Democratic Party and that they display more liberal views on race. While each research design used has its limitations, the amalgamation of evidence demonstrates that social movements can indeed engender ideological change.

6 Conclusion

Can social movements continue to shape politics after the immediate life of the movement? Using the case of the US Civil Rights Movement during the early 1960s, I argue and provide evidence that social movements that no longer exist today can still lead to a persistent impact politics outside of formal institutional changes. Generating testable hypotheses from theories of cultural transmission, I find that counties that experienced Civil Rights protest activity 50 years ago tend to be more liberal today as proxied by Democratic Party vote shares. These results are robust to the inclusion of an exhaustive set of observable historical confounders, state fixed effects, independent variable operationalization, Presidential election year, nonparametric estimation, and sensitivity analyses for selection on unobservables. Using an instrumental variables design, I demonstrate that the correlations that I find can be interpreted as a causal relationship between historical Civil Rights protests and contemporary political behavior.

Honing in on the specific mechanisms, I find that individuals from counties that experienced Civil Rights protests tend to be more liberal, are more likely to support affirmative action, and less likely to harbor racial resentment toward African Americans. Furthermore, I do not find that counties that experienced Civil Rights protests experienced a meaningful amount racial sorting. Thus, my results suggest that the US Civil Rights Movement led to persistent ideological change especially with regard to race.

This study contributes to several literatures in historical political economy and American political development. Particularly, these results provide an important contrast to Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (2016) and the study of continuity and change in American political attitudes. Though slavery may have imprinted a lasting and pernicious legacy on the status of race in America, efforts to overcome the norms and cultures created by this deleterious institution seem to have been successful to some degree. More broadly speaking while many scholars working in historical political economy focus on the effects of institutional change on long-run political and economic development, I show how political movements during times of spectacular social upheaval can shape contemporary politics outside of institutional

channels. Social movements matter and may indeed transform societies in the long-run.

Finally, this study suggests promising avenues for future research not just in the American case, but also in comparative perspective. For example, how did other transformations in American society such as the end of slavery, the adoption of women's suffrage, World War I, and World War II shape both institutions and American political culture? Comparatively, how do other social and political movements such as Solidarity in Poland, Anti-Apartheid in South Africa, and the Arab Spring in the Middle East shape their respective country's politics and why are some movements more successful than others? While I show that the Civil Rights movement in the American context seemed to have generated detectable shifts in political attitudes, it remains outside the immediate scope of this study to delineate the *types* of social movements that can generate these types of changes in attitudes. Answers to these questions, among others, will not only enrich our understanding of periods of fundamental transition, but should also guide those who intimately participate in these historic moments.

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A Online Appendix

Variable	n	Min	q_1	$\tilde{x}$	$\bar{x}$	q_3	Max	s	IQR	#NA
Democratic Party Vote Share, 2008	3034	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.9	0.1	0.2	0
Protest Indicator	3034	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	1.0	0.3	0.0	0
Percent Black, 1960	3034	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	1.4	0.2	0.1	0
Percent Urban, 1960	3034	0.0	0.0	30.7	31.4	51.3	100.0	27.6	51.3	0
Median Income, 1960	3021	1260.0	3160.0	4139.0	4161.1	5113.0	9317.0	1301.9	1953.0	13
Democratic Party Vote Share, 1960	3034	4.6	34.9	41.3	40.1	46.1	85.1	9.4	11.2	0
Log(Total War Spending), 1940-45	3034	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.9	6.9	13.6	4.2	6.9	0

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics

Table 6: Effect of Historical Civil Rights Protests on Democratic Presidential Vote Share, 2008

	Democratic Vote Share, 2008				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Protest	0.12**	0.10**	0.06**	0.06**	0.06**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Percent Black		0.30**	0.30**	0.29**	0.29**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Percent Urban			0.001**	0.001**	0.001**
			(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Median Income				−0.000**	−0.000**
				(0.000)	(0.000)
Dem. Vote Share, 1960					0.001**
					(0.000)
Constant	0.35**	0.23**	0.20**	0.23**	0.18**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	3,034	3,034	3,034	3,021	3,021
R^2	0.40	0.50	0.54	0.54	0.55

$^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

Table 7: Effect of Historical Civil Rights Protests on Democratic Presidential Vote Share, 2004

	Democratic Vote Share, 2004				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Protest	0.10**	0.08**	0.05**	0.06**	0.06**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Percent Black		0.26**	0.27**	0.24**	0.24**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Percent Urban			0.001**	0.001**	0.001**
			(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Median Income				−0.000**	−0.000**
				(0.000)	(0.000)
Dem. Vote Share, 1960					0.001**
					(0.000)
Constant	0.35**	0.25**	0.23**	0.27**	0.23**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	3,034	3,034	3,034	3,021	3,021
R^2	0.37	0.47	0.50	0.50	0.51

$^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

Table 8: Effect of Historical Civil Rights Protests on Democratic Presidential Vote Share, 2008: Extra Controls

	Democratic Vote Share, 2008					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Protest	0.06**	0.06**	0.06**	0.07**	0.07**	0.07**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Percent Black	0.09**	0.09**	0.10**	0.10**	0.10**	0.10**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Percent Black Sq.	0.20**	0.22**	0.21**	0.19**	0.19**	0.17**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Percent Urban	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Median Income	−0.000**	−0.000**	−0.000	−0.000**	−0.000	−0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Vote Share 1960	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Percent Labor Force Agriculture		−0.14**	−0.05†	−0.07**	−0.07**	−0.06*
		(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Percent Unemployment			0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.004**
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Median Age				−0.003**	−0.003**	0.000
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Median School Years					−0.01*	−0.002
					(0.003)	(0.003)
Percent Occupied Housing						0.004**
						(0.001)
Constant	0.20**	0.24**	0.16**	0.26**	0.31**	0.10†
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	3,021	3,021	3,012	3,012	3,012	3,012
R^2	0.56	0.57	0.57	0.58	0.58	0.59

†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01



Figure 5: Effect of historical Civil Rights protests on racial attitudes using randomization inference. To flexibly account for confounders, I use a Generalized Boosting Regression Model controlling for urbanization, income, Democratic Party vote share in 1960, percent black, percent black squared, percent labor force in agriculture, unemployment rate, median age, median years of schooling for persons age 25+, and percent occupied housing as well as interactions among these variables to generate residuals of Democratic Party vote shares in 2008. I then use a permutation procedure to generate the conditional distributions of the residualized outcome under treated and control units. This procedure can be replicated in `R` using the `GBM` and `ri` packages.

Table 9: Effect of Historical Civil Rights Protests on Democratic Presidential Vote Share, 1960

	Democratic Vote Share, 1960			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Protest	2.55**	2.55**	1.15*	0.88
	(0.55)	(0.56)	(0.59)	(0.59)
Percent Black		0.11	0.45	1.67
		(1.29)	(1.29)	(1.34)
Percent Urban			0.04**	0.02**
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Median Income				0.001**
				(0.000)
Constant	35.94**	35.90**	34.86**	32.39**
	(0.99)	(1.15)	(1.17)	(1.37)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	3,034	3,034	3,034	3,021
R^2	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.37

$^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

Table 10: Effect of Historical Civil Rights Protests on Democratic Presidential Vote Share, 2008: Continuous

	Democratic Vote Share, 2008				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Log(Protests)	0.03**	0.03**	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Percent Black		0.29**	0.30**	0.29**	0.29**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Percent Urban			0.001**	0.001**	0.001**
			(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Median Income				−0.000**	−0.000**
				(0.000)	(0.000)
Vote Share 1960					0.001**
					(0.000)
Constant	0.42**	0.29**	0.24**	0.27**	0.22**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	
N	3,034	3,034	3,034	3,021	3,021
R^2	0.40	0.50	0.54	0.55	0.55

$^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

Table 11: Effect of Historical Civil Rights Protests on Democratic Presidential Vote Share, Instrumental Variables: Spending per Capita

	Log(Protests)	Democratic Vote Share, 2008	Democratic Vote Share, 2004
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Log(Total War Spending per Capita)	0.157*		
	(0.062)		
Log(Protests)		0.122*	0.077†
		(0.056)	(0.045)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Geographic Controls	✓	✓	✓
1940 Demographic Controls	✓	✓	✓
Model	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
	First Stage	Second Stage	Second Stage
First Stage F-Stat		6.288	6.288
N	2,960	2,960	2,960

$^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$

Table 12: Reduced-Form Effect of WWII Spending

	Prop Democrat	Affirm. Action	Racial Resentment
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Log(Total War Spending)	0.006**	0.002**	−0.013**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Geographic Controls	✓	✓	✓
N	2,596	2,596	2,317
R^2	0.258	0.148	0.191

$^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$



Figure 6: Mediation analysis of migration mechanism. This procedure can be replicated in `R` using the `mediation` package.