



Off-the-Record & Signal

Scenario: Alice & Bob have never spoken before,
want to communicate securely

Really Basic:



"Basic" Secure messaging




Pitfalls / properties

- ② DHKA doesn't authenticate endpoints
- + Enc should be CCA secure to protect against outsiders (not Alice / Bob) injecting / modifying messages
- ① - if Bob is compromised, attacker can read everything
- ③ - Bob can blackmail Alice

Post-compromise Security

"protect against future compromise"


instead of



Bob
compromised
(Adv learns)
 k

can decrypt
past messages


Do this: (symmetric ratchet)




Adv learns
 k^3

can't
decrypt
past
messages


(assuming parties erase past keys)



Man-in-the-Middle




NSA just watches \Rightarrow NO PROBLEM!



When NSA actively doing MitM \Rightarrow problem

Recover from past compromise?

DH ratchet:



If MitM stops actively changing messages
 \Rightarrow regain security

Repudiation:

goal: Anyone should be able to come up with a valid transcript in which Alice says any message

$$\boxed{A} \quad \underbrace{c = \text{Enc}(k, m), \text{MAC}(k', c)}_{\text{CCA encryption}} \rightarrow \boxed{B}$$

