

CPA Security, Randomized Encryption

Why must encryption be randomized?

How can encryption even be randomized?

Ex: Is a PRP also a CPA-secure Enc scheme? **NO**

let's distinguish between: (assume F is good PRP)

$k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$
CHALLENGE(m_L, m_R):
ret $F(k, m_L)$

$k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$
CHALLENGE(m_L, m_R):
ret $F(k, m_R)$

Idea: Can tell whether same ptxt encrypted twice *****

A:

$c_1 = \text{CHALLENGE}(0^\lambda, 0^\lambda)$

$c_2 = \text{CHALLENGE}(0^\lambda, 1^\lambda)$

return $c_1 \stackrel{?}{=} c_2$

in presence of L library,
 c_1 & c_2 encrypt same
ptxt $\Rightarrow c_1 = c_2$

in presence of R library,
 c_1 & c_2 encrypt different
ptxts $\Rightarrow c_1 \neq c_2$

\Rightarrow advantage = 1

PRP vs CPA-encryption:

- both are invertible if you have the key (a bit string)
- without the key, they're not invertible, outputs "look random"

***** But: PRF/PRP outputs on distinct inputs look random
Enc outputs on all calls (even same input) look $\$$

How can it be randomized?

many possible outputs of $\text{Enc}(k, m)$
ALL of them can be decrypted to m

Alice

DB of randomly
initialized data



Bob

DB of randomly
initialized data

"next msg encrypted with
position 12345"

$$\text{DB}[12345] \oplus m$$

"next msg encrypted with
position 31415"

$$\text{DB}[31415] \oplus m$$

secure, correct, many ways to Enc same ptxt

Alice

~~DB of randomly
initialized data~~

PRF key
 k



Bob

~~DB of randomly
initialized data~~

PRF key k

"next msg encrypted with
position 12345"

$$F(k, 12345) \text{ } \cancel{\text{DB}[12345]} \oplus m$$

"next msg encrypted with
position 31415"

$$F(k, 31415) \text{ } \cancel{\text{DB}[31415]} \oplus m$$

Security Proof:

for $\text{Enc}(k, m) = \underline{(r, F(k, r) \oplus m)}$

outputs of Enc look random

Why?

$F(k, r)$ looks random, so it's like OTP ☆

Why does $F(k, r)$ look random?

PRF outputs look random if its inputs are distinct ☆

Why are PRF inputs distinct?

r -values (inputs to PRF) are long strings chosen randomly, so $\text{Pr}[\text{repeat}]$ is negligible ☆

ok.

Next time: Attacks:

Secure

$\text{Enc}(k, m)$:

$r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$

return $(r, F(k, r) \oplus m)$

Insecure

$\text{Enc}(k, m)$:

$r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$

return $(r, F(k, m) \oplus r)$