



Off-the-Record & Signal

Scenario: Alice & Bob have never spoken before,
want to communicate securely

Really Basic:



"Basic" Secure messaging




Pitfalls / properties

- ② - DHKA doesn't authenticate endpoints
+ Enc should be CCA secure to protect against outsiders (not Alice / Bob) injecting / modifying messages
- ① - if Bob is compromised, attacker can read everything
- Bob can blackmail Alice
- ③


Post-compromise Security

"protect against future compromise"


instead of




Do this: (symmetric ratchet)




(assuming parties erase past keys)



Man-in-the-Middle



NSA just watches \Rightarrow NO PROBLEM!




$\text{Enc}(g^{ab'}, \text{hi})$

$\text{Enc}(g^{a'b}, \text{bye})$

When NSA actively doing MitM \Rightarrow problem

Recover from past compromise?

DH ratchet:



If MitM stops actively changing messages
 \Rightarrow regain security

Repudiation:

goal: Anyone should be able to come up with a valid transcript in which Alice says any message

