



Merkle-Damgård Hashes

Ex: $h: \{0,1\}^{32} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{16}$ (4 bytes \rightarrow 2 bytes)
 (8 nibbles \rightarrow 4 nibbles)

$32 \rightarrow \bigg| \rightarrow 16$




Q: What happens if no length encoding?



insecure picture

$x' = cd9518f1ec725700$
 also has same hash (collision!)





Secure picture

length Extension Attack

$$H(k || m)$$

observation:




Bad Idea:

let's use $H(k || m)$ as a MAC

suppose Alice chooses $k = cd9518f1$

let's ask Alice for MAC of $m = ec7257$


Alice computes $H(k || m)$:




she responds 3699

We can now compute MAC of $m' = ec7257000007$

What is the correct MAC of this m' ?




Our perspective:



???

same picture



this part of computation only depends on one intermediate value that we know completely

Bonus thing:

can mitigate with wide-pipe

paradigm

