

# CS380S: Graduate Computer Security

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## 1. Course Contact

Dr. Shravan Narayan

**Classes:** 1pm to 2pm at PAR 302 on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday.

**Office Hours:** At GDC 6.430, 3:30pm to 4:30pm on Monday and Wednesday.

(Email to let me know you're coming, or if you need alternate meeting times)

**Email:** [shr@cs.utexas.edu](mailto:shr@cs.utexas.edu) (Expect a response within 48 hours)

**TA/Grader:** Taehyun Noh [taehyun@cs.utexas.edu](mailto:taehyun@cs.utexas.edu) (Always cc the Instructor)

**Canvas:** <https://utexas.instructure.com/courses/1414554>

(Syllabus last updated: Jan 26<sup>th</sup>, 2025)

## 2. Course requirements

It is expected that all students have taken CS 361s or equivalent. This is not a hard requirement, but students without this experience are expected to look through the readings in CS361s as needed on their own time to keep up with this course.

At a minimum, students are expected to have knowledge of programming with C, compiling C applications, the memory layout of C applications including stack and heap, as well as standard terms and operations from programming and compilation such as how control flow (branches, indirect function calls) work, what a program counter does etc. While the course will introduce the concept of memory safety, this is mainly meant as a refresher. Students should have some familiarity with this and those unfamiliar with memory safety are expected to go through the additional material listed in this course calendar or from UT's [CS361s](#) course.

## 3. Grading / Attendance

Grade breakdown is as follows:

- Class attendance – 10% (thrice a week after the first week)
- Paper writeups – 25% (thrice a week)
- Individual paper presentations – 10%
- Team paper presentations – 10%
- Project selection – 0% (one para writeup due on Feb 10<sup>th</sup>)
- Class project midterm writeup – 10% (on Mar 26<sup>th</sup>)
- Class project final presentation – 15% (on Apr 23<sup>rd</sup>, Apr 25<sup>th</sup>, Apr 28<sup>th</sup>)
- Class project final writeup – 20% (once on Apr 30<sup>th</sup>)
- **Bonus:** class participation – 5% (throughout the semester)

Each of these are broken down below.

## 4. Class attendance

Attendance in this class is required starting week 2 (Jan 22<sup>nd</sup>). See "Skipping attendance or paper writeups" below if you need to skip classes. Attending the last week of class is required as you will be required to present your project – only UT excused absences will be accommodated.

## 5. Paper writeups

The list of papers that will be discussed in the course are listed in the calendar below. Starting week 2 (Jan 22<sup>nd</sup>), we will discuss one or two research papers each class. Students are expected to read the papers prior to attending class and submit paper writeups prior to each class. A paper writeup is a short summary of each paper along with pros, cons, discussion points, and specific questions about the paper. These may not be submitted late unless you have a UT approved reason (sickness, emergency etc.). See “Skipping attendance or paper writeups” below if you need to skip classes.

These writeups will be submitted on Canvas and are due at 12:30pm on Monday, Wednesday and Friday.

### Notes:

- Paper presenters also have to submit paper writeups for papers they are presenting.
- Papers may be modified based on student interest/new security news etc. Papers that are replaced will be done so with one week's notice.

## 6. Skipping attendance or paper writeups

This class has a total of 4 skips for paper writeups and 3 skips for class attendance that you can use without any explanation/email/note to me. These are for any situations that may come up that is not recognized as a UT-approved reason for skipping class/assignments.

If you need to skip classes or paper writeups beyond the 4 paper skips + 3 class skips, please follow standard UT guidelines for excused absences.

**Suggestion:** try to reserve these skips for emergencies.

## 7. Paper presentations

Each student is expected to present one paper individually and one paper as a team of two starting Jan 22<sup>nd</sup>. The presentation can use powerpoint or other suitable presentation aids and is expected to be 30 mins of content with 10 mins of Q&A during or after the presentation. Presenters should be well versed in both the paper as well as background material. Bonus points for including some background or follow up research in the presentation.

Signups for paper presentations are available on the Canvas website.

## 8. Project

The goal for the course project is to first develop or build upon existing security hardening techniques, next, modify existing applications to use the security technique, and finally evaluate their impact on security and performance. The modifications will need to be evaluated on large popular applications such as browsers, the Linux kernel, frameworks like tensor flow etc.

The projects can be done individually or in groups of up to 3. If you are a group, you are expected to clearly document what contributions each member of the team has made to the project.

You are welcome to develop your own project ideas in systems security and discuss this with me. Alternately, you can build on or implement one of the existing project ideas that I will share in class.

Project group and topics selection should be complete by Feb 10<sup>th</sup>, although you are welcome to select your project earlier as well. A one paragraph writeup is due in Canvas describing your project (this is not graded). If you choose to develop your own project ideas, you must get my approval before using this as your class project. You are welcome to ask me about possible projects at any time in the course.

You are encouraged to be ambitious and try a challenging project that you think would be fun. Students who execute an easy project well will score the same as students who pick an ambitious project but only have partial success.

## 9. Class project midterm writeup

Project groups are expected to provide a two-page single-spaced writeup on the progress of their project on Mar 26<sup>th</sup> via Canvas.

## 10. Class project final writeup and presentation

Project groups are expected to provide a five-page single-spaced writeup on their project on Apr 30<sup>th</sup> via Canvas as well as a 15-minute presentation in class of their project on Apr 23<sup>rd</sup>, Apr 25<sup>th</sup>, Apr 28<sup>th</sup>. The exact day of the presentation will be decided in class during project selection.

## 11. Class participation

This class is powered by discussion and thus students should participate in discussions. It is thus very important you read the papers and submit paper writeups so you can take part in the class discussions. The discussions and Q&A will be directed to the presenter of the paper. Students who make a point of participating in discussions are eligible for a bonus score of up to 5% of the course grade.

## 12. Project ideas

Here are a few project ideas that you are welcome to use as this course's project. You are also welcome to develop your own project ideas in systems security and discuss this with me. If you choose to develop your own project ideas, you must get my approval to use your idea as this course project.

- Use RLBox to sandbox a library in a major application or framework. To sandbox the library, configure RLBox and modify the build scripts to use a WebAssembly sandbox. Compare the performance of this with that of a Native Client sandbox. A tutorial to use RLBox is available here <https://rlbox.dev/>. Some examples of libraries that have been sandboxed in the past (please find new examples for this project):
  - Sandboxing libjpeg in the TensorFlow framework
  - Sandboxing libjpeg (or any file format parsing library) in ClamAV
  - Sandboxing markdown-to-html libraries in the Apache web server or in [standalone apps](#)

**Pre-reading:** [RLBox: Retrofitting Fine Grain Isolation in the Firefox Renderer](#)

**Skills:** Comfortable with C++. Experience using Makefiles will help but is not necessary.

**Level of difficulty:** Easy/Moderate.

- Speedup Chrome's compressed pointer heap to use memory accesses based on Intel x86 segmentation. Similar to Native Client or WebAssembly, Chrome uses a contiguous heap for JavaScript code, as you will read about in class. Chrome accesses these contiguous memories using the usual load/store instructions. However, [prior research](#) shows that Intel x86 allows a more optimized way to access contiguous memories. This low-level optimization leverages instructions that are part of Intel x86 segmentation – instructions optimized to access contiguous memories. Modify Chrome's access of the contiguous JavaScript heap from using standard x86 load/store instructions to instructions that can use segmentation instructions. This requires two changes --- changes in Chrome's C++ code and changes in Chrome's JITted code. For Chrome's C++ code, clang provides annotations in C/C++ that can be used to modify code to leverage segmentation instructions. For Chrome's JIT code, you can modify Chrome's JIT compiler directly to use segmentation instructions. Modify Chrome to implement this optimization and measure the performance difference.

**Pre-reading:** [Segue & ColorGuard: Optimizing SFI Performance and Scalability on Modern x86](#)

**Skills:** Comfortable with C++ and clang. Experience working with Chrome will help but is not necessary.

**Level of difficulty:** Moderate/Hard.

- Implement a version of RLBox's tainted type in Rust. As you will read in the class, the RLBox framework provides "tainted" types to safely handle untrusted data coming from a particular sandbox's heap. When using a tainted integer, RLBox allows arithmetic on the tainted integer but does not allow the tainted integer to be used in place of a regular integer. When dereferencing a tainted pointer, RLBox automatically checks that the pointer being dereferenced is within the sandbox's heap. Recreate this behavior in Rust using the following setup. Use a Rust "Vec<u8>" to represent the sandbox heap. Then provide APIs to access this Rust Vec<u8> that return data wrapped in a new tainted type that you create in Rust. This tainted type must ensure that the tainted data being returned cannot accidentally be misused but continue to allow simple safe operations like arithmetic on a tainted int.

**Pre-reading:** [RLBox: Retrofitting Fine Grain Isolation in the Firefox Renderer](#)

**Skills:** Comfortable with Rust.

**Level of difficulty:** Moderate/Hard.

- Develop a scheme that compiler backends can follow to ensure the emitted instructions would simply abort in the presence of a 1-bit flip in any one of instructions. Compilers today emit assembly that when modified by Rowhammer can be used to bypass security checks. For example, assume that we have a load instruction "lw a1, 0(a2)". a1 and a2 are registers. This instruction loads from the memory location a2 and stores the loaded value in register a1. Assuming with Rowhammer, you could flip a single bit in this instruction which causes the instruction to be parsed differently. The instruction could now become "lw a1, 0(a4)" or "lw a1, 0(a8)". Then a simple encoding scheme that keeps this safe would be to emit "lw a1, 0(a2)" only after setting registers a4 and a8 to zero. This is because execution of "lw a1, 0(a4)" or "lw a1, 0(a8)" would fault as it in-effect dereferences a null pointer. You can modify the tiny C compiler to use this new encoding scheme. This project can target the RISC-V or ARM instruction encoding.

**Pre-reading:** [Exploiting the DRAM rowhammer bug to gain kernel privileges](#)

**Skills:** Comfortable with RISC-V or ARM. Familiarity with the tiny C compiler would help as well.  
**Level of difficulty:** Moderate/Hard.

- Implement HFI in QEMU. HFI is an instruction set extension designed for CPUs so they can allow applications to isolate components. The implementation can be in x86, ARM or RISC-V.

**Pre-reading:** [Going Beyond the Limits of SFI: Flexible and Secure Hardware-Assisted In-Process Isolation with HFI](#)

**Skills:** Comfortable with the chosen CPU architecture. Familiarity with QEMU would help as well.

**Level of difficulty:** Easy.

- Sandboxing runtimes isolate components of an application to a subset of the address space by applying bounds checks on all memory accesses. Construct a sandboxing runtime that isolates the components of an application by modifying the page table entries of an application dynamically. Concretely, these page table modifications will ensure that a component is isolated by restricting all page entries to only point to a fixed range of the virtual address space. For example, component 1 may be restricted to the space 8GB to 16GB while component 2 is restricted from 16GB to 32GB etc. Modifying the page entries of an application can be performed using libraries like [PTEditor](#). One subtle point to note here is that for correct functionality, you must ensure each component has its own allocator and each allocator only allocates memory within the permitted space. You can do this either by using a custom allocator that you modify like [dlmalloc](#), or you can do this by building on an existing sandboxing tool which already provides a runtime for this --- for instance [wasm2c](#) or [LFI](#). If you do build on an existing runtime, you can disable any bounds checks these tools add.

**Pre-reading:** [Lightweight Fault Isolation: Practical, Efficient, and Secure Software Sandboxing](#)

**Skills:** Comfortable with C/C++ and the linux kernel. Familiarity with sandboxing will also help.

**Level of difficulty:** Moderate

- Reproduce the results of [Arabica](#), a tool that isolates native libraries accessed by Java programs through the JNI interface.

**Pre-reading:** [Arabica: JVM-Portable Sandboxing of Java's Native Libraries](#)

**Skills:** Comfortable with Java and C++. Familiarity with JVM implementation would also help

**Level of difficulty:** Moderate/Hard

- RLBox is a sandboxing framework that allows applications to sandbox libraries with WebAssembly (wasm) which isolates the effects of the library from the application. Modify the RLBox sandboxing framework to concurrently execute each function call in a separate process as well. You can then use this mechanism to figure out if sandboxing with Wasm is faster or slower than sandboxing with processes for each function call to the sandboxed library. Modify RLBox to dynamically choose between the two options depending on which approach is faster for each function call. Compare the performance to stock RLBox.

**Pre-reading:** [RLBox: Retrofitting Fine Grain Isolation in the Firefox Renderer](#)

**Skills:** Comfortable with C++.

**Level of difficulty:** Easy/Moderate

If you're still having difficulties picking a project, please talk to the instructor to brainstorm.

### 13. Policy on Academic Accommodations

The university is committed to creating an accessible and inclusive learning environment consistent with university policy and federal and state law. Please let me know if you experience any barriers to learning so I can work with you to ensure you have equal opportunity to participate fully in this course. If you are a student with a disability, or think you may have a disability, and need accommodation please contact Disability and Access (D&A). Please refer to D&A's website for contact and more information:

<http://diversity.utexas.edu/disability/>. If you are already registered with D&A , please deliver your Accommodation Letter to me as early as possible in the semester so we can discuss your approved accommodation and needs in this course.

### 14. Academic Integrity

Recall the Student Honor Code: "As a student of The University of Texas at Austin, I shall abide by the core values of the University and uphold academic integrity."

Students who violate University rules on academic dishonesty are subject to disciplinary penalties, including the possibility of failure in the course and/or dismissal from the University. Since such dishonesty harms the individual, all students, and the integrity of the University, policies on academic dishonesty will be strictly enforced. For further information, please visit the [Student Conduct and Academic Integrity Website](#).

To detect instances of academic integrity violations in programming assignments we may use 3rd party software.

### 15. Artificial intelligence

The use of artificial intelligence tools (such as ChatGPT) in this class is strictly prohibited. This includes using AI to generate ideas, outline an approach, answer questions, solve problems, or create original language. All work in this course must be your own or created in group work, where allowed.

### 16. Religious holy days

Religion (or lack thereof) is an important part of who we are. If a holy day observed by your religion falls during the semester and you require accommodation due to that, please let me know as soon as possible. Email is an acceptable form of communication. To guarantee accommodation around presentations or other big deadlines, I will need notice of at least two weeks. If you are unable (or forget!) to provide that notice, please contact me anyway in case I can still accommodate you.

**University-required language:** A student who is absent from an examination or cannot meet an assignment deadline due to the observance of a religious holy day may take the exam on an alternate day or submit the assignment up to 24 hours late without penalty, ONLY if proper notice of the planned absence has been given. Notice must be given at least 14 days prior to the classes which will be missed. For religious holy days that fall within the first two weeks of the semester, notice should be given on the first day of the semester. Notice must be personally delivered to the instructor and signed and dated by the instructor, or sent certified mail. Email notification will be accepted if received, but a student submitting email notification must receive email confirmation from the instructor.

## 17. Class Recordings

While there are no plans to record this class, this may change, and classes may be recorded. Class recordings, if provided, are reserved only for students in this class for educational purposes and are protected under FERPA. The recordings should not be shared outside the class in any form. Violation of this restriction by a student could lead to Student Misconduct proceedings.

## 18. Class Calendar

Date	Theme	Class contents	Presenters
Mon, 13 Jan		<b>No class today</b>	
Wed, 15 Jan	Introduction	Introduction, syllabus etc.  <a href="#">How to read a paper</a> S. Keshav (2007)  Paper discussion assignments	Instructor
Fri, 17 Jan	Background	<b>Instructions: Background catchup. No paper writeup for this week</b>  <b>Memory safety:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Chapter 1 from <a href="#">How Memory Safety Violations Enable Exploitation of Programs</a> - M. Payer (2018)</li><li>- Sections 30.1 and 30.2 <a href="#">Low-Level Software Security by Example</a> - Úlfar Erlingsson, Yves Younan, and Frank Piessens (2010)</li></ul> <b>Side-channels:</b> Sections 1 to 4 from <a href="#">Transient-Execution Attacks: A Computer Architect Perspective</a> – Luís Fiolhais, Leonel Sousa (2023)  <b>On giving talks:</b> <a href="#">(An Opinionated Talk) On Preparing Good Talks</a> – Ranjit Jhala (2018)	Instructor
Mon, 20 Jan		<b>Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, no class</b>	
Wed, 22 Jan	Memory safety attacks	<b>Instructions: paper writeups start this week and must be submitted on Canvas</b>  <b>Paper 1:</b> <a href="#">Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit</a> - Aleph One (1996) – reformatted in 2017  <b>AND</b>	<Student sign up>



		<b>Paper 2:</b> <a href="#">Exploiting Format String Vulnerabilities</a> – scut (2001)	
<b>Fri, 24 Jan</b>		<b>Paper 1:</b> <a href="#">The advanced return-into-libc exploits</a> - Nergal (2001)  <b>AND</b>  <b>Paper 2:</b> <a href="#">Return-Oriented Programming: Systems, Languages, and Applications</a> - R. Roemer, E. Buchanan, H. Shacham and S. Savage (2012)	<Student sign up>
<b>Mon, 27 Jan</b>	Memory safety defenses	<a href="#">AddressSanitizer: A Fast Address Sanity Checker</a> - Konstantin Serebryany, Derek Bruening, Alexander Potapenko, Dmitry Vyukov (2012)	<Student sign up>
<b>Wed, 29 Jan</b>		<b>Paper 1:</b> <a href="#">SoftBound: Highly compatible and complete spatial memory safety for C</a> - Santosh Nagarakatte, Jianzhou Zhao, Milo M. K. Martin, Steve Zdancewic (2009)  <b>AND</b>  <b>Paper 2:</b> <a href="#">CETS: compiler enforced temporal safety for C</a> - Santosh Nagarakatte, Jianzhou Zhao, Milo M.K. Martin, Steve Zdancewic (2010)	<Student sign up>
<b>Fri, 31 Jan</b>		<a href="#">Evaluating fuzz testing</a> - George Klees, Andrew Ruef, Benji Cooper, Shiyi Wei, Michael Hicks (2018)	<Student sign up>
<b>Mon, 03 Feb</b>		<b>Note: the presentation of this is premade in the link. The challenge is to understand what this is doing in a complex application – Google Chrome</b>  <a href="#">MiraclePtr - the UaF slayer</a> - Keishi Hattori, Bartek Nowierski (2022)  <a href="#">Additional resources for MiraclePtr</a>	<Student sign up>
<b>Wed, 05 Feb</b>		<a href="#">Sys: A {Static/Symbolic} Tool for Finding Good Bugs in Good (Browser) Code</a> - Fraser Brown, Deian Stefan, Dawson Engler (2020)	<Student sign up>
<b>Fri, 07 Feb</b>		<b>Reserved for project discussions</b>	
<b>Mon, 10 Feb</b>	Control flow integrity	<b>Project description due: 1 paragraph writeup on canvas</b>  <a href="#">Control-Flow Integrity: Principles, Implementations, and Applications</a> - M. Abadi, M. Budiu, Úlfar Erlingsson, and J. Ligatti (2009)	<Student sign up>

Wed, 12 Feb		<a href="#">Security Analysis of Processor Instruction Set Architecture for Enforcing Control-Flow Integrity</a> - Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Deepak Gupta, Ravi Sahita (2019)	<Student sign up>
Fri, 14 Feb		<a href="#">Control-Flow Bending: On the Effectiveness of Control-Flow Integrity</a> - Nicolas Carlini, Antonio Barresi, Mathias Payer, David Wagner, Thomas R. Gross (2015)	<Student sign up>
Mon, 17 Feb	Coarse-grain defenses	<a href="#">Lightweight Fault Isolation: Practical, Efficient, and Secure Software Sandboxing</a> - Zachary Yedidia (2024)	<Student sign up>
Wed, 19 Feb		<a href="#">RLBox: Retrofitting Fine Grain Isolation in the Firefox Renderer</a> - Shravan Narayan, Craig Disselkoen, Tal Garfinkel, Nathan Froyd, Eric Rahm, Sorin Lerner, Hovav Shacham, Deian Stefan (2020)	<Student sign up>
Fri, 21 Feb		<a href="#">The Security Architecture of the Chromium Browser</a> - Adam Barth, Collin Jackson, Charles Reis, Google Chrome Team (2008)	<Student sign up>
Mon, 24 Feb	JIT Security	<a href="#">The Art of Exploitation: Attacking JavaScript Engines</a> - saelo (2016)	<Student sign up>
Wed, 26 Feb		<a href="#">The Art of Exploitation: Compile Your Own Type Confusion: Exploiting Logic Bugs in JavaScript JIT Engines</a> - saelo (2019)	<Student sign up>
Fri, 28 Feb		<a href="#">Icarus: Trustworthy Just-In-Time Compilers with Symbolic Meta-Execution</a> - Naomi Smith, Abhishek Sharma, John Renner, David Thien, Fraser Brown, Hovav Shacham, Ranjit Jhala, Deian Stefan (2024)	<Student sign up>
Mon, 03 Mar	Side-channel attacks & defenses	<b>For the below paper. Skip section 4.2 to 4.8</b> <a href="#">A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses</a> - Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens, Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss (2019)	<Student sign up>
Wed, 05 Mar		<a href="#">Hertzbleed: Turning Power Side-Channel Attacks Into Remote Timing Attacks on x86</a> - Yingchen Wang, Riccardo Paccagnella, Elizabeth Tang He, Hovav Shacham, Christopher W. Fletcher, David Kohlbrenner (2022)	<Student sign up>
Fri, 07 Mar		<a href="#">Exploiting the DRAM rowhammer bug to gain kernel privileges</a> - Mark Seaborn with contributions by Thomas Dullien (2015)	<Student sign up>
Mon, 10 Mar		<a href="#">Opening Pandora's Box: A Systematic Study of New Ways Microarchitecture Can Leak Private Data</a> - Jose Rodrigo Sanchez Vicarte, Pradyumna Shome, Nandeeka Nayak, Caroline Trippel,	<Student sign up>

		Adam Morrison, David Kohlbrenner, Christopher W. Fletcher (2021)	
Wed, 12 Mar		<a href="#">Trusted browsers for uncertain times</a> - David Kohlbrenner, Hovav Shacham (2016)	<Student sign up>
Fri, 14 Mar		<a href="#">Dynamic Process Isolation</a> - Martin Schwarzl, Pietro Borrello, Andreas Kogler, Kenton Varda, Thomas Schuster, Daniel Gruss, Michael Schwarz (2021)	<Student sign up>
Mon, 17 Mar		<b>Spring break, no class</b>	
Wed, 19 Mar		<b>Spring break, no class</b>	
Fri, 21 Mar		<b>Spring break, no class</b>	
Mon, 24 Mar	Hardware-based isolation	<a href="#">Keystone: An open framework for architecting trusted execution environments</a> - Dayeol Lee, David Kohlbrenner, Shweta Shinde, Krste Asanović, Dawn Song (2020)	<Student sign up>
Wed, 26 Mar		<b>Instructions: Project midterm writeup due on canvas</b>  <a href="#">Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems</a> - Yuanzhong Xu, Weidong Cui, Marcus Peinado (2015)	<Student sign up>
Fri, 28 Mar		<a href="#">Going Beyond the Limits of SFI: Flexible and Secure Hardware-Assisted In-Process Isolation with HFI</a> - Shravan Narayan, Tal Garfinkel, Mohammadkazem Taram, Joey Rudek, Daniel Moghimi, Evan Johnson, Chris Fallin, Anjo Vahldiek-Oberwagner, Michael LeMay, Ravi Sahita, Dean Tullsen, Deian Stefan (2023)	<Student sign up>
Mon, 31 Mar		<b>Guest Lecture TBA</b>	Guest
Wed, 02 Apr		<b>Guest Lecture TBA</b>	Guest
Fri, 04 Apr		<b>No class today. Work on your projects.</b>	
Mon, 07 Apr	Memory safety attacks 2	<a href="#">Hacking blind</a> - Andrea Bittau, Adam Belay, Ali Mashtizadeh, David Mazieres, Dan Boneh (2014)	<Student sign up>
Wed, 09 Apr	Redesigning OSes	<a href="#">Multiprogramming a 64 kB Computer Safely and Efficiently</a> - Amit Levy, Bradford Campbell, Branden Ghena, Daniel B Giffin, Pat Pannuto, Prabal Dutta, Philip Levis (2017)	<Student sign up>

<b>Fri, 11 Apr</b>		<a href="#">Simple and Precise Static Analysis of Untrusted Linux Kernel Extensions</a> - Elazar Gershuni, Nadav Amit, Arie Gurfinkel, Nina Narodytska, Jorge A. Navas, Noam Rinetzky, Leonid Ryzhyk, Mooly Sagiv (2019)	<Student sign up>
<b>Mon, 14 Apr</b>	Ecosystem security	<a href="#">Click Trajectories: End-to-End Analysis of the Spam Value Chain</a> - Kirill Levchenko, Andreas Pitsillidis, Neha Chachra, Brandon Enright, Márk Félegyházi, Chris Grier, Tristan Halvorson, Chris Kanich, Christian Kreibich, He Liu, Damon McCoy, Nicholas Weaver, Vern Paxson, Geoffrey M. Voelker, Stefan Savage (2011)	<Student sign up>
<b>Wed, 16 Apr</b>		<a href="#">Re: CAPTCHAs – Understanding CAPTCHA-Solving Services in an Economic Context</a> - Marti Motoyama, Kirill Levchenko, Chris Kanich, Damon McCoy, Geoffrey M. Voelker and Stefan Savage (2010)	<Student sign up>
<b>Fri, 18 Apr</b>	Measurement security	<a href="#">DSCOPE: A Cloud-Native Internet Telescope</a> - Eric Pauley, Paul Barford, and Patrick McDaniel (2023)	<Student sign up>
<b>Mon, 21 Apr</b>	Usable security	<a href="#">Alice in warningland: a {Large-Scale} field study of browser security warning effectiveness</a> - Devdatta Akhawe, Adrienne Porter Felt (2013)	<Student sign up>
<b>Wed, 23 Apr</b>		<b>Final presentation for projects, part 1</b>	
<b>Fri, 25 Apr</b>		<b>Final presentation for projects, part 2</b>	
<b>Mon, 28 Apr</b>		<b>Final presentation for projects, part 3</b>  <b>Project final writeup due by April 30<sup>th</sup> on canvas</b>	