

# CVE-2014-0226

## Overview/Summary

Race condition in the mod\_status module in the Apache HTTP Server before 2.4.10 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow), or possibly obtain sensitive credential information or execute arbitrary code, via a crafted request that triggers improper scoreboard handling within the status\_handler function in modules/generators/mod\_status.c and the lua\_ap\_scoreboard\_worker function in modules/lua/lua\_request.c

## How the vulnerability aroused?

This issue is of Race condition due to multiple workers on single system and improper locking of variables causing as two or more threads to share the same memory space causing them to interchange variable due to improper locking. This is issue is cause when two threads :

1) Thread which is executing the status-handler under the controller of mod\_status which is updating scoreboard in update\_child\_status\_internal() function calling the copy\_request() func and the other

2) Thread calling ap\_escape\_logitem() as ap\_escape\_logitem checks and escapes logitem chars but if the initial check is passed that is  
in server/util.c

```
/* Compute how many characters need to be escaped */
1920     s = (const unsigned char *)str;
1921     for (; *s; ++s) {
1922         if (TEST_CHAR(*s, T_ESCAPE_LOGITEM)) {
1923             escapes++;
1924         }
1925     }
```

that escapes == 0 and after that in update\_child\_status\_internal() func in which copy\_request() func would copy new request into memory over ws\_record->request but as the check is passed and no character is left to escape it causing it to improper escaping of characters the control characters would forward the request through apr\_pmemdup() which would return a str without trailing '\0'

```
/* Fast path: nothing to escape */
1931     if (escapes == 0) {
1932         return apr_pmemdup(p, str, length);
1933     }
```

Due to improper escaping of characters which could led bypass to control characters through requests Then the request is passed through ap\_escape\_html()

->  
x = apr\_palloc(p, i + j + 1);

```
1880 for (i = 0, j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++, j++)
1881     if (s[i] == '<') {
1882         memcpy(&x[j], "&lt;", 4);
1883         j += 3;
1884     }
1885     else if (s[i] == '>') {
1886         memcpy(&x[j], "&gt;", 4);
1887         j += 3;
1888     }
1889     else if (s[i] == '&') {
1890         memcpy(&x[j], "&amp;", 5);
```

```

1891         j += 4;
1892     }
1893     else if (s[i] == '"') {
1894         memcpy(&x[j], "&quot;", 6);
1895         j += 5;
1896     }
1897     else if (toasc && !apr_isascii(s[i])) {
1898         char *esc = apr_psprintf(p, "%#3.3d;", (unsigned char)s[i]);
1899         memcpy(&x[j], esc, 6);
1900         j += 5;
1901     }
1902     else
1903         x[j] = s[i];
1904
1905     x[j] = '\\0';

```

as we can see [x] is the final escaped str which is going to return and x[j] is '\\0' which is generally causing heap buffer overflow where we are accessing improper ptr and tending it to '\\0' which could cause heap buffer overflow that could lead to DoS(Denial of Server) of server

## Exploitation

Though I compiled my apache httpd with `-fsanitize=address` to show mem leaks or heap overflows That's why

```

0x0c4a800e7170: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
0x0c4a800e7180: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
=>0x0c4a800e7190: fd fd fd[fd]fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
0x0c4a800e71a0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
0x0c4a800e71b0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
0x0c4a800e71c0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
0x0c4a800e71d0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
0x0c4a800e71e0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable:          00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone:    fa
Freed heap region:    fd
Stack left redzone:    f1
Stack mid redzone:     f2
Stack right redzone:   f3
Stack after return:    f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone:        f9
Global init order:     f6
Poisoned by user:      f7
Container overflow:     fc
Array cookie:          ac
Intra object redzone:  bb
ASan internal:         fe

```

Shows a shadow byte at a buggy address which is a case when tends to give x[j]='\\0' or accessing an improper memory

To exploit this vulnerability we abuse the Race condition by giving two inputs on different threads one which is calling server-status handler which is calling `mod_status` module and other a random string to overwrite the original request and cause heap overflow.



