

## Agenda

### **PROBLEM DOMAIN: NUMBER THEORY**

- **APPLICATION DOMAIN: CRYPTOGRAPHY**
- **BASICS OF CRYPTOGRAPHY**
  - **SECRECY OR CONFIDENTIALITY**
  - **SHARED KEY AND PUBLIC KEY SYSTEMS**

# Cryptography - Secrecy

- Communication from Alice to Bob:
  - A sends a message M to B on a public channel
    - i.e. any one can read from the channel
- (Desired) Property of said communication:
  - ***Secrecy*** or ***Confidentiality***:
    - No one other than A and B can “get” the message.

# Cryptography: Protocol for Secrecy

- **Straw Man Protocol:**

1. A applies a function  $f$  on message  $M$  i.e. computes  $M' = f(M)$
2. A sends  $M'$  to B on a public channel
3. B receives  $M'$  and inverts i.e. B applies  $f^{-1}$  on  $M'$  to get  $M$

- **Requirements:**

- $f^{-1}$  cannot be computed by any one other than A or B.
  - **Solution:** Keep  $f$  and  $f^{-1}$  secret
  - **Pragmatics:**
    - *Obscurity is not security*
    - *Complexity weakens security*
    - Every pair of communicators - A and B - will have to invent their own functions
      - i.e.  $O(N*N)$  functions for a group of  $N$  communicators
      - i.e. this is not suitable for mass usage.

# Cryptography – Secrecy and Encryption

- **Tin Man Protocol:**

- A applies a function  $E$  on message  $M$  and a key  $K_A$  i.e. computes  $M' = E(M, K)$
- A sends  $M'$  to B
- B receives  $M'$  and inverts it by applying a function  $E^{-1}$  on  $M'$  and a key  $K_B$  to get  $M$  i.e.  $M = E^{-1}(M', K_B)$

- **Requirements:**

- $K_B$  must not be known to any one other than A or B.
- Without  $K_B$ ,  $E^{-1}(M', K_B)$  cannot be computed.

- **Note:**

- $E$  is referred to as an ***encryption*** function and  $E^{-1}$  is referred to a ***decryption*** function. **End of Note.**

# Shared Key Encryption

- **Tin man Protocol:**

- A sends  $M' = E(M, K_A)$  to B
- B receives  $M'$  and computes  $M = E^{-1}(M', K_B)$

- **Requirements:**

- $K_B$  must not be known to any one other than A or B.
- **Solution 1 : *Shared Key encryption*:**
  - A and B share a secret ( $K_A, K_B$ )
  - $K_A$  and  $K_B$  can be computed easily from each other;  
simplest case:  $K_A == K_B$
- **Pragmatics:**
  - Every pair of communicators A and B will require a pair of keys ( $K_A, K_B$ )
    - i.e.  $O(N*N)$  keys are required for a group of N communicators

# Public Key Encryption

- **Tin Man Protocol:**

- A sends  $M' = E(M, K_A)$  to B
- B receives  $M'$  and computes  $M = E^{-1}(M', K_B)$

- **Requirements:**

- $K_B$  must not be known to any one other than A or B.
  - **Solution 2 : *Public Key encryption*:**
    - $K_B$  is private to B: *denote it  $K_{Bv}$* ,
    - $K_A$  is public (but associated with B): *denote it  $K_{Bu}$* 
      - *$K_{Bv}$  cannot be computed easily from  $K_{Bu}$*
  - **Pragmatics:**
    - Every receiver B will require a pair of keys ( $K_{Bv}, K_{Bu}$ )
    - All public keys can be published (say, in a directory)
      - i.e. *N key pairs are required for a group of N communicators*

# Public Key Encryption

- **Iron Man Protocol:**

- A sends  $M' = E(M, K_{BU})$  to B
- B receives  $M'$  and computes  $M = E^{-1}(M', K_{BV})$

- **Requirements:**

- E and  $E^{-1}$  are computable in polynomial time with keys  $K_{BU}$  and  $K_{BV}$  respectively but
  - *they are not computable in polynomial time without.*
- Public Key encryption:
  - **Pragmatics:**  $K_{BV}$  *should not be computable in polynomial time from  $K_{BU}$ .*