



Symmetric Keys Distribution for End to End Encryption

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Symmetric Cryptography



<https://www.trentonsystems.com/blog/symmetric-vs-asymmetric-encryption>

Symmetric Keys Distribution for End to End Encryption

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

1. A can select a key and physically deliver it to B.
2. A third party can select the key and physically deliver it to A and B.
3. If A and B have previously and recently used a key, one party can transmit the new key to the other, encrypted using the old key.
4. If A and B each has an encrypted connection to a third party C, C can deliver a key on the encrypted links to A and B.

1. The scale of the problem depends on the number of communicating pairs that must be supported.
2. If end-to-end encryption is done at a network or IP level, then a key is needed for each pair of hosts on the network that wish to communicate.
3. if there are hosts, the number of required keys is $N(N-1)/2$.
4. If encryption is done at the application level, then a key is needed for every pair of users or processes that require communication.


Symmetric Keys Distribution for End to End Encryption

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Centralized Key Distribution Center: Master Key Pre-shared Between all hosts and KDC




1. Host sends packet requesting connection.
2. Security service buffers packet, asks KDC for session key.
3. KDC distributes session key to both hosts.
4. Buffered packet transmitted.




Symmetric Keys Distribution for End to End Encryption

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Decentralized Key Distribution



Key Distribution using Asymmetric Encryption



A typical Man In The Middle Scenario

1. A generates a public/private key pair $\{PU_a, PR_a\}$ and transmits a message intended for B consisting of PU_a and an identifier of A, ID_A .
2. E intercepts the message, creates its own public/private key pair $\{PU_e, PR_e\}$ and transmits $PU_e \parallel ID_A$ to B.
3. B generates a secret key, K_s , and transmits $E(PU_e, K_s)$.
4. E intercepts the message and learns K_s by computing $D(PR_e, E(PU_e, K_s))$.
5. E transmits $E(PU_a, K_s)$ to A.

Symmetric Keys Distribution for End to End Encryption

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Decentralized Key Distribution




Figure 14.5 Decentralized Key Distribution

Key Distribution using Asymmetric Encryption




Figure 14.7 Simple Use of Public-Key Encryption to Establish a Session Key

A typical Man In The Middle Scenario

1. A generates a public/private key pair $\{PU_A, PR_A\}$ and transmits a message intended for B consisting of PU_A and an identifier of A, ID_A .
2. E intercepts the message, creates its own public/private key pair $\{PU_E, PR_E\}$ and transmits $PU_E \parallel ID_A$ to B.
3. B generates a secret key, K_s , and transmits $E(PU_E, K_s)$.
4. E intercepts the message and learns K_s by computing $D(PR_E, E(PU_E, K_s))$.
5. E transmits $E(PU_A, K_s)$ to A.

Symmetric Keys Distribution for End to End Encryption

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Key Distribution using Asymmetric Encryption with Confidentiality and Authentication




Figure 14.8 Public-Key Distribution of Secret Keys

Distribution of Public Keys

- Public announcement
- Publicly available directory
- Public-key authority
- Public-key certificates




Figure 14.10 Public-Key Publication

Symmetric Keys Distribution for End to End Encryption

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Public Key Authority




Figure 14.11 Public-Key Distribution Scenario

Public Key Certificates




Figure 14.12 Exchange of Public-Key Certificates

1. Any participant can read a certificate to determine the name and public key of the certificate's owner.
2. Any participant can verify that the certificate originated from the certificate authority and is not counterfeit.
3. Only the certificate authority can create and update certificates.

End to End Encryption: Public Key Certificates

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Public Key Certificates Usage




Figure 14.13 Public-Key Certificate Use

Public Key Infrastructure X.509-Architectural Model

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


Figure 14.16 PKIX Architectural Model

HTTPS: HTTP over TLS/SSL: History of TLS/SSL

- The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol was first introduced by Netscape in 1994.
- The first official release of SSL, version 2.0, was out in 1995
- The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol was first introduced in 1999 as an upgrade to SSL v3.
- TLS 1.1 April 2006, TLS 1.2 August 2008, TLS 1.3 August 2018

HTTPS: HTTP Secure, HTTP over TLS/SSL, Web PKI

- Web browsers know how to trust HTTPS websites based on certificate authorities that come pre-installed in their software.
- Certificate authorities (such as Let's Encrypt, DigiCert, Comodo, GoDaddy and Global Sign) are trusted by web browser.
- The security of HTTPS is that of the underlying TLS, which typically uses long-term public and private keys to generate a short-term session key, which is then used to encrypt the data flow between client and server. X.509 certificates are used to authenticate the server (and sometimes the client as well).

When an end user accesses a website that has an HTTPS URL, they're interacting with Web PKI. It is a system of everything needed to issue, distribute and verify cryptographic keys and certificates, and tie them to the right domain. At the core of the Web PKI are cryptographic keys that enable cryptographic operations like authentication, authorisation and encryption. A certificate is, essentially, a binding of a cryptographic key (in this case a public key) to a web domain by a Certificate Authority (CA).

HTTPS: HTTP Secure, HTTP over TLS/SSL

- An X.509 [a standard that defines the format of public key certificates] certificate contains a public key and an identity (a hostname, or an organization, or an individual), and is either signed by a certificate authority or self-signed.
- When someone is holding a signed certificate from a trusted entity one can be sure of
 - That the public key in the certificate corresponds to the entity mentioned in the certificate or validate a document sent by the other party for authentication.
- X.509 also specifies the certificate revocation lists through which certificates which are no longer valid are announced or distributed.

X.509 Certificates

- There are different formats of X.509 certificates such as PEM, DER, PKCS#7 and PKCS#12.
- PEM[Privacy Enhanced Mail] and PKCS#7 [Public Key Cryptography Standards] formats use Base64 ASCII encoding while DER[Distinguished Encoding Rules] and PKCS#12 use binary encoding.
- The .pem file can include the server certificate, the intermediate certificate and the private key in a single file.
- The server certificate and intermediate certificate can also be in a separate .crt or .cer file.
- The PKCS#7 certificate uses Base64 ASCII encoding with file extension .p7b or .p7c




Figure 14.14 X.509 Formats

X.509 V3 Certificates: RFC 5280 format

```
Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
    tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
    signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
    signatureValue BIT STRING }
```

```
TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
    version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
    serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber,
    signature AlgorithmIdentifier,
    issuer Name,
    validity Validity,
    subject Name,
    subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
    issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
    -- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3
    subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
    -- If present, version MUST be v2 or v3
    extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL,
    -- If present, version MUST be v3
}
```

X.509 V3

```
rtificatelist ::= SEQUENCE {
    tbsCertList TBSCertList,
    signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
    signatureValue BIT STRING }
```

```
SCertList ::= SEQUENCE {
    version Version OPTIONAL,
    -- if present, MUST be v2
    signature AlgorithmIdentifier,
    issuer Name,
    thisUpdate Time,
    nextUpdate Time OPTIONAL,
    revokedCertificates SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
        userCertificate CertificateSerialNumber,
        revocationDate Time,
        crlEntryExtensions Extensions OPTIONAL,
        -- if present, version MUST be v2
    } OPTIONAL,
    crlExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL,
    -- if present, version MUST be v2
}
```

CRL V2

HTTPS

[illegible]

- <https://www.digicert.com/kb/ssl-support/openssl-quick-reference-guide.htm>

HTTPS

```

Certificates (2976 bytes)
Certificate Length: 1734
Certificate: 308206c2308205aaa003020102020900ae3e09b992ffbd9b... (id-at-commonName=*.niituniversity.in,id-at-organizationalUnitName=Domain Control Validated)
  signedCertificate
    version: v3 (2)
    serialNumber: 12555483503795355035
    signature (sha256WithRSAEncryption)
      Algorithm Id: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 (sha256WithRSAEncryption)
    issuer: rdnSequence (0)
      > rdnSequence: 6 items (id-at-commonName=Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2,id-at-organizationalUnitName=http://certs.godaddy.com/repositor,id-at-o
    validity
      > notBefore: utcTime (0)
      > notAfter: utcTime (0)
    > subject: rdnSequence (0)
    > subjectPublicKeyInfo
      > algorithm (rsaEncryption)
      > subjectPublicKey: 3082010a028201010099674d297ced06fe745cf51a6e0613...
        modulus: 0x0099674d297ced06fe745cf51a6e0613d346e885b8754b11...
        publicExponent: 65537
      > extensions: 10 items
    > algorithmIdentifier (sha256WithRSAEncryption)
      Padding: 0
      encrypted: 6cb861ab5417a3aa72f54809a5e5686b95a093c21348d1e7...
    Certificate Length: 1236
  > Certificate: 308204d0308203b8a003020102020107300d06092a864886... (id-at-commonName=Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2,id-at-organizationalUnitName=http://c

```

HTTPS

•A certificate chain is a list of certificates (usually starting with an end-entity certificate) followed by one or more CA certificates (usually the last one being a self-signed certificate), with the following properties:

- The Issuer of each certificate (except the last one) matches the Subject of the next certificate in the list.
- Each certificate (except the last one) is supposed to be signed by the secret key corresponding to the next certificate in the chain (i.e. the signature of one certificate can be verified using the public key contained in the following certificate).
- The last certificate in the list is a trust anchor: a certificate that you trust because it was delivered to you by some trustworthy procedure.



HTTPS- Certificate Chain Validation

Certificate:

Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
10:e6:fc:62:b7:41:8a:d5:00:5e:45:b6
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, CN=GlobalSign Organization Validation CA - SHA256 - G2
Validity
Not Before: Nov 21 08:00:00 2016 GMT
Not After : Nov 22 07:59:59 2017 GMT
Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=San Francisco, O=Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., CN=*.wikipedia.org
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:c9:22:69:31:8a:d6:6c:ea:da:c3:7f:2c:ac:a5:
af:c0:02:ea:81:cb:65:b9:fd:0c:6d:46:5b:c9:1e:
ed:b2:ac:2a:1b:4a:ec:80:7b:e7:1a:51:e0:df:f7:
c7:4a:20:7b:91:4b:20:07:21:ce:cf:68:65:8c:c6:
9d:3b:ef:d5:c1

End Entity Certificate Snapshot

Certificate:

Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
04:00:00:00:00:01:44:4e:f0:42:47
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, OU=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA
Validity
Not Before: Feb 20 10:00:00 2014 GMT
Not After : Feb 20 10:00:00 2024 GMT
Subject: C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, CN=GlobalSign Organization Validation CA - SHA256 - G2
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption

Intermediate CA Snapshot

Certificate:[14]

Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
04:00:00:00:00:01:15:4b:5a:c3:94
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, OU=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA
Validity
Not Before: Sep 1 12:00:00 1998 GMT
Not After : Jan 28 12:00:00 2028 GMT
Subject: C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, OU=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
Public-Key: (2048 bit)
Modulus:
00:da:0e:e6:99:8d:ce:a3:e3:4f:8a:7e:fb:f1:8b:

Root CA/Trust Anchor Certificate