Trends and Lessons from Three Years Fighting Malicious Extensions


Nav Jagpal, Eric Dingle, Jean-Philippe Gravel, Panayiotis Mavrommatis, Niels Provos, Moheeb Abu Rajab, and Kurt Thomas, Google



Motivation

Chrome Extensions – What & Why?

- > Small add-ons.
- > Enhance browser experience.
- Chrome Extensions Distributed by Chrome Web Store.



Source: https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/overview

Extensions – Utility



Evernote Web Clipper

Offered by: https://www.evernote.com

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ 133,392 | **Productivity** | **...** 4,707,021 users



LastPass: Free Password Manager

Offered by: lastpass.com

★★★★ 28,279 | **Productivity** | **2** 7,934,137 users



Grammarly for Chrome

Offered by: grammarly.com

★★★★ 34,666 | **Productivity** | **2** 10,000,000+ users



Adblock Plus

Offered by: adblockplus.org

★★★★ 167,785 | Productivity | **2** 10,000,000+ users

While at the same time...





Goal

- Block newly submitted malicious extensions before publishing.
- > Take down existing malicious extensions present in the store.

Topics Discussed in this Research Study

Study on roughly 100,000 extensions submitted to Chrome Web Store in between January, 2012 - 2015.

- Design & implementation of security framework WebEval.
- > Trends of malicious extension in the wild.
- Impact of undetected extensions




WebEval

Design Constraints

- 1. Minimum malware installs.
- 2. Simplified human verification.
- 3. Time constrained.
- 4. Comprehensible, historical reports.
- 5. Tolerant to feature drift.

System Flow



Evaluation - Extension Execution Framework

Static Analysis

- Permission & content script
- Code obfuscation
- Files & directory structure

Dynamic Analysis

- Behavioral Suites
- Network events
- Chrome & DOM API calls


Developer Analysis

- Developer's last login
- Developer's registered email domain
- Developer's age

Extension Analysis

- > Total no. of installs
- Total no. of users rating the extension
- Average rating of extension

Scoring Extensions



Decision = {Block, Take Down, Good to Go}

Evaluation Dataset

Evaluation Window January, 2012 - 2015

Total Extensions Reviewed 99,818

Total Malicious Extension Found 9,523 (9.4% of all extensions)

Total Malicious Developers Found 2,339

Total Extensions Manually 10,120


Reviewed

Extensions Scan Rate 19,000/day (Approx.)



Source:https://cdn.onlinewebfonts.com/svg/img_510380.png

Accuracy - Precision & Recall



Overall Precision – 73.7%

Why Human Experts?

- Reduce false-positives & false negatives.
- Adaptation to new threats.
- Live deployment environment requires additional check.
- Time taken to decide 2.75 minutes per extension.




Key Indicators to Detect Malicious Extensions

- Modification of CSP headers.
- Uninstalling other extension.
- > Preventing uninstall of extensions.
- Chrome & DOM API calls.


Permissions - not really.

Detection Latency



Median of Detection Frame: 25 Minutes

Moving Towards Proactive Approach




Overall Blocked/Taken Down Extensions




Trends of Extension Abuse

Different Malicious Extensions Detected in the Wild



Prominent Extension Abuses


Facebook session hijacking



Source: https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2017/08/07171223/170831-facebook-malware-3.png

Prominent Extension Abuses

Ad injecting extensions



Source:http://www.myantispyware.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/QuickSearch_ads.jpg

Other Pertinent Threats

- Cryptocurrency miner.
- Banking thefts.
- Search leakage.
- User tracking.

CHROME'S ACHILLES' HEEL -

Malicious Chrome extensions infect 100,000-plus users, again

Over two months, seven extensions stole credentials and installed currency miners.

Source:


https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/05/malicious-chrome-extensions-infect-more-than-100000-users-again/



Impact of Malicious Extensions

False - Negatives

- Approx. 100 extensions affected 50 million users.
- Suggestion: Proactive approach.



Lessons Learned

- > Extensive abuse different from malicious binaries.
- Monetization driving force.
- > Tools required to handle new, unforeseen threats.

Limitations

- > Testing Extensions in Sandboxed Environment not favorable.
- Chrome Lockdown Policy way to bypass policy exists.
- Human resources issue in scaling such systems.

Conclusion

- ➤ Identified & reported 96.5% between January 2012 – 2015.
- > 50% extensions reported within 25 minutes.
- Human experts integral to framework.
- > False-negatives can have drastic impact.
- Evolutionary trends of extension abuse.
- Key challenges while detecting in live deployment environment.





Questions?