CHAPTER 11

Private Publics

New Media and Performances of Pakistani Identity from Party Videos to Cable News

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Two stories from Pakistan dominated my Twitter feed in early 2017. Several prominent bloggers and activists from Islamabad and Lahore went missing, presumably abducted.[1] The uncertainty around their absence created an opportunity for another iteration of critique of the Pakistani political and military classes' ongoing intimidation of journalists and activists and debate over the possibility of an independent public sphere.[2] The other story was that of Tayyaba, a 10-year-old girl who was repeatedly severely physically abused by her middle-class professional "employers."[3] This story developed on social media when pictures of the child's badly bruised face circulated along with the fact that her employer was actually a district judge. As interest built, the police were forced to investigate, and a case was opened against her abusers.

These two stories together illustrate parallel concerns about the nature and scope of media publics in Pakistan today. The story of the abducted bloggers was inserted into public discourse as the latest skirmish in the struggle to establish independent institutions that can hold the state accountable for its actions. Tayyaba's story, on the other hand, feeds an appetite for scandal, but it also shows how the boundary between domestic private spaces and media publics is porous in a way that historically has not been the case. Domestic workers from rural or poor urban families are

intimate witnesses to the private lives of urban middle-class and elite families. These private lives had been protected by class privilege from public scrutiny, but the growth of new media publics—on news and talk channels as well as on digital media—have created spaces where aspects of these private lives are made selectively available for broader audiences. That is, the domestic private is quite literally made public, made visible, and thus available for scrutiny.

The emergence of these new publics brings with it new norms for public performances of Pakistani identity, norms that combine elements of private conversation and interaction with already established rules for public behavior. Unlike the state-centric productions of Pakistani identity that dominated electronic media for almost the first 50 years of the nation's existence, the last 10 to 15 years have seen the emergence of the varied and conflicted media publics that we see today in dozens of television channels, radio stations, and of course, digital media. These media publics express a range of interests, logics, and practices such as journalistic identities, social codes of interactions, visual codes for set design and live coverage, and developmental discourses.

In this chapter, I focus on social codes of interaction to trace how private conversational norms are remediated in a range of media publics on YouTube, ranging from news outlets to informal and amateur videos of weddings, dance parties, and encounters with sex workers. These online spaces publicize more informal and intimate spaces of conversation, contestation, opinion, and socializing, and are a fascinating space of performance of Pakistani identity. The desires, anxieties and frustrations, and humor on display here give us a window into a Pakistan that is, I would argue, closer to the one that many of us live than the one we see performed and produced on more official channels.

I call these spaces the "private publics" of digital life in Pakistan in order to bring out the texture of online interactions that easily slide from sociability to hostility and back again. In contrast with the attempts to impose order, security, and civility in official media publics, these overlooked private publics reveal the untidy experiences of national attachment. Recent scholarship on media publics departs from the Habermasian investment in rational civic discourse and instead explores the practices, affects, and attachments at play in digital publics. I build on this scholarship to suggest that Pakistani identity is one of several rhetorical devices used in "acts of citizenship" rather than a steady attachment.[4]

Official Digital Publics: State and Activist Calls for Censorship and Regulation

Pakistan's digital cultures register on the international news radar largely in relation to censorship. For example, the government's 2012 ban on YouTube following the distribution of the film *Innocence of the Muslims* (2012) on that platform was widely reported.[5] Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority, the main regulatory body for television, and the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, which regulates the Internet, are both charged with censoring content in the name of national security and protecting Islamic values.[6] A number of activist groups challenge this frame for regulation of digital spaces. Bytes For All, which advocates for transparency, freedom of expression, and action against cyber harassment and bullying, was one of the main groups that objected to the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Ordinance, enacted in August 2016. The ordinance was supposed to deter hate speech and harassment, but contained sweeping language that could be used to suppress critique as well.[7] The tension between media activist groups and the state over the line between protection and censorship is evident in the small, but growing, research corpus on hate speech, harassment, and censorship that is gradually taking shape. Largely consisting of reports from domestic and foreign NGOs, this body of research focuses on the online harassment of women as well as on instances of physical violence against women in retaliation for their use of digital media.[8]

Much of the discourse on public/private distinctions centers on the movement of women across boundaries that are themselves mobile and mediated by class, region, and religiosity.[9] Thus, it is no surprise that some of the most visible contestations over older and newer conceptions of modernity take place in relation to women's bodies and public appearance. For example, Girls at Dhabas, which started around 2015, is a movement of mostly elite women who unapologetically enter traditionally male spaces such as *dhabas* (roadside teashops) and public parks or organize group bike rides on public roads as a way of protesting the harassment of women.[10] While Girls at Dhabas has received extensive news coverage in the English press, rural and working-class urban women who navigate male public spaces on a daily basis remain deeply vulnerable. They make the news only in the context of violence, as in the case of Tayyaba or that of four women killed in a village in northern Pakistan because a video of them enjoying themselves at a wedding was circulated on social media.[11]

In contrast to the official discourse on modesty, surveillance, and privacy, Pakistani YouTube videos reveal a messier reality. For example, a poor-quality undercover style video of a roadside pickup spot for sex workers in Karachi had almost 220,000 views as of mid-2018.[12] All we see is the occasional conversation between burqa-clad women and the driver of a car, motorbike, or rickshaw that ends when one of the women walks off the screen. The comments are almost all in Urdu in either *naksh* script or transliterated into Latin script, and are light-hearted in tone. One person wrote, "*Yar me yahan ata hun to mujhy to milti he nahi hai han 1 mili the par wo bekar the. Usny kaha. K baki achi achi gai v hai. Biking par*." (Man, I never find any when I come here. I did find one a week ago but she was useless. She said all the good ones have gone biking.) Another offered the tip, "*Tariq road ka mqrkit mein achi wali hain*." (Tariq Road market has the better ones.) The joking, informal tone of these comments is typical of the mode of talk in the thousands of comments on other similar YouTube videos. Such talk is expressive of modes of public life in Pakistan that display little concern for religious morality, social welfare, or any of the other concerns we see in state or NGO discourses on the Internet.

Theorizing Pakistani Digital Media Publics

By now, scholarship on digital publics has moved well beyond the analytic constraints of public sphere theory developed for a different medium and context to research the nature of conversation and interaction in these digital publics; the dynamics of their formation and persistence; and, the potential of these spaces to nurture, direct, intensify, or practice political affinities, affects, and actions. For example, Mimi Sheller and John Urry's call for a "sociology of mobilities" that asks us to recognize "relationships that involve the complex and fluid hybridizing of public-and-private life" is much better for understanding Pakistani identity than any attempt to neatly contain politics and dynamics of citizenship within distinct "public" and "private" spheres of action and thought—even if only as analytic constructs.[13] Not only has the state variously been in the hands of the military, the industrial elite, and the landowning elite, these sectors are often united by kinship and business ties. The interlocking military-feudal-industrial-bureaucratic alliances in Pakistan are crafted, cemented, and negotiated in ways that cut across governmental, public, private business, and familial interests. The state, civil society, and the media, in their institutions and practices, are best understood as the sedimentation of these relationships.[14]

Thus, only an understanding of the social that recognizes mobility and fluidity can accommodate publics constituted by the crisscrossing movement of media, bodies, actions, and affects evident in either the case of the young women who were killed because a video of them at a wedding was leaked, or in the mediated construction of Girls at Dhabas as the feminist face of Pakistan. These multilayered entanglements also shape the formal structures of media publics in Pakistan. The performance of Pakistani identity we see in talk shows, television dramas, news programs, and so forth is also, I argue, shaped by the remediation of private norms of gendered and classed behavior.

In addition to challenging the spatial segregation of public and private, digital media publics also require a reconsideration of the modes and norms of reasoned public conversation. Instead of assuming rational debate as the only legitimate form of public talk, it is necessary to recognize the different modes of conversation, interaction, and, simply, presence in digital publics such as those of YouTube. As Zizi Papacharissi notes in her work on affective publics, democratic participation needs to be civil, but need not be polite: "The distinction drawn defines politeness as etiquette-related, and civility as respect for the collective traditions of democracy."[15] While this does open up room for taking trolling and other forms of online vitriol as part of political speech rather than disruptive noise, Papacharissi remains interested in assessing these spaces for their political potential.[16] Liesbet Van Zoonen, Farida Vis, and Sabina Mihelj offer a useful corrective to this approach in their analysis of responses to an anti-Islam video. Focusing on the multiplication of viewpoints in relation to the video's original provocation rather than on dialogue and close networks of interaction, they argue for YouTube as a digital public in which new "acts and practices of (unlocated) citizenship" emerge.[17] These scholars open up room to consider sentiments such as anger, provocation, satire, or amusement as legitimate political affects. They show how the political dimension of digital publics can include discrete performances or acts of citizenship rather than the expressions of citizen selves. Finally, I draw on Aswin Punathambekar who brings out the temporal dimension of media publics when he asks:

> Instead of arguing endlessly about whether popular culture can serve as a staging ground or a terrain for learning and practicing skills that can then, in some stagist fashion, be applied in the realm of formal politics, another way to think about "entertaining politics" is to ask, "How do people entertain political matters?" To pose the

question this way is to wonder how talk about political matters gets woven into the rhythms of everyday mediatized lives.[18]

Tehzeeb, Ikhlaaq, and *Takalluf*: Norms of Civility on Pakistani Television

News and public affairs programming as well as television drama are, I argue, structured by shared understanding of the etiquette of public conversation. In this section, I outline the two discourses on the norms of public conversation that have shaped Pakistani television. The first is *Ganga-Jamani tehzeeb* (north Indian, Muslim, Urdu-speaking elite culture) with its elaborate norms of *takalluf* (deference, politeness) and *ikhlaq* (manners, morals), and the second is that of the journalistic conventions of the 24-hour news channel that have supplanted these norms in the multichannel era.

The hegemony of elite north Indian Urdu culture had always been challenged in Pakistan by regional cultures, notably by a very popular vision of rural Punjabi culture articulated in a series of films in the late 1970s and 1980s. These films featured the character Maula Jatt who "marked the emergence of a new type of a hero, one who was rural, loud, hypermasculine, unabashedly violent, fluent in colloquial Punjabi, and had very little to do with the nation or state."[19] Further, this character marked the popularity of new filmic conventions that, instead of prioritizing socially conscious stories, celebrated "vulgar comedy, 'dirty' dancing and charismatic Punjabi villainy."[20]

PTV's (Pakistan Television) hour-long Urdu dramas, drawing on a tradition of *zannana* literature and often written by leading Urdu playwrights, continued to use the Urdu-speaking elites' norms of *tehzeeb* (culture) to frame their depictions of domestic spaces and lives and their intersections with public life well into the 1990s.[21] Eventually, intrusions from outside the hegemonic national space forced a change. Satellite television and videocassette tapes introduced Pakistanis to foreign media in the 1980s, and the penetration of these media accelerated in the 1990s.

Some of the old norms persisted in the news publics crafted by privately owned channels like Geo News and Aaj TV in the early 2000s in the use of what I call "uncle talk." This masculine version of women's talk relies on the comfort of familiar norms and spaces. In particular, it reproduces the conversational norms of elite drawing rooms and semiprivate spaces where men who hold positions of public importance meet in private (social or

familial) contexts and hold forth on issues of public import. It is marked by elaborate codes of politeness and verbal markers of deference to those of higher status. Despite the growth of regional language channels, increased class diversity in on-air reporters and on talk shows, and freedom from direct state supervision, these new publics still largely reproduce the conversational norms of elite Urdu-speaking culture, especially in the use of linguistic markers of respect for status.[22]

However, public figures and politicians have developed a greater repertoire of performance styles that blend private conversational modes, uncle talk, and formal address and allow a more confrontational attitude. For example, in 2016, during a session of the National Assembly, Khwaja Aziz, the defence minister, admonished Shireen Mazari, a leading opposition politician, to "make her voice more feminine." An unidentified government backbencher chimed in, saying "Keep quiet, aunty!," illustrating how social norms of politeness and respect are used even as the speaker is telling Mazari that she belongs in a different—private—space. Mazari's party's spokesman responded that "Khawaja Asif should be hung upside down for his vulgarity and misbehavior, and should be beaten with a shoe 25 times in the morning and 25 times in the evening." Mazari herself also drew on familial, even feudal, norms by calling Asif "besharam and behaya" (lacking in shame or a sense of propriety) in a tweet.[23]

A more promising trend for challenging elite hegemony over televisual norms comes from the introduction of elements from the repertoire of 24-hour news channels around the world. Live reporting on location, person-on-the-street interviews, investigative journalism, and reality programs introduced a range of voices and locations not seen before on television. As television journalists sought to define their professional identities in relation to international norms of objectivity and reasoned debate, they began to distance themselves from the modes of "uncle talk." In its place, we now see the emergence of a more confrontational style that articulates elements of elite Urdu-speaking *tehzeeb* with vernacular performance styles and global norms.

For example, *Sar e Aam*, a popular weekend television program on ARY News, takes a sensationalist approach to investigative reporting. The name of the program means "in public" or "something done openly in public." Each episode is structured as an exposé of a social issue or problem that has traditionally been kept private and unseen. In an episode from 2017, shot entirely on location, the host Iqrar-ul-Hassan invites viewers to accompany him into a beauty parlor, a back alley in a poor neighborhood,

and a "respectable" private residence to see the realities of prostitution in Karachi.[24] We hear Hassan negotiate a meeting and rates with the woman who runs a sex work business from a beauty parlor. More disturbingly, we see the visible and sustained distress of the women when Hassan and his camera crew burst into their space. Under loud, dramatic music, we can hear women crying as they cower on the floor and even grab Hassan's feet, begging him to stop. One woman implores Hassan to stop, saying that her husband will kill her, but he continues to demand the women uncover their faces and talk with him. The only concession he makes is to, impatiently, assure them that their faces will be blurred on television. However, his confrontational manner alters radically when he meets with a sex worker who has a more exclusive clientele. This woman, who is presented as young, educated, and middle class, is treated with compassion and Hassan's tone is polite and even mildly flirtatious. The episode ends in her bedroom with Hassan addressing the viewers asking them to make the changes in social norms needed to end this kind of exploitative sex work.

On the show's YouTube channel, this episode has over 1.5 million views and over 1,100 comments as of May 2018. Many of the commenters chide Hassan for his rough behavior: "Iqrar Bhai I respect you and ur programe. If u can do programe then do on Poverty which is the main root of 80 % problemes. Why u are teasing these innocent women." Another person asked "why don't you raid in five star hotels," and yet another noted "All faces are visible enough. Not sure what they are blurring." Other commenters, though, were simply fans: "Bhai iqrar I am big fan of you. . . . please I want meet you" and "I just love ur shoe u and ur show amazing, fabulous, brilliant, fantastic e.g u have a great sene of humour." Yet others expressed disapproval in religious terms, but the overall tone of the comments was one of distressed compassion: "Think some things are better not to be revealed or exposed so he should have just stayed away from exposing brothels; no point in making these poor women feel even more embarrassed about their lives. . . ."

The negotiations between religious beliefs, gendered ideologies about protecting women, class critiques, fandom, and disapproval of the host's techniques showcase the range of ways in which ordinary Pakistanis think and talk about uncomfortable issues. There is nothing remarkable about these responses except for their utterance in a shared public space. Like the talk shows on Geo News, family dramas on PTV, or politicians' tweet wars, *Sar e Aam* and the comments it elicited on YouTube remediates private norms in different ways for different audiences. In the collective, read

as acts of citizenship, these comments show a more nuanced version of private and public life in Pakistan than that revealed, for example, by the government's attempts to create a sanitized Internet.

Bickering between politicians, long-standing skepticism toward state media, and newer disillusionment with the urban and sensationalist bias of commercial media has contributed to the growing importance of social media such as Twitter and Facebook as important sources of breaking stories, leaks, comments by politicians, and so forth. For example, the efforts undertaken by cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan, who became Prime Minister in 2018, to mobilize public support are reported and debated in social media platforms such as Twitter as much as they are in news channels or newspapers. The dynamics of the digital publics that take shape around formal politics is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is a necessary complement to the analysis offered here.

The Private Publics of Digital Pakistan on YouTube

I stumbled upon the vast and varied world of Pakistani party, dance, and "sexy" videos while doing research for another project and was immediately fascinated. Following a trail of links, starting with documentary videos exploring Pakistan through either the eyes of either a white or Pakistani-British traveler, it took only a few clicks to reach a different set of "documentary" videos. Unlike diasporic narratives of return and discovery[25] that reproduce the aesthetics of documentary video, these party and "sexy" videos display all the signifiers of unauthorized, amateur videos captured on a camera phone: poor lighting and focus, uneven sound levels, jerky camera movements, and hastily composed framing. They are mostly uploaded to YouTube by ordinary users, but also by aggregator channels that specialize in subgenres such as *mujras* (erotic dances by women or *hijras* performed almost exclusively for all-male groups at parties, weddings, and so on), party videos, videos of college girls, and so forth. The videos that meet the criteria of a "private public" can be grouped into five categories by subject matter:

- private videos of dance recitals or performances by school or college girls that have circulated beyond their intended context;[26]
- illicit recordings of *mujras*;
- recordings of video sex chats or sexual encounters that are almost certainly circulated without consent;

- amateur videos of "underground" dance parties in elite homes or clubs;
- news or documentary clips that have been recoded for sexual content.

The descriptions for many of these videos explicitly state the desire to make private spaces available in public. When directed toward elites—coed groups or women—this impulse undermines the privilege that have kept elites protected from public scrutiny. In other instances, such as videos of private dances for all-male crowds, the videos reinscribe gendered hierarchies by inviting a shared voyeurism. The comment spaces are overwhelmingly male—judging by names and the language in the comments that use a mixture of everyday Urdu, English, regional languages, and, sometimes, Hindi. Urdu comments are sometimes written in *naqsh* script but are more often transliterated in Latin script.

What we see in the unofficial "private publics" of YouTube videos is a significantly different vision of Pakistan. The topics are actually quite similar to those discussed in more official spaces: the use of women's bodies to draw national, ethnic, religious, and class boundaries; the airing of ethnic or national rivalries and resentments; debates over women's rights couched in the opposition between Islamic values and Western modernity, and so forth. The difference lies in tone and in the presence of two other categories of comments: critiques of the aesthetic and technical quality of the video and brief, strangely poignant requests for contact with the subjects of the video (e.g., simply "plz numbe"). The comments I analyze below were in response to three YouTube videos: a private *mujra*,[27] an amateur documentary about an underground nightclub in Karachi,[28] and a video of a young woman practicing a dance in a classroom at the University of Lahore.[29]

I argue that the version of Pakistan expressed here is characterized by fragmented attachments, local desires and concerns, lazy provocation, and casual sociability and not the desire for legitimacy, civility, or accountability expressed in official discourses—statist or activist. For example, people looking for evidence of political activity might find it difficult to know what to make of the following exchange on a video of dance practice at the University of Lahore:

> kuch Khuda ka khuff khao yaar. . . . (Man, have at least some fear of God) (ItsKKJ)
>
> You're boring. (aqib2000)

These comments are performative acts of citizenship with such diffuse motivations and ambitions that to look for any kind of indication of potential for political affiliation let alone action seems perverse. Nonetheless, I argue that the utterances and interactions in these spaces tell us as much about what it means to be Pakistani as any official discourse. More so, they help us understand the everyday experience of living citizenship as one form of attachment among many.

Even though most comments focused on drawing national, ethnic, religious, and class boundaries, often using the videos either as examples of "Western" or Indian contamination of a Muslim society or as illustrations of progress toward social tolerance, the tone was rarely serious or coherent. The pair of comments on the nightclub video below are, respectively, stream of consciousness and ritual condemnation:

> i dont see whats so disgusting about this i think Pakistan should tone it down a bit. remove currupt asshole . . . i mean government officials. like come on . . . youth culture will always thrive this isnt a scandal its a revolution LONG LIVE FREEDOM (qaesar09)

> *lanat ho kutay ki naslon yahan janay walon par bc apna deen imaan bhool kar apnay bappoon ko follow kar rhay ho Doob maro Allah karay ya tm logo k liay sharam ki bat honi chyan haram khooron Allah karay asa azaab nazill ho jis s tum logon k hosh thikhanay ajain*!:@ ("curses on the descendants of dogs who go [to] these clubs because they have forgotten their faith and follow their fathers. You should drown of shame. This should be a source of shame for you bastards. May God punish you in such a way that it brings you back to your senses!") (someone501)

An equal number of commenters mocked the young people shown in the video as "wannabees." Yet others asked for the location of the club, "anyone who knows the location of this place should post it immeidiately . . . It looks fab for couples . . . I would be a regular goes so anyone who knows about the location. . . . Please do post . . . thanks." Another strand of comments was more reflective, wondering, "[h]aving night clubs is not a big deal but the thing is that what we gonna do with our life, imitating west by doing all wrong things that never ever being considered good even in noble western families."

While the comments on the nightclub focused on anxieties about au-

thenticity, the comments on the dance practice at the University of Lahore were split between ethnic insults targeting Punjabis (Lahore is the largest city in Punjab) and contesting the location of the performance by decoding the accents and the furniture in the room. One person declared, "its fake video. I am study in university of Lahore and we not have that kind of class. . . ." Several others claimed the young women could not be Pakistani because of their accents:

> @tamsadeas this is either in america or britain, listen to their accent at the start you idiot.

> WTF. . . . do u really think this fuckin accent can be from any pubjabi girl. . . . fuck u uploader!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

A small group of people voiced the same concerns about violating the young women's privacy as did commenters on the *Sar e Aami* episode. For example, one person both countered criticism from others and critiqued the uploader: "man come on ease up its just a dance for fun and sum stupid fck uploaded it. dont get angry pakistani brothers girls these days r changin." Some of the angriest and most violent comments were on the video of the *mujra*. For example, one person left two comments: "Punjabi girls are all cheaters. Never marry them" and "these bitches are on the increase . . . FUCK YOU BITCHES!" On the other side of the affective and political spectrum was this dispassionate observation on an older version of the nightclub video, "Bad upload. No sound after about 3 minutes."

In lieu of a conclusion, I'll end with a sequence of comments on the University of Lahore video that illustrates the range of emotions, opinions, desires, and provocations that are, I argue, typical of the comments on this genre of video:

> punjabi Randi. . . . (gulfam khan)

> Once in Pakistani universities and other educationak institutes students were practicing for educational debates and other developmental activities. . . . May ALLAH protects us (Syed Akhtar)

> clumsy steps (Abhi Jeet)

> She can come over to India and have a peaceful life away from Talibans. (LoveALL)

She needs more practice. (slickr48)

i want to marry that girl so i get her to dance for me every night for free lol (Sajid Ali)

What should we make of lazy insult, despair over decline, deliberate needling, aesthetic critique, and (ironic?) patriarchal humor in close textual (but not necessarily spatial or temporal) proximity? Artists, social commentators, and scholars have long lamented the underimagined nature of Pakistan. Filmmaker Sabiha Sumar says in relation to a lack of a "tradition of filmmaking" in Pakistan that it cannot develop "unless we can ask, what is Pakistan about, what is our vision, what is our self-image; unless Pakistan can define its dreams; unless Pakistan can define this very clearly and bring on board the majority of this country to agree to that vision—that dream, that self-image—we cannot create anything successfully. We do not have a nation."[30] In the face of such longing for identity, it is tempting to resolve the messiness of these digital private publics into neat social and political positions. But it might be more productive to instead spend some time in these spaces and, as Aswin Punathambekar suggests, entertain the political, "to give attention to, carefully consider, contemplate, think about, give thought to, support, and at times, tolerate an idea, a suggestion, and, of course, feelings (the affective dimensions of the political)."[31] In the process, we might discover a way of being that comes closer to the experiences of citizenship, belonging, and disaffection in Pakistani digital publics.

Notes

1. "Pakistan: Bloggers Feared Abducted," Human Rights Watch, January 11, 2017. https://www.hrw.org

2. The targeted killing in 2015 of social activist Sabeen Mahmud, who had worked to create, both literally and figuratively, a public space for liberal critique and expression, was a turning point for the urban liberal class.

3. Awais Yousufzai, "Tayyaba Case: Judge, Wife Deny Torturing Child," Geo News, January 16, 2017. https://www.geo.tv

4. Liesbet Van Zoonen, Farida Vis, and Sabina Mihelj. "Performing Citizenship on YouTube: Activism, Satire and Online Debate around the Anti-Islam Video *Fitna*," *Critical Discourse Studies* 7 (4) (2010): 252.

5. See for example, Ali Sethi, "Banistan: Why Is YouTube Still Blocked in Pakistan?" *New Yorker*, August 7, 2013. https://www.newyorker.com

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12. Jawed Rafi, "Prostitution at Back of Mazar-e-Quaid," YouTube video, 11:58, May 28, 2013. https://www.youtube.com

13. Mimi Sheller and John Urry, "Mobile Transformations of Public and Private Life," *Theory, Culture & Society* 20 (3) (2003): 108.

14. Ayesha Siddiqa, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007).

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16. Zizi Papacharissi, "Affective Publics and Structures of Storytelling: Sentiment, Events and Mediality," *Information, Communication & Society* 19 (3) (2016): 310. http://dx.doi.org

17. Van Zoonen, Vis, and Mihelj, "Performing Citizenship," 260.

18. Aswin Punathambekar, "Satire, Elections, and Democratic Politics in Digital India," *Television & New Media* 16 (4) (2015): 394.

19. Iqbal Sevea, "'Kharaak Kita Oi!': Masculinity, Caste, and Gender in Punjabi Films," *BioScope* 5 (2) (2014): 131–32. DOI: 10.1177/0974927614548645.

20. Wajiha Raza Rizvi, "Visual Pleasure in Pakistani Cinema (1947–2014)," *International Journal of Asia Pacific Studies* 10 (2) (2014): 77. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm

21. Shuchi Kothari, "From Genre to *Zanaana*: Urdu Television Drama Serials and Women's Culture in Pakistan," *Contemporary South Asia* 14 (3) (2005): 289–305.

22. For a detailed analysis of how the host of the very popular religious talk show *Aalim Online* embodied a modern, cultured version of this persona, see Shumaila Ahmed, "Islam, Media and the Construction of Religious Authority in Pakistan: The Case of Aamir Liaquat Husain," master's thesis, University of Wollongong in Dubai, 2014. http://www.academia.edu

23. Raza Khan, "Khawaja Asif's 'Vulgar' Outburst against Shireen Mazari Angers PTI," *Dawn*, June 8, 2016. http://www.dawn.com

24. Sar e Aam, "Karachi Ke Tariq Road Mein Chalta Hua Ghaleez Karobar?—Iqrar Ul Hassan," YouTube video, 34:23, May 5, 2017. https://www.youtube.com

25. For examples, see the British Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce's "Pakistan Calling" collection of videos. https://www.thersa.org

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28. Naima Chudrey, "Karachi Night Club," YouTube video, 9:38, October 2, 2009. https://www.youtube.com

29. Saknofear, "Universty of Lahore Dance Practice in Class Room," YouTube video, 3:09, February 22, 2009. https://www.youtube.com

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31. Punathambekar, "Satire, Elections, and Democratic Politics in Digital India," 398.

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