

SHUO TIAN

stian@tamu.edu | (979) 703-9495 | www.shuotian.org
Texas A&M University | Department of Economics | College Station, TX 77843-4228

EDUCATION

Ph.D. candidate, Economics, Texas A&M University, 2022 (Expected)

M.A., Management, Fudan University, 2016

B.A., Physics, University of Science and Technology, 2012

RESEARCH INTEREST

Microeconometrics, Empirical Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomics

WORKING PAPER

Inference on Number of Potential Bidders in Selective Entry (Job Market Paper)

This paper examines and justifies methods of recognizing potential bidders in practical auction data. I develop a selective entry model with an unknown number of potential bidders, and compare it with the selective entry model with constructed potential bidders set. Based on the difference between distributions recovered from the two models, I propose an approach to rationalize the construction methods of potential bidders set. Moreover, I suggest a test to distinguish whether any construction of potential bidders set is plausible and reasonable in terms of bidders' private values and beliefs. Finally, I apply these methods on procurement auction data from the Californian Department of Transportation.

Selective Entry in Incomplete Procurement Auctions

This paper studies the entry behaviors in procurement auctions of incomplete contracts held by the California Department of Transportation. Under a selective entry model framework, I construct a model considering both endogenous participation and incompleteness of contracts. The model explains the entry behaviors in incomplete procurement auctions. Based on the model, I structurally estimate the impact on entry behaviors of incompleteness. Furthermore, I also compare the model to models without endogenous participation or incompleteness of contracts. It shows that estimation will be biased when neglecting entry behaviors or incompleteness in procurement auctions.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Signaling in Land Market Auctions and Housing Prices in China (with Yonghong An, Jing Li, and Junfu Zhang)

This paper investigates an important factor of China's high housing prices: local governmental signaling in land market auctions. We first identify that the winning price of a land auction affects the nearby housing prices positively and such effect could be temporary. We propose a structural model to explain the phenomena. In the model, a local government strategically sends a signal to bidders on possible factors that may increase the value of the auctioned land. The signal affects bidders valuations and the winning prices. Using the model and data on land auctions and housing prices, we structurally estimate the contribution of governmental signaling on high housing prices in China.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE**Instructor**

ECON 202 - Principles of Economics, Summer 2020

Teaching Assistant

ECON 611 - Foundations of Macroeconomic Theory (with recitations), Spring 2021

ECMT 463 - Introduction to Economics (with recitations), Spring 2021

ECMT 675 - Econometrics I (with recitations), Fall 2020

ECMT 680 - Financial Econometrics (with recitations), Spring 2020,

ECON 460 - Intro Math Economics (with recitations), Fall 2019

ECON 660 - Math Economics (with recitations), Fall 2019

ECMT 680 - Financial Econometrics (with recitations), Spring 2019,

ECON 460 - Intro Math Economics (with recitations), Fall 2018

ECON 660 - Math Economics (with recitations), Fall 2018

ECON 630 - Microeconomic Theory II (with recitations), Spring 2018

ECON 636 - Macroeconomic Theory I (with recitations), Fall 2017

ECON 330 - Economic Development, Spring 2017

CONFERENCE

25th Texas Econometrics Camp, 2020

24th Texas Econometrics Camp, 2019

91st Southern Economic Association Annual Meeting, 2021 (Scheduled)

AWARD

Texas A&M University Department of Economics Assistantship, 2016-2022

SOFTWARE**Proficient**

R, Matlab, Stata, C, Java

Basic

Python, L^AT_EX, Mathematica, ArcGIS

LANGUAGE

English (Fluent)

Chinese (Native)