Michael Eldred
On Human Temporality

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Recasting Whoness Da Capo

εἷς ἐμοὶ μύριοι, ἐὰν ἄριστος ἦι

One is tens of thousands to me, if the best.
Herakleitos, Diels/Kranz Fragment 49

Contents

Foreword

Da capo – once again from the beginning. Why a fresh start? This inquiry is an attempt to remedy an oversight that has beset the Western mind for millennia, since the very beginnings of philosophy. The oversight consists in the misconception of time, a phenomenon so subtle and elementary as to have misled thinking into confusing time with other phenomena as surrogates. Thus time itself has been conceived as a kind of movement and especially, for the sake of ease of conception, has been spatialized in a variety of different ways. A spatial movement is then counted off as time, the most superficial conception of time inherited already from Aristotle's *Physics.* The spatial movement from which time is counted off may that of the planets (Plato's *Timaios*) through to the motion of light in Einsteinian relativistic space-time. Despite the efforts of thinkers over two-and-a-half millennia, the phenomenon of time is highly susceptible to spatial relapse through which the phenomenon itself is lost. The spatialization of time leads to topsy-turvy conceptions of the world and of ourselves, as I hope will become plain through a careful, patient reading.

On another path, the fundamental question initiating Greek philosophy, the question concerning being, was deflected into the metaphysical question concerning the being *of beings*, beings *as* beings or beings *qua* beings, i.e. their 'beingness' (οὐσία). The formulation in Aristotle's seminal *Metaphysics* reads τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν, i.e. the being simply insofar as it is a being. It is fair to say that today's prevailing Anglo-American philosophy no longer understands this 'qua' (ᾗ) that stands for the *ontological difference* between a being and its being. It knows of no ontological difference! This oversight is no mere oversight, but a wilful closure of the mind paving the way to practising a kind of philosophy that cuts off access to historical time as if, with the modern scientific age and a globalized economy, history had come to an end.

The question concerning how being *itself*, prior to any relationship to beings, is to be conceived remained unasked, hanging in the air, with a merely implicit, tacit connection with time that was not raised into the light of explicitness. 'Being' for the Greeks meant implicitly 'perduring, standing presence' (ständige Anwesenheit), a meaning that grants the present a preferential status among the temporal dimensions. Only as late as the twentieth century, with Heidegger's thinking, was the question concerning the meaning of being finally liberated from its metaphysical strictures as the investigation of beings in their 'beingness' to ask for the

meaning of being itself, that was shown to be temporal. The temporality of this originary time ("ursprüngliche Zeit" *Sein und Zeit* 1927), however, could no longer be conceived in the traditional way as derivative of any kind of linear movement, i.e. as any kind of linear succession, and thus linearly spatialized either as a straight line or a circle or some other linear variation thereof.

Rather, this originary time prior to any movement whatsoever is *existential*, which misleads modern philosophical and scientific thinking to classify it as 'merely' subjective, as a subjective 'impression', 'experience' or 'feeling' of time within subjective consciousness vis-à-vis an external, objective time that is pinned down 'objectively' by counting it off some physical movement or other. Hence the tendency within Anglo-American philosophy of science and in physics itself to regard time as an 'illusion', especially as an illusion generated by the brain. Subjectivity, objectivity, material cause, etc. all belong to the panoply of orthodox modern philosophy and science that feel no need to question their centuries-old clichés of thought, especially since they remain so unembarrassedly proud of the successful mathematization of the sciences.

The traces of originary, genuinely existential time can be found in the Platonic and Aristotelean conceptions of the psyche, or soul, that is open to the present through sense perception, to the past through memory and recollection with its regrets, remorse, celebration and commemoration, and to the future through phenomena such as expectation, hope, fear and longing. Even the Platonic conception of memory, in particular, is itself not free of spatialization. The psyche or soul – that may with care be recovered as the site for such three-dimensional temporal openness – has long since been renounced and abandoned in the modern age in favour of internal subjective consciousness that is both individuated and posited as confronting and encountering an external, objective world. This internalization of the psyche as individual consciousness introduces the dichotomy between inside and outside that characterizes today's thinking, all of which is infected in one way or another by a Cartesian dualism between res cogitans and res extensa, subjectivity and objectivity, inside and outside. With the necessary care, starting from an alternative starting-point in the pure, pre-spatial, three-dimensional temporality of the psyche will allow the pitfalls of modern subject/object thinking to be skirted, pitfalls that inevitably lead back to ancient entrenched conceptions under another name. The individuation and individualization of the psyche, for instance, are not taken for granted in this inquiry as self-evident and beyond questioning, but are conceptually developed. And the psyche itself is not conceived as being located anywhere at all, neither inside nor outside.

The Hegelian conception that all movement and change is driven by contradiction and that all beings are infected by negation will be shown to be intimately related to the temporally three-dimensional focus of the mind. Thus, starting

with a conception of three-dimensional time is a kind of oblique substitute for the beginning of Hegel's speculative system with its dialectic of being and nothing that results in the category of becoming. As far as I am aware, no one has yet attempted to 'update' Hegel's starting-point for his system with pure being by bringing its temporal meaning into play.

In the Western tradition, starting with Aristotle's *Physics*, all physical movement and change in the world has been, and continues to be, conceived as movement along the time-line of one-dimensional time. As we shall see, time has to be linearized in order for the *absolute will to power over movement* of all kinds to gain and maintain its grip. By contrast, three-dimensional time frees movement along the one-dimensional time-line from its bedfellow, the linear concatenation of cause and effect, thus enabling a conception of free movement that pertains above all to us mortal humans as we exist in the world. This starts with a phenomenology of the free movement of the mind within the psyche that, by sticking to the phenomena as they show themselves without interposing theoretical constructs, ably defies neuroscientific attempts to bring mental movement under material, brain-based, causally explanatory control, thus extinguishing human freedom altogether.

It is the tacitly presupposed subjectivist metaphysics, with its unquestioned dichotomy between subject and object, that allows modern science, committed as it unconditionally is to 'objective' causal explanation, to confidently assume, by begging the question with an audacious petitio principii, that the movement of the mind within the psyche is 'merely' subjective. By jettisoning this dogma of the subject/object split that originated with Descartes, movement in the world itself is no longer (conceived to be or interpreted as) constricted by the Aristotelean ontology of productive, efficient movement. Rather, it is allowed to unfold in a kind of movement sui generis called *interplay* through which the sociating movement of mutual estimation can be conceived as free, albeit a freedom that necessarily encounters the reciprocal resistance inherent in power plays of all kinds.

In particular, power plays of mutual estimation are played out in the ubiquitous *medium of thingified value* that will be shown to be the medium sociating the dissociated individuals in modern, so-called 'market-based societies' in a globalized economy. The accumulation of thingified value turns out to be the hidden underlying circular movement – otherwise, with cunning ignorance, given the benign label of the "invisible hand" (Adam Smith) – that constrains, induces and even dictates the movement and pace of life of such societies, thus making a mockery of liberal freedom. Is this medium existentially toxic, tainting our humanity in many subtle ways, even beyond our strictly economic lives?

To follow through consistently with substituting the role of being in thinking with its temporal meaning requires gradually developing an alternative conceptual

terminology that begins already with a temporalizing of the traditional conception of *essence* as the substantial whatness of a being to a verbal *essencing*, no longer of beings, but of *essents.* Even the venerable concept of ontology eventually has to be temporalized as *temporalogy.* All this is part of a temporalogical hermeneutic recasting da capo of the world, including human being itself *as* human essencing. This is in order to finally escape the hermeneutic orbit of today's entrenched subjectivist ontology in favour of a conception of essencing in three-dimensional time as *whoness.* The question then becomes: who are we, no longer as human *beings*, and certainly not fundamentally *as* a species of animal (a kind of *whatness*), but existentially *as* human *essents?*

A word on method: as a philosophical work, this inquiry employs the method of hermeneutic phenomenology that moves by successively conceptualizing phenomena in a connected way, rather than the subjectivist empiricist methodology of modern science or the favoured Anglo-American, adversarial method of -ism positions postulated and defended by argument. Empiricist methodology proceeds *epistemologically* from hypotheses formulated in the framework of an explanatory scientific theory that are verified or falsified by being tested *predictively* against experimental data. Truth is conceived as predictability of factual movement that, in turn, proves itself – above all, to be useful – through the effectiveness with which the applied theory controls movement, of whatever kind it may be. The crucial question of time focused on in today's attempts by modern physics to finally discover the 'holy grail' of a theory of quantum gravity uniting general relativity with quantum indeterminacy is dealt with as the quest for a thoroughly mathematized theory that can be empirically tested by observation of quantum and cosmological phenomena to verify or falsify it. The theory's mathematically formulated hypotheses themselves rely on uninterrogated preconceptions about how the phenomena of interest are to be approached and scientifically explained in a predictive, preferably strictly causal, manner.

By contrast, the method of hermeneutic phenomenology makes progress by going backwards to interrogate the tacitly in-built preconceptions through which the most elementary, foundational phenomena are preconceived – and thus appraised, estimated – in order to attain thought-through concepts. Everything hangs on how these elementary phenomena are *interpreted* conceptually, rather than asserting any postulates of one kind or another. Naïve preconceptions of elementary phenomena - to wit, of time and movement - already distort how they show themselves and are (mis)interpreted. The preconceptions are all embedded in a hermeneutic circle that is hard to escape because, once it is entered (and it is always already entered in a given historical age), it is consistent and therefore

self-reinforcing. In this sense, the hermeneutic circle is pernicious, and only the simplest of questions can break its spell.

The crucial point at issue in the present context is whether time itself is to be conceived as a linear dimension (it makes no difference whether the line is imagined geometrically as straight, circular or curved) or as a pre-spatial, three-dimensionally temporal openness, with all the radical consequences that flow from the latter option. It is no longer taken as self-evident, after two-and-a-half millennia, that time and space are on a par as elementary phenomena, thus allowing them to be tied together in a concept of space-time, whether mathematized or not, in which space inevitably is cast as the dominant partner. The concept of three-dimensional time can only prove its mettle by opening up an alternative understanding of the everyday existential world and ourselves that comes closer to the phenomena themselves in an alternative hermeneutic circle, rather than obscuring them with the constructs of scientific theories or basic postulates asserting the nature of what is called 'reality'. A path of conceptually thinking through the phenomena themselves in an interconnected way is offered to see where it leads. Entering upon such a path demands, of course, an open mind prepared to put its prejudices in abeyance in order, perhaps, to gain an alternative viewpoint that reverses the ingrained topsy-turviness of today's mind. Habits of thought are perhaps the hardest to overcome, especially when they have been handed down over millennia and are inculcated in each new generation from birth. Since thinking itself is a movement, it takes time for thoughts to – slowly – come to mind, and therefore demands patience.

ME Cologne, October 2023

1 Imaginative essencing in three-dimensional time

1.1 Temporally three-dimensional imagining

Imagine a situation, simply, without any theoretical scientific construction upon it. It could be any kind of scene, whether visually vivid to the mind's eye or not. The situation, comprising all its occurrences (which are here not at all restricted to physical occurrences) could be temporally situated in the *past*, the *present* or the *future*, or even temporally indeterminate as simply imagined, as a situation that perhaps could be, thus coming from a vague future or even as already vividly present as, for instance, in a reverie. No matter how the imagination situates the situation temporally, it presents itself to the *mind* in the present. The imagination thus presupposes (for its conception) the three temporal *dimensions* themselves whence the imagined situation presents itself, coming to mind. These three dimensions (which must not be taken in the mathematical sense of dimension) must be given beforehand, and they must be given as dimensions *through* which the imagined situation can *pass* (Greek διαμετρεῖν) and thus come to mind and be *understood* as such-and-such a situation with all that occurs in it. Where they come to mind is the *psyche*, the seat of the imagination with its (active or passive) power of presencing from the three temporal dimensions and its mental capacity to understand interpretively.

1.1.1 As such-and-such

Hence the mind is that faculty of the three-dimensionally temporally open psyche which enables a temporally given situation to be understood or misunderstood in some way or other, *as* such-and-such. This 'as' is already an implied reference to the hermeneutic nature of all mental understanding. It has the consequence

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1 Many years of experience with published English translations have led me to doing all translations from the Greek and German myself.

that there can be no facts that are not already interpreted in one way or another. The most elementary categories of the understanding, too, such as 'something', are hermeneutic in nature, as we shall see. These elementary categories are hard to see explicitly as such and therefore are mostly taken for granted, even by thinking with a pretension to being philosophical. Without these constantly used, elementary categories to interpret what comes to mind, we would not understand anything at all. We would not be human.

The psyche's faculty of mental understanding needs to come into view in its simplicity and not be *explained* in some way or other as emerging from or caused by anything else, or *why* it understands a situation the way it does, etc. Rather the focus has to be on seeing the simple phenomenon itself: the mind understands situations, occurrences that present themselves (or simply: presence) in the psyche *as* such-and-such.

1.1.2 The starting-point of Hegel's *Logik*

> Im Hinblick auf den Titel *Sein und Zeit* könnte man nun von *Ontochronie* sprechen. Hier steht χρόνος an der Stelle von λόγος. Aber wurden beide nur ausgewechselt? Nein! Es gilt vielmehr, alles von Grund auf und unter Übernahme der wesentlichen Motive der Frage nach dem Sein neu zu entfalten.
> Martin Heidegger *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes* GA32:144

> With regard to the title *Being and Time* one could now speak of *ontochrony.* Here χρόνος stands in the place of λόγος. But have the two only been swapped around? No! Rather, everything has to be unfolded anew from the bottom up, taking on board the essential motives motivating the question concerning being.

As is well-known, Hegel's *Logik,* the foundation of his dialectical system, starts with being and nothingness, Sein und Nichts, which are initially indistinguishable; they are the same (dasselbe). One could say that for Hegel, the mind is initially a blank, imagining nothing, and nothing is the same as pure being, both lacking as they do any differentiation or determination whatsoever through negation to mark them off from each other: being is nothingness, and nothingness is being, and the dialectic of being and nothingness does not lead to any movement. Hegel calls on us to follow the mind initially thinking pure indeterminacy that admits no differentiation. This starting-point for the *Logik* is purportedly time-less. It is purely logical, an achievement of pure rational thinking prior to any experience of the world. It is moot whether thinking can ever be timeless. Is not pure indeterminacy for the mind pure presence? And does not thinking pure indeterminacy amount to the blank mind staring into dimensions of pure presence, into *unmoving* time itself? Does not the purity of this incipient thinking consist in its not thinking any-

thing, any thing, any entity? For his part, Hegel only comes to conceive time in his system with the *Naturphilosophie*, along with space, thus adhering closely to traditional thinking on time and space as on a par with each other. His treatment of time is a paraphrase of Aristotle's.[2] Hegel is also one of the thinkers who, like Plato in his *Timaios*, conceive a spatialization of time as the 'eternal' circling of the celestial bodies. One could say that Hegel misses the starting-point.

In stark contrast to Hegel's starting-point, mine is with the experience of originary, open, three-dimensional time itself that has only a superficial resemblance with traditional linear time. This will become apparent as we proceed. If, after Heidegger, being (der Sinn von Sein überhaupt, *Sein und Zeit* §83 and passim) means time,[3] then this simple elementary phenomenon of originary, three-dimensional time (rather than the superficial conception of time as counted off movement) is the appropriate one to choose as starting-point. It is altogether prior to movement and therefore does not 'flow'. If it is originary, it must be thought through first of all, prior to any further phenomena whose thinking-through already presupposes a conception of more elementary phenomena, namely, in this case, the phenomenon of originary time in its simple, pure, temporally three-dimensional openness for presencing and absencing.

1.2 The fourth temporal dimension

The three temporal dimensions are given to the psyche's imagination as a *unity* of *three-dimensional time* that is passed through to the imagining psyche endowed with the mental faculty of, or capacity for, understanding. This latter passing-through (from Greek διαμετρεῖν, 'to pass or measure through, hence traverse', German: durchmessen) constitutes the *fourth temporal dimension*[4] through which unified three-dimensional time passes and is proffered to the psyche, thus appropriating the psyche to three-dimensional time to which it then *belongs in an identity*. Although playing into each other, each temporal dimension is kept apart, distinct from the others, thus enabling the psyche's mental faculty to situate the imagined situation as one that is present *now* in the present, or one that was *earlier* and is therefore *refused* presence in the present, or one that *may* come to pass *later* from

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2 For more detail cf. 'The Time of History' in my *A Question of Time* (2015b) and Heidegger *Sein und Zeit* § 82 a) footnote 1.

3 "Offenbart sich die Zeit selbst als Horizont des Seins?" ("Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of being?" Heidegger *Sein und Zeit* § 83 final sentence. Cf. Eldred *A Question of Time* Chapter 4 'Being Time Space' (2015b).

4 Cf. Heidegger 'Zeit und Sein' (1962) in *Zur Sache des Denkens.*

the future and is therefore *withheld* from the present. Now, earlier and later are situated in the three open temporal dimensions of present, past and future, and, as we shall soon see, do not necessarily imply a movement from later through now to earlier, i.e. from the future through the present into the past. The temporal dimensions themselves are unmoving or, more precisely, prior to any movement whatsoever, including that of mental essencing (see below). For the most part it will be convenient to speak simply of three-dimensional time, the fourth dimension or unified 'passing-through' to the psyche being implicitly understood as the *psyche's belonging to three-dimensional time in an identity.* They are thus 'the same' (τὸ αὐτό). Time is given to the psyche as a gift that is, ambiguously, both enpropriating and appropriating. The appropriating passing-through may also be conceived conversely as a stretching-out, or ex-tension of the psyche into the three temporal dimensions that also play into, interleave or even dovetail with, each other, as we shall see in more detail below. The psyche is exposed to ec-static time.

The fourth temporal dimension enables a *doubling of time* onto two planes by virtue of the mind's being able to focus on occurrences in any of the three temporal dimensions of past, present and future from the present. In particular, occurrences in the present can be focused upon in a presence of mind, thus introducing a distinction between Gegenwart (the present) and Vergegenwärtigung (coming to presence in the mind). All three temporal dimensions are open to the focusing mind in its own presence of mind. Such *mental focusing* is the *primordial kind of movement*; 'primordial' not in the sense of 'first in time, earliest', but as first in the order of thinking through the phenomena themselves. Much more needs to be said about this focusing of the mind in the following. In particular, the doubling of time onto two mental planes is the condition of possibility for self-consciousness in subject-object metaphysics and self-reflection, in which the self bends back onto its own thoughts (cf. Chapters 7 and 8).

1.3 Imagining a dynamic situation: movement along an imagined time-line

In a provisional conception that will prove to be inadequate, an imagined situation is generally a dynamic one in which there is some sort of sequence or succession of occurrences, i.e. a dynamic event of some kind that takes place in the dimension of the past, the present or the future. No matter how the imagined dynamic situation is assigned to one (or more) of the temporal dimensions past, present or future, it will itself consist of a continuous sequence of occurrences for the presently imagining mind to follow that are imagined as passing through an imagined present from an imagined future into an imagined past with respect to the imagined pre-

sent which *itself* may be situated in either the past, present or future. The imagined dynamic situation is an imagined *movement*, even a continuous one, in one of the three temporal dimensions as a sequence of occurrences occurring one after the other along an *interval of the time-line* from later (not yet) through now to earlier (no longer). The sequentiality of the imagined occurrences allows their lining-up along an imagined time-interval that itself may be imagined as falling entirely within the past, within the future, or around the present (thus straddling also past and future). The imagined dynamic situation is imagined by the mind in the *present*, i. e. through its *present* focus, but as a movement along a time-interval translated to be encapsulated in one of the temporal dimensions or around the present.

1.3.1 Derivative linear time

The imagined time-interval of linear time is itself not originary but *derived* from imagining the sequence of successive occurrences along a line. That is, linear time is only derivative of movement, which is therefore more originary, whereas the three temporal dimensions themselves introduced above are given originarily as altogether non-moving, prior to any movement, but, in turn, as enabling all movement to be temporally situated (for human understanding). So far, only the very restricted case of a linear movement of successive occurrences is considered. In tandem with a sequence of occurrences succeeding each other along linear time, the now (present moment) of time is conceived, somewhat incoherently, as being itself a moving sequence of present moments along a line (Jetztfolge) consisting almost entirely of moments that 'are not yet' or 'are no longer'. Such a conception presupposes that 'to be' or 'to exist' means 'to be present in a given moment' (but to whom?). All occurrences that do not occur in the given present moment 'do not exist' according to this conception, and linear time itself is in this sense almost entirely 'non-existent'. This represents just one of the antinomies of the traditional conception of time first investigated by Aristotle in his *Physics*, the science of moveable entities (κινούμενα) *as* (or qua) moving, especially movement with respect to place, i. e. locomotion (κίνησις κατὰ τὸν τόπον).

1.4 Linear mental movement in the imagination

So little imagination!

For the imagined sequence of occurrences occurring along an imagined time-line (often poorly conceived as a so-called 'stream of consciousness', as with William James) either in a presently imagined future, present or past, the focused, imagining mind, in its *own* present movement of the imagination, passes neatly through this sequence with one occurrence having already passed, followed by the presently imagined occurrence, followed in turn by the occurrence that has not yet occurred. Thus the occurrences are kept temporally apart and sequentially ordered in the imagining mind. This keeping-apart and ordering of occurrences along a time-line is to be distinguished from the distinctness in unity of the three open dimensions of originary time themselves introduced above. Nevertheless, the focusing of the imagining mind on a succession of occurrences is only possible because the unified three temporal dimensions have been passed through to it in the fourth temporal dimension. The genuinely three-dimensional conception of time will lead later to a deconstruction of the conception of mental movement along any sort of time-line and its Aufhebung[5] (sublating, lifting) to a richer, more concrete, non-linear conception with more determinations. Such sublative movement in the concepts themselves is characteristic of dialectical thinking that 'thinks through' (διά-νοια), thus bringing each phenomenon to its respective concept, successively bringing new aspects to light and thus raising it 'to its truth', as Hegel puts it. A phenomenon lacking its concept is like a loose cannon that can only cause confusion. It should go without saying that a concept must not be confused with a (theoretical, philosophical) 'model' or, even worse, with a 'picture' or 'metaphor'.

The mind can imagine, for instance, by focusing in the present, the sequence of occurrences constituting a past traumatic event such as a car accident or the death of a close relative that can be relived presently in the imagination as 'having been' in a certain more or less continuous sequence. Or the mind can imagine a serious conversation that one is scheduled to have on an important matter and go through the motions (in the present) of an imagined sequence of what may be said in the to and fro of such a future discussion. Or one can imagine from the past what one should have said in a job interview that went badly, thus revising what has been with a view toward a possible imagined, improved, future interview. Imagining a movement as a more or less continuous sequence of occur-

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5 Aufhebung in the Hegelian sense can be conveniently characterized by the threefold conceptual movement of waiving, saving and raising or annulling/suspending, preserving and elevating.

rences situated either in the past, the present or the future is only one way in which the mind imagines. The mind can also effortlessly skip its present focus (cf. 2.2 *Mental hip-hopping through interleaved temporal dimensions*) from one occurrence in a given temporal dimension to another one in another temporal dimension, each of which only reaches it by being passed to it as the unified three dimensions of time proffered to the imagining mind. The mental imagination is thus very free in its movement through three-dimensional time (indeed, it has *three temporal degrees of freedom*) and imaginative movement can happen not only when awake but also when dreaming.

The power of imagination is therefore given priority in these considerations because it encompasses all three temporal dimensions in its mental movement. This priority given to the imagination in its temporal fullness breaks with the priority traditionally given to the present and particularly to the sensuous present, as if 'to exist' meant 'to be sensuously present in the present'. The full temporal scope of the power of imagination is always at play, mostly inconspicuously, in our awareness of the world and it may even be said that most of what comes to mind whilst living in the world is precisely *not* sensuously present in the present.

1.5 Temporally three-dimensional absorption in a sensuously present situation

Apart from imagining a dynamic situation, one can be, and often is, also absorbed by a current situation happening in the present in whatever kind of action or inaction. The current situation presenting itself to the mind includes, but not exclusively, also occurrences presenting themselves sensuously in the present to the various senses along with bodily interplay with these sensuous occurrences. Such absorption in the matter presently at hand does not exclude, but rather in general includes also mental skipping back and forth between past and future occurrences that pertain to the current situation. Passive inaction allows the mind to freewheel in day-dreaming oblivious to the sensuously present in which the unbound imagination comes into play in the full scope of its three-dimensional temporality, skipping, hopping, flitting freely and non-linearly from one occurrence in one temporal dimension to another in another (cf. 2.2 *Mental hip-hopping through interleaved temporal dimensions*). Such hopping and skipping is only possible because the three temporal dimensions are independent of each other and do not necessarily have to line up in a single dimension. Absorption in a task at hand in the present relies also on the senses and bodily interplay (cf. 2.3 *Habituated presence-to-body in harmony with presence-to-mind: practices*) whilst incorporating occurrences from the past and future, for instance, recollections of how the task was last performed

or reference to the next task to be performed in the future or even to some other obliquely related future or past event. The mind is always stretched out into, or stands out ec-statically into the three temporal dimensions even when it is concentrated on a matter at hand, which will become more explicitly apparent later. Conversely, one could also say that the unified, independent three temporal dimensions are always proffered to the understanding mind. Insofar, the mind is always dependent upon the power of imagination passing through to it occurrences of any kind related to each other in a temporal situating by unified three-dimensional time.

1.6 Psychic power of imagination proffered by the three-dimensional temporal openness

To briefly reiterate salient points: the mind itself is the *faculty of understanding* situated within the psyche which is itself, first of all, the recipient of the unified *openness* of three-dimensional time proffered to it through the *fourth* temporal dimension. As such, the psyche *belongs* to the unified three-dimensional time passed through to it in which the psyche's power of imagination plays, employing its mental faculty to understand interpretively the situations it imagines in one way or another. In a certain way, one could even say, perhaps misleadingly, that the psyche 'is nothing other than' this temporal openness that is proffered to and reaches it through the fourth temporal dimension.

1.6.1 Psyche not a thing

The psyche is here initially conceived, fundamentally and simply, as the openness for the unified three dimensions of time passed through to it. With such a conceptual determination, the psyche is thought in a way close to the existential Da of Dasein, but with a shift of emphasis from revealing/concealing to presencing/absencing, which will be discussed in more detail further on (cf. 2.9 *Mental absencing distinct from concealment* and 2.10 *Mental presencing distinct from deconcealment*). Apart from the untranslatability of Da into English, the term also has unavoidable spatial connotations of 'here' or 'there' that obscure its properly pre-spatial, purely temporal character as developed in *Sein und Zeit* as temporality (Zeitlichkeit). The Western tradition is replete with conceptions of time that spatialize and thus miss it in various ways. The linear time-intervals discussed above are only one way in which the phenomenon of time has been (apparently conveniently) spatialized.

In the Western tradition, the psyche has also been conceived as the (immaterial) soul in an intimate relation with Christianity and is thus a term 'infected' with theological or spiritual connotations that here have to be held in abeyance. From the beginnings of philosophy, and prior to its intertwinings with Christianity, the human psyche has been conceived ambiguously. On the one hand, it has been determined as the *mode* of being, i. e. as the beingness (οὐσία, Seiendheit), of living beings, i. e. as the principle or origin of self-movement of a living being, be it plant, animal or human. But it has also, and usually, been conceived in the same breath *as* a kind of thingly being itself, thus reducible to a 'what' occupying even a physical location in the body, generally the heart or, since Descartes, more likely the brain as the seat of cogitation. Hence the crude conception that when the psyche leaves the body, the being dies. Since one signification of the Greek ψυχή is 'breath', there is even a phenomenal plausibility in this conception because it is a correct observation that animals die when they stop breathing. The Latin equivalent, anima, likewise signifies not only 'soul, spirit, shade', but also 'breath, breath of wind, wind'. An 'animal' is therefore from its etymology a being enlivened, animated by an anima. The significations of ψυχή as 'spirit', 'ghost' and 'shade' also suggest a 'scarcely material' thing on the cusp of immateriality.

A material reduction of the psyche that avoids wispy spirituality seems obvious to the present hour in modern, increasingly neuroscientific psychology, for which the psyche, or its mental faculty, is conceived as materially brain-based, if not as synonymous with the synaptically firing brain at the core of the central nervous system, or at least as a kind of qualitative emanation from nervous activity mentally experienceable as a quale.[6] Rather than deserving to be praised as a boon for humankind attained through scientific progress, in its smug, hubristic self-over-estimation, neuroscience is a calamity. Modern science even undertook (unsuccessfully) to weigh the psyche, an experiment that makes sense only if the psyche is preconceived *as* some kind of material, extended thing. The psyche conceived as the immaterial principle enabling self-movement of a material living being has remained a mystery giving rise to numerous conundrums concerning the relationship between psyche and body, as exemplified by the famous Cartesian dualism.

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6 "A mental phenomenon that is consciously experienceable is a quale." Ukachoke, (2018) Chapter 3 'Qualia, Conscious Awareness, and Conscious Experiences' https://mindtheory.net/chapter-3/, last accessed 09 December 2023. The summary of this chapter reads, "The mind and its phenomena of qualia and consciousness are non-material entities with information and information processing as their essence. They evolved into existence to help increase the survival chance of the species that possess them".

In his *Les Passions de l'Âme* (1649), Descartes pushed the conception of human being to the limits of the mechanical, but still had to resort to positing animal spirits (esprits animaux) as principles enlivening the body, in tandem with interactions with the soul as the seat of thinking and will that was said to be located in the pituitary gland at the base of the brain. These animal spirits nonetheless were conceived as very fine transpirations of the blood and hence as semi-material. Today, these esprits animaux would be nearer to hormones or genes (bits of DNA and RNA) being treated without further ado quasi as principles of life itself, whereby, according to the findings of neuroscience, various parts of the brain assume various roles for cognition and consciousness itself. Today's neuroscience has swept away any misgivings about a mechanical, dualist Cartesian conception of human being itself and proceeds dogmatically, employing only empirically established, but tendentiously rigged, results of effectivity of its explanations. Other questions, such as Cartesian dualism, are relegated to the realm of philosophical speculation in today's worst, most contemptuous sense of the word.

Already by giving the psyche a temporal, pre-spatial determination, a break is made with any 'thingly' determination of the psyche. The Greek conception of the psyche is cast not only as the principle (ἀρχή) of self-movement of all living beings, whether they be microbe, plant or animal, including humankind as a species of animal, but also as the intimately connected seat of the openness for sense perception (αἴσθησις) of the world, starting with the most primitive sense, that of touch (ἀφή). The sense of touch is that primitive bodily sense through which a living being primally senses the resistance of physical things, that they are (present) at all. This sensual openness to the world is the hallmark of all living beings that enables also their self-movement in the world. Of sole concern on the present path of thinking is the psyche as the principle of liveliness or *existence* of *human* being (that will transform into temporal human essencing), without regard to the (modified) traditional hierarchy of (virus—microbe—)plant—animal—humankind. This hierarchy accords with the ontological build-up of the human being as a species of animal, τὸ ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, the rational animal. This is a fateful casting of human being that allows all Western thinking, with unrelenting virulence even today, to regard animality as basic – as if we humans could have insight into animal being prior to understanding our own humanity, i.e. *who* we are. It is a topsy-turvy way of thinking altogether that, among other things, endows unwarranted primacy to the material human body with all its physiology that can be compared with other physical animal bodies (mice, drosophila fruit flies, earth worms, yeasts, microbes, etc.) in their mode of functioning. It should then come as no surprise that, with supreme hubristic confidence, modern scientific thinking then attempts to reduce the specific hallmark of human being, namely, its rationality, to

the neuronal cogitating of the material human brain that is amenable to material, quantitative investigation.

On the present path of thinking, precisely the opposite is attempted in order to see what this alternative starting-point brings to light, thus revolutionizing our conception of who we are. Hence the initial focus on the human psyche in its belonging to three-dimensional time. This focus nevertheless does not exclude some recognizable overlap with traditional conceptions. Within the psyche as the seat of sensuous, perceptual openness to the world in the *present* is situated, at least for humankind, also human understanding (νοῦς, reason, Vernunft) as the psyche's characteristic hallmark that 'specifies' humankind with its specific difference within the animal genus. Insofar, there is a natural linguistic association between psyche and mind already in the tradition of Western thinking, and both are thought as individuated, but also ambivalently as all-encompassing (e.g. Plato's world-soul, Anaxagoras' νοῦς, that later becomes interpreted as Hegel's Weltvernunft and Weltgeist). In the present study it is three-dimensional time that is all-encompassing.

With the onset of the modern age in the seventeenth century, the psyche was recast in an irremediably individuated way as consciousness that was even located in the body (to wit, the brain) along with a faculty of consciousness called cognition that has replaced a conception of νοῦς. Hence, for instance, in Kant's transcendental philosophy we find interiorized subjective consciousness (Gemüt) as the seat of pure, a priori intuition, on the one hand, and pure, a priori reason, on the other. Henceforth, both consciousness and cognition as individuated can, at most, only be collected, collectivized, gathered into so-called collective consciousness, collective intentionality, collective unconscious and the like, to construct anything faintly resembling a shared, historical Geist or mind. How such collecting is at all possible is a question left unposed by modern subject-object philosophy; it is thoughtlessly taken for granted as if, at first, there were individual subjective consciousness that then had to be collectivized in some way, such as collective, intentional will, to attain any notion of 'we', of a shared world. The Geist or mind of an age, its νοῦς, however, is the gathering (λέγειν) into a λόγος that already casts, prior to any collectivization, how 'we' understand an historical world.

A notion of individual cogitating subjective consciousness enables modern sciences such as psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience to investigate their subjects by individuating cognition, intelligence, etc. as functions of the brain in collaboration with the nervous system. This indispensable notion can then be carried over, via a modelling through artificial neural networks, to today's endeavours to build artificial intelligence around an artificial equivalent of the brain, namely, the central processing unit (CPU) processing information. To 'think' then is posited to mean 'compute' information, with Descartes' conception of the psyche as the

seat of thinking being translated into the computations carried out by a Universal Turing Machine.

1.6.2 Individuation, individualization, dissociation

To summarize and anticipate: in a move by thinking away from an entrenched tradition, the concern is not with the mode of being of living beings in general, but solely with human being and, ultimately, with human essencing, as we shall see. Priority is thus given to the Delphic motto, "Know thyself" (γνώθι σ'αυτό). This enables a pivot in thinking's focus from the traditional fixation on whatness with its *categorial* ontological determination to whoness, whose mode of being or ontology (or rather: mode of essencing or temporalogy) has to be captured conceptually by *existentials.* The *individuated* human psyche as a *sociating* individual has to be regarded as the kernel of *whoness*, which is not yet the topic in focus (cf. 8 *Recasting humanness through a temporalogy of whoness*). Such individuation (Vereinzelung) of the psyche into many psyches, and thus many individuals, is conceived first of all as the intimate obverse of their sharing the all-encompassing universal psyche of an age with its fundamental moods and its ineluctably shared historical cast of mind. This individuation of the psyche into individuals goes along with its individuation by virtue of individual bodies partaking of the psyche (cf. 2.8 *Bodying as empsychment and entitlement*). Individuals in the togetherness (Mitsein) of society become *who* they are in mutually estimative interplay that sociates them. This may be regarded as their *individualization* as selves. In a further step, in modern societies, individualized individuals are both *dissociated* by the medium of thingified value (in the guise of various forms of private property) and also sociated by it. Their *sociation* (Vergesellschaftung) through the medium of thingified value (cf. 9 *Sociation through the medium of thingified value*) is the precondition for the ideology of *individualism* that pervades today's Western societies. This hint anticipates what is yet to come.

1.6.3 Psyche and mind according to Aristotle

The seminal text for Western thinking on the psyche and mind is Aristotle's Περὶ Ψυχῆς (*De Anima*, *On the Soul*), where he investigates in detail the various capacities of all living beings comprising plants, animals and humans, starting with the basic powers of nutrition, through growth and decay, reproduction, locomotion to mind, with which only human beings are said to be endowed. Here I briefly consider the Aristotelean conception of psyche and mind only in relation to human

beings with their characteristic, inherent openness to the world. Significantly, Aristotle says that "in a certain way, the psyche is all things" (ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πῶς ἐστι πάντα. *De Anima* III viii 431b21) through its two principal modes of receptivity for beings in the world, namely, sense-perception (αἴσθησις) and intellect (νοῦς, mind) with these regarded first of all in relation to an individual human being (ἄνθρωπος) who, via its bodily, material, sense-organs (αἰσθητήρια), is able to take in the impressions of a being and sense it.

Receptivity, openness for the world thus stand at the centre of Aristotle's conception of the psyche, albeit that sense perception signifies such an openness as mediated by the bodily senses only in the present, whereas a conception of the psyche first and foremost as an openness toward three-dimensional time does not suffer from this impediment. On the other hand, Aristotle's conception of mind (νοῦς) is readily adaptable to a temporal conception, and even more his conception of the imagination (φαντασία).

Thanks to a third mode of receptivity, viz. the power of imagination (φαντασία), whose images (φαντάσματα) are conceived as being "like sense-perceptions, but without matter" (τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ὥσπερ αἰσθήματά ἐστι, πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης 432a10), "the mind thinks the 'looks' of beings in images of the imagination" (Τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ 431b3). "The images of imagination occur to the thinking psyche like sense-perceptions. ... Therefore the psyche never thinks without an image from the imagination,..." (τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει. ... διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή... 431a14) The power of imagination thus provides the ontological images to the mind for its thinking, ontological images being the 'looks' of what a being is as such, i.e. its beingness or whatness.[7] Noetic power relies on imaginative power. For Aristotle there are no *existential* images of *whoness* for the mind to see because the question concerning whoness was not yet explicitly on the philosophical agenda. In fact, the very term 'existence' (εἶναι) signifies for the Greeks in an underdetermined way merely that something 'is'. The question regarding the meaning of being, i.e. the meaning of the little word 'is', was still millennia away from being posed.

When the mind thinks a thing knowingly, it is the same as that thing in its eidetic beingness: "Knowledge at work is identical with the thing thought." (τὸ δ' αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι. 430a20 and 431a1); they belong together as one. Conversely, a being only properly *is* in its beingness, i.e. *exists as*

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7 Two millennia later, Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* will reiterate this mediating role of the power of imagination (Einbildungskraft) between pure sense perception and pure understanding; cf. 5 *Kant on the power of imagination.*

such, by virtue of its beingness (εἶδος) being thought by the mind; beingness and mind-at-work are identical, i.e. belonging intrinsically together. Whereas the individual mind is not always thinking, say, when the individual is asleep, thus putting knowledge into a state of potentiality, the mind in general is always at work thinking: "In the individual, [knowledge] as a potential is temporally prior, but on the whole [i.e. in general] it is not prior in time, sometimes thinking and sometimes not thinking (ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐ χρόνῳ· ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ μὲν νοεῖ ὀτὲ δ" οὐ νοεῖ. 430a21ff). That is, the universal, shared thinking mind is always energetically-at-work and hence "immortal and everlasting" (ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀίδιον 430a24). Another way of saying this is: beings in their beingness 'are' (exist) only as long as there is the encompassing openness of the universal mind to think them. Thus Aristotle here makes the crucial distinction between the individual mind and the universal mind, basically an Anaxagorean thought (cf. 429b25ff).

The mind itself is said to be the "place of the 'looks' of beings" (τόπον εἰδῶν 429a28). The εἴδη are namely the ontological 'looks' of beings, i.e. their beingness, that are visible only to the mind. The characteristic combination of matter and 'look' constituting an individual being in its beingness, i.e. its οὐσία, is mentally separable by the powers of imagination and the mind, with the latter having the task of thinking the ontological looks contained in phantasy, i.e. in the images of the imagination, to bring these images to stand *as* beings in their ontological categories. The mind is thus purely noetic, unmixed with matter. It is also able to see into the three temporal dimensions, e.g. when it ascertains whether "Kleon" is, was or will be "white" (cf. 430b5), with the mind uniting these three temporal dimensions: "What makes a unity in each case is the mind" (τὸ δὲ ἕν ποιοῦν, τοῦτο ὁ νοῦς ἕκαστον. 430b6). The mind can only unify the three dimensions of time because the imagination itself is temporally three-dimensional and thus able to imagine Kleon as white or not white in the present, past or future, something sense-perception with its bodily sense-organs is unable to do. *Pace* Aristotle, the unification of the three temporal dimensions accomplished by the power of imagination is prior to any unity attained by the mind.

1.6.4 The obliteration of the ontological difference and the partaking of living beings in the ψυχή

There is a fundamental distinction made in Greek philosophy between living and non-living beings that goes hand in hand with Greek thinking's focus on the universe itself as in movement (κίνησις), becoming (γένεσις) and thus as living, i.e. self-moving. Living beings are ἔμψυχον, whereas non-living beings are ἄψυχον. Lid-

dell and Scott tells us that ἔμψυχον is derived from ἐν (in) and ψυχή, thus, literally, 'in the psyche'. Accordingly, living beings are those that are 'in the psyche' and thus endowed with, i.e. animated by, the principle (ἀρχή) of self-movement, whereas ἄψυχα are excluded from partaking in the life-principle that is the psyche and are therefore non-living, inanimate. They can be moved passively as physical beings (κινούμενα), but are not actively self-moving, which is the state of affairs for physical entities in general, most of which are inanimate. This reading of ἔμψυχον has not been followed by the established tradition, however, which indeed interprets the concept in the opposite way, viz. living beings are those that have a psyche 'in them'. This interpretation has been characteristic for all of Western thinking, for it amounts to an inversion, a turning upside down. The psyche is accordingly interpreted *as* some sort of thing that has a location 'inside' rather than as an entirely non-spatial principle, namely, that of self-movement, of which beings can partake.

This interpretation is entirely, indeed, slavishly congruent with the orthodox interpretation of οὐσία also as a kind of thing, viz. as 'substance', i.e. literally, 'that which stands or lies under(neath)' as a durable substrate. Substances, of course, can have a location, whereas beingness or principles in themselves are non-locatable casts of mind to interpret beings as beings. Even today, 'beingness' as an etymologically informed rendering of οὐσία is still regarded as an outlandish term in mainstream philosophical circles. The same holds for any translations of Greek concepts respecting the ontological difference between beingness and beings that is at the heart of Aristotle's definition of ontology as the investigation of τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν, i.e. beings insofar (ᾗ) as they are beings, i.e. with regard to their beingness, as carried out in the *Metaphysics.* The quashing of the ontological difference is one of the major questionable 'achievements' of the orthodox metaphysical tradition, both in medieval times and the modern, scientific age. It amounts to an ontological lie that the modern mind tells itself, a wilful benightedness for the sake of power. Auguste Comte's positivism was at the forefront of this final obliteration of the ontological difference, but it was preceded by centuries of the British empiricism first lauded by Francis Bacon.

Mainstream (Anglo-American, analytic and pragmatist) philosophy has inherited this tradition in thinking that, with circumspection, may be regarded as an historical calamity for the mind whose depredations proceed unnoticed and painlessly. Today analytic philosophy enjoys the dubious distinction of having established a thoroughly insipid conception of ontology as "the study of being, of what there is"[8] with no longer the least hint of the hermeneutic As. Analytic philosophy is able

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8 Cf. the entries on 'Ontological Commitment' and 'Logic and Ontology' in the *Stanford Encyclope-*

to deploy its institutional predominance to entice bright young minds into a professional glass-bead game played in "the language of first-order predicate logic, where truth conditions, and thus ontological commitments, are easier to specify".[9] It positions itself with supreme self-confidence vis-à-vis a variety of 'positions' it collects under the self-chosen rag-bag rubric of 'Continental philosophy'.

Since then all 'we' have left is the empirical scientific method and are deluged with 'empirical studies' to know what's going on in the world and obsessively predict what's coming. Everyday discourse, too, is obsessed with chattering about what's happening and what's coming from the future. The modern empiricist way of thinking is tantamount to a throw-back to the Platonic parable of the cave, in which the fettered, tunnel-visioned spectators vie with each other over guessing the sequence in which the silhouettes of entities thrown on the cave's wall by the fire behind them will appear. Both scientific and everyday knowledge today remain captive to an historical mind-set that knows nothing of its origins, as should become ever more apparent to those following the path of thinking presented in this work. The indoctrination into this mind-set of an absolute obsession with control over movement begins with the moment of birth and is justified as scientific enlightenment.

In this context it is instructive to reconsider how Aristotle is conventionally translated in order to see how the ontological difference is obliterated and the psyche reduced to a kind of thing. 'Psyche' in English is a synonym for 'soul', so that ἔμψυχον could be rendered as 'ensouled' which, according to OED, is a past-participial adjective of the verb 'ensoul' signifying "to infuse a soul into", i. e. an action of putting something into something else, and not a kind of partaking-of. Consider, however, for instance, the following passage from Aristotle's *Generation of Animals:*

> Διὸ καὶ περὶ νοῦ, πότε καὶ πῶς μεταλαμβάνει καὶ πόθεν τὰ μετέχοντα ταύτης τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἔχει τῇ ἀπορίαν πλείστην. (736b5 ff)

> Therefore also with respect to mind it has the greatest, perplexing difficulty to determine when and how and whence it has a share of partaking of this principle [of the psyche ME]. (736b5 ff)

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dia of Philosophy, last accessed November 2022. Note that equating "the study of being" with the study "of what there is" is already a crude misunderstanding that elides being with beings. There is no mention of the 'ontological difference' in the *SEP.*

9 Entry on 'Ontological Commitment' *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* last accessed December 2022.

Here, as well as in other passages, Aristotle speaks of a "partaking" of or a "participation" in the psyche, which is the 'life-principle' (ζωτικὴν ἀρχήν 737a5), whereby both the nutritive and perceptual functions of the psyche are intermingled, via the pneuma (πνεῦμα, signifying also 'wind, breath, spirit'), with the material body, whereas the "divine" (θεῖον) mental soul is entirely independent thereof (736b27 ff).

The pneuma is conceived by Aristotle as the vehicle "of the psychic principle" (τῆς ψυχικῆς ἀρχῆς 737a9) and of the "psychic heat" (θερμότητα ψυχικήν 762a21) necessary for life (living beings having been observed to be warm rather than dead cold) that is found ubiquitously in water, "so that in a certain way everything is full of psyche" (ὥστε τρόπον τινὰ μάντα ψυχῆς εἶναι πλήρη 762a22) and thus potentially alive. In particular, pneuma is borne by the watery, white semen endowed with psychic heat in the act of fertilizing the likewise moist female menstrual blood to generate a foetation that is the kernel of a potential new offspring. Its psychic potential is first of all the nutritive psyche responsible for the self-movement of growth through nourishment. Aristotle says that the male semen bears also the potential "sentient psyche" (ψυχή αἰσθητική) characteristic of animals vis-à-vis plants, whereas the female's menstrual blood (καταμήνια 737a28) lacks this psychic principle of potential sense perception and the associated psychic heat. Only once the "female residue" (τὸ περίττωμα τὸ τοῦ θήλεος 737a34) comes to "partake" (μετάσχῇ 737a33) of the psychic principle borne by the semen does a successful foetation of an animal offspring result. It is significant to note that in a standard English translation of this passage, μετάσχῇ is rendered as "secures", i.e. 'takes into possession', rather than 'partakes of'.[10] For the psychic principle of mind, however:

> Λείπεται δὴ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπαισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον. Οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνέργεια κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια (736b27 f)

> It remains, then, that the mind alone comes in from the outside and that it alone is divine, for its movement has nothing in common with bodily movement (736b27 f)

(Note that the Greek ἐπαισιέναι 'comes in' already includes a confusing ambivalence of formulation, as if some*thing* came into the body.) It remains an unsolved "perplexing difficulty" (ἀπορία) and mystery for Aristotle's thinking how a human being comes to partake of the divine faculty of mind, just as it does for today's scientific thinking when it comes to ponder, not how the psyche, but its modern-day surrogate, consciousness, comes about. At least Aristotle is able to conceive the psyche as a non-physical principle of life, i.e. of self-movement and openness for the

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10 Thus in the Loeb Library translation of *Generation of Animals* by Arthur L. Peck.

world, in which all life participates, although even Aristotle is ambiguous, for instance, when he writes with regard to the generation of an animal's offspring, that "the principle of [its] nature is the heart" (ἀρχὴ γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἡ καρδία 738b17), thus making the psyche into a thing, namely, the heart. It makes a crucial difference, however, to regard the heart as the seat of the psyche, on the one hand, or, on the other, to say that the heart is that part of an animal's body that partakes first of all in the vital principle of psyche, i.e. the heart is used by the psyche as an organ of its active physical realization (ἐνέργεια).

Modern science dispenses with any consideration of what it regards as being mysterious, empirically unfounded and unmeasurable, and thus unscientific, metaphysical principles and instead endeavours to nebulously and suggestively explain life and consciousness by conjuring some sort of assumed, evolutionarily evolved, efficient causality among entities materialized in hormones, genes and the like. Lacking as it does any notion of the ontological difference between beings and modes of being, in doing so, modern science invariably begs the question. That is to say, it refuses point blank to raise the question concerning psyche as a mode of being and confront itself with this aporia that motivated Greek thinking. Furthermore, if one considers the modern translations of Aristotle, it becomes apparent that modern scholars themselves, with infinite self-complacency, have long since lost any appreciation of the ontological difference and therefore reduce all beingness, i.e. οὐσία, to kinds of beings, i.e. to ontic, factually ascertainable 'substances'. Such scholarship is thus, unsurprisingly, fully aligned with modern science's oblivion to the ontological difference.

1.7 Presencing and absencing

In a first phenomenal approximation, an imagined dynamic situation (movement) may be conceived as consisting of a sequence of imagined occurrences in which the one occurrence, now in an imagined present, is relieved by the next one coming from the imagined future through which the mind passes in imagination. Such an imagined sequence of occurrences has long been common practice in traditional philosophical discourse, going under the name of *introspection.* In a present movement perceived by the senses, too, on which the mind is currently focused, one present occurrence is relieved by the next arriving from the future while the present occurrence passes on into the past. These sensuously presenting occurrences occur temporally for present psychic-mental awareness and are therefore in this sense also imaginative, albeit sensuously mediated. The imagination should therefore not be conceived as the seat of fancy unleashed from the sensuously given present situation, but as the openness for any *awareness* (Bewußtsein,

known-ness) whatsoever, *including, in particular,* a sensuously given present situation. Such mental awareness in the imagination does not have to amount to a mental image, which is one of the drawbacks of the term 'imagination' in general. In truth, imagining amounts to 'letting presence' for the psyche's mental capacity.

When sequential occurrences in the world (whether it be in the present – sensuously perceptible or not —, the past or the future) constituting a movement are closely connected, hanging tightly together, the movement is seen (literally, but misleadingly: imagined, imaged) as *continuous.* The presently present occurrence (presencing, that is, for the mind) absents itself from the present, thus passing into the past as 'has been' for the mind-in-movement, but *retained* mentally as having been. The anticipative occurrence imagined (presencing) in the mind (in a *foreseeing protention*) as arriving from the future into the imagined present presences in the present, coming to presence in that imagined present before it, too, absents itself into the dimension of the past. Such *presencing* and *absencing* of occurrences in a non-sensuously imagined situation or in a sensuously mediated present situation characterize all dynamic situations, all continuous movement of the imagination following, with a single-minded focus of attention, a dynamic situation in the world, whether it be present, past or futural. Mental protention and retention already indicate that what is seen mentally in following a dynamic situation is not restricted to the present instant of sense perception, i.e. that neither is absencing from the present into the past equivalent to disappearance out-of-mind entirely, nor is presencing from the future into the present equivalent to coming to mind for the 'first time'. More needs to said on this, since concepts of protention and retention introduced by Husserl are entirely inadequate (cf. 2.5 *Temporally trifocal mental presencing*).

Consecutive presencing-and-absencing characterizes also *all* movement in the imagination in which the mind shifts its present *focus of attention*, skipping, hopping, flitting *discontinuously, discretely* hither and thither from one occurrence to another that may well presence, i.e. come to mind, from another temporal dimension. The one presencing occurrence then absents itself from the mind's focus and another presents itself in the imaginative mind from another temporal dimension, whereby the mind may also be 'simultaneously' involved in a present situation or a present task at hand into which the other temporal dimensions play. To be sure, absorption in a present task at hand or involvement in a present situation does not preclude, but rather includes both a mental skipping back and forth between other temporal dimensions (a shifting of mental focus) and also an incorporation of all three temporal dimensions into the present mental focus, thus rendering it temporally 'wide-angle' in a sense that needs to be further explicated. No matter how strongly the mental focus is concentrated single-mindedly on the matter pres-

ently at hand, all three temporal dimensions of the imaginative psyche remain in play, as we shall see in more detail later.

But even now it can be said that the mind's hip-hopping within the all-encompassing psyche from one temporal dimension to another makes sense and is not merely at random or arbitrary, for the occurrences presencing from all three temporal dimensions play into and complement each other. They make sense, perhaps only loosely, and have their own coherence. In particular, the presencing in a mental focus is accompanied by a *mood* (a resonant mode of presencing) with respect to what comes into focus, e.g. a mood of apprehension and fear with regard to what may happen in the near future as viewed from a present situation, or a mood of joy associated with happy memories recollected from the past being celebrated in a present situation, such as a wedding anniversary, or joyful expectation of a coming visit from an old friend. The mental roaming through all three temporal dimensions, remembering this, expecting that or enjoying the present moment, makes it apparent that the traditional focus on sensuously mediated presencing in the present, i.e. sense perception, has always amounted to a massive truncation of human *existential* temporality that is tantamount to ontological narrow-mindedness. Today's thinking's insisting that 'reality' consists of naked facts established in the sensuous presence, or science's insistence that its evidence consists of data gathered by sensors (including human subject-observers) in the sensuously perceptible or detectable present shrinks so-called 'reality' down to a size with which modern empiricist-positivist science can cope. Existence, however, means literally 'ex-sistence', i.e. 'standing out into the three-dimensional temporality of the psyche'.

The conception of the mental focus shifting *consecutively* from one occurrence to another in another temporal dimension, thus performing a mental hopping and flitting from one to the other, is inadequate and will have to be aufgehoben (lifted to higher level of conception in which the present conception is preserved). The successive or consecutive presencing-to-mind of one occurrence after the other is still implicitly captive to the traditional conception of movement in linear time as a succession of now-instants (even if the instants are stretched to enclose both protention and retention). Mental hip-hopping from one temporal dimension to another, amounting to a supposed 'instantaneous' shift of single-minded mental focus, which is indeed a genuine, commonly observable phenomenon, remains a succession and insofar linear. It will have to be complemented, as we shall see later, by the conception of a temporally three-dimensional, trifocal mental presencing 'all at once' (cf. 2.5 *Temporally trifocal mental presencing*) of disparate occurrences from all three temporal dimensions enabled by the *unity* of the three temporal dimensions that is 'always already' passed through to the psyche in the fourth temporal dimension.

1.8 Essencing essents

Mental movement of any kind is an ongoing presencing of occurrences in the mind's focus of attention within the unified, three-dimensional, psychic-temporal openness and complemented by an absencing of such occurrences from this present mental focus. The occurrences that occur to mind one after the other – perhaps in an apparently haphazard, temporally non-linear fashion, but nevertheless consecutively for the mind's focus – can therefore be called *essents* in the movement of mental *presencing*. Henceforth occurrences are called essents, comprising all that presences and absences psychically for the mind, i.e. all that 'exists' in traditional conceptions. The mental presencing can occur freely from (or into) any of the three temporal dimensions, which justifies designating it as non-linear, but as yet it is still a *single-minded* focus of attention that later will have to be raised to a more adequate conception of multifocal mental presencing. Whether it be purely non-sensuously in the imagination or mediated also by what the senses present to the imaginative mind in the present, the mind can only be aware of *essents presencing*. When it shifts its focus of attention, the essents then absent themselves, or *absence*. The very term essencing, comprising as it does presencing and absencing, is temporal and also dynamic, moving, and is thus verbal rather than substantive. It does not insist on the perduring, persistent presencing traditionally tied to substance. For anything at all to *be* for humans, it must *essence* (verbally) in the temporal psychic openness for the mind. It is a basic fallacy and self-contradictory nonsense of today's philosophical thinking to *imagine* (sic) that there is any other 'reality', i.e. that there could an essencing beyond essencing that were inaccessible to the human mind. 'To be' thus translates into 'to essence', and 'beings' (or 'entities') of whatever kind become 'essents' *essencing* in the all-encompassing three-dimensional temporal openness granted to the psyche through which the understanding mind moves.

1.8.1 Presencing and absencing as essencing

Essence is the English translation of the Latin 'essentia', the noun-substantiation of the verb 'esse' 'to be'. It was originally the translation of Greek τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, signifying what a being 'already was' in its steadfast, persistent, substantive whatness, i.e. its ontological origin. Hence, as discussed above, essence was understood also simply as quidditas, literally: 'whatness'. In the present context, essence takes on an entirely different, temporal, dynamic meaning comprising both presencing and absencing within psychic three-dimensional time. This provides the ground for thinking essence in a decidedly verbal sense as *essencing* related to ongoing move-

ment in the three-dimensional openness of non-linear time, comprising both coming to mental presence from absence, thus presenting itself to the mind as a present, and going into absence from mental presence, thus absenting itself from the mind as an absent in one of the three temporal dimensions. The psyche conceived as belonging to the unified openness of three-dimensional time that is passed through and thus given to it, is now the *playground for the presencing and absencing of essents.* Essencing in this verbal-temporal sense of mental movement in the psychic openness has the traditional grammatical form of the continuous present tense, i.e. an ongoing, not necessarily linear, movement in originary time among its three dimensions. (Linear succession for the mind in one temporal dimension is only a special case that arises when the mind single-mindedly observes a continuous movement in the world.) Essencing is therefore thoroughly temporal and dynamic, and may substitute for the traditional ontological concept of being which, despite its grammatical form likewise as continuous tense, is also substantivized as a noun, whereby the meaning of this noun-substantive remains minimal, indeed, more or less inexplicable. Being itself is often reduced to the mere copula, 'is', coupling together subject and predicate in a λόγος. As such, being itself remains a blank. In any case, the connection with originary time remains hidden, obliterated. As noted below when discussing οὐσία (beingness), the term 'essencing' is more amenable to being understood verbally,[11] temporally, thus signifying movement.

1.8.2 Οὐσία **as fundamental concept of Aristotelean ontology**

To understand the non-thingly nature of the psyche, even in the context of traditional metaphysics, it is important to see it as one mode of οὐσία, namely, that mode of beingness called 'life'. As is well-known, the fundamental concept in Aristotle's ontology is precisely οὐσία, that has long been standardly translated into Latin as 'substantia' ('that which stands under') or English 'substance'. Interestingly, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant interprets 'substance' as perduring presence along linear time. Οὐσία is said in the *Metaphysics* to have various significations that Aristotle lists as i) τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (essentia, quidditas, whatness) ii) τὸ καθόλου (the 'on the whole', universal, general) iii) τὸ γένος (genus) and iv) τὸ ὑποκείμενον (substrate, subject, 'that which underlies') (*Met.* Z3;1028b34 ff). In Books Z

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11 Heidegger himself pioneered a shift to a verbal understanding of Wesen (essence > essencing). The German word 'Wesen' can be taken either as a substantive (noun) or as a participial noun. Cf. Hanlon (2018, 2020) Last accessed 08 December 2021. In these essays Hanlon introduces her own proposal for rendering Wesen in a (substantivized-participial) verbal sense as "essenzing" and the German verb 'wesen' as 'to essenze'.

and H of the *Metaphysics*, in particular, Aristotle investigates these various significations to rule out the universal and the genus as possible candidates for οὐσία, which turns out to have the twofold meaning of both the individual thing itself (τὸ ἕκαστον or τόδε τι 'this here') and the whatness or essence of that thing (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι or εἶδος). The εἶδος, in turn, mostly rendered in English as 'form', is the 'look', 'sight' or 'view' (from the Greek verb ἰδεῖν 'to see') that something presents to the mind (hermeneutically) *as* what it is, its whatness. The εἶδος provides the essential definition (ὁρισμός) or 'formula' (λόγος) of the thing in its combination with matter (ἡ ὕλη), which may be either physical (αἰσθητή) or mental (νοητή 1087a5).

The above twofold meaning of οὐσία is a consequence of the *Metaphysics* itself being an investigation of τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν, i. e. of beings simply insofar as they are beings, or beings in their 'beingness', which latter is a literal translation of οὐσία, formed as a substantivization of the feminine continuous participle, οὖσα. The individual being presents itself simply ontically, i. e. factically, but *as* such-and-such in its 'look', i. e. *as* a being in its beingness, this 'as' marking the *ontological difference* between a being and its beingness. The very word οὐσία in its grammatical construction contains a remarkable tautology due to its being the substantivization (!) of the feminine continuous present participle οὖσα of the verb εἶναι (to be), hence its literal translation as 'beingness' from a verbal, ongoing presencing rather than construable as a substantivization. The substantivization of οὖσα as οὐσία, however, makes it into a definite, static something. The something as a substance "stands of or by itself; [and is thus] independent, self-existent, self-sufficient" according to the OED. An ongoing presencing (beingness) thus becomes a static substantial being, i. e. an ontic, factual entity as an individual what.

The preceding paragraph gives an overly condensed summary of how Aristotle makes sense of οὐσία in his own terminology. But the Greek word οὐσία also has an everyday meaning for the Greeks, signifying 'estate, (landed) property, goods and chattels, possessions, assets, money assets', i. e. everything that stands at the disposal, present-to-hand, of an owner of property. All this can be regarded as the substantial property of a 'man of substance', especially in the case of an estate of landed property that formed the 'substance' of the ruling classes of nobility for millennia. But to regard such substantial property as standing of itself in independent existence ('solid' or permanent presencing) overlooks that property is such only insofar as it is recognized, estimated and affirmed as such within a given society. Despite its standing seemingly at the private disposal of an individual owner, it is such only by virtue of its being sociated in a power interplay (cf. 8 *Recasting humanness through a temporalogy of whoness*) that guarantees such individual disposal by its owner through the social recognition, and hence protection, of private property. In Marxian terms, such 'substantial' property is such only by

virtue of social power relations constituting it as such. The sociating relations (πρός τι) are in this sense prior to substance (οὐσία), which flies in the face of Aristotle's determination of οὐσία as the primary category which, as ὑποκείμενον, is the subject about which all the other categories, including relation, can be said. The ontological concept of οὐσία thus indiscriminately strips things back to an apparently self-existent, i. e. independent, thingliness of singular whats (τὰ ἕκαστα) as the practical things (τὰ πράγματα) of everyday life, unencumbered by any consideration of their sociation *as* property. Property can be regarded as the thingly precipitation of the ongoing power interplays in the movement of sociation that enables exchange and leasing of private property.

The simplest of all the Aristotelean categories is that of 'something' (τὸ τι or Etwas) and it is this something to which the definition (ὁρισμός) of essence, i. e. τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, applies. But 'something' is immediately itself (τὸ αὐτό) vis-à-vis *another* something, something other (τὸ ἕτερον), i. e. something is only (identical with) itself in a relation differentiating itself from another, i. e. identity and difference belong inseparably together (ἅμα). Hence there is a kind of ontological leakage of the singular, independent entity as something into an identity with itself attained only *in relation to* other entities, thus rendering οὐσία insofar as πρός τι. This amounts to saying that an adequate ontology of things requires that their plurality, rather than their supposed independent singularity, come into conceptual focus from the start.

Moreover, although οὐσία is developed as the substantial essence of individual *things*, Aristotle extends its compass without further ado, via living things (ἔμψυχα), also to humans themselves, i. e. to ἄνθρωποι. The human himself – and Aristotle has men, first and foremost, in mind – is thus cast ontologically *as* an animal endowed with an essence called the psyche (ψυχή) that inhabits the human body. The human ψυχή, in turn, is endowed with νοῦς (mind), thus constituting the human essence or εἶδος housed in the material body (σῶμα). The human being is thus conceived *as* a something (a somewhat) alongside other substantial somethings, each with its characteristic combination of εἶδος and ὕλη.

It may be objected that, due to its discursive nature, any philosophical thinking must begin by abstracting from many determinations to build its fundamental concepts that are then enriched stepwise with further determinations to reconstitute the concrete in thought. The human being conceived initially *as* a somewhat could thus be enriched to be conceived finally *as* a somewho. The stumbling block here is that a somewhat and its essence (i. e. a being in its beingness) is taken initially *as* an individual thing, i. e. a τόδε τι or ἕκαστον as a stand-alone entity, to the neglect of its relations (πρός τι) or the intertwining interplay (commutation, συναλλαγή) with other entities, whether they be somewhats or somewhos. Can the initial ontological concepts be adequately corrected or adjusted in retrospect? For instance,

a useful thing has a use-value that is only actualized in its being used by a user, i. e. in relation to somewho else. Likewise, a thing sold on the market has an exchange-value that is only actualized in being sold for money, i. e. in relation to something else. One could perhaps say that the thing's use-value or its exchange-value belongs to its essence, i. e. its whatness, first as a potential, i. e. δυνάμει, that resides within itself, with this potential only being actualized as a definite, final amount (ἐντελεχείᾳ) in relation to (πρός τι) other whats or whos (albeit that it may be entirely uncertain whether the potential will ever be, or the extent to which it will be, actualized in any kind of movement, i. e. in any ἐνέργεια). But the very concept of use-value or exchange-value even as a potential already includes its relation to other whats or whos (cf. 9 *Sociation through the medium of thingified value* below for more detail).

If human beingness (τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι) itself is defined as a body inhabited by a psyche endowed with intellect or mind (νοῦς), as Aristotle does, this presupposes that the psyche is pluralized into many psyches and individuated in individual human bodies. A body inhabited by a psyche is a living being, for, according to Aristotle, the psyche is nothing other than that *mode* of being (i. e. beingness) called life, which is self-moving and open to the world through sensuous perception (αἴσθησις). As already discussed (cf. 1.6.1 *Psyche not a thing*), the talk of habitation spatially inside a body, however, makes of the psyche a kind of thing (rather than a mode of being) like other things (whats), even physical things, whereas it only characterizes a physical thing *as* living, i. e. its ontological status as a mode of presencing in the world *as* animated. That is, the psyche is life's beingness, its liveliness or animatedness. In the case of the human being, it belongs to a temporal openness to the world endowed also with understanding (μετὰ λόγου) that, inter alia, guides its self-movement under the motive force of appetite (ὄρεξις) and will (βούλησις). Such openness to the world is always already shared (as three-dimensional time itself to which the human psyche *belongs* through the fourth dimension of time, as we have seen), thus not individualized, so that the individual human being can never be regarded *as* a single, separate, self-standing thing, i. e. *as* an ἕκαστον, on which Aristotle's determination of οὐσία rests, for he takes pains to show that the οὐσία cannot be a universal (τὸ καθόλου), but must be located in a single being. Hence his determination of the essence of human being as an animal endowed with an understanding psyche, i. e. as a kind of what, is not at all propitious for ever coming to an appropriate conceptual determination of human whoness. As it turns out, is whoness essentially determined by the ongoing, interweaving movement of mutual estimation, a kind of interchange (συναλλαγή). In fact, this beginning (ἀρχή) puts philosophical thinking on the wrong track altogether, in particular, by substantivizing into essential whatness at the expense of conceiving οὐσία from its roots in a continuous present participle, οὖσα, thus pointing to a

kind of movement (that has been elaborated above as dynamic essencing in three-dimensional time).

1.9 Psyche and mind singular, not plural

The psyche and mind are here conceived initially and fundamentally not in the plural (πλῆθος), but in the singular, in its oneness (ἕν), for good reason, but is it not obvious that there are many psyches and many minds? Yes, but such apparent obviousness calls for interrogation and thinking-through to get to it conceptually. The psyche is conceived here as the phenomenally experienceable, originary human openness toward all-encompassing (thus infinite, limit-less, bound-less), three-dimensional time, just as the human mind is that faculty (δύναμις) within this originary, shared psychic openness for *understanding* the movement of pre-sencing and absencing of essents essencing *as* such-and-such (cf. 6 *Temporalogical recasting in historical time*). The shared temporal openness of the psyche of which all human essencing partakes is presupposed by and thus prior (πρότερον) to all individuation into human individuals, and therefore also to all individualized human discoursing *with one another* about what presences and absences in this shared, hermeneutically cast, temporal openness. In such discoursing (a kind of so-ciating) we have opinions and may even understand – or, more often than not, *mis*-understand – *each other.* We always-already share, i.e. partake of, the universal openness of the mentally understanding psyche, prior to any individuation, that enables us to communicate at all with each other and in particular, in the practical sphere, through *deliberation*, to perhaps come to an agreement about and resolve to undertake a course of action. The universality of this partaking cannot be patch-ed together in some kind of collectivity from individual bits of openness for the world such as underlies conceptions of collective subjective intentionality, "cosmic consciousness" (William James) or the so-called collective unconscious (C. G. Jung), although Jung is probably closer to the mark, and the adjective, 'collective', is pre-sumably a misnomer. The universality of partaking of three-dimensional time is conceptually prior to any individuation and individualization, and therefore also to any collecting together into any sort of collectivity, which always comes 'too late', having always-already implicitly presupposed the all-encompassing universal-ity of the temporal psyche.

There is much more to be said about the relationship between the universal, all-encompassing openness of the understanding human psyche and its individua-tion and individualization into singular individuals. An important question arises in connection with dissociated individualization in society, which is only possible in those modern societies in which an historically particular form of sociation is

practised in an historically particular medium of sociation (cf. 9 *Sociation through the medium of thingified value*).

For the moment it suffices to remark that psyche and mind are not somehow generated within each individual human body (brain or heart or phren) as consciousness emergent from some kind of asserted material, say, neuronal processes in the brain that, in turn, are causally explicable in terms of chemical processes. Such an individualized, materialist conception of causally 'emergent' consciousness dogmatically asserts its theoretical, explanatory standpoint without interrogating its preconceptions of elementary phenomena that it necessarily presupposes and which are staring it in the face, awaiting phenomenological interpretation, not causal explanation. What is consciousness? Why is it individuated from the start, without further ado? What lies behind this standpoint is ultimately the hidden, unbridled will to power to someday effectively 'make' consciousness. (Enter artificial intelligence as part of the program to algorithmize the control of all movement in the world.) To start with, it has to presuppose a conception of *matter*, which is itself not an empirical fact, but an idea within an historically cast mind.[12] The matter assumed by neuroscience is presumably the brain housed in the individual human body, and everything depends upon how the brain is interpreted. The conception of *efficient causality* linking occurrences as cause and effect along linear time presupposes a certain conception of *movement in time* that is open to questioning.

In short, it presupposes an historical hermeneutics of psyche and mind that is itself a shared, universal discourse in which the psyche has been deemed to be conceivable *as* consciousness with some kind of material, efficient-causal basis. This conception of a one-way efficient-causal connection may be modified into a two-way reciprocal interaction between consciousness and body without overcoming their status as entities with a relation toward each other. (But what is an entity?) The conception itself is a particular, modern, historical, hermeneutic, a priori[13] pre-casting that is not susceptible to any conceivable kind of scientific 'proof' through any kind of experiment or data-gathering. Modern philosophical discourse immunizes itself against any kind of radical self-questioning by abetting empiricist

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12 Cf. the role of ὕλη in Aristotle's thinking, which is itself an abstraction from the Greek word for 'wood' as 'forest', 'timber', 'firewood', etc., i.e. of that which offers a passive resistance to being worked upon by an active force, that is, a δύναμις energetically at work. Wood serves as the paradigm for Aristotle's working-out of the ontology of productive, efficient movement (τεχνὴ ποιητική).

13 The sense of a priori in the hermeneutic context is not the Kantian one, but rather signifies the priority of conceptualizing the most elementary, foundational phenomena prior to consideration of the happenings in the world that presuppose precisely preconceptions of such phenomena.

scientific methodology that eschews the necessity of a priori thinking in favour of the unceasing accumulation of a posteriori empirical proof. Such thinking gives birth to a peculiar discipline called neurophilosophy.

1.10 Aporias of consciousness

Modern philosophical discussion of consciousness is dominated by the present Anglo-American analytic mind-set. What is here developed conceptually as a conception of psyche is a radical alternative to the bewildering range of conceptions of consciousness debated as a plethora of adversarial positions in analytic philosophy, none of which makes any mention of the centrality of a conception of time, namely, three-dimensional time. Only implicitly are there references to three-dimensional temporality here and there when there is talk of memory or volition. Memory itself is immediately implicitly spatialized as some kind of storage space, and the open temporal dimension of the future is left hanging in vagueness as some kind of extension of a time-line.

It is also taken as self-evident that consciousness is *internal*, which only makes sense if at the same time a separate *exterior* is presupposed, namely the independent, external, *objective* world, whereas internal consciousness is said to be *subjective.* This internal consciousness is said to be either introspective ('looking inside') or internally conscious of an external object through some kind of double, an interiorized representation.[14] There is no problem raised about this internal/external split and doubling that has been accepted at the latest since Descartes, and which tacitly presupposes a conception of spatiality of consciousness that is never satisfyingly explicated. What stands in the way is that the phenomenon of time itself has already been (hermeneutically cast as) spatialized and is therefore no longer 'available'. At most there are futile attempts to overcome this presupposed inside/outside dichotomy, futile because the questions concerning being itself and time itself are not raised. It is also stubbornly overlooked that an object is only an object *for* a subject, i. e. that there can be no external, objective world independently of subjectivity. Yet the notion that there 'is' an objective world, a *reality*, out there, outside and separate from 'our' subjective, interior consciousness,

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14 Such a conception of the external world being represented inside consciousness is caricatured by today's technology of virtual reality, whereby mountains of data from the outside world, processed by algorithms, are fed into individual consciousness and thus represented to it sensuously (comprising all five senses) as a totally enveloping virtual, digitized world. This requires that the individual enclose itself entirely in a cybernetic interface I call the cyberskin. Cf. my *Tale of the Qua.*

waiting to be discovered as 'objective' empirical knowledge, reigns today unchallenged in the sciences.

The purely temporal psyche as conceived in this chapter, by contrast, is entirely pre-spatial, hence without inside and outside, and requires that thinking think this through appropriately, no matter how much it goes against the grain of orthodox thinking. All that is 'is' only by virtue of essencing in time. Since the purely temporal psyche is also prior to any internal/external split, it is therefore also pre-subjective (and also pre-objective). The internal/external split is simply unquestioningly accepted as a dogma in Anglo-American thinking as if it were obvious. It presumably has its historical origins in the ambivalent conceptions of the Greek psyche (ψυχή) that is often treated as some kind of entity that is located inside the body (σῶμα) rather than as that *mode* of being (or mode of essencing) called life. The conception of internal representations of objects is given sustenance by the conception in Aristotle that things leave a kind of image-impression in the psyche (cf. 2.1.3 *Aristotle on memory*). The Greeks, however, also conceived the psyche as all-encompassing (Platonic) world-soul, adopted in German as Weltseele, i. e. as the "animating principle which informs the physical world", according to OED. Today's mainstream philosophy runs roughshod over this equivocating ambivalence by having long since decided unambiguously in favour of an interior consciousness against what it regards as 'mystical, metaphysical notions'.

The *individuation* of consciousness into individuals endowed with bodies is also taken for granted, including that these bodies are material (but what is matter?). The mode of being, i. e. the mode of essencing in time, of (spatialized, physical) matter is not problematized but rather likewise taken as some sort of self-evident, hard fact. The internality of consciousness is taken as an obviousness because one individual cannot see what another individual is consciously perceiving or 'thinking', cogitating. This concealedness is then interpreted without further ado as a concealedness at some location inside, without pondering that the phenomenon of concealedness does not depend necessarily on spatial location at all. That individual essencing in the psyche is hidden to view for others says something only about the mode of essencing, but not about anything purportedly inside, as if thoughts were somehow 'in my head'. As will be discussed further below, there is much that presences concealed, or absences deconcealed (cf. 2.9 *Mental absencing distinct from concealment* and 2.10 *Mental presencing distinct from deconcealment*).

The question concerning consciousness in animals is raised in the analytic discussion whilst presupposing that human beings themselves are a kind of animal. Hence the question becomes whether consciousness conceived as sentience, internal perception (introspection) or self-awareness extends, by way of gradation, to certain kinds of animals (great apes down to microbes) and to what degree.

From my present starting-point with three-dimensional time, and its passing-through to humankind in a fourth dimension, nothing at all is presupposed or pre-judged about how we humans can properly conceive ourselves *as* sharing our mode of essencing with those of animals, but in the philosophical controversy over consciousness, the status of the human being *as* animal species is taken to be cut and dried from the start. I am more careful and, in line with the Delphic motto "Know thyself", am in no hurry to extend the conceptions of human essencing developed here step by step to animals, an enterprise to be undertaken only with extreme care, and not with the hubris of empiricist subject/object science. The discussion of consciousness in the era of Anglo-American analytic philosophy's imperialism sees no need at all to da capo with variations, and, through its institutions, systematically represses any attempt to do so. The ravages thereby wrought on the now globalized Western mind appear inverted as the progress of neuroscience which it is impotent to radically interrogate. The invention of new philosophical labels such as 'experimental philosophy' and 'neurophilosophy' is the best proof of this secular degenerative trend.

2 Temporality of mind and body

Ὅταν ἃ μετὰ τοῦ σώνατος ἔπασχεν ποθ' ἡ ψυχή, τοῦτ' ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀναλαμβάνῃ, τότε ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι που λέγομεν. Ἦ γάρ;

When the psyche has suffered something at one time together with the body, and retrieves this as far as possible within itself without the body, then we say surely that it remembers, do we not? Plato *Philebos* 34b

2.1 Single-minded focusing in three-dimensional time

By virtue of its power of imagination, the mind can focus single-mindedly on essents essencing in situations, also distinguishing one situation from another through determinate negation. Such essencing results from the mind's *own movement* by shifting its *focus of attention*, otherwise known as its *intentionality*, its stretching forth (from the Latin intendere) toward something futural, present or past, also known in German as Vergegenwärtigung, i. e. presencing for the mind purely and simply, without the mind's being intent upon carrying out a willed purpose. Such single-minded focusing of the mind itself in the present on present or past or future essents may be simply allowing what is already present at hand, but absent from mind, to come into focus in an *attentiveness*, i. e. a stretching forth of the mind toward what is potentially sensuously to be perceived. Such attentiveness may slacken to its determinate negation in *inattentiveness* when, say, the mind wanders aimlessly, as in a reverie, is unaware of and does not notice its close surroundings or a non-sensuous matter at hand calling for attention. Inattentiveness can also drift off itself into dreamless sleep in which the mind relaxes its focus on any essent at all.

The mind's single-minded focusing may be a calling-to or letting-presence of some essent that is absent in the past, i. e. *recalling* or *remembering* what has been that is now refused presence in the present but is nevertheless recollectable and 'is' present (presences) for the mind as past. Or it may be a calling to or letting presence of some essent that is yet to presence, or may yet presence in the present, from its withholding in the future, i. e. an expectant *looking out for* (from the Latin expectare) in the imagination toward some future event.

Past, present and future are thus the three *dimensions* of time understood as such by the mind through which it moves, passes through, traverses, perhaps haphazardly in a continually shifting focus that, paradoxically, is always the present. If it were not so misleading, the mind's present focus could be called its nunc stans, its 'standing presence'. The power of imagination amounts to the *power of mental*

presencing from (or rather, into, as we shall see further on) all three dimensions of three-dimensional time. They are thus conceived here not in the time-honoured, traditional way as a continuous, linear, moving succession of now-instants along a line neatly ordered into succession according to past, present and future, but as the openness of *three interleaved temporal dimensions* proffered to each other and also in a unity to the psyche, thus providing *three independent temporal degrees of freedom of movement* for the mind itself to pass through (διαμετρεῖν) within such psychic openness that itself *resonates* with the three-dimensional temporal openness.

The import of the adjective 'single-minded' for mental focusing will become apparent later (cf. 2.5 *Temporally trifocal mental presencing*), when it is shown to be inadequate, insofar as mental focusing is conceived up until now as successive and therefore still in *this* restricted sense as linear.

This shift of emphasis to the mind's *own* psychic-temporal focusing movement of its 'constant present', powered by the imagination, i. e. its own (active, but also passive) power of presencing, within the openness of non-moving three-dimensional time, that is entirely prior to movement, represents a rupture with the well-worn, traditional ways of thinking that have concentrated on following the movement of things in the world invariably conceived *as* a *continuous* physical movement, thereby counting time along a line of movement/locomotion, and bent on *causally* explaining it through a linear linkage of cause and effect along the time-line. Here, by contrast, there are quite distinct kinds of movement/change calling to be thought through, as we shall see, with which the concept of linear, one-dimensional time cannot come to terms. Movement explicable in terms of efficient causality is just one special, restricted, unfree kind of movement for which a 'flattened', one-dimensional conception of time seems to suffice.

2.1.1 Ambiguity in the sense of mental presencing as focusing

There is an ambiguity inherent in mental presencing that calls for further clarification. The mind's *shifting its focus of attention*, i. e. its Vergegenwärtigung and shifting *intentionality* (stretching forth toward) or even non-intentional wandering, can be regarded as a kind of *mental presencing* of essents (a state of affairs, a situation) from the present itself, from the past or from the future in a present mental focus. If something is already present, perhaps even (potentially) sensuously so, in the present situation, it seems odd to call a shift of focus in the mind's attention to it a *coming into presence* since, in a way, it is already present in the present situation, e. g. visible, i. e. able (potentially) to be seen by the sense of sight. Likewise, to call a shift of the mind's attention away from something present in the present

situation a *going from presence* into absence also seems odd. This oddness arises from regarding mental movement itself rather than the movement of physical somethings, as has traditionally been the case, and even today unquestioningly, tacitly remains the case. It is easy to confuse the two. In the present context, 'absence' means 'out of mind'. When the mind focuses on a past situation, thus recalling it into a present focus by remembering an *earlier* situation, or on a future situation by looking forward toward a possible *later* one, this presupposes that it already has available to it these open temporal dimensions to pass through and temporally situate what is absent.

Furthermore, calling something past or futural into a present mental focus (vergegenwärtigen) does not make that something past or futural into an essent that is itself presencing in the present. Rather, it remains in its respective temporal dimension as past or as futural, but nonetheless presencing, i.e. coming, temporally from its respective temporal dimension, through which it must pass (mentally, not physically) to presence in the mind's present focus, whilst respecting its temporal origin in its respective temporal dimension. Conversely, this can be conceived as the mind itself stretching out and passing through toward essents *themselves* in one of the temporal dimensions. In particular, it may at first seem nonsensical to consider something coming to presence from the past, since common sense says what is past is past and can no longer come back to presence. Nevertheless, a past essent presences *as itself* (not merely as a copy) in a recollective mental focus *as* absent. Traditionally, the past has been conceived as consisting of what 'is no longer'. But the past (or beenness, foregoneness) is a temporal dimension in its own right, and not merely a determinate negation of the present as the privileged temporal dimension, not merely a lack of presence. The absence of an essent in the past *is* its mode of essencing that potentially can come to mind through recollection. The absent essent *itself* is recalled, not merely some (psychically internal) representation of it.

Conversely, when an essent recedes from the focus of attention, this does not mean that it itself is going back from the present into another temporal dimension. For instance, when a memory recedes after having been remembered, its temporal status as past does not change, but rather the mind's attentive focus on it fades, perhaps even to the point of forgetting altogether in the sense that it *can* (δύναμις) no longer be recalled. The coming and going, or presencing and absencing, refer here exclusively to the mind's *own* attentive focusing movement under the actively intentional, or even passively non-intentional, psychic power of imagination within three-dimensional time, shifting, apparently randomly, like a bouncing searchlight. Thus, for example, the mind can shift its focus to the future in making plans, and it can also forget the plans it has made, which amounts, paradoxically, to forgetting possible future situations and essents therein, although the futural dimen-

sion comprises that which is yet to arrive, or *may* (possibly, potentially) yet arrive in the present, but is presently withheld from it. Paradoxically, the mind can even shift its focus from a present situation and matter at hand by letting it slip into mental absence whilst the situation maintains its presence, perhaps even sensuously so. This is usually called absent-mindedness.

2.1.2 Foreseeing the future

When calling to mind future situations, the mind may be planning, envisioning a possible course of action or even prophesying future historical events of greater or lesser import, all of which must be regarded as *possible* (δυνάμει), as-yet-withheld comings from the future. The future, however, is not to be conceived merely as the not-yet of the present, and expectantly looking out temporally into the future must not be confused with foreseeing or predicting it. Expectation is a phenomenon in its own right. The fixation on foreseeing, predicting events situated temporally in the open dimension of the future is a legacy of the traditional ontology of movement that itself is fixated on an end (τέλος) that is in sight (εἶδος) from a beginning (ἀρχή). Envisioning a future relies on the psyche's power of imagination, and envisioned future events essence as such from this temporal dimension, thus 'existing' (or rather: essencing) temporally *as* futurally absent. A literary dystopian envisioning of the future, say, does not need to lay claim to any predictive power, but rather conceives itself as a warning for warding off a possible future whose seeds of potentiality lie in the present. Presencing in the mind's focus from the hitherto mentally absent past may be associated with a mood of remorse, fondness, regret, sadness, gratitude, pride, commemoration, etc., whereas presencing in the mind's focus on the absent future may be associated with a mood of fearfulness, cheerfulness, joy, apprehension, hope, etc., independently of whether that withheld future ever arrives in the present.

2.1.3 Aristotle on memory

As a faculty of the psyche, for traditional ontology, the mind itself is not a being, but a kind of beingness pertaining to human being itself. To conceive it therefore relies on the ontological difference. However, Aristotle (and he is not alone) does not always respect this crucial distinction and treats the psyche with its mental faculty also as if it were itself a being that, moreover, as already often remarked, is located somewhere. This is more than apparent in Aristotle's short treatise on *Memory and Recollection* (Περὶ Μνημῆς καὶ Ἀναμνήσεως), a companion text to

De Anima that takes the latter as a basis. A memory is said to be "like an imprint" (οἷον τύπον 450a31) struck in the psyche by sense-perception at an earlier time, whereby the psyche itself is said to be located in a part of the body: "It is obvious that it is necessary to think such [affection] made by sense-perception in the psyche and in that part of the body that has the psyche" (δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι δεῖ νοῆσαι τοιοῦτον [πάθον] τὸ γινόμενον διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ τοῦ σώματος τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτήν 450a28). Accordingly, memories (that are genuinely and thoroughly temporal) are said to be located *somewhere* in a thing-like psyche within the body and the problem arises as to how a stored memory now physically present in a spatially located psyche can be that of a now-absent being. This amounts to a further instantiation of a spatialization of time, namely, of the temporal dimension of the past or beenness. "Someone could question how one can remember an absent thing when only the affection of the absent thing is present" (ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις πῶς ποτὲ τοῦ μὲν πάθους παρόντος τοῦ δὲ πράγματος ἀπόντος μνημονεύεται τὸ μὴ παρόν. 450a26). The affection of the absent thing is conceived *as* a stamp in the psyche, and memory itself as a stack of such psychically stamped impressions. Hegel, too, adopts this Aristotelean conception.[1]

Aristotle approaches this problem by introducing a distinction between the lasting imprint stamped into the soul like the impression of a signet ring in wax or "like a painting" (οἷον ζωγράφημά τι 450a30) that can be "contemplated as something in itself" (αὐτό τι καθ᾽ αὐτὸ εἶναι θεώρημα 450b25) but also as a "likeness" (εἰκόνα 450b23) that is an "imagined image of something else" (ἄλλου φάντασμα 450b26), namely, of the now absent thing itself, thus referentially. This doubling (in a representation, as Descartes will write millennia later) only becomes necessary, in the first place, due to treating the psyche itself as a being that, moreover, is located in the body, thereby not respecting its status as a *mode* of being, i.e. of beingness, οὐσία or a mode of essencing. If recollection by the power of imagination in the psyche is able to recall the absent thing *itself* (due to the psyche itself being all-encompassing time) and relate to it as its memory, there is no need for this doubling. The absent is an essent essencing from the temporal dimension of the past, of beenness. What is "contemplated" by recollection is neither a "painting" nor a "likeness" of something else now absent, but is the thing itself (καθ᾽ αὐτό) in the past, now presencing from the past to the mental imagination that is focusing on it, turning its attention toward and straining itself toward.

The doubling of memory into a present imprint left, and thus stored locally in the soul (as if on an electronic hard disk) and as an image of something else past

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1 Cf. Hegel *Enz.* III §§ 452 ff Die Erinnerung (Recollection) – §§ 455 ff Die Einbildungskraft (Power of Imagination) – §§ 461 ff Gedächtnis (Memory).

that is now absent is due, in the second place, to Aristotle's confusion between perception and imagination. Right at the start of *De Memoria* he asserts that "perception is of what is present, expectation is of what is futural, memory is of what has been" (τοῦ μὲν παρόντος αἴσθησις, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γενομένον μνήμη. 449b28). Imagination is here left out of account, even though he immediately notes in the following that "thinking does not exist without an imagined image [a phantasma]" (νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος 449b29) and also later that a memory itself is an "imagined image of something else" (ἄλλου φάντασμα 450b26), once again doubling the image into itself as a reference to something else. Nevertheless, he then goes on to pose the perplexing question, "if there is something in us like an imprint or drawing, of which there is a perception, why should it be the memory of something else rather than of it itself?" (ει᾽τ᾽ ἐστὶν ὅμοιον ὥσπερ τύπος ἢ γραφὴ ἐν ἡμῖν, τούτου αὐτοῦ ἡ αἴσθησις διὰ τί ἂν εἴη μνήμη ἐτέρον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ αὐτοῦ τούτου; 450b16 ff). Notice here that the image "in us" is now perceived and not imagined, and that Aristotle has already asserted that perception can only perceive what is present. Hence the conundrum and the question: why should the *present perception* of some sort of image imprinted in our thing-like psyche be the *memory* of something else that *has been* at all and situated in a completely different temporal dimension? After all, perception is said to be only of what is present, memory is only of what has been. The way out of this impasse (ἀπορία) is to note that it is the power of imagination, and not perception, that enables memory and this imaginative power is not restricted to the present but is precisely that psychic power which unites all three temporal dimensions and also passes freely through them. Moreover, what is imagined is not the image of something *else*, but the thing itself. (As we shall see later, this sight is understood as such-and-such by the mind's seeing as a matter of course. Thus the sight seen mentally is an ontological look (εἶδος) or idea of the thing seen.) Unlike perception, the power of imagination is not tied to the present but is freely, three-dimensionally temporal.

Aristotle emphasizes that a memory of something that was seen or heard is always accompanied by an "additional perceiving" (προσαισθάνεται 450a21) of an "earlier" (πρότερον 450a22) and that "earlier and later are in time" (450a22). The seeing or hearing is also a 'perceiving' of the essential temporal moments earlier and later. Thus all memory, he says, relies on a part of the psyche "in us", namely, "the primary perception through which we perceive time" (τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ, καὶ ᾧ χρόνου αἰσθανόμεθα 451a18). But how could we perceive time if perception is only able to perceive what is present (τὸ παρὸν μόνον 449b14)? Aristotle insists that memory is only possible in those living beings that "have a perception of time" (χρόνου αἴσθησιν ἔχειν 450a19), this being even the "primal perception" (πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ 450a14).

On the other hand, however, he describes memory as some kind of image imprinted in the soul (thus fatefully spatializing time) and maintains that those with poor memory, i. e. the young and the old, suffer the condition that "the imagined image does not remain in the psyche" (οὐ μένει τὸ φάντασμα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ 450b10). It fails to 'print', as if trying to print on water (the young whose minds are moving fast from one thing to another) or on a hard surface (the old suffering from mental sclerosis). If memory consists in seeing the mental image of something that has been, this seeing is not a perception at all, but an imagining of the has-been being itself, and not a copy of it present in the psyche that is *perceived* now. Rather, it is indeed imagined now but in its proper absent temporal status as 'was'. All this falls into place if it is the *imagination* as the primary power through which we imagine time itself (and not some kind of 'inner' time as postulated by subjectivist phenomenology of consciousness) that enables the memory of something that has been, and this time is not the linear, counted time of succession (like a time-stamp), but the imaginative unification of the three open temporal dimensions itself.

Recollection (ἀνάμνησις) consists in calling to mind *now* a memory of what *was.* This is the mind's power to focus on something present, past or future, thus calling it to *presence*, however without erasing its status as present, past or futural. Even with what is present, the mind still has to shift its attention to it for it to become present-to-mind, as noted above.

The psychic power of imagination enables the mind to pass effortlessly through the three temporal dimensions imagining this and that, one state of affairs, and another, in their respective temporal status. To anticipate the introduction of the body (cf. 2.8 *Bodying as empsychment and entimement*), such imaginative essencing can be and is accompanied by (in general: moodful) *somatic* affection that is experienced now while the imagination and the mind may be temporally somewhere else, in the past or the future. Thus, for instance, you can have happy or poignant memories now that are felt somatically, perhaps by laughing, smiling or weeping, the soma thus showing itself to be pliable to the mind's intentionality. But this somatic affection should not mislead us to think that memories are somehow stored somatically. Rather, we are 'there' in that temporal dimension with the remembered situation itself.

Needless to say, the Western tradition in thinking has followed in Aristotle's misleading footsteps right up to modern scientific thinking on memory. The doubling of memory into the ambiguity of a kind of present stored imprint and the image (or representation) of something else past is due to inadequately conceiving the power of imagination that is able to unify the three dimensions of time through which mental imagination can freely move.

2.1.4 Misconceived spatiality of time for the sake of artificial intelligence

Aristotle's (mis)conception of memory persists in today's striving to build algorithmically controlled artificial intelligences. The pre-physicality, and hence non-extension and non-spatiality, of purely temporal mental movement represents a temporalogical barrier to building machines (robots, artificial intelligences) that could simulate a perception of movement as such. The temporal dimension of the past (or beenness, foregoneness) is then simulated in such a techno-scientific project by storing data *spatially* with appropriate clock-time stamps that can be retrieved 'as if' they were being recalled to mind (digital processor) from the past by the algorithms of the robot (whatever form it assumes). Time itself is conceived one-dimensionally as counted along a line of succession, thus missing the phenomenon of three-dimensional time entirely (Eldred 2022). The data *presently* and *spatially* stored in some electronic medium are temporally situated merely by a time-stamp that is likewise present and can be read off interpretively. Such a crude, spatialized conception of time is also required by today's neuroscience when it comes to conceive memory *as* spatially stamped in certain cerebral regions that interact neurally in acts of memory storage and retrieval of coded neural impulses that are supposed to be the memories themselves (cf. 8.3 *Who is the human? What-answers*). Time itself, however, is a pre-spatial, non-material phenomenon that can only be grossly distorted by any kind of spatializing conception. Today's attempts to develop neuroscience and artificial intelligence are entirely oblivious to their crass distortion of the phenomenon of time and have to remain so to fulfil their scientific mission.

2.2 Mental hip-hopping through interleaved temporal dimensions

It is by now apparent that the psyche's own mental movement, its mostly *discontinuous hip-hopping or flitting* among the three dimensions of time, must not be confused with the mind's closely following a (sensuously mediated or non-sensuous), continuous movement/change (especially locomotion) of something physical and spatially extended, as has traditionally and paradigmatically been the case. A continuous physical movement/change must always be considered in its unity with the psyche and mind, anyway, for it to exist, i.e. to essence, *as* past, present or futural; it makes no sense to speak of 'objective' physical movements completely independently of the 'subjective' psyche and mind, for such speaking-of is itself a presence to mind and in this sense a dependence on the mind in its identity with temporal essencing. The intrinsic unity of three-dimensional temporal essencing

within the psyche's openness, and for the mind's focusing on essencing essents within this openness, is expressed already by an appropriate phenomenological interpretation[2] of Parmenides' famous Fragment 3: τὸ γὰρ αὐτό νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι, (mental presencing and essencing are the same). This unity or belonging-together in identity has been violated by the split in today's predominant modern ontology between an inner, subjective consciousness and an external, objective world conceived as independent of subjective consciousness and 'existing' without it. This philosophical barbarism is due to neglecting and suppressing the question concerning the very meaning of being itself. From its Greek beginnings onward, physics has been concerned with extended, spatial beings that are capable of movement/change, i.e. κινούμενα, as if such physical movement were a movement unto itself (für sich), independently of the temporal mind *for which* this movement 'is', i.e. presences, at all.

As we have seen, however, the mind's own movement is neither physical nor spatial, but purely temporal and thus genuinely *pre-spatial*, entirely *non*-spatial altogether, even when imagining spatial motions such as a spaceship on its way to Mars. It is not hard to convince oneself from self-observation that the mind's movement generally can be characterized as a temporally three-dimensional *hip-hopping or flitting*, which is normally anything other than a confused, incoherent, scattered mental movement. On the contrary, such hip-hopping of the mind usually involves an *interleaving* of the three temporal dimensions for the presencing and absencing, i.e. essencing, of essents in such a way that, say, what presences from an earlier past has a meaning for the mind's understanding that dovetails seamlessly and coherently with what may presence later from the future, or vice versa, or any other interleaved combination of temporal dimensions. In leading a life, shaping an existence, the mind is continually hopping, flitting among the interleaved three temporal dimensions and the essencing from them consecutively, freely and non-causally in its *own* focus, but nonetheless disparate and discontinuous with regard to the temporal dimensions whence essents essence. Such interleaving may be, and mostly is, coherent, i.e. makes sense, although, by virtue of determinate negation, it also may be deficient, i.e. incoherent, scattered and confused, perhaps even deranged. The coherence of the three-dimensional temporal hopping of the mind is due first of all to the unity of three-dimensional time itself which, in turn, enables a temporally three-dimensional, trifocal overview, which will be considered in more detail below (cf. 2.5 *Temporally trifocal mental presencing*). By introducing such a consideration of leading and shaping an existence, the individuation of the psyche in an individual has been anticipated, a topic that must

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2 Cf. 'Out of your mind?' in my *A Question of Time* (2015b).

be investigated more explicitly (cf. 2.6 *Sense perception, physical reality and bodily individuation*).

2.3 Habituated presence-to-body in harmony with presence-to-mind: practices

Is a physical, sensuous presence-to-hand of an essent in some kind of bodily practice to be distinguished from a presence-to-mind in which the mind shifts its focus of attention to that sensuously perceptible, physically present essent? Or do they intrinsically belong together? What kind of presence-to-mind is required of a practical presence-to-hand? Does the mind always have to be attentively focused on a given essent for it to be 'in mind'? When driving a car or playing a musical instrument such as a guitar, for instance, are the car's controls or the instrument's fret-board absent from the mind's intentional focus, which may be on something else, i.e. another essent such as the travel destination or the song's lyrics or even on some other unrelated event? Can the mind be multifocused? When driving or playing, the car's controls or the instrument's fret-board are appropriately sensuously present-to-hand, i.e. present-to-body, without requiring any *conspicuous present, single-minded* focus, especially not a *visual* one, but is this appearance deceptive? After all, the individual's mind understands and intentionally, purposefully wills the practices in which the individual engages, such as driving a car or playing a guitar, and the senses are required for such practices. In such practical activity, the mind with its understanding of the practice and its will is bodily with the things it is sensuously, practically, bodily handling and, for the most part, *inconspicuously* so.[3]

   The mind, i.e. its memory, is imbued with the previously learned and bodily practised *know-how* of the respective practices and is now putting it to practice by inconspicuously recalling from memory what it has learned, practised and thus habituated earlier on. The skilful sensuous presence-to-body of the practical things in the bodily practice is in seamless harmony with the presence-to-mind of the practically understanding mind in its present preoccupation. The inconspicuous sensuous presencing-to-body is also a presencing in the psyche, thus insofar also a mental essencing. The inconspicuousness of the presence-to-mind in a practice is due to the mind's being able to recall from the temporal dimension of the past (beenness, foregoneness) and put into practice what it has learned, practised

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3 Cf. Aristotle *Movement of Animals* "...the psyche is not required in each and every part (of the body)..." (μηδὲν δεῖν ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι ψυχήν Χ 703a36).

and thus habituated, *as if* the mind itself were absent-minded. Rather, the mind is effortlessly present with the recalled habituated practice with which it *inspires* the body to currently practise and thus, in that sense, indeed it is temporally multifocused on it with an intended present purpose, namely, to drive the car or play the guitar in the present whilst drawing on and letting presence its past: the mind breathes its know-how, i.e. what it has learned and practised, from the past into the body, thus in-spiring it in its present movement.

This temporal multifocus of the mind does not preclude, but rather includes the mind's drawing on essents and situations from other temporal dimensions, in this case especially the past. The guitar-player not only inconspicuously recalls and draws on the practically learned and habituated (thus effortlessly remembered) skill of how to play, but also, simultaneously, presences the remembered song's lyrics that would not be available to sing had not the mind likewise recalled them from a practised memory. Moreover, the singer is only able to sing the song proficiently because it has been practised, and this learning practice resides temporally in the *past*, where it is present as absent, and thus recallable to be effortlessly embodied in the singer's vocal cords. As a performer, the guitar-playing singer also has the sensuously *present* audience in mind, whose reactions s/he inconspicuously takes in and incorporates – indeed bodily – in the performance in an *interplay* with the audience. The performer also has the next (future) song in the set in mind.

All this temporally multidimensional mental essencing or 'minding' depends upon the mind's essencing 'all at once' throughout the three-dimensional temporal openness. This minding can include also the sensuously essencing of the audience over there, *presently* in front of the performer, but the essencing from the past of what the performer has learned and habituated through practice by way of playing, singing, performing previously is not tied to the memory of a specific situation sometime, somewhere. The mind's memory is inconspicuously called to mind (thus vergegenwärtigt, presenced) and inspiringly embodied (literally incorporated; cf. however below on entitement and empsychment, which are *conceptually prior* to embodiment) in the bodily performed performance, while the mind is also 'simultaneously' presently engaged with the various aspects of the present performance, e.g. the volume level of the guitar amplifier. Hence presence-of-mind and presence-to-mind are not synonymous with a *one-dimensionally concentrated, single-minded* focus in the present. Rather, the focus itself is, and has to be, *three-dimensionally temporal* or *temporally wide-angled* or, more precisely, *temporally trifocal*, as will be further discussed below (cf. 2.5 *Temporally trifocal mental presencing*).

To engage in any bodily practice, the mind must be engaged, usually with an intentionally willed purpose in mind, even when making a cup of coffee. The bod-

ily practice of handling the espresso machine draws on the habituated practice that the coffee-drinker has learned and performed already thousands of times and now performs bodily 'without thinking about it', i.e. without it coming into a focus of present mental attention. Nevertheless, the mind is 'absent-mindedly' involved, drawing on its memory that is smoothly em-bodied, whilst perhaps *also absent-mindedly* wandering off to other matters that may even interfere with the coffee-making itself by, say, forgetting to fill the espresso machine with water. Such scatter-mindedness may inadvertently 'sabotage' a practice, but it is not evidence of a complete divergence of the bodily action from the mental activity. Rather, it points to the mind's *temporal spread*, its *temporally three-dimensional focus* rather than a temporally concentrated, one-dimensional focus. In the usual case, the mind's multidimensional temporal engagement with the practice currently being practised dovetails in a unity of bodily and mental movement.

To recapitulate: the mind's *concentrated* focus on the present can wander off, but this does not amount to *complete* absent-mindedness. Indeed, a temporally multifocal presencing is required for any practice (which is a kind of movement). Previously practised bodily movements constituting a practical know-how have been *habituated.* This habit can be recalled from the *past*, thus enabling the practical movements to flow freely in harmony with the body in the present. A habit is an *embodied memory* amounting to an *inspiration* (Begeistung) of the body by the mind that no longer has to pass through a *concentrated, unifocal* present mental focus, but rather is recalled from the past directly into the body without any *concentrated* mental effort in the present. This conception of habit as an inspiring, embodied memory will have to be modified when considering the body's conceptually prior empsychment (cf. 2.8 *Bodying as empsychment and entimement*). When learning to drive a car or play an instrument, the mind first focuses minutely, in the present, on each of the individual practical physical movements involved (such as on how to release the clutch without jerking forward or on the fingering required for a given chord progression), but the learner has thus not yet learned the practice, and only becomes accomplished and proficient once this minute concentrated focus on the present gives way, through much practising, to a bodily presencing from the past of earlier, well-practised, habituated movements only *apparently* without any further thought. The mind's wide-angle temporal focus within the temporally three-dimensional psychic openness moves in unison, harmonizing with the practised body that is thus able to expertly handle the practical things, be they a car's controls, a musical instrument or an espresso machine.

2.4 Temporality of space and refutation of interior consciousness

The pre-spatiality of three-dimensional time (and hence also of psyche and mind) entails in particular that space itself only comes about in the pre-given openness of three-dimensional time via extended things taking their places. Space itself is temporal! To 'exist' at all, space must presence in time! In this sense, time is prior to space, whereas traditionally they are assumed unquestioningly to be equally originary or, more likely, that time itself is somehow spatial, thus giving priority to space over time. Grammar itself reflects an assumed parity between space and time in the adverbs, prepositions and conjunctions that have both, even-handedly, a spatial and a temporal meaning. Priority of temporality in this context means that space itself and spatiality of extended things cannot be conceived without a (pre-)conception of time being presupposed, usually by sleight of hand.

Nevertheless, there is a long tradition in Western philosophy and science of *spatializing time*, for it then seems easier to deal with, easier to imagine (e. g. geometrically). Like the phenomenon of being itself, the phenomenon of time "loves to hide" (Herakleitos), thus demanding a subtlety of thinking to counter its elusiveness. The movement of the hands of a clock or watch is one such linear-circular spatialization of time, perhaps the most superficial and crude, that is taken for granted, and modern physics is proud of the super-accuracy of its clocks. But the original spatialization of time (e. g. Plato's *Timaios*) was read off the circular motion of the sun, the planets and the moon around the Earth. This continues to hold even when, after the Copernican revolution, it is conceived, for the sake of easier mathematical calculability (the equations of motion are easier to solve), that all the planets, including the Earth, revolve around the sun. A year is then spatialized as the motion of the Earth in one revolution around the sun, the month as the motion of the moon in one revolution around the Earth, and the day as the motion of one rotation of the Earth upon its axis.

Now back to the inside/outside dichotomy. Because the mind and its own movement in three-dimensional time is pre-spatial, it cannot be located anywhere, a location being necessarily a spatial determination applicable solely to things placed somewhere in three-dimensional space. The mind as abiding in three-dimensional, psychic temporality is *whereless* and hence, in particular, not interior to, not *inside* anything. Nor, therefore, is it exterior to anything. As identical with the openness of three-dimensional time itself, the psyche is all-embracing without interior or exterior, and the mind, as a psychic faculty, can only move within this psychic-temporal openness. It is also a flagrantly dogmatic misconception, more than willingly and blindly practised by today's neuroscience, to postulate some sort of covariance between mental movement through three-dimensional time

and three-dimensional spatial movement (e.g. neural activity at a location) within the material brain.

As already repeatedly remarked, it makes no sense to speak of the mind's *interiority*, or of the *inner* psyche vis-à-vis some kind of exterior, usually imagined to be the extended physical world of things open to the bodily senses' perception in the present as the supposedly primary mode of access to this external world that, furthermore, is incoherently imagined to be 'objectively independent' of inner consciousness. As we have seen, in order to 'be', spatially extended things, too, must essence in the unified psyche, and such essencing is not restricted to sensuous essencing in the present. Talk of interiority (necessitating the construction of a sensuous transmission belt from outside to the inside of consciousness) imputes a spatiality to consciousness as a surrogate for the psyche, whose nature is purely three-dimensionally temporal, prior to any spatiality. Presencing in the mind from any of the three dimensions of time does not have to rely on physically presencing via the bodily senses that, in any case, can only sense something physical, spatial, in the single temporal dimension of the present.

2.4.1 Consciousness and psyche distinct

Hence the concept of the psyche developed here must be clearly distinguished from the modern conception of consciousness that is conceived to be located somehow inside. This is due to the confusion concerning conceptions of space, time and being (existence) themselves. Going back to the start – da capo— has enabled being itself to be recast as essencing in three-dimensional temporality, thus opening an exit from the inside/outside split. Sensuous, physical presence 'outside' in the present is privileged in modern subjectivist metaphysics, in comparison to which anything else that is absent from physical presence, from the past or future or even non-sensuously mediated present, presences in the mind, i.e. in consciousness, only somewhere 'inside' as a surrogate representation. Hence *absence* from sensuous perception is confused ubiquitously with *interiority*, namely, inside consciousness which itself, in truth, is psychic three-dimensional temporality. In short, consciousness needs to be recast as time itself, and three-dimensional time is the key to finding the way out of this subjectivist metaphysics that remains also the tacit, unacknowledged foundation of modern science – tacit and unacknowledged because modern science deludes itself that it has (positivistically) left all metaphysics behind.

When it comes to the scientific study of animals and their behaviour, all the pre-empirical, prejudicial preconceptions of subject/object metaphysics are transferred without further ado to the interpretation of observed animal behaviour,

and experiments are conceived in which these unexamined preconceptions are in-built. First of all, the theory of evolution is taken as an indisputable given. Then it is also delusively assumed that the scientifically dispassionate, objective study of animal behaviour is possible, whereas what we humans can learn of animal be-haviour is a matter of interplay in which our largely one-sided estimation of ani-mals is at play. In this oblivion to the phenomenon of interplay, bees e.g. are also imagined by behavioural science to construct representations of their surround-ings 'inside' their 'consciousness'. Or, in animal sentience research, self-conscious-ness is attributed to certain species of animal as an empirically observed fact, rather than first of all seriously posing the question concerning the phenomenon of human selfhood, which is anything but an obviousness, and certainly not simply observable as an empirical fact (cf. 8.4.2 *Contradictoriness of selfhood*). Only with an understanding of our own mortal selfhood could it be hazarded to contemplate and surmise through interplay, in which we are also looking in the mirror for com-parison, whether animals have characteristics of selfhood.

Sensuous presencing of the presently sensuously perceptible in the mind is only a special, restricted case of mental presencing that, without further thought, is taken as the paradigm for mental cognition of the world, with memory and ex-pectation relegated to a deficient status vis-à-vis physical, sensuous presencing as the 'really real'. Memory is then conceived *as* a store of traces of absent past oc-currences stored some*where inside* consciousness, whereas expectation is con-ceived *as* the imagining in images, or representations, of absent future occurrences likewise stored some*where inside* consciousness and, under the pressure of mate-rialistic neuroscience, ultimately some*where inside* the brain. The representations of the outside world thus come to be conceived *as* material patterns constructed by the brain's neuronal activity that then have to be ordered somehow to keep track of them temporally. In this way, time itself, conceived as one-dimensionally linear, is thoroughly spatialized 'inside' via the dichotomy between inside and outside. It is only consistent for subjectivist ontology that, for instance, Kant conceives time as the "inner sense" of a "succession" (Nacheinander) of (interior) representations (Vorstellungen). This would continue to be the case even with three-dimensional time if the radically pre-spatial nature of time itself were not clearly recognized.

2.5 Temporally trifocal mental presencing

> Διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀλγῇ, μεμνῆται δὲ τῶν ἡδέων ὧν γενομένων παύοιτ᾽ ἂν τῆς ἀλγηδόνος, πληρῶται δὲ μήπω· τί τότε; φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἐν μέσῳ τῶν παθημάτων εἶναι;

> Due to the *present* state <he feels> pain, but remembers *past* pleasures, with which the painful feeling may cease, even though it is *not yet* fulfilled. What is then the case? Are we to

> say or not to say that he is in the middle between both states?
> Plato *Philebos* 35e, my italics.

The mind's focusing on a present situation or on an absent one (in the past or future), that happens in the present as a calling or occurring to mind (Vergegenwärtigung in German), has so far been conceived too one-sidedly insofar as the mind's focusing in the present on essencing essents from any *one* of the three temporal dimensions amounts to a *unifocal* and thus *single-minded* presencing. Three-dimensional time, however, is passed through to the psyche in a fourth dimension as a *unity* (or identity) in which the three independent temporal dimensions both play into or proffer themselves to one another whilst being kept apart (in difference). This temporally multidimensional interleaving implies that the mind not only can skip and hip-hop back and forth discontinuously and consecutively among the three temporal dimensions, but also that the mind maintains an encompassing overview in which the three dimensions meld by virtue of a temporally *trifocal* mental vision. The word 'vision' here is misleading, for mental vision does not imply literally a mental image. To substitute 'perception' for 'vision' also suffers from being tied to the senses. 'Mental presencing' would be preferable for its neutrality that does not imply any sort of imaging. The concept of mental focus (an intentional directedness of attention toward an essent) introduced already in the first chapter is thus aufgehoben (lifted) to a phenomenally more adequate, more concrete concept.

As already discussed in the context of bodily presencing-to-hand (cf. 2.3 *Habituated presence-to-body in harmony with presence-to-mind: practices*), the mind is both with the body's present, sensuously mediated, practical activity whilst 'simultaneously' recalling to presence its learned and practised know-how that is incorporated seamlessly and inconspicuously into the current bodily practice. This implies already that the mind has temporally *bifocal* 'vision' in order to presence 'simultaneously' from two different temporal dimensions. The third temporal dimension, the future, also comes into play because the mind is *intent* on an accomplished performance of the practice, on performing it well, and that accomplishment is yet to come.

In general, the mind can hop among all three interleaved temporal dimensions whilst maintaining a coherent overview in what I call temporally *threefold* or *trifocal mental vision*, or better, *temporally trifocal mental presencing*, to which all three temporal dimensions contribute 'all at once'.[4] Such mental presencing is em-

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4 By way of contrast, cf. the discussion of "temporal nonlocality" in Section 5.7.2 of Atmanspacher and Rickles 2022 pp. 144 ff. Note that "nonlocality" is a spatial term applied to time.

ployed not only in bodily practices but also in dealing with all kinds of situations and matters that inevitably require a temporally three-dimensional overview in which temporally disparate situations and essents are coherently brought together and make sense. It may even be said that all mental presencing is bodily, even when the body is not performing a practical action. Sitting in a reverie or quiet reflection, for instance, with the mind moving freely through its imagination involves the body, no matter how passive it may apparently be in such involvement. Hence the mind relies upon the body.

It seems to be incontrovertible common sense, willingly adopted without further ado by philosophical and scientific thinking, that we humans have eyes so that we can see. The bodily organs of the eyes are used for vision, as any ophthalmologist will confirm. This vision is sensuous and therefore restricted, or truncated, to seeing things visible in the *present*, just one of the three temporal dimensions. The truncation of sensate vision of the eyes, or more generally, the necessary truncation of sensate perception to the sensuously present, amounts to the psyche's mental faculty gaining access to the world only through a slit, whereas in truth, the mind is free to move imaginatively throughout all-encompassing three-dimensional temporality. What has just been explicated with regard to three-dimensional mental presencing, however, gives the lie to the orthodox, common-sense way of thinking about sense perception via sense organs: it is because we see, i. e. mentally presence understandingly, and that 'all at once' into all three temporal dimensions, that we have eyes to see, in particular, sensuously visible things in the present. For the most part, however, we see non-sensuously. Similarly we do not hear because we have ears, but have ears because we hear temporally three-dimensionally, that is, for the most part non-sensuously. One can even go a step further to gain the insight that we humans are able to think and understand not because we have brains, but rather that we have brains (and other assisting bodily organs) because we have understanding minds essencing imaginatively in the three-dimensional time of the psyche.

Western thinking painted itself into a corner from the start by giving priority to sense perception as the criterion for establishing 'what is'. In the modern age, with the dominance of the modern sciences under the hegemony of physics, this has led to the sensately perceptible physical being conceived *as* (hermeneutically) the 'really real' (ὄντως ὄν), and all else as derivative, as less than 'real'. In truth it is the physical that is derivative of the temporally essencing, and the dominance of the physical sciences is a key feature, perhaps even the hallmark, of the present age's topsy-turvy mind (Geist). The physical is only a small part of all that essences in the psyche's understanding, as will become increasingly apparent as we proceed (cf. 2.6.1 *Sensuous presence loses its prerogative vis-à-vis temporally three-dimensional mental presencing*).

2.5.1 Traditional treatments of physical movement in linear time

In particular (and this is a special, restricted case more familiar to traditional considerations of *physical* movement), when the mind follows, via the senses, a continuous, physical movement in the world, it senses (sees, hears, smells, tastes, feels) not just in the present, but presences 'all at once', non-sensuously, both *before* and *after* in order to perceive the movement *as* a connected, continuous movement that remains a movement in merely linear succession (such as Zeno's famous arrow in flight that, however, purportedly cannot move at all because *instantaneous sensate* vision sees only the present instant and the arrow is supposed to 'be' only in that present instant and that present position; cf. 3.4 *Zeno's arrow*). Without such temporally stretched mental vision (in which, in this case, the three independent temporal dimensions are flattened into a linear dependence) to provide the basis for seeing a continuity in the physical movement, the mind would perceive only a disconnected 'snapshot' sequence of events, not a physical movement *as such.* Husserl's concepts of protention and retention are influential examples that, however, retain linear time. He fashioned them out of the Kantian concepts of apprehension, reproduction and recognition with which Kant attempted to grasp the synthesizing power of imagination (Einbildungskraft) that will be discussed in more detail later (cf. 5 *Kant on the power of imagination*).

2.5.2 Divine three-dimensional temporal vision according to Boëthius

In Book V of the famous *Consolatio Philosophiae* by the sixth century pagan-Christian philosopher Boëthius, a perplexing conundrum is posed in contemplating the contradiction between the conception that "God foreknows everything", on the one hand, and "that there could be any arbitrary free will" (praenoscere universa deum et esse ullum libertatis arbitrium, Boëthius 1918 Vol. III p. 6), on the other. If there were no free human will, what would be the point of humans' striving to be good and avoiding bad actions, thus attaining God's reward or evading His punishment? For then, since all future events would be necessarily predetermined, their voluntary actions would be without any effect and their fate on Judgement Day already sealed. The first step toward resolving this contradiction is taken by distinguishing between the necessity of the sequence of events due to the chain of efficient causality and the assured foreknowledge of coming events. Human foreknowing can only be certain in the case of a necessary causal chain that reason can construct, but in the case of the arbitrary exercise of free will, this necessity is inherently lacking. The future is therefore uncertain, at least for the human mind. How, then, could God's mind have a foreknowledge of such uncertain future events

due to the exercise of free human will? In other words: "In what way does God foreknow this uncertain future?" (Quonam modo deus heac incerta futura praenoscit? Boëthius 1918, Vol. III p. 70) And if God foreknows the future with certainty, how could there be any freedom of "human planning and human action if the divine mind foresees everything without falsity and error…" (humanis consiliis actionibusque libertas, quas divina mens sine falsitatis errore cuncta prospiciens… Boëthius 1918, Vol. III p. 85)?

The way out of this aporia is taken by first pointing out the various different human faculties for knowing anything at all: "Thus the senses judge the figure constituted in its underlying matter, whereas the imagination judges solely without matter. Reason, however, transcends both of these and investigates the form/species itself inherent in singular things from the viewpoint of the universal." (Sensus enim figuram in subiecta materia constitutam, imaginatio vero solam sine materia iudican figuram. Ratio vero hanc quoque transcendit speciemque ispam, quea singularibus inest, universali consideratione perpenit. Boëthius 1918, Vol. III pp. 85 ff) And these human faculties, in turn, are transcended by the eye of divine intelligence (intelligentia) that "stands out even higher" (celsior … exsistit Boëthius 1918, Vol. III p. 90) and "views that simple form itself with the pure acuity of the mind" (ipsam illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur Boëthius 1918, Vol. III p. 91). Hence there is an hierarchy of "diverse ways of knowing" (cognitiones diversis Boëthius 1918, Vol. V p. 11): i) sense perception, ii) imagination, iii) reason and iv) divine intelligence.

Human reason is (linearly) temporal, whereas divine intelligence is said to be eternal. What is eternity? Everything that "lives in time" (vivat in tempore Boëthius 1918, Vol. VI p. 12) is caught in temporal succession. "For it does not comprehend and encompass simultaneously the entire space of infinite life; it does not yet have the future and no longer has what is already past" (Non enim totum simul infinitae licet vitae spatium comprehendit atque complectitur, sed futura nondum, transacta iam non habet Boëthius 1918, Vol. VI pp. 23 ff). Such life lives only "in that mobile and transitory moment" (in illo mobili transitorioque momento Boëthius 1918, Vol. VI p. 18). By contrast, God "equally comprehends and possesses the entire plenitude of interminable life" (interminabilis vitae plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit ac possidet Boëthius 1918, Vol. VI pp. 26 f) and "has present the infinity of moving time" (infinitatem mobilis temporis habere praesentem Boëthius 1918, Vol. VI p. 30) "which is manifestly proper for the divine mind" (quod divinae mentis proprium esse manifestum est Boëthius 1918, Vol. VI p. 37). Divine knowledge (scientia), "transcending all temporal motion, remains in its simple presence and, by encompassing the infinite spaces of past and future, contemplates everything as if it had already happened" (omnem temporis supergressa motionem in suae manet simplicitate praesentiae infinitaque praeteriti ac futuri spatia com-

plectens omnia, quasi iam gerantur, in sua simplici cognitione considerat Boëthius 1918, Vol. VI pp. 65 ff). For the divine mind, says Boëthius, encompasses all three temporal dimensions all at once (simul) so that all happenings in this (static) three-dimensional time of eternity are simply present and known (as in modern physics' 'block theory' of the universe, which is (mis)conceived as timeless). Future happenings are known to this divine foreknowing even if they are not necessary according to causality, but merely contingent. Hence even arbitrary human actions resulting from free human will are known to the divine mind, whose eternity comprises all of time.

Hence there are two aspects. Firstly, the divine mind encompasses all three temporal dimensions 'all at once', albeit linearly, in a presence. Secondly, all events happening within this quasi atemporal time of divine eternity are known to the eye of divine intelligence, whether they be causally necessary events or contingent, future ones subject to the freedom of arbitrary human will. The former aspect is interpreted in the present study not as divine, but as the essential character of the human mind itself that must encompass all three (linearly independent) temporal dimensions all at once to be able to see (mentally imaginative or physical) movement and change *at all as such*, and, outside any linear succession of temporal moments, is able to also trifocally focus its attention on any event, whether it be past, present or future. The latter aspect of the foreknowledge of all events within time, whether they be causally necessary or merely contingent, is not granted to the human mind, which is thus not eternal in Boëthius' sense. Only within the restrictive hermeneutic cast of time as linear succession is it possible for the human mind, to a limited extent, to mentally grasp future events with causal necessity along the time-line, but for the most part, in the indeterminate openness of three-dimensional time, such foreknowledge is refused. This does not represent any defect for a mind that is not absolutely intent on mastering, controlling movement.

2.6 Sense perception, physical reality and bodily individuation

If all essencing of essents is temporally psychic, does this not amount (to employ the standard vocabulary of analytic philosophy) to a pure, anti-realist idealist 'position'? That essents can only essence in the psyche does not preclude, but rather includes, that the world of physical essents can only essence (and in old-speak: 'exist') through the mediation of the bodily sense organs through which they present themselves to the psyche and mind *as* essents. The res extensa, i. e. the extended things, can only essence as such by virtue of bodily senses that sense this extension in sensations that are identified with the respective extended essents that are

literally ex-tended, i. e. stretched out, and therefore offer resistance to bodily move-ments, most primitively through the sense of touch (ἀφή). Such extended essents presenting themselves to the senses require that *places* in space be conceded to them. In the first place these senses sensing extension would seem to be the sense of touch and the sense of sight. The senses of hearing, smell and taste do not seem to be senses especially suited to sensing the extension of things, although fragrances, for instance, can be said to waft through the air.

The sense of touch is the most intimate, amounting as it does to the sensation of resistance from something that, at first and for the most part, is more likely than not one's own body, starting with eating and drinking, pissing and shitting, as well as touching, scratching, rubbing, fondling oneself. One's own body also comes up against other sensately resistant, physical essents that are *felt* in the psy-che as present whilst at the same time sensately feeling its own body upright, re-clining, walking, running, swimming, jiggling, rocking, jerking, squirming, wrig-gling. writhing, twisting, etc. Likewise, visible things essence in the psyche, being understood as what they are, mediated by the bodily organs of the sense of sight. The thing seen is thereby not internalized, since the psyche, as three-di-mensionally temporal, is all-encompassing. One sees the thing itself, not merely a duplicate 'interior' representation of it (say, in the cerebrum's frontal lobe). It makes no difference that modern physiology explains the workings of the bodily organs of sight as if there were an image of the thing projected inside the body, say, via the eye's lens onto the retina and then along the optic nerve to the brain, because the seeing of something by the mind *as* such-and-such is nothing physical at all but an hermeneutic achievement, and most seeing is not sensuous, anyway. Mental, 'understanding' seeing itself is in general not dependent on the bodily organs, but only in special cases of seeing physically present things in the present. The sense of sight is experienced not as the resistance of a physically ex-tended thing, as the sense of touch is, but as the proffering of a view of the thing aided by the bodily organs of vision, whose physiology is explained today in terms of the reception of rays of energetic photons, etc. Hence we cannot see sensately in the dark because the light is lacking to stimulate sensations, but that is no hin-drance to seeing in the dark at all.

The designation of physically perceptible essents as *extended* things is some-what misleading, since the extension may be subtle. Is the sensation of taste in the mouth the sensating of something extended? Is the sensation of smell in the nose the sensating of something extended? Since modern science conceives smells and tastes *as* composed of molecules, and sounds *as* vibrating air molecules, one can understand extension in this molecular sense, but smelling, tasting, hearing something sensately in the present *as* such-and-such is the achievement of the mind's hermeneutic As. The bodily senses as such do not sense *anything* at all, be-

cause anything is only the generalized category of something. The essencing of physical things does require the bodily senses in order to essence in the psyche and be understood mentally as-such-and-such, and the bodily senses in turn require the *human body* by virtue of which the all-encompassing temporal psyche is now *individuated* into individual bodies, each of which partakes of the unified temporal psyche (cf. 2.8 *Bodying as empsychment and entimement*). This is the first concept of the human individual. Individuals can then, of course, have entirely divergent sensuous experiences of the physical world via their individual bodies, experiences they can have only in the present. Sensuous essencing is therefore a temporally truncated, sensually mediated essencing.

Physical essents can and do essence *also* non-sensately in all three temporal dimensions, but their peculiar hallmark is their sensately mediated essencing. It is not as if they would cease to essence (i. e. to 'exist') as soon as they were not presently sensed by some individual human body or other.

The mind's focusing on what is physically present at hand generally requires the employment of bodily sense organs as receptors of sense data, perhaps assisted by technical apparatuses, from the simple to the immensely complicated, that are able to physically detect what is present and pass on signals, ultimately to human sense organs, to which they are suitably technically presented. In this way, the essencing of physical things for the psyche is extended beyond what the technologically unassisted bodily senses can sense. This is not necessarily the case, however, since the mind can turn its attention also to a *matter* presently at hand, such as a pressing problem requiring a solution, that is not sensuously present or physical at all, but nevertheless 'there', essencing in the mind. Such a mental focus on the non-sensuously present-to-mind, from the trivial to the weighty, is, in fact, the usual case, with the sensuously present constituting only one aspect of the current situation. A strictly single-minded mental focusing on a non-sensuously present matter is a fictitious construction insofar as the mental focus, of itself, is temporally trifocal, encompassing also 'simultaneously' presencing from past and future (cf. 2.5 *Temporally trifocal mental presencing*).

The sensuous presence of what is present at hand (res, things) is generally called *reality* which traditionally is accorded an ontologically superior status. Such real things are *spatially extended* (räumlich auseinander, *res extensa*) and, together with their sensate qualities, constitute only *one* kind of presencing on which the mind can focus its attention and with which the psyche can resonate in a mood.

2.6.1 Sensuous presence loses its prerogative vis-à-vis temporally three-dimensional mental presencing

Sensuously palpable presence loses here its self-evidently assumed, traditional prerogative as the leading, primary temporal dimension and mode of presencing compared to which the dimensions of past and future or non-sensuous presencing in the present are regarded as 'unreal' or less real, non-sensuous derivatives of 'real' sensuous presence in the present and thus merely pale copies of the physically real, e.g. what is now past *was* once, earlier, *really*, sensuously present in the present, and now *is* no longer real, whereas what is envisioned for the future is merely fantasy or, at best, judicious (preferably scientific) prediction, and, in any case, *is* not yet real. Modern science tends to regard as real only those things for which it apparently has a material explanation in terms of quantum entities, atoms, molecules, etc. that are themselves theoretical conceptions of the mind invented to master their motion. But such material explanations cannot account for sensuously perceiving something *as* something, nor for perceiving something *as* something *at all.*

As already noted, the present does have a certain priority in the psychic openness for the world, but only in the special sense of the mind's own presencing through Vergegenwärtigung, focusing, intentionally turning-attention-toward.... This priority does not reside in *sensuous* presence, however, but in the mind's need and imaginative *power* to focus by actively calling or passively letting an occurring to mind in the present. By now it should go without saying, due to the prespatial and thus utterly non-spatial nature of the three-dimensional temporal openness, that mental focusing is not some sort of 'inner' sense, and certainly not an interior brain process. In truth, as we have seen, presencing for the mind is itself temporally three-dimensional, imaginative, amounting to a temporally trifocal mental presencing entirely foreign to the traditional conception of physical sense-perception in the present. The mind is not cooped up somewhere inside as an 'inner life', but enjoys the full, temporally three-dimensional freedom of movement of the imagination.

The present in the traditional conception of time, starting with Aristotle, is concentrated in the now-instant that is not even a dimension but imagined geometrically, via abstraction, as merely a point on a line dividing past from future. It is at this now-point that every event in the entire universe is supposed to 'happen' and 'be'. The temporal dimensions of past and future are thus conceived likewise geometrically as parts or rays of a single line emanating infinitely in two opposite directions from an origin that is taken to be the present now-instant. These two infinite temporal dimensions are full of non-being, non-existence, with the consequence that one could say that the universe is largely non-existent when

measured against the criterion of being as sensuous presence in the now-instant. Such a geometrical conception of time remains, of course, linear in the most pedestrian sense. In particular, it enables the conception of Cartesian co-ordinate space-time axes that was crucial for the mathematization of physics in the seventeenth century. Since the meaning of being has implicitly been conceived temporally *as* presence now in a now-instant that is taken to be not a fleeting now in the imagined flow of linearly successive time, but rather as the 'standing' now of a continual, persistent, ostinato, drum-beating, ever-recurring presence (cf. traditional conceptions of substance and Plato's ἀεὶ ὄν in *Timaios*, or modern physics' conception of a stationary 'block universe'), both past and future have been conceived as the dimensions of what *is* no longer or *is* not yet, respectively, amounting thus to a truncated meaning of being itself, restricted to just one temporal dimension, viz. presence itself, and moreover to sensuously extended, real presence vis-à-vis the merely ideal presence in the mind's 'unreal' imagination (*res cogitans*) of representations. (Hence the philosophically barren distinction between realism and idealism and the 'eternal', fruitless battle between these -ism positions.)

Such standing presence of being in which a 'really real being' (Plato's ὄντως ὄν) stands, is counterposed to becoming (cf. γένεσις in *Timaios*), i.e. to movement and change, upon which time itself depends to 'be' what it is. Hence static, standing being is said to be 'timeless', a non sequitur echoed down the ages, with timelessness being equated with changelessness. Here, by contrast, sensuous presence, standing, unmoving presence and the present altogether have lost their temporalogical privilege vis-à-vis the other two (now independent, non-linear) temporal dimensions and, moreover, are conceived for the first time as genuine dimensions (for essencing) in their own right (i.e. not merely as segments of a geometric line and not merely as negations of the present) that are not temporalogically inferior and stigmatized by a lack (στέρησις). Not even the present need be sensuous; rather, as a dimension of three-dimensional time, it is itself pre-sensuous and pre-physical altogether, constituting only one of the temporal dimensions in the mind's inevitably temporally three-dimensional multifocusing on matters both physical and non-physical.

2.7 Places in space in time

If the three-dimensional time of the psyche is pre-spatial, i.e. altogether prior to space, and all-encompassing, then, paradoxically, *space* itself must be embedded in time, i.e. space must essence in time, if at all, and not conversely: that time could be somehow located somewhere in space. Time is nowhere. Space, in turn, is what concedes the *places* (τόποι, 'wheres') occupied by physical, extended things

order the existential environs and thus also space in general as a manifold of pla-
ces. Physical things thus presence and absence (essence) some*where* in a place for
sense perception in the present, or more generally for the mind without requiring
sensuous presence. Sensately perceptible, real, physical things cannot be nowhere,
but must have a where. These wheres are the places where real things are (i. e.
where physical essents essence) or can be placed or pass through. Places for ex-
tended things require space that, conversely, concedes places to them. The connect-
ed totality of discrete wheres (places, τόποι) constitutes the *topography of a locality*
with its geographical characteristics through which human individuals can jour-
ney or where they can sojourn bodily, beneath the sky in which the sun, moon
and stars have their places and well-defined celestial movements that provide spa-
tial *orientation* in the environs.

On a smaller scale, in a domestic cosmos, each human existence is led embed-
ded within an *ordered manifold of places* where real things of all sorts are kept in
their respective places, ready to hand for some purpose or other. This connected
order of places can very well also be a disorderly mess, i. e. infected by a negation,
since any *dis*order is a dis*order*. Whether it be on a large topographical scale or a
smaller, local one, the surrounding space constituting environs is always a mani-
fold of places, an environment, where sensately perceptible things can presence,
either at rest or dynamically (implying also an absencing), and also where they
can belong or be found. Such sensuous or non-sensuous presencing somewhere
is always a presencing for and in the psyche whose mind is able to focus within
three-dimensional time on a place and things environing at that place while also
resonating with it. *Moods* are these quivering resonances in their manifold keys.
Hence landscapes and seascapes have their moods.

In the traditional conception of physically extended things (res extensa) there is
a prerogative tacitly given to the physical *sense of sight* that sees things, including
solid things, through the bodily eyes. The paradigm for a real thing is taken to be
something solid with the usual three Euclidian spatial dimensions. Hence a river
is generally taken to be a real thing more by virtue of its visible banks, river-bed
and geographical course than by the liquid water flowing in it. Its geographical
course defines its spatial length-extension. Is a fragrance wafting through the air
from a garden blossoming in spring an extended thing or a thing at all? Is the slight
breeze of air carrying the fragrance an extended thing? Is a tune being sung nearby
in the garden that wafts to a listener's ear a thing extended in space? Is the vibrating
air carrying the tune a thing extended in space? Each of these phenomena, of
course, can be construed as extended through scientific theoretical construction.
How is the *resonance* of the psyche with the tune heard to be conceived? Is it thing-
ly? Physical extension (Auseinandersein) implies at least extension, i. e. stretching-
out, in space. Does it imply the simultaneous occupation of multiple places? Or mere-

ly the simultaneous occupation of multiple, geometrically determined positions in a geometrized Euclidian space or even in a fully mathematized Cartesian space? Modern physics renders real essents (including even fragrances) thingly by conceiving of them *as* composed of tiny extended building blocks of *matter* such as atoms and molecules. Such questions regarding the thingliness of the thing will not be pursued further here, but it is noted that the hallmark of spatially locatable essents is that they can be perceived by the senses, with or without the aid of technical apparatuses. Hence, essents perceptible by sense perception and (thus also necessarily) located somewhere are presently the subject under investigation. Sense perception itself occurs in the present in the temporally three-dimensional psyche, along with the other modes of temporal presencing.

Empty space is an abstraction from the complexly interconnected totality of discrete places in their unique geography of places on Earth that is motivated by the mind's quest to *mathematize change of place*, i. e. locomotion, thus rendering it calculable and subject to mastery via equations of motion, whether they be Newtonian or relativistic or quantum-mechanical. Space is first cleared away to an empty, homogeneous, mathematical space that can be co-ordinatized by real numbers. Three-dimensional spatial co-ordinates then substitute for places. It must be underscored (and this is ignored by the mathematized conception of space) that the presencing somewhere of things and places is always a presencing *for the psyche's mind* that is able to (δυνάμει) orient itself mentally, intentionally toward a place and things at that place within the openness of three-dimensional time. An hermeneutically mathematized psychic mind-set conceives space and place in an historically determinate way that started with the Greek geometrization of places to positioned points that, in turn, was further abstracted by the arithmetization of positioned points, ultimately (with Descartes, Newton and Leibniz) in a mathematically continuous space in which the mathematical operation of differentiation can be carried out as a calculus with infinitesimals. The differential calculus with respect to linearized, real time, t, is crucial for the mathematized mastery of motion. Its success leads to the emergence and advancement of the modern sciences within a tacit program to ultimately mathematize all movement in the world that is today patently visible in the attempt to algorithmize the control of all movement in the world.

2.8 Bodying as empsychment and entimement

With the consideration of physical things presencing and absencing sensately somewhere at a place in the surrounding world, the *human body* has also come into its own thematically since it, too, is physical and is somewhere (cf. 2.6 *Sense*

perception, physical reality and bodily individuation). According to the tradition, the body *can* be conceived *as* the likewise corporeal physical vehicle through which we humans, under the guidance of our understanding, willed psychic faculty of mind, can ourselves move physically from place to place, whether it be domestically within the home, in an environing locality or on a journey. As sensate and physical, the body *can* be regarded *as* a physiological thing, like any other thing, but this is the body merely as *soma* or *corpus*, quasi in the third person. In the third person my body is not my body and it is not I who moves bodily, but my muscles, etc.

Medicine, in particular physiology, is the science that first and foremost studies and treats the body *as* a corpus, i. e. *as* a thing, with its complex anatomy, including many *mechanical* qualities, and the question arises concerning how psyche and soma interrelate. Hence psychosomatic medicine, so-called, and also the notorious mind-body problem. As already discussed, the human being is accordingly conceived as an animated body, i. e. a body inhabited by an anima (ψυχή, soul) that renders it a self-moving, living body that perceives the world. Modern science does not make much headway in locating this body-mobilizing psyche and instead reverts to material explanations in terms of the brain and certain kinds of evolutionarily evolved genes, neurons, hormones, etc.

This conventional conception of the psyche (by skipping over or forgetting the distinction between the psyche as a mode of being and the psyche putatively as an entity, i. e. *a* being) treats it as a kind of thing, a what (possessed of the faculty to impart life to a being) that even has a location in the body and, as such an embodied thing, can also leave it at the event of death. Such a conception of a separable psyche is convenient, especially for medicine that is somatically focused and hence can do experiments on animals such as mice as a preliminary for transferring the findings to the human body, but it is entirely perverse for psychiatry, for which an adequate conception of the psyche itself must be paramount. Is the psyche at all conceivable as embodied? Does the psyche depart the body or simply dissolve at the event of so-called 'brain death' (non-functioning brain)? Or is it, conversely, rather the human body that is empsyched (ἐμψυχός), thus partaking of the more encompassing temporal psyche that sets it into resonance with determinate moods and plays on it as its organ?[5] The Greek word suggests as much. Is the psyche not rather the site of essencing of all that resonantly essences?

As far as human essencing is concerned, the psyche is the very openness of human essencing to the world, its ex-sistent, three-dimensional temporal exposure

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5 Cf. Plato *Theaitetos* 184d; "Leiben eingelassen in die Seele" (Bodying let into the soul) Heidegger GA36/37:297.

to the world's essencing, whereby human essencing is attuned by it and is also able to understand it. A human body dies when it can (δυνάμει) no longer partake of this three-dimensional temporal, psychic openness that requires the body as the vehicle for its spatial movement through it insofar as physical things also essence in it. The body in the proper sense is the body of a singular self *who* (not: that) is able to play intentionally on his or her own body and who, conversely, is affected by the body's state of health, its physiological resonance with its environment, by the proper physiological functioning of all its various organs in order for the body to do the self's bidding. When, for instance, I am suddenly confronted with a worrying situation that presences in my psyche and is understood as worrying, my heartbeat and blood pressure rise. The self can be conceived in a first approximation as the individuation of the psyche that goes along with its individuation into an individual body for the sake of the sense perception of physical things. The concept of individuation developed here does away with the thoughtless complacency with which bodily individuation is taken for granted.

There is an *interplay* between the self's psyche and the body that is not susceptible to explanation as efficient causal *interaction*, which amounts to a conception in which inevitably (motivated by our own age's will to power over movement) the body as corpus (a thing) gains the upper hand as ultimate material cause, and psychopharmaceuticals are deployed to affect and control states of mind and the psychic resonances that manifest in *moods* of all kinds, such as anxiety and depression. Material, thingly causes, above all, are susceptible to mathematization, starting with measurement, which may take the form, say, of the stereo geometry of psychopharmaceutical molecules. One then studies how these molecules circulate throughout the brain effecting changes, such as triggering or inhibiting the firing of certain neurons.

The failure to distinguish ontologically (and now: temporalogically) between body and corpus has led to a fateful collapsing of the mind and psyche into the corpus, even to the extent that today it is quite acceptable to conceive thinking itself (now called *cognition* by modern psychology) as evolutionarily evolved, genetically controlled and/or hormonally influenced, neural brain activity. This is in line with today's extolled and ubiquitously influential neuroscience's claiming that phenomena of free will or being I myself, i.e. selfhood, are mere epiphenomenal illusions sitting atop unconscious efficient-causal neural mechanisms centred on the brain. For this modern mind-set, even life itself, in principle, can be explained solely in terms of efficient material causes (e.g. energy-flows induced by chemical metabolisms). Life itself is then imagined to 'emerge' mysteriously from sufficiently complex chemical processes that to date (for this scientific way of thinking) modern science has not yet discovered. Hence the search for life in the universe, with

the aid of ever larger, ever more elaborate telescopes, on the basis of elements detected by spectrography and 'bio-friendly' temperature ranges.

Bodying physically in the world, including moving from place to place (locomotion, mobility), is enabled first of all by the mind's oriented understanding of the surrounding, connected totality of places constituting the individual's *environment* (Umwelt). Such surroundings presence for the mind in psychic three-dimensional time. A totality of places does not 'exist' for itself, 'objectively' independent of the merely 'subjective' mind, but only in the two belonging together, or even more strongly, in that the 'objects' only essence *in* the 'subjective' mind, thus dissolving any subject/object split. In this sense, like space and the environment itself, places take their place through presencing in the all-encompassing psyche and mind. For instance, so-called 'outer space' with its vast vacuous distances, too, 'exists' only in and for the mind; it is a human conception that in our own age is thoroughly mathematized and scientized, to boot.

Bodying in the sense of performing a practice of some kind, such as driving a car or playing the guitar, has already been discussed as guided by a temporally three-dimensional, trifocal mental presencing that is seamlessly embodied in the body's movements (cf. 2.3 *Habituated presence-to-body in harmony with presence-to-mind: practices*). In particular, the habituated practical movements that have been learned and practised are effortlessly recalled from the past to the body now performing the practice in question, as if automatically.

Now the perspective has to be reversed to correct a gross misconception, since so far the mental presencing has been implicitly conceived as becoming embodied and thus as the mind's itself becoming somehow located inside the physical body, just as in traditional conceptions the psyche, too, is conceived as embodied somewhere inside the body or, even more crudely, as incorporated in the physical corpus. This is a consequence of the ambivalence of Greek thinking on the psyche. Rather, more originarily, it is the body that *partakes* of the psyche that belongs to the all-encompassing openness of three-dimensional time and is thus 'aspired' by aspiring *to* (rather than *from*) the psychic unity of these three temporal dimensions. Such 'aspiration' is no longer (conceived as) an inspiring breathing-*in* of the spirit (πνεῦμα) or psyche (ψυχή) into the body but, conversely, as the body itself aspiring to be *empsyched* and *entimed*, thus, ex-sisting or standing out in the temporal openness. The limits of the individual empsyched body[6] are therefore, ultimately, all-encompassing, three-dimensional time itself and all that essences in it, whereas the boundaries of the physical corpus are sensibly perceptible in the

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6 "A disembodied cosmos beautifully ruling an empsyched body..." (κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἄρξων καλῶς ἐμψύχου σώματος Plato *Philebos* 64c).

present, in general, as skin, the epidermis or outer layer of the corpus. By virtue of such *empsychment* and *entimement*, the body can call on, i.e. visit, its past, habituated practices in performing skilled movements, orient itself in its surroundings and move through the world toward its future whilst mentally presencing 'all at once' orienting situations from the past, present and future.

By partaking of three-dimensional psychic temporality, the corpus becomes a *self-moving body*, i.e. endowed with *life*, with the psyche's mental faculty granting this self-movement the understanding with which the mind can intentionally orient and guide its own bodily movements while leading its life. The body's partaking of three-dimensional time is *finite*, thus rendering the human a *carnal mortal. We mortals thus essence as individual, finitely empsyched and entimed bodies.* The psyche's mental faculty enables each of us to understand ourselves as mortals confronted by our own individual death. Whereas modern medical science has been astoundingly successful in lengthening life-expectancy through effective interventions in the physical corpus, this must not be confused with an enrichment of the body's partaking of mortal existence, perhaps in a short life. This partaking of psychic temporality is the revamped sense in which we humans can be cast hermeneutically as animals. It is radically different from conventional thinking that takes it as self-evident that the human being is individuated, not as an animated body aware of its own mortal carnality, but as an individual living corpus.

My own body presences for me in the temporally three-dimensional psychic openness, but other bodies presence for me as well. There are many individuals since the psyche has been individuated among a plurality. We encounter each other in the world not merely physically, corporeally, but existentially, bodily. What does encountering amount to? Bodily presencing for each other covers the entire gamut of the three temporal dimensions and does not rely necessarily on sensuous presence. Such bodily essencing in the shared world can only be adequately conceptualized in the context of whoness, which has yet to be developed. The distinction between corpus and body and their distinct modes of essencing depend upon the distinction between essencing as somewhat and essencing as somewho, respectively. Further discussion of the body and existential bodying in the shared world will therefore be postponed for the time being (cf. 8 *Recasting humanness through a temporalogy of whoness*).

2.9 Mental absencing distinct from concealment

Φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ

Nature loves to hide
Herakleitos, Fragment 123

The absencing of essents and essencing situations *from the individual mind* (as distinct from the world; see below) when it shifts its focus of attention implies neither their annihilation (abstract negation) nor even necessarily their withdrawal into *concealment* (Verborgenheit), since the psyche's power of imaginative presencing is able (δυνάμει, potentially) to recall to mind things and situations that are absent; they are not necessarily hidden at all, i. e. forgotten, but just temporarily out of mind. Absencing is thus to be distinguished from concealment, in particular, from concealment somehow 'inside', hidden from view in a subject's consciousness which may even be conceived erroneously as housed inside a human head. In the present context, only the simple case of factual absencing and concealing, as well as their opposites, for an *individual* mind is of concern (cf. 6 *Temporalogical recasting in historical time*).

Concealment pertains not to mental absencing per se, but to a negation, lack or deficiency (στέρησις), in the *mental presencing* from any of the three temporal dimensions. The usual paradigm for such a deficiency is when the mind is *unable* to remember *at all* a *past* situation that remains enshrouded in concealment (λήθη). This is the classic case of *forgetting* altogether, in which absence and concealment coincide. The mind is then a blank and has even forgotten it has forgotten; it is entirely oblivious. In a way, the totally forgotten situation has ceased to 'exist' for that individual. Otherwise, in most cases, the mind can recall to presence, but only deficiently, or conversely, it has only *partially* forgotten. Some or many of the details of the past situation remain concealed, although the situation itself is present to mind, e. g. the exact sequence of occurrences in a car accident witnessed can be hazy, forgotten, but not the overall, pertinent happenings that memory is able to *reveal* or *de-conceal* from concealment. Deconcealment in general is beset by a lack that renders it distorted, partial, in short, lacking. Conversely, concealment need not be total.

What is forgotten – a main focus in any psychoanalysis – is attributed to repression of painful past experiences by the so-called unconscious. Repressed, unconscious, past experiences belong here to essents that remain concealed in their absence, unable to be recalled from the past. Their forgottenness may be due to their painful memory, especially in connection with one's own self-esteem or the estimation in which one holds others (e. g. one's parents) that will come to the fore in Chapter 8. Concealment in the temporal dimension of the past is mis-

conceived psychoanalytically when conceived as (active) repression in a part of interior consciousness termed the unconscious by the id, the id itself thereby being regarded as itself a kind of subject. Temporal concealment requires no 'interior space'.

With regard to the temporal dimension of the *future*, the mind may presence a future happening, for instance, by way of planning it, such as a camping trip. Whether the camping trip *actually* comes to pass is not pertinent here, but rather how the mind is able to call to presence clearly (and thus 'envisage') all that is necessary to be prepared for unexpected eventualities or even expected ones associated with the trip. The camper may *forget* to pack the tent-pegs because he has not *foreseen* them in his planning or, what is the same, the tent-pegs do not *deconceal* themselves to the camper's planning mind, although the future camping trip itself is present to mind and also partially deconcealed (e. g. where it is to take place, how to travel there, and much else). This forgetting to pack the tent-pegs is a kind of concealing pertaining not to the past but to the future. The mind's envisaged plan (προαίρεσις) directed toward the dimension of the future conceals certain pertinent details. Deficiencies in preparing for future events amount to a lack in the mental presencing of future situations, whereby important details remain concealed, perhaps because of a lack of *past* experience that the planner can recall and deploy in order to foresee what a future envisaged situation requires. If experience is entirely lacking there is no forgetting of the past to be blamed for planning oversights, but it may also be the case that the past experience is forgotten altogether and can no longer be mentally presenced. It is thus totally forgotten and concealed. The camper, for example, may even have forgotten to take the tent-pegs along on a previous trip. The forgotten experience is not just absent (and therefore *capable* of being recalled to mind), but is altogether hidden in concealment and no longer mentally retrievable by that individual, i. e. both absent and concealed.

With regard to the temporal dimension of the *present*, the mind can call to mind, or presence in its focus, much that is *potentially* present to mind, such as the current political situation on a local, regional, national or geopolitical level, right down to the minutiae of all that is physically, sensuously around and requires only that the mind shift its attention toward it (such as reminding oneself in which drawer the garlic press can be found whilst sitting in one's study). The present political situation presences and is revealed in being mentally focused upon, but very many of the details will remain concealed and can only be deconcealed by further investigation of available revealing sources. Details of the furniture in the next room that is currently not sensuously perceptible can easily be called to mind and thus presence for it deconcealedly, while other details cannot be called to mind. The furniture thus presences mentally whilst remaining partially concealed.

What is sensuously present in a room can be deconcealed simply by focusing the sense organs on it and paying attention mentally to what they sense, but even much of what is not presently perceptible by the senses in the bodily surroundings can still be called effortlessly to mind by relying on memory that is able to mentally presence what has been, relying on a continuity with the present, e.g. insofar as the furniture in the next room has not been shifted or removed. Or what is sensuously *accessible* in one's bodily surroundings, and thus *potentially* deconcealed to sense perception, may be entirely overlooked, absent and thus fail to mentally presence because one's mind is wandering elsewhere. Or conversely: the couch is *present* but covered up, thus *concealing* its colour and worn patches although the mind's sensuous attention is turned toward it. Absencing and deconcealment can go together, just as presencing and concealment can. In this latter case it is more appropriate to speak of absent-mindedness rather than concealment, for there is no deficiency per se in the situation's deconcealment, but in the mental presencing of the mind that is momentarily distracted by some other essencing situation in any of the three temporal dimensions. The mind overlooks features of its present potentially sensuously-deconcealed situation so that it remains partially concealed.

2.9.1 Sensuously hidden whilst mentally deconcealed

There are epistemological-theoretical conditions that must be fulfilled for certain physical things to be perceived at all. Physically and sensuously perceptible are therefore not synonymous. An infectious influenza virus, for instance, is something physical that is sensuously hidden from view in a present environment, but nevertheless can be entirely deconcealed mentally by virtue of medical knowledge, thus not merely a factual deconcealment to an individual. By virtue of having partaken of epidemiological knowledge, an epidemiologist, for instance, understands a virus very clearly in its infectiousness and transmission, although it is never seen sensuously as such. The epidemiologist may clearly see and understand the deconcealed symptoms and *interpret* them *as* an indication of the virus in the patient. Before the scientific *epistemological-theoretical* (not hermeneutic-temporalogical) casting of viruses (hermeneutically) *as* pathological entities, the mind was entirely unable to see them and they were non-existent (since existence is always inseparable from presencing *as* such-and-such *for* the mind of an age, not just an individual).

For someone entirely lacking knowledge of modern medicine, a virus is inconceivable and thus hidden, even non-existent, or presents itself as something else altogether such as an evil demon or a curse. For anyone with some knowledge of modern medicine, influenza virus is disclosed to the mind without its having

to be sensuously visible at all. Its presence may be indicated by something else, viz. symptoms. Its deconcealment for the mind is first of all independent of its being detected by some physical apparatus or other in a present situation, say, to confirm the virus' presence in a hospital ward. A doctor may conjecture the presence of the virus from a patient's symptoms, thus having the virus deconcealed and present-to-mind as a likely possibility. The virus' presencing to the mind and its physical presencing in some kind of physical apparatus in a laboratory or through a simple chemical test for the doctor's eyes to see must be distinguished from one another. The doctor's eyes can see and interpret the apparatus' or test's reading *as* the presence of the virus only due to his or her prior knowledge of the virus *as* a virus within the framework of a pathological theory. In this sense, via scientific theories, i.e. epistemologically, scientific imagination invents entirely new essents for the mind.

2.10 Mental presencing distinct from deconcealment

The mind's shifting its focus to an essencing situation in one of the three temporal dimensions, within a nimbus of trifocal presencing 'all at once' from all three temporal dimensions in the course of some practice or other, lets it come to mental presence. Here, for convenience, the discussion is restricted to a single-minded focusing of the mind's attention on just one of the three temporal dimensions without, however, restricting the validity of the observations to be made.

For any factual situation in one of the three temporal dimensions to 'be' at all, it must i) essence in the shared psychic temporal openness which, in turn, ii) enables its being understood as such-and-such by an individual mind (or some individual minds) presencing the situation in its focus. It essences, first of all, by presencing and absencing in three-dimensional time. Mental presencing for the understanding mind enables any situation to be understood in some way or other, including being misunderstood. Such hermeneutic misunderstanding is attributable first of all, in an elementary case, to the situation itself partially concealing itself or rather, conversely, deconcealing itself only partially or distortedly.

In traditional discussions, that are generally fixated upon *sensuous* presence, preference is given to sensuously present situations toward which the mind can intentionally direct its bodily sense organs, especially its visual ones, that is, the eyes. The sensuously present situation is *potentially* present for the mind – if only it would turn its sense-perceptual attention toward it. In so doing, the situation is presenced from absence and *thus, through this presencing*, is revealed, or deconcealed (entborgen), to the mind through the senses.

It must be underscored that both concealment and deconcealment *presuppose* presencing for the mind or absencing from it. In other words, *presencing and absencing in three-dimensional time are more originary phenomena than concealing and deconcealing*, both of which depend upon and are essential features of prior *mental presencing and absencing.* As we have seen above (cf. 2.5 *Temporally trifocal mental presencing*), three-dimensional temporal presencing trifocally 'all at once' comes into its own especially when considering action, practice, making and physical movement, i.e. *existential* movement necessarily involving presencing and absencing. Hence the *movement* of concealing and deconcealing for the individual mind is itself embedded, as it must be, in the more originary movement of presencing and absencing in temporality itself. In particular, absencing is the phenomenon of essencing (temporally and temporarily) out of the mind's presencing purely and simply. The mind is distracted, has turned its attention away or has lost its attentiveness. That is to say, all that absences (essents, situations) is temporally absent in three-dimensional time and, insofar as it is potentially (δυνάμει) present, is only *temporarily* absent, and in this absence it may be either deconcealed or concealed.

The bodily senses have a perceptual power (δύναμις) to sense and perceive a physical situation presented to them (whilst not of themselves making sense of, i.e. understanding it *as* such-and-such). Thus the bodily senses are activated (ἐνέργεια) in an act of perception, whereby the sensuously present situation is indeed deconcealed, but only to the extent that it reveals itself to the senses. Insofar, sensuous presencing and deconcealing go together, but mixed with concealment. Hence, for example,[7] a figure standing in a field can present itself to the sensuously observing mind from afar as (interpretable as) a human individual, whereas closer up it turns out to be (interpretable as) a scarecrow. The initial sensuous perception turns out to be false (i.e. a false factual interpretation) and is corrected by a view closer up that reveals more to the sense of sight. The perceptual error in this case can reasonably be attributed to a lack of sensory power of the bodily sense organ, the eye, its perceptual capacity. From afar, certain details of a situation simply cannot be sensuously perceived by eyesight in the given illumination, thus leading to the false factual interpretation. In another situation, however, it may be the situation itself that does not fully deconceal itself, as in the case where the buildings in an urban environment wholly obscure the view of the mountain behind, as if the mountain were not there at all, or where a cupboard is positioned on a wall, thus entirely concealing the unused door behind.[8] The

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7 Cf. Plato's similar example in *Philebos.*
8 Cf. Heidegger *Parmenides* GA54:47.

door is physically present to the observer, but concealed from the mind. In such cases, it is the sensuously perceptible situation itself that prevents a factually correct sense perception due to the situation itself only partially deconcealing itself. Presence and concealment here go together. Note that deconcealment is so far being discussed only in the sense of *correctness*, i.e. in the factual situation's being *correctly* deconcealed as such-and-such. Its truth is a different, deeper matter that will be discussed later (cf. 6 *Temporalogical recasting in historical time*).

Deconcealing is not solely a feature of sense perception in the present, but pertains to presencing from all three temporal dimensions. In calling to mind an absent *future* situation such as the signing of a contract of purchase, an experienced solicitor may have in view all the necessary conditions and the proper formulation of clauses without omitting any detail that would leave a legal loophole open for the other party. The mentally *presenced*, *absent* future situation of signing is thus fully *deconcealed* with regard to all the necessary legal precautions, but not with regard to other details that may well remain concealed because they have no bearing on the contractual transaction (such as where the signing is to take place). The *deconcealment* of the *absent* contractual situation to the solicitor's *presencing* mind is independent of whether the envisaged purchase ever *actually* (ἐνεργείᾳ) comes about, i.e. whether the *expectation* of an executed purchase is disappointed and never presences in the present. The solicitor's past experience has already revealed (or deconcealed) to him all the pertinent details that can be carried over to the envisaged futurally absent purchase contract, whereas a young and inexperienced solicitor may omit certain important clauses safeguarding the prospective purchaser's interests. In such a case, the *absent* future envisaged situation is *present* to mind but only imperfectly *deconcealed*, again independently of whether the envisaged purchase ever comes about, i.e. presences in the present. The deconcealment, imperfect or otherwise, has to be distinguished from a correct, foresighted *prediction*, e.g. that the signing will actually take place. Deconcealment here must therefore not be confused with any notion of 'predictively seeing into the future'.

Agreements such as contracts and treaties represent the attempt to deconceal and bring possible absent future movements under control through a binding agreement among parties giving their *word*, thus constituting a kind of *bond*. Their word is a pro-mise (Latin promissum) that is 'sent on ahead' to bindingly control the foreseen contingencies of possible future situations that are as yet absent and may never presence in the present (as in insurance contracts), but presence for the foreseeing mind. The contract or treaty, however, must deconceal and properly articulate in language future eventualities. The various contingencies, firstly, must be *deconcealed* in order to be taken account of in the binding word

of a contract or treaty and, secondly, the parties to the agreement must accept the *obligation to be bound* by their promised word by giving their word.

With regard to the deconcealment of a *past* situation that *presupposes* its presencing for the mind, this is usually called *remembering* or *recalling* from memory. The mind shifts its *present* focus by turning its attention to that *absent* past situation and entering into that temporal dimension to 'be', i.e. to *presence* mentally, with it itself, and not with some representation or replication of it some*where* 'inside' the mind or even the cerebrum. You may recall (mentally presence) having spent a few days in a hotel in a certain city one summer and remember (deconceal) many of the details such as its location in the city, its surroundings, the look of the room and the breakfast room, the friendliness of the staff, etc. but altogether fail to recall the hotel's name. By remembering, you are *presencing* the hotel from the *absent* past and are there with the hotel itself in that city that summer, but the recalling-*presencing* leaves a detail, i.e. the hotel's name, *concealed*, forgotten. This example illustrates that such attentive presencing-with may reveal many of the details of a past situation, including the gist of its most important features, but it may also fail to deconceal important features or even mistakenly recall details that never occurred or occurred (essenced) on some quite different occasion. Such mistaken recalling, or imaginative inventiveness, may be motivated by *present* concerns to make an *absent* past situation congruent with a different *present* one (such as telling a good yarn in company) that likewise has to *deconceal* itself when the mind *presences* it, perhaps in a deficient way that amounts to the mind's misunderstanding it or leaving decisive details concealed.

Deficiencies in *deconcealment* thus abound in every factual situation that *presences* for the mind from the temporal *present* or the other two temporal dimensions of *absence.* Conversely, there are essencing situations in all three temporal dimensions that are potentially factually *deconcealed*, but the mind fails to *presence* them by turning its attention, or having its attention drawn, toward them; they remain thus *absent* from the mind. In that case, the individual's existential movement has something else in mind from three-dimensional temporality.

2.10.1 Confusing concealment with absence and deconcealment with presence (Heidegger)

Even though Heidegger's great achievement remains his uncovering of the meaning of being as originary, three-dimensional time during the course of his wide-ranging work in the 1920s, in particular in *Sein und Zeit*, around 1930 there is a turn in his thinking toward bringing disclosive, or deconcealing, truth (ἀλήθεια) into the foreground at the cost of tacitly relegating the three-dimensional temporal

openness to a lesser, or even superseded status. This is apparent, for instance, when Heidegger writes, "The name 'time' in the title mentioned [*Being and Time*], according to the clearly expressed belonging to being, is the provisional name for the more originary essencing of ἀλήθεια." (Der Name 'Zeit' ist in dem gemeinten Titel [*Sein und Zeit*] gemäß der klar ausgesprochenen Zugehörigkeit zum Sein der Vorname für das ursprünglichere Wesen der ἀλήθεια. GA54:113[9]) The clearing (Lichtung) is already assigned in *Sein und Zeit* to the question of truth, without exploring its implications, or interweavings, with originary time. This leads Heidegger, in part, to even equate concealment with absence, e.g. in his WS 1933/1934 lectures: "...out of the absence and concealment hitherto [prevailing] into the *repre-sentedness* [to the mind]..." (...aus der bisherigen Abwesenheit und Verborgenheit in die *Vor-gestelltheit...* GA36/37:117) and "Being signifies for the Greeks to be present, not absent, not hidden..." (Sein bedeutet für die Griechen anwesend sein, nicht abwesend, nicht verborgen... GA36/37:229).

Nowhere does Heidegger painstakingly and unmistakably clarify the distinction and criss-crossed interplay between concealment, deconcealment, absence, presence. Rather, on the contrary, he thoroughly confuses or equates them, thereby displaying conceptual carelessness. Such carelessness is discernible, of course, only for conceptual thinking, and not for scholarly diligence comparing quotes. At times he *does* underscore and show phenomenologically (e.g. by adducing the case of a stolen bicycle) that absence itself is compatible with a kind of presence, and thus a mode of being (i.e. essencing) in its own right, and even that this presencing is deconcealing. E.g. when you lose your car keys and discover the loss, the physically absent car keys are very present to your mind, and also deconcealed (to your mind) despite – or rather, *in* – their *spatial absence* from your pocket (they are missing, somewhere else), even though you do not know (concealed to your presencing mind) *where* they are at present (their precise location is concealed). In this example, *absence* from place in the *present* (you can sensuously feel in your pocket that they are not there) and focused *presence* to mind go together. Spatial absence as mental presence! It is, however, crucial in each case to clearly distinguish between non-being, absence and concealment, both in the mind and in the physical world, i.e. to have them firmly distinct in mental view.

In part, Heidegger surrenders and buries his discovery of the temporal meaning of being by shifting his focus to and foregrounding the phenomenon of ἀλήθεια, i.e. truth as deconcealment. In *What Calls to Thinking?* (*Was heißt Denken?*),

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9 Cf. also e.g. *Zur Sache des Denkens*, "The name 'time' is the provisional name for what was later called 'the truth of being'." (Der Name 'Zeit' ist der Vorname für das, was später 'die Wahrheit des Seins' hieß. SD:30).

for instance, he even incoherently gives precedence to deconcealing over presencing when he writes, "What is presencing has emerged from deconcealment."[10], as if all presencing were a deconcealing and as if pure presencing required a deeper-lying, more originary *deconcealedness* already beforehand to enable the *presencing* of something. Already Aristotle distinguishes various meanings of being (or, more precisely, of the beingness of beings) including that of οὐσία (essence, quidditas, whatness) as well as ἀλήθεια conceived as the truth/falsity of propositions (λόγοι) *about* (κατά) beings. Heidegger shows that the truth of a being does not reside originarily in a proposition about it, but in the being itself, e.g. true gold is a mode of being/presencing of gold in its deconcealed truth, rather than a false deconcealing as false gold. False gold, however, presents itself, i.e. *presences*, albeit distortedly, deceptively *as if* it were true gold. Its falsity depends upon its presencing. Truth is thus a characteristic of essents themselves presencing for the mind rather than a quality of propositions which, as it turns out, can at most be *correct*, but not true in the sense of a deconcealment of their mode of essencing. A correct proposition only corresponds, or is adequate to (adequatio) the deconcealment of the factual (temporal) phenomenon in question itself.

Throughout his entire career as a thinker, however, Heidegger does not square his uncovering of the temporal nature of being itself with his investigation of ἀλήθεια as disclosure (Unverborgenheit, deconcealment, revealment). Further evidence of his confusion are his lectures and writings on Nietzsche, where we read repeatedly the formulation of the implicit meaning of being (or rather beingness, οὐσία, presencing) for the Greeks, "presencing of the steadfast into the deconcealed" (Anwesenheit des Beständigen in das Unverborgene NII:217, the 'into' rather than 'in' is required to translate the accusative case of 'in das'). The steadfast here are the ideas themselves, the ontological 'looks' of beings *as* beings in which they stand for the mind's understanding by coming to presence, thus deconcealing themselves as such-and-such to the mind. The steadfast looks of beings are what make up the ontological cast or scaffolding of an age that is deconcealed to the mind of that age, i.e. its Zeit-Geist (to be discussed in more detail below – temporalogically; cf. 6 *Temporalogical recasting in historical time*). What follows next is insofar an anticipation, but focused on the issue of concealing-deconcealing.

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10 "Das Anwesende ist aus der Unverborgenheit aufgegangen." GA08:240.

2.10.2 Deconcealing a hermeneutic cast as historical struggle

This hermeneutic cast of the beingness of beings (the presencing of essents as…) presents itself a priori, i.e. before all else, to the mind, the Zeit-Geist. But what is prior here, the "presence" or the "deconcealed"? Since the formulation is one of movement, i.e. a movement "into" (ins), it is more appropriate to speak of the movement of 'presencing' (Anwesung) rather than the state of "presence" (Anwesenheit). Such presence, in any case, does not depend on sensuous presence for the sense organs because it is the mind itself that 'sees' such ontological 'looks' presensuously in its movement of presencing (Vergegenwärtigung) within three-dimensional time. They are deconcealed to the universal (i.e. not merely individual) mind of a given age to which they are given and into which they presence; the temporal openness of an age itself is the openness into which an ontological (or temporalogical) cast is cast and *can* presence at all, and the mind of that age can see, i.e. understand, such an a priori ontological cast because it is itself thoroughly temporal, i.e. exposed to the three open dimensions of time.

There is also strife and struggle over the deconcealing of an historical ontological (or now: temporalogical) cast and its presencing in which philosophers engage as long as there is genuine philosophizing. The deconcealing of an ontological cast is anything but simply granted, but must be wrested, perhaps over centuries, from concealment and partial or distorted deconcealment. Mortals themselves also engage in the cover-up of a future hermeneutic cast. In this sense the beingness of beings *presences* also into partial *concealedness* (Verborgenheit), not simply into plain deconcealedness (Unverborgenheit), as those aspects of an ontological cast that are misconceived, confused, overlooked or suppressed. The ontological cast of a shared world can also recede into absence in historical time when the mind of an age (usually slowly, punctuated by sudden ruptures) shifts its attention and gradually forgets altogether. This makes the historical, three-dimensional temporal openness itself into the playground, or battle-ground, for the struggle over the presencing or absencing of ontological (or now: temporalogical) casts. Such gigantomachia over the beingness of beings, (or now: temporalogically over the essencing of essents hermeneutically *as* such-and-such) has to be distinguished from the *factual* presencing and absencing of essents to and from the mind in their deconcealment or concealment, as already discussed in the preceding sections: all criss-crossing combinations of the three dimensions of time with concealment/deconcealment are phenomenally possible factually for essents within a given historical ontological cast. More on this gigantomachia below (cf. 6.2 *Hermeneutic recasting in historical time*).

2.11 Presence and absence of essents in the world

The essencing of essents has been introduced and discussed up to now solely as imaginative essencing for the mind. This restriction has now to be relaxed. The presencing of essents to and their absencing from the mind has to be distinguished from their *presence* or *absence in the world* at present, in the past or in the future, as well as from their *presencing into* or *absencing from* the world at present, in the past or in the future as a *movement.*

One can call to mind, for instance, that there was no such thing as a telephone present in the *past* world of the eighteenth century, since the telephone had not yet been invented then, and thus could not *presence* at all as an essent in that world. In other words, telephones were entirely *absent* from the world at that time, but this *absence* from an historical world *presences* in the mind today (in the *present*) when it turns its attention to that *past* historical period, thus *deconcealing* that past absence as an absence. The mere factual absence of telephones from that *eighteenth* century historical world cannot be characterized as a felt lack, or desire, motivating a desiderative movement to remedy that lack and thus *presence* telephones in that past world by inventing them. They were still unimaginable for the mind. In the *nineteenth* century, however, against the background of the developing science of electrodynamics and its technological application, the invention of the telephone *could* perhaps be felt as a possibility or even pressing need. The telephone (preceded by the telegraph) could then be imagined under the impulse of the absolute will to power over all kinds of movement. In any case, the absence of telephones from that past eighteenth-century world is for *us* today. Conversely, for example, the *presence* of the *essent*, horses, as a means of transportation in the world of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries turned into a movement of their gradual *absencing* as a means of transportation from that world in favour of the gradual *presencing* of new, mechanical means of transportation into the (twentieth-century) world. Such absencing and presencing of essents (here: horses and artificially powered, mechanical means of transportation) is *deconcealed* when the mind turns its attention to, and *presences*, those past developments factually *correctly.* The *absence* of horses as a means of transportation from today's world is not felt as a lack or an *absence* motivating a movement to once again *presence* them as a means of transportation in the *present* world, since, for the will to power over movement, horses have been superseded by artificially powered vehicles that represent an enhancement of that ubiquitous will to power in *our* historical world today.

The *presence* of complex-imaginary numbers as an idea in the mathematical mind today is due to their original presencing in the imaginative mind of a sixteenth century mathematician, Girolamo Cardano. Once invented, i. e. mentally

presenced and deconcealed, the *idea* of complex-imaginary numbers becomes an essent in the world that can be presenced in the mind of all those with the required mathematical mental capacity. Upon once having been envisaged by an inventive mathematical mind, the idea itself can be called to mind, thus presenced, by any suitably trained mind. The idea is not an individual, but rather, a universal possession. For those lacking the necessary mathematical training of the mind, although still capable of presencing in the mind in a general way, the idea of complex-imaginary numbers is only deficiently *deconcealed*, i. e. it remains largely *concealed*, even to the extent of being altogether beyond the understanding and unheard of. Its presence in the world is nevertheless *permanent* for the *universal* mathematical mind in historical time and, given its elaboration over centuries and its deployment in diverse areas of mathematics and applied sciences, could hardly ever again *absence* from it. It would nevertheless be entirely misleading to characterize mathematical entities (that *presence* only purely 'ideally' in the mind) as eternal or timeless, since they are tied historically to definite ages.

Another example: the mind can call to presence a *future* in which there is a painfully felt absence, or lack, of water in many regions of the Earth. In this way, the expected future's *absence* (it is withheld in abeyance, and may never presence in the present as envisaged) mentally *presences* in today's *present* and *deconceals* itself, whilst many details of this future may remain *concealed* or only distortedly deconcealed (that is, erroneous or merely surmised). Or the mind can remain entirely oblivious to, i. e. *unmindful* of, an expected future *absence* of water in many regions, thus keeping, or suppressing, this expected future lack thoughtlessly *absent* from the mind. The *absence* from mind here amounts also to a *forgetfulness* in which the issue of future water shortage fades from mental presence altogether and remains thus *concealed* and suppressed, perhaps in favour of profit-making opportunities that waste water (cf. 9.7 *Estimating and esteeming the Earth*). Or: the future absence of water may be potentially deconcealed (based on solid scientific work by meteorologists, etc.) but be actively suppressed from the public's mind (by the government and/or the media under pressure of corporate lobbyists). Or: the issue of future water shortage (absence) may motivate political action in the present to arduously *deconceal* the expected future state of affairs to the public, whereas certain conservative media may grossly misrepresent the issue, distorting it or playing it down, and thus *concealing* its potential deleterious impact on future generations to today's public.

A further example, illustrating the temporal dimension of the *present* is the following: the restrictive immigration policy of a certain country in the past has led in the *present* to an *absence*, or lack, of skilled labour power in certain industries that comes to the attention of the government. This state of affairs amounts to *presencing* in the mind (of government) of a *present absence* geographically in the

world. The government may also neglect ('forget') the lack of skilled labour power, thus failing to focus its mind on the lack, even though the present deficient situation could *potentially* be deconcealed if the government turned its attention toward it. This amounts to an *absencing* from mind of the *absence* of certain essents in the world that is even plainly *deconcealed* to those who care to look, thus a *double absence* through which the lack remains absent from the government's mind only by dint of lack of attention. It would have to shift its mental focus to *presence* and *actually deconceal* the *present* situation of an *absence* of skilled labour power from the economy, whilst perhaps simultaneously misrepresenting it, i.e. distorting its presentation to the public and thus partially *concealing* it by not facing the situation squarely. What is *deconcealed* for the government is then *concealed* from the public or distortedly *deconcealed* to it. Such a state of affairs is called *disingenuousness* or *lying*, since the government has agency in deciding whether, and how, to conceal or deconceal. Facts can be twisted and spun this way and that by skilled political speakers. This example is intimately related to the endless accumulation of thingified value (cf. 9.1 *The gainful game played atop the endlessly accumulative movement of thingified value*).

2.12 Factual correctness vs. hermeneutic truth

Up to this point, and from the start, the discussion of situations has been of them in their *facticity* as *factual* states of affairs, whether dynamic or not. Essencing essents are usually (mis)taken at face value, simply and naïvely, as 'naked' facts for the (usually: individual) mind to take cognizance of. The facts themselves are not naked, however, but are understood *as* such-and-such on the basis of tacit preconceptions that remain hidden. Insofar, facts are already hermeneutically invested, even though they seem to be naked. The understanding of a situation presencing for the mind thus so far depends of the situation's 'facts of the matter' revealing themselves, or at least deconcealing themselves sufficiently for a more or less *correct* interpretive understanding of the given situation, whether it be past, present or future. The facts themselves are always already (a priori) tacitly and effortlessly interpreted in order to essence as facts at all. *Facts* and their *correctness* is the currency of all modern science, that manufactures its theoretical explanations from (what it ascertains to be) correct facts sifted from the empirical (experimental, survey, documentary, etc.) data given a posteriori. Since such interpretive understanding of a given situation as such-and-such depends upon the pertinent facts deconcealing themselves, if they are covered up or are overlooked, this may result in a gross misunderstanding of the situation.

Situations in criminal cases before the courts, for instance, can only be properly understood, assessed and judged with respect to the law and its infringement insofar as all the relevant facts of the case are deconcealed and present in the minds of judge and jury. New evidence amounting to new revelations of pertinent facts may even give occasion to retry the case before the court, because it has crucially misunderstood and misjudged the case due to vital factual evidence having been hitherto withheld from it. What constitutes pertinent facts depends upon what the court conceives to be evidence in a given case at a given time, and the evidentness of such evidence is embedded, first of all, in hermeneutic epistemological preconceptions of a forensic kind that the court must accept as 'given'. The admission of DNA traces discovered by forensic investigations at the scene of a crime as factual, revelatory evidence depends upon an entire complex of preconceptions embedded in the current state of the physical sciences since the epistemological casting in the mid-twentieth century of an essent called DNA. Henceforth, although they are heavily invested, enrobed in epistemological presuppositions, traces of DNA are understood as facts in a court of law. Such facts are anything but naked.

Beyond even epistemological preconceptions, the deconcealment of a situation in its facticity and factual correctness has to be deepened to consider the deconcealment of a situation in its *hermeneutic truth* (strictly speaking, in its hermeneutic *temporalogical* truth; cf. 6 *Temporalogical recasting in historical time*). All modern science and today's mainstream philosophy are entirely oblivious to this deeper kind of hermeneutic deconcealment. In everyday life such hermeneutic interrogation is not necessary, nor is it possible. In going deeper, the facts of a situation can no longer be taken at face value as if they could be understood in and of themselves, immediately, as if they were naked facts 'as plain as day'. Nor can their factual interpretation in terms of tacit scientific epistemological preconceptions be left standing. All the tacit factual preconceptions have to be unearthed, interrogated and recast in the demiurgic abyss of the ontological difference or today, even more abyssally, in the temporalogical difference between the hermeneutic cast of essents and three-dimensional historical time itself. This step represents indeed a deepening because the presencing of a situation in its *factual correctness*, in which all the pertinent facts apparently have been deconcealed and adequately *understood*, may nevertheless amount to a thorough misunderstanding because the given phenomena in their *truth* have been fundamentally *misinterpreted* or *misconceived* by the *mind-set* of an age, i.e. by *our* age's own power-obsessed cast of mind in every subtle and not so subtle respect. All facts depend upon deeper-lying preconceptions that mostly go uninterrogated; they are all invested, clothed in invisible, hermeneutic underclothing. Insofar, the preconceptions remain invisible for as long as they are not interrogated.

Conversely, a factual situation may be incorrectly understood but nevertheless properly interpreted in the deeper-lying hermeneutic truth of a given age. To take an example from Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie* §100, in most empirical cases it would be incorrect to say that a convicted criminal factually wills his or her own punishment by the judiciary and penal system under the law. The general statement 'A convicted criminal wills his or her own punishment' as an empirical induction is clearly false, and one would be hard-pressed to find empirical evidence of this being the case. But if the criminal is to be regarded (as in our modern age) *as* a free human person living under just laws, in *truth* he must will his own punishment for a crime committed, for this is in accordance with the concept of freedom in the present age. Phenomena such as remorse, contrition and penitence point to the truth of this concept of freedom. Through the punishment for a crime, he is being honoured as free. The question then shifts deeper to the hermeneutic truth of the phenomena of freedom and justice themselves rather than the correctness of ascertaining the prisoner's factual will-to-punishment (cf. also further below on freedom). Here, factual correctness parts ways from hermeneutic truth, and phenomena such as freedom and justice demand ultimately, through interrogation, their temporalogical concepts, that are prior to any facticity, along with its tacit, hidden, unexplicated preconceptions of freedom and justice.

This example shows that situations can deconceal themselves to the mind not only straightforwardly in their factual correctness, but must, more deeply, be understood in their phenomenal, hermeneutic truth, and the two can diverge, even fundamentally so. The facts of a situation may be correctly ascertained, with each fact being clearly understood, but this understanding is at the same time an interpretation of the fact *as* such-and-such, and this *as* such-and-such can go very deep, to the most elementary phenomena in a situation, phenomena whose understanding is taken for granted. This deep 'as' is called the hermeneutic As or the hermeneutic Qua that is overlooked in taking a situation in its facticity *as if* there were no hermeneutic As at all to consider. For the most part, this may be inconsequential for interpreting a situation *within* an age, and it would not be possible to do otherwise, but it is consequential once the age's entrenched preconceptions become questionable. The hermeneutic As of an age provides its *a priori preconceptions* of the most elementary phenomena which also serve as an unquestioned basis for practical everyday life, as if it had a solid ground. Truth concerns how essents presence for the mind and deconceal themselves in their adequate hermeneutic phenomenal interpretation as such-and-such that is *prior* to their factual, pre-ontological understanding that perforce is implicitly reliant upon this prior hermeneutic ontological truth of the phenomena concerned itself. The hermeneutic interpretation of the elementary phenomena themselves pertains to the deconcealment of the *mode of essencing of the essents themselves*

through preconceptions that are taken for granted as self-evident and therefore are not subjected to interrogation.

By gathering factual data from a large sample of patients, for example, a neurological study may ascertain that a certain mental disorder is highly correlated with the abnormal presence of a certain hormone in the brain. This amounts to the experiment's deconcealing something about the factual situation of the disorder in relation to hormones in the brain under the guidance of a conjecture arising from neurological theory. The experimental findings based on an extended empirical study carried out according to accepted statistical methodology establish the correlation within an acceptable degree of statistical error. To come to this factual experimental finding, a whole series of *prior* interpretations, or preconceptions, must be presupposed, starting with what factual, observable symptoms constitute the deconcealment of the given mental disorder and what measurements of what substances can be interpreted as the factual presence of the given hormone in the brain. A hormone, in turn, only exists, i.e. presences for the mind, within a specific theoretical physiological-medical understanding of the body, including the brain, that enables certain factual data gathered to be interpreted *epistemologically* (not ontologically, not temporalogically) *as* the presence of the hormone. A hormone is itself a scientific-theoretical construct that 'exists' (i.e. essences) only within a certain historical way of thinking. In fact, the neurological study undertakes certain measurements only due to the epistemological pre-interpretation of the presence of certain chemicals *as* the presence of a hormone. What a hormone is, that is, how this essent is to be interpreted, is only possible within the *epistemological* framework of the physiological theory that also ascribes to it its effective attributes, i.e. its role as an efficient cause within the physiology of the living corpus (not body). Such medical science necessarily whatifies the human, as should become increasingly apparent (cf. 8 *Recasting humanness through a temporalogy of whoness*).

The theoretical focus on essents *preconceived as efficient causes* is itself a consequence of how *epistemology* itself is understood and that, in turn, is an historical, philosophical legacy of the ancient Greeks who answered the question, What does it mean to know?, in a specific way that was based on their *ontology* of (efficient, productive) movement that consequently conceived knowledge *as predictive* knowledge, a conception that has remained unchanged ever since and 'infects' our minds to this very hour. Epistemology had an ontological foundation from the start, no matter whether it is denied or not, no matter whether it is interrogated or not. The pre-ontological preconception of an *efficient cause*, i.e. a cause-effect nexus, is an *implicitly ontological* one arising from the historical legacy of an hermeneutic ontology of (a specific kind of) movement that today's epistemology in general does not see. The conception of cause-effect is *only one*, but one of the

deepest preconceptions with which all modern science operates, without in the least questioning them but, on the contrary, insisting upon them as self-evident for the sake of its very raison d'être.

When the neurological study adduced above takes the step of concluding that it is the presence of the hormone in the brain that *causes* the disorder, and that therefore a material psycho-pharmaceutical that causally neutralizes or dissolves the abnormal concentration of hormone would be an *effective* treatment of the malady, it is thus *implicitly* employing deeper historical *ontological* preconceptions to interpret the data. The ontology includes above all an ontology of *efficient movement through cause and effect* that is taken for granted and presupposed already in conceiving the experimental design and the explanatory theory itself, whose task it is to *causally explain* movement. As any scientist will aver, the experiment has to be *useful.* Such an ontological preconception can be neither affirmed nor refuted by the empirical study itself, no matter how many data from no matter how large a sample are gathered and statistically analyzed. The question is then raised as to the *truth* of the ontology of efficient-causal movement *itself* that is implicitly employed ubiquitously for the epistemology of all the modern sciences. Is all movement and change to be causally explained? Can one make do with 'soft' causal explanations such as correlations or statistical probabilities? Must science be predictive? Or are there kinds of movement, i. e. kinds of essencing of essents in the world, that have to be understood (rather than explained) in a radically different way? If such an ontology of movement is put into question and becomes questionable, then the factual correctness of the study and its findings may be impeccable, whereas its truth may be highly questionable with respect to the phenomenon of mental disorder itself. Questions of truth of the phenomena themselves delve deeper into their ontology (or now: temporalogy) through which the world in its facticity is interpreted truly 'from the bottom up' now out of the abyss of the temporalogical difference.

Another, intimately related, example concerns the above-mentioned phenomenon of *freedom.* It may be commonly understood that a criminal who is sentenced to imprisonment for an illegal and blatantly unjust act, such as defrauding investors through a snowballing Ponzi scheme, is regarded as having lost his freedom through being locked up (in German: Freiheitsstrafe). If freedom is understood (or rather: preconceived) as factually being able to do what you want when you want to as a free individual, then imprisonment does amount to a *loss or determinate negation of freedom*, and the prisoner is consequently factually unfree as long as it is factually correct to say that his freedom of *bodily movement* is constrained by prison walls and the prison's, perhaps very rigorous, regime. The question concerning the phenomenon of freedom is therefore rooted in the question concerning the temporalogy of a kind of movement – to wit: interplay – that has been neglected by the philosophical tradition of ontology. The understanding of the

prisoner's factual situation as unfree presupposes a prior interpretation of what *freedom in society* amounts to, and today that is a question of *socio-temporalogical truth.* Likewise, the interpretation of the prisoner's factual situation as *free* depends upon a socio-temporalogical concept of freedom itself that is not to be had as an obviousness. If freedom is conceived individualistically, this has consequences for how the justness of imprisonment is conceived (cf. 9.5 *Freedom* and the discussion of Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie* above).

How is freedom to be understood with regard to how mortals live together, necessarily sociating with one another in society? The law and its enforcement by the judiciary and penal institutions are not merely instances for the *factual* exercise of coercion and force over the citizenry, but for the *upholding of freedom* in the given society, and from this they draw their acknowledged legitimacy that, in turn, depends upon how social freedom itself is generally understood. In that sense, the criminal's imprisonment is an instance of a *realization* of freedom in the social sense, and not of an individualized prisoner's loss of freedom. It is questionable whether prison punishment can be properly conceived as convicted prisoners' 'paying their debt to society', as if punishment were a kind of transaction.

The socio-temporalogical *concept* of freedom cannot be captured by a crude notion of an *individual's* freedom *as* capriciously willed movement, above all because the individuality of an individual is itself dependent upon how individuals *sociate* with one another in an historical form of society, and *sociation* itself is a kind of movement that will have to be investigated further under the name of *interplay.* As we shall see, the temporalogy of interplay can only be grossly misinterpreted by the employment of categories of cause and effect (hence, e.g., interpreting punishment as deterrence). Because all human existence is a living together with one another, individual freedom is only derivative of (a determinate, historical kind of) social freedom. In (socio-temporalogical) *truth,* individual freedom as we know it in our own age is only possible, and even conceivable, in societies in which a certain socio-temporalogical form of sociation predominates that enables the human essent to essence *as* an individual *as if* it were individually free from constraint by others.

In this sense, the individualized individual is always already social, always already sociated *as* dissociated, and all talk in philosophy of a pre-social state of nature has always been not only an ill-thought-out fiction, but a scandalously misguided notion altogether that has sought to naturalize human individualization. The individualized individual itself is not a natural, self-evident, *factual* given, but an enigmatic socio-temporalogical phenomenon that in the modern age is enabled by an historically specific form of sociation through the medium of thingified value. This individualizing dissociation is congruent with the historical emergence of the modern subject with its encapsulated, interior consciousness. In hermeneu-

tic *truth* the phenomenon of the individual, its dissociation, sociation and its freedom of movement calls for further interrogation (cf. 9 *Sociation through the medium of thingified value* and 9.5 *Freedom*).

Freedom is an instance of phenomena that presence for the mind indeterminately from any of the three temporal dimensions of the psyche as 'ideas', presenting the challenge to the mind to appropriately conceive, as close as possible to the phenomenon itself. This applies also to many other phenomena such as justice, love or honour that present a challenge to hermeneutic phenomenology, presumably even more so than the physical phenomena dealt with by the modern sciences. As ideas they are not merely factual and cannot be ascertained empirically, although the phenomena themselves are intimately familiar to human experience. The concepts of pure mathematics, by contrast, are able to remain pure, apart from the empirical world, and are amenable to mathematical proof, a circumstance that has made mathematics enviable and emulable. Nevertheless, mathematical concepts remain historical insofar as they belong to and are shared by the mind of a given age which, in turn, may have received them as a bequest from a previous age's mind. In contrast to the (near) purity of mathematical concepts, worldly phenomena of concern presence in the psyche for the mind with ambiguities that occasion misunderstandings and contretemps. These, in turn, call for the contradictory ambiguities of the phenomenal presencing to be aufgehoben, or resolved, in a better, less ambiguous understanding through which a higher degree of deconcealing truth is attained (cf. 3.7 *The inherently ambiguous deconcealment of phenomena*).

3 All movement contradictory

3.1 All physical movement and change driven by contradiction

By way of interlude, how can the development so far in the preceding chapters be put into a relation with contradiction in the Hegelian sense? The focus in Hegel's *Objektive Logik* is on the *ontology of physical things* in the world which from one perspective could be regarded as a dialectical thinking-through and thus conceptual development of what Kant presents in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* merely as an already completed, pre-baked table of categories. For both Hegel and Kant, in line with the long tradition starting with Aristotle's *Physics*, physical things are κινούμενα, i.e. movable, changeable entities entertaining an intimate relation with contradiction. This observation provides the link to contradiction in the Hegelian sense, that is now amenable to qualified temporalogical reformulation in view of the fact that i) Hegel's conception of the speculative-dialectical movement of thinking through the concepts in a systematic way makes no mention of time; rather, speculative-dialectical thinking remains 'logical', albeit not at all in the sense of formal, syllogistic, logical argument. And ii) the conception of time implicitly presupposed by speculative-dialectical logic remains one-dimensionally linear.

The key to a temporalogical reformulation is to see that all *movement and change of sensuously perceptible, physical things* in space is (the resolution of) a *contradiction* (Widerspruch) between their presence and absence as essents *in the world* and *for the mind* (Ver- und Entgegenwärtigung). This is the paradigm of movement on which thinking is traditionally, narrow-mindedly, fixated. To take a simple example of locomotion, which is only one kind of movement/change: watching a horse galloping along a race track, perhaps with binoculars, is to observe the presence of the horse at continuously successive places along the track and its simultaneous (not: instantaneous) absence from each place, e.g. at the half-way post, so that the galloping horse is seen both at that place and not at that place, namely, already absently further on toward the finish line in the temporal dimension of the future. This is the 'double essencing' (διχῶς ὑπάρχει *Phys.* Γ 1;201a4; cf. Heidegger GA18:311f) of which Aristotle speaks with regard to all (four physical) kinds of movement and change, and it is already temporally bifocal vision in the case of watching a motion 'in action' (ἐνεργείᾳ). Formulated in Aristotle's concepts: anything with a potential (δύναμις) to move/change is characterized by a lack (στέρησις), an absence, that is being (continuously) overcome as long as that potential to move is at work (ἐνεργείᾳ) in actually moving/changing, until, finally, the movement/change is completed (ἐντελέχεια) and comes to rest

(say, when the horse crosses the finishing line). Contradiction in the case of non-sensuous essents presencing in the minds, will be considered specifically below when considering logical contradiction (cf. 3.5 *Principle of non-contradiction untenable*), but it is important to note that sensuously perceptible physical movement *as* such, too, is not separated, as if it were in itself (an sich), but *is*, i. e. essences, only insofar as it is *for* the mind (in Hegelian terminology: Anundfürsichsein). This does not imply, however, that, in the above example, the horse stops galloping or ceases to 'exist' when no one is looking at it, as in the Berkeleian nightmare, since it is a matter of the mind's potential to turn its attention toward and focus upon an es-sencing event, and the mind need not yet be pluralized into individual minds from its originary, shared oneness, which is nothing other than the unity of three-dimensional time itself of which 'we' all partake.

Presencing and absencing (essencing) are not merely different, complementary modes of *mental* movement when the mind shifts its intentional focus or simply flits hither and thither, but, insofar as the mind is focused upon following a continuous physical movement/change in the world, the presencing and absencing apply to the physical essents in the world themselves, as we shall see on further investigation. To employ Hegelian terminology[1] initially, the observed presence or absence of something in the world can be sharpened into an antithesis (Gegensatz) in which the presence and absence of an essent in the world contradict each other (sich widersprechen) as positive and negative. (The presence or absence of an essent in the world is always a *mode* of presence or absence, e. g. *where* or *how large* or in *relation to what* the essent essences.) As pure positivity, such mentally observed presence of an essent *excludes* the negativity of that essent's absence, but the actually present presence is also related to and contains or *includes* its potential absence to be what it is, namely, positivity vis-à-vis negativity. Likewise conversely for the negativity of the mentally observed absence of an essent in the world, which *excludes* the positivity of that essent's actually present presence, but also is related to and contains or *includes* its presence to be what it is, namely, negativity vis-à-vis positivity. Positivity and negativity are thus complementary, twin concepts (or categories in the broad sense) that imply, interpenetrate each other and are required to conceive movement *as* movement.

The poles of positive and negative can also be interchanged here, the crucial point being that they constitute a *contradictory* unity, with each pole both excluding and including 'all at once' the other as its very own, determinate negation as a possibility of presence or absence that is mentally understood. The contradictory

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1 Cf. Hegel *Objektive Logik* 2. Teil, Der Gegensatz (Antithesis) and Der Widerspruch (Contradiction) in *Wissenschaft der Logik, Werke* Vol. 6 pp. 55–79.

unity of presence and absence of a sensately perceived essent in the world is re-
solved through that essent's presenc*ing* and absenc*ing* 'all at once' in a move-
ment/change (κίνησις, μεταβολή, ἐνέργεια) of that essent in a dynamic situation
which may be followed by the mind that is able to observe the essent *as both* pre-
sent and absent 'at once' in a *transition* from...to. States of presence and absence in
the world are thus perceived *as* movements of presencing and absencing requiring
the mind's perceiving the states of presence and absence 'together' (ἅμα) or 'simul-
taneously', 'touching' each other. The mentally observed movements of presencing
and absencing in this case of the movement of physical essents in the world are a
presencing from the (open temporal dimension of the) *future* and an absencing
into the (likewise open temporal dimension of the) *past*, respectively. As sensuous-
ly observed (or observable) continuous physical movement, both presencing and
absencing thus presuppose the three temporal dimensions as centred around
the present and also *linearized*, i. e. future, present and past line up neatly along
a line and the physical movement is observed to take place in a *time-interval*.
This is a special case. Other non-sensuously, mentally observed, *continuous* move-
ments may happen wholly in the present, past or future, for which the simultane-
ous, contradictory, simultaneous presence and absence also hold. The time-interval
for the movement is then shifted or *translated* in one direction along the *time-line.*
Insofar, this is still a wholly orthodox conception.

3.1.1 Contradiction not resolved in ground

In contrast to Hegel's dialectical movement of thought in the second part of his
Logik, here contradiction is not resolved by going into a ground from which an ex-
istence can arise, but in physical movement itself, which is not necessarily ground-
ed nor, ultimately, effected by a cause, as Hegel develops in the Doctrine of Essence.
Dialectically going into a ground represents metaphysical thinking's attempt to gov-
ern physical movement from a *unified* ground, i. e. a single ἀρχή or ὅθεν, 'whence'.
Seeking the ground for movement is the metaphysical mission also for all the mod-
ern sciences which, without exception, aim to bring all movement and change into
line, namely, along the line of one-dimensional time. They are all judged according
to how well they can predict or explain movement and change, which is measured
on the basis of quantifiable empirical data. They have all imbibed and are inebri-
ated by the absolute will to power over movement that is the hallmark of Western
thinking.

3.1.2 Self-movement of living things driven by contradiction

An example of contradiction in physical, living things is that between satisfied and unsatisfied appetite (ὄρεξις) for nourishment. Satisfied appetite presences for an animal as long as its negative, namely hunger or lack (στέρησις) of nourishment, is entirely absent as a different bodily state so that the animal is at rest, not driven to move. However, the negativity of hunger also makes itself felt in the presencing of a lack, i. e. of something absent, namely food. The positivity of a satisfied appetite sharpens into a contradiction when the negativity of hunger as an absence, i. e. a lack, of food makes itself felt, presencing as a drive, which in turn is resolved by a striving, appetitive movement to get the food which is lacking. A satisfied appetite then quiets this striving for a time, until the eaten food is absorbed as nourishment by the corpus, thus giving rise once more to a felt lack.

3.1.3 Contradiction not made to vanish by mathematization of linear time

According to Walter Bröcker, Hegel goes mightily astray when he asserts the contradictory nature of movement:

> So insbesondere Hegel, wenn er z.B. behauptet, die Bewegung sei der daseiende Widerspruch, denn es bewege sich etwas nicht nur, ‚Indem es in diesem Jetzt hier ist und in einem anderen Jetzt dort, sondern indem es in einem und demselben Jetzt hier und nicht hier, indem es in diesem Hier zugleich ist und nicht ist'. (*Logik* W6:76) Wenn man, wie Hegel es tut, hier und jetzt punktuell denkt, ist das freilich ein offener Widerspruch, aber so müssen wir nun hinzufügen, nicht im Objekt Bewegung, sondern in Hegels Rede darüber. Und so folgt auch nicht, daß das Widerspruchsvolle existiert, sondern es folgt, daß der Begriff der Bewegung anders bestimmt werden muß, als Hegel das tut. [... Fußnote:] Der Widerspruch im Begriff der Bewegung verschwindet, wenn man jetzt und hier nicht als Zeitpunkte denkt, sondern als Zeitintervalle, die beliebig klein gewählt werden können. Dann kann man widerspruchsfrei definieren: Ein Ding ist im Zeitpunkt t in Bewegung, wenn bei beliebig klein gewähltem t einschließendem Jetzt-Intervall das Hier-Intervall so gewählt werden kann, daß das Ding jetzt hier und nicht hier ist. (Bröcker 1958 pp. 19 f)

> Thus, in particular, Hegel when he asserts, for instance, that movement is existing contradiction, for something moves not only 'In that in this now it is here and in another now there, but in that in one and the same now it is here and not here, in that in this here it simultaneously is and is not'. If, as Hegel does, you think here and now as points, this is of course an obvious contradiction, but, we must add, not in the object movement, but in Hegel's talk about it. [Footnote:] The contradiction in the concept of movement vanishes if you do not think now and here as points in time, but as intervals of time that can be chosen to be arbitrarily small. Then you can define without contradiction: A thing is moving at the point in time t if, for any arbitrarily chosen small now-interval enclosing t, the here-interval can be chosen in such a way that the thing is now here and not here.

Bröcker here follows the argumentation of the infinitesimal calculus with its mathematized notion of linear, real time, t, to make locomotion (the phenomenally simplest kind of movement) mathematically calculable in (differential) equations of motion encapsulating causal relations between potential force and kinetic movement. Of course, it is incoherent of Bröcker to speak of "here" as an interval of "time", but this can be put aside for the present purpose. The crux is to understand that the phenomenon of motion is such *for the mind* (not necessarily sensuously observing in the present) which, of its very nature, sees three-dimensionally in a temporal way that constitutes its very possibility of seeing, i.e. understanding, motion (or movement/change of any kind) *as such at all.* We 'see', i.e. understand, movement prior to any seeing with the aid the bodily eyes. Even the way of thinking behind the infinitesimal calculus implicitly assumes that the mind can see 'simultaneously' at least a tiny stretch of linear time passing by and thus a now simultaneously with a not-now, and it is this ecstatic stretchedness of mind over even a miniscule interval of one-dimensional, linear time which already compels the admission of the contradictory nature of the phenomenon of movement itself, as Hegel asserts. The fixation on physical movement, and especially on physical locomotion, in traditional philosophy and physics leads only to focusing on continuous movement over small time-intervals in linear time, which represents a truncation of three-dimensional time – for the sake of calculability. Hence, for instance, we have apprehension and reproduction in Kant (cf. 5 *Kant on the power of imagination*) or retention and protention in Husserl, both of whom shrink back from a fully fledged conception of three-dimensional time. With regard to Bröcker, one has to wonder why he is so keen on trying to think physical movement free of contradiction ("widerspruchsfrei").

3.2 Movement in the world

The mind does not observe only continuous physical movement and change in the world, but also events, occurrences, incidents, goings-on, happenings, developments, etc. of many diverse kinds. These are also movements in the world, but may not be continuous nor sensuously observable, nor even composed of physical essents. A marriage, for example, is an event in the movement that in the lives of the married couple, but it is not reducible to a physical event. The exchange of marriage vows, for example, is not a physical event. The mind can observe the essencing of many different kinds of physical and non-physical essents constituting a movement in the world by virtue of its *own*, mental, presencing and absencing. Hence two different kinds of movement are superimposed. Articulated in Hegelian concepts: the movement für sich in the mind is superimposed on the movement an

sich in the world to essence as a movement an-und-für-sich. In such movements in the world there is a presencing and absencing of essents constituting events that hang together in a coherent, sequential but discontinuous way that can even be articulated and related in some kind of report or story. A reporter from the local newspaper, for example, may attend the wedding of a prominent local politician to write a report on it. The mind can focus on such a sequence of essencing events that is not continuous but nevertheless coherent for the mind that does not necessarily have to follow the events in a temporal sequence of succession, but can presence them in a story or tale of some kind that presences the events from all three temporal dimensions, skipping hither and thither to piece together a coherent narrative. This is only possible because the mind has a temporally three-dimensional overview.

3.2.1 Movement of human life driven by contradiction

Leading a life constitutes the movement of a biography motivated by contradiction. Consider a young adult who has grown up in a country town and is now in search of employment that is presently absent, or lacking, as captured by the negative prefix in the term, *un*-employed. *Un*-employment is the determinate negation of employment. The adolescent has a striving to earn income to support life, just as animals have appetites to get nourishment. If there are few jobs on offer in the town, the youngster will experience this absence of employment opportunities as a lack provoking desire to overcome the lack. Jobs are not merely absent purely and simply – there are currently none on offer —, but their absence is present as a felt lack for the adolescent seeking employment. The (positive) desire for income and the (negative) lack of opportunities to earn it in a country town come into opposition which, when sharpened into a contradiction, motivate a movement on the part of the youngster, who moves to a city where income-earning opportunities (possibilities, δυνάμεις) are on offer. Thus the contradiction is resolved by movement. For a retiree in the town, by contrast, the lack of jobs on offer is personally an indifferent state of affairs. He is unemployed, but feels no lack, i. e. the presence of an absence. To grasp the opportunity to fulfil the desire to earn income, the youngster must have the open dimension of the future in mind to see (understand) a move to the city as a favourable prospect and to cast his or her life-movements in that futural direction.

3.2.2 Contradiction over correct deconcealment as a driver of democratic power play

The principle of modern democratic government, its *concept*, consists in a people's governing itself (δημο-κρατία) via its elected representatives who hold office and wield power for a time. The government itself, however, is an institution different and separated from the people itself. Hence the people governs itself only via a detour or mediation through its other, the government, including the entire complex of state institutions endowed with legitimate power, including power over the people, via laws, police, judiciary, bureaucracy, regulations which together are said to constitute the rule of law. The legitimacy is due to the people itself assenting to the government's holding power and exercising it. An identity, i.e. a belonging-together in a unity, between the people and the government, between the demos and power, is supposed to result, i.e. according to the concept, from free and fair elections in which the people itself exercises its power by electing its representatives who are to hold power for a time, until the next election. Each citizen has (is supposed to have) an equal vote in elections decided by majority votes. The elected government is thus (supposed to be) an expression of the *will of the people.* The will is therefore cast as the bond unifying the people with its government. The rules of play of the power play among democratic parties through which a government comes to be elected are laid down in the constitution from which lawful procedure for democratic elections is derived. The citizen is therefore a subject in the double sense of being i) the underlying source of an expression of will and ii) a subject of the legitimate government, subjected to its exercise of power over him or her.

The *democratic media*, constituting a *mediation* between the democratically elected government and the people, according to their concept, are supposed to report on, scrutinize, i.e. *deconceal*, and thus provide *transparency* with regard to what the government holding the reins of power is doing, i.e. how it is factually wielding its power in the various areas of government, including its negation, when democratic government diverges from its concept and legitimate power is covertly abused to become illegitimate. Such media transparency, i.e. their work of deconcealing the government's actions, is necessary to call the government to account, ultimately so that the plurality of citizens living in a democracy is able to assess for themselves what the government and the various arms of state power under its ultimate control are doing through their exercise of political power. The media's oversight of government actions thus is supposed to mediate an alignment of the government's factual exercise of power with its concept as having its power from the people and exercising it according to the rule of law and the constitution. This presupposes that the media themselves are independent

of government power and are thus free to go about their task of deconcealing the facts of the exercise of the government's power. This work is strenuous because there is much that the government would rather conceal, or reveal only in a distorted way that sheds a favourable light on the government's actions. Insofar, deconcealment has to be wrested from concealment through political controversy.

The *contradiction* between regarding the government's actions *as* legitimate or *as* illegitimate drives the movement of public debate in the media for the benefit of informing the public's judgement. The (unpredictable) outcome of such debates will be inconclusive, at least in the sense that no unanimous agreement about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the government's actions will be reached, although an overwhelming public opinion in one direction or the other may take shape that results ultimately in the government's being voted out of office or even resigning. Correct factual deconcealment and its deficiencies are thus a decisive driver of democratic power plays, with contradictory portrayals of government actions and government proposals becoming of concern for the body politic and having to be reconciled through the formation of public opinion and temporarily resolved by majorities achieved in elections.

According to its concept, the government is supposed to exercise its power not only formally in accordance with the constitutionally enshrined rule of law, but for the good of the people, a *universal* aim that is supposed to be more than the shifting aggregate of the *particular* interests of the various parts of the populace. The individual politicians are also expected to raise themselves beyond their *particular* self-interests to genuinely serve the people in its universality. 'The people', however, can signify either 'a people' or 'the people' as a motley plurality of divergent and contradictory particular interests that are temporarily balanced, but not reconciled and unified, through the formation of voting majorities in democratic elections. This is regarded as the expression and exercise of the will of the people. Like the exercise of legitimate government power, this will is constrained within the constitutional framework of the rule of law. The gulf between universality and particularity is only apparently bridged and reconciled. In today's Western liberal democracies, the constitution safeguards the rights of private property and its forms of intercourse through a bewildering array of many kinds of contract as a major, constitutive part of the rule of law. These enable individualization into a multitude of dissociated individuals who are sociated through the bond of contracts that come about through the mutual agreement of individual wills. The dissociated individual, who is taken to be a 'fact of nature', is said to be free, to enjoy his or her individual liberty, especially in the competitive pursuit of income and the enjoyment of its acquired private property. For this reason, Western liberal democracies are said to be free and even to constitute the 'free world'. That private property itself conceals a deeper-lying truth that democratic media are unable to

wrest from concealment is due to this truth being not factual but temporalogical in nature. Private property itself and its forms of intercourse have yet to be revealed as the surface forms of appearance of sociation of dissociated individuals through the medium of thingified value (cf. 9 *Sociation through the medium of thingified value*). With this revelation, this temporalogical deconcealment, the liberal theory of the democratic form of government shows itself to be superficial and untrue.

3.3 Physical productive movement as seen by the mind a contradiction

The classical case of movement/change as investigated by Greek thinking is consummated by Aristotle's ontology of physical movement modelled on the paradigm of making something physical such as a table, which is enabled by τέχνη ποιητική, i.e. by productive know-how that skilfully guides the efficient, productive movement. Know-how is a seeing by the mind as a power or potential that sees the appropriate material such as wood as something that can be transformed by the know-how in action to pro-duce, i.e. bring forth, under its guidance a final product that itself is foreseen as an idea by the knowing mind. Skilful guidance of the productive movement is required if the final product is to turn out as envisaged. The know-how is first of all ideal, mental and requires the mind to see temporally in three-dimensions, i.e. the past of the material required with the suitable passive potential (δύναμις) to be worked upon, the present active potential, or power, in skilful action (ἐνέργεια) working on the material, and the future of the final product (τέλος) that must be envisaged in advance as an idea (εἶδος) in order to be made. The actual, 'en-erg-etic', physical movement of the making in the present example is guided by the carpenter's foreseeing mind, and such a continuous physical movement of making may be regarded as a movement along the time-line of traditional, one-dimensional time in which there is a succession of stages of completeness of the end-product.

However, the mind's seeing *all at once* (temporally contiguous or together, ἅμα, zugleich, thus in a non-traditional sense, 'simultaneously') the three dimensions of originary time – invariably overlooked in the tradition and up to the present day in philosophy and all modern science – is prior to such a conception of movement *along* one-dimensional, linear time. Three-dimensional time is itself the openness *prior* to any movement and thus unmoving, pre-moving, whereas conventional one-dimensional, linear time is *derivative* of physical movement that the mind may observe and thus itself is conceived as moving, i.e. as a consecutive flow of nows.

How can the productive movement of making seen by the mind's know-how in three-dimensional time be conceived as a contradiction? The mind sees, i.e. understands, the wood, for instance, as a potential, i.e. as a *passive power*, for making a table, since the wood is *able* to suffer, i.e. withstand, the application of an active power, viz. the know-how, to undergo a productive transformation into something else, such as a table. Initially, wood and table are merely two different (real or ideal) things *indifferent* to each other. Wood is wood, and a table is a table – *different* things. The know-how brings these two together and into an *opposition* by mentally seeing the material *present* as a sensuous, positive reality and the final product present only negatively in the mind, i.e. ideally, as a possible, as yet *absent*, future reality negating the positive determinate presence of the material. Seen by the productive mind in this way, however, the present material is also beset by a lack (στέρησις), i.e. something negative, and has the potential (δυνάμει) to positively become a product foreseen in its 'look', its εἶδος, that is as yet absent, but present to the mind in its absence and as such *motivating* (οὗ ἕνεκα) the productive movement itself. The material and the product are now no longer merely two indifferently different things, but opposed mentally as positive and negative, whereby these labels are interchangeable. The present material is opposed by its potential future 'look' as a product, and insofar as this opposition sharpens into a contradiction in which the material's present form or 'look' as something negative, contradicts its future form or 'look' as positively something else, namely, a product, it can only be resolved by the actual movement, i.e. the ἐνέργεια, of the know-how at work, producing the final product. The final product is the envisaged τέλος of the movement in which the ideal 'look' comes to final physical presence. In this productive movement, the material is negated, losing its previous unworked appearance, but also saved and raised (aufgehoben) finally, in gradually gaining the form of a table, to a higher form or 'look' in the product. The productive movement is thus an absencing and presencing 'all at once'.

3.3.1 Motion one of four kinds of movement/change

In Aristotle's thinking, which here is true to the phenomena themselves, there are four (physical, continuous, linear) kinds of movement/change according to the four basic categories of what (τὸ τί ἐστιν, οὐσία, essentia, quidditas, Wesen), how (ποιόν, quality), how much (ποσόν, quantity) and where (ποῦ, τόπος, place; cf. *Phys.* Γ3;200b33). The last (locomotion) is perhaps easiest to see phenomenologically, as in the example of an arrow in flight, but all kinds of movement/change (κίνησις, μεταβολή) can likewise be characterized as powers being put to work to actualize a contradictory at-onceness of presencing into the present from what/how/how-

much/where it *was* earlier and absencing from its present state in the present now into the future later of what/how/how-much/where it *will be.* The examples chosen by Aristotle mostly conform with the paradigm of productive movement (or skilled practice, a reduced case of productive movement) under the guidance of a know-how, thus giving rise to a one-dimensional linear movement from-to..., i.e. from an initial state to the final state under the impetus and governing guidance of a single potential (an ability or capability) energetically at work. The emphasis is always on *governing, mastering, controlling the movement by efficient causes*, not on letting it happen, not on not *knowing* what will happen.

Thus, even the gestation and birth of a child or a foal (a kind of 'final product') can be regarded in line with this paradigm as roughly a kind of productive movement, i.e. as αὐτοποίησις, albeit that such natural movement of genesis is blind, i.e. not under the guidance of a foreseeing, knowing mind. Medical science substitutes for this blind natural process by foreseeing through the discovery of the efficient causes at work in gestation and birth, thus seeing (e.g. in the art of midwifery with its auxiliary physiological knowledge), whereas the natural movement itself is blind. The becoming of the child in the womb can also be conceived as a contradictory unity of presencing into and absencing from the present 'all at once'. Where the movement of *exchange* (μεταβολή in one of its senses) rather than change (μεταβολή in another of its senses) comes into consideration, however, the paradigm of productive movement breaks down altogether, for in this case the movement proceeds not from a single, governing ἀρχή, but from a plurality thereof. This non-linear kind of movement will be discussed later (cf. 8.4.1 *Intermeshing of self-movements through estimative interplay*).

3.3.2 Not all movement productive

Not all movement, not even all physical movement, is productive movement. Rather, productive movement or τέχνη ποιητική was taken by Plato and Aristotle as paradigmatic for *all* movement, with Aristotle developing his famous ontology of movement on the basis of this paradigm which henceforth has served to subsume, by hook or by crook, all kinds of movement and change under this one ontological paradigm, including in all the modern sciences, both physical and social. Neither does practical action (πρᾶξις) exhaust the kinds of movement that must be contemplated, for it, too, can be regarded as a productive movement in which the exercise of the potential itself already includes its aim. Cf. on this *Met.* Θ7, where a distinction is made between ἐνέργεια, which as activity already contains its τέλος within itself, and κίνησις, which is ἀτελής, i.e. unfinished, having a separate τέλος to attain as result or 'product'. Thus, for instance, a guitarist's playing the guitar is

already in its very practice the attainment of the guitarist's aim, whereas the composer's writing a composition produces an end-product that is separate from the action of composing itself. Nonetheless, one can still say that any potential (δύναμις) in action, i.e. at work, is ἐνέργεια, no matter whether the movement is still under way toward an end or whether it is already complete (ἐντελεχείᾳ) in its exercise.

The productive paradigm is well and truly burst by the phenomenon of the intertwining sociating movement of social interchange, which demands its own ontology, or rather temporalogy. (Traditional thinking on movement tacitly assumes one-dimensional, linear time, whereas kinds of movement in the three-dimensionality of originary, existential time call for temporalogical thinking, as we shall see.) In particular, the *interplay* between a speaker and an audience in the practice of the art of rhetoric (τέχνη ῥητορική) is a prime, indeed paradigmatic, example of a movement that can only be subsumed beneath the paradigm of productive movement by doing violence to the phenomenon itself.[2] Other arts or techniques, too, familiar to and spoken of by Greek philosophy, such as τέχνη κτητική (the art of acquiring property) and τέχνη χρηματιστική (the art of wealth-getting), are not assimilable to the paradigm of τέχνη ποιητική, but rather require their own temporalogy of movement as *power interplay.* The movement of the mind in dialectically thinking a matter through also requires its own investigation as a movement driven by contradiction (cf. 3.7 *The inherently ambiguous deconcealment of phenomena* below). The contradictoriness of the movement of interplay in three-dimensional time requires special consideration (cf. 8.4.2 *Contradictoriness of selfhood*).

3.4 Zeno's arrow

Another famous example of physical movement is that of Zeno's arrow which, paradoxically, is supposed to show that an arrow in flight cannot move, since at any instant in time it is motionless. To Zeno's teacher, Parmenides, was famously (mis)attributed the doctrine that there can be no movement at all, a grand misunderstanding arising from the confusion between being itself and beings.

I approach this paradox first of all from the perspective of Aristotle's ontology of productive ontology, but incorporating insights from Hegel's conception of con-

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2 On the break with the ontology of productive movement, cf. e.g. Chapter 5 'Ontology of Exchange' in my *Social Ontology of Whoness* (2019b), a study that in retrospect may be regarded as a prolegomenon to the present inquiry. What is treated there as an ontology of exchange will be transformed into a temporality of interplay (cf. 8.4.1 *Intermeshing of self-movements through estimative interplay*).

tradiction. An arrow in flight is a case of practical motion through the practice of archery that is analogous to the case of productive movement under the guidance of a technical know-how, whose result is not a finished product but a practical aim. Now it is the archer who possesses the know-how of archery, i. e. how to use a taut bow to send an arrow flying accurately toward its target. The archer's know-how is a δύναμις as ἀρχή τῆς κινήσεως, i. e. a power, ability or capability to set a well-aimed movement moving, in this case, a loco-motion. Initially the bow and arrow are simply two *different* physical things *indifferent* to each other. It is the archer's past practised know-how that, having been implicitly recalled and having understood bow and arrow as fit for purpose from the temporal dimension of the past, brings them together in the present, first ideally and then practically, as suitable for the practice of archery, by placing the arrow properly into the bow and tightening the bow's string, the active force (power as potential) of the archer's arm *opposing* and balancing the passive counter-force (an opposed power as potential able to suffer the archer's positive force) of the strained, stringed, wooden bow that strains to release the tension under the archer's skilful guiding fore-sight of the target aimed at.

The two opposed powers can be regarded as *positive* and *negative*, negating each other in a counter-balance of the arrow's being both *here* in the bow and mentally *there* in the target, but also each related to and containing its opposite (in a Reflexionsbestimmung, i. e. a determination of reflection) to *be*, i. e. to presence as, the power that it is. This opposition is sharpened into a *contradiction* by the archer's straining the bow with the arrow aimed at a target which the archer has in view, not just sensuously, but mentally (εἶδος, causa idealis), and aims at, in the temporal dimension of the future, as the τέλος (causa finalis) of the foreseen motion of the arrow. The capable, foreseeing archer sees the arrow already in advance, stuck in the target. The archer's know-how is the efficient cause (causa efficiens, δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν *Met.* Θ1;1046a19) of the motion, the bow and arrow the material cause (causa materialis δύναμις τοῦ πάσχειν) that passively suffers itself to be employed by the skilful know-how in a unified power comprising both active and passive powers as starting-point (ἀρχή) for the productive, targeted movement.

Now to introduce a temporalogical insight: the archer sees three-dimensionally in a temporal sense in stretching and aiming the bow. Hence, in this example of locomotion, the arrow itself presents itself to the archer's mind in three temporal dimensions of where it was earlier in the quiver, where it is now in the bow, and where it will be later in the target, so that the arrow itself is mentally-temporally stretched in three places all at once. The potential forces inherent in bow and arrow are sharpened into the unity of a present contradiction in the strained bow aimed at the target which is its futural place in the archer's foreseeing view, no matter whether the arrow finally hits the target or misses it.

The contradiction is *unwound* by the archer's releasing the arrow from the bow to initiate the arrow's *actual* motion of flying toward the target, the opposed positive and negative *potentials* under skilful guidance by the efficient know-how now being put *to work* as an energy under way in a motion toward the foreseen target. The arrow is hence presently in flight, but it is *also* futurally at the target and it is *also* where it was in its past in the archer's quiver, i.e. its present, future and past at three places are 'existent' all at once in their respective temporal dimensions through which the arrow can pass. For the mind contemplating movement *as* movement, the arrow in flight is the arrow's presencing presently in a given place whilst simultaneousy absent from whence it presenced in the past and also absent from where it will presence in the future. The arrow in flight is the sharpest of contradiction insofar as it is all at once trifocally this presencing from its absent past, presently presencing where it now presencing, and absent from where it will presence in the future. The flying arrow is hence *for the mind* not stationary in flight where it is at an assumed present 'point' in time, but stretched in a temporally three-dimensional, contradictory unity of being (presencing) here and also being not here (absencing) in a temporally twofold sense. In other words, to conceive the arrow's motion *as* such requires seeing mentally, i.e. understanding, in three-dimensional time. Zeno's paradox truncates the mind's vision to an instantaneous snapshot of now (as if there were points in time) in which it is impossible to see motion *as such* at all.

3.5 Principle of non-contradiction untenable

The logical principle of non-contradiction, otherwise known as the law of the excluded middle, which can also be expressed as the law of identity, depends crucially on the conceptions of being and time to generate the exclusion. Traditionally, anything that is, i.e. exists, is conceived to *be* only in the present instant. That which *was* earlier no longer exists, i.e. *is* no longer, whereas that which may be coming later from the future (*futural*) is conceived as not yet existing. If the mind were restricted, or rather, truncated to 'really' seeing only that which is in the present instant, whereas all that presents itself from the past or the future is only imagined and not really real, i.e. non-existent, but at most an ideal imagination or fantasy, then the mind would be unable to see any movement or change except in its 'unreal', idealizing imagination, and all movement would be unreal, merely an unjustified figment of imagination contradicting the ostensibly genuine meaning of being as presence, and especially as sensuous presence that can be registered by the senses. What is past or futural is inaccessible for the senses which only 'work' by receiving the sense-data given exclusively in the present. Hence

there could be no movement *as such in reality* for the human mind on the basis of this temporally truncated conception of being as momentary presence, and Zeno's paradox would prevail. Movement would be an illusion of fantasy.

If, however, the meaning of being itself is three-dimensionally temporal and open to the mental faculty of the psyche (psyche and three-dimensional time thus belonging together in an identity), then the two temporal dimensions of absence, namely, the past and the future, *are* each in their own way also presence and above all *presence for the mind* that is able to see, understand (physical or mental) movement and change in three-dimensional time *as* a contradiction between presence and absence that is continually resolved in presencing/absencing 'all at once', i. e. in movement/change itself of all kinds. Anything moving is both present and absent 'all at once' so that there is no excluded middle. Since Aristotle movement/change has been cast ontohermeneutically *as* powers (δυνάμεις) at work (ἐνεργείᾳ) and thus as having causes, grounds, reasons. As indicated in the preceding, however, not all movement can be conceived as productive, and Aristotle's (and Greek philosophy's) paradigm is too narrow.

3.5.1 Non-contradiction according to Aristotle

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη πασῶν βεβαιοτάτη ἀρχή, δῆλον· τίς δ' ἔστιν αὕτη, μετὰ ταῦτα λέγομεν. Τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αυτό· [...] αὕτη δὴ πασῶν ἐστὶ βεβαιοτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν· ἔχει γὰρ τὸ εἰρημένον διορισμόν. ἀδύνατον γὰρ ὁντινοῦν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, [...] φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἅμα ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό. (*Met.* Γ3;1005b17–30)

Hence it is clear that this is the most unshakeable of all principles; what it is we now want to say. Namely, for the same to presence and not to presence all at once [temporally together, simultaneously] for the same [person's mind] in the same respect is impossible; [...] This is the most unshakeable of all principles that fits what has been discussed, for it is impossible for anyone to assume the same to be and not to be, [...] It is obvious that it is impossible for the same [person's mind] to assume all at once [simultaneously] the same to presence and not to presence.

This is the classical statement of the principle of non-contradiction that here is cited at some length to note the Greek formulations. The Greek verb ὑπάρχειν at the beginning of the passage is usually translated as 'to begin', 'to come into being, arise, spring up' and hence 'to be, exist'. This latter rendering fits with the εἶναι 'to presence' further on in the passage that is traditionally rendered simply as 'to be'. Against the convention, I have also rendered ὑπάρχειν as a verb 'to presence', entailing that μὴ ὑπάρχειν 'not to presence' should be rendered correspondingly as 'to absence'. 'Coming into being' is thus not a leap from a nothing-

ness of totally abstract non-existence into existence, but a presencing from absence, where both presencing and absencing are understood as movements *for the mind* in all-encompassing three-dimensional temporality. With regard to all phenomena of movement/change, whether physically, sensately real or mentally ideal, presencing and absencing occur all at once or 'simultaneously' once it is understood that each of us partakes in a mind that 'sees' three-dimensionally in a temporal sense. [Phenomenologically it must *always* be asked 'for whom' anything 'is', 'exists', i.e. presences or absences.]

The principle of non-contradiction depends crucially on the simultaneity of the ἅμα being interpreted as 'at the same instant of presence', i.e. 'now', thus restricting the mind's view of the world to the present instant. If μὴ εἶναι and μὴ ὑπάρχειν are interpreted as 'non-existence' pure and simple, this implies something that is beyond the mind's reach altogether, akin to a Kantian Ding an sich that is purportedly entirely unknowable and hence entirely unsayable and, strictly speaking, entirely non-existent, not even a blank, a void. To conceive a Ding an sich already amounts to its presencing in the mind and thus 'existing'. There is nothing to prevent a conception of an absencing from the mind of something that is out of the mind's focus and hence is surprising when it suddenly presences as if out of nothing, i.e. 'as if' out of non-existence altogether. On closer consideration, an apparent presencing out of nothing turns out to be either a creative act of the mind's power of imagination, i.e. an invention enabling entities to show themselves in a new, hitherto unknown light, from a different perspective or as due to the passive receptivity of the mental imagination. Such creative imagining is not ex nihilo.

3.5.2 Kant on formal non-contradiction

When thinking through conceptual determinations, which is itself a kind of mental movement, the principle of contradiction is an injunction against attributing opposite determinations to one and the same concept. Kant attempts to avoid the employment of the condition of simultaneity in the formulation of the principle of non-contradiction by dint of a neat trick. He points out that in its usual formulation, a contradiction arises when a "judgement" (Urteil, proposition) of the simple, formal, i.e. non-transcendental, kind, 'S is P', clashes with the other, negative proposition, 'S is not P'. Both cannot pertain 'simultaneously', i.e. at one and the same time, but at *different* times, says Kant (KdrV A153/B192, cf. FnD:133 ff), 'S is P' and 'S is not P' can avoid contradicting each other. Kant eludes the simultaneity condition by formulating the single proposition as 'a non-P S is P' is a contradiction in itself, i.e. in adjecto. He provides an example of non-contradiction with the proposition "no unlearned person is learned" (kein ungelehrter Mensch ist gelehrt A153/B192),

a solution that Kant regards as elegant "because the characteristic (of unlearnedness) now co-constitutes the concept of the subject" (weil das Merkmal (der Ungelehrtheit) nunmehr den Begriff des Subjekts mit ausmacht A153/B192). Thus, allowing that an "uneducated person" is a "concept" at all, the proposition becomes analytic and formally correct logically. Nevertheless, reading and understanding the compact proposition, "no uneducated person is educated", requires a movement of the mind in contemplating both the attribution and non-attribution of unlearnedness as a predicate. The proposition about uneducated persons is held together by the copula 'is'. Any uneducated person is, i.e. essences in three-dimensional temporality, existing not merely in an instantaneous, or even stretched now-moment, but in the temporal three-dimensional entirety of an existence in which he or she is open to the future with all its possible essents, including that of essencing *as* educated. The person's whoness is not reducible to a present now. A lack of education *may* motivate a striving to overcome the lack by becoming educated. Formulated in the language of contradiction: the contradiction between educated and uneducated may be resolved in an existential movement toward becoming educated (which may or may not fail). This existential possibility as a potential cannot be excluded for all persons. In some persons the potential is present as more than a mere possibility, and this potential may even be realized through gaining an education. Insofar, when viewed from the unity of three-dimensional time, some uneducated persons are educated. For Kant, however, the logical proposition is timeless and as such says nothing about any temporally existing human individual. Movement of the mind in understanding, for Kant, is not subject to time. Hence thinking through a concept analytically does not require the pure intuition of time that pertains only to synthetic judgements a priori that transcend to a *physical* object (cf. 5 *Kant on the power of imagination* below for more discussion of Kant's transcendental philosophy).

3.6 Non-contradiction in mathematics

The principle of non-contradiction has traditionally been employed especially in mathematics, where it is used even today in indirect, apagogic proofs where the opposite of what is to be proven is initially assumed, in order from this assumption to deduce by mathematical inference a contradiction, thus reductio ad absurdum. The principle of non-contradiction or excluded middle then allows the opposite of the initial assumption to be concluded to avoid the contradiction. There is, for instance, an easy apagogic proof of the existence of infinitely many prime numbers that proceeds by first assuming that the number of prime numbers is finite from which assumption an additional larger number is constructed that is not divisible

by any of the purportedly finite number of prime numbers and hence is a new prime number, a clear contradiction. The same technique of indirect proof is employed in all diagonal proofs to prove that a certain set of mathematical entities is not only countably infinite (and hence rational, logical in the sense of decomposable into discrete units) but uncountably infinite. Counting itself is an ideal movement of the mind that belies the common conception of mathematical entities as unmoving; already the natural numbers must be conceived as a movement of successively adding 1 to the initial unit; hence the successor function in the axiomatic formulation of the natural numbers. The set of real numbers can be proven to be uncountably infinite by first assuming it is countably infinite and then constructing a real number 'diagonally' that is not among this purportedly countably infinite set of real numbers.

But the principle of non-contradiction becomes shaky in dealing with the uncountable infinity of, say, the supposed continuum of real numbers that arises by considering geometrical entities as arithmetic ones, i.e. based on countable numbers (usually called 'denumerable' in mathematics). Although there is a countable infinity of natural numbers (counting is an endless movement in which the unit, 1, can always be added), and also a countable infinity of rational numbers that can be expressed by ratios of natural numbers, this infinity cannot count all the points on the continuum of a geometric line, any tiny interval of which contains more than a countable infinity of points that include irrational numbers, or surds, which are irreducible to any ratio.[3] The ideal, mental movement of successively counting numbers, even an infinity of rational numbers in an ordered sequence that can be neatly set out in an array, cannot capture the uncountable infinity of points conceived in the continuum of a 'real' geometric line whose reality is in turn conceived to be the abstraction from the continuous contours of a physical entity itself or of its continuous motion in space. The locomotion of a physical body hence can be conceived as a geometric curve which, in order to be calculable, must be reduced to numbers mathematically representing that curve in an equation.

The gulf of negation, i.e. the contradiction, between the countably infinite and the uncountably infinite must be resolved in some way which is achieved by conceiving infinitesimally small segments that can be treated as *both* continuously geometric (intervals) *and* discretely arithmetic (points conceived *as* infinitesimally small segments) 'all at once'. Thus arises a kindly treated duality of conceptions whose kernel, however, is a contradiction between point and line. Likewise, the

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3 The conception of a geometric line as consisting simply of an uncountable infinity of points is untenable, because it is left out of account how the points hang together in continuity. Cf. my critique of the Dedekind cut in 'Continuum and Time: Weyl after Heidegger' in *A Question of Time* (2015b).

countable infinity of regular polygons (square, pentagon, hexagon, heptagon, octa-gon, … n-agon, …) fitted to tightly enclose a given circle comes ever closer in a *mathematically imagined movement* toward the circle itself that is thus conceived as a regular polygon with sides of infinitesimally small length that are likewise *both* continuously geometric and discretely arithmetic 'all at once', i.e. a contradic-tion resolved by an ideal, infinite *movement* of the mathematical mind endlessly approaching an asymptotic limit that amounts to a kind of squaring of the circle *through movement.*

3.6.1 Russell's paradox

One of the most famous cases of having to avoid contradiction concerns the foun-dations of set theory as it was developed from the mid-nineteenth century onward, namely, the very idea of a set, together with its connection to the logic of proposi-tions. Although first noticed by Ernst Zermelo, the contradiction's significance was only brought to the fore by Bertrand Russell when its detrimental consequences for Gottlob Frege's foundations of arithmetic became apparent. Russell communi-cated the antinomy to Frege in a letter dated 16 June 1902; it has become known as Russell's paradox. In retrospect a few years later, Russell formulates the contradic-tion as follows:

> The comprehensive class we are considering, which is to embrace everything, must embrace itself as one of its members. In other words, if there is such a thing as "everything", then, "everything" is something, and is a member of the class "everything". But normally a class is not a member of itself. Mankind, for example, is not a man. Form now the assemblage of all classes which are not members of themselves. This is a class: is it a member of itself or not? If it is, it is one of those classes that are not members of themselves, i.e., it is not a member of itself. If it is not, it is not one of those classes that are not members of them-selves, i.e. it is a member of itself. Thus of the two hypotheses – that it is, and that it is not, a member of itself – each implies its contradictory. This is a contradiction.[4]

The all-encompassing set of everything, i.e. of all entities, which is itself something, must be a member of itself, if it exists at all. This leads inevitably to the self-con-tradictory set R of the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. R is a member of itself if and only if it is not a member of itself. The entire discussion of Russell's paradox from the outset has focused on the logical contradiction and how it can be avoided by restricting the compass of the so-called Comprehen-

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4 Russell (1919), p. 136; cf. the entries on Russell's paradox in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-ophy* and *Wikipedia*, last accessed December 2022.

sion Axiom which says that for any propositional formula f(x) there is a set whose members consist precisely of all those x satisfying the formula f, e. g. f(x) is the formula 'x is a horse'. The set H of all horses can be formed, and H itself is not a horse; it is on a higher level than horses themselves. H is not a member of itself. The restriction of the Comprehension Axiom is done in such a way as to force a hierarchy of levels to escape the contradiction of self-reference of a set. For Russell, this escape strategy is type theory. Whether H is a member of itself is no longer an issue if H is on a higher logical level anyway. Apparently, the set H of all *existing* horses can be formed. In which sense do horses and the set of all horses exist? Is H a proper mathematico-logical entity at all? What is the mode of existence of a mathematical entity?

From the outset and to the present day, no attention has been paid to the question concerning what it means for an entity to exist, i. e. to be, at all, nor to the question concerning the various *modes* of existence of entities, e. g. whether the entity is a living being or a non-living being, whether a something or a somewho, whether it exists in past, present or future, or all three at once, for *whom* it exists (for nobody?), etc. The question concerning the meaning of being *itself* is a non-question for this logical way of thinking that conveniently suspends temporality. To predicate that something 'exists' does not elicit or prod any consternation or questioning at all for logical thinking's self-complacency. The examples employed in the copious, century-long discussions of Russell's paradox and antinomies of logic in analytic philosophy are usually of banal entities such as dogs or teacups, i. e. of objects in modern philosophy's sense of the term. The focus instead is on formulating sophisticated, complicated logical formulae in a highly controlled, 'unnatural' language, all the time taking for granted that the meaning of being itself is understood and unquestionable, i. e. requiring no question at all. At most there may be a reference to whether the entities in question are 'ideal' or 'real', a distinction that presupposes unquestioningly the split between interior subjective consciousness and external objective reality. Seriously raising the question concerning the meaning of being itself, rather than paying attention exclusively to beings and so-called 'ontological commitments' to their existence, would ruffle analytic philosophy's composure. Whether the question is raised at all therefore becomes one of institutional power in a power play in which analytic philosophy is currently the hegemon. It would be naïve to suppose that this hegemony is not intimately succoured by and intertwined with the current political and economic hegemony in the world.

3.7 The inherently ambiguous deconcealment of phenomena

> ...though truth and falshood bee
> Neare twins, yet truth a little elder is;
> John Donne *Satyre III*

It has already been shown that presencing is not the same as deconcealing, and absencing is not the same as concealing (cf. 2.9 *Mental absencing distinct from concealment*; 2.10 *Mental presencing distinct from deconcealment*). The deconcealment of an essent *as* that which it is, concerns the *deconcealing* of phenomena in their very presencing and absencing for the hermeneutically understanding mind. Deconcealment is therefore itself a temporal phenomenon dependent upon the three-dimensional temporal openness encompassing the dimensions of future, present and past (Gewesenheit, beenness, foregoneness). The complementary phenomenon of *concealment* is the negation of factual correctness or genuine temporalogical deconcealment in the sense that it is the concealing of an essent altogether or its deconcealing *as* that which it is *not* and thus a distorted deconcealing or *semblance.* The conception of deconcealment of the phenomena themselves is entirely different from the derivative, orthodox conception of the truth and falsity of statements and propositions, as if truth and falsity resided in the λόγος, which ultimately (for instance, via truth tables) can be reduced to discrete binary differences between 0 and 1. If truth were a matter of the λόγος, then, in principle, the truth or falsity of a state of affairs could be decided by the better, discretely logical argument through syllogistic inferences from factually correct premises. But truth is temporal.

The Greek word for truth is ἀλήθεια, which is formed with a negating unaspirated alpha (ἀ) prefix that negates concealment (λήθη, also denoting 'forgottenness' or 'oblivion'). This suggests already that the Greeks experience truth as something to be wrested from concealment, either partial or total. Hence the term 'deconcealment' is appropriate for the conception of phenenomenal truth discussed here, the 'de–' prefix signifying that the deconcealment of the phenomena is a movement from concealment into deconcealment. Such wrestling with the most subtle, elementary phenomena is an existential movement of the mind that strives to overcome concealment, distortion, ambiguity, semblance and indeed, contradiction, as we shall see. Closure of the mind on all levels, and thus a mental blindness, from the most trivially factual (e. g. blind bigotry wanting to believe what it wants to believe) through to the epochally ontohermeneutic in our own age of taking the subject/object split as self-evident, or blindness to the ontological difference, is a fundamental affliction for human being.

Since 'to be' entails, and is nothing other than, a temporal essencing for the psyche and mind, how can true deconcealment be distinguished from deficient? After all, both are a kind of essencing for the mind. Only by clearing away the distortions can the phenomenon in its plain truth ever come to light, which involves examining the phenomenon in question more closely until one's mind is satisfied that, as far as possible, undistorted clarity has been attained. First of all, a phenomenon in its simple facticity may show itself unambiguously as what it is (correctly) or as what it is not (incorrectly, falsely), thus as infected, interpenetrated by its own negation. It is always already preconceived and thus understood in a certain way in a given age with its own hermeneutic cast, e.g. *as* an object in our own age. Correct understanding on the basis of epochally untrue preconceptions may distort the phenomenon itself, thus requiring that the distorting preconceptions be cleared away, de-constructed. Today that is a temporahermeneutic task that must also perform the transition from ontology to temporalogy.

Any of the more concretely factual, especially social, phenomena such as fairness, legality, responsibility, justice, freedom, etc. in any specific instance bear within themselves their own contradictory determinate negations of unfairness, illegality, irresponsibility or injustice, etc., respectively, that render them ambiguous and thus inevitably susceptible to *controversy*. Hence whether a contractual transaction is fair or unfair, an action legal or illegal, or a law just or unjust, is exposed to essential *ambiguity* when interfused with its determinate negation, as happens when such issues are litigated, inevitably against the background of firm, unquestioned preconceptions of the phenomena in question in a given age, such as justice, thus requiring ultimately temporalogical explication that interrogates the preconceptions themselves. *Determinate* negation signifies here that the negation is not into nothing at all, i.e. absolute or abstract negation, nor into something arbitrarily different, such as negating justice into untidiness, but negation by its very own contradictory negation that belongs to the phenomenon in question itself. Thus, for instance, injustice can present itself, i.e. deconceal itself distortedly, precisely as its opposite, namely, justice, when it disguises itself as popular will. Such ambiguity is only compounded by the confusion arising from the unclarity and – ultimately temporalogical – misconceptions surrounding the very concepts of fairness, legality, justice, freedom, etc. themselves, quite apart from specific instances of the same (such as a miscarriage of justice by the courts). The correctness of many plain, factual matters, on the other hand, can be easily ascertained by presenting available evidence, e.g. last month's paid electricity bill or photos of the damage from a car accident or irrefutable alibi evidence that the suspect could not have been present at the scene of a crime.

There is no rock-solid criterion for establishing whether full, plain, incontrovertible deconcealment of a phenomenon in question (past, present or future) fi-

nally has been attained, and the mind may satisfy itself with a mere conviction that neglects key aspects of it. Or it may overlook an aspect that distorts the phenomenon in question. Or it may accept a deconcealing that is "beyond reasonable doubt", as is done in a court of law, without digging deeper. Or its preconceptions, especially its temporahermeneutic ones, may block, distort or skew the view altogether, such as when Western conceptions of land ownership (a form or temporalogical 'look' of thingified value) make it scarcely conceivable that indigenous peoples have land rights or compel the conception of an indigenous people's relation to the land into the modern ontological corset of land ownership without truly appreciating a people's historical relationship to the Earth. In this sense, a final deconcealment of phenomena in their unsurpassable truth once and for all is unattainable, especially since (as we shall see; cf. 6 *Temporalogical recasting in historical time*) there can be no final, ultimate, 'true', historico-hermeneutic cast of the essencing of essents, quite apart from factual deconcealment, which may consist in hitherto unknown historical documents hidden away in archives or buried archaeological artefacts coming to light. Such deconcealment allows historians or archaeologists or anthropologists to tell a different, perhaps surprisingly different story without disturbing any deeper preconceptions. Even such factual, narrative accounts always remain contestable due to the interpretation of the historical facts (e.g. colonization conceived *as* a process of civilization of 'primitive' peoples) and also to the possibility of new facts coming to light through new finds and being interpreted by more 'enlightened' conceptions. On a deeper level, it is a matter of contention whether modern scientific truth with its own criteria – notably, predictive power and empirical verification – is above question; namely, modern epistemological deconcealment consists in 'knowing' by providing (preferably causally) predictive, verifiable explanation of the phenomena in question. Hence scientific truth is constricted to deconcealment in terms of such explanation of movement and change deploying the appropriate theoretical models that prove their true mettle by accurately predicting movement. Such scientific truth is equated with correct theoretical prediction. In the case of cosmology, for instance, modern science focuses on gathering data from the universe via ever more sophisticated telescopes and interpreting them in the framework of the Big Bang theory to construct a narrative of how the universe purportedly 'came into being', including how galaxies are formed and change their shape, and how stars are 'born' and 'die'. This evidence-based scientific mythology – dependent as it is on a relativistic conception of one-dimensional light-time – differs markedly from other culturally anchored cosmologies with very different narratives.

Historico-temporalogical truth itself is abyssal, groundless and thus subject to recasting in the hermeneutic crucible of an age's mind, its Geist, the temporalogical difference. This is rare and the slowest of all movements: a change of historical

mind. At first and for the most part, the distinction between semblance and (factually correct) truth is made *within* a given hermeneutic cast of world, i.e. in a given historical time, and therefore takes its ontological basis in our present age as a given, solid ground, e.g. that the human is a self-conscious subject or a species of animal and the split between subject and object, both of which are pre-ontological prejudicial preconceptions that today call for temporalogical interrogation. Or that "men are born free" (in the absence of a properly founded, or downright obscurantist, conception of freedom). These deep-seated prejudices and seemingly self-evident preconceptions give rise to philosophical questioning that is able to dig deeper than any mere empiricism.

Since elementary, crucial phenomena presenting themselves are always already shared, ultimately because we mortals ineluctably share the openness of three-dimensional, historical time within which the hermeneutic λόγος gathers its contours,[5] their truthful disclosure is in principle also a shared disclosure enabling and requiring a *communication* through the medium of language, which is a precipitation of the originary λόγος. Such discursive disclosure is always a reluctant, contested, controversial deconcealing of the phenomena themselves for understanding that has to be brought to language by *articulating* them. Truthful deconcealment of elementary phenomena is insofar (derivatively) discursively mediated by words (literally: 'running around' with words) that claim to bring the phenomenon at hand to light, to partially conceal it, or obscurantically conceal it altogether by remonstrating against newfangled ideas that upset the status quo. Deconcealment then becomes a matter of contretemps (a kind of back-and-forth movement of the shared mind in words) aiming to present the phenomenon in question *as* such-and-such rather than otherwise, thus raising previous views of the phenomenon in question to a higher level insofar as their contradictoriness is resolved.

The most elementary (ontological, speculative, θεωρητικός) categories such as 'something' (τι, τις) or 'something other' (ἕτερον) or 'difference' (διαφορά), as Aristotle points out in his discussion of reason's intuition (νοῦς), can hardly (but perhaps nevertheless?) distort the deconcealment of the elementary phenomena they articulate. Even plain, elementary categorial truth can become questionable for us today da capo when it is no longer cut and dried whether an essent presents itself as some*what* or rather as some*who*, which in turn requires that these different phenomena be conceptually unfolded – and thus understood and articulated –

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5 "Although the logos is shared in common, most live as if they had their own, individual insight." (τοῦ λόγου δ' ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν. Herakleitos Frag. 2)

in very different ways (cf. 8 *Recasting humanness through a temporalogy of who-ness*).

3.8 Estimative deconcealing of essents

The deconcealing of essents presencing phenomenally for the mind from whatever temporal dimension, thereby overcoming as far as possible the many distortions that occlude their deconcealment and generate ambiguities, is invariably accompanied also by their *estimation* and *evaluation.* Essents essence *existentially* in the psyche for the mind's understanding. This does not amount to an 'objective', 'value-free' deconcealing of essents presencing for the mind being complemented by their 'subjective' evaluation in some sort of value-judgement, since both the deconcealing and the estimating are only possible within the *unity* of the essents presencing in the psyche for the understanding mind. Hence both are inseparably 'subjective-objective', being encompassed by the unifying openness of three-dimensional time, and continued use of the terminology of subject and object is, at the very least, misleading.

An essent presencing for the mind is always already estimated in one way or another, even if this estimation is one of indifference. There is hardly a dry fact that is not linked to being-good-for or being-bad-for, i.e. that is *estimated* as either good-for or bad-for in a humanly existential sense. Apparently bare facts are embedded contextually in situations that are estimated in one way or another and therefore are anything other than 'value-free'. Here I shall first consider the estimation of *physical things.* For instance, something, such as a packed suitcase, may factually weigh 20 kg. and be factually, 'objectively' ascertained to weigh 20 kg., but be too-heavy-for, too-light-for, just-right-for, acceptable or inacceptable for transportation, safe or unsafe for a certain situation, e.g. negotiating steep stairs. The deconcealment of the factual weight goes hand in hand with the estimation of the suitcase as suitable or unsuitable for carrying, transportation, etc. A suitcase that already weighs 8 kg when empty may therefore already be estimated and evaluated as 'useless' for convenient travel, and this uselessness pertains to the suitcase's estimated *use-value* in a given context, namely, personal travel. The suitcase itself is not simply some 'object' out there in the 'objective' world with objective 'properties', but *as* a suitcase it is already tied existentially into being good for (or bad for) a certain use or uses *as* which it always already presences for the mind.

The estimation of essents goes beyond both physical and commercial ones, and is inseparable from their deconcealment pure and simple. Hence we may speak of *estimative deconcealment.* Already simply in the deconcealing of a situation, there

is the continual estimation of whether and to what degree such deconcealment has succeeded, e.g. whether the available information is to be estimated as reliable and sufficient, whether it is welcoming or dangerous, etc. In particular, a discursive interchange with oneself or with others in a discussion is a movement of the mind (shared in a discursive situation) focused on deconcealing the phenomenon in question. The force and cogency of what is said is thus subjected to continual estimation with regard to how it helps to understand the phenomenon properly. Is what is said truly insightful? Is it said merely with the aim of persuading, convincing or winning an argument? Does it truly deconceal, for instance, the phenomenon of justice itself that itself is highly estimated? Due to the ambiguity of phenomenal deconcealment, each phenomenon, either in its pure concept or empirically in the world, is infected by its own determinate negation(s); justice can show itself as injustice, fairness as unfairness, kindness as unkindness, freedom as unfreedom, and so on, so that the movement of the interchange to clarify the phenomenon itself, i.e. *as* what it essences, focuses on working through negations to attain a degree of unambiguous clarity that (wholly or sufficiently) satisfies the (individual or shared) mind.

Such evaluative discursive mental movement through the dialectic of negation to gain a more adequate concept of the phenomenon in question has to be distinguished from that other kind of movement in which the phenomenon in question is observed in the world and itself changes into its own negation as estimated against its already established and accepted concept. The critical media are often engaged in such estimative deconcealment, having to assess the sources they tap as to whether they affirm or refute accounts of the situation or action. For instance, is the justice meted out by a judiciary in a given instance its own negation, i.e. a perversion of justice perpetrated by a corrupt or biased judiciary or a miscarriage of justice due to suppression of evidence? Or has a given democracy become a deeply undemocratic perversion of democracy through infection by the power of wealth, thus degenerating into plutocracy? To make this estimative judgement of degeneracy, democracy itself must already be understood as excluding from its very concept plutocratic influence, including the influence of well-paid lobbyists for particular industries. Another name for the power of wealth is the power of thingified value, which gives rise to the question whether this power perverts liberal democracy in its very concept, or whether, on the contrary, the power of thingified value belongs to the concept of liberal democracy (cf. 9 *Sociation through the medium of thingified value*), in which elections are fought out just like marketing campaigns invented and executed by marketing experts. Hence

Schumpeter's competition theory of democracy.[6] This is just one of the vexing questions concerning today's liberal democracy that is cherished as one of 'our' highest values. Is the liberality of liberal democracy truly aligned with freedom in the deepest, hermeneutic sense?

A further example: In a *rhetorical* situation such as a TV talk-show, the viewers do not simply try to *understand* what the talk-show guests are saying but automatically also *estimate* what they say as credible, persuasive, etc. with regard to the given topic. Is the speaker ingenuous or disingenuous, truthful or lying, honest or fawningly manipulative? The rhetorical employment of words can be provocative, enticing, coaxing, wheedling, cajoling, flattering, expostulatory, remonstrative, threatening, and much else. All of these uses of words aim at moving listeners in a certain direction and are therefore means of social power. In a *political* situation of deliberative debate, the deconcealment of the issue is an estimative one with regard to, say, good or bad policy, narrow self-interest or the social good, even-handed or tendentious. Here, too, the deliberative deconcealment of the issue is inseparable from its estimation.

The discussion of estimation in this section is still underdeveloped and, strictly speaking, an anticipation. Esteem and estimation are phenomena belonging to the phenomenality of whoness in the movement called mutually estimative interplay involving both people and things (cf. Chapters 8 and 9, where the above-mentioned topics will recur).

3.8.1 Cartesian estimation

It is noteworthy that the phenomenon of esteem and estimation has significant weight also for Descartes when he considers, in the framework of his subject-object ontology, the fundamental ways in which the soul (l'âme) has access to the world. In his *Les Passions de l'Âme* (1648), published shortly before his death, Descartes accords esteem (l'estime Art. LIV) and its opposite, disesteem (le mespris), a basic role in how the subject's soul encounters objects in the world. The first basic passion or motive force of the soul is postulated to be wonderment (l'admiration Art. LIII) that occurs whenever the subject comes across an object for the first time and is surprised by it. It cannot do otherwise in its encounters with objects than to estimate them in some way or other along a spectrum that spans from veneration to disdain (veneration, dédain Art. LV). The objects are encountered furthermore as possible sources of good and bad for the subject, which leads Descartes to pos-

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6 Cf. Schumpeter (1975) and Section 13.1.3 of my *Social Ontology of Whoness* (2019b).

tulate what he considers to be the second and third basic passions of the soul, namely, love and hate (Art. LVI).

This determination of the role of esteem in the subject's encounters with the world, including the world of others, may come as a surprise when one considers that the Cartesian way of thinking is usually taken to be focused on encountering the objects in the world 'objectively', i.e. without any 'value-judgements' that are implied by estimating an object (that may also be another subject), thus esteeming it in some way that may be also entirely negative. One could wonder how it has come to pass that the estimation of objects has subsequently been stripped down to a barren, value-free objectivity of objects whose qualities can be measured and quantified for the sake of scientific deployment. Through phenomenological interrogation, scientific objective truth reveals itself to be an historically determinate, and therefore relative, hermeneutic cast of the deconcealment of phenomena rather than an absolute terminus of history.

3.9 Truth and power interplay

The deconcealment of the truth of a state of affairs is never merely a matter of syllogistic argument from factually correct premises to logically inferred conclusions. The phenomena themselves in question in a controversy are always ambiguous, lending themselves to contradictory interpretations, perhaps multiply so, even though each side of an argument pretends to point dispassionately to the plain, putatively 'incontrovertible' facts of the matter in dispute. An adversarial, argumentative approach to the phenomena themselves more likely than not detracts from the attempt to show how the phenomenon in question shows itself of itself, for each of those engaged in the argument is a subject underlying and defending a viewpoint that it seeks to assert over others. Subject/object metaphysics gives rise to an assertive subject argumentatively defending an –ism position via-à-vis the positions of other, similarly assertive subjects. A (rare) shared effort to adequately deconceal the phenomena in question requires, at the least, circumspection from a more encompassing horizon, not only to appreciate alternative viewpoints, but, most of all, to practise a devotion to the phenomena themselves. Mutual estimation and esteem (including disesteem) among the disputants are also necessarily in play. Adversarial deconcealment thus becomes a movement nourished by the obscuring ambiguity of the phenomena themselves that is taken up in the rhetoric of argument (say, in parliament, in the media, in learned scientific journals, in philosophical discourse, etc.) presenting the phenomena in dispute one way rather than another, thus also (mis)estimating and (dis)esteeming each other one way or another in their whoness (e.g. as ingenuous or disingenu-

ous, competent or incompetent). There is always a way to present the phenomena rhetorically in a different light with different, well-chosen words (with or without photos, video-clips, seductive music, etc.), suiting the speaker's or the medium's aims which is today called 'spin'.

Gorgias is perhaps the first and most famous philosopher of rhetorical spin (cf. Plato's *Gorgias*). Rhetorical argument is itself a necessarily *mutually estimative power interplay*, between or among opposing viewpoints on the same phenomena seeking to present a persuasive interpretation of the 'facts' in one way rather than another. Rhetoric as an art is therefore a kind of social power. As we have seen, however, the 'facts', are never naked facts, but always already hermeneutically invested phenomena in their inherent ambiguity, open to differing, opposing and even outright contradictory and topsy-turvy interpretations that are more often than not self-serving. A disinterested 'value-free' search for the truth of the phenomena in question is a fiction that abstracts from the powers at play in the search for the 'unvarnished truth' of the matter. This applies also to the ostensibly dispassionate search for truth in philosophical endeavour.

The issue of the entanglement of truth with power properly requires consideration of the temporalogical situation of the *whoness* of the players involved in the power interplays. This enables questioning to dig deeper than the factual correctness that is uncovered by investigative journalism, etc. to temporalogical issues concerning whoness itself. It is inadequate to leave the status of the players implicitly *as* subjects, i.e. to conceive humans *as* certain kinds of whats equipped with certain psycho-cognitive powers and neurologically driven, emotional inclinations, etc. This is the default position for thinking human being per se today disseminated and diffused throughout everyday life. I will therefore return to the problematic of the whoness of mortal essencing through mutually estimative power interplay in Chapters 8 and 9.

4 Antinomies in physics' conceptions of motion in linear time

The present chapter is an opportunity to draw a contrast between the preceding development and conventional theorization of physical movement. It therefore has the character of an excursus.

4.1 Motion of physical bodies in time according to Aristotle, Newton, Einstein

Ever since Aristotle, physics has been the investigation of all sorts of spatially extended beings that move or can move (κινούμενα). Whereas Aristotle's concept of movement was fourfold, in modern times, since Kepler and Galileo, the concept of movement was reduced to just one of the Aristotelean kinds of movement, namely change of place, i. e. locomotion, or motion for short. This reduction of the four kinds of movement (change of what/progeneration, change of how/quality, change of how-much/quantity, change of place) to just one was principally for the sake of simplicity in being able to mathematize the conception of movement. Hence qualitative chemical reactions can be theorized as motions of molecules, atoms, electrons and ions, and the movements of arms and legs can be conceived in terms of the motions of potassium ions through membranes, etc. The simplicity of mathematized movement is evidenced especially by Newton's famous three simple laws of (loco)motion:

> (i) Free particles move with constant vector-velocity (that is, with zero acceleration, or, in other words, with constant speed along straight lines).
> (ii) The vector-force on a particle equals the product of its mass into its vector acceleration: $\mathbf{f} = m\mathbf{a}$
> (iii) The forces of action and reaction are equal and opposite; for example, if a particle A exerts a force $\mathbf{f}$ on a particle B, then B exerts a force $-\mathbf{f}$ on A.[1]

Henceforth physics becomes the science of the motion of extended physical beings, not from place to place, as with Aristotle, but from abstractly mathematized position to position in a space that also had to be mathematized, initially as three-dimensional, geometrical, Euclidian-Cartesian space, which is itself an abstraction from physical space with its *places.* The essential kernel of modern physics, con-

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1 Cited according to the formulation in Rindler (2006) p. 4.

cerned as it is from the outset of the motion of extended moveable entities, brings with it a concern with mathematically expressible, *efficient causal laws for change of position*, i.e. for the rate of change of position (speed or vector velocity) and also the rate of change of velocity, which is acceleration (involving either change of speed or direction, or both). After all, Newton's second law states mathematically, in a very simple equation, that the force acting on a physical body is equal to the product of its mass and acceleration. The acceleration of a physical body itself has to be mathematized as the rate of change of velocity which is, in turn, the rate of change of position in a given direction. Such rates of change must be measured with respect to time, and to be mathematized, the rates of change must be grasped as differentiations in the infinitesimal calculus with respect to a continuous, real variable, t, that stands for linear time. If no external force is acting on a physical body, its motion is said to be inertial, i.e. the body continues 'forever' to move in a *straight* line at a *constant* speed unless 'interfered' with by an external force. Any diversion in its motion has to be accounted for by a force accelerating its motion, that is, changing its speed or direction or both. This is demanded by requirements of simple mathematization.

For the force to have any power over the physical body, it must have mass that can be accelerated. In Aristotle's physics,[2] by contrast, this mass was captured by a concept of the heavy (βαρύ) that was paired with the light (κοῦφον). Together they accounted for the *natural* motion of four physical elements either up, away from the centre, or down, toward the centre, whereby the centre was taken to be that of the Earth. As natural motions, they are not effected by any force, because they are already endowed with the (passive) potential (δύναμις) to move up or down, if only they are not prevented from doing so and are given a nudge. By contrast, in classical modern physics a downward motion toward a centre is conceived (hermeneutically-epistemologically) *as* an attractive, centripetal force such as gravity, and an upward motion away from a centre is conceived as a repulsive, centrifugal force. This is due to natural motion being conceived in Newtonian-Galilean mechanics *as* inertial motion in conceptually different ways, as we shall see. The shift in the conception of natural motion is an example of historical hermeneutic casting, as discussed below in a separate chapter (cf. 6 *Temporalogical recasting in historical time*).

For Aristotle there were four basic elements: earth, water, air and fire, which in modern physics correspond roughly to four states of matter: solid, liquid, gas and plasma, respectively. (This leaves to one side a discussion of the status of the fifth Aristotelean element, namely, aether, the stuff of stars, whose natural mo-

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2 Cf. especially Aristotle *On the Heavens* Book IV.

tion is circular, which also played an important role in modern physics prior to the advent of Maxwellian electromagnetic fields and subsequently Einsteinian relativity theory, which dispensed with it.) The third kind of natural, forceless motion in Aristotelean physics is circular motion, the kind of (superlunary) motion that pertains to the stars and planets highest up in the heavens, above the moon. It is said to be the most perfect due to its having neither beginning nor end, thus mimicking eternity, as exquisitely expressed in Plato's *Timaios. Natural* motion up, down or around in Aristotelean physics corresponds to free, forceless *inertial* motion straight ahead in Newtonian physics which in turn is ultimately transformed into the *geodesic* motion of free fall along 'shortest' paths in curved space-time in Einsteinian general relativity theory. What Newton conceived as gravitational force becomes with Einstein a field in curved space-time such that the geometry of the curved field determines the free fall of a physical body and substitutes for the postulation of a gravitational force. Hence there is a kind of continuity in Western physics from Aristotle via Galilean-Newtonian mechanics through Maxwellian and Hamiltonian field theory to advanced relativity theory, insofar as all have at their core a conception of free, natural motion of physical bodies where 'free' means free of external force. Whereas Aristotelean physics has differentiated places, thereafter, from Newton onward, space is homogenized and geometrized for the sake of mathematization, with even time itself becoming spatialized in various ways amenable to mathematization.

4.2 Mathematized access to physical motion

> The rational approximating the irrational
> The countably infinite approaching
> the uncountably infinite asymptotically
> They never fall together

The motion of physical bodies of all kinds that modern physics deals with has to be conceived as motion through space from one position to another (rather than from one place to another). Hence space is an indispensable concept that must receive a suitable mathematization, namely, a geometrization, to grasp motion within such mathematized spaces that need not be conventional three-dimensional Euclidean spaces. But what of *time*, that age-old conception invariably mentioned in the same breath as space and taken to be just as fundamental as and on a par with space? The caveat here is that it must be questioned whether the phenomenon of time has indeed *ever* been conceived, i. e. brought to its *concept,* in a fundamental, elementary way by Western thinking, starting with the Greeks. Rather, today we need to

entertain the possibility that violence was done to the phenomenon of time at the inception of Greek thinking, whose legacy and fateful ramifications we still bear today. Time itself in modern mathematized physics has to be mathematized by considering motion, which is measured as the *rate of change of position* in some co-ordinate frame or other (a gauge, a metric) imposed on some well-defined mathematical space, such as a three-dimensional linear vector space that represents the traditional Euclidian geometry or in a four-dimensional Minkowski space-time or Riemannian space-time manifold. The change in position itself is measured as a *distance* (that, in turn, has to be mathematically defined) and its rate of change is measured as *speed* in a given direction. The time taken to cover the distance at a uniform speed is therefore given simply by the ratio of the distance to the speed, $x/s = t$. Inversely, one could determine the distance covered at uniform speed maintained for a certain time interval, e.g. 100 km is the distance covered, say, by a car travelling at 50 kilometres per hour for 2 hours, thus rendering 50 km to be the spatial equivalent of the linear time interval of 1 hour.

Speeds and directions of motion, of course, can and, in general, do vary, so that one proceeds mathematically by first considering very small, *infinitesimal* distances dx covered by a physical body at an assumed constant speed s in a *straight* line in a given direction. This allows the ancient *Pythagorean theorem* to come into play as indispensable in all of modern physics, albeit in modified ways: the sum of the squares of the two sides of a right-angled triangle is equal to the square on the hypotenuse: the ratio of the distance dx covered to the time dt taken is simply the speed $s = dx/dt$ that is thus the hypotenuse of the right-angled triangle with sides dt and dx whose hypotenuse dy is given by the Pythagorean relation: $dy^2 = dt^2 + dx^2$, which is defined as a *metric* or *gauge* on the space, as we shall see below.

Conversely, the ratio of distance covered, dx, to the assumed constant speed, s, is a measure of time as an infinitesimal time interval, $dt = dx/s$. The time taken to travel a given route is obtained by integrating, that is, summing together, all the infinitesimal time intervals, dt, along the line, now for varying speeds (assumed to be a function of position) for each infinitesimal distance dx. This line of reasoning can be extended to three spatial dimensions by considering position to be a vector **p** and speed to be a velocity vector **v**, the speed at **p** in a given three-dimensional direction. If **v** is expressed as a function of **p**, i.e. as a field equation, then the time taken for a movement along a path through three-dimensional space can be calculated by integrating (summing up) d**p**/**v(p)** along the path. This renders time intervals equivalent to paths taken by a physical body moving in a suitably chosen mathematical space, thus *spatializing the linear scalar time variable t* whose units now can be counted in terms of multiples or fractions of the distance covered by a standard regular periodic motion (a clock), as will be considered below.

4.3 Perplexing 'earlier' and 'later' in counted time

In particular, if the speed of a physical body is always constant, independently of position, although direction may vary, then the distance covered will always be simply a measure of time itself, that is, time is *spatialized as distance covered by a given uniform motion.* This accords with time itself being conceived consistently as *derivative* of motion, in line with Western conceptions of time ever since Aristotle's famous definition of time simply as the "number of movement with respect to earlier and later" (ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον *Phys.* Δ 219b1 ff). Hence in all of physics, despite suggestions and statements to the contrary, time is not conceived as a fundamental, elementary phenomenon, but rather as a derivative one, that is, derivative of a standard, uniform, continuous, periodic, physical (loco)motion. Hence counted clock-time, the most superficial conception of time. In fact, the latter part of the Aristotelean definition of time, "with respect to earlier and later", points to an aporia in the ontology of time from the very inception of philosophical thinking insofar as the definition is viciously circular. For, what do "earlier" and "later" mean? They are clearly temporal determinations, but not simply numbers counted off movement of any kind. Rather, the temporal determinations, earlier and later, are used by Aristotle to mark off the starting-point and end-point of a movement, in particular, the *spatial* starting-point and end-point of a (loco)motion of *physical* beings. They cannot be dispensed with if movement is to be measured, i.e. counted, although earlier and later *in themselves* are not necessarily tied to the measurement of movement but are temporal determinations in their own right, *prior* to movement of *any* kind, physical or otherwise. Nevertheless, this does not prevent Aristotle – via his focus on the magnitude (μέγεθος *Phys.* Δ 219a12) of one kind of movement, namely, locomotion – from giving conceptual priority to the spatial signification of "earlier" and "later" as "before" and "after": "before and after, however, are first of all in a place (spatial)"(τὸ δὲ δὴ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τόπῳ πρῶτον ἐστιν 219a16) – namely as starting-point and end-point of a locomotion —, thus initiating the long, unbroken tradition of the spatialization of time. His line of thought moves conceptually from continuous magnitude/length (μέγεθος εἶναι συνεχὲς 219a12) to movement as continuous change of place (κίνησίς ἐστι συνεχής *Phys.* Δ 219a14) to time-interval marked off by "earlier and later" (πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον 219a19). This Aristotelean line of thought renders time as a truly derivative phenomenon, i.e. it misses the primitive phenomenon of time itself altogether.

But that is not all; by sleight of hand with respect to his own definition of time as derivative of, i.e. counted off, movement (rather than primitive or primordial or 'originary'), Aristotle also conceives movement/change as taking place *in* time, thus implicitly giving time a status other than, indeed deeper than, a mere number

counted off motion. But this deeper time is never explicated. Instead, Aristotle considers physical beings existing in time: "Since what is in time exists as in number, one can take more time than any being existing in time" (Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὡς ἐν ἀριθμῷ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ, ληφθήσεταί τις πλείων χρόνος παντὸς τοῦ ἐν χρόνῳ ὄντος· 221a28), that is, any physical being existing only for a finite time interval can be encompassed by a longer time interval with its own starting-point and end-point, and is thus "in time", namely a length of time. The counting of the linear stretch of time is not needed for this determination of a finite physical being, but only the end-points. By contrast, "everlasting beings" (ἀεὶ ὄντα 221b4) cannot be thus "encompassed" (περιέχεται 221b5) by a finite stretch of time and are therefore "not in time" (ουκ ἔστιν ἐν χρόνῳ 221b4). Hence the traditional distinction between finite beings and eternal, timeless beings still in force in today's mind. Eternal, timeless beings are simply changeless according to this way of derivative thinking about time, whereas beings in time change. Whereas for Plato and Aristotle, the stars circling overhead in the night sky were eternal and thus outside time, through its equations, modern mathematical physics has encompassed them by a very long time interval, thus rendering them finite.

4.4 Time spatialized as light-distance in relativity theory

There remains an inherent incoherence in the conception of time as counted off movement (by a clock) with respect to earlier and later in modern relativity physics because for it, all events depend on light-signals (strictly speaking: electromagnetic signals) being received by an observer-subject as data kilometres per hour in the present. 'Earlier' and 'later', however are essential determinations of counted time that can never be data received in the present, but are prior to any experience of the physical world and are already well understood by the observer-subject, likewise a priori. The observer-subject's understanding already inhabits and ranges implicitly through three dimensions of time prior to any determinate, empirically concrete experience of the world provided by empirical data carried by light signals and therefore also prior to any physical movement empirically observed in the world. The three temporal determinations of 'earlier', 'later' and 'now' situated in the three open temporal dimensions of past, future and present, respectively, enable physical movement as such to be understood at all. How so? Because if there were only the 'now' of the time of receipt of a light-signal, there would be no possibility of understanding motion as such at all; there would be only standstill, an instantaneous snap-shot. The observer-subject postulated by modern relativity physics as receiver of light signals of an event, 'located' in space-time at (x, y, z, t), does not situate this subject in the openness of three-

dimensional time in which, in particular, all physical movement must happen if it is to be understood *as such.* Rather, the three temporal dimensions that remain inconceivable *as such* for today's mathematized physics are squashed, truncated and aligned into the conventional, one-dimensional, linear time it has *also* been ever since the Greeks, which makes it amenable to easy mathematization. As already noted, the deep antinomy in the conception of time is already virulent in Greek thinking.

The spatialization of time via motion is the case especially with Einsteinian relativity theory, both special and general, in which the speed of light (i.e. of electromagnetic radiation) in a vacuum is an absolute constant, c, that will now provide a standard for measuring all other motions by comparison. The motion of light is the purest motion of all because it is the motion of massless photons, i.e. pure energy, and it is mass that sullies this pure motion and reduces the speed below c. Due to c's absolute constancy, the co-ordinate t in mathematically four-dimensional relativistic (Minkowski or Riemannian) space-time can be and is standardly spatialized as ct, that is, light travelling at constant speed c covers a certain distance that is always strictly proportional to the time interval taken. Light-distance and counted time are thus perfectly *covariant* as variables of motion. Time is thus 'nothing other than' a counter for distances covered by light; it could be *counted off* a certain standard motion, say, the path of light from the Moon to the Earth if this path were a constant distance which, unfortunately, it is not. Nor is this path yet regularly periodized to enable a counting-off. If, however, the distance is assumed to be a uniform 300,000 km, a radar signal travelling at the speed of light bounced off the Moon from the Earth would take approximately two seconds to return to the transmitter.

(In general, the *covariance* of clock-motion counting off time with any other movement, i.e. dynamical variable, of interest to the physicist allows the clock-motion counting off the real variable t to be replaced by any other covariant physical movement – such as, in the present context, light-distance covered – thus enabling the elimination of t from the equations of motion of a dynamic physical system. Physicists then claim they have eliminated time from physics, i.e. that they can do mathematized physics that is intent solely on *predicting* future configurations of dynamic systems 'without time',[3] and even conclude that 'time does not exist', whereas all they have achieved is the elimination of the most superficial conception of time, to wit, counted clock-time, which misses the phenomenon of temporality altogether. The so-called 'evolution' of dynamical systems, whether they be classical, special relativistic, general relativistic, quantum or quantum-gravitation-

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3 Cf. Rovelli and Vidotto (2021) Chapter 2 *Physics without Time.*

al, can be predicted by *relations* between covariant variables rather than employing "the time variable [as] independent evolution variable" (Rovelli and Vidotto 2021 2.4.1 p. 51).)

To achieve better accuracy, conceive instead a *light-clock* whose regular ticks count the reflection round-trip motion of light shot from a photon gun ping-ponging back and forth through a vacuum between the photon gun source and a mirror at a fixed distance of exactly half a kilometre. Each time the photon-light signal completes its round trip, the clock ticks once. Or conceive a light-clock whose ticks count a photon circling a circle with a circumference of exactly one kilometre in a vacuum and passing a chosen counting-point on the circle with absolute regularity. For such a light-clock, a time unit corresponds in conventional units roughly to one three-hundred-thousandth of a second, assuming a constant speed of light of about 300,000 km/s (or exactly 299,792,458 m/s by definition, to give one 299792458th of a second). Conversely – and this is the crucial step for overturning the topsy-turvy traditional conception of time as being itself a counter of motion —, a second can be defined as approximately 300,000 units of *light-kilometres* (or exactly 299,792,458 light-metres), a measure of *light-motion.* 1 sec. := 1 light-kilometre. Rather than distances being measured in light-years, for which time is taken as the underlying independent variable, *time itself is now measured in units of distance covered by light in a given uniform, periodic motion* (which is what the replacement of the variable t by ct in four-dimensional space-time amounts to; see below).

The speed v of any physical body is then expressed in units of the ratio of kilometres covered to light-kilometres, or simply as a proportion of c, a universal physical constant speed and the maximum (massless) speed for purely energetic motion. Hence the speed v of any moving massive body is always less than c. Variations in speed are then nothing other than variations in proportions of c, the absolute speed. The dimensional units of the vector **v(p)** considered above are therefore a proportion of c in a certain spatial direction. The absolute, standard motion of light taken as a counting measure for time intervals has to be periodized with a starting-point and an end-point that is repeated over and over again, as in the light-clock described above in two versions, whose unit is the light-kilometre, a motion of pure, massless light. The units of c are then *kilometres per light-kilometre*, and c's own magnitude as a speed is always 1. The units of magnitude of the vector **v(p)** (i.e. speed) thus become likewise kilometres per light-kilometre as a proportion of c with the vector character specifying a certain direction, i.e. the speed of any moving physical entity is always a comparison with the absolute speed of light in a vacuum, c, the *universe's postulated absolute top speed* at which all mass has become purely energetic motion. In turn, d**p**/**v(p)** has the dimensions light-kilometres (km divided by km/l-km). Integrating d**p**/**v(p)** along the path taken by a physical body will give a time interval that is no longer anything

that can be described as 'time taken' or 'time passed', but rather is measured in light-kilometres of an absolutely uniform periodic motion, namely, that of light itself in a constructed light-clock.

In Newtonian physics as well as relativity theory, time is conceived as a continuous mathematical real variable t that merely counts off discrete units of time, such as days, hours and seconds, taken as units in themselves rather than as multiples or proportions of a standard motion such as one revolution of the Earth about the Sun, the so-called ephemeris year. Time has to be conceived as continuous and differentiable for the sake of differentiation and integration, the two indispensable standard operations in the infinitesimal calculus for predictively calculating any kind of (loco)motion. Such need for infinitesimal calculability introduces into the conception of time a latent contradiction between its *discrete* and *continuous* nature.[4] Time in both physical theories remains therefore *clock-time* in which the clock is merely the discrete counter for a uniform, standard periodic motion, with one tick of the clock counting off one period of such regular motion without, however, the distance covered by such standard motion ever having been taken as the unit of time.

4.5 Absoluteness of Newtonian time abandoned in favour of absoluteness of light-motion in Einsteinian relativity

Since in both special and general relativity theory, the time variable ct is tied mathematically to the three spatial variables x, y, z, by the Lorentz transformation or a four-dimensional Riemann tensor for the same variables, respectively, this determines the mathematically formulated geometry of the space-time as shaped by gravity in which physical entities of any kind move. The postulated self-contained absoluteness of time, t, in Newtonian mechanics (even though it is conceived merely as a tick-counter) allows it to remain an independent variable in the equations of motion, independent, that is, from the three spatial co-ordinates as a ticking variable in itself (an sich). Time is assumed to be somehow the regular, *ubiquitous* (hence spatially independent), synchronized ticking 'heart' of the universe itself that Newton called the "sensorium Dei" (cited by Rindler 2006 p. 5), the seat of God's common sense through which He feels the Universe.

Relativity theory amounts to abandoning the *absoluteness* of time in favour of its surrender to its *relativity* to space, or rather, to spatial position *and* the recep-

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4 Cf. my 'Continuum and Time: Weyl after Heidegger' in *A Question of Time* (2015b) and 'Digital Being, the Real Continuum, the Rational and the Irrational' arte-fact.org (2010).

tion, by an observer-subject with a clock, of light signals from spatial positions to determine physical events in a four-dimensional space-time in which now events, and not merely positions, are specified using four co-ordinate variables (x, y, z, ct). Time thus becomes relative to the observer-subject. In special relativity, this dependence of time on space is expressed neatly by the Lorentz transformation that captures that the light-distances covered at absolutely constant speed c, which are 'nothing other than' measures of time passed (especially for an observer-subject to receive objective event-signals), depend upon the assumed uniform speeds of the inertial frames of reference in which light-signals from events in four-dimensional space-time are received. (Relative, subjective) time counted in different inertial frames by observer-subjects therefore differs! That is, time intervals counted on the observer-subject's clock in one uniformly moving inertial frame are uniformly compressed or dilated compared to the time intervals counted by a clock in another uniformly moving inertial frame. The motion of light in a vacuum is postulated by Einsteinian relativity theory to be, paradoxically, an *absolute*, whereas its reception by an observer-subject is *relative.* Consequently, its speed, in particular, is also an absolute constant, c. The absolute motion of light in a vacuum replaces the absoluteness of time in Newtonian physics, rendering time itself subjectivized, and spatialized as the path of light (hence the Lorentz transformation and the Riemannian tensor linking space with time). This spatialized, relativistic time based on the absolute motion of light may be termed light-time.

Since the Michelson-Morley experiment in 1887, modern physics is satisfied that it has experimentally established that the motion of light is indeed an absolute, albeit that there is nowhere in the universe that can be said to be a perfect vacuum. The absoluteness of light's motion is rather a consequence of a postulate or axiom, i. e. a conception of pure, massless motion in which all potential mass-energy has been converted into actual, pure energy, that is, into pure motion. This situation corresponds to that of the law of inertia in Galilean-Newtonian mechanics itself being an experimentally unverifiable postulate, since there is no possibility of scientifically observing any motion at all that is perfectly free of the effect of external forces. In both cases the conception of perfection is circular (perfection means simply satisfaction of the postulated axiom) and beyond experiment, that is, beyond physical experience, since natural experience never fulfils the perfect conditions postulated by the axiom. The axiom itself is postulated for the sake of mathematical pre-calculability of motion. Be that as it may, accepting the postulate of light as the *absolute motion at constant speed* throughout the universe (at least once it has exceeded the assumed Planck dimensions of the Big Bang singularity where the scientific jury is still out because the equations of motion collapse into a singularity), the signal-paths travelled by the light from a physical event have different lengths and therefore can be employed to conceive different

times being registered on the ticking clock-counters in the different inertial frames ('flat' local inertial frames in general relativity) when these light-signals are received as data by observer-subjects equipped with their receiving apparatuses, including huge, sophisticated telescopes designed to receive a certain spectrum of wave-lengths.

4.6 Motion in relativistic curved space-time

The absoluteness of the motion of light carries over to general relativity in which this motion is no longer in a straight line, but curved, which amounts to light *accelerating* due to a change of direction, not of speed. The force invoked to account for this change of direction is *gravity* that is able to bend the path taken by light from a supposed inertial straightness. This, however, is equivalent to conceiving the space-time through which the light travels to be itself curved by the gravitational field, which in turn alters the mathematical geometry of the space-time. It is no longer conceivable as flat Euclidian space, nor merely as a four-dimensional (Minkowski) space-time in which straight light paths in one inertial frame are either compressed or dilated compared to another inertial frame, but as a curved (Riemannian) four-dimensional space-time in which the curvature is determined mathematically by the *metric*, i.e. by the way in which distances are measured in this space-time. Light and free bodies then move along the geodesics of this curved Riemannian space-time. The metric in such a space-time is no longer the simple Euclidian-Pythagorean metric defined as (the square root of) the sum of the squares of the three spatial co-ordinates nor only slightly modified by a Lorentz compression or dilation factor. The metric is instead determined by the Riemann tensor that mathematically captures the space-time's curvature. It can be very complicated, intertwining as it does all the spatial and time co-ordinates with one another in a 4 x 4 matrix.

Frequently, however, a physical situation (usually of cosmological motion) can be modelled mathematically by a nicely symmetric space-time metric in which the time-co-ordinate can be separated out from the three spatial co-ordinates so that there are no space-time cross-terms in the Riemann tensor. This is expressed mathematically by the Riemann tensor for the space-time reducing to a four-dimensional *diagonal* matrix in which the only non-zero entries are along the matrix's diagonal. This enables, in particular, the light-distance of time to be expressed in purely spatial terms, as already discussed above. An example is the Schwarzschild metric that was eventually used to theorize the physical character of black holes. It is a metric suitable for considering a spherically symmetrical universe centred upon

a mass radially expanding into a vacuum. The assumed symmetry renders the Riemann tensor diagonal and thus (fairly) easy to handle mathematically.

Distances in space-times measured by diagonal metrics are given in the metric first of all as the square of small (infinitesimal) incremental distances that are expressed as the sum of the squares of infinitesimal light-distances (time) and infinitesimal distances in the three spatial co-ordinates that may be taken in a Euclidian fashion on a rectilinear grid, or as spherical co-ordinates on a sphere, or as cylindrical co-ordinates, or some other way. The metric is defined such that it must measure zero for the path of light, i. e. for spatialized time, so that the square of time (light-distance) is expressible as the sum of the squares of purely spatial terms. In such a space-time, light travels along a *geodesic* of constant measure zero in the assumed metric and this path, measured by integrating the metric along a zero-geodesic, determines how long it takes (that is, the light-distance it takes) for an observer-subject in a given local inertial frame to receive an objective signal from a given physical event at the speed of light (assuming that the light travels through a vacuum). A massive particle cannot attain the speed of light simply due to its mass that embodies potential energy instead of being converted into the pure massless motion of light and the assumed law of conservation of energy, as expressed in Einstein's most famous equation, $E = mc^2$. The mathematical geodesic in a curved metricized space-time models the motion of *free fall*, which is the shortest path for a physical body moving through a given mathematico-geometrical space modelling a portion of the universe.

4.7 Perplexities of quantum-mechanical movement

The brief treatment of general relativity theory in the previous section obliges me to say something also about that other theory, namely quantum dynamics, that has presented apparently insurmountable problems for its unification with the former. If the curvature of space-time is deeply paradoxical for the mind, then the indeterminacy of quantum motion is no less so. The obstacles to unification in a so-called quantum-gravity theory are related to the fundamental question concerning time, namely, whether it is a phenomenon that reveals itself to the scientific thinking of physics in anything but a distorted way.

The advent of quantum mechanics as the successor to classical Newtonian-Galilean mechanics through the work of famous physicists such as Einstein, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Dirac, Born and Bohr has been hailed by many physicists as an exquisite testament to the power of the human mind to unravel the mysteries of nature. It also gives rise to perplexing paradoxes. To quote just one of these enthusiastic quantum physicists, "Quantum mechanics is the greatest, the most pro-

found of revolutions in our modern view of the physical world. Even for experts, achieving a deep conceptual understanding of quantum mechanics can be an elusive goal."[5] Wherein lies the deeply paradoxical and downright confusing nature of quantum physics expressed in figures of thought such as quantum indeterminacy and the dual nature of quantum entities as both particle and wave? Are they ultimately paradoxes of the mathematized mind's own making? The matter calls for further investigation and has been dealt with in some depth in the Appendix 'A demathematizing phenomenological interpretation of quantum-mechanical indeterminacy' of my *Movement and Time in the Cyberworld.* Therefore I will not repeat this investigation here, but return instead to consider more generally the character of physics itself as a mathematized science.

4.8 Mathematico-empiricist modelling in physics

Throughout modern physics, starting with Galileo and Kepler, the phenomenon of time has been mathematized in such a way as to enable the predictive calculation of physical motions. To this end, the absolute time t of Newtonian physics has had to give way to a relativization in Einsteinian relativity as a light-path-distance, ct, but in both hermeneutic casts of time it remains necessarily a real, linear, continuous, differentiable variable in all the equations. For any physicist the reason for this is self-evident and is expressed by one highly regarded physicist when discussing the necessary features of a suitable general relativity theory thus:

> Evidently, for the theory to be useful, it should predict the orbits in the field of a given mass distribution. (Rindler 2006 p. 178)

The *unbridled and thus absolute, totalizing will to power over movement* of all kinds (including, say, even the existential movement of love) – in this case, the will to predictive power over celestial motion – is here in play as an unquestionable preconception for all physics. The will is directed toward physical motion, tracking it and supposing it to be smoothly continuous, from which a smoothly continuous time is somehow discretely counted off. It is the will to power that dictates the mathematized mode of access to nature as expressed implicitly by Galileo Galilei already in 1623 in his *Il Saggiatore:*

> La filosofia [della natura] è scritta in questo grandissimo libro che continuamente ci sta aperto dinanzi a gli occhi (io dico l'universo), ma non si può intendere se prima non s'impara a

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5 Bowman E. (2008) p. 172.

intender la lingua, e conoscere i caratteri ne' quali è scritto. Egli è scritto in lingua matematica, e i caratteri son triangoli, cerchi, ed altre figure geometriche, senza i quali mezi [sic] è impossibile a intenderne umanamente parola; senza questi è un aggirarsi vanamente per un oscuro laberinto. (Galileo Galilei *Il Saggiatore* (1623) in *Opere* Vol. VI, p. 232.)

The philosophy [of nature] is written in this grand book that is continually open before our eyes (I say the universe), but it cannot be understood unless one first learns to understand the language, and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in mathematical language, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other geometric figures, without which means it is impossible to humanly understand a word; without these it is a vain wandering through a dark labyrinth. (Galileo Galilei *The Assayer* translated by Stillman Drake, modified p. 4)

From the outset the criterion for assessing the access to the book of nature is taken as a matter of course to be whether predictive laws of motion can be discovered that simultaneously provide the *criterion of truth*, namely, *calculative effectivity* that then translates into pragmatic technological effectiveness. One could even view this criterion of truth as the modified extension of that of Gorgias, a famous teacher of rhetoric in ancient Athens, who praised his art for its power to persuade and thus exert power over others to do the orator's bidding. The criterion of truth is then no longer the correctness of a proposition or alignment of the intellect with the 'object', i. e. adaequatio intellectus ad rem. The criterion is not derived from empirical observation but is an *a priori postulate* dictating what kind of knowing is required, namely, predictive, calculative foreknowing. The general relativity theorist, Rindler, unembarrassedly displays his 'effective', empiricist way of thinking:

A physical theory, in fact, is a man-made amalgam of concepts, definitions, and laws, constituting a mathematical *model* for a certain part of nature. It asserts not so much what nature *is*, but rather what it is *like*. Agreement with experiment is the most obvious requirement for the usefulness of such a theory. However, no amount of experimental agreement can ever 'prove' a theory, partly because no experiment (unless it involves counting only) can ever be infinitely accurate, and partly because we can evidently not test all relevant instances. (Rindler 2006 p. 33 italics in the original)

A mathematical model does not have to be true to the phenomena themselves; it just has to model them effectively. It has to be useful in correctly predicting the results of experiments thought up to test the model that subsequently can be put to use elsewhere. Whether the truth of the phenomena of time and movement themselves have been truly grasped is irrelevant; all that counts is the measurable correctness within acceptable margins of experimental error of mathematically calculated predictions based on the relevant model. As an important example, Rindler discusses in detail

> how Einstein's proposed geodesic law of motion for free particles in a gravitational field finds
> its first *quantitative* support by leading to approximately the same orbits as Newton's theory
> in 'classical' situations; that is, for slow test particles in weak static fields. (Rindler 2006 p. 188
> italics in the original)

Note that physicists are compelled to seek the "*quantitative* support" that only
mathematics applied to empirical data can deliver. From this he concludes in *prag-
matist-empiricist* fashion:

> The present result illustrates well the 'man-made' character of physical theories. It is really
> remarkable how the same empirically known orbits can be 'explained' by two such utterly
> different models as Newton's universal gravitation and Einstein's curved spacetime. Nature
> exhibits neither potentials nor Lorentzian metrics. Yet both these human inventions lend
> themselves to a description of a large class of observed phenomena. And again, GR [general
> relativity] is one of the classic examples where a pure mathematician's flight of fancy (Rie-
> mann's n-dimensional geometry of 1854) later becomes the physicists' bread and butter—a
> process that has often been repeated. Mathematics is the theoretical physicists' hardware
> store where they can get the materials for their models. (Rindler 2006 p. 190)

This example can be taken as illustrating the accepted procedure in all of modern
physics with its brazen will to power, especially in advanced theoretical physics,
where mathematical models invented by mathematically gifted theoretical physi-
cists lead the way and are eventually tested long after by delivering experimental
data in conformity with the model's predictions. The mathematized theory can
even cast new, hitherto unimagined physical entities (essents) whose existence (es-
sencing) is then eventually empirically confirmed through their being useful to ex-
plain certain (especially sub-atomic, quantum or cosmological) motions. Such sci-
entific method in which theoretical fantasy eventually leads to experimentally
confirmed breakthroughs has enabled physics to gain the public's attention and
admiring astonishment via the mass media. It has been emulated by all the mod-
ern sciences, both natural and social, but mostly without the same degree of public
relations' success and the concomitant puffery of scientists' achievements. In par-
ticular, modifications to the method have to be made, including strict efficient cau-
sality having long since given way to accuracy within statistical margins of error,
right down to modelling various scenarios for outcomes (e.g. economic forecast-
ing) that are labelled with certain probabilities that are nothing more than guesses.

4.9 An historically fateful casting of time in the beginning

Enough has been said by now to see the antinomy inherent in insisting upon the
linear spatialization of time in relativity theory, but nevertheless continuing to em-

ploy it as a fundamental variable in the equations of motion, whatever they turn out to be (e.g. Einstein's field equations). How did we get here? The derivative status of time as counted off linearly from motion has been with us since the very inception of physics (cf. Aristotle). The motions from which time was counted off are those of the Sun, the Moon and the fixed stars for days, months and years, respectively. The Sun returns daily to the same place in the sky and follows a regular circular path in a regular motion that can be divided up into hours, minutes, seconds and beyond. The moon with its regular phases is also a periodic motion. Finally, the stars regularly and periodically display the same sequence of Zodiac signs marking the passage of the year's seasons, and come back annually to display the same constellations in the night sky. These regular, periodic, celestial motions can be taken as the basis for all kinds of clocks, starting perhaps with the sun-dial or the hour-glass, that count off time in convenient units.

Clocks (of all kinds, here including watches and other chronometers) are useful for co-ordinating the life-movements of everyday life such as meeting a friend in a certain place at a certain time or catching a train, laying down the deadline for the submission of applications, for logistical tasks along a supply line, etc. Clocks themselves embody only a regular periodic motion that is indicated by it (usually on the dial). It cannot be said that time itself is somehow located in the clock itself, no matter how proud modern physics is of the accuracy of today's timepieces. It is we who interpret the clock-time indicated *as* a now-time relative to both an earlier and later time that we also have to 'see', not physically, but mentally in the open three dimensions of time. Our originary relationship with time is three-dimensionally existential in nature, not mathematical or arithmetic: we may regret what happened in the past, or be fearful of or hopeful about future events, or excited about what is happening in the present, all without especially focusing on counted time. We understand the hands of a clock moving linearly in a circle over the dial 'all at once' in their earlier and later positions (e.g. half past or quarter to) as well as their present position on the dial. We can only see/understand the hands *as* moving because our mind always moves already within three-dimensional time and 'sees' trifocally. This trifocal mental presencing is our originary experience of *existential* time with respect to which all other conceptions of time are derivative. To speak of three-dimensional time today, however, remains an eccentricity, unscientific and apparently useless in practice, and it lies outside the orbit of millennia-old ways of thinking still maintained in today's most advanced physics, vitally concerned as it is with maintaining mastery over motion.

How we got here is a story of historical hermeneutic castings. Modern physics, even the most advanced theories of quantum-gravity, cannot provide the answer because they remain entangled in traditional conceptions of time. We only got here due to the way the ancient Greeks approached the phenomenon of time in

relation to the phenomena of physical movement. This can be seen and examined by studying Aristotle, who laid down the blueprint for all later conceptions of time that maintain their grip on all of today's scientific conceptions of time. Just as today's sciences are all mathematized and quantified to greater or lesser extents, depending upon how their respective subject matters lend themselves to mathematization and quantification – all the empirical data gathered by the empirical sciences have to be treated mathematically in some fashion to draw 'useful' results —, the approach to the phenomenon of time adopted by Aristotle is that of (spatial) geometrization and arithmetization. Already the first step in the of spatialization of time was irredeemably fateful.

The above-quoted, famous casting of time as the number counted off movement with respect to earlier and later is complemented by a geometrization of time as a continuous line that can be endlessly divided. Hence the phenomenon is subjected concurrently to two different mathematizations. And these differing mathematizations are not compatible with one another. The first (arithmetical) is clearly derivative of movement, more particularly, of (loco)motion, and results in a discrete, countable time, whereas the second (geometrical) conception of line is supposed to enable motion and movement to be conceived *as* happening *in* time, i.e. *as* embedded in the one continuous infinite time-line (e.g. ἐν ἑνὶ χρόνῳ *Phys.* VIII viii 262a2). This is plain when Aristotle speaks of motions coming to a *stop* (ἵστασθαι 264a20), of a mobile entity coming to *rest* (ἠρεμία 264a27), or of *interruptions* to motions when "something stops and starts moving again" (στῇ ἐπὶ τοῦ Β καὶ πάλιν φέρηται ἐπὶ τὸ Γ 262a28 f), in the final chapters of Book VIII of his *Physics.* For, if there is no movement or motion for a time interval such that the motion in question is interrupted, "there will be a time in the middle" (χρόνος ἄρα ἔσται ὁ ἐν μέσῳ 262b4) and, thus conceived, time is clearly no longer derivative of movement as something counted off it, but rather 'flows' on endlessly even when void of anything that moves.

Again: how did we get here? With regard to an important question that Aristotle raises at the beginning of *On the Heavens* and treats in detail over three chapters, starting with geometric proofs, namely, whether the universe is infinite or not, he writes:

> ... καὶ τὸ μικρὸν παραβῆναι τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφισταμένοις γίγνεται πόρρω μυριοπλάσιον. ... τούτου δ" αἴτιον ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ δυνάμει μείζων ἢ μεγέθει, διόπερ το ἐν ἀρχῇ μικρὸν τελευτῇ γίνεται παμμέγεθες. Περὶ Οὐρανοῦ I v. 271b9 ff)

> ... even a small [initial] deviation from the truth becomes multiplied ten-thousandfold standing far off. ... The cause of this is that the beginning is potentially greater than its [present] size; therefore what is small in the beginning [becomes] in the end very great. (*On the Heavens* I v. 271b9 ff)

For Aristotle it is important to clarify the question concerning whether the universe is infinite or not because the answer has decisive implications for all that follows in his attempt to think through the nature of the heavens.

Aristotle's warning about a small mistake at the beginning leading to a grand deviation from the truth later on, applies mutatis mutandis to the truth of the phenomenon of time. It is Aristotle himself who makes this fateful 'mistake' in the question concerning the nature of time, not only for his own physics, but also for the entire Western history of physics as foundational science. And this is the case not only for Western science, but for our most elementary, everyday understanding of the world, because our shared conception of time as one-dimensionally linear distorts our very self-conception of who we are. Existentially, in the most elementary, we essence in the openness three-dimensional time without explicitly knowing it. Three-dimensional temporality, which I have interpreted from the start as the openness to which our very psyche with its imaginative mental capacity belongs, is not amenable to mathematization, and certainly not to a mathematization into any kinds of linear functions that are relatively easy to deal with when they occur in equations, especially equations of motion. The mathematizing of time for the sake of furthering the absolute will to power over movement has brought us historically to an impasse at which we cannot conceive the richness of time's phenomenality. Modern science has to content itself with *peering through the temporal peep-hole of the present moment onto the world*, through which it can gather in empirical sense data with which to construct and test its explanatory theoretical models.

If time is conceived as a linear flow of instants from the future through the present-now into the past, then what is past is simply past and cannot be altered. Only the future offers the possibility of change starting from how the world is at present. But the past is never cut and dried as what was, but, presencing as absent, remains malleable for our mind that moves constantly, fluidly among the three temporal dimensions. What we may cast as a future possibility plays into and plays out of how we interpret what has been, which is never past, due to its temporahermeneutic malleability. Moreover, how we interpret the present plays into how we conceive a possible future. To be sure, our mental movement through three-dimensional time is not a movement in linear succession at all but rather a coherent skipping back and forth. Only when tracking some movement or other in the world do we glue our mind (and perhaps our eyes) to following the movement in question, perhaps to see which horse wins the race at the race-track, or when calculating the expected orbit of a planet. As essents of three-dimensional time, we flit temporally hither and thither among the three temporal dimensions, interpreting and reinterpreting essents that come to mind from what-

ever temporal dimension, thus interweaving them within the texture of our shared three-dimensionally temporal psyche.

5 Kant on the power of imagination

5.1 Kant's antinomy of pure reason

Kant's antinomy of pure reason is one kind of contradiction pertaining to the mind's limitations and their transgression. His *Critique of Pure Reason* rests crucially on critiquing reason's "hazarding out" (herauswagen) beyond the finite bounds of understanding (Verstand) that finds its anchor in what is given by sense-data in experiencing the finite, real world. In its essential dependence upon what is given by sensate experience, understanding is *relative* to the given and thus finite. Hegel's critique of Kantian philosophy aims at this relativity of knowledge by showing how reason (Vernunft) can indeed go beyond finite limits of experience to be emphatically infinite, absolute. This is the primary sense of the absolute in Hegel's thinking. In Kant's view by contrast, reason is inadmissibly infinite, indulging in fantasies (Hirngespinste, pipe dreams), whereas understanding keeps its feet on the ground, within the finite bounds of experience garnered via the bodily senses. Reason can only set up ideals that can become moral imperatives for practical reason, whereas the understanding of the transcendental ego, in synthesizing with sensuous intuition (sinnliche Anschauung) by way of pure understanding's categories, produces objective knowledge of the real world, i. e. of the world *as* a world of objects in their objectivity. Insofar, for Kant, experience of the world is possible only as experience of the *objects* of experience, i. e. only as objective experience (cf. KdrV A111, A158/B197).

Kant's antinomy of pure reason concerns four "conflicts" (Widerstreit KdrV A426/B454 ff) of the "transcendental ideas" (transzendentale Ideen A407/B434) about the world, thus "cosmological ideas" (kosmologische Ideen A408/B435) or "world concepts" (Weltbegriffe A408/B434) pertaining to "the absolute totality in the synthesis of appearances [...], on which the concept of the world-totality rests that itself is only an idea" (die absolute Totalität in der Synthesis der Erscheinungen [...] worauf auch der Begriff des Weltganzen beruht, der selbst nur eine Idee ist A407/B434). Kant lays out these four conflicts pairwise in four pairs of theses and antitheses in which he shows in each case that cogent arguments of reason can be made for both sides of the conflict and hence that the conflict is undecidable by reason. In all four conflicts, it is the transgressive infinitude or absoluteness of reason that induces this inconclusiveness.

For my purposes here it is sufficient to consider only the first part of the thesis of the first conflict among cosmological transcendental ideas, on time, which reads "the world has a beginning in time [...]" (Die Welt hat einen Anfang in der Zeit [...]

A426/B454) (the second part concerns space). Kant provides the following indirect proof of the first part of the thesis:

> Denn, man nehme an, die Welt habe der Zeit nach keinen Anfang: so ist bis zu jedem gegebenen Zeitpunkte eine Ewigkeit abgelaufen, und mithin eine unendliche Reihe aufeinander folgender Zustände der Dinge in der Welt verflossen. Nun besteht aber eben darin die Unendlichkeit einer Reihe, daß sie durch sukzessive Synthesis niemals vollendet sein kann. Also ist eine unendliche verflossene Weltreihe unmöglich, mithin ein Anfang der Welt eine notwendige Bedingung ihres Daseins; welches zuerst zu beweisen war. (A426/B454)

> For, assume that the world does not have any beginning in time: then, up to any given point in time an eternity has run out/elapsed, and hence an infinite series of successive states of things in the world has flowed/passed by. Now, however, the infinitude of a series consists precisely in its never being able to be completed by successive synthesis. Hence an infinite world-series having flowed/passed by is impossible and thus a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its existence; which was first to be proven.

This proof depends on asserting a contradiction between the infinitude of a series and its completeness, which purportedly amounts to its finitude which, in turn, depends on the finite completeness of an empirical givenness. It is questionable that an infinite series, such as the infinite series of natural numbers, cannot be regarded conceptually, i. e. in the mind, as complete, on which more below. The proof depends also on a conception of time as a one-dimensional, i. e. linear, succession of points from the future through the present instant into the past. This calls for a digression.

5.1.1 Time as "inner sense", space as "outer sense"

According to Kant, this one-dimensional time is "the inner sense by means of which the soul intuits/looks at itself or its inner state, [...] a certain form under which alone the intuition/looking-at of its inner state is possible" (der innere Sinn, vermittelst dessen das Gemüt sich selbst, oder seinen inneren Zustand anschaut [...]; eine bestimmte Form, unter der die Anschauung ihres inneren Zustandes allein möglich ist, [...] A22/B37). This purportedly "inner sense" is counterposed to the "outer sense", itself likewise a "property of our soul" (Eigenschaft unseres Gemüts A22/B37) and a pure intuition by means of which "objects" (Gegenstände) can be represented as "outside us" (außer uns) and "as a whole in space" (insgesamt im Raum). Kant asserts, "Time cannot be intuited/looked at externally, just as little as space can be as something within us." (Äußerlich kann die Zeit nicht angeschaut werden, so wenig wie der Raum, als etwas in uns. A23/B37) However, given that this a priori conception of space is what enables objects to be sit-

uated anywhere at all, how could it be that time could be somehow inside us and space outside? In other words, how can time and space themselves as pure intuitions be regarded as spatial, i.e. inner or outer, in any sense at all? And since the purportedly "outer sense" of space is supposed to be a "property of our soul", is it not itself, in the Kantian conception of subjectivity, somehow "within us"? In short, what is "inside" and "outside" supposed to mean at all in a pre-spatial sense? Kant merely assumes without examination that this inside/outside dichotomy is obvious.

The resort to identifying the outside with the sensuously given, thus conceiving the bodily senses as the lines of communication with a physical world outside, and pointing out that all that is physical is spatially extended in space would seem to give space itself credentials as the "outer sense". But any experience of an appearance of something sensuously given is also marked by a temporal datum which applies just as much to the physico-sensuously given as do spatial co-ordinates, i.e. a place, in three-dimensional space, thus rendering time itself as an outer sense. Conversely, representations of the sensuously given physical inside the soul are given a spatial place that is also represented without the sensuous presence of the thing represented. For instance, I am conscious of the coffee cup placed spatially in the kitchen even when I am sitting in my study and the cup is not accessible via my bodily sense organs (although it is entirely and unconcealedly present in my psyche now as spatially absent). This implies that the cup's spatial place is given by an "inner sense" just as much (or just as little) as its temporal positioning in the (non-sensuous) present is. It would seem that the distinction between an outer and an inner sense is a chimera derived from not considering the phenomena themselves closely enough. Thus the inside/outside dichotomy, with its inevitably spatial overtones, dissolves on closer inspection; it is a casualty of the subject/object split assumed by Kant as an obviousness, just as Descartes did, and just as scientific as well as everyday understanding continue to do today. One version of this is the dogma that there objectively 'exists' an external world entirely independent of internal subjective consciousness. As already noted, the subject/object split may be regarded as a wanton ignorance of Parmenides' deep wisdom as expressed in Fragment 3: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι which can be rendered variously as: "It is the same [for a phenomenon] to mean [such-and-such] as it is [for it] to be", "Do not separate thinking from being" or "Thinking and essencing belong inseparably together".

Kant proceeds with an attempt to demonstrate that both time and space are not attributes of things in themselves, but apply solely to the "form of intuition/looking-at" (Form der Anschauung A23/B37), and hence to "the subjective constitution of our soul" (der subjektiven Beschaffenheit unseres Gemüts A23/B38) for things given to the senses as appearances (Erscheinungen). Appearances, in

turn, appear in the soul precisely as subjective representations (Vorstellungen), which, according to Kant, are the closest that we humans can get to things in the world. The "form" in "form of intuition/looking-at" carries its traditional weight as a rendering of Plato's ideas (ἰδέαι) or Aristotelean εἶδος, both derived from the Greek verb for 'to see' ἰδεῖν and both signifying the 'look' or 'sight' (Anblick) something offers of itself as a phenomenon. Hence, time as a "certain form" enables the soul's manifold of representations of objects to be ordered in a succession (Nacheinander) or simultaneously (zugleich). Since these representations depend on what is given by the senses in a certain succession, there seems to be no reason to assert that this temporal ordering is inside the soul, whereas the spatial ordering of representations next to one another (neben einander) or adjacent is somehow outside the soul. Both the temporal and spatial ordering of the manifold of representations derived from given sense-data are – pace Kant— neither inside nor outside, but simply in the soul which is here, initially, simply the openness for receiving sense-data and ordering them according to the two a priori forms for looking at them.

5.2 Kant's antinomy of pure reason (continued)

To return to the conflicts of the transcendental cosmological ideas in the antinomy of pure reason: Kant sets up this quandary first of all by pronouncing that reason proceeds by "freeing itself from the unavoidable restrictions of a possible experience" (sich von den unvermeidlichen Einschränkungen einer möglichen Erfahrung, frei mache A409/B435). It achieves this by seeking, for any conditioned thing (Bedingtes), the "absolute totality" (absolute Totalität) on the side of the "conditions" (Bedingungen) to which "the understanding subjugates all appearances of the synthetic unity" (unter denen der Verstand alle Erscheinungen der synthetischen Einheit unterwirft A409/B436). It is this "absolute totality" that leads to the infinitude of the unconditional/absolute (das Unbedingte = das Absolute). Kant claims "that the transcendental ideas are really nothing other than categories expanded to the unconditional/absolute" (daß die transzendentalen Ideen eigentlich nichts sind, als bis zum Unbedingten erweiterte Kategorien A409/B436). This alleged character of the transcendental ideas is reinforced by Kant's setting up the "table of ideas" (Tafel der Ideen A411/B438) precisely corresponding to the "table of categories" (Tafel der Kategorien A411/B438) in which he now, surprisingly, includes "at first the two original quanta of all our intuition, time and space" (zuerst die zwei urspünglichen quanta aller unserer Anschauung, Zeit und Raum A411/B438).

This sudden pronouncement contradicts all that Kant says beforehand about the manifold of pure intuition requiring first of all the "power of imagination" (Einbildungskraft A79/B104) to synthesize and then, secondly, the understanding to give this pure synthesis unity under a concept. Both time and space are forms of pure (non-empirical) intuition that enable the manifold of representations given by sensuous experience to be ordered in a temporal sequence or simultaneity, on the one hand, and in a spatial adjacency, on the other. According to Kant himself, they are not categories, but provide the ordered sense-data to be further synthesized by the power of imagination and then unified under a concept from the categories.

Nevertheless, Kant presents his table of "four cosmological ideas" (vier kosmologische Ideen A415/B442) as four modes of "absolute completeness" (absolute Vollständigkeit A415/B443) of "appearances" (Erscheinungen) and hence as tied back to appearances given by experience: "At first it should be noted that the idea of absolute totality concerns the exposition of appearances" (Zuerst ist hierbei anzumerken, daß die Idee der absoluten Totalität nichts anders, als die Exposition der Erscheinungen betreffe A415/B442). With this assertion, however, he prevents reason already at the outset from overstepping the restrictions of understanding at all. (Albeit that there is an equivocation when he comes to actually considering the first conflict of transcendental ideas with respect to time by treating a "series of successive states of *things* in the world" (A426/B454), and not of appearances.)

Kant's treatment of cosmological ideas thus pertains (apparently, i.e. with some equivocation) solely to "the absolute totality in the synthesis of appearances" in the soul ordered according to the pure intuitive forms of time and space, i.e. things in the world are given within these two forms of pure intuition only as appearances in the soul (Gemüt, psyche) that derive from sensuous experience of the world. Kant distinguishes this "synthesis of appearances" from the "pure concept of understanding of a totality of things in general" (reinen Verstandesbegriff von einem Ganzen der Dinge überhaupt A416/B443). Such things in the world are only given *as* representations (Vorstellungen) once empirical sense-data have been received from the world in the *present for the soul*, whence they then pass into the past along with the flow of linear time itself. This implies that things in the past are only given as representations in a temporal past after they have already passed through the sensuous present of the soul into the past.

Kant's subjective idealism is hence not merely subjective with an interiorized subjectivity in which all appearances must be represented, but also tied to the *sensuous present* in which a nexus with the world is at all possible. Hence the world itself is given initially only in the present within subjectivity as a totality of representations of objects that passes in each moment into the past that is occupied by representations that, in the sequence of linear time, *once* were present and now,

later, are past. The soul, in turn, gains its unity in the *apperception* of the transcendental ego that accompanies all the soul's representations, taking them into itself as a standing ego and unifying them. Hence the world is such only for a transcendental ego which, since it is a human transcendental ego, is presumably mortal, finite if it is not merely a theoretical construct. The things in the world and the world itself are given empirically, initially in the present, as representations to the ego, only as long as it is living in its present and past, and this life is finite, i.e. has a beginning and an end. Conceived this way, the world begins with the transcendental ego's birth and ends with its death.

One can easily object that Kant's transcendental ego is not the empirical, individual human being experiencing its subjective connection with the world via its senses in the present, but then it has to be asked: who (or rather: what) is this transcendental ego that, according to Kant, is irretrievably tied to empirical sensuous data being given to it in the present for it to be in the world at all? The bedrock of Kant's subjective idealism is his unbending insistence on the givenness of sensuous experience to the human subject as the indispensable anchor and touchstone for grounding understanding of the world, hence not merely the logical cogency of understanding free of contradiction, but understanding's transcendental synthesis, via the power of imagination, with the pure intuitions of space and time as forms to ground it in empirical, sensuous experience of appearances. The transcendental ego's pure understanding construes objectivity in such a way that it transcends its interiority to climb over, (Latin: trans-scendere), to the outer world to render the empirically given appearances *as* objects. Insofar the transcendental ego must be empirically immersed, via the senses, in the world for it to know about it, i.e. to work up appearances into *objective* knowledge.

Does Kant pass surreptitiously from an individual subject to some kind of collective human subject in general in speaking continually of "us" and "in us", etc., thus attempting to elude the inevitable finiteness of the world as identical with the finiteness of an individual, mortal human's life? This would seem to be the case when he remarks in connection with "the empirical regress" (der empirische Regressus A521/B549) from something conditioned back along the chain of its conditions that this can happen "through one's own experience or the thread of history or the chain of effects and their causes" (durch eigene Erfahrung, oder den Leitfaden der Geschichte, oder die Kette der Wirkungen und ihrer Ursachen A522/B550), but always on the basis of given empirical appearances. If this were so, then the world could have only begun with the empirical, evolutionary emergence of human beings (assuming that this is not merely a fantasy of reason) and could only exist as long as human beings live on Earth to receive empirical appearances. The world's past would then consist only of past, receptive, sensuous experiences made by human beings sensuously at some time in an instant that have passed

through the present. Time itself would be finite, since it is merely a form of the (individual or collective?) mortal soul's looking-at/intuiting the world from 'within' its subjectivity. Any other 'ideas' we humans might have about the world or time itself, including even those based on scientific theories of the cosmos that construct a past of the universe encompassing billions of years through causal explanation retrojected mathematically along the time-line, would have to be relegated to fantasy, i.e. to the unfounded vapours of the power of imagination (Einbildungskraft) or reason, because the empirical facts gathered in the present on which such scientific theories rely as evidence depend on their interpretation *as* facts of a long gone past in which there were no humans at all to experience them in a present in which they were given in representations. (Note that for Kant time is absolute, and not conceived spatialized as the path of light received as a signal by an observer-subject.)

Alternatively, the chain of empirical experience linking the transcendental ego across generations could be some kind of narrative tradition, so that a transcendental ego living now would at least have second-hand evidence of appearances of things received by human beings in the past. This trans-generational chain would lose itself in the mists of past linear time, thus becoming questionable as empirical evidence and turning into mere myth. This line of thinking is provoked by Kant's leaving open the question of I or we in relation to the transcendental ego, since he speaks interchangeably in the first person singular or plural. This seems to indicate a lack of care in thought.

The upshot of considering Kant's anchor for the existence (Dasein, i.e. presencing) of things in the world *as* subjective appearances is that "the absolute totality in the synthesis of appearances [...], on which the concept of the world-totality rests" (A407/B434) is only ever finite. Hence, "the world has a beginning in time" (A426/B454), viz. an empirically subjective beginning, since time itself is a pure intuition of finite, mortal subjectivity, i.e. a form of intuition for ordering representations in the soul (Gemüt, psyche) given by the senses. Moreover, when Kant argues against an "empty time" (leere Zeit A427/B455) in which there was nothing (in the antithesis of the first conflict of transcendental reason), this emptiness is unproblematic insofar as time itself is an empty form of intuition that is receptive to sense data whether they are given or not. In this sense, the first conflict of cosmological ideas is decidable already on the basis of finite understanding, and reason that exceeds understanding (for Kant has clipped its wings already from the start) has no task to fulfil regarding this cosmological idea. It can't get off the ground. Due to the finite nature of subjective time itself as a form of intuition for ordering empirically received appearances in a succession, it makes no sense to speak of an infinite time of reason with which Kant's first conflict of reason grapples, and Kant's setting up this conflict results from his own inconsistency in positing an em-

pirically based conception of linear time as pure intuition that of its own nature is finite, but then passing to a consideration of an infinite linear time without an empirically finite anchoring. The conflict becomes thus trivial, a mere adamant insistence on the finitude of subjective experience that reins in and prevents the power of imagination at the outset of its flight into infinitude.

Kant indeed later resolves the first conflict of the transcendental ideas (A517 ff/ B545 ff) by resorting to an "indefinitely continued regress" (unbestimmbar forgesetzter Regressus A518/B546) of experience, whereby he speaks of the "conditions" (Bedingungen A518/B546) preceding a "given perception" (gegebene Wahrnehmung A518/B546), thus presupposing that all appearances are conditioned (bedingt) and therefore require their conditions (Bedingungen) to be synthesized in a totality without, however, assuming the unconditional absolute as a given, simply because it cannot be given in experience. The indefinite regress is provoked in the first place by conceiving the appearances to be necessarily conditioned by conditions preceding in linear time. Such an indefinite regress, according to Kant, can never result in a "definite concept" (einen bestimmten Begriff A523/B551), but only continues on into an "indefinite expanse" (unbestimmte Weite A523/B551). Would a corollary of this line of reasoning be that the natural numbers are not a "definite concept" because their infinite totality relies on an indefinite progress of counting?

To return to the first part of the thesis of the first conflict of transcendental ideas and its proof, it must be asked why it is that a "series of successive states of things in the world", i.e. a *movement* or *change* in the world itself, whether it be infinite or finite, must be conceived *as* a series of conditions conditioning something conditioned at one end of the series and given in the present? Can there be unconditioned change purely by accident? Although the first conflict is supposed to be mathematical rather than dynamic, and thus not concern movement or causality, the conditions for the conditioned in this first conflict of reason seem very much like causes effecting an effect. The appearances ordered in the succession of one-dimensional time are therefore linked via condition/conditioned, as if it were out of the question that an unconditioned series of successive states of things in the world – and above all, for *whom* – be pondered. Is it movement in the physical world or movement of the *mind* itself in shifting its focus that requires thoughtful attention here?

The conditional linking of successive events in the world and understanding's fixation thereon would seem to have to do with the very conception of time as the pure intuition of a linear, i.e. one-dimensional, succession of nows in receptive readiness to receive sense-data from the experiential world, which for Kant is only a world of appearances. The two go hand in hand. The categories of understanding are not to free themselves into the transcendence of infinite, pure reason,

but, according to Kant, must remain synthesized via the power of imagination with the pure intuition of time to remain 'down to Earth', interrogating nature to divulge its laws. Hence Kant's attempt to sensualize the categories of pure understanding in their pure temporal schemata. If, however, the power of imagination turns out to be genuinely three-dimensional (as attempted on the present path of thinking from the start), rather than sequential, linear time, then reason, or rather, the mind, is free to move, i. e. shift its focus, in imagination without the shackles of empirical givenness, without the fixation on a linear continuity of a synthesized manifold of representations, and employing other pure, i. e. ontological, concepts than those traditional ones tabulated by Kant in his table of categories. These categories are fashioned with an eye to their synthesis in *continuous linear time*, as demonstrated by the sensualizing schematism of the pure categories of understanding as well as the power of imagination's time-related synthesis in the apprehension (of present appearances), reproduction (of past appearances) and recognition (of future appearances) by the transcendental ego. These latter three syntheses deal only with a small linear time-interval enclosing the present (amenable to the infinitesimal calculus) and thus remain compatible with the traditional conception of linear time, with the mind's understanding being focused on tracking physical movement of objects in the physical world. How this traditional conception can be radicalized has already been demonstrated in earlier chapters.

With regard to the first conflict of transcendental ideas in the antinomy of reason involving time, at least, it can be said that Kant avoids allowing it to come to an *opposition* in which the empirical finitude of understanding would genuinely trigger a contradiction between the claims of infinite, absolute reason and the finite, relative limits of the sensuously given. He achieves this simply by restricting consideration to the totality of appearances that have to be given sensuously to finite, moral consciousness, in any case. The underlying contradiction is avoided by postponing, or outsourcing, the infinitude of reason to a separate part of Kant's system, viz. to the critique of practical reason, in which the ideas of infinite reason can at least have validity as regulative ideals and moral imperatives without providing any knowledge of the world.

I continue with the topic of the ontological and its truth in contradistinction to the ontic-factual and its correctness.

5.3 Taking leave from Kant: Recasting the ontological difference as temporalogical difference

The active or passive power of imagination (not to be confused with Kant's distinction between the productive and reproductive power of imagination) is not only

that which lets presence and absence (An- und Abwesenlassen) purely and simply, but lets presence and absence *as* such-and-such. The As is the idea or 'look' (εἶδος, Anblick) that things (essents), both physical and non-physical, present of themselves to the mind's understanding. For Kant, these As-looks are the a priori categories of pure understanding underlying and enabling objectivity prior to experience so that the objects of experience are experienced precisely *as* objects. The power of imagination thus synthesizes presencing and absencing with understanding in such a way that the mind sees ideas of objects with which it can play in such *ideality*. At first and for the most part, the mind is a play of ideas that is prior to any empirical interplay of real things in reality that is accessible to the senses. Without the play of ideas, the mind could not 'see', i.e. understand, reality at all, neither res in their physical reality nor their movement and change. To be visible to the mind's understanding, all somethings, whether physically real or mentally ideal, (i.e. for us: essents in general), must present themselves in their 'looks' *as* such-and-such. The ideal look of a being is its hidden ontological quality, vis-à-vis its merely surface ontic facticity, that requires explicit positing in its ontological 'look' to come to light, to be deconcealed in its truth. This difference between a being and its mental idea through which it presents itself *as* such-and-such in a *mode of being* is called the *ontological difference* that has assumed different casts throughout the ages since Plato and Aristotle. The meaning of being *itself*, rather than the beingness (οὐσία, Seiendheit) *of beings*, has been left unasked and undefined throughout the ages until the advent of Heidegger's question concerning the meaning of being, a question hitherto largely ignored or polemically repressed.

For instance, a living being presents itself in that mode of being called life; a human subject presents itself in that mode of being called subjectivity, and both these modes of being demand their explication, i.e. their discursive unfolding, which has been undertaken in the philosophical tradition, e.g. by Aristotle for the former and Kant for the latter. The As enabling such self-presentation is the *hermeneutic As* which interprets the phenomenal truth of beings/essents in their 'looks' in a given age. In Kantian subjective idealism, which is just *one* (albeit today still prevalent) hermeneutic casting of the ontological difference in the modern age, the looks beings present of themselves are those of objectivity of object based on the a priori categories of pure understanding. The looks human beings present of themselves in the present age are those of the subjectivity of subjects.

A delicate terminological problem now becomes apparent since, in the present inquiry, beings have already been hermeneutically recast in the light of a conception of three-dimensional time as *essents*, comprising *presents* presencing for and *absents* absencing from the focus of the psyche's mental faculty of understanding. *Essents essence in a temporal, verbal sense; the meaning of being itself has been ver-*

balized, temporalized. Insofar, to continue to speak of the ontological difference is, strictly speaking, obsolete, since *essencing* in three-dimensional time has come to the fore, thus superseding 'being' with temporal 'essencing' *as* such-and-such. Essents can be understood in their facticity, thus taking their temporal mode of essencing for granted, or more deeply in an *hermeneutic recasting* in their *temporal mode of essencing* that calls for and remains an open task for thinking in the present age. E. g. how is the essencing of human 'being' itself to be recast temporally, i. e. what is the human mode of essencing in three-dimensional time? How is the temporal essencing of different kinds of movement themselves to be reconceived once time is recast as three-dimensional?

Yet the pull of tradition is great, and entrenched habits of thought are heavy with inertia, so that it remains convenient and hardly avoidable to continue speaking of beings, being, ontology and the ontological difference, for which ontology is the logos of the being of beings, of τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν, i. e. of beings simply insofar as they are beings. The ontological difference becomes, strictly speaking, *the difference between essents and their respective mode of essencing in the openness of three-dimensional time*, but this difference could hardly be called the 'essential difference' for obvious reasons. Instead I propose that it be called the (hermeneutic) *temporalogical difference*, where the prefix 'tempora-' now refers not to one-dimensional, but rather to three-dimensional time.

5.4 Kantian power of imagination deconcealed as originary three-dimensional temporality by Heidegger's critique

For Kant the power of imagination (Einbildungskraft) is that power residing in the soul (Gemüt, ψυχή) that synthesizes the pure (i. e. a priori) *intuition* (Anschauung) of linear-sequential time with the pure understanding (Verstand) according to the rules of the categories, thus enabling appearances (Erscheinungen) given by empirical experience (Erfahrung) to show themselves *as* objects in their categorial interrelations. In this way, for Kant, the power of imagination is the source for *casting an ontological cast* solely of *physical* being as external *objectivity* from within the *subjectivity* of pure, transcendental apperception. It is by no means fortuitous that the categories of the understanding laid down by Kant in order to construct the objectivity of objects are tailor-made to fit perfectly with the objectivity assumed by modern physics – and then extended to all the modern sciences – to gain knowledgeable mastery over all kinds of movement. The objectivity of objects has to be set up outside, at some remove from the subjectivity of the subject's interiority, in order to construe an apparently objective impartiality conducive to quantification and mathematization.

In his multiple, detailed critical interpretations of Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* starting in the 1920s, Heidegger endeavours to show that the unifying, pure power of imagination turns out to be time itself, but a more originary, rudimentary three-dimensional time that has to be distinguished from the linear succession (Nacheinander) of nows (Jetztfolge) that Kant adopts uncritically from the philosophical tradition, starting with Aristotle. Kant interprets it to be the soul's pure, ostensibly inner intuition needed to temporally order a priori the manifold of appearances given by experience. This linear time of a succession of nows (Jetztfolge) is employed by Kant solely to demonstrate how the categories of understanding wielded by pure apperception transcendentally enable sensuous experience of the physical world *as* objectivity that is subject to natural laws. In particular, but not only, the crucial law of causality, without which mathematical physical science would not be possible, goes hand in glove with the linearity of one-dimensional time. Hence the ontological cast of objectivity itself is wedded indissolubly to one-dimensional, mathematizable time.

The more originary time that Heidegger counterposes to one-dimensional sequential time is that of existential temporality (Zeitlichkeit), whose fundamental structure he presents in *Sein und Zeit*, but also in his lectures in WS 1925/1926 (GA21)[1] and 1927/1928 (GA25), i.e. shortly before and shortly after the publication of *Sein und Zeit* in 1927, explicitly in a confrontation with Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason.* In this confrontation Heidegger concentrates on the power of imagination's pivotal role in enabling experience: the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction and recognition (i.e. rudimentary three-dimensional time), as well as the synthesis of the schematism of the categories that temporalizes them in the pure sensuous intuition of one-dimensional time, thus implicitly intimating that categorial understanding itself (i.e. logic) is, in a certain way, itself one-dimensional. Heidegger shows that the synthesizing role of the pure power of imagination in producing an image (Bild) mediating between pure intuition and pure categorial understanding has prominence in Edition A, whereas it is curtailed in Edition B in favour of the traditional predominance of logical understanding over imagination.

Kant's treatment of the apprehension of representations achieved by intuition, the reproduction and association thereof performed by the power of imagination and the recognition or rather, as Heidegger reinterprets it phenomenologically, the identifying *precognition,* of associated representations performed by understanding by bringing them under the rules of concepts and, ultimately, the laws provided by the categories, does indeed contain the germ of a conception of time that ex-

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[1] On which Heidegger's *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* GA03 is largely based.

ceeds what Kant posits simply as the pure intuition of an "inner sense" that a priori orders representations sequentially. *Apprehension, reproduction and precognition* correspond respectively to the *present, past and future* which now no longer are conceived merely as segments of successive, identical nows, but each with its own characteristic structure as a genuinely independent dimension, i.e. as a distinct horizon against which representations *come to stand.* All three are held together, and thus 'synthesized', by the apperception of the transcendental ego as the unifying instance of consciousness that takes them in and binds them together under conceptual rules, thus bringing the representations to stand against their respective temporal horizons in a unified continuity so that the sensuous appearances from the ostensibly outside world of nature come to stand precisely as Gegen-Stände, i.e. as objects standing vis-à-vis transcendental self-consciousness.

The power of imagination thus has a pivotal, mediating role in gathering the manifold of appearances and bringing them to stand against their respective temporal horizons in a unified way amenable to understanding's applying the rules of its categories to them. Kant endeavours to show this in the "Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding" (A95ff) and in the schemata (A137/B176ff) that bring the pure categories of understanding into sensuous images of pure intuition in linear time, albeit that the power of imagination itself is operating against the horizon of three different dimensions of unified originary time. On this phenomenological interpretation, the transcendental apperception (or taking-into-itself of representations) undertaken by self-consciousness is no longer the ego of understanding, but (implicitly) primarily the *imaginative ego* within the psyche (Kant's Gemüt).

The power of imagination's vital role for Kant, at least in Edition A, consists in the circumstance that "both extreme ends, namely sensuousness and understanding, necessarily must be connected by means of this transcendental function of the power of imagination" (Beide äußerste Enden, nämlich Sinnlichkeit und Verstand, müssen vermittelst dieser transzendentalen Funktion der Einbildungskraft notwendig zusammenhängen A124). This connection enables the knowledge of natural objects *as* objects insofar as they are given to the senses in appearances. Objects themselves in their objectivity are constructs "in us" (in uns A129, A130), for it is only by virtue of the understanding's applying the conceptual rules of its categories to appearances that objects come to stand at all *as* objects, *as* Gegen-Stände. And this objective knowledge "in us" of the ostensibly 'outside' natural world is all that concerns Kant in his deduction of the pure concepts of understanding: bridge-building between sensuous appearances and object-concepts that provide objective knowledge. "Thus we ourselves bring the order and regularity into the appearances we call nature, and we would not be able to find order and regularity in them if we, or the nature of our psyche, had not originally laid such order and

regularity in them." (Die Ordnung und Regelmäßigkeit also an den Erscheinungen, die wir Natur nennen, bringen wir selbst hinein, und würden sie auch nicht darin finden können, hätten wir sie nicht, oder die Natur unseres Gemüts ursprünglich hineingelegt. A125). Nature itself is thus compelled to present itself to our psyche in a way that conforms with the categories of understanding, namely, objectively. This makes the objectivity of objects within subjectivity the ontological cast of the natural-scientific age.

5.5 Kant's subjective objectivity further considered

Knowledge of the natural world for Kant is objective knowledge by virtue of the appearances appearing to the psyche coming to stand as Gegen-Stände, i.e. as objects, vis-à-vis the transcendental ego (self-consciousness). The categories themselves play the key role in bringing the empirically given appearances to a stand. Appearances must be given sensuously to the subject's psyche as intuitions, i.e. by the psyche's intuiting, or simply looking-at, appearances, which it can only do within the two forms of intuition, namely, three-dimensional space and one-dimensional time, so that they are spatially and temporally ordered. The intuition of space enables sensuous empirical appearances, i.e. the sense data, to be placed somewhere, i.e. in some *where* that is either above or below, before or behind, right or left, that is, *adjacent to each other* (Nebeneinander) and spatially located with respect to the intuiting ego, whose body *within the form of spatial intuition* is spatially 'here' vis-à-vis a 'there' outside its body. The ego takes in these appearances within three-dimensional space given as a pure sensuous intuition (paradoxically enough) not requiring the bodily senses. According to the first principle of pure understanding[2] corresponding to the first kind of *quantitative* categories, "all appearances are as intuitions extensive magnitudes" (Alle Erscheinungen sind ihrer Anschauung nach extensive Größen. A162). Extension refers to space within which the appearances are placed some*where.* This extension itself can be measured according to some unit in three-dimensional space as length, breadth and depth. The appearance is thus brought to stand as a three-dimensionally extended, measurable magnitude located somewhere in space, and such a spatial, quantitatively extensive stand at some where, in some position, constitutes a

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2 On the principles of pure understanding cf. Heidegger *Die Frage nach dem Ding* pp. 145–189 (= FnD:145–189) (GA41 in the *Gesamtausgabe*): "Pure understanding as source and capability for rules" (Der reine Verstand als Quelle und als Vermögen der Regeln p.145); "The principles of pure understanding lay the ground for the objectivity of objects." (Die Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes legen den Grund für die Gegenständlichkeit der Gegenstände. p. 148), etc.

first categorial determination of its objectivity. Objects are therefore categorially compelled to be spatially somewhere in three-dimensional space and extended in a quantitatively specifiable way amenable to mathematical manipulation.

The connection between the intuiting subject and the empirically given appearance is mediated by the bodily senses. The appearance has a sensuous impact on the subject, it *affects* (affiziert) it sensuously in a *sensation* (Empfindung). The manifold of sensations constitutes the *material* nature of the physical appearance as *what* it is. Its whatness, however, for Kant following the older metaphysical tradition, is its *reality*, i. e. its thingliness as all that belongs to its concept (Begriff) of *what* it is, as distinct from its actuality (Wirklichkeit). The appearance makes itself felt as a sensation induced by some aspect of what the physical appearance is, be it a sensation of colour, sound, pressure, heat, etc., whereby each qualitative sensation can be itself measured as an *intensive magnitude in degrees.* Thus qualitative appearance, too, is reduced to quantity. The appearance in its manifold of sensations given to the subject can thus be made to stand as the reality of something conceived ontologically *as* a manifold of measurable objective intensities constituting its whatness, i. e. its reality *as what* it is. Each 'sensational' appearance is coerced to stand in the qualitative category as a degree of intensity, i. e. a magnitude, and bundled into what constitutes an object's whatness, that is, what it is with its measurable, mathematizable *properties.*

The categorial cast of quality serves as an *ontological trap* to catch the sensations and make them stand in the reality of what they are for this mathematized ontological cast of the natural world. Such sensations can only be given to the subject in the *present*, the *now,* so that the appearance's constitution *as* an objective, standing some*what* is tied first and foremost to the present, i. e. to the now in which sense-data are given to the subject. The present is therefore the primary temporal determination in this subjective-objective ontological cast. The second class of qualitative categories determines *what* something is, i. e. its reality or whatness as a bundle of qualities or properties whose intensities can be measured and thus mathematized.

The third principle of pure understanding corresponding to the categories of *relation* concerns the appearances given along the time-line of one-dimensional time. "All appearances include perdurability (substance) as the object itself, and what is changeable as its mere determination, i. e. as a way in which the object exists." (Alle Erscheinungen enthalten das Beharrliche (Substanz) als den Gegenstand selbst, und das Wandelbare, als dessen bloße Bestimmung, d.i. [als] eine Art, wie der Gegenstand existiert. A182) The one-dimensional temporal *perduration* (Beharrlichkeit) of an appearance is made to stand as the object's categorial *substance* which, on the other hand, is subject to *alteration* (Veränderung) over perduring linear time. An object as such must perdure in linear time, thus as a substance,

whose 'accidents' or attributes, however, may change over linear time, such change being an alteration on top of the underlying substance or *substrate.* The appearance must perdure to stand as, i. e. to *be*, a substantial object, although its attributes may alter. The relation to other substantial objects with their own attributes is regulated firstly by the category of *causality* in terms of cause and effect along the linear time axis, with the cause preceding the effect. Otherwise the appearances would appear scattered higgledy-piggledy in linear time without any underlying order of cause and effect linking them. In the *simultaneity* of linear time, however, the appearances are brought to stand, secondly, in a relation of reciprocity (Wechselwirkung) with each other in a relation of actio and passio.

It is not merely by accident that these three categories of *relation* among objects correspond to the three mathematized laws of (loco-)motion of physical bodies (a restricted kind of movement) according to Newton: i) the law of inertia of substantial, i. e. massive, bodies according to which, of themselves, they perdure unchanged in their motion through space, ii) the efficient-causal law between *substantial, massive* bodies according to which one massive body in motion can *force*, i. e. effectively cause, another to subsequently (nacheinander) change its motion (i. e. accelerate), and iii) the law of *reciprocity* according to which one body's force exerted on another is simultaneously (zugleich) reciprocated by an equal and opposite force from the other body according to its own substantive mass and change of motion (acceleration). (This Newtonian reciprocity of forces, in turn, is an ontological echo of Aristotelean δύναμις ποιητική and δύναμις παθητική or scholastic actio and passio.) In Newtonian mechanics, substance is thus mathematized as *mass* that is a definite, perduring quantity. The substance of physical things as objects is their *mass.* Their attributes as physical things in motion are exhausted in Newtonian mechanics by *momentum* which depends solely on mass and *velocity* that is nothing other than the directional rate of change of spatial position in three-dimensional space over one-dimensional linear time. Such momentum changes only when the physical object's velocity changes, i. e. the object *accelerates*, thus changing its direction and/or speed, under the effect of a *force* (derived from Aristotelean δύναμις) that is itself mathematized in a simple equation, namely, Newton's second law of motion.

Thus it is plain to see that Kant's third class of relational categories is bespoke tailored to providing the ontological grounding in objectivity for causal laws of movement and change, to start with, for simple Newtonian mechanical (loco-)motion, i. e. change of three-dimensional spatial position over one-dimensional time, but is extendable to cover all sorts of causally effected change in the attributes of substances, whereby the objectivity of objects consists precisely in perduring substance or substrate with its changeable attributes (or measurable properties) 'on top'. Such laws of movement govern the presencing of the attributes of substances.

The attributes, in turn, are the appearances received as sensations 'inside' which, in turn, are mathematized as the degree of intensity of such sensations sensed by the sense organs (with or without the aid of apparatuses) in the present. Kant's construction of the pure intuitions of space and time in tandem with the four kinds of categories of pure understanding is focused solely on the subject-object relation. The objectivity of objects is only possible by virtue of pure understanding's categories that compel empirical appearances received sensuously in the present to *stand* as Gegen-Stände, i.e. as objects, vis-à-vis self-consciousness according to the first three classes of categories: i) spatial extension, ii) sensational intensity constituting the object's reality and iii) causal relationality between substances with attributes.

The fourth class of modal categories (cf. FnD:183 ff) does not pertain to the reality of objects, i.e. to what belongs to their essential whatness, but to their existence, i.e. to their presencing in the *present. Possibility* is no longer conceived by Kant in the traditional metaphysical way as merely freedom from contradiction in thought, but as compatibility with the "formal conditions of experience" (formalen Bedingungen der Erfahrung A218/B265 f), i.e. as appearances' being compatible with their coming to a categorially regulated stand as extensive objects in space. Hence, for example, a physical body without extension is impossible because, to be an object at all, it must stand in the category of extension. *Actuality* (Wirklichkeit) of an object is compatibility with the "material conditions of experience" (materialen Bedingungen der Erfahrung) given by present sensation, i.e. with reality in Kant's sense. The received material sensations constituting what the object is, i.e. its whatness, show themselves, i.e. actually presence, only in the present as sense-data. Hence it is easy to confuse actuality (Wirklichkeit) with reality (Realität) in Kant's sense, the latter concerning only the object's concept (its whatness), not its presencing (its that-it-is). *Necessity* pertains to the necessary presencing of an object "whose connection with the actual is determined by general conditions of experience" (Dessen Zusammenhang mit dem Wirklichen nach allgemeinen Bedingungen der Erfahrung bestimmt ist,...A218/B266). When all the causal conditions of an object's actual presencing are fulfilled, it *must* show itself, i.e. it must presence in the present.

Throughout, the transcendental psyche's focus is concentrated on the sensuous, spatio-temporal presencing of appearances *as* objects standing vis-à-vis the self-conscious subject conceived as transcendental apperception that takes the appearances into itself (ap-perceives them) and makes them stand in the a priori categories of pure understanding. These a priori categories constitute an epochal ontological cast of objectivity compatible with and tailored to the thoroughgoing mathematization of the phenomena. In particular, both the pure forms of intuition must themselves be mathematizable as three-dimensional space and one-dimen-

sional time, with the latter's one-dimensionality being a necessary condition for the third class of categories, i.e. substance, causality and reciprocity, to make sense at all. The pure understanding of the mind within the transcendental subjective psyche is focused on the presencing of objects standing as objects in the present, including their causally changing properties/attributes, which likewise are given originally as sensuous data in the present to the recipient subject.

The power of imagination in this transcendental construction of objective knowledge of the physical world of nature is limited to mediating the appearances sensuously given within the formal intuitions of space and time with the categories of pure understanding, whose rules bring these sensuously given appearances to stand *as* aspects of objects in their objectivity for apperception in three different categorial respects: spatially (extension), sensationally (intensity) and 1D-temporally (perduration, causal succession, reciprocal simultaneity). The power of imagination is thus relegated to an auxiliary function in the apperceptive subject's concentration on *mathematically governing* the presencing (i.e. movement) of objects *as* objects in the empirically given physical world. In the ontological cast of subjective objectivity the imagination has been made subservient to the senses, at one extreme, and to a determinate mathematized a priori categorial understanding, at the other, to *track calculatively* the movements of physical things as objects in a world laid out spatio-temporally in three-dimensional space and one-dimensional time co-ordinates.

From this vantage point it is easier to see why Kant shrinks back from the prominence of the power of imagination in Edition A, reverting instead to the traditional primacy of logical understanding in Edition B. Objective movement can be governed by laws of motion only if the pure intuition of one-dimensional time pertains, whereas the genuine three-dimensionality of the power of imagination, if allowed to play, puts a spanner in the works by breaking the governing nexus between appearances given in the present and thus causal control over their change and movement.

5.6 Liberating the power of imagination from subjugation

There are tell-tale signs in Kant's text on the transcendental deduction of pure concepts of understanding that the power of imagination is not unconditionally bound to its bridging function between empirically given sensuous appearances and the transcendental ego's pure categorial concepts. One of these indications is the geometrical concept of the triangle as Kant treats it by way of example under the headings "On the Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept" (Von der Synthesis der Recognition im Begriffe A103 ff) at A105 and "On the Relation of the Under-

standing to Objects in General and the Possibility of Recognizing them a priori"
(Von dem Verhältnisse des Verstandes zu Gegenständen überhaupt und der Mö-
glichkeit diese a priori zu erkennen A115 ff) at A124. Noteworthy is that Kant treats
the triangle as a "sensuous intuition" (sinnliche Anschauung A124) and, moreover,
in connection with the main task of showing how the sensuously given "manifold
of representations" (Mannigfaltige der Vorstellungen) can be synthesized under a
pure "concept" (Begriff A105). The triangle, however, is not sensuously given, i.e. by
the bodily senses, although in another sense it is sensuous as a mental image,
namely, in the power of imagination which in this case is not dependent upon
the intuition of a triangle being sensuously given, thus requiring "the reproduction
of the manifold a priori" (die Reproduktion des Mannigfaltigen a priori A105), at
least insofar as this manifold is empirically, sensuously given. Rather, with the fig-
ure of the triangle, the manifold can only be the manifold of three lines intuited
spontaneously by the power of imagination itself, without requiring any sensuous
givenness, which are synthesized by the understanding under the concept of a tri-
angle. Nonetheless it is the productive power of imagination that makes or 'builds'
the images of the three lines. All this is achieved under the "unity of apperception"
(Einheit der Apperzeption A105) that brings the manifold of three intuited lines
under the "unity of the rule" (Einheit der Regel A105), namely, the concept of a tri-
angle:

> So denken wir uns einen Triangel als Gegenstand, indem wir uns der Zusammensetzung von
> drei geraden Linien nach einer Regel bewußt sind, nach welcher eine solche Anschauung je-
> derzeit dargestellt werden kann. (A105)

> Thus we think [conceive] a triangle as an object by being conscious of the synthesis of three
> straight lines according to a rule, according to which such an intuition can be presented at
> any time.

This passage shows only a link between the power of imagination (Ein*bild*ung-
skraft which 'builds' images) and the understanding (which subjects these images
to a conceptual rule), and all this under the gaze of the mind's *present* focus. To
intuit a triangle, the power of imagination does not have to "reproduce" any mani-
fold at all; rather, it is productive, i.e. spontaneously creative, in intuiting a triangle
"at any time" at all, that is, unless one considers that the power of imagination has
already previously 'built' a triangle and now recalls it imaginatively, thus reproduc-
ing it. In any case, the present moment in which sense data are given plays no role
whatsoever in intuiting a triangle. Rather, the psyche's power of imagination, to-
gether with its understanding, only has to shift its focus "at any time" to call the
figure of a triangle to present itself in an act of imaginative presencing (Verge-
genwärtigung).

Furthermore, the concept of the triangle is not one of the categorial concepts required to bring a sensuously given appearance to stand objectively in the unity of self-consciousness. In geometric imagining, the power of imagination is freed from both sensuous givenness and *categorial* concepts such as extension, intensity or substance, all of which rely on the sensuous forms of space and time (especially, in this case, duration in connection with substance), and the understanding takes on a different role in ordering the imagination's pure intuitions. The present of the mental power of imagination when 'building' a triangle is purely psychic. The triangle presences in the mind for as long as its power of imagination keeps its present focus, but this does not lend the triangle any substance in Kant's categorial sense, and this is no deficiency.

The latter passage on the triangle at A124 is also instructive with regard to the status of the power of imagination. The context is the "productive power of imagination" (produktive[n] Einbildungskraft A123) in its "transcendental function" (transzendentale Funktion A123) in making "experience itself possible" (die Erfahrung selbst möglich A123) in conjunction with "concepts of objects" (Begriffe von Gegenständen A123) in "an all-encompassing pure apperception" (einer allbefassenden reinen Apperzeption A123 f):

> Diese Apperzeption ist es nun, welche zu der reinen Einbildungskraft hinzukommen muß, um ihre Funktion intellektuell zu machen. Denn an sich selbst ist die Synthesis der Einbildungskraft, obgleich a priori ausgeübt, dennoch jederzeit sinnlich, weil sie das Mannifaltige nur so verbindet, wie es in der Anschauung *erscheint*, z.B. die Gestalt eines Triangels. Durch das Verhältnis des Mannigfaltigen aber zur Einheit der Apperzeption werden Begriffe, welche dem Verstande angehören, aber nur vermittelst der Einbildungskraft in Beziehung auf die sinnliche Anschauung zustande kommen können. (A124)

> Now it is this apperception which has to supplement the pure power of imagination to make its function intellectual. For, in itself, the synthesis of the power of imagination, although exercised a priori, is always sensuous because it only connects the manifold in the way it *appears* in the intuition, e.g. the figure of a triangle. Through the relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception, however, concepts arise belonging to the understanding, but which only mediated by the power of imagination can come into a relation to sensuous intuition.

Once again the triangle is employed as an example of *sensuous* intuition brought about spontaneously by the power of imagination through its combining the manifold of straight lines into the geometric figure that is said to be itself sensuous, albeit sensuous not in the sense of sensuously given, but sensuous only in the sense of an image built by the imagination. The image of a triangle, however, requires the additive of apperception's intellectual understanding to become a concept. Such conceptualized geometric images can then be further manipulated by the geometric understanding according to axioms, to be sure, but a triangle can never be an

object in the proper transcendental sense of an empirical, sensuous appearance brought to a stand in the categories. This is simply because the concept of a triangle is not categorial at all, i.e. it has no substance, does not obey causal laws or those of reciprocity in linear time, nor does it result from bundling sensuous sensations in their intensity into a reality. But perhaps it is extended in three-dimensional space, as covered by the first class of quantitative categories?

A triangle in Euclidian geometry is a two-dimensional, plane figure; a tetrahedron, regular or not, is a three-dimensional solid figure, and this two- or three-dimensionality relies on the pure intuition of three-dimensional space, albeit that a Euclidean geometric figure does not have to be given empirically by the senses, but can be produced or reproduced at any time by the power of imagination as an image in the psyche. A geometric figure in two or three dimensions also has extension in the imagination, although a point does not, although it is still imaginable. Euclidean geometric figures can be drawn, thus gaining an empirical spatial existence, although a drawn triangle, say, is only the approximate picture of a triangle that must not be confused with a triangle itself. A triangle or other Euclidean figure can also be made to move (quasi animated) in the imagination at any time; its movement does not depend, however, on any empirical movement being received by the senses. Rather, the power of imagination is entirely independent of empirical, sensuous givenness, and geometry's figures do not appear 'outside' in the three-dimensional space where physical objects appear. In this sense, a geometric figure is not an empirical object at all, but a product of the imagination that can be manipulated, i.e. moved, and put into relation to other geometric figures by the understanding according to certain conceptual rules that are by no means causal laws but nevertheless possess a cogency for the imagination. For example, any imagined triangle can be bisected into two triangles, each of which has a right angle.

The imagination can also take further steps by making the imaginary-sensuous intuitions of points, lines, planes, figures representable, i.e. measurable, in numbers, in line with the first quantitative class of categories, whereby they become mathematically manipulable by a calculus, unaccompanied by any figurative intuition, thus transposing the imaginative geometric to the calculating arithmetic. Moreover, the power of imagination is able to imagine spaces other than Euclidean three-dimensional space (e.g. projective or curved geometries) which have more dimensions or non-intuitive axioms for the manipulation of geometric formations that escape any simple intuition, i.e. looking-at, but require, say, the use of algebra. Numbers and algebraic entities themselves are not beyond spatial imaginative intuition altogether, i.e. they can be looked at or intuited in a sense, e.g. when certain natural numbers such as the primes or numbers expressible as the sums of squares take root in the mathematical imagination.

In the branch of abstract mathematics known as category theory, much reasoning is done literally via commuting diagrams through which relations among categories themselves are imagined, drawn and mathematically inferred (Eldred 1975). But the intellectual rules for manipulating mathematical entities in the mind bear little or no resemblance to the categories of pure understanding employed to bring physical appearances to a stand as objects against the three temporal horizons because they are not sensuous entities and thus not objects in the Kantian sense at all. Since such mathematical entities of the imagination are not causally, but only inferentially related on the basis of axioms, one-dimensional time has no role to play in sequentially ordering them in some kind of movement. Mathematical entities are, in truth, mathematical essents that essence in the imaginative mind's present focus, wholly independent of any sensuous givenness of appearances in the physical present.

Mathematical movement is an imagined movement as, say, when an infinite sequence asymptotically approaches a limit. Mathematical essents also appear in the mind simply according to where the mind shifts its focus at any time, thus calling them to mind. They are not temporally located determinately in a present, past or future like physical entities, but rather are called to presence, vergegenwärtigt, in and by the imagination itself at most from the dimension of the past when they have already been imagined earlier and 'learned'. The mental power of imagination is free to move to, i.e. to wander and focus on, what it wants at will.

5.6.1 Phenomenon of the dream

Such freedom of movement of the imagination becomes more than apparent with the phenomenon of the *dream* which for Kant has an inferior ontological status to that of physical objects that can be known. The categories of pure understanding enable experience precisely as the experience of objects brought to a stand as objects against temporal horizons vis-à-vis transcendental apperception. Without the synthesis of empirical appearances performed by categorial concepts:

> ...ohne dergleichen Einheit, die ihre Regel a priori hat, und die Erscheinungen sich unterwirft, würde durchgängige und allgemeine, mithin notwendige Einheit des Bewußtseins, in dem Mannigfaltigen der Wahrnehmungen, nicht angetroffen werden. Diese würden aber alsdann auch zu keiner Erfahrung gehören, folglich ohne Objekt, und nichts als ein blindes Spiel der Vorstellungen, d.i. weniger, als ein Traum sein. (A112)

> ...without such a unity that has its rule a priori and subjugates appearances, a thoroughgoing and universal, thus necessary, unity of consciousness would not be encountered in the manifold of perceptions. These [perceptions] would then, however, not belong to any experience,

> and consequently would be without an object, and be nothing other than a blind play of representations, i.e. less than a dream.

In a later passage, Kant repeats this thought of the necessity of categorial concepts to intellectualize the appearances synthesized by the power of imagination according to rules "without which it [the unity of appearances] would not even be knowledge, but a rhapsody of perceptions" (ohne welche [synthetische Einheit der Erscheinungen] sie nicht einmal Erkenntnis, sondern eine Rhapsodie von Wahrnehmungen sein würde A156/B195). The "reproductive power of imagination which calls the objects of experience over" (reproductive Einbildungskraft …, welche die Gegenstände der Erfahrung herbeiruft A156/B195) must be supplemented by the "concepts of the object of appearances in general" (Begriffen vom Gegenstande der Erscheinungen überhaupt A156/B195), a task which neither a dream nor a rhapsody can fulfil. Neither are grounded in the sensuous experience of appearances that have to be given empirically, but are free to wander through appearances steered by nothing other than the capricious play of the spontaneously productive imagination that often infringes not only the rules of the transcendental categories such as causality, but even formal logical rules of consistency.

The sensations experienced in a dream, say, of indulging in gluttony, are not induced or accompanied by actually eating something while sleeping. Nevertheless, I can dream that I am greedily devouring delicious chocolate tarts, thoroughly enjoying their luscious taste. What I experience in a dream may have significance, although it does not provide objective knowledge of the world. Unravelling a dream's enigma can be revealing, but not of objects as constituted by pure understanding's categorial rules. A poet's poem or a novelist's novel may provide deep and subtle insights into the phenomena of the world and into who we are as mortals that no objective science can ever achieve due to its being bound by empirical givenness that remains forever tied to the sensuous present. Creative imagination, by contrast, can cast essents hitherto unknown in the empirical into the open dimension of an indeterminate past, present or future. A dream or a rhapsody, whether poetic or musical, is not less than objective scientific knowledge, but entirely other than it, since it is not intent on exercising mastery over any kind of *physical* movement. All creative endeavour requires the productive power of the imagination in bringing images to mind. The creation of an entity called an electron horse, for example, consisting of a ball of electrons that levitates and floats over the ground, and on which riders can ride, does not depend on a rigorous interpretation of the laws of quantum physics and superconductivity. Rather, it is a

playful product of the imagination in a narrative context where quantum phenomena become macroscopically experienceable in a humorous fashion.[3]

Modern scientists, too, are fond of pointing out how creatively imaginative scientific research can or must be, albeit that any creative burst of imagination has to be disciplined by the categorial understanding of scientific method to gain sound, empirically based, objective knowledge. However, this is merely one aspect of the power of the imagination's being tied to the two extremes of sensuous givenness and categorial understanding and being ultimately tied back to the will to power over movement.

Released from self-imposed bondage, the creative power of imagination, teamed with the power of thought, could even question Kant's transcendental construction of subjective self-consciousness inside and objectified appearances outside to cast an alternative, phenomenologically more adequate ontological cast of human being itself, and ultimately a temporalogical cast of human essencing in the world. Such is attempted on the present path of thinking.

For Freud the dream, along with its interpretation, was the "royal road to the unconscious", providing as it does experience of the psyche's playful power of imagination normally considered as beneath serious consideration. A German phrase says, "Träume sind Schäume" – 'dreams are mere froth and foam'. Freudian psychoanalysis thus paved the way to reassessing the core role of the transcendental ego as the ruling centre of the self-conscious subject by pointing to significant psychic experiences that eluded subjugation to the pure understanding's categorial rules. The unconscious, as the determinate negation of transcendental apperception, therefore hints at a brittleness of the self-conscious subject per se, i.e. at the questionability of the cast of human being itself as (self-)conscious, under-lying subjectivity. By calling it the unconscious, this hinted alternative is named only negatively *as something*; the *un*conscious is the un*conscious* and thus remains tied to the conception of consciousness as the modern cast of the psyche. Nevertheless, the departure from an unquestioned, unbroken consciousness may give pause to revise the cast of human being as subjectivity altogether in favour of a phenomenologically more adequate, hermeneutic one.

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3 Cf. Eldred *The Land of Matta* (2015a).

6 Temporalogical recasting in historical time

τοῦ λόγου δ' ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν.

Although the logos is shared in common,
most live as if they had their own, individual insight.
Herakleitos, Fragment 2

6.1 Ideas as hermeneutic and the transformation of ontology into temporalogy

The role of the power of imagination in Kant's construction of the objectivity of empirically given appearances for the transcendental ego's understanding, and its tendency as prototypical three-dimensional time to break loose from this limited role, has already suggested that the ontological cast of Kantian subjective idealism is not beyond question. It does not represent the final word on how the world, i.e. how the being of beings as a whole, and human being itself as the openness for the being of beings, shape up for understanding. The subject/object split between interior, subjective consciousness and independent, external, objective world may be remediable in an alternative hermeneutic casting, an alternative temporalogical scaffolding. Inevitably, today's orthodox mainstream philosophy, mired as it is in the subject/object split, cannot, and does not want to, see the temporalogical difference and instead speaks nondescriptly of 'structures' as a poor surrogate for hermeneutic phenomenological thinking.

With regard to the long metaphysical legacy it can already be said that the character of ideas as hermeneutic looks enabling some*things* to present themselves *as what* they are in a given historical time entails that all understanding is hermeneutic, i.e. a *matter of interpretation* and, most deeply, of *ontological* interpretation of beings *as* beings. What presences from past, present or future for the mind's contemplative understanding always presents it with questions of interpretation with historically malleable results that are subject to revision today in the crucible of the temporalogical difference. Ontological hermeneutics, whose task it is to interpret the various historical casts of the being of beings, stands at the opposite end of the spectrum to all anthropologies, whether they be philosophical or scientific, that operate with very naïve, ahistorical conceptions of the so-called human animal, e.g. as an animal equipped evolutionarily with genetically implanted 'flight mechanisms' to flee from predators on the African savannahs. The evolutionary history of this animal is ontic, factual, whereas history in the her-

meneutic phenomenological sense is the subterranean history of the castings of the beingness of beings, including that of the human being.

However, it is now insufficient to speak of an ontohermeneutic casting or recasting because the very meaning of being itself has now been recast da capo as three-dimensional time. What was 'onto-' is now 'tempora-', thus turning the onto-hermeneutic into the temporahermeneutic cast of the essencing of essents rather than the being of beings. What happens to language when substantive beings are verbalized as essents? When mobile verbs gain ascendency over standing noun substantives? What happens to thinking when beings are temporalized as essents and, in particular, human beings as finitely mortal essents? The investigation thus becomes one of the various *temporal modes of the essencing of essents* in a given historical time, with ontology now being superseded by and transformed into *temporalogy* which, of course, cannot amount merely to a renaming.[1] The shift in thinking requires a shift in language, which is very strenuous, since habits of thinking as well as articulation of this thinking in saying die hard and meet with stalwart resistance.

As will become plainer further along the way, the primary distinction in the modes of essencing in this temporalogy is that between whatness and whoness. The phenomenology of whoness, especially, requires a more adequate conception of time that is no longer constricted to the merely one-dimensionally linear. This is a consequence already of the psyche's openness itself being itself now being cast as all-encompassing three-dimensional time with three linearly independent dimensions. Throughout the long tradition of metaphysics, only whatness has received intensive, explicit attention and conceptualization, and the ontology of whatness (οὐσία, substance) has served even as the foundation for grammar in Western languages, starting with ancient Greek. Hence our very language is deeply infected by metaphysical ways of thinking. The phenomenality of whoness only started to make itself felt explicitly with Hegel's thinking, which can be regarded as having instigated German dialogical philosophy.[2] The Dane, Kirkegaard, in particular, may be singled out as an author whose focus on human existence was borne implicitly by a shift away from whatness toward whoness.

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1 For a (in my view) deeply flawed and failed attempt at what the author terms a "temporal ontology", cf. Lally, R. (2016).

2 Cf. Theunissen, Michael (1977).

6.1.1 Categories

> Was hält die Welt im Innersten zusammen?
> Wie? Was sagst Du? Kategorien!??

In particular, the *categories* first introduced by Aristotle, but also employed by later philosophers such as Kant, are themselves ideas, literally, the way things, i.e. whats, are spoken about, addressed and thus 'accused of being' (κατηγορεῖν) in the elementary ways they show themselves, immediately intuited by the mind (νοῦς). In the case of Kant, for whom the categories are logically discursive rather than intuitive, the categories enable the understanding of *physical* beings *as* objects in an ontological interpretation in conformity with the mathematized laws of modern physics governing movement and change of various physical kinds. Hegel went one better than Kant by grounding the categories phenomenologically in the speculative dialectic of his *Logik* rather than merely enunciating them in a finished, ready-to-use state, but he, too, sticks with physical beings as objects (Vorhandenes). The hermeneutic nature of the categories that has come to be recognized since the nineteenth century implies that the interpretation of nature via the categories is not ultimate and can be revised – in historical time. This applies, for instance, even to the elementary category of the being of beings in Hegel's *Logik*, "Etwas" ('something'), whose apparent simplicity and universality can be interrogated as to its adequacy to the phenomena.

Categories, however, are not the only ideas, already with Aristotle, whose ontological investigation of beings *as* beings encompasses, besides the famous ten categories of what, how, how much, relation, etc., also their truth or falsity in the λόγος, their movement according to the modes of potential, at-workness and finished presence (δύναμις, ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια) as well as whether they come about and 'are' of themselves (καθ'αὐτό) or contingently (κατὰ συμβεβηκός), which is the source for the distinction between a substance and its accidents or properties. This fourfold of the beingness of beings is not one of species under a genus called being, but is analogic, each requiring its own special investigation. All the modes of being investigated by Aristotle and throughout the metaphysical tradition are modes of whatness, i.e. of essence in the traditional sense.

The exclusive focus on whatness only starts to break down with Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* in which one self-consciousness encounters another in the world, thus introducing the phenomenal problematic of *recognition* (Anerkennung) that was left dormant in the tradition after having received attention in Plato and Aristotle as the phenomenon of τιμή, i.e. esteem, estimation, value, worth, honour. The ontology of movement associated with esteem and estimation was never worked out by the Greeks, nor thereafter, with the consequence that

these phenomena became subsumed under a separate, even disparate branch of philosophy called ethics that maintains its autonomy as a separate discipline to the present day. Under the pen of the young Marx in the *Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte* of 1844, the phenomenon of recognition is transformed into its determinate negation in that of alienation (Entfremdung) which in the mature Marx of *Das Kapital* becomes mediated by fetishized thingified value (fetischisierter, verdinglichter Wert). This 'discovery', or rather, casting of recognition in the interplay between subjects (as Marx still conceives them) is the seed that now leads to a philosophical, temporalogical consideration of whoness and its perversions and inversions (cf. 8 *Recasting humanness through a temporalogy of whoness*). Players in power interplays of mutual estimation are then no longer subjects, but require explicit temporalogical interpretation. Already Marx's concept of alienation signals that the modern subject has been desubjectivized, and this is exponentiated with the thingification of value. Liberal theory is unable to cope with this situation at all because it does not think conceptually, i.e. ontologically, existentially or now, temporalogically.

6.1.2 Factual reinterpretation

Even on the everyday, factual level, certain occurrences in the past can be subjected to very different interpretations, depending not only upon the available factual evidence, but above all on prevailing ideas of the time, which may be superficial or deep. The ambiguities in how phenomena present themselves in their looks leave much room for the play of mere opinion, which is a kind of superficial understanding that is highly unstable and open to influence by others endowed with sophisticated rhetorical skills. Even the apparently most plain, positivist facts can be given interpretations that turn opinion upside down, thus making it vacillate hither and thither. In philosophy this is called sophistry. The psyche's resonant *mood*, how it quivers in three-dimensional historical time, can also shift, thus encouraging reinterpretations in new opinions that may be uplifting or downcasting, optimistic or pessimistic, and even scarcely recognizable compared to previous communio opinio doctorum. Public discourse, today mediated by the mass media, is largely a melange of constantly changing, intertwining and tangled opinions with little or no grounding and with more or less cogency. Much of it is devoted to opining on ongoing power interplays in various domains, especially politics and sport, about what their outcomes will be. Or there may happen a more momentous shift in how certain important historical events such as a war or the treatment of an ethnic group is interpreted. Hence the task of historians who deal with

facts largely sedimented in documentary archives is never finally done, and the past can experience surprisingly disparate interpretations.

Factual reinterpretation pertains also to epistemic reinterpretation depending on i) scientific discoveries within established scientific theories and ii), more deeply, on shifts in the very epistemic paradigms on which a social or natural science raises its apparently solid edifice. Thus, for instance, a factual find during an archaeological dig may lead to a major revamping of an empirical theory of how or when a certain culture developed. Or scientific advances in a certain field may lead to the postulation or imaginative invention of new entities (essents) altogether that are mostly presented misleadingly as 'scientific discoveries'. Or, more momentously, a shift in the foundational concepts of a science, such as force or mass or energy or time in physics, may induce a major revamping of how physical theory proceeds in interpreting physical phenomena. Scientific theories do not merely make discoveries of entities, but invent and cast (or annihilate) them within an alternative epistemology.

6.2 Hermeneutic recasting in historical time

> ...hard knowledge too
> The mindes indeavours reach, and mysteries
> Are like the Sunne, dazling, yet plaine to all eyes,
> Keepe the truth which thou hast found;
> John Donne *Satyre III*

The possibility of reinterpreting even the most fundamental and apparently plain ideas of an age opens the realm of three-dimensional time as the *time of history* in which foundational ontological (or now: *temporalogical*) ideas can be hermeneutically *recast*.[3] Such an ontohermeneutic (or rather, now, temporahermeneutic) recasting of world brings with it the necessity of reinterpreting the world past, present and future, with the consequence that it presents itself entirely anew. Thus, for example, the interpretation of historical events in a past age from today proceeds erroneously on the preconception that previous humans were conscious subjects with economic interests, with scant appreciation of human being itself as sub-

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[3] The sense of 'recasting' and 'casting' in connection with ontology and temporalogy throughout this inquiry is threefold. First of all it means throwing or casting ahead into (future) historical time. Secondly, it means a moulding or remoulding of the hermeneutic As. And thirdly it signifies a casting into roles as are players in a play, although the 'players' here can be either things or humans, whats or whos.

jectivity only having been cast in the modern age along with the historical emergence of an economy as a semi-autonomous sector of society. Thinking is called upon today to break the hermeneutic mould of the world as it has been cast in our present, modern age and recast it in a renewed mould that precasts an alternative cast of world from the ground up, starting with the most elementary phenomena whose interpretation seems absolutely set in stone. Such hermeneutic precasting of world is a foreshadowing of a possible future as a kind of forecasting that is by no means a prediction. Today this recasting has to be called temporahermeneutic.

To take a look back: with the emergence of the metaphysics of subject/object in the modern age, the world could no longer be interpreted and understood self-evidently as an almighty God's creation. The latter ceased to make sense in the new way of thinking, and a mighty, long-lasting historical struggle ensued that continues even today. Modern subjectivist ontology has placed the human subject front and centre as the underlying instance to which all movement in the world is to be ultimately attributed. Hence the absolute reliance on the modern sciences, whose mission is to serve this unbridled will to power that has come over and overwhelmed the captive human mind, even to the extent that it is mirrored as a matter of course also in everyday chatter, that is, more often than not, about what to expect, how this or that development will play out, etc., as if there were nothing else to talk about. By partaking of this absolute will, through collective human subjectivity equipped with techno-science of all kinds, including the digital-algorithmic, foreknowing willed action of human subjects becomes the highest instance to be appealed to: what *we* collectivized subjects want and can effectively, efficiently predict and do.

The reinterpretation of the world from the ground up – or rather, in the groundless abyss of the crucible of history in which an alternative cast may be moulded and from which it may emerge by breaking out of a given, apparently hermetically closed, historical hermeneutic circle – is a struggle, a πόλεμος, a fight among giants, i. e. a γιγαντομαχία, as Plato calls it. The battle is fought out first of all not through the exercise of physical force and violence, although its upheavals may have such violent, murderous repercussions in the social and political world, but among those who serve as messengers of a recasting and those who defend the status quo of the age's mind-set. A temporalogical recasting of the world today amounts to an historical reshaping of the age's universal (καθόλου), shared mind, i. e. its Geist, in which such a world is cast and presents itself to understanding. The world and its historical interpretation form an inseparable unity. Such a recasting inevitably encounters the steadfast and often bitter opposition of mind-sets from all sides that resist any revision of the hermeneutic cast of an historical world, even going so far as to claim that the world-and-mind in its established on-

tological cast is 'naturally' and 'timelessly' so and that it is inconceivable that any mind could reconceive it radically, starting with the most elementary phenomena. In our time, these most elementary phenomena are being and time, and the challenge is a temporalogical recasting.

The first line of defence against recasting is therefore to dismiss the interrogation as baseless and trivial, just as in a court of law the defence first pleads to dismiss a case as frivolous. The established mind-set(s) of an age are 'naturally' conservative, boundlessly complacent, dogmatic, entrenched, with tangible personal and institutional vested interests in preserving the status-quo. The leading representatives of the prevailing Zeit-Geist receive the accolades of the most prestigious institutions, e.g. the Nobel Prize, and/or of the world's supremely confident, leading, elite universities. The status quo is also shored up by the inertia of sheer habit, especially thoughtless habits of thought inducing indolence of mind. This implies that the struggle will be long, acrimonious and arduous, requiring as it does that the deepest prejudices and preconceptions of traditional ways of thinking be interrogated, loosened up and revised by first clearing away the mental debris of centuries and millennia that blocks and distorts the view.

6.3 Dialectic of concepts constituting an interconnected hermeneutic cast: speculative thinking

Hegel's philosophy is the consummate exemplar at the height of metaphysical thinking of how the ideas constituting an ontological cast can be intimately interconnected. An undertaking to understand this interconnectedness of fundamental ontological ideas determining *as* what things present themselves to the mind is *dialectical thinking* as practised by Hegel "as a system of determinations of thought" (als System der Denkbestimmungen LI W5:61). In such dialectical thinking-through, one idea arises from another through *determinate negation* of a moment in the preceding idea, and this idea is in turn negated to raise both the preceding ideas to the higher level of their deconcealed "truth" (Wahrheit), on which both are acknowledged, but also shown to be one-sided. In dealing with ideas that are nothing other than the ontological 'looks' of things in the broadest sense, such dialectical thinking has the character of *speculation* or *theorizing* (from the Greek θεωρία), both terms originating from verbs for 'to see'. Hegel does not speak of 'ideas' in this dialectical movement of thought, but rather of *concepts* (Begriffe), insisting that each phenomenon addressed be brought under an ontological concept to establish its credentials as having been *thought through* and also placed in a proper relationship to the concepts of other phenomena. Thinking-through (dialectically, systematically) has to be distinguished from talking-about (especially in

the usual scholarly fashion). On being realized in the world, the concept is then an idea (Idee) in Hegel's sense, which accordingly is the unity of concept and reality or, in Hegel's terminology, subject and object. Hegel very often characterizes mere *talk about* phenomena rather than their conceptualization as "begrifflos", i. e. as lacking a concept. In their lack, the phenomena cry out for their close-fitting onto-logical concept. On this criterion, the overwhelming bulk of discourse, including ostensibly philosophical discourse, and especially today, is a mere talking-about, ul-timately inane chatter. This includes also the positivist-empirical sciences, because they lack ontological depth, invariably evading as they do any deeper interrogation of their preconceptions that could ever open the way for an hermeneutic recasting.

6.3.1 Commentaries on Hegel's *Logik*

Commentaries on Hegel's *Logik* mostly neglect to take notice that this work, ac-cording to Hegel's own conception, is his ontology. Each step along the dialectical path therefore must be interpreted paying regard to the ontological difference. The speculative dialectic practised is one of "forms", i. e. of 'ideas', 'looks' of beings in their beingness. Hence critiques of the *Logik* that treat it as some kind of formal logic which aims to 'deduce' the ontic reality of the 'real' empirical world from merely formal ideas entirely miss the mark.

> Die objektive Logik tritt damit vielmehr an die Stelle der vormaligen *Metaphysik*, als welche das wissenschaftliche Gebäude über die Welt war, das nur durch *Gedanken* aufgeführt sein sollte. – Wenn wir auf die letzte Gestalt der Ausbildung dieser Wissenschaft Rücksicht neh-men, so ist [es] erstens unmittelbar die *Ontologie*, an deren Stelle die objektive Logik tritt, – der Teil jener Metaphysik, der die Natur des *Ens* überhaupt erforschen sollte; das Ens be-greift sowohl *Sein* als *Wesen* in sich,... (LI W5:61 italics in the original)

> The objective logic thus rather [i. e. in contrast to Kant's transcendental philosophy ME] takes the place of the former *metaphysics* that was the scientific [i. e. philosophical ME] building about/over the world that is supposed to be performed only through *thoughts.* – If we take consideration of the last shape in the elaboration of this science, then it is primarily *ontology* whose place objective logic takes, – the part of that metaphysics which is supposed to inves-tigate the nature of the *ens* [beings ME] as such; the ens comprises both *being* and *essence* within itself,...

That the ontological character of Hegel's *Logik* is overlooked is due above all to that all-pervasive blindness to the ontological difference which has only become more severe and pernicious as the generations have passed.

6.4 Dialectical contradiction

If dialectical thinking of the speculative, i.e. ontological, kind is movement of the contemplative mind then, like all movement, it calls for an interpretation as driven by contradiction in the concepts themselves insofar as they contain their own determinate negation, i.e. encompass also what they are not, what they lack. The ontological concept of contradiction itself is developed dialectically by Hegel in the Doctrine of Essence, the second, middle part of his *Logik*, where it is employed to dialectically unfold stepwise the relationship between appearances and the essential whatness of things. The Second Part of the Doctrine of Essence, headed "Appearance" (Die Erscheinung), opens with the statement: "*The essence must appear*" (*Das Wesen muß erscheinen* LII W6:124 italics in the original). The first topic in the first chapter, Existence, of this Appearance section, is "The Thing and its Properties" (Das Ding und seine Eigenschaften LII W6:129 ff). The Doctrine of Essence culminates in unfolding concepts of "substantiality" (Substantialität), "causality" (Kausalität) and "reciprocity" (Wechselwirkung) corresponding precisely to Kant's relational categories which, in turn, are isomorphic with Newton's three laws of motion (see above). The entire Doctrine of Essence is therefore dedicated to the ontology of whatness in conformity with the modern scientifico-epistemological mode of access to nature.

The question, however, is whether a conception of dialectical contradiction could also be deployed in a phenomenology of whoness. Already a cursory glance at the "Subjective Logic" or "Doctrine of the Concept" following on from the Doctrine of Essence as the third and final part of the *Logik* makes it apparent that it is not concerned with the phenomenality of whoness per se. Hegel's thinking is also embedded in the metaphysical-ontological tradition and therefore, from the start, is engaged in an altogether different endeavour from that of temporalogical thinking as attempted on the present path that started out from a phenomenology of three-dimensional time. This philosophical da capo first makes it possible to break out of the grip of traditional ontology's fixation on causal movement.

6.5 The historical task of temporahermeneutic recasting

The phenomenon of whoness is at the core of the task facing philosophical thinking in our own historical age, for it amounts to shifting from the traditional exclusive focus on whatness, i.e. essence, quidditas, Wassein, to the question of the whoness, quissity, Wersein of human essencing itself, i.e. who I am, who you are, who we are, who they are. Its aim is to investigate what these modes of temporal essencing are in their own right, without continuing to subsume them thoughtlessly

under third-person categories and concepts of whatness. Whereas the movement of whats has hitherto been conceived as movement in one-dimensional, linear time as far as possible according to the schema of cause and effect, and modifications thereof (e.g. through statistical probabilities), the movement of whos, and also *as* who the who essences, require the richer conception of three-dimensional time to come to terms with the non-causality of the kind of movement in which whos engage, viz. estimative interplay, as should become apparent as we proceed. Subsumption under third-person categories is what inevitably happens and must happen under the reign of the prevailing 'objective' cast of being vis-à-vis the human being as an interior, self-conscious, underlying subject that is itself a kind of 'what' subjected to modern objective scientific, in particular, to psychological and neuroscientific investigation. Knowledge of the human subject must be objective, not subjective, these sciences insist dogmatically!

To mark a phenomenology of whoness off from traditional ontological pursuits in the name of essence, whatness, quidditas, one could even insist on calling this endeavour *existential* rather than ontological. The mode of human essencing in three-dimensional time is then called existence (Existenz), as proposed in *Sein und Zeit*, or even *existential essencing*. The term existence (Existenz), however, is not much help, because in both German and English, 'Existenz' and 'existence' are simply synonyms for the being of any*thing* at all. 'To be' means simply and indistinguishably 'to exist' (but for whom?). Moreover, in the philosophical tradition, the term 'existentia' has already been 'claimed' and 'occupied' to signify *that* some*thing* is vis-à-vis *what* it is, i.e. its essentia. Hence the proposal to speak instead verbally, dynamically of *temporalogical essencing*.

In the present inquiry da capo, the meaning of being itself has already been recast temporally from three-dimensional time as *essencing* (Wesen as verbal noun). The being of beings in such recasting becomes the presencing and absencing of essents in three-dimensional time *as* they show themselves of themselves *to us mortals*. The enterprise is therefore phenomenological, and attempts to avoid interposing any theoretical 'model' construction between the thinking-through and the phenomena themselves. The term 'essent' in lieu of 'a being' is already more fluid than a standing substantive object (Gegen-stand), hinting as it does at movement, although, by virtue of the temporalogical difference, even a fleeting essent still shows a stable temporalogical 'look', i.e. idea, of itself. Perdurance of a substrate in linear time is not required for an essent. As developed in Chapter 1, presencing and absencing can be contracted to *essencing*, where the emphasis is on (initially imaginative mental) movement within the openness of three-dimensional time, as suggested by the continuing tense of the participle. The concept of being itself thus becomes temporal, dynamic essencing. Such verbal essencing as movement (or, misleadingly, as γένεσις, becoming, Werden suggesting 'coming into

being') must be distinguished from the traditional, metaphysical substantive essence (quidditas, whatness, Wesen, Wassein) of whats. As we have seen, essencing for the focused, understanding mind also has to be distinguished from the essencing of essents in the world that the mind can follow.

A genuinely hermeneutic phenomenology of whoness cannot be cordoned off from other fundamental questions: the meaning of being itself, the nature of time, the traditional ontology of movement, all of which have been investigated above. As we have seen, the shift in the meaning of being itself has occasioned even a change of name of ontology itself into temporalogy. Henceforth, the tacitly reigning ontology of movement that is tied to one-dimensional, linear time has to be reconceived as a *temporalogy of movement* that allows for three, independent, non-linear temporal dimensions of movement. Insofar as an hermeneutic phenomenology of whoness is cast within and requires such a temporalogy of movement, it is by no means merely an example, but goes to heart of the philosophical challenge facing us today of posing the most fundamental, elementary questions. As we shall see, this has the consequence that the traditional, all-dominating ontology of productive, efficient-causal movement along linear time, including its modifications, has to be recast hermeneutically *as the unmasterable interplay among many origins of movement* in the world that, in turn, is embedded in and only *conceivably* possible within the three-dimensional temporal openness. Such interplay matches the freely three-dimensional movement of the imaginative mind itself in time that is no longer constricted to solely tracking and attempting to master the movement of whats in the world along a time-line.

In the struggle for a temporahermeneutic recasting, it must also be kept in mind that the nature of deconcealing, rather than merely logical, inferential truth within the openness of historical three-dimensional time is itself inherently ambiguous and therefore also contradictory, first of all in a factual sense concerning the understanding of factual situations, which induces a movement of the mind to resolve such contradiction. Ambiguity and contradictoriness of truth assume their own guise on the deeper level of temporalogical recasting, because truth's ambiguity is now infected by the difference between essents understood in their facticity and essents understood in their modes of essencing for the mind in three-dimensional time. Furthermore, subjectivity and whoness are two fundamentally different hermeneutic casts, the former a cast of human being on the basis of an ontology of whatness, the latter a recasting of human 'being' now as *human essencing* in a *temporalogy of whoness.* A human can be conceived either *as* a self-conscious subject or *as* a who, whose self is no longer encapsulated in an interior, with the latter possibility calling for a thorough, temporalizing rethinking. Even when this self-conscious subject is endowed with the dignity of a person bearing human rights, such ethical status is a superposition on top of a deeper-

lying ontology of whatness that distorts who the subject is and opens it to being conceived through inappropriate, whatifying concepts of modern science, especially psychology and neuroscience. In this way, the phenomenality of whoness proper does not attain a suitable language and insofar thus remains concealed.

Modern psychology deals with the subject that (not who), of course, is subjective. Psychological investigations of the subject's behaviour, sensibilities, attitudes, opinions, etc. are therefore confronted with the subject's subjectivity in the quest for objective knowledge. An individual attitude or opinion is, of its nature, subjective, and that is deemed to be useless for scientific (explanatory, predictive) purposes. The subject's subjectivity, especially its attitudes and opinions, has to be objectified by gathering data from many subjects to dilute the merely subjective component in favour of averaged-out, statistically 'significant' measures that may be taken to be objective surrogates for the subjectivity under investigation. In this methodological scientific way, the subject's subjectivity is statistically whatified to attain reliable scientific objectivity, invariably with regard to predicting movement. The subject is interrogated psychologically only with questions that can be factually ascertained and converted into data that can be subjected to statistical procedures such as the calculation of means, medians, standard deviations, linear regressions, etc. Genuine phenomena of subjectivity itself, such as anxiety, are given short shrift and treated as self-evident givens that require only crisp, succinct, clinically useful definitions. *As who* the subject essences remains buried beneath this scientific psychological objectivity.

Due to the positivist closure of the ontological difference, human sciences such as psychology and neuroscience, as well as social sciences such as sociology and economics, evade foundational questions. It is not even evasion, but that the positivist or empiricist mind is unable to see and take on foundational questions at all; it has been ruined. Instead, all these sciences are committed 'self-evidently' to predictively mastering movement, in line with the prevailing ontology of productive movement. Hence they are assessed according to the *predictive or causal explanatory power* of their studies and experiments that can be measured by empirical data from suitably large samples of humans surveyed or precisely designed experiments. All of them are intently interested in and focused upon what's coming, even when their studies and discussions amount to nothing more than idle chatter. Their theories are therefore, at best, predictive models that are constructed to fit the empirical data as closely as possible and extrapolate them, perhaps by pattern recognition employing artificial neural networks.

Who are we as mortal humans? The human behavioural and social sciences cannot understand the question and therefore provide only what-answers on the basis of a tacitly or explicitly presupposed metaphysics of subjectivity. Likewise, today's philosophy cannot understand the question of whoness and can pro-

vide only ethical answers, for it has long since made itself at home in the tradition-al rift between metaphysics and ethics already present in Plato and Aristotle. This rift is ultimately due to the one-sidedness of the Greek ontology of movement and hence due to deficiencies in the ontology of power that, in turn, is due to the pauc-ity of the conception of one-dimensional, linear time. The challenge is to (start to) heal this rift through an alternative understanding of the meaning of being itself, thus gaining distance from the traditional, productive ontology of movement that today tacitly still holds sway not only in all the sciences, but in the last cranny of everyday opinion and concern. Why otherwise the intense interest in the outcome of a football game, as if one's life depended upon it?

7 Prolegomenary excursus on Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*

Before proceeding to a phenomenology of whoness proper, it is instructive, as a kind of anticipatory prolegomenon, to briefly review salient features of one of Adam Smith's famous works. That eighteenth century Scottish professor of moral philosophy published his opus magnum in the field already at the age of thirty-seven in 1759, a decade-and-a-half before his famous *Wealth of Nations*, the work that gave birth to political economy, appeared in 1776. The former is a grandly conceived, comprehensive work that places the *sentiments* arising in people (that is, mainly men, with women mentioned only occasionally in connection with love, sex, chastity and the like) living together in society and the *sympathy* they have for each other at the centre. Social living requires that men comport themselves toward each other in a proper, fitting, suitable way that Smith collects under the rubric of *propriety*, thus giving the treatise a moral tone from the outset. Part I of the treatise, comprising a total of seven parts, bears the heading "Of the Propriety of Action". The sense of propriety, in turn, requires sympathy to form the bridge between the sentiments and corresponding conduct of one man and the other.

The concept and phenomenality of propriety with its attendant mutual sympathy could therefore be said to be central to Smith's implicit treatment of the *phenomenality of whoness* that he offers in the manner of a late eighteenth-century Scottish gentleman, thus reflecting the mores of the time. The concern with living together in society makes *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759/2000) interesting and instructive as, implicitly, an early study of whoness and the *sociating movement of mutually estimative interplay* at its core. Its metaphysical-ontological core, of course, remains subjectivist with the well-known dichotomy between inside and outside, and its concern is moral in the sense of judgements of what ought to be rather than ontological. This is to be expected.

7.1 Propriety, sympathy, approbation and disapprobation

Under the heading "Of the manner in which we judge of the Propriety or Impropriety of the affections of other men, by their concord or dissonance with our own", Chapter III of Part I provides a concentrate of those basic concepts of Smith's theory that will recur throughout his treatise. As such, it deserves special attention.

Man is *affected* by happenings in the world; he *suffers* what happens to him in *passions* that, in turn, give rise to *actions* aiming at some end or other. "Affection"

for Smith is a synonym for "sentiment", which in turn is used synonymously with "feeling", "emotion" and "passion" (TMS:17), perhaps with some shift in shades of meaning. "Passion" is employed ambiguously as a hinge between passively suffering an affect and actively being driven by a passion, such as sexual desire, to gain an "object" of desire. "Emotion" is a being-moved and thus a being-affected passively by something else, but it also motivates action in a certain direction. Man's living in the world is hence *movement*, i.e. suffering oneself to be moved emotively and also actively moving by conducting oneself with certain motivations. Chapter III sets up the situation of a "spectator" observing and judging the propriety of another's sentiments and actions. *Sympathy* itself comprises those emotions enabling a spectator to feelingly "enter into" and "go along with" (TMS:15) the feelings of another by "bringing the case home to himself" (TMS:14). Since it is impossible to actually feel what the other is feeling, in the first place because the other's bodily sensations are not directly accessible to a spectator, such "bringing the case home to himself", must be achieved, if at all, by the "imagination" (TMS:16) that enables the spectator to "picture" (TMS:16) to himself the other's sentiments in his given situation, affected happily or adversely by occurrences in his world. The *imagination* thus enables a sympathy or co-feeling (Mitgefühl) with the other which is not necessarily a compassion, i.e. a co-suffering.

Today, under the influence of modern psychology, instead of describing sympathizing as being reliant upon "bringing the case home" to oneself, we are inclined to speak of 'empathy' as the subject's ability to feel himself into another's interior feelings. The word 'empathy' is the rendering of German 'Einfühlung' that was coined by Theodor Lipps in his *Leitfaden der Psychologie* from 1903. According to the OED, it signifies 'the power of projecting one's personality into (and so fully comprehending) the object of contemplation'. The Greek word ἐμπαθία signifying (being immersed in) 'strong, passionate emotion' (cf. Passow 1841), is unrelated to the modern subjectivist meaning of empathy, but signifies instead a partaking in a suffering of the quivering psyche encompassing all. If empathy is supposed to be a matter of projecting oneself feelingly from out of one's interior into another's interior feelings, then Smithian sympathy is supposed to be, conversely, imaginatively introjecting another's interior feelings into one's own subjective interior by picturing them in the imagination. Both are a kind of commerce between subjective interior consciousnesses, a way of thinking that has long since become fallaciously self-evident.

Sympathizing for Smith is a going-along-with or a not-going-along-with the other's sentiments or affections in his respective situation that relies upon the power of imagination to 'bring the case home' into one's 'own breast'. Sympathizing that positively enters into and goes along with the other's affections is concordant or consonant, whereas its negation in not going along with the other's affections is

discordant or dissonant. According to whether his own imagined affections on bringing the other's situation home imaginatively to himself are in *consonance* or *dissonance* with the other's affections as manifest in his conduct, the spectator positively *approves* or negatively *disapproves* of the other's own feelings and the actions arising from them, which harbours an inherent contradiction. This introduces *approbation* and *disapprobation*, thus mediated by sympathy and imagination, as the element in which social togetherness is morally judged according to *propriety*, i.e. its fittingness and suitability. Approbation and disapprobation are *judgements* of what *ought* to be and what *ought not* to be in an individual's emotions and actions, and not appropriate or inappropriate, accurate or inaccurate *estimations* of the powers moving that individual, as I will endeavour to show in more detail below. Propriety itself is thus rendered, in the first place, as a matter of *individual* judgements about what ought to be, not about what shows itself in presencing for the mind. Morality thus trumps phenomenology from the outset. It goes beyond or quickly skips the attempt to see the phenomena clearly in order to judge them.

How can propriety become a *social* criterion for sentiment and conduct from this individualized basis of a spectator, since there are many individuals, each with his own imaginative capacity to sympathize and judge another's manifest emotionality and conduct? If Izzy sympathizes with Tizzy's hurt over being badly insulted by Iggy, Ziggy may feel that Tizzy is being overly sensitive because her emotion is not consonant with the emotion he imagines he would feel on being similarly insulted by Iggy. For Izzy, Tizzy's sentiment indicates an appropriate sensitivity, whereas for Ziggy, she is overly sensitive, soppy and needs a thicker skin, so he disapproves of her emotional reaction to the insult. Positive consonance and negative dissonance here come into opposition that may result in Izzy and Ziggy contradicting each other vehemently. What is fitting and proper in Izzy's judgement is unfitting and improper in Ziggy's. Instead of considering how to help Tizzy overcome her hurt feelings and perhaps strengthen her self-esteem, the togetherness is exhausted by approving or disapproving judgements of moral propriety.

Propriety as a *socially* shared moral criterion for sentiments and actions can presumably be salvaged by referring to the *usual* judgements of propriety experienced by observing how others judge similar sentiments and actions on the average, thus setting up a conventional criterion by empirical induction, or even an established custom, that modifies and tendentially overrules my own individual judgement. This would be the approach of modern psychology, which would undertake an empirical appropriate study to gather appropriate factual data. My moral judgement of propriety is then overwhelmed by conventional standards of propriety, i.e. by 'what other people think'. Such a conventional standard insofar contradicts Smith's asserted basis for propriety as residing in individual judgement:

> Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another. I judge of your sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reason by my reason, of your resentment by my resentment, of your love by my love. I neither have, nor can have, any other way of judging about them. (TSM:18)

He does not consider that the criterion of propriety I apply in judging the appropriateness of another's sentiments and actions is not my very own and uniquely singular, but rather, despite its being a 'subjective' individual judgement, is such only within a given spectrum of morally judgemental attitudes that pertains socially in a given time. Morally I am never myself, but only an exemplar of social custom and convention. An individual's judgements are merely particular, not uniquely singular. Smith himself provides a telling example of judgements of propriety with the moral virtue of chastity. He puts "violations of faith" (breaking a promise, treachery, falsehood, etc.) on a par with

> violations of chastity in the fair sex, a virtue of which, for the like reasons, we are excessively jealous; and our sentiments are not more delicate with regard to the one than with regard to the other. Breach of chastity dishonours irretrievably. No circumstances, no solicitation, can excuse it; no sorrow, no repentance, atone for it. (TMS:489 f).

Chastity is thus deemed to be an absolute moral virtue on which "we" (men?) are completely unanimous as to its inviolable propriety. The judgement is no longer a matter for the individual, but is valid as a kind of absolute, shared, social value appropriate for esteeming or disesteeming, i. e. approving or disapproving, an individual woman's conduct. This does not prevent Smith, on the other hand, from commiserating with a fellow man's "calamity" of having suffered "the loss of a mistress" (TMS:36), albeit that it is a small misfortune to "have only been jilted by your mistress" (TMS:59). The consonance or dissonance with the sentiments and actions of a woman who (more likely than not under male pressure) surrenders her chastity would tend in the mid-eighteenth century toward universal dissonance in individual males' (and presumably also females') judgements, with few exceptions from those more licentious, morally questionable individuals who were, supposedly, out of step with the times.

Today, by contrast, individual judgements on the virtue or otherwise of chastity allow a much greater spectrum of consonance or dissonance, and thus approbation or disapprobation, for the individual to choose from. Its moral colouring as a virtue that *ought* to be lived has faded altogether in favour of a more matter-of-fact view of the phenomenon for which even the word 'chastity' is no longer used to describe a woman's self-determined sex-life. As women have gradually struggled their way into the historical cast of human subjectivity and become the underlying subjects determining their own lives, chastity as a virtue for women has lost most

of its rigidity as a moral value in modern Western societies, whilst retaining its uncompromising absoluteness in conservative patriarchal societies that regard the West as decadent. This example shows that the estimative mores of an historical time can and do shift momentously, and that individual subjects are ineluctably caught up in prevailing conventional mores. Such shifts are only superficially understood if they are attributed merely to shifting social conventions explicable in an ad hoc way by various social causes. Rather, the very mind and mood of historical time shift through profounder and less visible struggles in which contradictions are played out. Such contradictions are rooted ultimately in the question concerning who the human being is, i.e. in the hermeneutic cast of human whoness in historical time. The virtue of chastity, as an aspect of who the woman is, exemplifies how womankind has been cast historically in contrast to how manliness has been cast on the deepest level, the dichotomy having become less sharp in Western liberal societies as women have been cast into the historically specific neutral whoness of subjectivity.

7.2 The role of imagination and three-dimensional temporality

Let us step back to ask more insistently how the imaginative sympathizing with another's feelings, be it consonant or dissonant, is possible at all. It is enabled by the power of imagination, which has been discussed in Chapter 1 in connection with the psyche as that power enabling a calling or occurring to mind, i.e. a mental essencing of all that presences and absences, a conception, of course, entirely foreign to Smith, just as it is to the modern subjectivized mind with its inside and outside. The psyche itself is the temporal openness for such presencing and absencing, and thus belongs to the three-dimensional temporal openness itself of which each individual mortal ineluctably partakes for as long as he or she lives. When Smith discusses imagination, he contrasts it to "actually" having feelings sensuously in the present, because an impartial spectator is able to imagine his affections in the emotional situation of someone else, even when he is in quite a different mood at present, thus implicitly acknowledging the movable temporal nature of the psyche that is always reverberant one way or another with a mood. He adduces the example of someone jesting in company and our thinking that

> the laughter of the company is quite just and proper, though we ourselves do not laugh, because, perhaps, we are in a grave humour [...]. We have learned, however, from experience, what sort of pleasantry is upon most occasions capable of making us laugh [...]. We approve, therefore of the laughter of the company, and feel that it is natural and suitable to its object;

because, though in our present mood we cannot easily enter into it, we are sensible that upon most occasions we should heartily join in it. (TMS:16)

This phenomenological example illustrates very well the power of imagination's temporal credentials in being able to freely move to recall other situations and experience a previous, absent mood, allowing it to presence from the past in the light of the imagination and so "enter into it". The approbation of the laughter is only possible because our psyche, or rather our mental temporal focus and resonance within the psyche, is able to range through the temporal openness to recall, and thus experience bi- or trifocally in a temporal sense, other situations with other moods. In jovial company "we" are both with its present cheerful mood, with our own mood that may pertain to a future or a past situation, and also with a recalled mood from previous jovial social situations, and that 'all at once'.

The use of "we" indicates our shared, universal temporality, for we all recognize and appreciate the details of Smith's example. It is the consonance and dissonance of moods pertaining to situations present, past or future which then provide the criteria for approbation and disapprobation of another's conduct. Prior to any consonance or dissonance with another's sentiments and actions, any spectator is always already attuned in one mood or another by temporality, perhaps from multiple dimensions; his mood is a resonance with the psyche in this three-dimensional temporal sense that may be uplifting or downcasting or indifferently neutral, light-hearted or grave, and it may also differ according to which temporal dimension is particularly focused upon by the imagination. Thus 'all at once' you may have fond memories and also be fearful of coming events whilst being presently content and calm. The imagination is also able to fantasize, i.e. call into mental focus, situations that have no specific temporal determinacy or are only vaguely futural, and resonate with the corresponding moods. Such is the case with the theatrical drama fantasized by a playwright that is set in the past, the present, the future, or vaguely in an indeterminate time. It is therefore the temporally three-dimensional imagination that first and foremost enables all sympathy with another as that imaginative power of psychic mental movement through the three-dimensional temporal openness which is always already shared with others. Such sharing is prior to individuation (cf. 2.6 *Sense perception, physical reality and bodily individuation*).

The temporal openness of an age encompasses all of us mortals. Our human essencing itself is this existential exposure to and partaking of three-dimensional time with which, in particular, we resonate in the moods of the times. We are inescapably attuned by three-dimensional time's quivering reverberations and thus willy-nilly share its attunements within a certain spectrum of possible moods held

in the quiver of the age[1] that accompany our imagination's temporal transports. Although, due to bodily individuation, each of us roves individually and privately, concealed from others, through the temporal openness, resonating with it in specific moods given by the times, such resonant temporal roving provides the basis for imagining the moods of another time of which he partakes and by which he is affected through resonating with them without the need of sense organs in the present. Mood is thought here as encompassing by virtue of being a resonance with the three-dimensional temporal openness rather than as an internal, subjective state of emotion, feeling, or the like. The very conception of a 'feeling inside' is spatial, whereas three-dimensional time is a conception altogether prior to space, a nowhere. This does not prevent emotions, understood as resonating moods, from having palpable bodily effects such as a rapid beating of the heart, high blood pressure or sweaty palms that a spectator may even observe. In line with the priority of the temporal over the spatial, this has been conceived above (cf. 2.8 *Bodying as empsychment and entimement*) as empsychment of the body rather than as the traditionally conceived embodiment of the psyche.

7.3 Self-reflection, self-approbation, self-esteem

When Smith comes to consider self-approbation in Part III, he very simply takes the spectator observing the sentiments and actions of another and places him bodily inside "the breast" of oneself as an "impartial spectator" reflecting on our own sentiments and actions. The spectator's consciousness co-knows its self and thus has conscience. Smith claims that this kind of self-reflection by way of consciousness bending back on itself is derived (ontically rather than ontologically) from our seeing ourselves reflected first in the mirror of the social world of others upon emerging from imagined individual isolation. On his own, he has "no mirror" (TMS:162) to see himself; it requires the "eyes of other people" (TMS:163) that function as a kind of "looking-glass" (TMS:163). The conscience of self-consciousness is thus conceived as the internalization of an outside spectator so that we "become the impartial spectators of our own character and conduct" (TMS:167). Hence, in a certain way, our self-reflection is initially the reflection from others whom we imagine and not the co-knowing of self implied already by the very term 'con-science' which, in Descartes' French, means also 'consciousness'.

Once again, the power of imagination has a pivotal role to play. We each imagine ourselves as the impartial judge approving or disapproving of our own senti-

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1 On the "quiver", cf. my *Thinking of Music* (2015c).

ments and conduct. This inner spectator is inescapable insofar as all consciousness is necessarily reflective self-consciousness, i.e. consciousness bending back on the self, continually "accompanying" (Kant) it. On this basis, Smith describes, for example, the horrors of someone who has committed a heinous crime and cannot escape his own conscience's disapprobation and harsh judgement of his act (TMS:173), even to the point of committing suicide.

The supposed internalization of an impartial observer of our selves within our "breast" goes hand in hand with an important distinction. Since we are all said to rely upon the mirror of other people's approving or disapproving eyes to see ourselves, their esteeming or disesteeming us, we are eager to have them see us in a favourable light. Smith calls this "the love of praise" (TMS:166), that wanting to be loved which plays a great role in Plato as φιλοτιμία (philotimia). Its negation for Smith is the dread of blame by others. Because of the internalization of the impartial observer, however, it does not suffice to have praise heaped upon us and to surreptitiously escape being blamed by others, since we have to be sure in our own hearts and inner eyes that we deserve the praise and also deserve not to be blamed. Hence Smith says that praise and praiseworthiness have to be distinguished from each other just as blame and blameworthiness do. These latter judgements are made not by the others, but by the internalized spectator, our individual conscience. To be praised by others without, in one's own judgement, being truly worthy of it is hollow, just as to escape blame by others (say, by dissembling, subterfuge or lies) whilst being worthy of it weighs heavily on one's own co-knowing conscience. Praise and praiseworthiness may or may not coincide in the individual case. For instance, I may know myself to be praiseworthy in my sentiments and actions without enjoying the least praise by others, or vice versa: I may know myself to be a 'rotter', like Mr Bustrow in George Eliot's *Middlemarch*, whilst being held in high esteem by others. Likewise, blame and blameworthiness may diverge, say, if my reputation is tarnished unjustly whilst knowing myself to be not blameworthy.

Smith equates praise with approbation, praiseworthiness with self-approbation, blame with disapprobation and blameworthiness with self-disapprobation, all of which are regarded in a moral sense of comparing what is with what ought to be. This moral colouring of all judgements, however, obscures the phenomena. A lack of praise does not have to amount to blame, nor does a lack of praiseworthiness amount to blameworthiness. Someone may be highly praised for his excellence in a certain field, but ascertaining the lack of this excellence does not amount to any sort of moral condemnation or depreciation. Nor does possessing this excellence qualify the individual to a morally higher status; it is not a matter of judging that the individual *ought* to have the ability in question, but simply judging that he does possess and display it. Likewise, if I fail in a certain action

such as playing a piece of music on the guitar, and judge my playing as having fallen far short of the mark, I judge my playing as not praiseworthy in this instance, which is not to be equated with being blameworthy and may indeed be a spur to my trying again until I succeed. I may be angry at my own poor playing, but there is no moral blame involved. My self-esteem may suffer along with the esteem an audience gives me for my playing, but these lacks do not amount to moral self-disapprobation or disapprobation. My conscience is not weighed down, even though I may be ashamed of my poor playing.

This observation has to do with the subjectivist conception of virtue as a moral category in the modern age (together with its roots in Christianity where the individual is always already fallen into sinfulness in God's eyes) vis-à-vis the Greek conception of ἀρετή as 'excellence', by no means necessarily in any moral sense. Ἀρετή has a very broad semantic field encompassing, according to Benseler, 'competence, excellence, suitability, amicability, perfection, magnificence, fortitude, skilfulness, beauty, honours, happiness, flourishing, fruitfulness, magnanimity, goodness, virtue, merit, innocence, strength of will, serviceability, nobility, bravery' besides 'virtue' in any moral sense. To translate this phenomenologically: I *estimate* myself, i.e. my 'excellent' qualities, powers, abilities of various kinds, in *self-esteem*, just as others estimate them in their *estimation* of me, but self-estimation is not to be equated with self-approbation, nor is the estimation by others to be equated with approbation in any sense of 'ought to be'. Similarly, my lack of self-esteem is neither blameworthy, nor does it call for any kind of moral disapprobation. Rather, it calls for kind encouragement from others for me to realize my potential, my inherent powers and abilities. Esteem and self-esteem arise existentially from success in the outcomes of the interplay of one's own powers with others' in the movement of life.

Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* narrows down human togetherness to a matter of moral judgement according to conformist propriety, whereas its phenomenality of mutually estimative power interplay is much more manifold and encompassing. Moral approbation or disapprobation often obscure the phenomenon that presents itself to the mind. Someone's breaching trust through fraud, lying, breaking a solemn promise, etc. cannot escape moral disapprobation, and some of these acts also deserve punishment under law. On the other hand, other acts deserve moral approbation and even acclamation. But the deeper-lying phenomenon is how we mortals share the world in intertwined, sociating life-movements that can be conceived pre-morally as ongoing power interplays of mutual estimation. Moral judgements of disapprobation often serve to obscure the view of the underlying power interplay, even to the extent of moralizing the exercise of power itself as per se reprehensible.

The moral disapprobation of women's freedom to shape their own existences expressed by restricting their freedom to pursue lives in public life, including employment, or their freedom to decide to abort a pregnancy, for example, is at base a power struggle over human freedom of existential movement derived from deeper-lying, prejudicial, historical conceptions of female whoness. Moral condemnation pure and simple diverts attention from shedding light on how power interplays in their intricacy and subtlety are played out, whereas insight into such interplays may be crucial for subverting and counteracting some of their underhand strategies. Moral questions become questions of power. Moral judgements are easy, whereas insight demands effort, patience and a stepping-back from merely judgemental stances to a more distanced view. Blameworthy social acts as power interplays invariably rely on some element of deception to unjustly gain and retain the upper hand in the power interplay. In this sense, pre-morally exposing and deconcealing the truth of power interplays – from individual interchanges through to political, social and cultural power plays – is conceptually prior to moral judgements thereof.

8 Recasting humanness through a temporalogy of whoness

> Science explained people, but could not understand them.
> E.M. Forster *Howards End*

8.1 Factual and temporalogical truth of whoness

The question of truth and untruth is intimately related to the question of being and non-being. Both questions are at the heart of Plato's philosophy and his struggle with the sophists, who calmly claimed that they could not speak falsely, for to do so would amount to saying that which *is not*, i. e. to saying nothing at all. Hence Plato's attempt in *The Sophist*[1] to corner and capture the slippery sophist comes to a decisive head in his famous dialectic of the five genera (γένη) of being, movement, standstill, sameness and difference (ὄν, κίνησις, στάσις, τὸ αὐτό, τὸ ἕτερον) whose upshot is that the non-being (μὴ ὄν) exists, i. e. it *is*, in a certain way. Being and non-being (presencing and absencing) thus do not exclude, do not point-blank negate each other, but enable, in a certain sense, the possibility and necessity of contradiction both in the phenomena themselves (notably, those of all kinds of movement and change) as they presence in the mind, and also, derivatively, in statements about them. It is possible to say that which is not and also to have a false view (ψευδὴς δόξα) of a matter, a crucial topic taken up in *Theaitetos* in a dialogue on what it means to know (i. e. ἐπιστήμη, Wissen, knowledge, not necessarily science as it has come to signify today).

In the language of dialectics, every being is, in a certain way, also what it is not, viz. its determinate negation (present as an absence, a lack), and this infection by negation, i. e. by the presencing of an absence, enables the disclosure of that being in its deconcealed truth to be ambiguous, that is, infected by the untruth of the being showing itself *as* what it is not. The sophist employs this ambiguity of deconcealing truth in his words (λόγοι) by rhetorically presenting a being *as* what it is not (i. e. as one of its possible, plausible negations), whilst simultaneously denying that a non-being could exist at all (hence he cannot lie). This 'as' indicates already that all disclosive truth is hermeneutic.

In line with the traditional prioritizing of the sensuous present, Plato gives the simple, innocent example of seeing someone in the distance and mistaking him to be Socrates when, in fact, he turns out to be Theaitetos. Such is a false, or incor-

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[1] Cf. Heidegger's illuminating phenomenological exegesis in GA19.

rect, view of the factual phenomenon rather than untrue in a deeper sense to be considered below. To then claim (in statements) to have seen Socrates in the distance is a false view in the sense of a false opinion expressed in a false statement or proposition (logical falsity in the superficial sense, upon which analytic philosophy focuses). Or: I see someone coming along the street toward me and see this person *as* Socrates, whereas you, who are standing next to me, identify him *as* Theaitetos. Our views of the factual phenomenon of someone coming along the street are different, indeed, contradictory, for, according to conventional logic, this person cannot be both Socrates and Theaitetos. That we *disagree* about who the person is, is *derivative* of the ambiguity in the factual phenomenon itself. Nota bene that the question is then: *Who* is this person? and not *What* is this person? It could not be *a* Socrates coming toward me, but only the *singular* Socrates; insofar the ontological distinction between who and what has already been implicitly, off-handedly invoked without thinking about it any further. However, there is already a hint that whoness is intimately related to singularity and bearing one's very own name, whereas whatness is general, universal. Whats can be of a certain kind (εἶδος) within a genus (γένος), whereas, properly speaking, singularity eludes such hierarchical ordering from the universal to the particular to the singular.

If I express my view in words as an opinion (δόξα), and you yours, then these differing opinions are contradictory, which may end in a controversy between us over who the person coming down the street 'really', ὄντως, i.e. in his singular, deconcealed truth, is. Thus it is with all factual phenomena; they can show (deconceal, disclose) themselves in a distorted view that gives rise to false views and leads to error, i.e. to missing the mark (ἁμαρτάνειν). Or they may hide themselves altogether, thus preventing them from coming into view altogether. The double, or even treble, meaning of 'view' here should be noted: the phenomenon shows itself in a view, and you or I have a view of the phenomenon in its showing itself which, in turn, we may expressly state, articulate in an opinion, i.e. a viewpoint. The basis of this falsity is the defective factual deconcealment of the phenomenon itself, that allows you or me to have a false view of it. The distortion, in turn, is possible because essents themselves in their deconcealing are infected by negation.

To pose the crucial question of human essencing itself, it must be asked whether the person coming down the street is a subject or a who (or even as somewho else, such as a player; cf. 9 *Sociation through the medium of thingified value*), which is no longer a question of factual correctness, but of truth in a deeper sense: Is the human in truth a subject? How can this question become a visible, pressing crucial question in our historical time? And why should it? What difference does it make to regard the human as a subject endowed with an interior consciousness or entirely differently? The path of thinking so far has already shown that, properly speaking, the question concerning whoness is no longer an ontological one, nor

simply an existential one, but must be transformed into a temporalogical question demanding hermeneutic recasting. The recasting is demanded because casting the human as a subject with interior subjectivity covers up, i.e. is untrue to, the phenomena themselves. This concealment in untruth itself requires phenomenological deconstruction.

Any phenomenon must present itself to the mind, not necessarily or primarily sensuously in the present, but from one or even all three temporal dimensions all at once. As we have seen (cf. 2.5 *Temporally trifocal mental presencing*), phenomena of movement in the world even *require* a trifocal presencing to be seen, i.e. understood, *as such.* No matter whether the phenomenon presents itself from the past, present and/or future, it exists temporally, i.e. it 'is' in the sense of *essencing* (cf. Chapter 1). Its possible absence in the past or future is not nothing at all, not at all a μὴ ὄν point-blank, not an absolute negation, but itself a mode of temporal essencing. Nevertheless, its deconcealment, both factually and temporalogically, may be ambiguous, incomplete, skewed, warped, twisted, imaginary or even completely topsy-turvy, thus more or less distorted, which gives rise to false, deceptive, or even temporalogically deeply untrue views of it. Here the question is whether the phenomenon of the human's self-showing as a subject is deeply untrue.

As discussed in previous chapters, truth vs. untruth must be distinguished from being vs. non-being or presencing vs. absencing (cf. 2.9 *Mental absencing distinct from concealment*ff). Non-being conceived as point-blank 'nothing at all' is beyond our human ken and psychic imagination altogether and is thus nothing at all. Hence, as we have seen, it is phenomenally more adequate to think of being vs. non-being as presencing vs. absencing, which comprise two different temporal modes of essencing. By contrast, deconcealing and concealing can befall, and do befall, all three temporal modes, and thus belong to, and are embedded in, the play of temporal essencing itself. Questions of truth of the phenomena thus become questions of deconcealing essencing.

Factually *lying*, for instance, a commonplace phenomenon of everyday life, is itself only possible because phenomena can show themselves impaired or obscured by concealment, for it amounts to knowingly making a statement that the speaker knows to be false, i.e. the speaker covers up the truly disclosable state of affairs to further his or her own ends by means of the λόγος. The lying λόγος covers up a phenomenally *concealed* factual state of affairs essencing in three-dimensional time by presenting it verbally *as* another state of affairs. Apart from lying, there are numerous other variants of intentional concealment of states of affairs, including fraud, prevarication, shuffling, duplicity, double-dealing, deceitfulness, etc. In some circumstances, such as litigation, it is important that this hidden truth come to light by removing all the deceptions as far as possible, including the lies, covering up the factual phenomena that indicate culpability. This

makes it apparent that factual truth has to be wrested from the phenomena themselves, for, more often than not, their deconcealment is imperfect, defective, ambiguous and, in addition, can also be knowingly, connivingly suppressed, i. e. prevented from coming to light, often through collusion. The uncovering of factual states of affairs is crucial for all areas of human existence and concerns the *correctness* of particular facts, whereas the concealment or distorted deconcealment of how human essencing itself is conceived is a universal concern that goes to the pith and has repercussions even for how the factuality of facts is conceived, i. e. deconcealed for the mind of an age, i. e. its Zeit-Geist.

As already noted (cf. 3.7 *The inherently ambiguous deconcealment of phenomena*), in ancient Greek λήθη normally signifies 'forgetting' 'oblivion' as when someone 'loses their mind', sinking into amnesia, unable to call to presence what was, as in dementia, literally, the condition of having lost one's mind. The word λήθη is derived from λανθάνειν, 'to escape notice', thus remaining *concealed*, as when Aristotle writes δουλεύων λέληθας 'you are a slave without knowing it', i. e. 'it remains concealed to you that you are a slave' or 'you are deceiving yourself as to your true slave status'. The status in this example is one of *unfreedom* which you, however, view self-deludedly as its contradictory opposite, viz. as freedom. *Freedom* itself inherently shows itself ambiguously, and the view you hold of your own status in society depends not just on your bare, factual situation, but on its interpretation in the light of an (implicitly temporalogical) concept of freedom, which itself may be, and generally is, distorted, as we shall see below in the final chapter. You delude yourself about your status as a free person by unknowingly or pig-headedly or self-servingly applying a defective concept of freedom to your own situation. This leads ultimately to the highly controversial, core philosophical *question concerning human freedom* which in turn depends upon and goes to the very heart of how human essencing itself is conceived, i. e. hermeneutically cast – now *temporalogically.* There are many self-delusions about freedom (even and especially in the so-called Free West), in the sense of deluding yourself that you are a free subject or a free person in a free society whereas in 'truth' you are not. The various self-deluding ideologies of freedom in circulation are therefore pivotal for the question concerning who we are and who we could be historically (properly speaking: *as* who we essence in the dimensions of historical time).

8.2 The truth of human essencing

The truth of freedom itself has to be wrung from partial concealment and defective deconcealment in comforting self-delusions and obfuscating cover-ups in tandem with how the deconcealing truth of the whoness of human essencing in three-di-

mensional temporality can be brought to light. As a philosophical, temporalogical question concerning the hermeneutic casting of human essencing itself in historical time, it has to uncover, clear up and clear away the distortions that, during the millennia-long tradition of philosophy since the Greeks, have historically partially covered up, obscured, or even inverted the phenomenon of human being/essencing by presenting fundamental (mis-)conceptions of it. Uncovering the cover-up calls for arduous, determined philosophical struggle, presumably over centuries.

Apart from the ancient ontohermeneutic casts of human being *as* τὸ ζῷον λόγον ἔχον and ζῷον πολιτικόν, i. e. as a generic animal with certain specific differences and thus as a species (cf. 1.6.1 *Psyche not a thing*), the modern cast of the human being *as* a subject endowed with an interior self-consciousness is predominant today. Already the positing of the human being as a political animal begs the question regarding the sociation or togetherness (Vergesellschaftung oder Mitsein) of human beings as if it were obvious or could be dealt with in a one-line definition. The conception of social togetherness as a collectivity of individual subjects also begs the question regarding human sociation in the shared temporality of an historical age, since such collectivity is taken to be a merely factual obviousness of 'many taken together' like a mere body count or bunch of like things. How does the hermeneutic cast of human being *as* subjectivity obscure and distort the truth of human essencing? Wherein lies the distortion and inversion, and how can it be remedied by focusing on the phenomenality of the essencing of whoness? First a preliminary remark.

8.2.1 Existentials of whoness

As late as the twentieth century, with the 1927 publication of Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, a radical ontological recasting of human being itself as existence was enacted, transforming the modern subject endowed with interior consciousness and self-consciousness into Dasein (whoness) with its own existential embeddedness in the world, initially of a pragmatic nature. (This crucial point is stubbornly and tendentiously overlooked to the present day.) Things (whats) are thereby reinterpreted from being cast as substances with certain qualities and properties into practical things that are useful for certain possibilities of Dasein's existing in the world and are *estimated* as being good for such existing, which of course includes also the negation of being bad for it. A fundamental distinction is made between ontological *categories* pertaining to whats (Vorhandenes) and *existentials* encapsulating human being (Dasein) itself existing in the world taking care of (Besorgen) things and caring for others (Fürsorge) in their whoness (Wersein). Heidegger

does not deepen the phenomenology of whoness by explicitly considering and conceptualizing the *plurality* of human beings sharing the world as whos, but provides only cursory existential concepts of togetherness such as Mitsein and Mitdasein that call for further deepening and development. Arendt explicitly takes up the challenge of considering the plurality of human beings, at least in a political sense, without plumbing the ontologico-existential depths of how human beings share and sociate in the world. The germs of a phenomenology of whoness are thus present in both Heidegger's and Arendt's philosophizing.[2]

The question is now posed concerning how the whoness of human essencing in the shared openness of three-dimensional time is to be conceived. This takes it considerably further than either Arendt or Heidegger did, by explicitly undertaking the trans-lation from being to time already adumbrated in the title of Heidegger's iconoclastic magnum opus.

8.3 Who is the human? What-answers

Our own age calls for challenging the ontohermeneutic cast of human being *as* subjectivity in favour of a temporahermeneutic casting of human *essencing as* whoness. Initially, this is merely an assertion that requires phenomenological justification through execution. This makes philosophizing into an incomparably radical praxis that challenges not only present-day philosophy's scholastic existence in the universities, but also, and especially, the unquestioned ontological preconceptions of the modern sciences. One of the prime deficiencies of having hermeneutically cast human being *as* interior subjectivity is precisely that the very approach, from the outset, encapsulates human being in an isolation of the singular[3] rather than exposing it in the very conception of selfhood to a togetherness in the plural. The singular here should not be confused with singularity (Einzelheit, uniqueness). Nor should the individualization into socially dissociated individuals be confused with the individuation of the unified temporal psyche ("disembodied cosmos")

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2 Cf. my chapter on Arendt in Eldred et al. (2013).

3 The isolated singleness of the conscious subject in the modern age is congruent with (but is not caused by) the modern individual in society whose dissociated individualization, in turn, is only possible by being sociated via the medium of thingified value as the prime medium of mutual estimation; cf. my *Social Ontology of Whoness* (2019b) and below 9 *Sociation through the medium of thingified value.* This form of sociation is the foundation upon which a dissociated, individualized individual as such is at all possible and the corresponding ideology of individualism becomes historically possible, thus enabling a crude, egoistic, individualistic conception of freedom to be propagated and become socially entrenched.

into a plurality of "empsyched bodies"[4] in line with each of us individually being all descended conceptually from originary time (cf. 2.8 *Bodying as empsychment and entitement*). We share our descent. When it comes to the phenomenality of the social world, i. e. of always already sharing a world in togetherness (Mitsein), such a subjectivist metaphysics, disinclined as it is to think conceptually, can only respond by talking *about* intersubjectivity, thus extending singularity, apparently self-evidently, to plurality as a kind of *collectivity*, whereby the interiority of consciousness breaks out (say, through the intentionality of directing consciousness in common toward an external object) to make contact with other consciousnesses in some kind of 'inter', some kind of mediating 'between' that remains self-evident and unconceptualized (begrifflos) (cf. 1.6.1 *Psyche not a thing* .)

In our present age, each individual consciousness is cast ontologically to be encapsulated in an interior inaccessible to others (I can't look inside your head, or vice versa, they say). Individual consciousness is conceived as the seat of sensations and cognition (a surrogate for thinking), and is even regarded as having a specific location inside the body, namely, in the brain. (Incipit neuroscience in distinctly Cartesian footsteps and even the contradictio in adjecto of so-called neurophilosophy.) Consciousness is thus conceived as consciousness *embodied, incarnated*, and thus *spatialized*, in individual bodies, and subjectivist phenomenology (taking its orientation especially from Husserl and Merleau-Ponty) investigates human being on the uninterrogated preconception that it can be adequately conceived hermeneutically *as* individually embodied subjectivity. The embodiedness of subjectivity in individual bodies only reinforces the subject's ontological isolation and paves the way for conceiving robots as individual things that can cogitate algorithmically, just as Descartes proclaimed that we humans, as individual subjects, cogitate with the brain. The ontological fit of man-machine is thus construed (or rigged) as perfect from the outset. Such robots steered by (literally timeless) artificial intelligence can even be *built* on the basis of this ontological misconception, giving rise to the impotent critique of such endeavours by pointing out that such robots know nothing of deeply human, embodied emotions such as love and are incapable of making moral judgements.

Modern neuroscience seeks access to this hitherto inaccessible, encapsulated, interiorized consciousness (in contrast to an all-encompassing, universal, pre-spatial, temporally three-dimensional, open psyche) by probing the material brain to uncover the *location* of its hidden thought-processes and -functions that have to be

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4 "A disembodied cosmos beautifully ruling an empsyched body..." (κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἄρξων καλῶς ἐμψύχου σώματος Plato *Philebos* 64c). For Plato, the cosmos is ordered by reason (νοῦς 63c) and purposeful understanding (φρόνησις 63c) in the psyche which they inhabit (τὰς ψυχὰς ἐν αἷς οἰκοῦμεν 63d).

conceived somehow, via the construction of theoretical models, *as* 'nothing other than' the complicated firing of billions of neurons that, in principle, can be modelled via cybernetic algorithms. The patterns of firing neurons in particular parts of the brain are claimed to be correlated or even causally connected (usually from matter cast *as* cause to mind cast *as* effect) with specific mental functions, and this empirically determined correlation or asserted causality is then elided via an easy step into an identity: mental activity is said to be 'nothing other than', or at most an epiphenomenon of, brain activity which, in turn, is amenable to manipulation by modern science via specific techniques and technologies.

One of the major unresolved questions regarding embodied consciousness is how even one-dimensional time, and *memory* of the *past*, in particular, could somehow be *located spatially at all* in the *present* in a part of the brain. This is a further variant of the ubiquitously practised *spatialization* of time that has so easily passed muster throughout the entire philosophical tradition due to an originary misrecognition, i. e. distorted deconcealment, of the phenomenon of time itself (cf. 2.1.4 *Misconceived spatiality of time for the sake of artificial intelligence*). How are these postulated *present* traces of memory purportedly laid down in the brain recognizable *as* memories from a *past?* Is it the brain or consciousness that is supposed to perform the feat of recognizing a present, locatable, physical, cerebral trace *as* a trace of the past? This aporia is one of those springing from our living historically in the untruth of the phenomenon of time.

Conceiving, i. e. interpreting, the mind *as* encapsulated and embodied spatially in the individual human head with appropriate sensory channels of neuronal communication with its body and the external world entails that these individual consciousnesses have to somehow come into communication with each other to constitute a social world in its plurality. This is the ontological question concerning sociation (Vergesellschaftung) that must be at the heart of any social ontology and now becomes the temporalogical question at the heart of a social temporalogy. Language is the obvious candidate, as a means of communication, for this necessary medium of sociation, hence analytic (language) philosophy's concentration on it. Such a language must be shared; it cannot be each individual's private language, for otherwise there could be no genuine language and no communication. It would not be a medium at all. If language is proposed as the sociating medium, it is easily seen that this medium is not originary, since language can only articulate an already shared, deconcealed essencing in the world. Language always speaks about the world that is round about, the surroundings that are interpretively understood. How is language possible? How can it be always already shared, i. e. 'always already' without individual human beings already sharing a world? What is the originary or primal sharing of which mortals partake and language itself speaks?

It is no use evading and begging these questions by resorting to factual, evolutionary explanations, i.e. more or less plausible stories about how language itself came about excruciatingly slowly over aeons, starting with grunts and gesticulations exchanged, gradually evolving into a shared language somehow or other by convention in parallel to the evolution of the brain. Such flimsy narrative explanations can never amount to conceptualization and already presuppose that humans 'always already' share a world with one another without being able to say in what this sharing itself consists. The sharing is conceived only factually, say, as hordes of animals of a certain kind living together in a certain natural environment at a certain geographical location.

One steadfastly evades the question concerning the essence of language itself, resorting instead to the animal kingdom with the observation that all animals (and even plants) share a world communicatively with one another, in their own 'language', in so-called ecosystems, which is purportedly obvious to us human beings by 'objectively' observing them and even learning to decode this purported language. Linguists then claim that certain 'higher' animals (or even 'lower' ones, including plants) have their own rudimentary languages (conceived *as* means of communication) which they further investigate empirically, having already decided a priori that there is some kind of language there for communicating (e.g. to warn of danger, to ward off predators or indicate food sources, even via chemical transmitters along the roots of trees, etc.). Human beings are thereby conceived as being the evolutionarily most highly developed animals with the most highly developed, complex brain enabling speech, with language itself being cast in this seemingly plausible ontogenetic story as means of communication. They are then ostensibly just animals with better capacities and smarter, mainly due to a larger brain from which consciousness somehow emerged through biological evolution. It is overlooked that there can be no language without the ontological difference and its hermeneutic As. Consciousness is thus conceived as the epiphenomenon sitting atop, emerging from highly complicated brain functions that neuroscience is wont to interpret *as* calculations of some kind.

All this scientific investigation of the human as a subject endowed with consciousness proceeds as an investigation of *what* the human being is, an investigation in the 'objective' third person. Observations therefore have to be based on large enough samples to ensure objectivity. The subjective human subject has to be whatified, i.e. objectified, to gain distance from the merely subjective. The question concerning *who* the human is, is relegated, or shunted off, implicitly or explicitly to ethics, where the human gains the dignity of personhood. Ethics itself is an ancient, separate branch of philosophy, still serving today as a convenient way of compartmentalizing philosophical questions and discourses in silos so that they do not infiltrate and interfere with each other, even to the extent that some philoso-

phers are ethicists and others are metaphysicians, with little or no overlap between them. The compartment of philosophy known as ethics or moral philosophy with its notions of inviolable human dignity is a result of the failure of an adequate ontological conception of human being, i.e. ultimately, an adequate temporalogical conception of human essencing; the truncation of ontological inquiry to subjective whatness leaves ethics without a viable foundation, but this lack goes unnoticed. And drawing notice to the deficit is unwelcome.

Modern subjectivist metaphysics does have its ethics and morality which conceive the human *as* a *person* demanding *respect*, *who*se *dignity* as a human *should* be morally respected. Is not personhood a very weak notion of whoness that is grafted onto subjectivity as a kind of whatness? How is respect and dignity played out in sharing a social world? The Ought in this moral philosophy is counterposed to the Is, and Ought, as that which ought to be but isn't, falls short of Is. There is a cleavage, with the Is not only having the upper hand over an ultimately impotent Ought, but also without having its meaning laid out. The human therefore only *ought* to exist with dignity, but what existence itself means remains conceptually unexplicated within a phenomenology of whoness worthy of the name.

If dignity belongs intrinsically to human essencing, then it already essences, albeit possibly as a negation, a lack, an absence. On the basis of what ought to be (to essence temporally) there are today universal human rights as ideals and regulative principles for regulating the movements of mortal humans sociating globally. Does the conception of the human individual as a person demanding respect and treatment with dignity suffice to determine and disclose who the human is? In what, in detail, do phenomena of respect and dignity consist, and can they be conceived as phenomena pertaining specifically to human subjectivity? Do not respect and dignity have to be conceived temporalogically as a kind of existential movement? What is human dignity's origin, if it is not to be taken baldly as a self-sufficient, 'innate' idea – such as "All men are born equal"? Or can the phenomenon of whoness find an anchor in the person as the abstract bearer of rights demanding recognition and respect (starting with the right to life and private property rights) as in Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie?* Whence do such ideas come? How does the ethical personhood of human being relate to the modern casting of the human being *as* a subject with an interior consciousness and conscience, a kind of what? Is Hegel's answer to this question adequate? Do the modern rights of private property, that are closely associated with individual liberty exercised in the sociating medium of thingified value (as will be discussed in more detail; cf. 9 *Sociation through the medium of thingified value*), do violence to human possibilities of whoness? Is personhood supposed to capture the whoness of human being, whereas conscious subjectivity captures human existence's whatness? Or does this pair of ontological conceptions distort the truth of human essencing by con-

ceiving it as composed partly of whatness and partly of whoness? Are we living today in an ontological-existential 'lie' as regards whoness?

One might be inclined to say that human existence is a compositum of conscious subjectivity and ethical personhood, thus upholding the traditional compartmentalization of philosophy into metaphysics and ethics. All consciousness, however, as literally con-scientia or co-knowing, is a co-knowing of the self, hence *self*-consciousness, thus doubling consciousness into consciousness of external objects (including the physical body) and reflexive consciousness bending back internally onto the self. Is it accordingly this interior, asocial, as yet unsociated self of the self-conscious subject that demands from others respect as a person? But how – if the self of self-consciousness is inside the subject and thus as yet dissociated? Insofar, one might then say, the gap between conscious subjectivity and ethical personhood, i. e. between what and who, is supposed to be straddled by the selfhood of self-consciousness, with subjective conscience straddling the gulf between Is and Ought. But how could the reflexive self of interior self-consciousness as conscience share a world with others in such a way as to demand or command their respect as a person to be treated with dignity?

The self itself is encapsulated solipsistically in reflective self-consciousness which, for instance, in Kantian subjective idealism, assumes the guise of pure apperception of the transcendental ego accompanying all conscious representations or 'ideas' (Vorstellungen; cf. Chapter 5). What does such pure apperception constituting selfhood have to do with others? The problem lies with the very conception of consciousness itself as something individualized and embodied inside vis-à-vis an objective external world. What is the alternative? In the present inquiry we are confronted with the challenge of thinking through the whoness of mortals sharing the world with each other starting from our likewise shared individual human partaking – first of all, primally, through the psyche – of the openness of three-dimensional time. The all-encompassing, temporally three-dimensional psyche thus steps into the place occupied by the encapsulated interior consciousness of the subject.

The spatial dichotomy between the subject endowed with an *interior* consciousness and an *external*, objective world independent of subjective consciousness continues to hold sway today, as if it were an incontestable obviousness. The *inwardness* (Innerlichkeit) of subjective consciousness has long been a staple diet of metaphysical thinking, playing an especially prominent role in German idealism in an environment of romanticism in which inwardness is praised as an achievement of Christianity. Inwardness and interior, as well as their opposites, however, are *spatial* concepts that result from a spatialization of one-dimensional time (time, according to Kant, being the "inner sense" of encapsulated subjectivity). Space itself is left on the outside as the externality in which objects can spread

out next to each other, whereas linear time is internalized on the inside of consciousness as an inner experience of linear succession of representations. In preceding chapters, this conception of an inside/outside dichotomy has been abundantly shown to be a mere theoretical construction that is not true to the simple phenomena themselves. I turn now to another grave self-deception about who we are.

8.3.1 Survival of the human species through sustainability?

What if, in spite of all scientific, factual correctness and usefulness, a conception of psyche and mind proceeding from the ontohermeneutic cast of the human being as a species of animal status is untrue, i.e. untrue to the phenomena of psyche and mind themselves, and above all, to how we live and could live together on the Earth? What if the pathway to the pith of the human being via its animality, despite its seemingly inexhaustible promise of 'progress', is ultimately a calamitous dead-end? What if, despite the ubiquitous claims to the scientificity of 'our' investigations into the deeply fascinating 'animal kingdom' from the primates right down to the most inconspicuous insects and one-celled organisms, 'we' are not gaining independent, 'objective' knowledge, but are imagining *who* we are ourselves by looking into the mirror of animal behaviour and *interpreting* it *imaginatively* from the start in our own likeness? Since the purportedly subjective question of whoness remains out of bounds for this scientific worldview, we are then caught in our own mirror reflection by imagining ourselves to be a species of animal, i.e. a kind of what. Objective scientific knowledge as we know it can only be had on the basis of a tacit preconception of whatness. To this end, the phenomenality of whoness has to be repressed as merely subjective.

By way of illustration: one of the gravest consequences of the paradigm of the rational animal is the way the catastrophic climate change attributable to global warming is conceived *as* the dire question of and political struggle for the survival of the human species on planet Earth, alongside other species. The human animal as intelligent species is accordingly called on to employ its reason to understand how its own activities in the so-called anthropocene have caused environmental degradation that threatens its own survival, along with that of countless other species of animals and plants. The human species is thus urged by environmentalists of all stripes to employ its differentia specifica, i.e. its reason, to bring these environmentally devastating trends on the planet under control, to rein them in. To this end, advanced technologies are called for which represent the application of techno-scientific reason to control movement, the kind of reason that ostensibly counts in such a crisis, when theoretical and practical reason are united to become

effective. This obviates having to interrogate, more deeply and more painfully, *who* we are and confront ourselves with who we are become historically. That it is the conception of human being itself as a species of animality that is problematic, and that the issues of environmental destruction are not merely those of survival, nor of controlling deleterious movements through the application of techno-science, nor of making the difficult transition to sustainability, remain entirely beyond the horizon of such thinking. These issues of our own deep-hermeneutic misconceptions of ourselves and the world remain painlessly invisible. The danger to human essencing itself has long since been at work without being noticed, and today it is silently reaching its crescendo at the ever-progressing dead-end of a long and overly successful historical trajectory of Western thinking. Due to this obliviousness, it could even be asked whether the survival of the human species could go along with 'extinction', i.e. the utter degeneration, of human essencing itself to algorithmic whatness. Techno-science is driven by the underlying absolute will to power over movement, whereas our sharing the world in the modern age is lubricated by a sociating medium whose hold on us *as* who we are has hardly even begun to be fathomed, as we shall see (cf. 9 *Sociation through the medium of thingified value*).

8.4 Temporalogical casting of whoness

> ...as you grow older you will find that
> people are estimated in the world
> by the results they have obtained at the Varsity.
> Siegfried Sassoon
> *Memoirs of a Fox-hunting Man*

We come now finally to the task of outlining an alternative cast of human essencing as whoness. If, in a radical da capo back to redrafting and recasting the questions concerning the most elementary, decisive phenomena, human *essencing* itself is cast first of all from the psyche conceived as a belonging-to the three-dimensional temporal openness (as attempted here in Chapter 1), this alternative hermeneutic cast may rightly be termed *temporalogical.* What is the fundamental temporalogical concept of whoness? Essents of all kinds essence in the psyche, thereby deconcealing themselves estimatively for the psyche's understanding (cf. 3.8 *Estimative deconcealing of essents*). In the course of conceptual development, the psyche has been individuated by virtue of places' having been conceded space in time and thence individual human bodies' partaking of the openness of three-dimensional time (cf. 2.6 *Sense perception, physical reality and bodily individuation* and

subsequent sections). The empsyched mortal individual human is thus alive, i.e. capable of leading its life under the guidance of understanding and will, for as long as its body is able to partake of the psychic-temporal openness. Such living is not merely survival, as in scientific evolution theory, but existential in a sense requiring explicit conceptualization rather than flowery linguistic gestures toward 'human flourishing'.

The psychic quivering with time in the gamut of moods of a time passes to resonances and attunements in the body and its various organs. The individual, empsyched mortal body understands its own movements in the world, including its bodily movements, and understands them as emanating from its *self* as the starting-point, or ἀρχή, of movement and insofar as an individual *power* (δύναμις) of bodily movement. Essencing existentially as the spontaneous starting-point of its own life-movements, which comprise far more than bodily movements, constitutes the kernel of the individual's *freedom* in a shared world. As we shall see, the characteristic existential movement of human individuals' leading their respective lives is that of *mutually estimative power interplay.*

Mortal human existence therefore amounts first of all to leading a finite life in which the individual estimates its own life-movements (pleasing, displeasing, indifferent, praiseworthy, shameful, generous, mean, etc.), thus coming to a *self-estimation* of *who* it is itself from which its *self-esteem* is also accretively shaped. These existential life-movements are actions proceeding from the self, consisting not only of those actions undertaken in the present, but also in the other two temporal dimensions of past and future. The individual's self that estimates how the individual is leading its life performs this ongoing estimation of who it is, i.e. of as who it is essencing, through all three temporal dimensions. It has ambitions, thus evaluatively projecting who it will or may become in aspirations and lack thereof, and it also bears responsibility for its past actions that weigh upon or elevate its self-estimation of who it has been. In *reflecting* on its actions, it estimates not only its past actions as good or bad, useful or useless, competent or incompetent, praise- or blameworthy, embarrassing, shameful, etc., but also its *intended* actions through which it casts its self into the future. Such self-estimation, on reflection, can be cause for pride or shame, either bolstering or diminishing self-esteem. Because three-dimensional time has been passed through to it as a unity in the fourth temporal dimension (cf. 1.2 *The fourth temporal dimension*), the individual maintains its unified self as the centre of its existential time throughout its life. As who it presences as a self from the three temporal dimensions for its self-estimation continues for as long as the individual mortal is able to partake of three-dimensional time.

This temporally three-dimensional estimation of its willed, existential action constitutes initially the individual's *self-estimation* and *self-esteem.* It is only an in-

itial concept of self-esteem as *self*-reflective because the individual itself is not the only one who estimates how it leads its life in actions through the exercise of its will. There are also the *others* with whom it shares the world who similarly engage estimatively with all kinds of essents, including especially other individuals whose – past, present or projected future – actions presence in their individualized minds insofar as they are deconcealed one way or another, plainly or deceptively, misleadingly, ambiguously and thus exposed to estimation by others. In this way the individual's self-esteem accretes the others' estimation of as who it essences; insofar self-esteem is more than a self-reflection, but a *shining-back* (Widerschein, reflection) from the world of others (cf. 8.4.2 *Contradictoriness of selfhood*).

The estimative shining-back from the world of others gives the individual its *reputation* that amounts mainly to an estimation by others of how the individual has led its life, performing actions that per force are estimated one way or another insofar as they are deconcealed to them one way or another in others' understanding. This deconcealment of as who the individual in question essences, presencing in and absencing from others' minds, is generally by word-of-mouth that passes on the opinions of how 'people' in general estimate the given individual's actions. The others' estimation of *as who* the individual essences is hermeneutic, as indicated by the 'as', i.e. its deconcealment deconceals *for* others' hermeneutic understanding in their very estimation of that individual. Estimation and interpretation go together; estimation itself is hermeneutic. An individual's reputation can be either good, bad or middling, inevitably estimated ambiguously or even controversially. The deconcealment can be entirely deceptive, as in the cast of an impostor, or only partially so. Depreciative word-of-mouth can amount to *slander* and *defamation*, resulting in a reputation of *notoriety*, whereas appreciative word-of-mouth may amount to consolidating an individual's *fame.* An individual's who-standing can be promoted superficially by being presented in a dazzling light to a likewise superficially estimating public.[5]

To recapitulate briefly da capo: in the first place human essencing consists in i) mental focusing on essents as they presence and absence in the psychic imagination for the mind's understanding and ii) resonating with the psyche's temporal openness in one mood or another. Such is mental movement in three-dimensional time. iii) The mind can also, in particular, track the movement of essents essencing in the world, deconcealing and concealing themselves in all three temporal dimensions, either sensuously in the present or non-sensuously, whereby the essents themselves are estimated, evaluated one way or another whilst interpreting

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5 Cf. my *Phänomenologie der Männlichkeit* 1999 and 'Worldsharing and Encounter: Heidegger's ontology and Lévinas' ethics' 1997–2011.

them one way or another. Not all these tracked essents are physical ones requiring sense perception. iv) The human individual can also itself engage bodily in all sorts of practices under the guidance of understanding in the form of know-how of many different kinds apart from productive know-how. Such engagement is willed, intentional, proceeding from the individual as free starting-point. Individuals also move themselves in the world taking care of their daily affairs in which they also necessarily v) *encounter* others who are similarly engaged. Any such engagement involves encountering others who are *estimated* as who they essence for hermeneutic understanding. This hermeneutic estimation is necessarily also reciprocal in an *interplay* of mutual, interpretive who-estimation.

A mutually estimative encounter usually essences initially sensuously in the present, and that by gaining a first estimative impression and understanding of the other. The other's body is generally the first to presence, especially visually, but also aurally, olfactorily or even tactilely. Such bodying of the other, whether mediated by a technological medium or not, is necessarily always already hermeneutically estimative, including not only physical features such as (especially) the face, the hair, the voice, but also the other's clothes, skin colour or ethnicity through which he or she indicates much of as who he or she essences in the world's estimation, an estimative understanding contaminated to a greater or lesser degree by (racial, religious, gender, national or other) prejudice. What the other wears, how s/he dresses, deconceals the other's who-status and self-esteem. Skin colour and race, as deconcealed through the body, triggers prejudices of a global nature. Such existential bodying in estimative encounter underscores that the body is not merely something physical, not merely a corpus, but always already immersed in the who-game of mutual hermeneutic estimation.

Narcissism, the phenomenon of estimative captivation by one's own mirror-image, consists in an ultimately futile, constantly endangered attempt to derive one's self-esteem wholly from overblown self-reflective self-esteem, like trying to pull oneself up by one's own bootstraps. A narcissist's self-stand is necessarily shaky. My self-movements in the world, an exercise of the power of self-movement, require negotiations with others who are likewise engaged in taking care of themselves, including through ongoing self-estimation. Our encounters with one another are therefore not merely *interplays* of reciprocal estimation in which, above all, our powers and abilities are estimated appreciatively or depreciatively, but also often of mutual agreement, either tacit or explicit, that allows our life-movements to dovetail co-operatively with each other, mutually furthering each of our ends.

8.4.1 Intermeshing of self-movements through estimative interplay

The *temporalogy of the movement of interplay* remains a question requiring expli-
cation as a radical alternative to the traditional *ontology of productive movement*
that implicitly assumes one-dimensional time in accordance with the schemata of
cause and effect (as if the outcomes of power interplays could, in principle, be
mono- or multi-causally explained rather than the more subtle endeavour to un-
derstand the phenomena). The movement of mutual, estimative interplay is a (so-
ciating) movement with its own temporalogy whose conception proceeds explicitly
from three-dimensional time. To approach this temporalogical question, it is best
to start from a simple situation in which only two individuals enter into mutually
estimative interplay under the guidance of their understanding wills that proceed
from each as the spontaneous starting-point of its actions. Each individual is some-
who first of all as a partaker of shared three-dimensional time in which its who-
ness as self extends into and occupies the three temporal dimensions of as who it
has essenced (its personal history), as who it essences in the present through its
current engagement with the world, and also as who it projects itself to essence
in the future through its plans, ambitions, aspirations, wishes, expectations, etc.
Each who in its stretchedness into the three temporal dimensions thus has its
uniquely singular whoness with its own, unique, temporal profile, and moves itself
in the world in its own singular direction, perhaps haphazardly and discontinuous-
ly, under the impetus of its own motivations and desires and in accordance with
how it estimates its own individual powers and abilities as fit for interplay with
others. Individual self-movement proceeding from oneself is a *power of self-move-
ment*; I *can* move myself existentially according to my free will and in line with my
abilities.

   This self-movement is *free* in the sense that it proceeds from an individual self
of its own free will (sua sponte), but this does not entail that the self-movement
proceeds without friction and resistance, principally because it has to *negotiate*
its own self-movement with the self-movement of others who are likewise embed-
ded in their own temporally three-dimensional whoness-profile that renders each
individual temporally complex. *Freedom of self-movement* is thus negotiated in per-
petual power interplay with others as the temporarily settled, reciprocal freedom
of life-movement that eventually comes to be solidified and enshrined in *rights* (cf.
9.5 *Freedom*).

   In the case of just two individuals, how are their existential self-movements in
the respective complex temporalities of their whoness as singular selves to *inter-
mesh?* For the most part, they do not intermesh at all, so that the individuals
are entirely indifferent to each other, their existential paths do not cross, and
there is no interplay between them. There is no existential overlap at all in the

temporal essencing of their respective whonesses as each moves in the world. In other cases there is overlap and a possibility of existential intermesh by mutual agreement when there is some *complementarity* in the individuals' future self-movements amounting to a *mutual enabling* of life-movements. This complementarity may consist in shared interests of any kind, or in one offering a good or service that the other desires, as in the case of a dentist and his or her patients who desire to have their teeth cared for professionally, or any kind of commercial transaction. There has to be some kind of *intermesh* of whoness, no matter how limited, no matter how passing, for any actual interplay in the present on the basis of mutual agreement to come about. The interplay may be as minimal as the simple transaction of buying an ice-cream in a shop in which the customer is estimated as possessing the purchase price of an ice-cream and the shopkeeper is estimated as being able to offer a tasty ware. The interplay of *politeness*, too, is often of this minimal kind, since each individual has incorporated in its self-esteem (i. e. already in the past) that, for the sake of its *own* self-respect viewing him- or herself in the mirror of self-estimation, it will at least refrain from treating the other depreciatively or disparagingly and will remain 'decent' by not descending into the 'gutter'. Saying 'thank you' to a stranger in a transitory situation in the present is of this minimal kind of interplay that only scarcely amounts to a mutual intermeshing of two individual, temporally complex whonesses.

At the other end of the spectrum, the complementarity of the complex, temporally three-dimensional whoness of two individuals may initiate their mutual, *free* decision to share their existential paths through life with one another, thus intimately *intertwining* them. Such intertwining is not merely momentary or in the present, but entails an existential *plaiting* of all three temporal dimensions into which each unique whoness extends. In any case, the intermeshing of two singular who-temporalities, proceeding as it does from two free starting-points and dependent upon the possibilities of *future* projected, intertwined self-movements in three-dimensional time, is incalculable, unpredictable and most likely also periodically intractable or retractable, with considerable frictional losses. The existential plaiting requires that both endeavour to understand and estimate each other in their full temporally three-dimensional complexity, especially as who each has essenced in the past, right down to each who's present singular sensibilities carried over from this past.

The intertwining of life-paths is anything other than a mere *superposition* of the one path upon the other, that is, for as long as the one individual does not slavishly submit to the other and become abjectly servile and unfree by renouncing its own power of existential self-movement. The individual's existential path through life has three, genuinely independent temporal dimensions that defies any causal explanation, no matter how many ostensible 'variables' and 'factors' are put into

any supposed 'psychological-existential' equation. Drama, in particular, is an art-form that investigates and plays with this incalculability in exploring the intrica-cies of how an individual existential path unfolds through all its vicissitudes. The complexity and incalculability of this existential path is raised exponentially when one considers the possibility or (un)likelihood of two different individual ex-istential paths' becoming intertwined on the basis of affirmative mutual estima-tion, perhaps even intertwining tightly to the point of symbiotic existential stran-gulation.

What is said here of the complexity, incalculability and unlikelihood of actual mutual intertwining coming about between two individuals carries over to the sit-uation of interplay among several or many or very many individuals, each of whom is to be regarded, at least formally, as the free starting-point of its own, in-dividually willed actions. How is it possible for individual free wills to become uni-fied, or even partially so, at all? This is often referred to as the formation of a *col-lective* will, especially in politics, formed from individual subjects. Is collective subjective will organized in some way by democratic government through political power interplays to gain electoral majorities the only viable option for a unifica-tion of many individual wills? Does a collective will not presuppose a deeper-lying sharing of the understanding and moods of an historical time embedded in a culture of affirmative mutual estimation? Be that as it may, the formation of a collective will (through elections or some kind of mutual consensus) is subject to *inertia* that increases exponentially with the size of the group coming to a col-lective decision through some sort of deliberation to act concertedly in a particular direction. Such inertia plays out as conservatism in politics and cultural life. In the case of collective decision-making, each individual in the group, each immersed and stretched in its own complex, ecstatic, personal, three-dimensional temporal-ity, has its own perspective on the prudence, feasibility and desirability of future-oriented actions.

Such is the perspective on collectivity starting from individualized humans, but this starting-point is itself only the result of an individuation from the emp-sychment in a more originary, shared three-dimensional time, with its own Zeit-Geist, of which all those living in a given age necessarily partake *together.* By virtue of this shared temporal partaking, there is a fundamental, more or less uniform and stable, categorial understanding that pertains epochally, gathering all, and in-itiating all, from the start, into a shared *we-ness,* prior to any need for the collec-tivization of individual wills, that inevitably remains invisible, implicit. The con-temporaries of an age also share its undulating moods' rising and falling and are swept along by them.

More needs to be said here about how two individuals *encounter each other* in the shared world as they lead their lives.[6] Such encounters happen (i.e. presence) in the present when each focuses in the moment on the other's presence and self-presentation as *who* he or she singularly essences in complex, three-dimensional temporality. Such self-presentation is necessarily also momentarily assessed, estimated some way or another, even to the extreme of ignoring the other's presence altogether. We mortals do not conduct ourselves toward each other as things, as whats, but, from the outset and without a further thought, treat each other *as* whos, albeit often in deficient or downright demeaning ways that are determinate negations of whoness, and that even to the point of *whatifying* the other, a tendency that is only reinforced through the *thingification of value* that has yet to be discussed (cf. 9 *Sociation through the medium of thingified value*). More often than not we miss the mark of proper estimation of the other and thus either exaggerate (e.g. in flattery) or fall short (through disparagement or disdain) (cf. ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις *Eth. Nic.* B5 1106b30). The self-presentation of the other in the present presences not only the one individual's 'snap-shot', 'first impression' view at that moment, but brings the entire temporal three-dimensionality of other's whoness into play in a *trifocal* view that is always already estimative (and not somehow initially 'objective'). A cursory, superficial, temporally trifocal view of the other will be necessarily deficient and leave much concealed or only distortedly or falsely deconcealed about who the other is. The factual truth of the other's whoness, i.e. how the other's life-path is to be appropriately estimated and appraised, remains fragmentary, largely concealed and the corresponding assessment is thus more or less cursory and perfunctory. The other's whoness presents itself to others largely encumbered by various deficiencies of untruth, especially those of bias and prejudice arising implicitly from one's own self-estimation as superior.

To come to a more complete deconcealment, the encounter must extend beyond the present moment to allow enhanced deconcealment of who the other is in its full temporal three-dimensionality. The other's past is revealing, as well as its future prospects and projected direction. Both complement an estimative view of the other's present engagement with the world through its practical actions. The mutual deconcealment of as who each essences for the other is generally called 'getting to know each other' and can last a lifetime. The first encounter with the other is only a potential gateway to a deeper, fuller, less ambiguous deconcealment. Such fuller deconcealment of whoness does not enable any greater predictive foresight as to the other's future actions, at least insofar as the other remains the free starting-point of its own life-movements, its own actions, thus perhaps de-

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6 Cf. my 'Worldsharing and Encounter: Heidegger's ontology and Lévinas' ethics' 1997–2011.

ciding to make surprisingly radical turns in its existential course. The extrapolation into the future of how the other has 'always' conducted itself up to the present may well be erroneous, since the other has its future dimension as an independent, i.e. non-linear, open temporal dimension into which it *can* project its future plans and actions. The other remains singular and its life-movements unsubsumable under any kind of psychological 'laws of motion'. The other's own estimative view of the world may and will change in a re-vision according to its own past life-experience through which it comes to a more nuanced understanding of the world's essencing – or conversely: its own life-experience may lead it to a more narrow-minded, bigoted and biased view of the world in which it refuses to pay heed to the complexity and subtlety with which the world's essencing in three-dimensional time deconceals itself.

This implies that 'getting to know each other' remains always inconclusive and also that the mutual estimation of each other in its whoness remains fluid for as long as, and insofar as, the two individuals share their lives, perhaps only intermittently and in one-sidedness or superficiality, with each other. The sharing of two individuals' lives – as in friendship, appreciating (hermeneutically) *as* who each other essences – amounts to an intermeshing of the temporalities of their respective whoness through which a mutual interpretive deconcealment of as who each essences eventuates. Such getting-to-know each other is itself haphazard, amounting to an intermittent deconcealing of this or that aspect of as who the other essences from any of the three temporal dimensions of its life. The deconcealment may even be deceptive, amounting thus to partial concealment. Through the mutual interchange the other gains various different impressions of the other's whoness, not only with respect to the past but also with respect to present and future. The other's whoness is deconcealed estimatively as a composite patchwork put together through temporal hip-hopping from one 'revelation' to another, whilst inevitably leaving also concealing blanks. Piecing together and estimating as who the other essences in its individualized three-dimensional temporality, itself requires a temporally trifocal mental vision to come to an estimative appraisal. This revelatory estimation itself remains necessarily subject to revision, depending upon as who the other reveals itself to essence through the course of the mutual intermeshing of lives in encounters that may ebb and flow in intensity.

8.4.2 Contradictoriness of selfhood

A principal contradiction of whoness is that who you are yourself, i.e. as who you essence as your self in your singularity is an identificatory reflection of estimation from others that itself plays out in a temporally three-dimensional interplay. Your

selfhood is not merely a result of the self-contained, estimative reflection of self-consciousness upon itself, as if self-estimation were a matter of *individual*, co-knowing conscience. In this sense, selfhood is otherhood. You are who you are not. This is a contradiction, a contradictory unity of identity and difference, but now temporally complex. You become your self, reflecting on your self in self-esteem, only mediated via estimative reflection from others in temporally three-dimensional interplay with them, most of whom lead their lives in average everydayness.[7] The contradiction can lead to your losing yourself, i.e. your independent stand in your selfhood (Selbständigkeit), to the others, especially in their average normality, through becoming dependent upon their estimation to which you (strive to) *conform* which, in turn, will reduce the friction in the power interplays through which you lead your life. Even in maintaining an independent stand in your selfhood, you need the others' encouragingly affirmative or even discouragingly disparaging estimative reflection to become and essence as your 'self-standing' (selbständig, independent) self, even to the point of confronting the others, conversely, with your own estimation of them, since selfhood itself is not a substantial perduring presence in itself as the nuggety kernel self of self-consciousness, but relationally reflective and dynamic in ongoing *mutually* estimative interplay, as a consequence of your always already sharing a world with others in estimative power interplays with others through which contradictions of opposed life-movements are continually resolved one way or another.

Thus independence and dependence, standing in your self and hanging on others, are intertwined in a moving *contradiction* that is your life-movement, accompanied and attuned by the undulations of uplifting and downcasting moods. At either of the extreme poles of selfhood, you run the risk of self-annihilation. To become your self requires that you identify your self in the mirror with possibilities for existing in the world on offer from this shared world, existential possibilities which you yourself must estimate one way or another. Such existential possibilities may be exemplified by others whom you emulate, especially as an adolescent and young adult. This reflective identification with difference is invariably mediated by certain key, singular others whose appreciative or depreciative estimation of who you are and who you could become are pivotal for your own self-esteem, thus sending you existentially in one direction rather than the other in casting your future life-movements. A world offering you a palette of existential possibilities with which to identify, within whose reflection you cannot, in your own estimation, find your singular self, brings the contradiction of selfhood to a head. The world remains alien. Your refusal or inability to self-identify with any

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7 Cf. Section 3.3.1.4 of my *Social Ontology of Whoness* (2019b) on selfhood.

of the existential options on offer from the world amounts to existential alienation arising from your own depreciative estimation of those options. Devaluation of and resistance against the selves offered by reflections from the world may strengthen your resilience to take and shape a singular self-stand in the face of being singled out as an eccentric or enfant terrible by the others.

All this is only possible because your very selfhood, or who-standing in the world, is a temporally three-dimensional, estimatively bidirectional reflection from the world whose movement is a temporally three-dimensionally stretched power interplay. As who you essence is always already caught in such temporally estimative reflections (Widerschein, shining-back, relucence) imbued with both affirmative and detractive aspects in either uplifting or downcasting moods. Your self-esteem is either buoyed or it sinks just as, conversely, your estimation of the world does, perhaps in angry repudiation of the existential options it offers. As who you essence as self is also as who you essenced earlier, as reflected in your recognized achievements or lack thereof, and also as who you may one day essence through realizing your potentials and abilities as assessed, and perhaps mediated, by others in the present, that, due to discouragement, may result even in your utter lack of ambition to 'make' something of your self in future by developing your powers and abilities. The existential movement of becoming who you are in the world is one of reflective power interplay through which your identity as self is continually shaped and reshaped, oscillating in a to-and-fro between independence and dependence, neither of whose extremes is viable.

Most of the existential possibilities for self-identification offered by the world are indifferent to you, just as are those others indifferent to you who embody such existential options for selfhood you deem to be 'beneath you'. You find no reflection in them, no shining-back of an attractive existential possibility. Certain other such existential possibilities and other whos embodying them are not indifferent at all, but rather are appropriate as belonging to you in self-identity, i. e. they offer an enticing possibility of self-identification that is initially futural. These certain others, who are usually older and established in their self-stands, serve as *role models*, as inspiring figures to be emulated. You adopt a mask of whoness as part of your very own, singular identity, perhaps from someone whom you emulate, and strive to fulfil it, to fill it out, thus fulfilling your self-defined existential potential (δύναμις) in an interplay with the world that is always also a power interplay.

In confronting such existential possibilities of self-casting, invariably mediated by certain others with whom you share your world, you come into an opposition with or resistance from such possibilities, for they do not yet belong to your identity; they are as yet withheld. You reflect upon your self, understanding your selfhood in a certain positive way, but the reflection from the world offering an alter-

native existential possibility of self-identification confronts you as somewho who you are not (yet), i.e. as a possible existential cast of self negating your present self. You essence presently as who you are become in actuality and also 'simultaneously' as who you could potentially essence, thus an *opposition* of existential self-castings reflected in three-dimensional existential time. Once this opposition sharpens into an *existential contradiction* through your identifying your self with whom you are not, it can only be resolved in your own existential movement of becoming who you are *not* that may be more or less momentous, more or less existentially dramatic, constituting an existential crisis (κρίσις, decision) in your life demanding a decision one way or the other as to your own existential direction. The contradictoriness of selfhood is resolved in your own life-movements toward essencing as who you cast yourself to essence in future. Your self-casting is a continual hermeneutic process of understanding the existential possibilities reflected by the world that are refracted in your appropriation of them as your very own, through which you also come to understand yourself.

To become the self as whom you cast yourself to essence later is an existential movement and hence a struggle to realize a self-casting as an acknowledged status affirmed estimatively by reflections from the world, through which your self-stand is vindicated or else ultimately denied by others, especially by the world at large. Such existential struggle of self-casting entails not only the sobriety of self-appraisal, but inevitably also power interplays with others, often as agents of institutions requiring conformity to a certain 'normal' cast of selfhood as otherhood that invariably is articulated in certain 'self-evident' and expected norms of behaviour and customs with which, through your *own* estimation, you may not be able to identify. These others may be on your side, or they may be against you, which amounts to their estimating your potential affirmatively or disparagingly, even to the point of writing you off. A given culture and society lays down a certain spectrum of socially acceptable casts of selfhood offering you possibilities to exercise your powers and abilities to gain a set of who-masks more or less of your very own choice that is esteemed within that specific culture and society. Particularly attractive who-masks of identity include those promising enhancement of social power through acquiring wealth, being appointed to a position wielding corporate or state power, winning political office in some capacity, or attaining fame and celebrity status in the public's eyes.

The customary cultural practices of a given society go hand in glove with a certain mentality, a certain cast of mind or mind-set, through which that culture and society is understood. Such a cultural cast of mind includes the set of acceptable who-masks on offer for you to become your self, whilst excluding other who-masks that are not estimated highly or are downright denigrated and regarded as perverse or dangerously subversive, especially by questioning the world's status

quo. Who-masks include offers of gender identity in a given culture in a more or less narrow spectrum. Such inevitably conservative socio-cultural mind-sets do not reach as deep as the fundamental, historically malleable, hermeneutic cast of world on which the world rests and shapes up in an age, 'as if' it were necessarily and self-evidently that way, without any viable or even conceivable alternative. There is a multiplicity of cultures, customs, cultural practices and cultural mind-sets within a given historical hermeneutic cast, each of which can be investigated factually, i.e. empirically, to gain knowledge of them and to discourse on them, often in a political context, say, of identity politics, but the ontological (or now: temporalogical), hermeneutic cast of mind of an age transgresses cultural borders, since its castings are not only historically seldom, but more elementary and universal.

The character of the human as 'free', in particular, demands a fundamental temporalogical investigation of freedom as a universal and fundamental mode of human essencing (together with its determinate negations in unfreedom), despite the many different and even opposed cultural conceptions of human freedom whose contradictions can only be clarified and resolved against the universal touchstone of how human essencing per se, as existential movement, is to be conceived as free. Freedom per se remains an open philosophical question demanding hermeneutic thinking-through to sift out inadequate conceptions of freedom in a given age (cf. 9.5 *Freedom*).

The constitution of selfhood itself as a mode of essencing through estimative reflection in interplay with others, with the world in general, already shows that it breaks with the longstanding predominant ontology of whatness with its core concept of οὐσία, i.e. *substance* or standing and enduring presence, here, in a core self or I of self-consciousness. Because it is rooted in the mutually estimative interplay of sociation, whoness is not substantial, and this is not a deficiency. Rather it is a recognition of the character of temporal human essencing itself as 'always already' *shared*, *moving* human essencing, i.e. Mitsein, Miteinandersein, starting with i) the *commonality* of mind in three-dimensional psychic temporality and the cast of the essencing of essents historically shaping it hermeneutically, ii) the individuation of the psyche via the empsychment of individual bodies into a plurality of individuals and iii) the *relational*, sociating power interplay of mutual estimation among many mortals sharing a world. It makes no sense to (continue to) start by conceiving the single human (τὸ ἕκαστον) as a what-being with certain properties or capacities, psychology or personality, in particular, as an animal with certain specifying capacities defining 'man' (der Mensch) as an evolutionarily evolved species.

8.4.3 Who or what: interplay or interaction among powers?

It should be plain by now that each of us is only constituted as a self through one's own hermeneutic reflection upon existential possibilities offered by the world, their refraction in being incorporated into one's self, and the reflective estimation of this selfhood by the world of others. As a self each of us is dependent on others not merely factually, but temporalogically for our very selfhood, i. e. our individual stand in our selves as who each of us individually essences. This can be further elaborated. We acknowledge and *estimate each other* as selves in our basic understanding, and conduct ourselves toward each other in our life-movements accordingly, either affirmatively or detractively, continually esteeming and disesteeming each other. Mutual estimation and esteem in interplay, including their determinate negations, lie at the core of whoness. With this a further deficiency of the cast of human being as self-conscious subjectivity becomes apparent: conceiving the human being in the isolation of third-person whatness occludes the view of the dynamic relationality of estimative encounter in the first and second persons. Mutually estimative, power interplay is a kind of reciprocal, mirroring movement, which renders whoness as a special kind of essencing in shared three-dimensional time that is not restricted to the present and certainly not to the sensuous present.

Estimating the who-status of a known historical figure from the past, for instance, is an estimative, power interplay whose reciprocity consists in a transference to a contretemps among contemporaries over an appropriate estimation of the historical figure that, in turn, is based upon how the figure was estimated in power interplays during his or her own lifetime and how that figure him- or herself responded to and played this estimative power interplay, and this against the foil of present-day criteria of whoness. Estimating power interplays of the past from the present is an hermeneutic task requiring sensibility in dealing interpretively with a temporally far off time. The situation in the historical past must be brought to presence and appropriately understood as such-and-such, perhaps even from within a radically different historical mind-set with a different temporalogical cast which, in turn, requires breaking out of the hermeneutic circle of the present age.

To focus now on the present: the other is another self leading a life analogous to my leading my own life, whereby such leading is always under the guidance of a conventional, habituated way of life or some plan or project, no matter how 'planless' and vague, conceived by the understanding and directed toward the future, even deficiently so, as in the case of those trapped in hopelessness and despair who can see no future for their selves; they have been denied the reflections of anything but depreciative existential options. Each of us is able to cast our singular self into the future according to how we imaginatively prefigure our active future

by virtue of the imagination's free movement through three-dimensional temporality. Each individual self is an origin, an ἀρχή, i.e. an individual δύναμις or power, of its own life-movements that of necessity intermesh either smoothly or gratingly with the life-movements of others through various kinds of estimative interchanges. These constitute the sociating movement within the temporalogical scaffolding of mutual estimation *as* somewho, which is subject to historical recasting. Who is estimated as great and who as insignificant depends on the historical cast of whoness in a given age.

In our own age, being the *origin of one's very own life-movements* – and insofar a power – under the guidance of one's own temporally three-dimensional, imaginative understanding may be conceived as the core of human *freedom*, which cannot consist in isolated autonomy free from any restrictions but, if at all, is played out in the movement of mutually estimative, power interplays. To be free, such power interplays require the freedom of movement afforded by the three degrees of freedom of three 'linearly independent' dimensions of time. Respecting such self-guided life-movements of someone else constitutes the core of acknowledging and understanding the other *as* a person, i.e. *as* a who, rather than *as* a what to be merely manipulated. Hence *personhood* itself is rooted in the dynamic interplay of mutual estimation of who we are as individuals, which amounts to respect for the other's freedom as somewho leading his or her own life in the *play of freedom.* Hence we are not born free, but only potentially so, and that only relative to the spectrum of estimatively graded existential options on offer in a given culture in a given age. Respect for the other's freedom does not amount, of course, to allowing the other's self-movements entirely without hindrance, since mutually estimative interplay is always also a power play. Even an opponent in a power play calls for respect as somewho, which affects the rules of play, but by no means dissipates the *resistance* offered by the intertwined movements of sociated living in ongoing power interplays that necessarily involve, in part, also consent, agreement, consensus and/or compromise.

Human sociation consists in the intermeshing of life-movements in the world, and such intermeshing cannot be conceived simply *as* the interaction between physical bodies as undertaken by the physical sciences, nor *as* the interaction between psyches as investigated objectively by modern psychology with a view toward *predicting* or even manipulating such interactions. The causal *interaction* between physical bodies (whats) (or whos conceived *as* whats) along one-dimensional linear time under active and reactive powers has to be distinguished from the playful power *interplay* among persons (whos) in three-dimensional time that invokes certain rules of play respecting the other as a free person who demands appropriate estimation in dignified treatment. Interchanges of all kinds must be *negotiated* with the others throughout life in power interplays of mutual estimation that re-

solve mutual resistances. A trivial instance: you politely *ask* someone to step aside rather than pushing them aside wordlessly by physical force like a thing, thus negotiating, no matter how tacitly, your own self-movement with the other's self-movement by mutual agreement based on mutual estimation as persons. Rules of politeness are followed in such an interplay. More generally, *norms* of social intercourse derive ultimately from the more fundamental, mutually estimative power interplays among whos, each of whom – at least in our own age in the West – is a person demanding respect.

Utterly thwarting and preventing, ultimately by superior physical power (e.g. brute strength, incarceration, mobster 'liquidation' or military force), the self-movements of another person leading his or her own life amounts to robbing them of their freedom, which has to be *justified* in the context of personal whoness if any phenomenon resembling freedom is to maintain its plausibility. The state ultimately resorts to physical violence to defend itself against individuals and groups thereof that challenge its authority. Hindering somewho's self-movement in daily life by physical force is generally unjust, an infringement of personhood. To rob somewho of their freedom of movement whilst respecting the other as a person (somewho) is a question of the *justice of punishment* administered by a legitimated superior social instance – as a rule a judiciary – whereas to train a dog or a horse to obey one's commands is not conceived *as* robbing the dog or horse of its freedom, since freedom makes sense only for persons, for whos, who are the starting-points for their own existential life-movements, that are always also tinged by estimative interplay with the world. A brumby ranging 'free' in the wild is not free, although its movements in the wild are unhindered, at least by humans. Curtailment of a who's freedom of life-movement has to be justified by basically respecting the who as a person who *rightly deserves* punishment and may gain insight into his or her own wrong-doing; it must not be arbitrary. Such wrong-doing invariably involves the infringement of the socially acknowledged rules of power interplay that underpin living together. By contrast, capturing a brumby from the wild and breaking it in is an arbitrary human act that needs no justification as being rightful, although criteria of non-cruelty may apply. (This leaves aside the attempt by certain humans to extend the rights of personhood to animals.)

Conceptions of punishment according to which it is necessary to train, i.e. to impel by loss of freedom and punitive acts of physical force, a criminal not to re-offend give rise to controversy as to the justness of the punishment so conceived as deterrence, which amounts to understanding the criminal as a *what* (a kind of animal) requiring behavioural conditioning rather than as a *who* demanding due respect and *estimation* as a free self and person who, in turn, is able to estimate his or her own conduct. Someone can indeed be understood and treated *as* a what or *as* a who, which amounts to a *contradiction* of injustice between whatness and

whoness calling to be resolved ultimately with regard to appropriate temporalogical conceptions of justice itself and hence of just punishment and just treatment of prisoners of all kinds. The contradiction between punishment either as deterrence of further, would-be criminal acts or as rehabilitation of the offender as a free person is lived out also in the practices of penal institutions, where just punishment wavers on the line of its negation in unjust maltreatment, torture and brutality.

How does the explicit recognition and conceptualization of both whatness and whoness enable the compartmentalization that has reigned between metaphysics and ethics since the Greeks to be overcome? If the movement of whats (including whos as whats) can be conceived as the interaction between and among powers, forces, invariably with the aim of controlling or predicting it, the sociating movement of whos has to be conceived as mutually estimative power interplay, with the aim of understanding the many nuances of the phenomenon. This indicates already a fundamental 'paradigm shift' for thinking, to employ a hackneyed term often used in contemporary epistemology. Ontology traditionally investigates the essence of things, i. e. their quidditas or whatness, whereas ethics traditionally deals with deontological questions of ought, duty, morality and norms without ever explicitly and insistently having raised the question of whoness or quissitas *as such*, including the question of power at its core. The conception of whoness as a temporalogical category vis-à-vis the ontological category of whatness, i. e. essence, Wesen, is rooted ultimately in the human psyche's being cast *as* the openness of three-dimensional temporality enabling *all* kinds of movement and (inter) change for all kinds of essents, including human essents endowed with selfhood and self-esteem engaged in power interplays with others. That is, the temporalogical concept of interplay requires the prior concept of three-dimensional time as the 'playground' in which the interplay is played out and interpreted *as* such by human understanding.

Each individual human only moves existentially by exercising its powers, engaging thereby with others who are similarly exercising their powers either for, with or against each other in mutually estimative power interplays. The powers at play are of numerous different kinds from the brute physical to the economic, social and political. Ethical questions turn out to be at root questions of such power interplay. Whoness itself is a dynamic concept relating to kinds of existential movement through which mortals *sociate.* Also for this reason, human being is more appropriately termed dynamically human essencing in three-dimensional time. The temporalogy of that kind of movement here called mutually estimative power interplay is prior to any ethics. Ontology and ethics, or whatness and whoness, find their common ground in phenomena of movement and change now conceived temporalogically. All movement and change are manifestations of powers being exercised; however, the kind of movement with which ethics is fundamental-

ly, but only implicitly, concerned is that of mutually estimative power interplay in three-dimensional time, which demands its own temporalogy, in contradistinction to the traditional ontology of productive movement along linear time that can make do with the interaction among powers.

8.4.4 Taking care of living: conformity and aloofness (Heidegger)

It is instructive to consider some of Heidegger's early lectures from 1921/1922 and 1923 published as Vols. 61 and 63 of the *Gesamtausgabe*, especially the existentially flavoured ones that foreshadow themes of his later opus magnum, *Sein und Zeit* (1927). As already discussed, whoness is a dynamic, relational concept relating to how you and I lead our respective individual lives as selves in intertwinement. The movement of living is powered in the first place by our potentials and abilities exercised in the manifold sociating power interplays of living. Each of us is concerned with taking care of living in ways corresponding to how each of us has cast our selves and thus taken a stand (or not) in selfhood. There are, however, various ways in which you can be your self (or I can be my self) which fall into two broad classes:[8] expressly becoming your self in a who-stand either from a distance from the normal masks of selfhood shining back from the world or being drawn into and becoming immersed in and swept along by the current of taking care of what has to be taken care of in an average way of leading an everyday life. In being thus pulled into the stream of living with others, you lose the *distance* (Abstand, GA61:102 ff) of a stand in your self and thus go along with the others in their average normality. You adapt. Your taking care of living takes its direction from an *inclination* (Neigung, Geneigtheit, GA61:100 ff) that pulls you into the busy business of the world. This pull toward adaptation and conformity consists largely of the weight of opinion on the part of others that is experienced in the estimative interplay played through all three temporal dimensions.

What you undertake has a significance, a relevance (Bedeutsamkeit) for your leading your life that is interwoven in a web with other relevancies for taking care of your life which, in turn, leads you from one movement to another, one concern to another, one power interplay to another, distracting and scattering (Zerstreuung) your life-movements simply through the pull of the inclination taken by your life – toward the future, but with the other two temporal dimensions of as who you have essenced and as who you presently essence in a trifocal mental overview of your existence. Your stand in your self and thus your distance from the world of taking

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8 Cf. Heidegger III. Teil, 1. Kapitel 'Grundkategorien des Lebens' GA61:84 ff.

care of life in power interplays is lost to distracted going-along-with the stream of average everyday living according to average everyday understanding. You become immersed in the cares of living. One movement of taking-care-of leads breathlessly to another under the gravitational pull of inclination in an endless succession.

Nevertheless, within this distracted, scattered movement, you attempt to erect a self against the others at a vertical distance in the power interplays through being concerned about and taking care of your status as somewho superior compared to the others that is commonly called aloofness (Abständigkeit, GA61:103). In your loss of distance from the world of taking care of living, you are out for superior status, success, advantage, surpassing the others, drawing attention to your self, etc. Your selfhood thus becomes a superior stand *compared* to others that calls for consolidation and defence. In losing your distance and becoming entangled in the distractions of scattered movements of taking-care-of, you close yourself off from your potential self (Abriegelung, GA61:105 ff), or rather, your selfhood becomes a mere *mask* (Maske, GA61:107 f) as part of your *persona* that you wear in the daily interplays in the world through which you pretend to yourself and to the others to be who you are, preferably in a comparatively higher self-stand. Your going along with the average, normal movements of everyday life is easier (Das 'Leichte', GA61:108 ff) than taking a stand in your very own self at a distance from averageness. In this way you miss (verfehlen, GA61:108) your self, i.e. as who you *could* potentially essence in the temporal dimension of the future, i.e. how you could presence and present yourself in the world as a self-standing self.

Your sharing the world with others through leading your life is largely a matter of the interchanges, intercourse, i.e. the estimative power interplays with others, which may be as banal a buying a cake of soap in a supermarket. With this transaction you take care of keeping your hands clean, whereas the shop assistant takes care of his or her earning a livelihood as an employee. You estimate each other as customer and shop assistant, respectively, in transacting, politely and without friction, this simple everyday movement of interplay of doing something for each other. As a customer you have the power of thingified value (money as one of its guises; cf. the next chapter) in your pocket, whereas the shop assistant has the acknowledged power to serve customers. Soap is interchanged for money by mutual agreement. A much weightier power interplay with the others consists in having your life-achievements as a whole appraised by a highly regarded institution of some kind, perhaps through the award of an honour that bolsters your who-status. Such an award may amount to your breakthrough in the world as a highly estimated who in the eyes of the many others.

The world of others (Mitwelt), however, presents itself also in other, more inconspicuous and imperceptible ways via the intricate *web of interrelationships* through which things and people, whats and whos, are interlinked by relevancies

that each of us understands (Verstehen). Everything and everyone in the world has an understood relevancy (Bedeutsamkeit) in a web of interrelationships that constitutes how the world is understood at all, i.e. the worldliness of the world.[9] When, say, I enter my daily routine by sitting down at the useful thing that is my desk, this thing itself bears many references, mostly inconspicuous and unnoticed, to others. I estimate my desk as a useful, even pleasing and valuable thing that I purchased years ago in which I indirectly and unnoticeably estimated the labours of all those who contributed to its production and distribution, including the miner who mined the minerals that went into the desk's frame, the worker in the glass factory that produced the desk-top, the company managers who organized the production, the salesperson who sold me the desk, the transportation company and workers who delivered the desk to me, etc. All these others essence inconspicuously and unnoticed from the past through my writing desk. They remain concealed although they are present as absent.

In addition to this, the desk itself has a personal history that refers to many others, such as the authors who wrote the books that I have read at this desk, the friends with whom I have had a conversation, drinking tea or wine, at the desk, the many officials with whom I have spoken on the telephone at various times, with those who have communicated with me by e-mail, with those from whom I have received internet news on my computer, and so on. All these various others present themselves inconspicuously as who they are from a certain perspective at my glass-topped writing desk, mostly without my ever noticing it, or only in small details of recollections. They presence as absent, remaining concealed, but may potentially be recalled by memory to deconceal them.

Through my desk I also encounter myself quietly as who I essence, my self from all three temporal dimensions. I am someone who reads certain authors and writes books of a certain kind, who has conversations with friends, telephones with certain others in taking care of my own movement of living, who gets information via the cyberworld. As who I essenced in the past also comes to mind intermittently in memory, and also as who I may essence in future through plans, projects, hopes and expectations. The reflection even from my desk, a useful thing, tells me inconspicuously who I am (as who I essence in three-dimensional temporality) as a self, whether I am caught up in the power interplay of setting my self up as a superior who vis-à-vis the others, or carrying on with taking care of who I am as an independent, self-standing self with distance from distracted immersion in the world's endless, busy goings-on. No matter whether distanced or distractedly immersed, my taking care of living as a movement can only happen

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9 Cf. Heidegger GA63:98 ff.

within the shared three-dimensional temporal openness in which I understand what I have already taken care of, what I am currently taking care of, and what I plan to take care in the future. In so doing, various essents from each of the three temporal dimensions light up sporadically, intermittently in my mind, albeit in such a way that this scattered mental essencing of essents is held together in a coherence by its relevance to the present task in hand.

I am familiar (Vertrautheit, GA63:99) with my world of interrelated whats and whos that is open (erschlossen) to me in understanding and in which I carry on my daily life in routines and habits, taking care of the various matters concerning my own life-movements according to the direction my life has taken. Nevertheless, this familiarity with my world in its movement can be disturbed by the intrusion of the alien and unfamiliar (Fremdes, Unvertrautheit, GA63:100) that are unforeseen and presence incalculably (Unberechenbarkeit, GA63:100). Such disturbance by the unfamiliar and unforeseen arises for the most part from the incalculability and unpredictability of how the myriad, ongoing, estimative power interplays in the world play out, i.e. the moving world as the sociated, intertwined movements of interplay, not only those that are close to home in personal power interplays with others, including everyday economic transactions, but also through the global interrelatedness of uncountable power interplays that impact on the lives of many and are understood in an uncountable number of, mostly conflicting and contradictory, opinions. Such power interplays can be political ones (e.g. the shifting political mood of the world or major geopolitical events mediated by the mass media) or, in today's globalized capitalist world, power interplays mediated via the movement of thingified value (e.g. disruptive global financial and economic crises) on which all depend economically to earn a livelihood. The way the gainful game is played out and its unforeseen moves cross individual plans, affecting individual lives in often unexpected ways. Power interplays, of whatever kind, are inherently, i.e. socio-temporalogically, incalculable.[10] With this remark, I have already addressed the topic of the next chapter.

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[10] On power interplays and the gainful game, in particular, cf. my *Social Ontology of Whoness* (2019b) and also *Capital and Technology* (2015).

9 Sociation through the medium of thingified value

> I began to think that the very soul of the world is economic...
> E.M. Forster *Howards End*

In previous chapters various kinds of movement have been discussed at length and from various angles. A proper consideration of the kind of movement appropriately called mutually estimative power interplay and struggle requires, as investigated in the preceding chapter, the introduction of temporalogical whoness as a mode of essencing vis-à-vis traditional ontological whatness. Mutually estimative interplay plays out against the horizon of all three temporal dimensions. Movement within whoness is in general that of mutually estimative power interplay in which, in the first place, mortals themselves mutually estimate each other's value, their worth in one respect or another. Such mutually estimative interplay can be played out, in particular, mediated by things themselves insofar as they are mutually valued in exchange, thus becoming owned *commodities*, here comprising both goods and services having exchange-value. This is taken to be the elementary instance of mutually estimative interplay's being mediated by the medium of thingified value that now becomes the focus of attention.

We are all intimately familiar with commodities from everyday life, starting with banal examples such as chocolates or hair-cuts, milk or shoelaces. Such exchange movement is basically that of trade, commerce, mercantile activity, whose historical origins are ancient, well documented and narrated in economic histories, mostly in relation to material goods of all kinds. The trader him- or herself comes to be estimated, valued for the commodities on offer whose conceptualization, and not factually genetic history, is the issue here. Such value-things, in turn, come to mediate the estimative interplay among mortals. This thingified medium sociating us calls for closer investigation and interrogation, in particular with regard to how thingified value as sociating medium deforms estimative interplay in our own historically specific age.

9.1 The gainful game played atop the endlessly accumulative movement of thingified value

Money as a mediator of commodity exchange and insofar as a crystallization of commodity-value itself is also historically ancient, and histories of money abound. Value-thingification as a socio-temporalogical category of things, and the temporal-

ogy of the sociating movement called *commodity exchange* (itself a kind of estimative power interplay), however, are already inaccessible for any historical storytelling, including any purported dialectical-historical narrative. Things as thingified value are, paradoxically, no longer purely whats in the traditional ontological sense, but are made impure in being mediated via the estimative value power interplays among human players, i.e. via the evaluative dimension of whoness. Therefore it is particularly hard to see *thingified value*[1] as a socio-temporalogical category with existential underpinnings. (As should be plain by now thingified value is, in particular, neither objective nor subjective.) Commodities as exchange-values are not captured by traditional categories of whatness, but require the existential dimension of whoness. Use-values, too, are existential in character, for they are things that are good for human existence. Use-value itself cannot be captured by listing ostensible 'objective properties'.

Among others, the Greeks knew of two techniques or arts that distinguish themselves from the paradigmatic art of making, called τέχνη ποιητική, namely, τέχνη κτητική and τέχνη χρηματιστική, i.e. the art of acquiring property and the art of wealth-getting, respectively. Through the latter art, Aristotle says, "there seems to be no limit to wealth and acquisition" (οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πέρας εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως *Pol.* I iii 1257a1). Both arts involve essentially the movement of exchange (μεταβολή), whereby μεταβολή, interestingly and crucially, ambiguously signifies also simply 'change', which can be understood productively.[2] The movement of exchange, however, as a mode of three-dimensional temporal essencing, differs from the movement of change initiated from a *single* origin (ἀρχή) as a productive power (δύναμις), for the latter, successive change can make do with a

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1 The foregrounding of the sociating medium of thingified value and its accumulative movement in preference to the usual, ubiquitous and today ultimately blandly-critical talk of 'capitalism' as a mode of production is the result of a value-form analytic reconstruction of *Das Kapital* that formed (as an appendix) the co-authored foundation of my doctoral dissertation, *Critique of Competitive Freedom and the Bourgeois-Democratic State: Outline of a Form-Analytic Extension of Marx's Uncompleted System*, at the General Philosophy Department of the University of Sydney (1984/2015). The "Competitive Freedom" in the title becomes what I later term the gainful game, whose basic players are developed as subjectivized character-masks of the fundamental value-forms, i.e. as "subjects of competition". These "subjects" are now necessarily raised to a higher conceptual level (aufgehoben) in the present context of a temporalogy of whoness, becoming players in the competitive interplays of the gainful game.

2 Cf. my 'Technology, Technique, Interplay: Questioning Die Frage nach der Technik' 2006/2013 with its incisive critique of a decisive one-sidedness in Heidegger's thinking that persists in today's Heidegger scholarship. Technology must be conceived hermeneutically as one of the principal means of enhancing the endless valorization of thingified value.

one-dimensional concept of time. Hence Aristotle's definition of productive potential (δύναμις) as ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς, i.e. starting-point for a change.

Despite the millennia-long tradition of forcing and pressing the phenomenon of exchange and interchange into the ill-fitting mould of the ontology of productive change, in the ultimately futile attempt to gain predictive power over interchange-movement via efficient causality and stochastic reckoning, the phenomenology of exchange has to be considered in the context of movement in three-dimensional time in its own right. The phenomenon of exchange is homomorphic with the temporalogy of the mutually estimative power interplay of whoness, if only because the commodities exchanged are either directly the expenditure of players' powers and abilities (services) or the products thereof (goods) and are necessarily valued, evaluated, estimated in an interplay among multiple players who are the *multiple* ἀρχαί for the kind of movement called exchange. Behind any thingified valuation of goods in exchange there is always also the estimation of the expenditure of human abilities exercised (as well as of the natural powers exploited), via exchange, for the benefit of others. (The estimation of natural powers as the gifts of nature, along with the appropriation of parcels of land or water as private property will be further considered below in 9.7 *Estimating and esteeming the Earth* with the aim of showing how the medium of thingified value grossly deforms our mortal estimative interplay with the Earth.)

Even at the time of the Greeks, both the art of acquiring property and the art of wealth-getting, however, imply a striving for 'more' (πλέον) in property or money, respectively, and thus a *quantitative* aspect. From the merchant's standpoint, the movement of exchange then fails in one sense if a 'more' does not come from it. Wealth-getting can be conveniently quantified as money-making. The 'more', or surplus, is quantified in terms of money itself as *price* or money-value, estimated value, but even prior to serving as a measure of a surplus, *monetary price* is the quantified measure of exchange-value. Money is the thingified or 'thingy' universal equivalent of everything of value, thus enabling their uniform valuation in a *sociating* (who-)measure that has to be distinguished from any physical (what-)measure such as milligrams, tonnes, litres, kilos and nanometres. As the primal crystallized value-form, or 'look' of thingified value, money therefore embodies, apparently in itself, a power, namely, the *power to acquire* something of value through exchange. That is, it embodies an *exchange-power*, including (since hiring amounts to acquiring the use of something for a time) the *power to hire* the labouring power of individuals that is put productively to work by and for the benefit of the hirer, as well as the power to lease land for productive use by the lessee.

Money thereby becomes *money-capital*, a distinct guise, 'look' or form of thingified value, rather than merely a means and medium for effecting transactions of

buying and selling, hiring and lending. Such augmentative movement of thingified value as money-capital to produce a surplus mediated by the necessary exchanges and value-form transformations to acquire produced means of production, land and labour power is the prototypical *movement of capital* whose simplest formula is the movement of money to more money mediated by production, a sociating movement of value sociating both things and people, whats and whos, in production and circulation processes. The augmentative movement of thingified value as money-capital is already an inversion of money as means of exchange that ultimately turns the entire social world upside down, blinding the players in the gainful game with illusions that are hard to decipher, demystify and dislodge.

All the value-form transformations undergone in the augmentative circuit of capital *diffuse* the sociating *medium of thingified value* throughout all that is drawn into the circuit, so that all things are 'infected' or 'sullied' by, 'saturated' or 'drenched' in this medium as the element through which they move by virtue of various sociating, estimative interchanges. If, on the one hand, the resulting surplus of all the required value interchanges and value-form transformations is negative, i. e. a loss, then the movement has failed in a certain sense and its continuation is put into doubt, since the loss must be compensated in some way. On the other hand, the *augmentative, accumulative movement of thingified value* through its many intertwined, repeated circuits has no limit (πέρας) within itself, is boundless, and is in this sense *infinite* (ἄπειρον) . The simple, accumulative movement of thingified value through its various value-forms is a purely *formal* sociating movement that is not only limitless, endless, but also *indifferent* as to its content, including as to what is produced and circulated and how the hired labour powers and leased land fare under this inexorable formal accumulation of thingified value.

To be sure, the role of consumer in the gainful game requires that the goods and services produced must have some sort of use-value to entice consumers to spend their earned income on them and thus contribute to realizing advanced capital as sales revenues. However, these use-values do not represent purely the fulfilment of need, but of stoked-up desire promising momentary happiness. The ambiguity of phenomena here comes into play: the genuine use-value of goods and services is inverted into a mere vehicle for the valorization of thingified value. The use-value aspect of goods and services is subsumed beneath the formal 'needs' of valorization, and many consumers' 'needs' are forced upon them by their participation in the gainful game itself. The formal indifference of endless value-accumulation entails that, depending upon the state of play in the power interplays among the players, both labour power and land, mortals and the Earth, may be ruthlessly exploited and ruined for the sake of limitless accumulation. In countless other ways, too, the medium of thingified value – perhaps starting

with its cold indifference as a medium of sociation – carries the seed of a toxicity for both mortals and the Earth.

Although a circuit of capital proceeds from an initial advance of money-capital to purchase, lease or hire the required means of production, land and labour power (which are each themselves subsumed under their specific thingified value-forms), the money-capital or its bearer, the capitalist entrepreneur (who may be a natural person or an 'unnatural', incorporated company), is not the sole origin of this movement because it requires multiple value interchanges with other players in the circuitous thingified-value movement: the suppliers of means of production, the bearers of labour power, i.e. the workers/employees themselves, the lenders of money-capital (financiers), the landowners leasing land, the purchasers of the end-product, the so-called 'consumers' in their consuming role spending their earned income. These four kinds of income-earners are the basic players in this *gainful game* to gain income atop the underlying endless value-augmentation, each striving to gain their characteristic share of the resultant thingified value, i.e. the sales revenue or gross cash-flow, in the form of wages, interest and ground-rent, leaving a residue of profit of enterprise for the entrepreneur. All the various kinds of players are involved in mutually estimative power interplays with one another over gaining their respective kinds of *income*, in which uniform category the differences between the income-sources are disguised, more than often, conveniently so, *as if* all players were in some sense qualitatively 'equal', playing on a 'level playing field'. The players are also free to play the gainful game, and this competitive freedom of movement can be deceptively equated with freedom per se.

The circuitous, abstractly formal character of the gainful game renders it a more or less banal *everyday drama* whose players are character-masks of forms of thingified value fulfilling their allotted roles in the gainful game. Whether the incomes earned through the countless various power interplays are fair or not (cf. 9.3 *Fairness as criterion of justice*) depends on the current historical state of play of the power interplays, ranging from utter destitution and depravation of the poor, through periods of relative all-round mutual satisfaction to bitter and bloody power struggles among the players in a seemingly endless pendulum swing. The outcomes of power interplays over earning income in any given society in a given time are in any case uneven: fair, middling or deplorably unfair – an historically fluctuating state of play —, and can and do have disastrous consequences. The diagnosis of these consequences is prevented by obscurantist ideologies of freedom that cover up the underlying endless, accumulative movement of thingified value in its inexorable indifference. Globally as well as locally, the valorization of thingified value as the principle (or law) of economic movement sets strict and

necessary boundary conditions for any freedom of movement in the gainful game, i.e. individual freedom collides here with its ineluctable and merciless negation.

None of the players needs to know anything at all about thingified value, so that the gainful game is played on the surface in a so-called 'competitive market economy', with all the players (as well as the social science of economics) remaining entirely ignorant of the underlying accumulative movement of thingified value *as such.* The deconcealment of this underlying movement remains a principal task for socio-temporalogy. Moreover, the carving-up of the total thingified value generated by economic activity into income-portions of different sizes as such does not have any effect on the formal, accumulative movement, that simply reproduces itself. Due to its formal indifference, there is a *diremption* and *contradiction* between the endlessly accumulative movement of thingified value through its form-transformations and ways of shared living, i.e. our sociated essencing, on Earth. Again: the competitive gainful game played by the players striving for incomes of the four basic kinds, or countless hybrids thereof, and thus motivated by the prospect of gain (if only to gain barely enough income to live on) carries out, on a subterranean level, the *accumulative movement of reproduction of the total social capital* that insofar is covered up by the thingified value-forms that are accepted (in our age in the West) as 'natural', as 'matter of course'. This accumulative reproduction appears on the surface as 'economic growth' that is measured in monetary terms such as Gross Domestic Product and greeted by all as the sine qua non of the 'good life'. Conversely, one could say that the gainful game over acquiring income is the form of appearance (Erscheinungsform) of a concealed essence (Wesen) in the traditional ontological sense.

Money-income appears as what the players are desirously striving for and is thus *fetishized* as the value-*form* par excellence estimated and esteemed in itself, dirempted from any *content* of living. This thingification obscures and renders invisible, in particular, the underlying estimative interplay among human abilities and powers (exercised ultimately for each other's benefit). The mutual estimation of who-players played out in power interplay in the thingified medium assumes the guise of the competitive gainful game over thingified value in its various income forms or 'looks'. Insofar, the power interplay of whoness presents itself deceptively as a competitive interplay of whatness, merely as economic competition through which an 'efficient distribution of scarce resources' is putatively achieved. In truth, however, thingified value is not simply a what but the fetishized guise mediating the estimative, sociating value-interplay.

The fetishization of money-income in its value-whatness and seemingly as a fascinating power in itself, lends itself to income-earning itself becoming a criterion for who-status by being incorporated, by way of identification, into a given who's selfhood, puffing him or her up with pride, depending upon the success

in income-earning. The success of a corporate leader, for instance, in achieving increased profits year after year, and steering his or her corporate ship skilfully on the rough seas of global markets bolsters his/her self-esteem and serves simultaneously as providing a 'meaning of life'. Conversely, lack of income-earning prowess serves as a criterion for failure of a player in the gainful game, resulting inevitably in loss of self-esteem.

9.1.1 Contradictoriness and incalculability of elementary exchange-interplay as kernel of the gainful game

In what sense are the power interplays played out in the capitalist gainful game contradictory? As a kind of movement, power interplay partakes of the contradictoriness inherent in all movement as the 'at-once-ness' of presencing and absencing pertaining to all transition, an 'at-once-ness' that is seen by the mind's temporally trifocal vision (cf. 2.4 *Temporality of space and refutation of interior consciousness*). But what, beyond contradictoriness, is special or idiosyncratic about those movements that can be called mutually estimative power interplays that are played out specifically in the sociating medium of thingified value? Here the focus is restricted to the simple kernel of the gainful game, the interplay of commodity exchange.

Just as a carpenter's making of a table can serve, and has in fact served, as the simple paradigm for the ontology of productive movemenť, the paradigm of the exchange of wares on the market may serve as the elementary kernel of the socio-temporalogy of the intricate web of power interplays constituting the competitive gainful game. The art of making (τέχνη ποιητική), on which the Aristotelean ontology of productive movement is based, has 'blossomed' into the onslaught of the modern sciences and technologies in striving (ultimately: futilely) to absolutely master all movement in the world, whereas the simple paradigm of commodity exchange at the elementary core of the gainful game has 'blossomed' into the untrammelled gainful game that today is unleashed globally with ever more devastating effect. Today's globalized world itself is predicated historically upon the permeation throughout the entire world of the sociating medium of thingified value, its imbibition by multiple cultures and societies, and the resulting establishment of its formal movement of endless accumulation as the predominant global movement. The socio-temporalogy of the paradigm of commodity exchange as a kind of movement, however, has to date never been explicated, nor has the fundamental difference in its temporalogy from the ontology of productive movement been made clear. On the contrary, in the social science of economics the attempt is undertaken to press the movement of what is called the 'economy' as far

as possible into the mould of the ontology of productive movement, with its attendant postulated cause-effect connections along linear time and the resultant predictability. It is therefore inevitable that attempts have long since been undertaken to mathematize economics and that such attempts have enjoyed particular accolades.

An elementary exchange[3] in the present (rather than in the future) between two parties mediated by money is idiosyncratic in the sense of being its own mixture (ἰδιοσύνκρασις) of two different movements proceeding from *two* different origins or starting-points (ἀρχαί), viz. the buyer and the seller. These two movements are in two different, indeed, *opposed* directions (cf. 3.1 *All physical movement and change driven by contradiction*), but intertwine and depend on each other if they are to reach their respective destinations, i.e. each movement negates the other but also positively includes it. The seller aims at physically getting rid of, i.e. absencing, the good in his or her possession in favour of gaining, i.e. presencing, money in his or her hands, whereas the buyer aims at gaining possession, i.e. physically presencing, a good that is good for something or other, useful and therefore a use-value, while at the same time handing over, and thus physically absencing, the purchase price in money, from his or her possession. (The physical absencing of the money today may consist simply in an algorithmically commanded digital transfer of bits.) The same holds when the transaction is for the purchase of a service rather than a good, in which case the purchaser comes into possession, i.e. the use and enjoyment, of the service provided that comes to presence through being performed. Each party as a starting-point for the transaction has an opposed but interlocking, dovetailing intention in mind that is complementary to the other party's intention.

A successful, mutually satisfying transaction reached by agreement represents the resolution (Aufhebung) of the contradiction between two intended, potential, opposed movements in actuality. The resolution is attained, if at all, through each party's estimating the value of what the other party has to offer and, crucially, coming to an agreement in order to actually execute the transaction. If no agreement is reached and no exchange takes place, prospective buyer and seller relapse into *indifference* toward each other. If, by contrast, the one party appropriates the other's good by force or cunning, the contradiction has not been resolved but only exacerbated by negating the other's willed intention, and its resolution must be referred, under the guise of the 'rule of law', to an adjudicating court of civil law to pronounce *commutative justice* in the case of the specific commutation (interchange, συναλλαγή).

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3 Cf. my *Social Ontology of Whoness* (2019b) Chapter 5.

The buyer assesses the value in use of the good on offer (which may be either a consumer or even a productive good, or service) in relation to how much it costs, whereas the seller assesses the price at which he or she is willing to part with the commodity good, whereby this assessment includes, in the case of an enterprise, an estimation of the margin of profit made or whether, more generally, the expenditure of his or her own powers in producing the good in question is adequately compensated, i. e. valued, by the prospective purchaser. (For the present purpose, it suffices to consider the elementary exchange situation of someone offering to sell a self-produced good or service to a consumer-buyer.) Insofar there is a formal homomorphism between the productive movement of making something and the completion of an exchange transaction: the contradictoriness inherent in the respective movements is resolved in attaining an end (τέλος), either in the finished product or in the finished, agreed transaction, albeit that the latter properly represents the attainment of a *double* end through a dovetailing, complementary, *double* movement for two players. Otherwise, however, these two different kinds of movement differ fundamentally, as is apparent already in the necessity of two different ἀρχαί having to reach agreement, to strike a deal, on their mutual estimations. For instance, a carpenter can finish making a table and be satisfied with the result of his or her productive activity, viz. a good table, but its sale requires the independent value-estimation of the table by another, namely, the prospective, potential buyer, and also that this buyer and the carpenter reach agreement with each other over details of the transaction, including price.

Whether the resolution of the contradiction between two opposite but complementary movements in a completed transaction is mutually satisfactory for both parties is entirely open, just as is whether a transaction comes about at all. In contrast to productive movement, neither party (ἀρχή) to the potential transaction has power over its eventual outcome, even though each may have definite intentions, such as the buyer or seller having envisaged (mentally, 'ideally') a fixed acceptable price range in advance. Despite best efforts, for instance, the seller cannot activate an efficient cause on the prospective buyer to effect a sale. Market conditions outside the control of either buyer or seller also set boundary conditions within which any transaction can be completed. A glut or scarcity of a certain good on the market may force transactions on one of the parties that are entirely unsatisfying, e. g. sale at a loss or purchase at an exorbitantly high price. Or a monopoly held for a certain good may unfairly dictate the selling-price of its good. The mutual estimation of the values involved in the transaction then does not lead to a mutually satisfying resolution of the opposed movements, with the consequence that, depending as it does on the mutual agreement of two parties, the exchange may not take place at all, or only begrudgingly on the part of one of the parties, who is in need and therefore compelled to accept a bad deal.

Already from the structure of the elementary exchange interplay it can be seen that this kind of movement is inherently unpredictable, incalculable, in fundamental contrast to the paradigm of efficient, productive movement that *can* be mastered by know-how. This calls for the traditional ontology of efficient, causal movement along one-dimensional, linear time to be relativized by an adequate temporalogy of interplay-movement, whose incalculability requires that it be viewed as happening (essencing) in three-dimensional time. The unpredictability of exchange interplay carries over to and infuses the entire, full-blown movement of the gainful game that altogether breaks the mould of efficient movement that can be mastered by the prevailing absolute will to power over all kinds of movement. For this absolute will, the movement of interplay is refractory.

The mediation of exchange interplay through thingified value lends it a formal universality that levels down the particularity inherent in other kinds of more concrete interplay. Such levelling enables the formation of markets comprising many buyers and sellers by allowing comparisons using a limited range of criteria. Price becomes a prime parameter for estimating potential transactions in a simple quantitative way that can be assessed against the quality of the product or service, among other relevant parameters such as availability, delivery times, etc. Such formal, quantitative universality of thingified value underlies the formation of global markets and conforms to the simple, abstractly formal movement of accumulating thingified value. The billions and trillions of transactions completed every day depend upon the formal universality of the mediating medium which, however, is equated with one of its surface forms of appearance, namely, money.

9.1.2 Temporalogy of the gainful game

The gainful game is played by players who are the personae or character-masks of the various forms or 'looks' of thingified value, as whose place-holders they are able to participate in the game of the pursuit of income which serves as a surrogate for the pursuit of happiness. And income really does provide the universal key to the pleasures of consumption in all imaginable forms. The complementary role of consumer in the gainful game is therefore willingly adopted by income-earners as another of the gainful game's character-masks. The game is played entirely immersed in the sociating element of thingified value. The players' whoness is thus reduced to that of character-masks for the various guises of thingified value and roles in the game. Their selves are *alienated* as character-mask roles in a value-thingified game, about whose underlying movement they know nothing. Self-alienation prevails even when the players identify their selves inextricably with their respective roles in a play whose author remains hidden to them. They have an ink-

ling of their self-alienation without being able to name and conceive their alienated otherness as thingified value. To participate in the gainful game, they have to enter into power interplays in which they estimate and evaluate each other in terms of what they each have to offer by way of thingified value in the various kinds of transactions: sale, hire, loan, lease. On the surface of social life, these transactions assume the form of appearance of various kinds of innocuous, formally free-willed, contractual exchanges among private property-owners. What each player has to offer ranges from individual powers and abilities, means of production, consumer goods and services, an operating enterprise, interest-bearing loans, through to landed property. The interplay movement itself as a whole, with its myriad interweavings, is highly intricate and always unpredictable, played as it is in the three, non-linear dimensions of three-dimensional time.

The mutual estimation and evaluation of the players, even in narrow, abstractly formal terms of thingified value, encompass the temporal present, past and future and are not purely quantitative assessments, but qualitatively quantitative. A bank lending finance to an enterprise, for instance, must assess the enterprise's past profit-generating track record and, for a start-up, its forward-looking business model. Another bank giving a mortgage to a consumer client has to assess that client's present employment security, net disposable income, educational background, etc. against the background of current mortgage lending rates. A prospective employee evaluates the future career prospects offered by an employer to avoid becoming stuck in a 'dead-end' job without chances of promotion. A landowner will carefully consider the term of the lease offered to a prospective lessee in order to optimize future prospects of earning rent from the land long-term, whilst taking into account present market rates for leases and likely improvements to be made to the property. An entrepreneur will evaluate the current market situation when purchasing a new supply of a required raw material, including price and suppliers' reliability, or assessing the prospects for generating sales revenues in new markets. And so on. All the players in the interplay are involved in mutually estimating income-earning opportunities, and thus each other, with a temporally three-dimensional overview, including past experience and track records, that is necessarily beset with uncertainties with regard to the future success of their efforts and game strategies. They know of three-dimensional time only implicitly, but pay regard to it just the same.

With regard to the price paid to enable the transaction to be completed, the players have *opposed* interests and are therefore insofar in potential conflict that can resurface unpredictably at any time. In other respects, the players also have common interests, such as the survival of the enterprise in the competition on local or global markets. In view of such common interests, the players will also co-operate and even treat each other as partners. In the interplay between en-

trepreneur and work-force, however, the opposed interests over the level of wages and the conditions of work, including working hours, remain conflictual, because what are termed 'human resources costs' represent a deduction from potential profit of enterprise. For some enterprises, the best profit-generating strategy will appear to be to ruthlessly wring every last minute of labour out of the labour force at minimum cost. The workers are thus depreciated and abused.

The necessity of having to accept a bad deal applies especially, but not solely, to the player who has nothing to offer but his or her own labour power to thingify under the wage form of value, often for poor pay and working conditions. Wage-earners desire their self-thingification under the wage-form in jobs for the sake of earning their specific form of income to lead a life, but these jobs themselves 'exist' (essence) only as openings in an enterprise's labour process into which workers can be slotted by their employers, thingified as valorizable labour powers.[4] Jobs are only offered for as long as the workers contribute to, rather than detract from, the valorization of thingified value. Job seekers are keen to participate in the gainful game. It may be noted in passing that in the realm of democratic politics, the prospect of jobs is often dangled in front of the electorate as an attractive proposition whilst suppressing the other, decisive, side of the story, namely, that a given enterprise's profit-making will be enhanced.

There is thus a basic asymmetry in the power play between the entrepreneur hiring labour power and workers/employees desiring employment, and thus self-thingification, that can only be compensated by workers'/employees' banding together to bargain collectively. Asymmetry in bargaining situations is a root source of *unfairness* or even gross *injustice* in the power interplay between entrepreneurs and employees that may go so far as to endanger the lives and health of the latter. This does not prevent functioning, entrepreneurial capitals from going to great lengths to prevent the formation of trade unions as a major aspect of the classical *class struggle* between the entrepreneurial-capitalist and working classes.

For wage-earners of all kinds, interplay with an employer is invariably embedded in the context of the employee's entire existence as an individual who essences in the full three-dimensional openness of time. Wages earned are a means of livelihood, for the sake of an individual's sharing his or her life with certain other, dear and loved ones. All essence temporally with a past, present and future that

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4 In German, the thingification of workers is particularly plain; they are called Arbeitskräfte (literally, 'labour powers'), whereas skilled, specialist workers/employees are called Fachkräfte (literally, 'specialist powers'), whose labour power is required for valorization by performing specialist tasks in the labour process. One particular quirk of the German language that inverts the true state of affairs is that workers (Arbeitskräfte) are termed Arbeitnehmer (literally, 'takers of work') whereas entrepreneurs are Arbeitgeber (literally, 'givers of work').

shape and belong to each individual's existential selfhood and whoness. The small players in the gainful game, whether they be employed or self-employed or perhaps small landlords, are generally existentially more embedded in their three-dimensional temporal whoness than other players who identify their selves more narrowly with the purely economic gainful game. Their success earning income in the gainful game then serves as a measure of their self-stand as whos.

Employees and other small players earn income and spend it for the sake of supporting a way of life with all the vicissitudes of its movement. Consumer spending is embedded within the complex life-movements of individuals' leading their lives who are therefore more than merely consumers. As we have seen, their lives are movements in three-dimensional time, (cf. 8.4.1 *Intermeshing of self-movements through estimative interplay*). For an enterprise, however, employees are hired to contribute to the enterprise's profit-earning success, and consumers fulfil their formal role contributing to the completion of a circuit of advanced capital by recouping it in sales revenues that are swelled by profit. As thingified value in circular movement, the circuit of capital is temporally one-dimensional along a timeline that the enterprise attempts to plan as far as possible, despite all the incalculability inherent in interplay. An individual circuit comes to an end in sales revenues realized on the market. There is a contradiction between individuals' leading a shared life with others in complex, interwoven, three-dimensional temporality and their fulfilling a merely formal role as consumers in the value-form transformations of endlessly valorizing thingified value in a temporally one-dimensional, circular movement. This contradiction may be called consumerism, although the well-known consumerist critique of capitalism knows nothing of thingified value or movement in three-dimensional time. For the formal movement of valorizing thingified value, it is completely indifferent what consumers consume, just so long as they consume. For the small players in the gainful game, by contrast, their existentially embedded interplay can be experienced as mutually exercising their powers and abilities for each other's benefit rather than merely fulfilling formal roles as character-masks in the accumulation of thingified value.

This does not hold for the big players. The sale of an enterprise's products and services to consumers is infected by the contradiction between the company's abstract, value-form interest in generating sales revenues and thus profits, on the one hand, and consumers' more concretely existential interests in living well by enjoying the fruits of others' labour, on the other. This contradiction has many kinds of perverse resolutions, such as supplying consumers with food that is convenient, cheap, with high profit margins, but detrimental to health. There is also the fundamental contradiction that for companies, *who* the buyers of its goods and services are is reduced to that of a *consumer*, i.e. a bearer of thingified value in the form of disposable income that has the fixed, formal, quantitative

role in the gainful game of realizing advanced capital invested in production through value-transformation into sales revenues. The *character-mask of the consumer* is an essential role in the gainful game whose complementary obverse is generally the *character-mask of the wage-earning employee.* Whereas for the consumer, who is in general more than willing to consume and expand his or her consumption under incessant prodding and nudging by clever, manipulative marketing and advertising, the purchase of a consumer product involves the evaluation of the product against the background of the consumer's own temporally three-dimensional existence as somewho, whereas for the entrepreneur marketing and selling the product, the estimation of the product is primarily a temporally one-dimensional assessment of its power to generate future sales revenues through the turnover of its advanced capital.

Underlying the gainful game is the augmentative circulation and reproduction of the total social capital through the medium of thingified value, a movement that may also be called the *valorization* of thingified value. Thingified value's valorizing circulation and reproduction is never-ending and its quantitative accumulation is without limit (Greek: ἄπειρον). Its historical germ lies already with the art of wealth-getting that Aristotle likewise describes as limitless (cf. 9.1 *The gainful game played atop the endlessly accumulative movement of thingified value*). Such circulation of valorizing thingified value is akin to the 'eternal' circling of the celestial bodies in the heavens. Such circling *movement* of the solar system and fixed stars in *space* was the first (spatialized) measure of *linear, counted* time, that traditionally, and even today, is still counted off a uniform movement such as that of a caesium atomic clock. Hence, e.g., enterprises will balance their books and calculate their revenues and profits for a financial year, the year itself being a measure of the linear, circular movement of the Earth around the Sun. Likewise, the *turnover time* of individual capitals is a measure of the circular *movement* of advanced capital back to its renewed advance as well as a measure of its rate of accumulation: the shorter the turnover time, the faster the rate of accumulation, formally and mathematically, the second derivative of thingified-value-in-motion.

The temporally three-dimensional confusion of intricately interwoven movements in the myriad interplays of the gainful game on the surface of appearance is thus reduced or straightened out, on the deeper, hidden level of (traditional ontological) essence, to the deceptively simple, underlying circulation and reproduction of endlessly accumulating total thingified value transforming itself through its value-forms, an abstractly *formal* movement. For individual enterprises, the quantity and rate of turnover of its advanced capital can be calculated in retrospect as a measure of its success in the gainful game, if not predicted in advance. As a value-formal movement, the turnover of accumulating total social thingified value is *indifferent* to how the lives of the players are lived in the gainful game. An acceler-

ation of this turnover, i.e. the shortening of the turnover time, furthers the endless aim of ever more enhanced valorization. Since the circular valorization movement of thingified value is the all-dominating movement in societies sociated through thingified value, it dictates the pace of life in such societies and, behind the backs of the players in the gainful game, its acceleration induces also an acceleration of the pace of their lived lives. Linear, counted time thus accelerates as well, and the pace of life becomes all the more hectic and breathless. Time itself seems to 'flow' faster.

Hence there is something *deeper* and more consequential than the class struggles among the various kinds of players in the gainful game over the distribution of the various kinds of income it generates. This deeper layer – the circular movement of endlessly accumulating thingified value – is carefully kept out of sight by the social science of economics that itself can 'see' only the gainful game on the surface as played by *subjects* engaged in competition with marketable economic objects, and knows nothing of thingified value.

All the players in the gainful game play whilst, behind their backs, the hidden valorizing movement of thingified value sets the boundary conditions of play for the gainful game. Their freedom of movement in playing the gainful game is restricted; their individual moves are constrained, induced or even dictated by the value-formal conditions of valorization. Dislocations in the intertwining circulation of the many capitals, for whatever reason, will have greater or lesser effect on the lives of the gainful game's players. Since the transformations of value-form necessary for thingified value to circulate and valorize as capital are inherently uncertain due to their being effected by exchanges among many players in three-dimensional time, there can also be no reliable knowing, no science of how to steer the gainful game or avoid its periodic, more or less violent disruptions. At best there can be only the modelling of various scenarios based on different sets of basic assumptions derived from *past* experience which are at best judicious guesses and extrapolations, that can always be suddenly rendered highly implausible.

The hidden valorizing movement of thingified value with its absolute drive to augment is the prime, albeit unknown, subterranean, *freedom of movement* in societies whose economic life is lived mediated through the all-pervasive element of thingified value. Such societies are said to be free without, however, saying which movement is genuinely free. Only within and underneath this overarching, overreaching, valorizing movement of total social capital do the various players unknowingly play out their individual gainful power interplays, fulfilling their allotted roles in the pursuit and consummation of income-happiness. This underlying dictatorial movement asserts itself unbeknownst to all the players in the gainful game and, in particular, through its inherent boundary conditions, *subverts* the

possibility of upholding and protecting it as a *free, fair and just* game that could truly be seen as being played for the mutual benefit of the players. Hence the possibility of the fairness of estimative power interplay remains an unattainable ideal of liberalism, the truth of whose unattainability is unfathomable as long as the medium of thingified value itself remains a hidden unknown to the players.

The much-praised liberal rule of law is also subverted and *perverted*, not only, but also not least of all, by ruthless, powerful players in the gainful game, the big players who may be regarded as those most closely identified as selves with endless accumulation for its own sake. They are unknowingly the most slavish worshippers of the limitless valorization movement, who themselves know no limit in suppressing the claims of living mortals and the living Earth. This submission to an unknown, grim god inevitably induces them to adopt a vicious, violent, vindictive stance toward all opponents. Even the most powerful, richest players have to bow to the disruptions and discontinuities in the subterranean augmentative movement of thingified value, whose freedom of movement is ultimative. This impotence carries over to democratic government, which is based on the illusion of ultimate control by the collective, electoral will of free subjects, mediated by the various institutions of the democratic state. These include fiscal policy of government and the monetary policy of the central bank, neither of which knows anything of the subterranean augmentative movement of thingified value *as such.* Their actions therefore are directed at keeping the gainful game going through more or less clever hit-or-miss measures with their proverbial unintended consequences.

The protection of private property rights is the way, on the deceptive surface of society, in which the underlying accumulative movement of thingified value is covered up and thus unknowingly upheld. The freedom of private property is proclaimed as a cherished value and as the very pith of human freedom per se in the 'free world'. However, the highest value of a society whose economic life is lived immersed in and saturated by the medium of thingified value is, surreptitiously, thingified value itself that, however, *appears* only in the guise of the full spectrum of kinds of private property, including private property in one's own labour power. Perfectly adapted as it is to the dissociation of individualized subjects, private property is thus an exquisitely deceptive mask to disguise the phenomenon of thingified value and its augmentative movement. Due to the fetishism and inversion achieved by this medium and its senseless, never-ending augmentation, its unmasking simultaneously deciphers the nihilism inherent in our historical, now globalized, form of sociation through thingified value.

Although the gainful game seems motivated originally by the willed and willing strivings of its many and various players to earn income (often called 'human greed' as an aspect of anthropologically conceived 'human nature'), and thus seems

to be the result of the collective action of countless subjects in a 'competitive market economy', its core movement is disjunct from any underlying human subjectivity. The players themselves, including even the big, powerful entrepreneurial players, are not the underlying subjects of a game initiated by them; it is beyond their collective control, even if exercised politically via a democratic government. The players play i) temporalogically an *interplay* in three-dimensional time and ii) in the all-pervasive medium of *thingified value.* Interplay – whether it be in the complex existential movement of people living their lives, or the more focused, restricted movement of earning income – is a kind of movement that is inherently unpredictable. The valorization of thingified value sets the boundary conditions for any collective control by underlying subjects. A power interplay among players exercising their powers and abilities for mutual benefit would be an entirely different kind of economy from our present regime of valorizing thingified value.

9.2 Social power and fairness of interplay

As already touched upon, the recasting of human being as human essencing, for the first time, *explicitly as* whoness from three-dimensional temporality in lieu of *as* subjectivity from an underdetermined concept of time has far- and deep-reaching ramifications for a conception of the *temporalogy of power*, for now power can no longer continue to be conceived implicitly and uniformly as efficient, productive power, including predictive power, over the movement of things (whats, including human bodies and humans conceived as things subject to psychological investigation and manipulation). This has been the case throughout the Western tradition from Aristotle onward up to and including all of today's modern sciences, as well as today's mainstream analytic philosophy. To alleviate our mental blindness, the conception of power (δύναμις) under an ontology of whatness, which has been the way in which Western thought has hitherto come to grips with all phenomena of movement and change, must make way for an explicit conception of power under a temporalogy of whoness. In a rupture with and alternative to traditional metaphysical ontology, such a temporalogy proceeds, as we have seen, from a *multiplicity* of human individuals sharing a world with one another via ongoing interplays of mutual estimation. This individuated world-sharing itself is a precipitation of mortals partaking bodily of the more originary, *unified*, three-dimensional temporality (cf. 2.8 *Bodying as empsychment and entimement*). The opening of the view to plurality via this route in thinking enables for the first time a temporalogy of *social* power to be thought through adequately from a dynamic conception of being as essencing within three-dimensional temporal openness and the movement of sociation among mortals that essences temporally. So-

cial power itself can then be conceived from a temporalogy of that kind of sociat-ing movement I have called *interplay* that now is at the core of a *temporalogy of social power.*

Each individual leading his or her life is necessarily engaged in interplays of mutual estimation, esteeming, evaluating and valuing of many and various kinds that per se, as life-movements, are *power* interplays. This epithet is justified be-cause, in the first place, each individual as an origin or 'principle' of his or her own life-movements is a power, potential, potency (δύναμις) over such movements (ἀρχή τῆς κινέσεως) originating from it. Being the origin of one's own life-move-ments does not render the individual as an *underlying subject*, but as a dynamic *player* in power interplays with other individuals who are likewise origins of their own life-movements in interplays; as one of *many* players. The individual does not 'underlie' as sub-ject (from Latin: 'sub'='under' and 'iacere'='to lie'; Greek: ὑποκείμενον, from κεῖσθαι='to lie') the power interplays and, despite all fac-tual and ontological self-deception and unbridled, ambitious, and even tyrannical, striving, cannot (ἀδύνατος) master them (cf. 9.6 *Phallic whoness* below). Further-more, even a collectivity of individuals is not the underlying subject of the power interplays that have a 'life' of their own, especially when the sociating me-dium of their interplay is thingified value (cf. preceding section).

Human essencing itself is thus stripped back from traditional casts of human being, such as an individual person morally demanding acknowledgement of its dignity (Kant), to a player essencing in diverse, mutually estimative, power inter-plays with other players. Due to the multiplicity of bewilderingly intertwined life-movements of a plurality in *different*, sometimes *aligned* (e. g., co-operative, col-laborative) and often *opposed* (e. g. competitive, inimical) directions, the exercise of individual powers is necessarily a power interplay of often *antagonistic* and mutu-ally excluding, *contradictory* powers. Due to its free, three-dimensional temporal nature, the resolution of such contradictions in the movement of interplay is *un-predictable*, for there is no underlying unified ἀρχή, no unifying ground. Power in-terplay is potentially *fair* interplay of mutual estimation through which individual mortals are *sociated* with each other *as* whos on a most elementarily *just* level. *Fairness* bears within itself its own negation of *unfairness*, and the power interplay can essence the *lack* of fairness as *un*fairness in myriad different ways. These two sides of the coin are inseparable; they form an identity in difference in the Hege-lian sense. The mutual estimation itself is either appreciative or depreciative or any subtly nuanced hybrid thereof; the estimative power interplay therefore can be either *for, with or against each other*, including all blends thereof.

All *sociation* (Vergesellschaftung) is dynamic power interplay that constitutes the core of world-sharing, human essencing. Your selfhood as a reflection from the world of others with whom you engage in power interplays, and hence your who-

status and personal power are therefore also shifting throughout your life, and that in three independent temporal dimensions. The estimation of an individual's whoness is subject to defective deconcealment by the player him/herself through phenomena such as pretence, misrepresentation, cheating, swindling, imposing, etc. and by others through phenomena such as defamation, calumny, libel, rumour, etc. Mutual estimation is also necessarily *hermeneutic* because, in mutually estimating and esteeming each other in whatever way, the players are simultaneously *interpreting* each other's who-stands and -status *evaluatively* through the socio-ontological 'looks' of whoness predominant in a given age and culture. These 'looks' are ultimately not merely culturally sociological, but *socio-temporalogical*, i.e. rooted in elementary modes of presenting oneself to the world *as* somewho, in short, in elementary modes of *essencing as* somewho. The power interplay provides room for movement for both putting somewho down or lifting them up estimatively, thus boosting or depressing that somewho's standing and self-esteem. The estimative, evaluative interplays, as mutual, can therefore become brutal and nasty, especially where political power, i.e. the power over others, is at stake. As we have seen, the estimation of an individual who encompasses all three temporal dimensions, especially as who the who in question has previously essenced, upon which his or her *reputation* hangs. Whether a given who can be *trusted* in *future* depends upon an estimation of how the who in question presents him- or herself as who he or she *has been.*

Sociation as power interplay is thus a foundational concept in the temporalogy of whoness that must not be confused with socialization, which is a merely ontogenetic concept of explanation employed ubiquitously in modern disciplines such as sociology, psychology or evolutionary biology. Socialization amounts to education or indoctrination into a cast of whoness within a *given* society along with its established mores, customs and narratives, taken merely factually, empirically. As necessarily sociating, we mortals live in continual power interplays that are simultaneously and unavoidably an interplay of mutual estimation, mutual evaluation, mutual valuing, hence, *mutually estimative power interplays* that can assume the guise of virtually infinite variations and nuances ranging from private intimacy through earning a livelihood in fair or bruising economic interchange, to the brutal, conniving, intriguing power interplays of politics on all levels up to the geopolitical. In addition to all the personal power interplays, there are all the derivative, more impersonal, mediated power interplays, more often than not played out in the medium of thingified value (cf. preceding section), among groups and also in the medium of the social institutions that precipitate as organs for organizing society on all levels from bottom to top and are thus organs of social and political power over others. The holders of office in such organs of power are themselves in some way esteemed, honoured by others and thus endowed with social and po-

litical power. They are or have been successful players in their respective power interplays.

The mediation of the sociating power interplays of a society through the medium of thingified value lends them a fundamentally different character by fundamentally altering the complexion of whoness itself, which is no longer determined at core by personal powers and abilities, but by the wealth, (i.e. the amount of thingified value in its various forms) that an individual is able to wield as a power in the sociating power interplays. To put it simplistically and misleadingly: money in the hands of an individual is a special kind of social power. This formulation is misleading because money itself has to be deconcealed hermeneutically *as* a form of thingified value, which is a deeper concept providing more insight than merely referring to that factual thing called money because, as everyone already knows and has known for millennia, 'money is power'. Thingified value is able to exercise social power by virtue of enabling its possessor to transform one form of value into another. An individual who may even be enticed to sell his or her self-esteem, and any individual wielding political power of office may be enticed, or even coerced by the power struggle to stay in office, to 'monetize' his or her political power with the highest bidder. This represents the germ of plutocracy that represents an inherent danger to and perversion of the principle of equality in democracy which is predicated upon each individual citizen's having an equal vote, i.e. an equal voice, in electing who is to govern. As they say: money talks, and democracy is in dire danger when the vote is given to non-natural persons, i.e. to corporations.

Even in the intercourse of daily life, a wealthy individual is able to wield more power over others due to his or her enhanced who-status to which, as a matter of course, s/he expects and receives deference. The everyday power interplays shift 'naturally' in favour of the wealthy. The power inherent in thingified value in its various forms represents a deep-lying impediment to the fairness of sociating interplay by artificially bolstering the who-status of certain whos. The privileges enjoyed by the wealthy in social intercourse pale in comparison to the social and political power wielded by those big players in the gainful game who unknowingly (but all the more closely for that) identify their selves with the accumulative circulation and reproduction of the total social thingified value, the primary movement in societies sociated by the medium of thingified value. In view of this all-pervasive, covertly dominating, subterranean social power, it becomes self-delusional to speak of the possibility of fair, sociating interplay, which cannot be inoculated as an ethical issue but must be seen as a temporalogical one of power interplay among players perverted by their self-casting as selves.

9.3 Fairness as criterion of justice

If social living in an elementary sense is the diverse intertwining movements of myriad mutually estimative (and therefore also hermeneutic) power interplays, then the question of *justice* must relate also in an elementary way to such interplays. There is always a plurality of powers at play in such interplay which, as interplay among whos, is reciprocally evaluative, either directly, or indirectly via the impersonal medium of thingified value (in its various value-form guises as money, landed property, enterprise, loan capital, etc. as discussed in preceding sections), and social and political institutions that are borne by their agents such as politicians, functionaries, officials and bureaucrats wielding their respective kinds of power. In such mutually estimative power interplay there is always the question as to its *fairness*, which can be assessed according to how the powers in play are mutually estimated and receive their *due.* A bureaucrat, for instance, can implement a lawful regulation in a consistent, even-handed way without favour or prejudice, or he can implement it capriciously or more harshly than the law requires due to bias. The latter is an instance of unfairness in power interplay. On a higher, meta-level it can also be questioned whether the law itself enforced by the bureaucrat is fair and just, which turns it into a political issue that may or may not be resolved (at least in so-called liberal Western democracies) through democratic political controversy and struggle.

The fairness of power interplay is intimately related to the *freedom* of social movement that is lubricated by mutually satisfying, due estimation of the players. As a 'look' or 'idea' of that movement called mutually estimative power interplay, *fairness* is a socio-temporalogical, hermeneutic concept of estimating-as..., not just a factual description. *Unfairness* is the phenomenon of *ugliness* in power interplays that can appear in myriad ways. If one party in the power play is obviously at a great disadvantage, is put down and treated *unfairly* in it, this may be seen clearly as an instance of *injustice.* Since, however, the judgement as to whether a given instance of power interplay is fair or not is necessarily an interpretation of the state of affairs – not just in the present, but within the full compass of three-dimensional temporality – the power interplay itself inevitably shifts terrain to a power interplay of an exchange of words and opinions interpreting the power interplay one way or the other, more often than not diametrically contradictory, and is hence a struggle in the medium of the hermeneutic λόγος over fairness in a particular, factual instance. The phenomenal 'looks' presented by the power interplay can be interpreted one way or another, inevitably affected and infected by self-interest and vested interests, through the prism of traditional, habituated custom, all the way down to fundamental, elementary conceptions of whoness itself, i.e. to how various kinds of human essencing are estimated and esteemed in a

given society in a given time, including e. g. whether the who is a man or a woman or has a 'non-standard' sexual orientation. A certain kind of power interplay may be viewed, i. e. interpreted, as perfectly fair and proper in a certain culture in a certain time and come to be interpreted in retrospect at a later time as grossly unfair and unjust due to shifts in the esteem and respect accorded to various social groups. The shift in interpretation is itself a struggle fought out in terms of whether certain whos are 'capable' of freedom of life-movement in every respect, whether their freedom of life-movement would undermine social norms and mores, etc.

Fairness itself is no hard-and-fast, definite criterion but, like the outcome of power interplays themselves, is also a shifting one that depends on how the players themselves and the onlookers interpretively estimate and evaluate the fairness of the interplay itself along with its outcome. The power interplay itself may be present, past (e. g. historical struggles over the heritage of colonialism) or even futural (e. g. prospects for future generations). If all sides in a power interplay are more or less satisfied with a given outcome, fairness, and thus justice, is generally deemed to have been served, especially if the onlookers concur. This is the case, for instance, with the truth-telling undertaken to make recompense for the wrongs of the oppression of indigenous peoples. Hence criteria of fairness themselves shift according to often fickle public opinion, and socio-political struggle itself becomes a battle over shifting the weight of public opinion regarding the fairness or unfairness of the outcomes of power interplays in one direction or another. The more momentous of these power interplays become long-term historical struggles that leave their indelible mark on an age. In this sense, as the fairness of sociating, estimative power interplays, all justice is *social justice* and at base a *question of power* rather than a *moral* question of ought-to-be. The *ethics* of a society as a matter of its *customary* way of life is the sedimentation of past power struggles over social mores that were played out employing also moral arguments over what 'ought to be'. The struggle for changes in a society's customs and norms is fought in the name of fairness, justice and freedom, all of which pertain to how the power interplays whose intricate movements weave the fabric of social life are played out.

Social mores, how they look *as* fair or unfair, thus have a powerful influence, and they shift over time according to common, necessarily hermeneutic, conceptions of what shape social living *ought* to take according to moral judgements. This Ought as a look of fairness is itself subject to the ever-controversial power interplays over fairness, i. e. over the 'fair sight' of acceptable social practices of all kinds, as distinct from the ugly sights that take hold in social opinion as a blight and a blemish covered up by bigotry. There is thus an ineluctable *hermeneutic circularity* in determining the fairness of social power interplays, since the determination of fairness itself as criterion for justice is just such a social power interplay

with fluctuating, shifting outcomes dependent also upon public opinion. The circularity, however, is not vicious, but arises necessarily from the hermeneutic nature of the world itself: the world is *as* we think it interpretively to essence which, of course, does not imply that the world is a subjective world-view that 'we' ostensible 'subjects' project onto an ostensibly 'objective' world. Rather, as *who* 'we' essence is always a way we interpret ourselves to essence through the unceasing estimative power interplays that make up life-movement itself. In modern democracies there is the opportunity to *politically* play out social power interplays over determining their fairness insofar as the citizenry has the vote and there are, in turn, free and fair elections. In other non-democratic circumstances, such social power interplays may be played out in popular uprisings or guerrilla insurgency.

One major historical, bitterly fought power interplay that emerged in the nineteenth century has gone under the name of the struggle for *socialism* or *communism.* The criterion of justice applied in this struggle has been that of unfairness in the distribution of social wealth as well as in the control of the means of production producing that wealth. The former has been at the core of the struggle for a social-democratic state that is able to redistribute produced wealth to correct imbalances in outcomes of the gainful game to attain those forms of thingified value called income. The unfair imbalances are seen to consist in certain players in the competitive game not gaining sufficient income to support a fair material standard of living. An unfair material standard of living is estimated as poverty, whose unfairness is ugly. The social-democratic state's task is to redress this unfairness through redistributive social justice, and elements of this kind of social democracy have long since been incorporated even in liberal democratic societies based on so-called 'free market economies'. This has drawn the fangs of any class-revolutionary socialist movement.

The latter criterion of justice aims at redressing the power imbalance resulting from a certain social class (usually called the capitalist class, but comprising the entrepreneurial class, the class of financiers and perhaps also the class of owners of real property) having possession and ownership of and thus being empowered to control the society's economic activity and reap its benefits in the shape of large shares of the total social wealth produced. The critique of class divisions with their inherent class exploitation *as such* aims at the unfairness and injustice of the capitalist class' being able to exploit the working class whose labour, in the Marxist critique based on the so-called labour theory of value[5], is said to be the source

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5 For a critique of the labour theory of value as well as a better founded, value-form analytic reconstruction of what Marx attempted in *Das Kapital,* see the co-authored appendix to my *Critique of Competitive Freedom...* (1984/2015).

of the surplus value appropriated by the capitalist class. Redressing the unfairness and injustice of class exploitation, an extreme and systematic form of injustice, is seen to lie in the expropriation of the capitalist class in favour of the working class (comprising all those employed by the capitalist class). Those who were downtrodden are now supposed to be on top through revolution, thus gaining in some fashion control and ownership of society's means of production.

The critique of the sociating medium of thingified value per se aims primarily neither at unfair distribution nor at unfair class exploitation, but, more deeply, at the sociating medium itself. This is because of the unfairness and injustice the accumulating movement of valorization in the medium generates by systematically deforming the outcomes of power interplays in the gainful game, i.e. in the economic life of a so-called market economy. This deformation or perversion of the gainful game comes about because of the one-dimensionality of its pursuit of thingified gain that is covertly in perfect alignment with the underlying movement of endless accumulation of thingified value itself. Criteria of unfairness or injustice in mutually estimative power interplays thus have pertinence only indirectly with regard to a thingified medium of sociation, whose unbridled accumulative movement has long since assumed a life of its own in modern societies and the global economy. The critique consists first and foremost in appropriately deconcealing the medium itself, its eery, inexorable augmentative movement, and how we mortals have blindly become the willing slaves of an absolute will to endless augmentation of thingified value.

In the second place, the agents of the covert underlying movement of endless valorization, namely, the character-masks of entrepreneurial, financial and land capital, enjoy a systematic advantage in asserting their interests in the gainful game because they keep the market economy, on which all depend for their livelihoods, running. The term 'market economy' is the cover-up for the movement of unbridled accumulation that remains invisible to empiricist and positivist ways of thinking within subjectivist metaphysics. The absolute will to accumulate thingified value (also known superficially as economic growth) is temporally one-dimensional, since it wills an endless, formal, circular movement which, in turn, not only intoxicates and toxicates the lives of those on the surface of society playing the gainful game, but also has severe repercussions for the Earth on which we mortals live (cf. 9.7 *Estimating and esteeming the Earth*). Capitalists of all stripes, however, are those whose lives are poisoned most of all by unknowing identification with the inexorably accumulative medium. In politics, those unknowingly aligned with endless valorization constitute its conservative right wing, although the progressive left wing is equally ignorant of underlying valorization movement that trammels human freedom of movement.

The uncovering of this absolute will to valorization, once it is seen explicitly *as such* and the blindness alleviated through long controversy and struggle, enables the sociating power interplay among the players to be seen for the first time in another light and thus perhaps estimated more fairly, more even-handedly. Abstracting from the inherent one-dimensional bias toward endless accumulation hidden beneath the indistinctive rubric of 'economic growth', the mutually estimative power interplays can be seen to be played out in existential, three-dimensional time with its three degrees of freedom of movement. In this sense, with deconcealing insight enabling a step back, the sociating power interplays essence more clear-sightedly, more freely. Without the imposition and encumbrance of thingified value's temporally one-dimensional, augmentative movement that systematically undermines the possibility of genuine fairness of power interplay, the mutual estimation performed in sociating interplay can be seen to be one of mutually estimating what we as players can do for each other. This for-each-otherness may be regarded as a synonym for what has traditionally been called ἀγάπη, i. e. love of one's fellow. The deconcealment of thingified value as endlessly accumulative medium of sociation provides a diagnosis of one the impediments to such love.

9.4 Right, law, legitimate state power

The acknowledged criteria of fairness for the outcomes of mutually estimative power interplays attain the solidity and fixity of a social *value* with the status of a *right*, only apparently set in stone and only apparently enjoying the status of 'natural, inalienable human rights'. Such values *evaluate* estimatingly the outcomes of power interplays according to right and wrong in the context of the customs and norms of a given society. Individuals can thus be conceived as (institutionally and politically, especially constitutionally guaranteed) *bearers of rights* in a society who must be respected as such in intercourse among themselves. Such rights attain the *force* of *laws* in relation to the *state* that is endowed with the *legitimate power* (including physically violent power, legitimized by being accepted and affirmed by the citizenry) within the framework of law that aims to regulate the power interplays of society within such state-posited legal bounds. Once certain rights are socially established as criteria of fairness for power interplays and enshrined in enforceable law, an individual can insist on his or her rights not being infringed or violated. They are then acknowledged and enforced by the state as the superior, preferably legitimated, instance of social power endowed with a monopoly of legitimate physical force, ultimately over bodies. This is called the *rule of law,* that accordingly must not be an arbitrary exercise of superior power.

Individual rights presuppose that the human individual has been individualized in a form of society in which the individual is dissociated from the others and sociated with them primarily through the medium of thingified value that strips off all social bonds and fixed, stratified, social power relations, such as those been the nobility and the common folk, to expose the individual as a formally bondless, free and equal subject that can become the bearer of individual rights (cf. 2.12 *Factual correctness vs. hermeneutic truth*). Henceforth: "All men are equal." Due to the very medium of thingified value and its movement, however, this formal, individualized freedom is deceptive. The individualized human individual is taken to be a self-evident fact of 'nature', and its freedom of movement in pursuing happiness in the gainful game is taken to be freedom per se, no matter what the individual outcomes are and no matter whether and the extent to which the game is rigged from the outset in favour of those players with greater thingified-value power. Those (of whom there are many) advocating such individualized freedom as freedom per se and as the highest value are covertly and unknowingly in alignment with the predominating, underlying sociating movement of endlessly accumulating thingified value that is only colourlessly captured by the worn-out term 'capitalism'.

In an elementary socio-temporalogical sense, the state can be conceived first of all as the mediator and adjudicator of the fairness of sociation through power interplay, and thus as the guarantor of justice, in conflicts arising within the countless ongoing power interplays of civil society which constitute it *as* sociating movement. Such adjudication as the state's *administration of justice* is called for whenever certain power interplays are considered on one side or the other as *unfair.* The *judiciary* is the organ of state tasked with appropriately *interpreting* conflictual power interplays within the framework of law. State-posited law must not be arbitrarily posited and enforced, but must be *seen as fair* by public opinion to be legitimated. Public opinion itself is hermeneutic and only constituted within the customs, norms and usages of a society and its current debates.

Conflictual power interplays themselves may be of either a *criminal* or *civil* nature. *Crime* is an infringement of the laws posited by the state governing sanctioned rules of play for social interplay, in particular those relating to private property and individual life and liberty. The state itself is called upon to punish the infringement of its own laws. *Civil disputes*, on the other hand, arise through the power interplays among particular citizens (litigating parties) in which the courts may be called upon to judge a particular case of interplay, i.e. of commutation, as to its fairness or unfairness and accordingly adjust its outcome to be fair for the parties involved. Such an adjustment may amount to awarding *compensation* to one of the parties. The judge has to judge and apportion blame, liability, compen-

sation, and so on. All this serves to keep the gainful game going, without knowledge of its underlying movement.

As instituted by the state and enshrined in enforceable law, rights are relatively stable fixations of the outcomes of social and political power interplays that may have been played out tediously and recurrently over generations and centuries. As the secular outcome of mutually estimative power interplays, rights are themselves values evaluating the fairness of power interplays of diverse kinds. Their apparent established fixity, especially when enshrined in the constitution, ossifies them *as if* they were unchangeable, even inalienable human rights. Rights are established nevertheless through socio-political power struggle in an historical age, guided by *ideas*, and can also be eroded and watered down in the same way; they are not 'eternal', but rather are exuded by the movement of social power interplays that never attain a final outcome and resolution once and for all. They themselves remain subject to controversial reinterpretation in one way or another, progressively or reactionarily, even to the point of perverting and inverting them entirely in a movement known as socio-political rollback. In particular, the rights upheld in a society sociated through the medium of thingified value can be thoroughly perverted by their interpretation by the judiciary in a way that favours its relentless and ruthless accumulation under the camouflage of a perverse interpretation of freedom itself.

9.5 Freedom

The criterion of fairness underpinning justice and right serves for judging the outcomes of ongoing power interplays of all kinds and, as already stated, is itself subject to social power interplays that are always also essentially hermeneutic in nature. They all have to be interpreted one way or another. This makes fairness as a norm not only hard to define, but also susceptible to fluctuation through power struggles, especially in polemical words. The protagonists in social power struggles inevitably employ such words as 'fairness', 'justice' and 'freedom' in their speeches, commentaries and writings, thereby implicitly pointing to the decisive importance of well-grounded socio-temporalogical concepts of these phenomena. Underlying fairness is always about how human beings, as inevitable players in all sorts of mutually estimative power interplays constituting the movement of life, *estimate and esteem each other*, i.e. whether appropriately or inappropriately in all shades and nuances, but without knowledge of how their mediation through thingified value deforms them by bringing them into line with the temporally one-dimensional augmentative movement of thingified value (usually called blandly the 'state of the economy').

The power struggles over the criteria for fairness itself, justice and right, the bulk of which pertain directly or indirectly to how the gainful game is played in myriad sub-games of bewildering kinds, thus recur again and again in historical time in ever new situations and interpretations and against diverse socio-historical cultural backgrounds, including very ugly ones (e. g. slavery under colonialism and its aftermath). The fixation of criteria of fairness as rights is only ever relatively permanent; rights therefore have to be preserved and regained from the incessant power struggles in societies that are invariably also hermeneutic struggles over the interpretation of key controversial phenomena such as 'freedom' and the 'right to life' that are usually interpreted as individual, pertaining to the free subject exercising its will to lead a life.

Since power interplays are kinds of movement, the *question of freedom itself* is rooted in the question of the *freedom of life-movements* in such power interplays and most fundamentally in the freedom of each individual player to strive to cast her or his very own self. As we have seen, the individualization of each player *as* individual is here not to be taken as self-evident, but involves socio-temporalogical preconceptions. The power to play freely in such mutually estimative power interplays lies at the root of human freedom for our sharing the world with one another, estimating each other as who we are. (Hence the conception of freedom as an individual's freedom to do what he or she wants without restriction is grossly naïve and silly, albeit very popular and widespread.) The freedom of movement of mutually estimative power interplays depends crucially upon the historically specific sociating medium of thingified value, in which it is played out, where the players are covertly character-masks of (hybrid) forms of thingified value. The very socio-temporalogical 'looks' or masks of whoness, i. e. of how whos are estimated and esteemed in a given historical society, albeit obliquely, unknowingly and only implicitly, has a decisive influence upon such power struggles. An explicit struggle over such 'looks' of whoness amounts to a socio-temporalogical struggle itself, whose elementary precondition is that 'we' understand what social temporalogy is as an endeavour arising from our essencing with one another in the full expanse of historically shaped, three-dimensional time.

To be free, the interplay must be fair, and to be fair, the interplay must be free. Freedom thus resides elementarily in the fairness of mutual estimation of powers in dynamic interplay, in the first place, of individual powers and abilities, but not restricted to these, since there are also indirect media of social power. The proclamation of human rights attempts to give the outcomes of struggles over fairness relative permanence or even to be ascribed the status of 'eternal', 'innate' or 'inalienable' rights, although they originate from incessant social movement, i. e. from power interplays that are often long and bitter struggles. In a Nietzschean sense, the "permanence of being" is stamped upon endless "becoming", i. e. move-

ment, with a kind of pretence of permanence (which Nietzsche calls necessary "Irrtum", i.e. error). Rights in this sense are *ideals*, or rather, guiding *ideas* as temporalogical 'looks' that serve as orientation in power struggles in a certain time. The movement of history is thus not driven – *pace* Marx – solely by class struggle, but also by the *contradictions* among opposing social powers of diverse kinds engaged in antagonistic struggles with each other (political in the broadest sense, including cultural) under the guidance of certain fundamental ideas, including especially ideas of freedom and justice. These ideas pertain to the Geist or mind of an age and can themselves only surface and gain contour through struggle of the philosophical kind in which superseded ideas are interrogated, historically recast and alternative ideas of freedom attain firmly rooted truth through deconcealment. Hence freedom and truth are intimately interrelated: struggle without truth is blind. The idea of individual freedom, in particular, that originated in the West, goes hand in hand with a particular historical form of sociation via thingified value that sociates dissociated individuals, thus enabling individual freedom to be understood as individualism. As we have seen, sociation through such a thingified medium generates certain illusions of individual freedom that are deeply problematic for our living together on the Earth. A stronger truth must evaporate and disperse these illusions for us to see and assess more clearly *as* who we could freely essence.

9.6 Phallic whoness

At the opposite end of the spectrum to appropriately esteeming, appreciating and valuing each other in the dynamics of fair interplay, thus demonstrating *humility* and *modesty*, there is the socio-temporalogical phenomenon of *phallic whoness*,[6] a kind of extreme otherwise known in the philosophical tradition, starting with Plato, as the 'love of esteem' (φιλοτιμία, from τιμή signifying esteem, value, dignity; Latin: honore, gloria) for which 'men' of ambition strive. This elevated 'look' of whoness in the mutually estimative power interplays among mortals is anything but fair, although it shows a striving to appear magnificent by dint of its wielding of social power in the sociating power plays. Such a 'look' is an ideal offering an attractive possibility to some for casting one's self as a powerful player in the game of who-estimation, interwoven with success in the gainful game and in the striving to wield political power over others. Elevated estimation as somewho seems to be

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6 Cf. my *Phänomenologie der Männlichkeit* (1999) which here requires recasting within a temporalogical setting.

worthy to strive for as a high good. The phallic who is a grotesque character-mask in the who-game who sees himself, i. e. his self, reflected in his success in acquiring power over others. His self-aggrandisement is elevated by others' acknowledgement of, or even submission to, his superior social power in the sociating interplays that goes beyond the accolades and admiration accorded to an individual with exceptional abilities, who may even comport him- (or her-)self with modesty. A highly situated phallic who requires the misguided and self-deluding adoration of many lower situated follower-whos to erect and maintain his elevated social power.

Due to their mutually estimative nature among many, power interplays do not proceed from a single power source. Nevertheless, this circumstance does not hinder certain players in the power interplays from striving ambitiously for a dominant position in them that approaches as nearly as possible *command* over them by having oneself estimated *as* a dominating player to whom others submit or (for those not taken in by the phallic who's peacock-strutting) at least make a show of deference, even down to the degradation of lickspittling. Such phallic whos pretend and enjoy a kind of autocratic status, despite the sociating nature of whoness itself. Such is their temporalogical untruth: they have imbibed and been intoxicated personally, individually by the absolute will to power over social movement, over the power interplays, representing the ultimately vain attempt to compel the three-dimensional temporality of potentially free interplay into the mould of one-dimensional, linear temporality of a command hierarchy. The shift of focus to social movement, i. e. to interplay, brings with it the necessity of introducing whoness and phenomena of social power. The striving to master the social movement of interplay leads inevitably to command hierarchies of various kinds. The hierarchical chain of command in armed forces is only one example.

Ambitious who-game players stand out phallically above the rest in being wielders of power over others, thus aggrandizing their self-esteem. In the political sphere, the power may reside in personal characteristics such as charisma, demagogic manipulativeness, leadership qualities, Machiavellian wiliness, machinating pushiness, bullying, underhand intrigue, etc., interfused with and mediated by thingified value and/or political office enabling its holder to wield institutionalized political power over others. The wily politician knows the ways of climbing the rungs of political power and holding onto it, both behind the scenes and on the public stage. For the latter, the phallic politician requires a following of those susceptible to being hoodwinked, to believing the politician's story, and he must therefore possess a measure of rhetorical skill that is used to turn black into white in the eyes of his/her uncritical followers. Such rhetorical skill must understand how to pander to the prejudices and stoke the anxieties and grievances of the masses congregated by mass media technologies. As who the phallic who essences

in the full temporal spectrum of past, present and future must be presented in the most flattering light to curry favour with and dupe supporters who, in turn, vicariously enjoy and bathe in his exercise of political power.

A particular, commonplace combination of social powers is *plutocracy* in which the wealthy plutocrat – who stands out phallically due to the power of thingified value he owns in various forms – may wield political power directly (e.g. a democratically elected billionaire) or as the influential power (e.g. a media tycoon) behind the throne of the politician holding top office. The phallic who presents a look of whoness fixated on the pinnacle of all kinds of social power in the power interplays, on either a banal or a grand scale, through which all social life is moved and driven. Under the guise of promoting economic progress and prosperity, the plutocrat exercises political power in order to enhance the political boundary conditions (government policies, laws, regulations) for valorizing thingified value. Accumulated thingified value is mobilized to shape and mould the more or less gullible mass opinion of the people (today constituting an electorate in the democratic West). Such shaping undertaken by moneyed wealth via mass media amounts to manipulation of public opinion with suitable, more or less clever or crude, distortions and misinterpretations of factual states of affairs to align it surreptitiously with the interests of major players in the gainful game.

The will to power in such phallic power interplays aims at domination and at having this domination esteemed by others, thus completing a reflective circle of self-adulation. All such will to power wills its continuation, securing and consolidation; it wills 'eternity', a phenomenon universally observable with despots, who, if at all possible, will go about establishing a dynasty. Due to his love of power, and the circumstance that whoness is not 'substantial', but essentially reflective via others rather than self-generated, such a phallic who needs his whostand to be seen, mirrored and acknowledged by those willingly subservient in order to bask in the glorious reflection of his (or perhaps even her) own phallic stand above the rest. Hence the tendency of phallic symbols of power to tower vertically. Who-status is reckoned in the vertical dimension, and the phallic who particularly enjoys the possession and exercise of power over others and having this superior status reflected in their submissive behaviour.

The phallic who therefore also surrounds himself with sycophants and cannot tolerate criticism (which may even have lethal consequences), for this represents a potential break in the temporally one-dimensional, linear chain of command and submission. This desire for superiority may be materialized spatially in vertically soaring architectural monuments named after the towering phallic who. The phallic who's proper name (Eigenname) must stand out from the heights to become universally known and also cast in stone to attain illusory *immortality*. Phallic whoness amounts to a striving for standing presence, where 'standing' here signifies

both 'vertical' and 'enduring'. Such standing presence represents a potentiation of the phallic who's very being, his contrived substance in the traditional ontological sense of whatness. This substantial standing may be reflected also in the advantageous tallness of the phallic who's body or his putting on weight to seemingly enhance his gravitas. All such striving for *elevated permanent presence* represents a denial of the fluid *essencing in three-dimensional time* of mutually estimative social interplay that constitutes the core of mortal human life.

Such single-minded concern with his own elevated who-status makes the phallic who one-sidedly uncaring, ruthless and even murderous in power interplays with others at the slightest hint of resistance against his absolute will to command. Mutual, free and fair estimation gives way to the unbridled will to gain, preserve and extend the position of mastery and command in power interplays, to the detriment of others whom the phallic who, in more or less veiled ways, despises and employs as his lackeys and tools. Any moves in the power interplays, no matter how duplicitous, prevaricating, underhand, mendacious, unfair and invidious, are acceptable for the phallic who's absolute striving to gain and hold onto power at any cost. Through intrepid investigative reporting, democratic media may be able to expose some of the gross abuses of a phallically fixated politician's power. His estimative power interplays amount to disdaining others as beneath himself, from which he draws pleasure per se. Such depreciating disdain may be openly visible or subtly camouflaged and hypocritically denied, depending on the state of power play in a given situation. The others are made to feel their dependency on the phallic who, who enjoys and relishes his potent power-status even when not exercising it.

The attractiveness of a highly placed phallic who wielding political power for the many who support him lies in the supporters' possibility of self-identification with such a powerful figure whom they would love to emulate, doing so in their own small way, perhaps as the family tyrant terrorizing both wife and offspring. Patriarchal power is attractive to those desiring to suppress dissent, to have one's word obeyed unquestioningly without complaint. An autocratic political leader offers much appreciated reassurance to such believers in patriarchal power by way of practical example.

World history is replete with phallic (tyrannical, autocratic) power-figures wielding political power for a time and frequently wreaking havoc, especially of the bloody kind, on their subject populations. Tyrants who seemingly have attained the pinnacle of social and political power from which their every whim seems to pass down the chain of command to frictionless realization, on the other hand, become paranoically plagued by the anxiety that others are plotting his downfall. This paranoia of the tyrant gives the lie to the ultimately futile striving to merge the absolute will to power over the movement of whats with the absolute will to

power over the movement of whos. The love of wealth, of political power and of elevated who-status forms a kind of eternal unholy trinity as a fateful lode star attracting and guiding the basest natures.

9.7 Estimating and esteeming the Earth

> This craze for motion ... may be followed by a civilization that won't be a movement, because it will rest on the earth. All the signs are against it now...
>
> E.M. Forster *Howards End*

What is the character of the power interplay with the Earth of players in the *gainful game* played atop the underlying movement of valorization of thingified value? In what sense, if at all, is the Earth itself a player in this game? How is it drawn in? Is the Earth itself to be conceived as a what or as a who? Are we mortals to call her Mother Earth to restore her dignity? Or does such a gesture fall short of what is required of us? The Earth here comprises our planet together with its continents, sky and atmosphere, landscapes, oceans and mountains, rivers and valleys, coastlines and deserts, as well as all living beings, i.e. plants and animals of all kinds, down to microbes (literally: small life, especially bacteria). Another term for the Earth in this sense is the *natural world* with its natural, solar-defined cycles and all its magnificence and astonishing, living richness. In this sense, the Sun also belongs to the Earth, on which all its stupendously intricately interwoven movements of the living and non-living depend.

The mutually estimative power interplays in which we mortals incessantly engage depend for their mutuality upon the capability of mortals to estimate, esteem, evaluate, value *each other* appropriately, including *in*appropriately, in our togetherness. We are constantly estimating, evaluating, interpreting each other *as* some who or other in a multitude of respects. In the gainful game specifically, the players estimate each other in terms of each other's competencies, skills, talents and other powers deployed in the game, along with the powers of thingified value, such as an enterprise or money-capital or loan capital, that the player is able to harness and wield in the pursuit of gain. Such estimating, esteeming, evaluating, valuing carries over mutatis mutandis to the one-sided human estimating, esteeming, evaluating and valuing of natural essents of all kinds that are usually understood as kinds of whats. They have much to offer humankind, and we are vitally dependent upon them. With respect to us, all of them have some value or other, including negative, deleterious ones, for our living together on the Earth. Hence the magnificence of rivers, mountains, landscapes, seascapes can be appreciated, admired, valued, treasured as wonders of nature, but also feared when rivers

flood, the sky's winds become tempestuous, or mountains and undersea volcanoes quake and erupt. Some plants and animals are highly beneficial for human consumption, whereas others are highly deleterious and correspondingly evaluated. Rivers provide water for agriculture; land provides pasture for all sorts of animal husbandry; seas and lakes and oceans teem with fish.

Subsumed beneath its own specific value-form in the globalized accumulative movement of thingified value, the Earth also provides the sites for locating economic, valorizing activity, including not only blocks of land for stores and industrial plants. Alongside the expanses of land and water for agriculture and the extractive industries, the Earth's material resources are thus exploited for gain in the gainful game and thus for their tacit contribution to value-accumulation. Parcels of the Earth's surface, namely, are subsumed under the *thingified value-form* of *ground-rent*, that, however, remains unknown *as such.* Nevertheless, already for centuries, the Earth has borne the burden of its subsumption underneath this thingified value-form. The category of ground-rent, a value-form of *income* derived from land ownership, is largely ignored in today's environmental debates as well as in economics. The parcelling of the Earth into private landed property is a most obvious manifestation of the dissociation of the players in the gainful game, who are then associated and sociated only, or first and foremost, via the medium of thingified value whilst playing the gainful game.

Parcels of land, including stretches of water, can be *leased* for ground-rent. They can also be bought and sold for a price that depends on how the parcel can be deployed in the valorization movement of thingified value. Just as loan (or finance) capital can be deployed by enterprises in return for interest, so can land in return for ground-rent. As a form of income, the ground-rent to be gained by leasing land bears a resemblance to the interest to be gained by lending loan capital. Hence the *price* of land can be regarded as capitalized interest at prevailing market interest rates, as if the land were equivalent to loan capital and the ground-rent were equivalent to interest. This equivalence rests on both land and loan capital being forms of thingified value whose deployment in a circuit of valorizing capital generates their specific forms of income, namely, ground-rent and interest, respectively. The ground-rent income is capitalized at a given interest rate to determine the price of a parcel of land, thus *inverting* the value of the Earth in a topsy-turvy world! From the viewpoint of investment to generate income, it's the quantitative yield that counts, independently of its qualitative source. Due to this thingified equivalence as income-generating and the inversion induced by capitalization of interest rates, when market interest rates are low, the price of land as capitalized ground-rent of land rises, and conversely.

The character-mask of ground-rent is the *private landowner* who is estimated and esteemed as such in the gainful interplay. A parcel of land is conceived entirely

as a what, a valuable, income-generating what. The *private* ownership of land, *depriving* others access to the land, requires securing by a superior social power; it is therefore guaranteed by the state, whose defendable territorial sovereignty is a precondition for its exercise of power over land and sea. By virtue of state territorial sovereignty, it is the state that usurps the land and grants property titles to landowners, even in the case where indigenous peoples lived on the land long before there was any state or sovereign state territory at all. The licence fee paid by a mining company to the state for permission to explore a tract of land for minerals with the aim of profitably mining them, for instance, is one form of appearance of ground-rent for which, notionally, the state is the sovereign landowner. Another example is a portion of the rent paid by a retailer to a property owner for a store in which the retailer's business is located. The rent paid is partly for use of the building and partly simply for the land on which the store is located, i. e. pure ground-rent. The location itself is ground-rent-valuable insofar as it provides something indispensable – namely, a location on Earth – for valorizing advanced capital. This kind of basic ground-rent is called *absolute ground-rent.* For the retailer, location is decisive for generating sales; consequently different locations will attract different amounts of ground-rent, for instance, more in a city centre compared to a suburb on the outskirts due to the differing turnovers of goods sold on these respective sites. These rent differentials are termed *differential ground-rent.* If the conditions of valorization change, e. g. when fewer consumers shop in city centres in favour of ordering goods via algorithms and having them delivered to their door, the differential ground-rent for central locations will diminish and hence the price of blocks of land in the city centre (as capitalized ground-rent) will fall. The very price of land itself, its valuation, therefore depends on how the gainful game is playing out at different locations.

A further example: a river estuary may be highly suited to locating an aquaculture farm and therefore command a higher ground-rent than a location only a kilometre away where the currents are not so favourable for breeding fish. For an enterprise such as an aquaculture farm, the ground-rent paid for the licence to locate its facility in the estuary is a *cost* that must be recouped by the valorizing circulation of its advanced capital when the fish cultivated there are sold. In this way, the estuary is reduced to a factor of production and further, quantitatively, to an amount of thingified value that must be taken account of when determining the profitability or otherwise of the aquaculture enterprise. The estuary's natural beauty, for instance, is filtered out by this reduction, just as the desert beauty of a location where oil is drilled for and extracted. For a resort hotel located on the same estuary, by contrast, the estuary's natural beauty is *estimated highly* in terms of thingified value in the form of ground-rent because it attracts tourists as prospective consumers of precisely this natural beauty which, in turn,

enhances the valorization of the thingified value invested in the hotel facility. Of course, as an enterprise, the hotel need know nothing of thingified value, but it does know about profit derived from the gainful game. The (absolute and differential) ground-rent paid to locate a hotel on the estuary is thus a reflection of how tourists estimate the location quantitatively through what they are prepared to pay for a stay at the hotel. The tourists themselves are *consumers* playing an indispensable role in the gainful game by helping the hotel enterprise to realize sales revenues, thus recouping and valorizing its invested capital. The esteeming of the estuary itself as a part of nature thus depends on how prospective tourist-consumers estimate it and how this estimation is reduced to a monetary amount of thingified value generated by the cycle of capital.

Access to the Earth's resources for enterprises of all kinds to carry out profit-generating activity is acquired either by being granted permission by the state or through negotiations with a landowner over a lease. In the latter case, the character-mask of the landowner stands for parcelled, more often than not fenced-off, nature owned as protected, private property that enters into and is evaluated in the gainful game. In the former case, the state releases a parcelled piece of nature, wherever it may be located, to certain players in the gainful game who, via their explicit profit-generating activity, employing human labour power, implicitly set about valorizing thingified value by using the natural resource of whatever kind thus made available in circuits of valorizing capital. The Earth becomes thus a gigantic reservoir of exploitable material resources.

What is the relationship between the cycles of nature and the cycles of valorizing thingified value? Both are on the whole circular, thus linear movements round and round, albeit composed of myriad (causally) interweaving sub-movements of ecosystems, on the one hand, and of (gainfully) intertwining, individual circuits of capital, on the other. The gainful game itself is played as a bewildering, unpredictable interplay of countless transactions among the players in *three-dimensional time*, whereas the natural cycles of ecosystems may be highly complex, but nonetheless (in principle, as long as natural essents are conceived as whats) largely explicable scientifically in terms of causal interconnections, often in feed-back loops. Such causal-theoretical explanations, along with statistical forecasting based on empirical data, are provided along the time-line of *one-dimensional time.* On the tacit basis of an ontology of efficiently causal movement, the science of ecology studies the fascinatingly complex interweaving of natural cycles both among species and also with movements of the weather. In a society whose economic activity is mediated by the medium of thingified value cycling through its multiple forms, thereby drawing in natural resources as needed primarily via the fundamental value-form of ground-rent, the Earth's natural cycles are *subsumed* be-

neath this *formal circular valorization movement of thingified value.* This subsumption is not free of friction and contradiction.

The *formal subsumption of nature under a form of thingified value* and its subsequent role in valorizing circulation do more or less violence to the natural cycles, especially to the complexly interwoven reproduction cycles of plants and animals, but also, ultimately, even to the natural weather cycles. As formal, the augmentative cycle of valorizing thingified value is entirely indifferent to many natural cycles, even to the point of driving whole species of animals and plants to extinction. Natural cycles are even forced by techno-science to adapt to valorization cycles. As the primary movement in societies sociated globally through the medium of thingified value, the circular movement of valorizing thingified value inevitably attempts to interfere with natural cycles for the sake of enhancing valorization. An example is the exploitation of the soil to plant multiple crops of a valuable agricultural commodity during a single year to meet consumer demand in certain seasons; the multiple crops serve to accelerate the turnover of the capital employed, thus increasing the profits made in a given time period. In this way, nature's cycles are forcibly made to synchronize with capital turnover. The disturbance of the cycles of nature may reach such an extent that it, in turn, in a kind of backlash, starts to impair the valorizing conditions of thingified value. The Earth mutely responds in this exploitative interplay. This disturbance of natural cycles has to be distinguished from the adverse affects on the living conditions of humankind on Earth, which themselves stand in contradiction with the merely *formal* valorization of thingified value, its *indifference* to life, both of mortals and natural living essents.

Whether a productive activity is undertaken at all – thus employing, in particular, living labour power under the wage-form – depends essentially on the overall conditions of valorization. On the surface of society in the gainful game, this translates into cost calculations on the part of the enterprise, large or small, which decide whether and to what degree the investment of money-capital is likely to be profitable. For already functioning capitals, that is, for going concerns, methods of production will be modified according to the dictates of cost pressures. Environmental degradation and destruction may be entirely congruent with profitable operations when companies pursue a business plan of rapacious exploitation as long as easy profits can be made, in which case the state may be called upon, via democratic political struggle, to step in to enforce environmentally compatible, conservational production for the sake of the populace. This amounts to the state's positing and enforcing boundary conditions for the gainful game on the surface whilst remaining oblivious to the underlying valorization movement of thingified value, which it unknowingly furthers under the rubric of economic prosperity. Whether the state pursues an environmentally friendly policy itself depends on political

struggles in which the Earth is sacrificed for the sake of the accumulative valori-
zation movement itself and, on the surface, for the sake of the profitability for
functioning capitals and employment for all those hiring out their labour power.
The lure of new jobs dangled before a section of the population, often constituting
a democratic electorate, will frequently outweigh considerations of environmental
protection. The gainful game then trumps the sparing of the Earth. What remains
invisible is that the Earth itself has been thoroughly imbued everywhere by the
medium of thingified value in its valorization movement.

Such global saturation by the medium of thingified value is nowhere plainer
than with the *energy requirements*, not only to keep the subterranean movement of
valorizing thingified value going, but to accelerate its turnover time as far as pos-
sible. Although the form of thingified value itself and its accumulative cycling is
'merely' a concept that captures an historically determinate kind of sociating inter-
play, its realization in the physical world demands sources of physical energy for
all the physical movements in the world that have to be mastered and carried out
for the sake of valorization. Perhaps the most obvious manifestation is that of
transportation required to get produced goods to market or directly to customers,
who may be either themselves enterprises or consumers. Transportation belongs
to the circulation sphere of thingified value's accumulative movement. Of course,
energy sources are required also for all kinds of production processes, from small
scale up to huge industrial plants, that comprise the production sphere of thingi-
fied value's accumulative movement. The workforce, too, must travel, for which
physical energy must be generated. To keep the endless valorization movement
smoothly turning over and also to accelerate it, the Earth and Sun are exploited
as sources of efficient physical energy.

Such energy is available, first of all, because modern science has worked out
(i. e. interpreted) what efficient energy itself is via its mathematized physics, thus
paving the way to accessing it in a practical, engineering fashion. Nature itself is
thereby stripped back to mathematizable essents. The ultimate source of mathema-
tized physic's successful theorization of physical energy is, in turn, the Aristotelean
ontology of productive, efficient movement which served as the philosophical
source for Newton's first spectacular mathematization of physical motion, but
then, later, and thus indirectly, for Maxwell's mathematical theory of electrody-
namics. The achievements of mathematized physics and its spread to chemistry,
biochemistry,… thus neatly dovetail with the insatiable need for physical energy
to support and enhance the endless accumulation of thingified value globally as
a senseless end in itself to which we mortals today are oblivious.

The access to Earth and Sun practised by modern science in general is to treat
them as scientific objects of study, hence as whats, and not as whos, and that with a
view to mastering their movement with predictive laws of motion for the sake of

their exploitation as resources invaluable for valorization of thingified value. Hence, for instance, so-called 'ecologically sustainable' wind energy is harvested for profitable use without thinking beyond this setting. The modern scientific mind-set remains unbroken and scarcely seriously questioned in our present age. The triumphs of its progress are celebrated wholeheartedly through institutionalized mass media indoctrination; its hubris is visible only for those who have managed to escape the cage of our present age's mind-set. In the present inquiry this is attempted by returning to the historical beginnings to rethink da capo. Is an interplay between mortals and the Earth in our solar system conceivable that is not subsumed unknowingly beneath the inexorable globalized valorization movement of thingified value that employs techno-science in countless ways to sustain enhance and intensify valorization? Eye-opening is a precondition for any possible historical step back from ruthless exploitation of the Earth. The path of thinking offered in this book does not undertake to present any kind of solutions for the dire predicaments facing today's humanity. All it attempts to do is reveal the deepest hermeneutic truth of our situation to show the radicality of the changes needed in our ways of thinking in order to see, in the first place, the shortcomings of present proposed and attempted solutions. The seemingly innocuous question – Who are we? – goes deeper than today's thinking, whether it be everyday, scientific or philosophical, would care to think.

To rethink who we are starting from our belonging first and foremost to three-dimensional time indeed seems to be a wayward enterprise. Our most primordial We is our shared psyche that receives the three-dimensional temporal openness and itself intimately belongs to this openness. It is prior to our individuation in individual bodies and our individualization into individual players in the gainful game. Three-dimensional temporality enables both the movement of our mind and all other kinds of movement, including especially physical movement comprising also energetic physical movement required by the movement of valorization. The absolute will to power over movement comes to grief on three-dimensional temporality, which it refuses to (learn to) see. Likewise, although the gainful game is pressed into the form of a circular valorization movement in linear time, apart from being brutal and exploitative, as a bewildering intertwined array of estimative power interplays, it is untameable. It coerces us to play as mere players unknowingly reduced to character-masks of thingified value in general and ground-rent in particular as one form of thingified value. Disclosing our world-situation in this way raises the historical question regarding an alternative to estimating and esteeming in the medium of thingified value.

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