

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Personal Information: Indian Citizen, US Permanent Resident

Prior Education:

Bachelor of Arts, Economics and Statistics, St. Xavier's College, Mumbai University, 2012

Master of Arts, International and Development Economics, Yale University, 2013

Graduate Studies:

Harvard University, 2016 to present

Ph.D. Candidate in Public Policy (*Economics Track*)

Thesis Title: "Essays on Development Economics"

Expected Completion Date: May 2022

Academic Positions:

Postdoctoral Fellow, King Climate Action Initiative (Jameel Poverty Action Lab), Fall 2022-2024

Visiting Scholar, Global Policy School, UC San Diego, Fall 2022-2024

Research and Teaching Fields:

Environmental Economics, Development Economics, Political Economy

Teaching Experience:

Fall, 2018 DEV 101, Kennedy School of Government, teaching fellow for Professor Dani Rodrik And Professor Rohini Pande

Fall, 2019, DEV 101, Kennedy School of Government, teaching fellow for Professor Dani Rodrik And Professor Eliana Carranza
2020

Research Experience and Other Employment:

Jan-Aug 2020 Teaching at the Right Level (TaRL), JPAL Africa, *Consultant*

Jan-May 2021

Jan-May 2019 DigiFI Initiative, JPAL Africa, *Research Assistant*

Jun-Aug 2017 Evidence for Policy Design, *Research Assistant*
For Professor Rohini Pande

Jul 2013-Jun
2016 Innovations for Poverty Action, *Research Analyst*
For Professor Tavneet Suri and Dr. Rachel Glennerster

Oct 2014-Mar
2015 World Bank, *Short Term Consultant*

Fellowships and Affiliations:

March 2021 Climate Change Solutions Fund

August 2020 GSAS Covid-19 Emergency Funding

January 2020 Weiss Fund Exploratory Travel Grant

September 2019 Professional Development Fund

2016-2021	Evidence for Policy Design PhD Affiliate
2020-2021	Harvard Environmental Economics Program PhD Affiliate
2020-2021	The Institute for Quantitative Social Sciences Affiliate

Job Market Paper:

“Run on the Reservoir: Evidence of Administrative Competition for Groundwater in India” with Shamil Khedgikar

We study whether administrative jurisdictions exacerbate the standard tragedy of the commons problem for groundwater through the policies they implement. We use a difference-in-differences framework that relies on the variation in the overlap of groundwater resources with districts, and the permeability of aquifer systems which facilitates groundwater movement across district borders. We find that districts that competitively overlap with a common resource engage in water-intensive agricultural practices. District spending through different policies escalates this dependence on groundwater instead of controlling it, indicating an aggravation of externalities by decentralized administrations. In the long-term, competitively shared groundwater resources experience unsustainable extraction and are more likely to have defunct wells. Lastly, we find evidence for some adaptation to depleting groundwater within small administrations like villages where local cooperation is more feasible.

Research Papers in Progress:

“On the Returns to Local Agricultural Research Centres in India”

I study the effects of district-level agricultural research centres on productivity and resilience to climate shocks in India. I use a district-level panel of outcomes in an event-study design based on the rollout of these centres starting in 1974, up until 2015. This timespan overlaps with India’s Green Revolution when new varieties of seeds for various cereals were being introduced. Therefore, I can test whether local research capacity enables customization of new technologies and agricultural practices to regional ecological variations, leading to gains in productivity. Additionally, I test whether the presence of these centres minimizes the adverse effects of climate shocks like droughts or extreme temperatures through preventative best practices as well as improved adaptation. *Results expected in May 2022.*

“Population Dispersion and Rural Public Good Delivery” with Shamil Khedgikar and Kartik Srivastava

A dispersed distribution of settlements in villages can generate competition between groups for scarce resources. Such competition may enhance state capacity to provide broad-access public goods like schools, banks and mobile phone towers. But it may also lead to the under-provision of highly targeted public goods, like drinking water taps and farm ponds, if citizens from competing settlements can sabotage investments in other parts of the village. We test this hypothesis using data on the number of habitations in villages across India and public good outcomes on both – broad-based and highly targeted amenities. Moreover, we use exogenous variation from a country-wide road building program (PMGSY) that connects habitations to test whether incomplete road networks exacerbate the effects of competition between habitations.

“Indirect Vs Direct Elections: Evidence from Municipal Elections in an Indian State”

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Non-Academic Publications:

“Digital Identification and Finance Initiative Africa: An Overview of Research Opportunities” with Tavneet Suri (June 2019), for J-PAL Africa

“The Economic Impacts of Ebola Bulletin” with Rachel Glennerster and Tavneet Suri (2014-2015), for the International Growth Centre