

IMAGE IDENTIFICATION

When we started analyzing any memory dump, we must identify the type of the image so we can use "imageinfo" command to identify the following things.

- 1- Identify the operating system
- 2- Identify hardware architecture (32 or 64 bit)
- 3- Identify service pack
- 3- Identify time that the sample was collected
- 4- Identify the DTB address

```
C:\Users\MemoryForensics>vol.exe -f MemoryDump.vmem imageinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
INFO : volatility.debug : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
Suggested Profile(s) : Win7SP1x64, Win7SP0x64, Win2008R2SP0x64, Win2008R2SP1x64_23418, Win2008R2SP1x64, Win7SP1x64_23418
AS Layer1 : WindowsAMD64PagedMemory (Kernel AS)
AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (C:\Users\MemoryForensics\MemoryDump.vmem)
PAE type : No PAE
DTB : 0x187000L
KDBG : 0xf80002a30120L
Number of Processors : 1
Image Type (Service Pack) : 1
KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xffffffff80002a32000L
KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffffffff78000000000L
Image date and time : 2021-07-29 17:57:58 UTC+0000
Image local date and time : 2021-07-29 19:57:58 +0200
```

Figure 1 image identification

From the output of "imageinfo", we can identify the suggested profile and suggested profile is very important as we can use it with other plugins.

PROCESSES CHECK

We can identify the correct profile from the previous figure 1, now we can start analyze the processes of the memory dump.

PSLIST COMMAND

To get all processes on a system, we can use "pslist" command and we can extract all processes on a system by running it on Memory Dump and get information about the following thing

- 1- The offset
- 2- Process name
- 3- Process ID
- 4- Parent process ID
- 5- Number of threads

6- Number of the handles

7- Data and time when process started or exited

We can see all processes on a system in the next figure and identify the previous information about every process so let us see the results in the next figure 2.

```
C:\Users\MemoryForensics>vol.exe -f MemoryDump.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 pslist
```

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6

Offset(V)	Name	PID	PPID	Thds	Hnds	Sess	Wow64	Start
Exit								
0xffffffff800069b860	System	4	0	92	563	-----	0	2021-07-28 21:10:24 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8003f50450	smss.exe	268	4	2	29	-----	0	2021-07-28 21:10:24 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8002479060	csrss.exe	352	344	9	489	0	0	2021-07-28 21:10:28 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8001b31060	wininit.exe	392	344	3	76	0	0	2021-07-28 21:10:28 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8002458880	csrss.exe	404	384	10	243	1	0	2021-07-28 21:10:28 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80025fe8e0	services.exe	452	392	9	237	0	0	2021-07-28 21:10:29 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8002631360	lsass.exe	460	392	7	628	0	0	2021-07-28 21:10:29 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8002649b00	lsm.exe	468	392	10	150	0	0	2021-07-28 21:10:29 UTC+0000
0xffffffff800262ea40	winlogon.exe	496	384	5	119	1	0	2021-07-28 21:10:29 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80027c4b00	svchost.exe	620	452	11	368	0	0	2021-07-28 21:10:30 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80027e4360	svchost.exe	688	452	9	301	0	0	2021-07-28 21:10:30 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8002805b00	svchost.exe	736	452	20	488	0	0	2021-07-28 21:10:30 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8002858b00	svchost.exe	848	452	20	481	0	0	2021-07-28 21:10:31 UTC+0000
0xffffffff800289c5f0	svchost.exe	900	452	15	364	0	0	2021-07-28 21:10:31 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80028a9320	svchost.exe	944	452	41	1188	0	0	2021-07-28 21:10:31 UTC+0000
0xffffffff800296eb00	svchost.exe	984	452	18	508	0	0	2021-07-28 21:10:34 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80029d3b00	dwm.exe	1132	848	3	74	1	0	2021-07-28 21:10:34 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80029dab00	explorer.exe	1144	1124	53	1093	1	0	2021-07-28 21:10:34 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8002a11610	spoolsv.exe	1204	452	13	304	0	0	2021-07-28 21:10:35 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8002a39b00	svchost.exe	1264	452	19	329	0	0	2021-07-28 21:10:35 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8002a775f0	vm3dservice.exe	1304	1144	2	45	1	0	2021-07-28 21:10:35 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8002a434f0	vmtoolsd.exe	1312	1144	8	229	1	0	2021-07-28 21:10:35 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8002a71270	taskhost.exe	1324	452	11	276	1	0	2021-07-28 21:10:35 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8002abdb00	svchost.exe	1496	452	10	149	0	0	2021-07-28 21:10:37 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80020731d0	VGAAuthService.	1632	452	3	89	0	0	2021-07-28 21:10:37 UTC+0000
0xffffffff800228b1f0	vmtoolsd.exe	1704	452	11	294	0	0	2021-07-28 21:10:38 UTC+0000
0xffffffff800225b510	WmiPrvSE.exe	844	620	10	307	0	0	2021-07-28 21:10:40 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80023a07c0	msdtc.exe	2332	452	12	147	0	0	2021-07-28 21:10:52 UTC+0000
0xffffffff800275d060	mscorsvw.exe	2184	452	5	103	0	1	2021-07-28 21:13:22 UTC+0000
0xffffffff8002a517f0	svchost.exe	2292	452	7	115	0	0	2021-07-28 21:13:22 UTC+0000
0xffffffff80039975f0	mscorsvw.exe	2084	452	5	95	0	0	2021-07-28 21:13:23 UTC+0000

Figure 2 list all processes

From the previous figure 2, we can identify a lot of information about every process such as the offset of the process, the name of the process, the ID of the process, the ID of parent process, the number of threads. The number of the handles and the date and time of the process when it started or exited.

Now we will show the processes that generated by “pslist” command and identify malicious process that can do malicious acts on a system and we can see the results in the following figure 3.

0xfffffa800276c750	spssvc.exe	2696	452	5	155	0	0	2021-07-28	21:13:24	UTC+0000
0xfffffa80028b62b0	svchost.exe	2236	452	14	401	0	0	2021-07-28	21:13:25	UTC+0000
0xfffffa80012c6590	msiexec.exe	3492	452	5	2917	0	0	2021-07-29	07:29:17	UTC+0000
0xfffffa80025b6730	OSPPSVC.EXE	3656	452	3	150	0	0	2021-07-29	07:30:11	UTC+0000
0xfffffa8000e9a5f0	TrustedInstall	2760	452	4	132	0	0	2021-07-29	07:30:14	UTC+0000
0xfffffa8000f80b00	WmiPrvSE.exe	2416	620	5	106	0	0	2021-07-29	07:30:18	UTC+0000
0xfffffa80023a2240	SearchIndexer.	3352	452	11	622	0	0	2021-07-29	07:34:12	UTC+0000
0xfffffa80007df060	srvcany.exe	660	452	2	39	0	1	2021-07-29	07:34:15	UTC+0000
0xfffffa80007f0060	KMServise.exe	3712	660	3	55	0	1	2021-07-29	07:34:15	UTC+0000
0xfffffa8000f39120	conhost.exe	2504	352	2	33	0	0	2021-07-29	07:34:15	UTC+0000
0xfffffa8000ed1250	SearchProtocol	2780	3352	7	328	0	0	2021-07-29	07:39:21	UTC+0000
0xfffffa8001b5a4d0	SearchFilterHo	3376	3352	5	126	0	0	2021-07-29	07:39:21	UTC+0000
0xfffffa8000ede1d0	audiodg.exe	3416	736	6	135	0	0	2021-07-29	07:39:29	UTC+0000
0xfffffa800191e110	taskhost.exe	2112	452	9	164	0	0	2021-07-29	17:56:01	UTC+0000
0xfffffa8001ac9060	wcryv2.exe	580	452	28	207	0	1	2021-07-29	17:57:27	UTC+0000
0xfffffa8001bce290	tasksche.exe	2328	3924	1	31	1	1	2021-07-29	17:57:30	UTC+0000
0xfffffa8000ed8b00	cmd.exe	3400	452	1	21	0	0	2021-07-29	17:57:30	UTC+0000
0xfffffa80019b7b00	tasksche.exe	3968	3400	8	81	0	1	2021-07-29	17:57:30	UTC+0000

Figure 3 list processes

In the figure 3, we can see the processes that generated by “pslist” command and we can see the process Wcryv2.exe which has PID (580), PPID (452), Thds (28) and Hnds (207) is stranger than legitimated processes so I will search in Google by name of the process and we can see the results in the next figure 4.




Figure 4 searching about process

From searching about the process, we can identify that the process is used by WannaCry ransomware to encrypt files on the system.

PSTREE COMMENT

When examining the processes, it is very important to know what the parent process and child process which executing under the parent process. One indicator of system compromised is identification of a process that executes outside the normal parent or child process used to inject malicious code into legitimated process like explorer.exe process so we should use “pstree” command to see parent process and child process. And we can see the results in the next figure 4.

```
C:\Users\MemoryForensics>vol.exe -f MemoryDump.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 pstree
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
```

Name	Pid	PPid	Thds	Hnds	Time
0xfffffa8001b31060:wininit.exe	392	344	3	76	2021-07-28 21:10:28 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa80025fe8e0:services.exe	452	392	9	237	2021-07-28 21:10:29 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa800191e110:taskhost.exe	2112	452	9	164	2021-07-29 17:56:01 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa8001ac9060:wcryv2.exe	580	452	28	207	2021-07-29 17:57:27 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa8002abdb00:svchost.exe	1496	452	10	149	2021-07-28 21:10:37 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa800289c5f0:svchost.exe	900	452	15	364	2021-07-28 21:10:31 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa80023a07c0:msdtc.exe	2332	452	12	147	2021-07-28 21:10:52 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa80039975f0:mscorsvw.exe	2084	452	5	95	2021-07-28 21:13:23 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa800228b1f0:vmtoolsd.exe	1704	452	11	294	2021-07-28 21:10:38 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa8002a71270:taskhost.exe	1324	452	11	276	2021-07-28 21:10:35 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa80028a9320:svchost.exe	944	452	41	1188	2021-07-28 21:10:31 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa800275d060:mscorsvw.exe	2184	452	5	103	2021-07-28 21:13:22 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa8002a11610:spoolsv.exe	1204	452	13	304	2021-07-28 21:10:35 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa80027e4360:svchost.exe	688	452	9	301	2021-07-28 21:10:30 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa80028b62b0:svchost.exe	2236	452	14	401	2021-07-28 21:13:25 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa80023a2240:SearchIndexer.	3352	452	11	622	2021-07-29 07:34:12 UTC+0000
... 0xfffffa8001b5a4d0:SearchFilterHo	3376	3352	5	126	2021-07-29 07:39:21 UTC+0000
... 0xfffffa8000ed1250:SearchProtocol	2780	3352	7	328	2021-07-29 07:39:21 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa8002805b00:svchost.exe	736	452	20	488	2021-07-28 21:10:30 UTC+0000
... 0xfffffa8000ede1d0:audiogd.exe	3416	736	6	135	2021-07-29 07:39:29 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa80025b6730:OSPPSVC.EXE	3656	452	3	150	2021-07-29 07:30:11 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa800276c750:sppsvc.exe	2696	452	5	155	2021-07-28 21:13:24 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa8002858b00:svchost.exe	848	452	20	481	2021-07-28 21:10:31 UTC+0000
... 0xfffffa80029d3b00:dwm.exe	1132	848	3	74	2021-07-28 21:10:34 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa800296eb00:svchost.exe	984	452	18	508	2021-07-28 21:10:34 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa80012c6590:msiexec.exe	3492	452	5	2917	2021-07-29 07:29:17 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa8000ed8b00:cmd.exe	3400	452	1	21	2021-07-29 17:57:30 UTC+0000
... 0xfffffa80019b7b00:tasksche.exe	3968	3400	8	81	2021-07-29 17:57:30 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa80027c4b00:svchost.exe	620	452	11	368	2021-07-28 21:10:30 UTC+0000
... 0xfffffa800225b510:WmiPrvSE.exe	844	620	10	307	2021-07-28 21:10:40 UTC+0000

Figure 5 running pstree command

From the previous figure 5, we can take example about parent process and child process so the parent process is Services.exe which has PID (452) and child process is Wcryv.exe which has PID (580) and we know that Wcryv.exe is malicious process that execute under Services.exe to encrypt file on a system.

DLL COMMAND

We will check the loaded DLL files that associated with the Wcreyv.exe process and this will help us to determine if malicious process has access files when it was executed on a system and we can see the files associated to Wcreyv.exe to examine the DLL files and we can see the results in the next figure 7.

```
C:\Users\MemoryForensics>vol.exe -f MemoryDump.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 -p 580 dlllist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
*****
wcrv2.exe pid: 580
Command line : C:\Users\windows_7\Desktop\wcrv2.bin\wcrv2.exe -m security
Note: use ldrmodules for listing DLLs in Wow64 processes

Base                Size                LoadCount Path
-----
0x0000000004000000  0x66b000           0xffff C:\Users\windows_7\Desktop\wcrv2.bin\wcrv2.exe
0x0000000077800000  0x19f000           0xffff C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll
0x0000000074970000  0x3f000            0x3 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\wow64.dll
0x0000000074910000  0x5c000            0x1 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\wow64win.dll
0x00000000749e0000  0x8000             0x1 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\wow64cpu.dll
```

Figure 6 examine DLL files with process Wcreyv.exe

From the previous figure 6, we can see that process Wcreyv.exe loads the following DLL file when it was executed on a system.

- C:\Users\windows_7\Desktop\wcrv2.bin\wcrv2.exe
- C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll
- C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\wow64win.dll
- C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\wow64cpu.dll

We see that process when it was started, it connected with wcrv2.exe and loaded DLL files likeas ntdll.dll, wow64.dll, wow64win.dll and wow64cpu.dll.

HANDLES COMMAND

The handles plugin can help us to view the files associated with the process and get information about registry key and we can see the handles that associated with process Wcreyv.exe that has PID (580).

We can see the results in the following Figure 7.

```
C:\Users\MemoryForensics>vol.exe -f MemoryDump.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 -p 580 handles
```

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6

Offset(V)	Pid	Handle	Access	Type	Details
0xfffff8a0026a7260	580	0x4	0x0	Key	MACHINE\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\IMAGE FILE EXECUTION OPTIONS
0xfffff8a0005d4760	580	0x8	0x3	Directory	KnownDlls
0xfffff8a000680ea0	580	0xc	0x3	Directory	KnownDlls32
0xfffff8a002830600	580	0x10	0x100020	File	\Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows
0xfffff8a0024f87f0	580	0x14	0x9	Key	MACHINE\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\IMAGE FILE EXECUTION OPTIONS
0xfffff8a000680ea0	580	0x18	0x3	Directory	KnownDlls32
0xfffff8a003f15950	580	0x1c	0x100020	File	\Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\SysWow64
0xfffff8a00197ec40	580	0x20	0x20019	Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\NLS\SORTING\VERSIONS
0xfffff8a001509940	580	0x24	0x100003	Semaphore	
0xfffff8a0022b1480	580	0x28	0x1f0001	ALPC Port	
0xfffff8a0017b1840	580	0x2c	0x100003	Semaphore	
0xfffff8a000f6a270	580	0x30	0x1f0001	Mutant	
0xfffff8a001caa060	580	0x34	0x1f0001	Mutant	
0xfffff8a002209ad0	580	0x38	0xf003f	Key	MACHINE
0xfffff8a002319200	580	0x3c	0x1f0003	Event	
0xfffff8a002be4060	580	0x40	0x1	Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\SESSION MANAGER
0xfffff8a0022a47c0	580	0x44	0x804	EtwRegistration	
0xfffff8a002767230	580	0x48	0x21f0003	Event	
0xfffff8a0026bf420	580	0x4c	0xf016e	WindowStation	Service-0x0-3e7\$
0xfffff8a0026c05b0	580	0x50	0xf00cf	Desktop	Default
0xfffff8a0026bf420	580	0x54	0xf016e	WindowStation	Service-0x0-3e7\$
0xfffff8a00752ccc0	580	0x58	0x1	Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\NLS\CUSTOMLOCALE
0xfffff8a0025afc80	580	0x5c	0x804	EtwRegistration	
0xfffff8a002431de0	580	0x60	0x804	EtwRegistration	
0xfffff8a002930070	580	0x64	0x804	EtwRegistration	
0xfffff8a0022c2e10	580	0x68	0x804	EtwRegistration	
0xfffff8a000e50990	580	0x6c	0x804	EtwRegistration	
0xfffff8a000f0adc0	580	0x70	0x804	EtwRegistration	
0xfffff8a0017bff90	580	0x74	0x804	EtwRegistration	
0xfffff8a00077f6b0	580	0x78	0x804	EtwRegistration	
0xfffff8a00282f5d0	580	0x7c	0x1f0003	Event	
0xfffff8a00284060	580	0x80	0x1f0003	Event	

Figure 7 examine handles for PID 580

We see a lot of results after running handles command and we can use amazing option to see the registry key and file associated with the process so we can started with key to identify any registry key changed with the process and we can see the results in the next Figure08.

```
C:\Users\MemoryForensics>vol.exe -f MemoryDump.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 -p 580 handles -t key
```

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6

Offset(V)	Pid	Handle	Access	Type	Details
0xfffff8a0026a7260	580	0x4	0x9	Key	MACHINE\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\IMAGE FILE EXECUTION OPTIONS
0xfffff8a0024f87f0	580	0x14	0x9	Key	MACHINE\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\IMAGE FILE EXECUTION OPTIONS
0xfffff8a00197ec40	580	0x20	0x20019	Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\NLS\SORTING\VERSIONS
0xfffff8a002209ad0	580	0x38	0xf003f	Key	MACHINE
0xfffff8a002be4060	580	0x40	0x1	Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\SESSION MANAGER
0xfffff8a00752ccc0	580	0x58	0x1	Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\NLS\CUSTOMLOCALE
0xfffff8a00197ed00	580	0x9c	0xf003f	Key	USER\DEFAULT
0xfffff8a0024db500	580	0xa0	0x2001f	Key	USER\DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\INTERNET SETTINGS
0xfffff8a001615e60	580	0xc0	0xf003f	Key	USER
0xfffff8a0019818a0	580	0xe0	0x1	Key	USER\DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\EXPLORER
0xfffff8a0019d5b00	580	0xec	0x20019	Key	USER\DEFAULT\CONTROL PANEL\INTERNATIONAL
0xfffff8a007a41930	580	0x128	0x1	Key	MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\INTERNET EXPLORER\MAIN\FEATURECONTROL
0xfffff8a001aad610	580	0x12c	0x20019	Key	MACHINE\SOFTWARE\POLICIES\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\INTERNET SETTINGS
0xfffff8a0022a0060	580	0x130	0x20019	Key	USER\DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\INTERNET SETTINGS
0xfffff8a00188a230	580	0x134	0x20019	Key	MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\INTERNET SETTINGS
0xfffff8a0026a5b50	580	0x138	0x20019	Key	MACHINE\SOFTWARE\POLICIES
0xfffff8a002cb0db0	580	0x13c	0x20019	Key	USER\DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\POLICIES
0xfffff8a001f34ad0	580	0x140	0x20019	Key	USER\DEFAULT\SOFTWARE
0xfffff8a0073b8470	580	0x144	0x20019	Key	MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE
0xfffff8a001ae5830	580	0x158	0xf003f	Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\WINSOCK2\PARAMETERS\PROTOCOL_CATALOG9
0xfffff8a003c5cdc0	580	0x160	0xf003f	Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\WINSOCK2\PARAMETERS\NAMESPACE_CATALOG5
0xfffff8a002b8a870	580	0x168	0x20019	Key	USER\DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\INTERNET EXPLORER\MAIN
0xfffff8a0022c2c50	580	0x180	0x2001f	Key	USER\DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\INTERNET SETTINGS\ZONEMAP
0xfffff8a00235f810	580	0x190	0x20019	Key	MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\INTERNET SETTINGS\ZONEIP
0xfffff8a0022437d0	580	0x1b8	0xf	Key	USER\DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\INTERNET SETTINGS\5.0\CACHE

Figure 8 show key handles

From the previous Figure 08, we can see all keys the open by the process and we can identify all handles to files in the following Figure 09.


```

C:\Users\MemoryForensics>vol.exe -f MemoryDump.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 -p 580 handles -t file
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Offset(V)      Pid      Handle      Access Type      Details
-----
0xffffffff8002830600  580      0x10      0x100020  File      \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows
0xffffffff8003f15950  580      0x1c      0x100020  File      \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\SysWOW64
0xffffffff800231c5e0  580      0x118      0x12019f  File      \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\SysWOW64\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\W
indows\Temporary Internet Files\counters.dat
0xffffffff800241f4b0  580      0x170      0x100080  File      \Device\Wsi
0xffffffff8002355dd0  580      0x19c      0x16019f  File      \Device\Afd\Endpoint
0xffffffff8002a6eb30  580      0x1cc      0x100001  File      \Device\KsecDD
0xffffffff8001abcf20  580      0x20c      0x120089  File      \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\Registration\R0000000000006.c1b
0xffffffff8001b41790  580      0x218      0x16019f  File      \Device\Afd\Endpoint
0xffffffff8001c622f0  580      0x2a8      0x16019f  File      \Device\Afd\Endpoint
0xffffffff8000f6e710  580      0x2ac      0x16019f  File      \Device\Afd\Endpoint
0xffffffff8002a89300  580      0x2c0      0x212019f  File      \Device\Afd\AsyncConnectHlp
0xffffffff8002839330  580      0x2cc      0x16019f  File      \Device\Afd\Endpoint
0xffffffff80023ff9a0  580      0x2d4      0x16019f  File      \Device\Afd\Endpoint
0xffffffff8001bffb00  580      0x304      0x16019f  File      \Device\Afd\Endpoint
0xffffffff8000e55230  580      0x31c      0x16019f  File      \Device\Afd\Endpoint
0xffffffff80022ff3b0  580      0x340      0x16019f  File      \Device\Afd\Endpoint
0xffffffff8002a338f0  580      0x35c      0x16019f  File      \Device\Afd\Endpoint
0xffffffff8000ed0b10  580      0x394      0x16019f  File      \Device\Afd\Endpoint
0xffffffff8002948ac0  580      0x3b0      0x16019f  File      \Device\Afd\Endpoint

```

Figure 9 identify file handles

From the previous figure 9, we can see all file handles which use the process and we will see the all keys in Memory Dump by the printkey command to see all keys in Memory Dump so we can see the results in the Figure 9.

```

C:\Users\MemoryForensics>vol.exe -f MemoryDump.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 printkey
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Legend: (S) = Stable (V) = Volatile

-----
Registry: \??\C:\Users\windows_7\ntuser.dat
Key name: CMI-CreateHive{D43B12B8-09B5-40DB-B4F6-F6DFEB78DAEC} (S)
Last updated: 2021-07-28 21:10:34 UTC+0000

Subkeys:
(S) AppEvents
(S) Console
(S) Control Panel
(S) Environment
(S) EUDC
(S) Keyboard Layout
(S) Network
(S) Printers
(S) Software
(S) System
(V) Volatile Environment

Values:
-----
Registry: \SystemRoot\System32\Config\DEFAULT
Key name: CMI-CreateHive{BD6FA63F-599C-4F99-99DE-A05742AA2377} (S)
Last updated: 2009-07-14 04:57:10 UTC+0000

Subkeys:
(S) Control Panel
(S) Environment
(S) EUDC
(S) Keyboard Layout
(S) Printers
(S) Software
(S) SYSTEM

```

Figure 10 first figure to print keys in memory dump

```

Values:
-----
Registry: \??\C:\System Volume Information\Syscache.hve
Key name: {91131d19-f032-11eb-a372-9e6e7c4f0ac4} (S)
Last updated: 2021-07-28 21:10:39 UTC+0000

Subkeys:
(S) DefaultObjectStore

Values:
-----
Registry: \SystemRoot\System32\Config\SOFTWARE
Key name: CMI-CreateHive{199DAFC2-6F16-4946-BF90-5A3FC3A60902} (S)
Last updated: 2021-07-28 21:08:02 UTC+0000

Subkeys:

Values:
-----
Registry: \??\C:\Users\windows_7\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
Key name: S-1-5-21-1918648498-4183601615-3781470-1000_Classes (S)
Last updated: 2021-07-28 21:05:58 UTC+0000

Subkeys:
(S) Local Settings

Values:
-----
Registry: \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE
Key name: HARDWARE (S)
Last updated: 2021-07-28 21:10:09 UTC+0000

Subkeys:
(S) ACPI
(S) DESCRIPTION
(S) DEVICEMAP

Values:

```

Figure 11 second figure to print keys in memory dump

From the previous figures, we can see all keys in Memory Dump