Network & Cyber Security

What is network security?

confidentiality: only sender, intended receiver should "understand" message contents

- sender encrypts message
- receiver decrypts message

authentication: sender, receiver want to confirm identity of each other

message integrity: sender, receiver want to ensure message not altered (in transit, or afterwards) without detection

access and availability: services must be accessible and available to users

Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy

- well-known in network security world
- Bob, Alice (lovers!) want to communicate "securely"
- Trudy (intruder) may intercept, delete, add messages



Who might Bob, Alice be?

- … well, *real-life* Bobs and Alices!
- Web browser/server for electronic transactions (e.g., on-line purchases)
- on-line banking client/server
- DNS servers
- routers exchanging routing table updates
- other examples?

There are bad guys (and girls) out there!

Q: What can a "bad guy" do?

A: A lot!!!

- *eavesdrop:* intercept messages
- actively *insert* messages into connection
- *impersonation:* can fake (spoof) source address in packet (or any field in packet)
- *hijacking:* "take over" ongoing connection by removing sender or receiver, inserting himself in place
- *denial of service:* prevent service from being used by others (e.g., by overloading resources)

Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?

8.2 Cybersecurity and it's details

8.3 *Principles of cryptography*

8.4 Message integrity, authentication

8.5 Securing e-mail

8.6 Network layer security: IPsec

8.7 Securing wireless LANs

8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

What is cyber security?

Cyber security is the practice of defending computers, servers, mobile devices, electronic systems, networks, and data from malicious attacks. It's also known as information technology security or electronic information security.

- Top 10 threats in cyber security:

The term applies in a variety of contexts, from business to mobile computing, and can be divided into a few common categories.

- **Network security** is the practice of securing a computer network from intruders, whether targeted attackers or opportunistic malware.
- **Application security** focuses on keeping software and devices free of threats. Successful security begins in the design stage, well before a program or device is deployed.
- **Information security** protects the integrity and privacy of data, both in storage and in transit.
- **Operational security** includes the processes and decisions for handling and protecting data assets. **Disaster recovery and business continuity** define how an organization responds to a cyber-security incident or any other event that causes the loss of operations or data.
- **End-user education** addresses the most unpredictable cyber-security factor: people. Anyone can accidentally introduce a virus to an otherwise secure system by failing to follow good security practices.

Types of cyber threats

The threats countered by cyber-security are three-fold:

1. **Cybercrime** includes single actors or groups targeting systems for financial gain or to cause disruption.
2. **Cyber-attack** often involves politically motivated information gathering.
3. **Cyberterrorism** is intended to undermine electronic systems to cause panic or fear.

So, how do malicious actors gain control of computer systems? Here are some common methods used to threaten cyber-security:

- **Malware**

Malware means malicious software. One of the most common cyber threats, malware is software that a cybercriminal or hacker has created to disrupt or damage a legitimate user's computer. Often spread via an unsolicited email attachment or legitimate-looking download. There are a few different types of malware, including:

Virus: A self-replicating program that attaches itself to clean file and spreads throughout a computer system, infecting files with malicious code.

Trojans: A type of malware that is disguised as legitimate software. Cybercriminals trick users into uploading Trojans onto their computer where they cause damage or collect data.

Spyware: A program that secretly records what a user does, so that cybercriminals can make use of this information. For example, spyware could capture credit card details.

Ransomware: Malware which locks down a user's files and data, with the threat of erasing it unless a ransom is paid.

Adware: Advertising software which can be used to spread malware.

Botnets: Networks of malware infected computers which cybercriminals use to perform tasks online without the user's permission.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
Viruses
Malware
Trojans
Ransomware
Spyware
& Worms!

Types of cyber threats

- **SQL injection**

An SQL (structured language query) injection is a type of cyber-attack used to take control of and steal data from a database. Cybercriminals exploit vulnerabilities in data-driven applications to insert malicious code into a databased via a malicious SQL statement. This gives them access to the sensitive information contained in the database.

- **Phishing**

Phishing is when cybercriminals target victims with emails that appear to be from a legitimate company asking for sensitive information. Phishing attacks are often used to dupe people into handing over credit card data and other personal information.

- **Man-in-the-middle attack**

A man-in-the-middle attack is a type of cyber threat where a cybercriminal intercepts communication between two individuals in order to steal data. For example, on an unsecure WiFi network, an attacker could intercept data being passed from the victim's device and the network.

- **Denial-of-service attack**

A denial-of-service attack is where cybercriminals prevent a computer system from fulfilling legitimate requests by overwhelming the networks and servers with traffic. This renders the system unusable, preventing an organization from carrying out vital functions.

Latest cyber threats

Dridex malware

In December 2019, the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) charged the leader of an organized cyber-criminal group for their part in a global Dridex malware attack. This malicious campaign affected the public, government, infrastructure and business worldwide.

Dridex is a financial trojan with a range of capabilities. Affecting victims since 2014, it infects computers though phishing emails or existing malware. Capable of stealing passwords, banking details and personal data which can be used in fraudulent transactions, it has caused massive financial losses amounting to hundreds of millions.

In response to the Dridex attacks, the U.K.'s National Cyber Security Centre advises the public to "ensure devices are patched, anti-virus is turned on and up to date and files are backed up".

Romance scams

In February 2020, the FBI warned U.S. citizens to be aware of confidence fraud that cybercriminals commit using dating sites, chat rooms and apps. Perpetrators take advantage of people seeking new partners, duping victims into giving away personal data.

The FBI reports that romance cyber threats affected 114 victims in New Mexico in 2019, with financial losses amounting to $1.6 million.

Emotet malware

In late 2019, The Australian Cyber Security Centre warned national organizations about a widespread global cyber threat from Emotet malware.

Emotet is a sophisticated trojan that can steal data and also load other malware. Emotet thrives on unsophisticated password: a reminder of the importance of creating a secure password to guard against cyber threats.

Cyber safety tips - protect yourself against cyberattacks

How can businesses and individuals guard against cyber threats? Here are our top cyber safety tips:

1. **Update your software and operating system:** This means you benefit from the latest security patches.
2. **Use anti-virus software:** Security solutions like Kaspersky Total Security will detect and removes threats. Keep your software updated for the best level of protection.
3. **Use strong passwords:** Ensure your passwords are not easily guessable.
4. **Do not open email attachments from unknown senders:** These could be infected with malware.
5. **Do not click on links in emails from unknown senders or unfamiliar websites:** This is a common way that malware is spread.
6. **Avoid using unsecure WiFi networks in public places:** Unsecure networks leave you vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks.

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The language of cryptography



m plaintext message

$K_A(m)$ ciphertext, encrypted with key K_A

$m = K_B(K_A(m))$

Symmetric key cryptography



symmetric key crypto: Bob and Alice share same (symmetric) key: K_S

- e.g., key is knowing substitution pattern in mono alphabetic substitution cipher

Simple encryption scheme

substitution cipher: substituting one thing for another

- monoalphabetic cipher: substitute one letter for another



```
 plaintext:   abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz

ciphertext:   mnbvcxzasdfghjklpoiuytrewq
```

e.g.:

```
 Plaintext: bob. i love you. alice
ciphertext: nkn. s gktc wky. mgsbc
```

Encryption key: mapping from set of 26 letters to set of 26 letters

A more sophisticated encryption approach

- n substitution ciphers, $M_1,M_2,\ldots,M_n$
- cycling pattern:
  - e.g., n=4: M_1,M_3,M_4,M_3,M_2; M_1,M_3,M_4,M_3,M_2; ..
- for each new plaintext symbol, use subsequent substitution pattern in cyclic pattern
  - dog: d from M_1, o from M_3, g from M_4

Encryption key: n substitution ciphers, and cyclic pattern

- key need not be just n-bit pattern

Symmetric key crypto: DES

DES: Data Encryption Standard

- US encryption standard [NIST 1993]
- 56-bit symmetric key, 64-bit plaintext input
- block cipher with cipher block chaining
- how secure is DES?
  - DES Challenge: 56-bit-key-encrypted phrase decrypted (brute force) in less than a day
  - no known good analytic attack
- making DES more secure:
  - 3DES: encrypt 3 times with 3 different keys

Symmetric key crypto: DES

DES operation

initial permutation

16 identical "rounds" of function application, each using different 48 bits of key

final permutation

http://page.math.tu-berlin.de/~kant/teaching/hess/krypto-ws2006/des.htm



AES: Advanced Encryption Standard

- symmetric-key NIST standard, replaced DES (Nov 2001)
- processes data in 128 bit blocks
- 128, 192, or 256 bit keys
- brute force decryption (try each key) taking 1 sec on DES, takes 149 trillion years for AES

Public Key Cryptography

symmetric key crypto

- requires sender, receiver know shared secret key
- Q: how to agree on key in first place (particularly if never "met")?

public key crypto



- radically different approach [Diffie-Hellman76, RSA78]
- sender, receiver do *not* share secret key
- *public* encryption key known to *all*
- *private* decryption key known only to receiver

Public key cryptography



K_B^+ Bob's *public* key

K_B^- Bob's *private* key

plaintext message, m

encryption algorithm

ciphertext

$K_B^+(m)$

decryption algorithm

plaintext message

$m = K_B^-(K_B^+(m))$

Public key encryption algorithms

requirements:

1. need $K_B^+(\cdot)$ and $K_B^-(\cdot)$ such that

$$K_B^-(K_B^+(m)) = m$$

2. given public key K_B^+, it should be impossible to compute private key K_B^-

RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adelson algorithm

RSA: Creating public/private key pair

1. choose two large prime numbers $p, q.$ (e.g., 1024 bits each)

2. compute $n = pq$, $z = (p-1)(q-1)$

3. choose e (with $e<n$) that has no common factors with z (e, z are "relatively prime").

4. choose d such that $ed-1$ is exactly divisible by z. (in other words: $ed \bmod z = 1$).

5. *public* key is $\underbrace{(n,e)}_{K_B^+}$. *private* key is $\underbrace{(n,d)}_{K_B^-}$.

RSA: another important property

The following property will be *very* useful later:

$$\underbrace{K_B^-(K_B^+(m))}_{\substack{\text{use public key first,}\\ \text{followed by}\\ \text{private key}}} = m = \underbrace{K_B^+(K_B^-(m))}_{\substack{\text{use private key}\\ \text{first, followed by}\\ \text{public key}}}$$

result is the same!

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8.3 Message integrity, *authentication*

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Authentication

Goal: Bob wants Alice to "prove" her identity to him

Protocol ap1.0: Alice says "I am Alice"



"I am Alice"

Failure scenario??

Authentication

Goal: Bob wants Alice to "prove" her identity to him

Protocol ap1.0: Alice says "I am Alice"



in a network,
Bob can not "see" Alice,
so Trudy simply declares
herself to be Alice

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap2.0: Alice says "I am Alice" in an IP packet containing her source IP address



Alice's IP address

"I am Alice"

Failure scenario??

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap2.0: Alice says "I am Alice" in an IP packet containing her source IP address



Trudy can create a packet "spoofing" Alice's address

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap3.0: Alice says "I am Alice" and sends her secret password to "prove" it.



Alice's IP addr | Alice's password | "I'm Alice"

Alice's IP addr | OK

Failure scenario??

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap3.0: Alice says "I am Alice" and sends her secret password to "prove" it.



playback attack: Trudy records Alice's packet and later plays it back to Bob

Authentication: yet another try

Protocol ap3.1: Alice says "I am Alice" and sends her *encrypted* secret password to "prove" it.



Alice's IP addr | encrypted password | "I'm Alice"

Alice's IP addr | OK

Failure scenario??

Authentication: yet another try

Protocol ap3.1: Alice says "I am Alice" and sends her *encrypted* secret password to "prove" it.



record and playback *still* works!

Authentication: yet another try

Goal: avoid playback attack

nonce: number (R) used only *once-in-a-lifetime*

ap4.0: to prove Alice "live", Bob sends Alice *nonce*, R. Alice must return R, encrypted with shared secret key



"I am Alice"

R

$K_{A-B}(R)$

Alice is live, and only Alice knows key to encrypt nonce, so it must be Alice!

Failures, drawbacks?

Authentication: ap5.0

ap4.0 requires shared symmetric key

- can we authenticate using public key techniques?

ap5.0: use nonce, public key cryptography



Bob computes

$K_A^+(K_A^-(R)) = R$

and knows only Alice could have the private key, that encrypted R such that

$K_A^+(K_A^-(R)) = R$

ap5.0: security hole

man (or woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)



I am Alice

I am Alice

R

$K_T^-(R)$

Send me your public key

K_T^+

R

$K_A^-(R)$

Send me your public key

K_A^+

$K_T^+(m)$

Trudy gets

$m = K_T^-(K_T^+(m))$

sends m to Alice encrypted with Alice' s public key

$K_A^+(m)$

$m = K_A^-(K_A^+(m))$

ap5.0: security hole

man (or woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)



difficult to detect:

- Bob receives everything that Alice sends, and vice versa. (e.g., so Bob, Alice can meet one week later and recall conversation!)
- problem is that Trudy receives all messages as well!

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8.3 *Message integrity,* authentication

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Digital signatures

cryptographic technique analogous to hand-written signatures:

- sender (Bob) digitally signs document, establishing he is document owner/creator.
- *verifiable, nonforgeable:* recipient (Alice) can prove to someone that Bob, and no one else (including Alice), must have signed document

Digital signatures

simple digital signature for message m:

- Bob signs m by encrypting with his private key K_B^-, creating "signed" message, $K_B^-(m)$



Bob's message, m

Dear Alice

Oh, how I have missed you. I think of you all the time! …(blah blah blah)

Bob

K_B^- Bob's private key

Public key encryption algorithm

$m, K_B^-(m)$

Bob's message, m, signed (encrypted) with his private key

Digital signatures

- suppose Alice receives msg m, with signature: m, $K_B^-(m)$
- Alice verifies m signed by Bob by applying Bob's public key K_B^+ to $K_B^-(m)$ then checks $K_B^+(K_B^-(m)) = m$.
- If $K_B^+(K_B^-(m)) = m$, whoever signed m must have used Bob's private key.

Alice thus verifies that:

- Bob signed m
- no one else signed m

non-repudiation:

- ✓ Alice can take m, and signature $K_B^-(m)$ to court and prove that Bob signed m

Message digests

computationally expensive to public-key-encrypt long messages

goal: fixed-length, easy-to-compute digital "fingerprint"

- apply hash function H to *m*, get fixed size message digest, *H(m)*.



Hash function properties:

- many-to-1
- produces fixed-size msg digest (fingerprint)
- given message digest x, computationally infeasible to find m such that x = H(m)

Digital signature = signed message digest

Bob sends digitally signed message:

Alice verifies signature, integrity of digitally signed message:



large message m

H: Hash function

H(m)

Bob's private key K_B^-

digital signature (encrypt)

encrypted msg digest $K_B^-(H(m))$

+

encrypted msg digest $K_B^-(H(m))$

large message m

H: Hash function

H(m)

Bob's public key K_B^+

digital signature (decrypt)

H(m)

equal ?

Hash function algorithms

- MD5 hash function widely used (RFC 1321)
  - computes 128-bit message digest in 4-step process.
  - arbitrary 128-bit string x, appears difficult to construct msg m whose MD5 hash is equal to x
- SHA-1 is also used
  - US standard [NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1]
  - 160-bit message digest

Certification authorities

- *certification authority (CA):* binds public key to particular entity, E.
- E (person, router) registers its public key with CA.
  - E provides "proof of identity" to CA.
  - CA creates certificate binding E to its public key.
  - certificate containing E's public key digitally signed by CA – CA says "this is E's public key"


Bob's public key
K_B^+
digital signature (encrypt)
K_B^+
Bob's identifying information
CA private key
K_{CA}^-
certificate for Bob's public key, signed by CA

Certification authorities

- when Alice wants Bob's public key:
  - gets Bob's certificate (Bob or elsewhere).
  - apply CA's public key to Bob's certificate, get Bob's public key



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Secure e-mail

Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob.



Alice:

- generates random *symmetric* private key, K_S
- encrypts message with K_S (for efficiency)
- also encrypts K_S with Bob's public key
- sends both $K_S(m)$ and $K_B(K_S)$ to Bob

Secure e-mail

Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob.



Bob:

- uses his private key to decrypt and recover K_S
- uses K_S to decrypt $K_S(m)$ to recover m

Secure e-mail (continued)

Alice wants to provide sender authentication message integrity



- Alice digitally signs message
- sends both message (in the clear) and digital signature

Secure e-mail (continued)

Alice wants to provide secrecy, sender authentication, message integrity.



Alice uses three keys: her private key, Bob's public key, newly created symmetric key

Chapter 8 roadmap

8.1 What is network security?
8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 Securing e-mail
8.6 Network layer security: IPsec
8.7 Securing wireless LANs
8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

What is network-layer confidentiality ?

between two network entities:

- sending entity encrypts datagram payload, payload could be:
  - TCP or UDP segment, ICMP message, OSPF message ….
- all data sent from one entity to other would be hidden:
  - web pages, e-mail, P2P file transfers, TCP SYN packets …
- "blanket coverage"

Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)

motivation:

- institutions often want private networks for security.
  - costly: separate routers, links, DNS infrastructure.
- VPN: institution's inter-office traffic is sent over public Internet instead
  - encrypted before entering public Internet
  - logically separate from other traffic

Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)



IPsec services

- data integrity
- origin authentication
- replay attack prevention
- confidentiality

- two protocols providing different service models:
  - AH
  - ESP

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WEP design goals

- symmetric key crypto
  - confidentiality
  - end host authorization
  - data integrity

- self-synchronizing: each packet separately encrypted
  - given encrypted packet and key, can decrypt; can continue to decrypt packets when preceding packet was lost (unlike Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) in block ciphers)
- Efficient
  - implementable in hardware or software

Review: symmetric stream ciphers



key

keystream generator

keystream

- *combine each byte of keystream with byte of plaintext to get ciphertext:*
  - m(i) = ith unit of message
  - ks(i) = ith unit of keystream
  - c(i) = ith unit of ciphertext
  - $c(i) = ks(i) \oplus m(i)$ ($\oplus$ = exclusive or)
  - $m(i) = ks(i) \oplus c(i)$
- WEP uses RC4

Stream cipher and packet independence

- recall design goal: each packet separately encrypted
- if for frame n+1, use keystream from where we left off for frame n, then each frame is not separately encrypted
  - need to know where we left off for packet n
- WEP approach: initialize keystream with key + new IV for each packet:



End-point authentication w/ nonce

Nonce: number (R) used only *once –in-a-lifetime*

How to prove Alice "live": Bob sends Alice *nonce*, R. Alice must return R, encrypted with shared secret key



Alice is live, and only Alice knows key to encrypt nonce, so it must be Alice!

WEP authentication



authentication request

nonce (128 bytes)

nonce encrypted shared key

success if decrypted value equals nonce

Notes:

- not all APs do it, even if WEP is being used
- AP indicates if authentication is necessary in beacon frame
- done before association

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Firewalls

firewall

isolates organization's internal net from larger Internet, allowing some packets to pass, blocking others



administered network

trusted "good guys"

firewall

public Internet

untrusted "bad guys"

Firewalls: why

prevent denial of service attacks:

- SYN flooding: attacker establishes many bogus TCP connections, no resources left for “real” connections

prevent illegal modification/access of internal data

- e.g., attacker replaces CIA’s homepage with something else

allow only authorized access to inside network

- set of authenticated users/hosts

three types of firewalls:

- stateless packet filters
- stateful packet filters
- application gateways

Stateless packet filtering


Should arriving packet be allowed in? Departing packet let out?

- internal network connected to Internet via *router firewall*
- router *filters packet-by-packet,* decision to forward/drop packet based on:
  - source IP address, destination IP address
  - TCP/UDP source and destination port numbers
  - ICMP message type
  - TCP SYN and ACK bits

Stateless packet filtering: example

- *example 1:* block incoming and outgoing datagrams with IP protocol field = 17 and with either source or dest port = 23
  - *result:* all incoming, outgoing UDP flows and telnet connections are blocked
- *example 2:* block inbound TCP segments with ACK=0.
  - *result:* prevents external clients from making TCP connections with internal clients, but allows internal clients to connect to outside.

Stateless packet filtering: more examples

Policy	*Firewall Setting*
No outside Web access.	Drop all outgoing packets to any IP address, port 80
No incoming TCP connections, except those for institution’s public Web server only.	Drop all incoming TCP SYN packets to any IP except 130.207.244.203, port 80
Prevent Web-radios from eating up the available bandwidth.	Drop all incoming UDP packets - except DNS and router broadcasts.
Prevent your network from being used for a smurf DoS attack.	Drop all ICMP packets going to a “broadcast” address (e.g. 130.207.255.255).
Prevent your network from being tracerouted	Drop all outgoing ICMP TTL expired traffic

Stateful packet filtering

- *stateless packet filter:* heavy handed tool
  - admits packets that “make no sense,” e.g., dest port = 80, ACK bit set, even though no TCP connection established:

action	source address	dest address	protocol	source port	dest port	flag bit
allow	outside of 222.22/16	222.22/16	TCP	80	> 1023	ACK

- *stateful packet filter:* track status of every TCP connection
  - track connection setup (SYN), teardown (FIN): determine whether incoming, outgoing packets “makes sense”
  - timeout inactive connections at firewall: no longer admit packets

Application gateways

- filter packets on application data as well as on IP/TCP/UDP fields.
- *example:* allow select internal users to telnet outside



host-to-gateway telnet session
application gateway
router and filter
gateway-to-remote host telnet session

1. require all telnet users to telnet through gateway.
2. for authorized users, gateway sets up telnet connection to dest host. Gateway relays data between 2 connections
3. router filter blocks all telnet connections not originating from gateway.

Intrusion detection systems

- packet filtering:
  - operates on TCP/IP headers only
  - no correlation check among sessions
- *IDS: intrusion detection system*
  - *deep packet inspection:* look at packet contents (e.g., check character strings in packet against database of known virus, attack strings)
  - examine correlation among multiple packets
    - port scanning
    - network mapping
    - DoS attack

Intrusion detection systems

multiple IDSs: different types of checking at different locations


firewall
internal network
Internet
IDS sensors
Web server
FTP server
DNS server
demilitarized zone