

## Homework 5: Mechanism Design

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Due: December 2, 2023

### Problem 1 Sponsored Search Auctions

10 pts.

Search engines (e.g. Google, Yahoo and Bing) rely on auctions to decide which advertiser's links are shown, in what order and how they are charged. Sponsored search auctions play a significant role in Internet economics, as they continue to generate tens of billions of dollars every year. For example, Google ad revenue amounted to about \$39.58 billion in 2020, which is about 29.4% of the company's overall revenue. Initially, Google's engineers designed *Generalized Second-Price* (GSP) auctions in 2001, and developed Adwords in 2002. Later, Google hired economists to improve their business, who replaced GSP auctions with VCG auctions and other variants. The main difference is that, in GSP auctions, the  $i^{th}$  slot is allocated to the  $i^{th}$  highest bidder for the price of the  $(i+1)^{th}$  highest bid in GSP auctions.

The goods for sale include  $k$  slots for sponsored links on a search results page. The bidders are the advertisers who have a standing bid on the keyword that was searched on. For example, Toyota, Honda and Volkswagon might be bidders on the keyword *sedan*, while Nikon and Canon might be bidders on the keyword *camera*. We define click-through-rate (CTR), denoted  $\alpha_j$  at slot  $j$ , as the probability that the end user clicks on this slot. Without any loss of generality, let  $\alpha_1 > \alpha_2 > \dots > \alpha_k$ . Also, assume that the  $i^{th}$  advertiser has a private valuation  $v_i$  for each click on its link. For simplicity, let us make an unreasonable assumption that the CTR of a slot is independent of its occupant.

In this problem, we compare two mechanisms: (i) GSP auctions, and (ii) VCG auctions.

- Compute the valuation of  $i^{th}$  advertiser in the  $j^{th}$  slot, and the social welfare of both the auctions, assuming the bidders bid truthfully.
- Let A, B and C compete in a GSP auction with  $k = 2$  slots having  $\alpha_1 = 2/3$  and  $\alpha_2 = 1/3$ . If the advertisers' per-click valuations are  $v_A = 10$ ,  $v_B = 8$  and  $v_C = 4$ , show that A obtains a greater utility via bidding  $b_A = 5$ , as opposed to  $b_A = 10$ .
- Show that A prefers to bid  $b_A = 10$ , as opposed to  $b_A = 5$  in a VCG auction, which is similar to that of (b).
- Compute the payments of all the three advertisers in a VCG auction in (c).

### Problem 2 Voting Rules

10 pts.

There were three candidates in 1998 Minnesota gubernatorial race: *Jesse Ventura* (denoted J, former professional wrestler and radio shock-jock), *Skip Humphrey* (denoted S, Minnesota

Attorney General and a Democrat) and *Norm Coleman* (denoted N, St. Paul Mayor and a Republican). J was declared the winner of the election. Post-election surveys indicate (viewed as percentages) the voter preferences as follows:

Preference	Percentage of Voters
$N \succ S \succ J$	35%
$S \succ N \succ J$	28%
$J \succ N \succ S$	20%
$J \succ S \succ N$	17%

- Who won this election under Plurality rule? Explain.
- Who won this election under Borda count? Explain.
- Which candidate is ranked first by the largest number of voters? Which candidate is ranked last by the largest number of voters?
- Evaluate winners in pairwise contests, and show that the plurality rule does not satisfy Condorcet winner criterion?