DOES PROSECUTOR PARTISANSHIP EXACERBATE THE RACIAL CHARGING GAP?

Sidak Yntiso¹

WILF FAMILY DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

November 17, 2021

Hundreds March in Chicago, Protesting Police Shooting of Adam Toledo, 13

Protests continue after police reports appear to contradict Laquan McDonald video







State's Attorney Alvarez defies calls to quit, urges U.S. probe of Chicago cops



To what extent do electoral selection and incentives influence how local prosecutors treat defendants from different races?



Source: Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online



Source: Incarceration Trends Dataset (population housed in state-run facilities).

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- 2. Non-random assignment of partisanship
- Difficulty distinguishing role of police, prosecutors and judges

This Paper

Collect 39 million criminal records from TX, VA and WA.

- 300 districts over 20 years;
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Leverage electoral RDD to examine the causal impact of partisanship on prosecutor behavior, by defendant race.

Exploit variation in electoral calendar and within-district geographic variation to uncover incentive effects:

critical to understand viability of institutional remedies.

Preview of Findings

- Republican prosecutors seek tougher charges than their Democratic counterparts.
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- Republican prosecutors seek tougher charges than their Democratic counterparts.
 - Partisan disparity concentrated in charging of Black defendants.
- 2. This finding cannot be explained by preferences alone:
 - A. Partisan difference increases over electoral calendar, at different rates depending on defendant race.
 - Racial charging disparities between parties most pronounced for Democratic/minority neighborhoods.

2. Institutional Background

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Prosecutors enjoy broad discretion:

- Unilateral discretion to drop or pursue charges
- Proliferation of criminal codes increased discretion
- Although decision to prosecute cannot be based on race (Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456)...

Racial disparities are widespread

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
In part, due to disparate treatment by prosecutors (Rehavi and Starr, 2014; Crow and Johnson, 2008; Berdejo, 2018; Sloan 2019)

Competing explanations:

- Role of racial threat (Keen and Jacobs 2009; Feigenberg and Miller 2019)
- Conservative electoral strategy in post Civil-Rights Era (Flamm 2005; Lowndes 2008; Mendelberg 2001; Weaver 2007; Becket and Francis 2021)


3. Partisanship & Racial Charging Gap

Electoral Selection



Confounder? Or partisan differences in prosecutor preferences about punishment and/or racial bias?

Electoral Selection and Incentives



Partisan differences in benefits or costs of charging?

- Reelection-seeking incumbents will seek to minimize likelihood of well-publicized "errors." (Gordon and Huber 2004; Bandyopadhyay and McCannon 2014)
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 - Electorate may weight under-punishment differently by race

Electoral Costs of Punitive Charging

Social costs of charging:

 Households face financial and emotional disruptions (e.g. Comfort 2002)

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
Electoral Costs of Punitive Charging

Social costs of charging:

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- Communities redirect dollars from social investment to social expense

Incentives to target prosecutions in areas that are not in support coalitions (e.g. Holland 2014)

Racial residential segregration



Black defendants (black dots) and white defendants (yellow dots) in Harris County, TX.

Why do mechanisms matter?

Mechanism		Implied policy recommendation
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1. Prosecutor tastes	\Longrightarrow	Elect less biased prosecutors?
Partisan differences in reelection concerns	\Longrightarrow	Insulate officeholders from electoral scrutiny
Partisan differences in electoral costs	\Longrightarrow	Redesign political boundaries

4. Data & Empirical Approach

The States

	Texas	Virginia	Washington	
	A. Institutional Setting			
Incarceration ranking	6th	16th	37th	
Primary system	Partisan	Partisan	Top-two	
DA responsibilities	Felony	Felony	Felony	
		& Misd.	& Misd.	
	B. Charging Data			
Period	1980-2020	2000-2020	2000-2020	
Arrest charges	Υ	N	N	
Decision to prosecute	Υ	N	N	
Indictment charges	Υ	Υ	Υ	

DA Elections: Descriptive Statistics

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	Never	Contested at	
	Contested	least once	
Republican wins	0.425	0.530	
	(0.418)	(0.346)	
Total population	0.057m	0.176m	
	(0.107m)	(0.462m)	

DA Elections: Descriptive Statistics

	Never	Contested at
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Republican wins	0.425	0.530
	(0.418)	(0.346)
Total population	0.057m	0.176m
	(0.107m)	(0.462m)
Total prison pop.	350.608	1,058.285
	(498.187)	(3,201.216)
Black prison pop.	58.9	345.695
	(131.918)	(1,625.281)
Num. of felony cases	1.87m	3.85m
Num. of districts	182	142

Criminal Records




Criminal Records



Aggregated to 5.9 million felony cases.

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


Aggregated to 5.9 million felony cases.

Primary outcome: Charge severity (maximum possible sentence) constructed using state-by-state functions of


- indicted charges and enhancements;
- defendant criminal history.

Racial Disparities in Charging



The dependent variable is (logged) charge severity. Defendant characteristics include prior criminal history, crime type (violent, property, or drug), gender as well as arrest offense in TX.

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Challenges to Inference

1. Confounding differences between jurisdictions that elect Democratic and Republican district attorneys.

Two-way fixed effects estimates

Empirical Approach

1. Baseline local-linear regression model:

$$log(y_{ijst}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathbb{1}(r_{jst} > 0.5) + f(r_{jst} - 0.5) + \alpha_{st} + \epsilon_{ijst}$$

- y_{ijst} is an indictment outcome; r_{jst} is Republican vote share.

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- y_{ijst} is an indictment outcome; r_{jst} is Republican vote share.
- Unit of analysis is case, so cluster at treatment assignment (election) level
- Estimated by defendant race throughout.
 - Adjust for defendant sex, prior criminal history, and crime type (whether violent, drug, property, or other)

Challenges to Inference

- 1. Confounding differences between jurisdictions that elect Democratic and Republican district attorneys.
- 2. Sample selection bias: estimates may reflect changes in case composition due to strategic behavior by police.

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RDD Effect on Arrest Outcomes

	Estimate	Std. Err.	Eff. Obs	Clusters
	A. Arrest Characteristics			
(log) Num. of Arrests (TX)	0.234	(1.015)	85	85
(log) Num. of Traffic Stops	0.339	(1.353)	75	75
(log) Arrest Severity (TX)	-0.107	(0.071)	0.594m	63
Pr(Arrest Traffic Stop)	-0.002	(0.004)	3.494m	77

Traffic stops sourced from the Stanford Open Policing project.

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- Downward bias on partisan difference (see Knox, Lowe and Mummulo 2020)

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
- Less likely to make arrest when (liberal) prosecutor is unlikely to seek indictment.
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But how large is the downward bias? And might it vary by race?

Estimating Selection into Arrest


5. Main Results

Graphical Evidence




Binned means of (logged) charge severity. A local-linear (maroon) and local polynomial smoother (grey) are fit on either side of the Republican vote margin cutoff.

Graphical Evidence: Black Defendants




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Graphical Evidence: White Defendants



Binned means of (logged) charge severity. A local-linear (maroon) and local polynomial smoother (grey) are fit on either side of the Republican vote margin cutoff.

Local-linear Estimates



The dependent variable is (logged) charge severity, adjusted by state-and year- fixed effects. Defendant characteristics include prior criminal history, crime type (violent, property, or drug) and sex.

Robustness to alternative specifications

Effect on indictment severity for Black defendants robust to:

- 1. Varying bandwidth used for estimation
- 2. Clustering on district level
- 3. Alternative samples and outcomes
- 4. Null effect for White defs. persists under all robustness checks.

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Partisan differences appear largest in low-level drug and property crimes. Heterogeneity by Crime Type

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
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
Similar partisan differences appear on prison admissions (estimated using a larger sample). Effect on Prison Admissions

6. Isolating Incentive Effects


Electoral Selection and Incentives




RDD removes *U* path but doesn't isolate mechanism




6a. Electoral Benefits of Punitive Charging




Proximity to Reelection



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





Necessary conditions:

 A greater proportion of minorities reside in areas where Republicans are not competitive (majority D-precincts).

Local partisan context



Black defendants tend to live in Democrat precincts.



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
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
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 - Republican areas: social costs ↑ at electoral threshold.

Heterogeneous Effects by Partisan Context



Each point corresponds to the RDD effect on (logged) charge severity by precinct partisan context.

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Next steps: Substantive Importance

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How much of this disparity is attributable to prosecutor partisanship?

Little's law (1961): steady state number of prisoners is equal to the admissions rate times the expected sentence (by race):

Disaggregated by partisanship of prosecutor.

Partisan differences in charging decisions:

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Growing evidence that incentive effects matter:

- "Incentive Effects of Recall Elections" (Gordon and Yntiso 2022, Journal of Politics)
- "Judicial Accountability and Racial Disparity in Criminal Appeals" (Harvey and Yntiso 2021, Journal of Legal Studies)

Partisan differences in electoral costs:

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- officeholders responsive to geographic variation in partisan incentives;
- punitive enforcement of laws also induce externalities.

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Next steps:

- "Targeting Punishment: Political Geography and Criminal Sentencing in Texas" (Yntiso 2021)
- "Shaping the (S)electorate" (Simpson and Yntiso 2022)

Thank you!

Email: sidak.yntiso@nyu.edu


Homepage: http://sidakyntiso.com



DA Elections: Descriptive Statistics

	Uncontested	Contested	
Republican wins	0.496	0.565	
	(0.496)	(0.496)	
Total population	0.091m	0.341m	
	(0.203m)	(0.800m)	
Total prison pop.	528.374	2,246.135	
	(1,167.007)	(5,782.0127)	
Black prison pop.	115.328	916.519	
	(514.882)	(3009.637)	
Num. of felony cases	3.78m	1.94m	
Num. of elections	1,760	260	


Descriptive Evidence of Partisan Effects



Two-way fixed effects estimates. Sample restricted to contested elections. Robust standard errors clustered at district level.



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


Validity of Research Design: Balance

	Estimate	Std. Err.	Eff. Obs	Clusters
	A. Pretreatment Covariates			
Black pop. share	0.053	(0.069)	160	160
(log) Total pop.	0.133	(0.560)	185	185
Rep. Vote Share $_{t-1}$	0.014	(0.039)	44	44
	B. Defendant Characteristics			
Female	0.003	(0.011)	0.778m	147
Prior Criminal History	0.041	(0.060)	1.308m	165

Back to Presentation

Validity of Research Design: Sorting





Selection into Arrest: Estimand

Consider effect on indictment decision as risk ratio:

$$RR_{naive} = \underbrace{\frac{E[Y|R=1, A=1]}{E[Y|R=0, A=1]}}_{\text{naive risk ratio}}$$

Selection into Arrest: Estimand

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
$$RR_{naive} = \underbrace{\frac{E[Y|R=1, A=1]}{E[Y|R=0, A=1]}}_{\text{naive risk ratio}}$$

Causal risk ratio approach (see by Zhao et al. 2020)

$$RR_{causal} = \frac{E[Y_i(1)]}{E[Y_i(0)]}$$

$$= \underbrace{\frac{E[Y|R = 1, A = 1]}{E[Y|R = 0, A = 1]}}_{\text{naive risk ratio}} \underbrace{\frac{Pr(R = 1|A = 1)}{Pr(R = 0|A = 1)}}_{\text{bias factor}} \underbrace{\frac{Pr(R = 1)}{Pr(R = 0)}}_{\text{bias factor}}$$

Risk Ratio Results: Texas Sample



Estimates adjust for two-way FE and defendant covariates. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.

Back to Presentation

Selection into Indictment: Estimands

Let I_i denote the indictment decision, with potential outcomes defined accordingly.

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1. **The extensive margin:** RDD effect on the indictment decision ($E[I_i(1) - I_i(0)|r_{jt} = 0.5]$), where r_{jt} is the running variable.

Selection into Indictment: Estimands

Let I_i denote the indictment decision, with potential outcomes defined accordingly.

- 1. **The extensive margin:** RDD effect on the indictment decision $(E[I_i(1) I_i(0)|r_{jt} = 0.5])$, where r_{jt} is the running variable.
- 2. **The intensive margin:** RDD effect on charge severity, regardless of changes in the composition of cases $(E[Y_i(1)|I_i(1)=1,r_{jt}=0.5]-E[Y_i(0)|I_i(0)=1,r_{jt}=0.5];$ see Dong 2019)

Identifying Assumption

Suppose that conditional on arrest severity, the probability of inclusion into the arrest sample is smooth at the threshold.


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
To test for indirect effect of party, suppose no direct:

 partisanship affects charge severity only through the indictment decision.

Complete DAG



Visualizing Assumption




Estimation

The intensive margin is point identified by with a fuzzy RD estimator using $1\{r \ge 0\} \times Y \times I$ as the outcome and $I \times 1\{r \ge 0\}$ as the treatment e.g. from the right hand side:


$$I \times Y \times 1\{r \ge 0\} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 r + \beta_2 (I \times \widehat{1\{r \ge 0\}}) + \epsilon_2$$
$$I \times 1\{r \ge 0\} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 r + \alpha_2 (1\{r \ge 0\}) + \epsilon_1$$

Extensive and Intensive Margins: Texas Sample



Estimates adjust for the severity of the underlying arrest offense. Standard errors are clustered at the election level in the first two panels. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals reported in the third panel.

Heterogeneity by Crime Type



The dependent variable is (logged) charge severity, adjusted by state-and year- fixed effects. Defendant characteristics include dummies for prior criminal history, and sex. Standard errors are clustered at the election level.



National-level dataset

Local prosecutor elections:


- Covers 2700 counties, for the period 1995-2017

National-level dataset

Local prosecutor elections:

- Covers 2700 counties, for the period 1995-2017

Number of Contested Elections



Effect on Prison Admissions

Incarceration Trends Dataset:

- Prison admissions (by race) by county of commitment
- Assembled by Vera Institute of Justice
- Covers all counties, for the period 1983-2018

Effect on Prison Admissions


Incarceration Trends Dataset:

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
Final dataset:

- Unit: county election year dataset
- Outcome, by race: new prison admissions per 100k

Effect on New Prison Admissions per 100,000, by race




Permutation Test: Full Sample



Estimated placebo effects of electing Republican prosecutor on charge severity. Solid lines depict point estimate obtained in the original data.




Permutation Test: Black Defendants



Estimated placebo effects of electing Republican prosecutor on charge severity. Solid lines depict point estimate obtained in the original data.




Permutation Test: White Defendants



Estimated placebo effects of electing Republican prosecutor on charge severity. Solid lines depict point estimate obtained in the original data.



Residential Segregation, Democratic Jurisdictions





Residential Segregation, Republican Jurisdictions

