

An Exploration of Modern Cryptography

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Abstract

In this paper we analyze three cryptographic algorithms spanning all three major branches of modern cryptography: substitution ciphers, block ciphers and public-key ciphers. We explore cryptanalytic techniques used to break each algorithm, and evaluate each algorithm with regard to its practicality, speed and memory efficiency.

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Introduction

Suppose two people, Alice and Bob, wish to communicate by mail and do not want their mail woman, Eve, to be able to read their messages. Alice and Bob are military personnel of the same country, but they have never met each other before. Because Eve is the mail woman, she will be able to read all of the messages passing between Alice and Bob, but her obligation to the postal service prevents her from tampering with these messages¹.

The question is, is it possible for Alice and Bob to communicate securely in these circumstances? Astoundingly, the answer is yes!

Cryptography is the science of securely sending messages over insecure channels. Using cryptographic techniques, Alice and Bob can be sure that their communications are illegible to Eve.

0.1 Terminology and Basic Concepts

0.1.1 Alice and Bob

Unless specified otherwise, Alice and Bob are two parties attempting to communicate over an insecure channel, and Eve is their adversary trying to read their messages.

0.1.2 Encryption and Decryption

Messages in cryptography are formally called plaintext. When messages are scrambled, or made “illegible”, they are encrypted. The encrypted form of these messages is called ciphertext. The reverse process of encryption, decryption, accepts ciphertext as input and returns plaintext. We can describe this mathematically as:

$$\begin{aligned}E(M) &= C \\E'(C) &= D(C) = M\end{aligned}$$

Where M denotes plaintext, C denotes cipher text, E is the encryption function and D is the decryption function, or the inverse of E . Also note

¹In reality, Eve would not be bound by such a petty obligation, however, for the sake of simplicity, let us assume this is true.

the following identity:

$$\begin{aligned}D(E(M)) &= M \\E(D(C)) &= C\end{aligned}$$

0.1.3 Ciphers and Keys

A cryptographic algorithm, or cipher, is a function used for encryption and decryption.

If the workings of a cipher are made public, then the messages of anyone who is known to use the cipher can quickly be compromised by simply implementing an inverse of the cipher. Therefore, cryptographers introduced a key. A key is a piece of secret, private information upon which the cipher depends. It often takes the form of a number. The total number of possible values a key can take on is called the keyspace. Because ciphers depend on the key to encrypt and decrypt plaintext, encryption and decryption is often denoted:

$$\begin{aligned}E_K(P) &= C \\D_K(C) &= P\end{aligned}$$

The key is denoted by K and the keyspace is by \mathcal{K} . Note that the identity mentioned in 0.1.2 still holds true for ciphers.

0.1.4 Symmetric and Public-Key Ciphers

There are two distinct kinds of ciphers, symmetric ciphers and public-key (or asymmetric) ciphers.

Symmetric ciphers are ciphers for which the key used to decrypt ciphertext and encrypt plaintext is the same. In most symmetric ciphers, this means that Alice and Bob will need to agree on a key before they can begin sending messages. Symmetric ciphers can be further categorized as stream ciphers or block ciphers. Stream ciphers operate on only one bit (or byte) of plaintext at a time, where as block ciphers operate on a large number of bytes at once.

Public-key ciphers are ciphers for which the key used for encrypting plaintext is different from the key used for decrypting ciphertext. Further, these keys should be independent of each other, meaning the decryption key

can not be calculated² from the encryption key. The design of this cipher is such that the encryption key can be published for anyone to encrypt messages with, but only the owner of the decryption key can decrypt these message. This is why the encryption key is referred to as the public key and the decryption key is referred to as the private key.

0.1.5 Cryptanalysis

Cryptanalysis is the study of obtaining the plaintext from encrypted messages without the knowledge of the key. An attempt to cryptanalyze a cipher is called an attack. Successful attacks reveal either the plaintext, the secret key, or both.

The only assumption made in cryptanalysis is that the only piece of information the users of the cipher, Alice and Bob know that the adversary Eve does not is the secret key. This means that all other information, including communications and the workings of their cryptographic algorithm are available to anyone. This assumption implies that the security of the algorithm rests only in the key, and nothing else.

There are three main cryptanalysis techniques we will be focusing on in this report. Listed in decreasing order of difficulty they are; ciphertext only attacks, known-plaintext attacks and chosen plaintext attacks.

In ciphertext only attacks, the cryptanalyst (or attacker) Eve has access to several different ciphertexts. The attack is considered successful if Eve successfully retrieves the plaintexts corresponding to the ciphertexts or the key used in encryption.

In known-plaintext attacks, Eve has access to the ciphertexts as well as their corresponding plaintexts. The attack is successful if Eve finds the key (or keys) used to encrypt each plaintext.

In chosen plaintext attacks, Eve can not only access the ciphertexts, and their corresponding plaintext, but can also choose which plaintexts are encrypted and which are decrypted. The attack is successful if Eve retrieves the key (or keys) used to encrypt each plaintext.

Note that in all of the cases above, the adversary, Eve, had to know some amount of “information” about the ciphertext, plaintext or the relationship between the two. The only other technique which can yield the key is a

²In a feasible amount of time, i.e. less than the age of the universe.

brute force attack or exhaustive search attack, in which Eve checks the ciphertext against all possible keys in the keyspace until one of the keys reveals the plaintext.

1 Substitution Ciphers

A substitution cipher is a cipher in which each character or byte in the plaintext is substituted with a character or byte³ in the cipher text.

The substitution cipher we will be analyzing is called the Caesar cipher. The Caesar cipher operates on one byte (or character) of the plaintext at a time. Briefly, the value of the key is added to each byte of the plaintext. If this sum is a byte which does not corresponds to a character in the English alphabet, the sum is set modulo 26⁴. Decryption works the opposite way. The value of the key is subtracted from each byte of the ciphertext. If the sum is not in the English alphabet, the sum is set modulo 26.

See the appendix for a full code example.

1.1 Information Theory and Languages

Before we begin a deconstruction of the Caesar cipher, there are a few assumptions we make that must be explained.

Firstly, we must clarify the definition of information we used in section 0.1.5. Information can be rigorously defined as the least number of bits it would take to represent all possible meanings of a message, assuming all messages are equally likely.

For example, suppose we are trying to determine the amount of information in a list of possible sexes:

1. Male
2. Female

³A byte is a group of 8 binary digits, or bits, which are operated on as one unit. For example, this is the byte representing the integer 5: 00000101.

⁴Recall that $a \equiv b \pmod{c}$ implies $a = b + ck$, where $k \in \mathbb{Z}^+$. Basically this means the remainder of a divided by c .

Clearly, this data can be represented using one bit, where the 1 represents male and 0 represents female. Therefore, we can say that there is only one bit of information present in this list.

Now, if we take a look at words used in the English language, we clearly see that English does not represent this information very succinctly, i.e. there is a considerable amount of redundancy per character.

For example, the sentence “met u tmrw @ 9” conveys the same information as the sentence “meet you tomorrow at nine”, yet does so much more succinctly. Therefore, we can say that many of the character in the latter sentence are redundant or useless.

Although this may not seem related at all to cryptography, it is. This redundancy in languages causes sentences to “leak” more information than they need to. As we shall soon see, this often manifests itself as discrepancies in the frequency and location of certain characters in relation to others, and makes breaking the Caesar cipher a piece of cake.

1.2 Cryptanalysis of the Caesar Cipher

If we take the most naive cryptanalytic approach, a brute force attack, the Caesar cipher appears quite strong. Indeed the keyspace of the cipher is $26!$ or approximately 4×10^{26} . This means that even if we were to check a million keys per second, it would still take us around 1.27×10^{13} years to check every possible key! That’s longer than the estimated age of the universe!

However, we know from our understanding of redundancy in languages that there is information being leaked here.

Because the output of this algorithm merely “switches” one letter with another, the letters in any particular ciphertext will continue to follow the known statistic rules regarding English text. Particularly, they will maintain certain distributions of characters over the message.

Letter Frequency (%)			
E	13.11	M	2.55
T	10.47	U	2.45
A	8.15	G	1.95
O	8.05	Y	1.95
N	7.15	P	1.96
R	6.85	W	1.55
I	6.35	B	1.45
S	6.15	V	0.95
H	5.25	K	0.45
D	3.75	X	0.15
L	3.35	J	0.15
F	2.95	Q	0.15
C	2.75	Z	0.05

Figure 1: General frequency of English characters in decreasing order

Therefore, if we are given the following ciphertext:

ofobiyxocryevnkvcyexnobcdkxndrovswsdksyxycypmbizdyqbkz
rikckdyvvgroxekonxmyxtexmdsyxgsdrCyvsnzbyqbkwwsxqzbkm
dsmockxnpsbwwkdrowkdsmkvmyxtomdebocsdmkxlorsqrvioppomd
sforygofobspwscecondrobowkilonsckcdbyecmyxcoaeoxmocsx
mvensxqwkccnkdkdropdybcobfobrsqrtdkmusxq

We would first construct a table of the characters present in the text and their respective frequencies, as so:

Character	o	s	c	k	d	x	y	b	m	r	n	e	w
Frequency	27	21	19	19	19	18	17	15	14	13	10	9	9

Character	v	q	p	i	f	z	g	t	l	a	u	h	j
Frequency	8	7	6	5	4	4	3	3	2	1	1	0	0

Figure 2: Frequency of English characters in the ciphertext

Then we would map the most frequent characters to each other, using a frequency table, found in Figure 1. Clearly, the character “o” appears to represent the character “e”. We know, based on our knowledge of the algorithm, that the key was used as a shift, such that the integer value of

each ciphertext character was the integer value of the plaintext character plus the key. A quick glance at the ASCII character table reveals that e = 101 and o = 111 as integers. Therefore, we can conclude that the key used to encrypt this plaintext is the number 10.

A quick check reveals that we were indeed correct.

everyone should also understand the limitations of cryptography as a tool when used in conjunction with solid programming practices and firm mathematical conjectures; it can be highly effective, however, if misused, there may be disastrous consequences, including mass data theft or server highjacking.

With proper punctuation and capitalization the plaintext becomes:

Everyone should also understand the limitations of cryptography as a tool. When used in conjunction with solid programming practices and firm mathematical conjectures, it can be highly effective. However, if misused, there may be disastrous consequences, including mass data theft or server highjacking.

1.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Caesar Cipher

At this point, you may be asking yourself why the Caesar cipher would ever be considered a viable method of encrypting data, considering we have been able to break it quite easily using a ciphertext only attack.

Although this cipher is very deeply flawed, it still has certain advantages which make it practical in certain situations.

For example, if speed and memory are your main concerns, and your plaintext only has to be superficially secure, then this cipher is one of your best options. The Caesar cipher has a time complexity of $\Theta(1)$ and a memory complexity of $\Theta(1)$ ⁵. This means that the cipher's speed and memory usage stay within a constant range, and do not grow (or shrink) in relation to the size of the cipher's input. This is because the cipher operates on only one character (or byte) at a time, and performs the same constant time operation on each byte.

Furthermore, the Caesar cipher may also be practical in situations where only a small amount of plaintext is being encrypted. The statistical anal-

⁵See [3, p. 76] for a thorough review of Order Notation

ysis which was used is only relevant to plaintexts of sufficient length. It has been shown that highly competent cryptanalysts can break the Caesar cipher using only 25 English characters of plaintext. Therefore, the Caesar cipher might be practical for messages shorter than 25 characters.

2 Block Ciphers

Block ciphers, unlike substitution ciphers, operate on several bytes at a time. This ensures that redundancies in the data are not easy to analyse using statistical methods, such as the frequency analysis we performed earlier.

The two basic methods of obfuscating redundancies in plaintext messages are confusion and diffusion. Confusion obscures the relationship between the plaintext and the ciphertext. This can be most simply achieved through substitution, as was done in the Caesar cipher. Diffusion, on the other hand, disperses the redundancy in the plaintext over the ciphertext. A simple example of this is a permutation box, where the position of the input bits are swapped with each other.

Substitution ciphers can only use confusion based techniques, whereas block ciphers are capable of using both confusion and diffusion based techniques. This is why modern block ciphers are generally more secure than modern substitution ciphers.

The block cipher we will be analyzing is a heavily modified version of the GHOST cipher used by the former Soviet Union as encryption standard⁶. The cipher operates on 64 bits of input and accepts a 256 bit key.

See the appendix for a full code example.

2.1 Construction of Block Ciphers

Before we begin the analysis of GHOST, let us briefly look at some important ideas behind the design and construction of block ciphers.

⁶See [5, p. 331] for information about the original version of this algorithm.

2.1.1 Feistel Networks

Most blocks ciphers, including this version of GHOST, are Feistel networks. In Feistel networks, the plaintext is divided into two separate halves, the right half, R , and the left half, L . Encryption is performed by repeatedly iterating a function, f , over half the plaintext, using a different subkey of K each time, such that the i -th left and right half are defined as:

$$\begin{aligned}L_i &= R_{i-1} \\R_i &= L_{i-1} \oplus f(R_{i-1}, K_i)\end{aligned}$$

Decryption is the exact inverse of encryption, except the subkeys for f are placed in inverse order.

$$\begin{aligned}L_i &= R_{i+1} \oplus f(L_{i+1}, K_{i+1}) \\R_i &= L_{i+1}\end{aligned}$$

The wonderful property of this construction, is that decryption does not require f to be invertible, it can be as complex as desired, so long as the input to each iteration (or round) can be reconstructed. This means that rather than having to construct both an encryption and decryption function, one only needs to construct the former.

For example, consider encrypting the following message, $m = 01011100$, via a Feistel network, using subkeys $K_1 = 1100$, $K_2 = 0101$ and the function $f(x, k) = (x + x) \oplus k$. Breaking m into two halves, we obtain, $L_0 = 0101$, $R_0 = 1100$. Then, passing L_0 and R_0 into the Feistel network, we obtain the output byte 01010011:

$$\begin{aligned}L_1 &= 1100 \\R_1 &= 0101 \oplus f(1100, 1100) \\&= 0101 \oplus 0000 \\&= 0101 \\L_2 &= 0101 \\R_2 &= 1100 \oplus f(0101, 0101) \\&= 1100 \oplus 1111 \\&= 0011\end{aligned}$$

Now if we decrypt 01010011 by passing it in reverse through our Feistel

network, we obtain our original message 01011100.

$$\begin{aligned}L_2 &= 0101 \\R_2 &= 0011 \\L_1 &= 0011 \oplus f(0101, 0101) \\&= 0011 \oplus 1111 \\&= 1100 \\R_1 &= 0101 \\L_0 &= 0101 \oplus f(1100, 1100) \\&= 0101 \oplus 0000 \\&= 0101 \\R_0 &= 1100\end{aligned}$$

2.1.2 S-Boxes and P-Boxes

The confusion and diffusion properties of block ciphers come from their substitution boxes and their permutation boxes, abbreviated to S-boxes and P-boxes respectively. S-boxes output a transformation of their input bits, while P-boxes output a permutation of their input bits. An S-box which maps m input bits to n output bits is called an $m \times n$ bit S-box.

Some ciphers do not have P-boxes, but rather permute the input or output bits in a different fashion. The GHOST cipher, for example uses an 11-bit left circular shift, rather than a proper permutation box.

S-boxes are the most important part of any block cipher, because they provide its only non-linear component. If the S-boxes were linear, (or close to linear) the entire cipher would just be one big linear transformation of bits, and hence trivially simple to break.

Therefore, if these boxes are improperly designed, that is, they perform close to linear transformations of bits, the security of the entire cipher can be compromised.

As we shall soon see, if these boxes are improperly designed, their overarching cipher can be susceptible to attack.

2.2 Linear Cryptanalysis

Suppose you were given an expression of XOR'd bits, called a linear expression, of the form:

$$a_1X_1 \oplus a_2X_2 \oplus \cdots \oplus a_nX_n \oplus b_1Y_1 \oplus b_2Y_2 \oplus \cdots \oplus b_mY_m = 0 \quad (1)$$

It is obvious that (1) holds true with a probability of $1/2$ if $\{X\}$, $\{Y\}$, $\{a\}$ and $\{b\}$ are all random sequences of bits.

Now suppose that X and Y are the respective sequences of input and output bits of a substitution box. If the S-box is a good one, then for any random sequence $\{a\}$ and $\{b\}$, the probability of (1) being 0 should be less than some $1/2 + \epsilon$, where ϵ is some negligibly small number⁷. However, if there are certain combinations of $\{a\}$ and $\{b\}$ which result in a probability of obtaining 0 significantly greater or significantly less than $1/2$, then the S-box is said to be biased. The linear probability bias (or just bias), is the amount from which the probability of the linear expression deviates from $1/2$. When the bias is positive, the expression is said to be linear and when it is negative it is said to be affine.

Linear cryptanalysis is a known-plaintext attack against block ciphers, which attempts to take advantage of highly probable or improbable linear expressions occurring at key points in the cipher, most importantly in S-boxes. The attack uses these linear expressions to approximate portions of the cipher (accurate to some non-negligible probability) and eventually obtain the key bits. In general, linear cryptanalysis does not reveal the entire key, but rather makes exhaustive search an option by finding several key bits.

For example, suppose, given a 4×4 bit S-box, every combination of the four input bits are inputted and every output is recorded. It is found that the XOR of the first and second bits of input and the fourth bit of the output is equal to 0 exactly 12 of 16 times. This can be stated as:

$$X_1 \oplus X_2 \oplus Y_4 = 0$$

Or equivalently:

$$X_1 \oplus X_2 = Y_4$$

⁷In practice a negligible value can be defined as any value greater than $1/2^{80}$. This ensures that an event that occurs with this probability probably won't happen over the life of the key.

With a probability of $3/4$.

Therefore, the probability bias of this expression is $3/4 - 1/2 = 1/4$. Now suppose that the input to this S-box is the plaintext, P , XOR'd with the key K . Then we know that expression $(P_1 \oplus K_1) \oplus (P_2 \oplus K_2) = V_4$ holds true with a probability of $3/4$, where V is the vector of output bits. Now, if we fix values for the bits K_1, K_2 , and then XOR these hypothesized values with the output, we obtain our original plaintext bits.

$$\begin{aligned} P_1 \oplus K_1 \oplus P_2 \oplus K_2 \oplus K_1 \oplus K_2 &= V_4 \oplus K_1 \oplus K_2 \\ P_1 \oplus P_2 &= V_4 \oplus K_1 \oplus K_2 \end{aligned}$$

If we try each combination of K_1 and K_2 over several different pairs of values P and V (called plaintext-ciphertext pairs), we will see one pair of K_1 and K_2 which when added give us the plaintext bits most often, i.e. with the probability $3/4$. These values are the values of the first and second bits of the key. The rest of the key can then be acquired by exhaustive search of the remaining key bits.

In this example, the savings were quite trivial because the key space was only 2^4 , however, in larger key spaces, the advantages become more significant.

2.3 Cryptanalysis of the GHOST Cipher

Now that we know how linear cryptanalysis works, we can begin analyzing the GHOST cipher. The GHOST cipher is a 8 round Feistel network which uses a different S-box for each round. At each iteration of the Feistel network, the 32 bit input XOR'd with the subkey for that round. Then it is split into eight 4 bit chunks, which are each inputted into a different S-box, the first chunk in the first S-box, and so forth. Finally, these chunks are concatenated and circularly left shifted 11 bits.

To illustrate

During the round, the subkey corresponding to that round is XOR'd with the input and that is then circularly left shifted 11 bits.

Each S-box is a 4×4 S-box, meaning it accepts 4 input bits and 4 output bits. The first S-box, for example looks like this:

To figure out which linear expressions (if any) have high or low biases, we need to test every combination of input bits and output bits for each

Input (hex)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F
Ouput (hex)	4	A	9	2	D	8	0	E	6	B	1	C	7	F	5	3

Figure 3: Substitution Box 1

S-box, and find out which match the most or least often. That is, we need to evaluate

$$a_1X_1 \oplus a_2X_2 \oplus a_3X_3 \oplus a_4X_4 \oplus b_1Y_1 \oplus b_2Y_2 \oplus b_3Y_3 \oplus b_4Y_4 = 0$$

Or equivalently,

$$a_1X_1 \oplus a_2X_2 \oplus a_3X_3 \oplus a_4X_4 = b_1Y_1 \oplus b_2Y_2 \oplus b_3Y_3 \oplus b_4Y_4$$

For every possible combination of $a_i = \{0, 1\}$ and $b_j = \{0, 1\}$.

\oplus	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F
0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	-2	4	-2	-2	0	2	0	4	2	0	2	-2	0	2	0
2	0	0	-2	2	-2	2	0	0	-2	2	0	0	-4	-4	2	-2
3	0	2	-2	0	-4	-2	-2	0	2	0	-4	2	2	0	0	-2
4	0	2	0	-2	2	-4	-2	-4	0	2	0	-2	-2	0	2	0
5	0	0	0	0	0	-4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	-4	-4	0
6	0	2	-2	0	0	-2	-2	4	2	0	4	2	-2	0	0	2
7	0	4	2	2	-2	2	0	0	2	2	0	-4	0	0	-2	2
8	0	4	2	-2	2	2	0	0	-2	2	0	4	0	0	-2	-2
9	0	-2	2	4	0	-2	-2	0	-2	4	0	2	2	0	0	2
A	0	0	4	0	0	0	-4	0	0	-4	0	0	0	-4	0	0
B	0	-2	0	-2	-2	0	-2	0	0	2	4	-2	2	0	-2	-4
C	0	-2	-2	0	0	2	-2	-4	2	0	0	2	-2	0	-4	2
D	0	0	2	2	-2	-2	0	0	-2	-2	0	0	-4	4	-2	-2
E	0	2	0	2	-2	0	2	-4	0	-2	4	2	2	0	2	0
F	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	-4

Figure 4: Linear approximation table for S-box 1

This can be done using a linear approximation table. The table shows us the bias of each combination of input and output bits for the S-box. The input and output hex values represent the values of sequences a_i and b_j respectively from right to left. For example, the bias at row A, column 2 represents the bias of the combination

$$(1)X_1 \oplus (0)X_2 \oplus (1)X_3 \oplus (0)X_4 = (0)Y_1 \oplus (0)Y_2 \oplus (1)Y_3 \oplus (0)Y_4$$

Or more succinctly,

$$X_1 \oplus X_3 = Y_3$$

As $A = 1010$, $2 = 0010$ in hex.

By analyzing each S-box, and the way the output of each S-box moves across different S-boxes after each round, we can identify particular chains of linear expressions which will allow us to approximate rounds of the cipher.

Let $U_{i,j}$ and $V_{i,j}$ represents the input and output of the i -th round, at the j -th bit, (where the bits are numbered from left to right, 1 to 32). Further, let $K_{i,j}$ denote the j -th bit of the i -th subkey of K .

Let us begin with the following linear expression which approximates the first round of the cipher with the probability $3/4$.

$$\begin{aligned} V_{1,3} \oplus V_{1,4} &= U_{1,1} \oplus U_{1,2} \oplus U_{1,3} \oplus U_{1,4} \\ &= (P_1 \oplus K_{1,1}) \oplus (P_2 \oplus K_{1,2}) \oplus (P_3 \oplus K_{1,3}) \oplus (P_4 \oplus K_{1,4}) \end{aligned}$$

Note that each S-box maps a certain range in the output. S-box 1 works for the first four bits, $(U_{i,1} - U_{i,4})$, S-box 2 for the next four $(U_{i,5} - U_{i,8})$ and so forth. Therefore, certain expressions, such as the one above, use only one S-box transformation, as all of the bits involved in the expression belong to one S-box, whereas other expressions may use several S-box transformations as the bits involved in those expressions may be allocated to different S-boxes. This also means that some expressions may have several probability measures attached, as each S-box will have a different probability bias at certain input and output bits, whereas others will have fewer probability measures attached, as there are fewer S-boxes involved.

We then circularly left shift the output 11 bits, and expand $V_{1,3} \oplus V_{1,4}$. We find that

$$U_{2,24} \oplus U_{2,25} = V_{1,3} \oplus V_{1,4} \oplus K_{2,24} \oplus K_{2,25} = V_{2,22} \oplus V_{2,23} \oplus V_{2,24} \oplus V_{2,28}$$

Is true with a probability of $1/2 + 2^2(3/4)(-1/4)(-6/16)$.

Now we expand $V_{2,22} \oplus V_{2,23} \oplus V_{2,24} \oplus V_{2,28}$, once again after the circular left shift:

$$\begin{aligned} &U_{3,11} \oplus U_{3,12} \oplus U_{3,13} \oplus U_{3,17} = \\ &V_{2,22} \oplus V_{2,23} \oplus V_{2,24} \oplus V_{2,28} \oplus K_{3,11} \oplus K_{3,12} \oplus K_{3,13} \oplus K_{3,17} \end{aligned}$$

These expansions of the output of the S-boxes continues until we reach the output of the seventh S-box. This final expression give us the approximation of the first seven rounds of the cipher:

$$P_1 \oplus P_2 \oplus P_3 \oplus P_4 \oplus V_{7,3} \oplus V_{7,6} \oplus V_{7,10} \oplus V_{7,25} \oplus V_{7,31} \oplus V_{7,32} \oplus \Sigma_K = 0$$

Or alternatively:

$$P_1 \oplus P_2 \oplus P_3 \oplus P_4 \oplus U_{8,14} \oplus U_{8,20} \oplus U_{8,21} \oplus U_{8,24} \oplus U_{8,27} \oplus U_{8,31} \oplus \Sigma_K = 0$$

Where Σ_K is the XOR of all the keys picked up along the expansion.

Based on the Piling Up Principle⁸, this expression holds with a probability of

$$1/2 + 2^{23-1}(-1/4)^1 2(1/4)^8 (-6/16)(6/16)(5/16)$$

or approximately 0.499999832362 if $\Sigma_K = 0$ and 0.500000167638 if $\Sigma_K = 1$. Although this may seem small, it is actually non-negligible in cryptography.

Because the final input bits are divided into 6 different S-boxes, each of which has a 4 bit input, the total number of bits of subkeys we will have to check by exhaustive search is $2^{6 \cdot 4} = 2^{24}$. One of these keys will match our expression the best, and that will give us 24 bits of the last subkey. Although this is not nearly enough to break the entire cipher, it shows that the cipher is certainly breakable, as these procedures can be repeated with other linear expression chains and the last 8 bits of the subkey can be quite easily retrieved. Then each of the previous subkeys can be analyzed in a similar fashion. Finally, we may retrieve either enough key bits to perform a brute force search, or find the entire key itself.

Theoretically, this cipher is quite broken, however, in practice an attack on the scale of what I have just proposed is often infeasible. Based on Matsui's research⁹, the number of plaintexts required to perform this attack is approximately

$$N_L \approx \frac{1}{\epsilon^2}$$

⁸See [2, p. 7] for a proof of this principle, and a comprehensive explanation of how this principle works.

⁹See section 3.3 for a rough reason why Matsui's research would hold true. Try considering the plaintext and ciphertext portion of each pair as two lists. For a deeper look at the complexity of linear cryptanalysis see [2, p. 17].

Where ϵ is the bias of our linear expression and N_L is the number of plaintexts required to perform the linear cryptanalysis attack.

In this case, this means that our cipher would require approximately 3.55×10^{13} plaintext-ciphertext pairs, to recover only 24 bits of the key. Since each pair is 2×64 bits of data, the total number of memory needed to store this data would be approximately 520 terabytes. Although this large an amount of data storage is not impossible to obtain, it is very expensive and costly to operate.

Note however, that additional memory need not be purchased to perform subsequent linear cryptanalytic attacks, and therefore this is only an upfront cost. After discovering the entire 8-th subkey, the number of plaintexts required to obtain meaningful results will only become smaller, as there are fewer and fewer biases to account for (everything past the seventh S-box is now completely linear).

2.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of the GHOST Cipher

Clearly, one of the biggest disadvantages of the GHOST cipher (and for that matter most block ciphers) is that the entire cipher relies on the security of the S-boxes and their construction. A good S-box must have good diffusive properties while still being resistant to linear cryptanalysis and other forms of attack (such as differential cryptanalysis¹⁰). Finding better S-boxes, however is a very difficult task, and there is still much debate in the scientific community regarding how it should be done. It is known that larger S-boxes are stronger than smaller ones, however, these large tables increase the size of these algorithms considerably. Furthermore, current mathematical techniques can only create S-boxes which are secure against current attacks, whereas randomly selected S-boxes with adequate properties may be more secure against future attacks.

Furthermore, the GHOST cipher (and block ciphers in general) are quite slow in comparison to other kinds of ciphers. For example, on my personal machine, running the modified GHOST cipher took 1192 milliseconds on one run, whereas running the substitution cipher from the previous chapter took only 6 milliseconds! Obviously, this is due to the larger number of operations involved in each encryption step, which must also be performed over larger quantities of data. Therefore, if speed takes precedence

¹⁰See [2, p. 19] for more information about differential cryptanalysis

over security, GHOST (and for that matter block ciphers in general) may not be the best choice.

However, GHOST does have some great benefits. Cryptographically, it is considerably stronger than the substitution cipher we examined in the previous chapter. It is also very simple to implement in software, as it deals mainly with large chunks of data rather than individual bits.

Lastly, although the parameters set for such an attack seem outrageous and infeasible for any normal person, this cipher will be easily broken by more powerful organizations such as governments or criminal organizations, who have the necessary resources to carry out such attacks.

3 Public-Key Ciphers

So far, we have only examined a subset of ciphers called symmetric-key ciphers. These ciphers require both Alice and Bob to know a shared secret key before they can be used and any secure communications can occur.

However, there exist also a set of ciphers which do not require Alice and Bob to know a shared secret key prior to communication. These types of ciphers are called public-key ciphers.

Public-key ciphers usually function using two keys, a public key, K_{pub} , and a private key K_{pri} . Alice sends Bob her private key K_{pub} over a public channel. Bob then encrypts his message using Alice's private key and sends this encrypted message to her. Alice then decrypts the message using her private key, K_{pri} .

The security of these kinds of ciphers assumes two key things. Firstly, that it is very difficult to decrypt Bob's encrypted message without Alice's private key, and secondly, it is very difficult to retrieve Alice's private key from her public key.

Unlike symmetric-key ciphers which usually use information theoretic methods to achieve security. Public-key ciphers are usually based on the intractability of certain mathematical problems, and hence, use computational complexity theoretic methods to achieve security. Basically, this means that they rely on the assumption that certain mathematical problems have no efficient solution and leverage that to build strong ciphers.

The cipher we will be examining is a type of public-key cipher, called the

elliptic ElGamel cipher. It is based on the difficulty of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Before we can describe this cipher, we will need to cover a little elliptic curve theory.

3.1 Elliptic Curves

Elliptic curves are a special kind of equation whose set of solutions have interesting properties.

For our purposes, an elliptic curve can be defined as the set of solutions to the equation:

$$E : Y^2 = X^3 + AX + B \text{ such that } 4A^3 + 27B^2 \neq 0$$

The condition $4A^3 + 27B^2 \neq 0$ ensures that elliptic point addition is possible on the curve. See Figure 5 below for an example of what an elliptic curve looks like.




Figure 5: The elliptic curve $Y^2 = X^3 - 4X + 10$.

3.1.1 Addition Over Elliptic Curves

What makes these curves special is that there is a natural way of “adding” two points on this curve which always results in a third point which is also on the curve! This property, combined with a special point \mathcal{O} , form an abelian group in the solution set of an elliptic curve. The point \mathcal{O} serves as an identity element, which is said to lie “at infinity”, or at every vertical. The elliptic curve addition algorithm is as follows.

Algorithm 1 Elliptic curve addition algorithm

Ensure: $E \leftarrow Y^2 = X^3 + AX + B$ and $4A^3 + 27B^2 \neq 0$

Require: $P_1, P_2 \leftarrow$ some points on E

```

if  $P_1$  or  $P_2 = \mathcal{O}$  then
    if  $P_1 = \mathcal{O}$  then return  $P_1 + P_2 = P_2$ 
    elsereturn  $P_1 + P_2 = P_1$ 
    end if
else
     $P_1 = (x_1, y_1)$ 
     $P_2 = (x_2, y_2)$ 
    if  $x_1 = x_2$  and  $y_1 = -y_2$  then return  $P_1 + P_2 = \mathcal{O}$ 
    else
        
$$\lambda \leftarrow \begin{cases} \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} & \text{if } P_1 \neq P_2 \\ \frac{3x_1^2 + A}{2y_1} & \text{if } P_1 = P_2 \end{cases}$$

         $x_3 \leftarrow \lambda^2 - x_1 - x_2$ 
         $y_3 \leftarrow \lambda(x_1 - x_3) - y_1$ 
         $P_3 = (x_3, y_3)$  return  $P_1 + P_2 = P_3$ 
    end if
end if

```

For example, consider the elliptic curve $E : Y^2 = X^3 + 8X + 4$, and the points $P_1 = (4, 10)$, $P_2 = (5, 13)$, both of which are on the curve.

If we add the two points together using the algorithm above,

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda &= \frac{13 - 10}{5 - 4} = 3 \\ x_3 &= 3^2 - 4 - 5 = 0 \\ y_3 &= 3(4) - 10 = 2 \\ P_1 + P_2 &= (0, 2) \end{aligned}$$

We obtain the point $P_3 = (0, 2)$, which is also a solution to E !

$$2^2 = 0^3 + 8(0) + 4$$

The elliptic curve addition can also be demonstrated geometrically.




Figure 6: The addition of the points $A + B = C$ on the elliptic curve $Y^2 = X^3 - 4X + 10$.

Suppose we wish to add points A and B on the elliptic curve E . We start by drawing a line between these points, L . Due to the structure of the curve, L also intersects E at another point C . This point C is reflected over the x -axis to obtain the point C' , which is the elliptic sum of A and B . See Figure 6 for an illustration of this process.

3.1.2 Elliptic Curves Over Finite Fields

To allow for us to work with elliptic curves in a cryptographic context we need to extend our definition of elliptic curves to include elliptic curves over finite fields. This will allow us to define the mathematically difficult problem which defines the security of the ElGamal cipher.

Simply, we defined elliptic curves whose points have coordinates in the finite field ("over" the finite field) \mathbb{F}_p , with the equation

$$E : Y^2 = X^3 + AX + B \text{ with } A, B \in \mathbb{F}_p \text{ satisfying } 4A^3 + 27B^2 \neq 0$$

where p is some prime number larger than 3. The points on E with coordinates in \mathbb{F}_p are denoted by

$$E(\mathbb{F}_p) = \{(x, y) : x, y \in \mathbb{F}_p \text{ and } y^2 = x^3 + Ax + B\} \cup \{\mathcal{O}\}$$

The same addition rule we previously defined works here as well, however, because all operations are now in the field \mathbb{F}_p , the addition of two points will always yield another point inside \mathbb{F}_p . This cyclic property of the group is what this cipher exploits to ensure its security.

For example, consider the addition of the points $P_1 = (0, 2)$, $P_2 = (4, 10)$ on the elliptic curve $E : Y^2 = X^3 + 8X + 4$ over the finite field \mathbb{F}_{11} .

$$\begin{aligned}\lambda &= \frac{10 - 2}{4 - 0} \equiv 2 \pmod{11} \\ x_3 &= 2^2 - 0 - 4 \equiv 0 \pmod{11} \\ y_3 &= 2(0) - 2 \equiv 9 \pmod{11} \\ P_1 + P_2 &= (0, 9)\end{aligned}$$

Although it may not seem obvious,

$$\begin{aligned}9^2 &\equiv 0^3 + 8(0) + 4 \pmod{11} \\ 81 &\equiv 4 \pmod{11}\end{aligned}$$

The point $(0, 9)$ is indeed a solution to E in the field \mathbb{F}_{11} .

3.1.3 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem

As we mentioned earlier, the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP), is the underlying hard problem upon which ElGamal is based.

The ECDLP is the problem of finding an integer n such that $Q = nP$, where $P, Q \in E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ and the multiplication of n and P is defined as:

$$\underbrace{P + P + P + \cdots + P}_{n \text{ additions over } E} = nP = Q$$

Although this may seem simple, remember that the addition occurring over the curve E is more complex than normal addition, and that it is being done in the field \mathbb{F}_p .

A key point to notice here is that if there exists one n then there must, through the cyclic nature of the addition rule, be an infinite number of n which also solve $Q = nP$. As we shall soon see, this can be exploited to find n .

3.2 Elliptic ElGamel

Now that we have an understanding of the mathematics behind elliptic curves and the ECDLP, we can describe the ElGamel cipher in its entirety.

ElGamel works as follows. A large prime p , an elliptic curve E over \mathbb{F}_p and a point $P \in E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ are chosen by a trusted party or agreed upon by Alice and Bob and published to the public. Alice then chooses a private key, n_A , and computes $Q_A = n_AP$ in $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$. She then published Q_A as her public key. If Bob wants to send a message to Alice, he chooses a plaintext $M \in E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ and a temporary key k . He then computes $C_1 = kP$ and $C_2 = M + kQ_A$ in $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ and sends (C_1, C_2) to Alice. Alice then computes $C_2 - n_AC_1$ in $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ to obtain M , given that:

$$C_2 - n_AC_1 = (M + kQ_A) - n_A(kP) = M + k(n_AP) - n_A(kP) = M$$

To illustrate this cipher in action let us assume there is a public point $P = (6, 730)$ on the elliptic curve $E : Y^2 = X^3 + 14X + 19$ in the finite field \mathbb{F}_{3623} . Alice picks a secret key $K_{pri} = 12$ and publishes her private key

$$K_{pub} = 12P = (1669, 1991)$$

Bob wants to send Alice the message $M = (2149, 196)$, so he picks a temporary key $k = 4$ and computes

$$\begin{aligned} C_1 &= kP = 4P = (2277, 502) \\ C_2 &= M + k(K_{pub}) = (2149, 196) + (1175, 1246) = (600, 2449) \end{aligned}$$

Which he then sends to Alice. Upon receiving C_1 and C_2 , Alice computes

$$M = C_2 - K_{pri}C_1 = (2277, 502) - (1175, 1246) = (2149, 196)$$

Which was indeed what Bob sent her. Notice that all Eve saw during this entire transaction were the points C_1 and C_2 , both of which require knowing either the temporary key, k , or the private key, K_{pri} before they can be deciphered, which in turn, requires solving ECDLP.

3.3 The Birthday Paradox and the Collision Theorem

Now that we have described the algorithm, let us take a quick tangent into the realm of probability theory which we shall use, in conjunction to our knowledge that an infinite number of solutions exist to the ECDLP, to cryptanalyse our cipher.

3.3.1 The Birthday Paradox

Given a group of 40 people, consider the following questions:

1. What is the probability that someone has the same birthday as you?
2. What is the probability that at least two people have the same birthday?

Contrary to popular belief, the answers to these questions vary greatly. In the first case, the probability can be calculated by determining the probability that none of these people share your birthday, and subtracting this by 1.

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{someone has} \\ \text{your birthday} \end{array}\right) &= 1 - \Pr\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{no one has} \\ \text{your birthday} \end{array}\right) \\ &= 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{40} \Pr\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{the } i^{\text{th}} \text{ person does not} \\ \text{have your birthday} \end{array}\right) \\ &= 1 - \left(\frac{364}{365}\right)^{40} \\ &\approx 10.4\%\end{aligned}$$

Note that the probability of this occurring is not $\frac{40}{365}$ as this method double counts the occurrence of more than one person who shares your birthday.

Now consider the second case, where we calculate the probability that two people of this group of 40 have the same birthday. In this case we need to calculate the probability that each i^{th} person has a different birthday than the previous $i - 1$ people. Therefore, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{two people have} \\ \text{the same birthday} \end{array}\right) &= 1 - \Pr\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{all 40 people have} \\ \text{different birthdays} \end{array}\right) \\ &= 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{40} \Pr\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{the } i^{\text{th}} \text{ person does not have the same birthday} \\ \text{as any of the previous } i - 1 \text{ people} \end{array}\right) \\ &= 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{40} \frac{365 - (i - 1)}{365} \\ &\approx 89.1\%\end{aligned}$$

It is worth noting how we have arrived at the formula for the probability of the i^{th} person not having the same birthday as any of the previous $i - 1$ people. If the i^{th} person is to have a birthday which is different from any

of the previous $i - 1$ people, he only has $365 - (i - 1)$ choices of dates which have not been repeated. Therefore, the probability that he has a birthday on one of those dates is simply $\frac{365-(i-1)}{365}$.

The surprising thing is that most people assume 1 and 2 have relatively similar probabilities, when in fact the former event has a probability of approximately 10% whereas the latter event has a probability of approximately 90%. The idea that finding two identical objects in a set is easier than finding a match for one is the basis of cryptographic collisions. Broadly, a cryptographic collision can be defined as the event which occurs when two objects in a large set of (often distinct) objects are identical.

3.3.2 The Collision Theorem

The Collision Theorem states that given a total of N possible objects, and two distinct subsets of those objects A where $|A| = n$, and B where $|B| = N - n$, the probability of choosing at least one object from A after m random choices is

$$\Pr(\text{at least object from } A) = 1 - \left(1 - \frac{n}{N}\right)^m \quad (2)$$

And that the following is a lower bound for (2)

$$\Pr(\text{at least object from } A) \geq 1 - e^{-mn/N} \quad (3)$$

Furthermore, it turns out that when n and m are not too much larger than \sqrt{N} , (3) is almost an equality.

For example, suppose that we are given two random lists of names which are 1000 names long from a phone book with 1,000,000 names. What is the probability that a name from our two lists is identical? The Collision Theorem says

$$\Pr(\text{a match}) = 1 - \left(1 - \frac{1000}{10^6}\right)^{1000} \approx 63.2\%$$

If we take a look at the lower bound

$$\Pr(\text{a match}) \geq 1 - e^{-1000(1000)/10^6} \approx 63.2\%$$

We see that they are quite similar.

Now suppose that instead of a list of 1000 names, we were given a list of 4000 names. Note that $4000 = 4(1000) = 4\sqrt{10^6}$ is a small multiple of \sqrt{N} . Now, our results are quite different

$$\Pr(\text{a match}) = 1 - \left(1 - \frac{4000}{10^6}\right)^{4000} \approx 99.9\%$$

And our lower bound is equally high

$$\Pr(\text{a match}) \geq 1 - e^{-4000(4000)/10^6} \approx 99.9\%$$

The proof of this theorem is beyond the scope of this report, however, if you are curious you can find it in [3, p. 227].

3.4 Cryptanalysis of the ElGamel Cipher

We know that if we solve the underlying hard problem of the ElGamel cipher namely, ECDLP, then we can quite easily break the entire cipher, as ElGamels public key $Q_A = n_A P$ relies on the intractability of the ECDLP to maintain the secrecy of n_A . The naive solution would be to check every value of n less than the order of the finite field \mathbb{F}_p , however, this will quickly become infeasible as large p are chosen, take a total time of $O(p)$.

Consider the following solution to the ECDLP, using the Shank's Baby Step Giant Step algorithm adapted for the ECDLP. We shall create two lists of multiples of the points:

List 1. $j_1 P, j_2 P, j_3 P, \dots, j_r P$

List 2. $k_1 P + Q, k_2 P + Q, k_3 P + Q, \dots, k_r P + Q$

Where j_1, \dots, j_r and k_1, \dots, k_r are between 1 and p . As soon as we find a collision between these two lists, it becomes trivially easy to compute $nP = Q$, as:

$$\begin{aligned} j_u P &= k_v P + Q \\ (j_u - k_v)P &= Q \end{aligned}$$

Therefore $n = (j_u - k_v)$.

We also know from the Collision Theorem, that the size of List 1 and List 2 need only be a small multiple of the size of \sqrt{p} , after which the probability of a match is very high.

It is clear that this method is considerably faster than exhaustive search as each list requires only $2\sqrt{p}$ operations to create, given each step is an elliptic multiplication. Comparing the lists should also only take a maximum of $2\sqrt{p}$ operations. Therefore, this algorithm should run in approximately $O(\sqrt{p})$ time.

To illustrate the effectiveness of this algorithm, consider solving ECDLP for the points $P = (1395, 8021)$ and $Q = (10866, 8078)$ on the elliptic curve $E : Y^2 = X^3 + 43X + 93$ in the field \mathbb{F}_{22307} . On my machine, the Shank's ECDLP adaptation requires between 17 and 19 milliseconds to run, where as exhaustive search requires approximately 303 milliseconds. This supports our claim that Shank's ECDLP adaptation runs in time $O(\sqrt{p})$ as $\sqrt{303} \approx 17.5$.

3.5 Advantages and Disadvantages of the ElGamel Cipher

Clearly, the overwhelming advantage of ElGamel is that it will always be secure, so long as there is no efficient algorithm to solve the ECDLP, irrespective of any other factor¹¹. Informally, this means that we can choose certain primes, p , such that the running time for the most efficient algorithm to solve ECDLP, $O(\sqrt{p})$ is too high to ever be computed in a feasible amount of time¹².

Despite this theoretic security, ElGamel remains seldom used in practise for one key reason. There is no obvious way to store a message using a point! Therefore, ElGamel is often used in conjunction with other symmetric key ciphers (primarily block ciphers) to securely exchange keys with multiple parties.

Furthermore, ElGamel requires very large keys in comparison to symmetric ciphers. For example, to achieve a security of 128 bits, one requires an elliptic curve over a finite field \mathbb{F}_p where $p \approx 2^{256}$, as this means an attacker would need to compute $\sqrt{2^{256}} = 2^{128}$ operations. In contrast, block ciphers only require keys of size 2^{128} .

However, in comparison to other public-key ciphers, ElGamel performs remarkably well. To achieve 128 bit security using conventional public-

¹¹This is not entirely true, as in certain cases, such as when an elliptic curve is anomalous, it is possible to solve ECDLP in $O(\ln p)$. For a much deeper investigation of such rare cases, see [4].

¹²For example, the expected age of the universe.

key ciphers¹³ such as RSA, one requires keys of size 2^{3072} ! This means that ElGamel is 10 times more memory efficient! Furthermore, as the power of computers, increases, ElGamel scales much better as a higher security level is required. If suppose, in 10 years, a security of 256 bits is required, ElGamel would only require $p \approx 2^{512}$, whereas RSA would require keys of size 2^{15360} !

Conclusions and Further Exploration

In this paper, we have analyzed a variety of cryptographic algorithms which are essential to modern cryptography: substitution ciphers, block ciphers, and public-key ciphers. We have evaluated the utility of each cipher not only with respect to their security, but also to their practicality, speed and memory efficiency. Furthermore, we have learnt to employ many advanced cryptanalytic techniques, from simple frequency analysis attacks to advanced collision attacks.

Moving forward, there are several other more advanced branches of cryptography which have not been addressed in this paper, despite their prevalence in modern cryptography. These topics include cryptographic hashing, random number generation, quantum cryptography, digital authentication, hyper elliptic curve cryptography and digital signatures. These topics were not included in this paper as their complexity is beyond the abilities of the author. However, I encourage the reader to see [3, 5] for more information. I hope you have enjoyed learning about cryptography as much as I have.

¹³See [1] for more information regarding these statistics.

References

- [1] National Security Agency. The Case for Elliptic Curve Cryptography. <http://1.usa.gov/IaIdvX>, 2009.
- [2] Howard M. Heys. A Tutorial on Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis. *Cryptologia*, XXVI(3):189–221, 2002.
- [3] Jeffrey Hoffstein, Jill Pipher, and Joseph H. Silverman. *An Introduction to Mathematical Cryptography*. Springer, 233 Spring Street, New York, N.Y., USA, 2008.
- [4] Matthew Musson. Attacking the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem. Master’s thesis, Acadia University, 2006.
- [5] Bruce Schneier. *Applied Cryptography*. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y., USA, second edition, 1996.

Appendix

All of the following code is also available online at the following locations:

Caesar Cipher <http://bit.ly/JYyL3L>

GHOST Cipher <http://bit.ly/J5lGAF>

ElGamel Cipher <http://bit.ly/IlyrYL>

The Caesar cipher and the GHOST cipher need to be compiled using the GCC source compiler.

The ElGamel cipher needs to be run using `node.js`. To install `node.js`, visit <http://nodejs.org/>.

Caesar Cipher Source Code

caesar.c

```
// Written by Siddharth Mahendraker
// Copyright (c) 2011
// MIT Licence

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

// a - z in ascii
#define CHAR_START 97
#define CHAR_STOP 122

/*
 * Usage: ./shiftpcipher [shift] [-e|-d] file.txt
 *
 * Only lowercase ASCII will be parsed, everything else
 * will be skipped
 */

int main(int argc, char *argv[]){

    if(argv[1] == NULL){
        printf("An error occured, a shift value is required. \n");
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

    int shift = atoi(argv[1]) % 26;
    int encrypt;

    if(argv[2] == NULL){
        printf("An error occured, please use -e or -d
        to set the encryption/decryption mode. \n");
    }
```



```

    exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} else {
    if(strcmp((char *)argv[2], "-e") == 0){
        encrypt = 1;
    }
    if(strcmp((char *)argv[2], "-d") == 0){
        encrypt = 0;
    }
    if(encrypt != 1 && encrypt != 0){
        printf("An error occured, please use -e or -d
        to set the encryption/decryption mode. \n");
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }
}

FILE *file = fopen(argv[3], "r");

if(file == NULL){
    printf("An error occured opening the file %s. \n",argv[3]);
    exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}

// Main body of the code begins here

// Retreives the integer representation which correspond to
// the first character and move the internal pointer forward

int i = fgetc(file);

// Loops through each of the characters in the file until the
// end of the file is reached

int ctxt;

if(encrypt == 1){
    while(i != EOF){
        if(i >= CHAR_START && i <= CHAR_STOP){
            ctxt = i+shift;

            if(ctxt > CHAR_STOP){
                ctxt = CHAR_START + (ctxt - (CHAR_STOP + 1));
            } else if(ctxt < CHAR_START){
                ctxt = (CHAR_STOP + 1) - (CHAR_START - ctxt);
            }

            char c = (char) ctxt;
            printf("%c", c);

            i = fgetc(file);
        }
    }
} else{
    while(i != EOF){
        if(i >= CHAR_START && i <= CHAR_STOP){
            ctxt = i-shift;

            if(ctxt > CHAR_STOP){
                ctxt = CHAR_START + (ctxt - (CHAR_STOP + 1));
            } else if(ctxt < CHAR_START){
                ctxt = (CHAR_STOP + 1) - (CHAR_START - ctxt);
            }
        }
    }
}

```

```

        char c = (char) ctxt;
        printf("%c", c);
    }

    i = fgetc(file);
}

fclose(file);
return 0;
}

```

GHOST Cipher Source Code

ghost.h

```

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif

#include <inttypes.h>

typedef unsigned char u_char;

typedef struct {
    // sub keys
    uint32_t key[8];
    // sbox vectors
    unsigned char sb1[16], sb2[16], sb3[16], sb4[16],
                  sb5[16], sb6[16], sb7[16], sb8[16];
} blk_ctx;

/* Function
 * init -> initialize sbox vectors and generate subkeys
 * enc -> encryption
 * dec -> decryption
 * destroy -> clean up after yourself
 */

/* Setup and Teardown */
void blk_init(blk_ctx *, uint32_t *);
void blk_destroy(blk_ctx *);

/* Encryption and Decryption */
void blk_dec(blk_ctx *, uint32_t *);
void blk_enc(blk_ctx *, uint32_t *);

/* Internal */
uint32_t blk_scrm(blk_ctx *, uint32_t, int);
uint32_t blk_sub(blk_ctx *, uint32_t);

#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

```

ghost.c

```
#include "blockcipher.h"

void blk_init(blk_ctx *ctx, uint32_t *key){
    int i;
    for(i = 0; i < 8; i++){
        ctx->key[i] = key[i];

        // S-Boxes taken from the GOST algorithm
        u_char sb1[16] = { 4, 10, 9, 2, 13, 8, 0, 14, 6, 11, 1, 12, 7, 15, 5, 3 };
        u_char sb2[16] = { 14, 11, 4, 12, 6, 13, 15, 10, 2, 3, 8, 1, 0, 7, 5, 9 };
        u_char sb3[16] = { 5, 8, 1, 13, 10, 3, 4, 2, 14, 15, 12, 7, 6, 0, 9, 11 };
        u_char sb4[16] = { 7, 13, 10, 1, 0, 8, 9, 15, 14, 4, 6, 12, 11, 2, 5, 3 };
        u_char sb5[16] = { 6, 12, 7, 1, 5, 15, 13, 8, 4, 10, 9, 14, 0, 2, 11, 2 };
        u_char sb6[16] = { 4, 11, 10, 0, 7, 2, 1, 13, 3, 6, 8, 5, 9, 12, 15, 14 };
        u_char sb7[16] = { 13, 11, 4, 1, 3, 15, 5, 9, 0, 10, 14, 7, 6, 8, 2, 12 };
        u_char sb8[16] = { 1, 15, 13, 0, 5, 7, 10, 4, 9, 2, 3, 14, 6, 11, 8, 12 };

        int j;
        for(j = 0; j < 16; j++){
            ctx->sb1[j] = sb1[j];
            ctx->sb2[j] = sb2[j];
            ctx->sb3[j] = sb3[j];
            ctx->sb4[j] = sb4[j];
            ctx->sb5[j] = sb5[j];
            ctx->sb6[j] = sb6[j];
            ctx->sb7[j] = sb7[j];
            ctx->sb8[j] = sb8[j];
        }
    }
}

uint32_t blk_sub(blk_ctx *c, uint32_t data){

    register u_char first  = (data & 0xf0000000UL) >> 28;
    register u_char sec    = (data & 0x0f000000UL) >> 24;
    register u_char third  = (data & 0x00f00000UL) >> 20;
    register u_char fourth = (data & 0x000f0000UL) >> 16;
    register u_char fifth  = (data & 0x0000f000UL) >> 12;
    register u_char sixth  = (data & 0x00000f00UL) >> 8;
    register u_char sev    = (data & 0x000000f0UL) >> 4;
    register u_char eight  = (data & 0x0000000fUL);

    first  = c->sb1[first];
    sec    = c->sb2[sec];
    third  = c->sb3[third];
    fourth = c->sb4[fourth];
    fifth  = c->sb5[fifth];
    sixth  = c->sb6[sixth];
    sev    = c->sb7[sev];
    eight  = c->sb8[eight];

    uint32_t final = 0x00000000UL;

    final |= (first << 28);
    final |= (sec << 24);
    final |= (third << 20);
    final |= (fourth << 16);
    final |= (fifth << 12);
    final |= (sixth << 8);
    final |= (sev << 4);
    final |= (eight << 0);
}
```

```

        final |= eight;

        return final;
    }

uint32_t blk_scrm(blk_ctx *c, uint32_t data, int round){

    u_char first  = (data & 0xff000000UL) >> 24;
    u_char sec    = (data & 0x00ff0000UL) >> 16;
    u_char third  = (data & 0x0000ff00UL) >> 8;
    u_char fourth = (data & 0x000000ffUL);

    uint32_t final = data ^ c->key[round];
    uint32_t ret = blk_sub(c, final);

        return (ret << 11) | (ret >> (32 - 11));
    }

void blk_enc(blk_ctx *c, uint32_t *data){
    register uint32_t r, l;

    l = data[0];
    r = data[1];

    r ^= blk_scrm(c, l, 0); l ^= blk_scrm(c, r, 1);
    r ^= blk_scrm(c, l, 2); l ^= blk_scrm(c, r, 3);
    r ^= blk_scrm(c, l, 4); l ^= blk_scrm(c, r, 5);
    r ^= blk_scrm(c, l, 6); l ^= blk_scrm(c, r, 7);

    data[0] = r;
    data[1] = l;
}

void blk_dec(blk_ctx *c, uint32_t *data){
    register uint32_t r, l;

    l = data[0];
    r = data[1];

    r ^= blk_scrm(c, l, 7); l ^= blk_scrm(c, r, 6);
    r ^= blk_scrm(c, l, 5); l ^= blk_scrm(c, r, 4);
    r ^= blk_scrm(c, l, 3); l ^= blk_scrm(c, r, 2);
    r ^= blk_scrm(c, l, 1); l ^= blk_scrm(c, r, 0);

    data[0] = r;
    data[1] = l;
}

void blk_destroy(blk_ctx *c){
    int i;
    for(i = 0; i < 8; i++)
        c->key[i] = 0x0;
}

```

main.c

```

#include <stdio.h>
#include "blockcipher.h"

```

```

int main() {

    uint32_t key[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 };
    uint32_t data[] = { 1, 1 };

    blk_ctx c;
    blk_init(&c, key);
    //printf("Decrypted data: %u, %u\n", data[0], data[1]);
    blk_enc(&c, data);
    //printf("Encrypted data: %u, %u\n", data[0], data[1]);
    blk_dec(&c, data);
    //printf("Decrypted data: %u, %u\n", data[0], data[1]);
    blk_destroy(&c);

    return 1;
}

```

ElGamal Cipher Source Code

point.js

```

/*
 * Creates a point x, y, where
 * x and y can be Infinity.
 *
 * @class point
 *
 * @param {Integer} x
 * @param {Integer} y
 *
 * @returns {Point} (x, y)
 *
 * @api public
 */

function point(x, y){
    if(!(this instanceof point))
        return new point(x, y);

    if(x == Infinity && y == Infinity)
        this.inf = true;
    else
        this.inf = false;

    this.x = x;
    this.y = y;
}

// Exports
module.exports = point;

```

curve.js

```

var point = require("./point.js"),
    pow = Math.pow,

```

```

    floor = Math.floor;

/*
 * Creates an elliptic curve of the form
 *
 *  $Y^2 = X^3 + AX + B$ 
 *
 * over the field Fp.
 *
 * @class curve
 *
 * @param {Integer} A
 * @param {Integer} B
 * @param {Integer} Fp
 *
 * @returns {Curve} curve instance
 *
 * Although it is not explicitly checked, it should be
 * noted that operations work best over curves which are
 * non-singular, ergo the discriminant of the curve,
 *  $= 4A^3 + 27B^2$ , should be non-zero.
 *
 * @api public
 */

function curve(A, B, Fp) {
    if (!(this instanceof curve))
        return new curve(A, B, Fp);

    this.A = A;
    this.B = B;
    this.Fp = Fp;
}

/*
 * Computes whether a given point is on the
 * curve
 *
 * @param {Point} p
 *
 * @returns {Boolean} if p is or isn't on the curve
 *
 * @api public
 */

curve.prototype.contains = function(p) {
    return this.mod((p.y*p.y), this.Fp) ==
        this.mod((p.x*p.x*p.x) + this.A*p.x + this.B, this.Fp);
}

/*
 * Computes modulo for both positive and
 * negative numbers.
 *
 * @param {Integer} a
 * @param {Integer} b
 *
 * @returns {Integer} a mod b
 *
 * @api public
 */

```

```

curve.prototype.mod = function(a, b){
    return ((a % b) + b) % b;
}

/*
 * Computes the GCD of two numbers
 *
 * gcd(a, b)
 *
 * @param {Integer} a
 * @param {Integer} b
 *
 * @returns {Integer} gcd(a, b)
 *
 * @api public
 */

curve.prototype.gcd = function(a, b){
    while(b != 0){
        var t = b;
        b = this.mod(a, b);
        a = t;
    }
    return a;
}

/*
 * Computes the solutions to the equation
 *
 *  $ax - by = \text{gcd}(a, b) = 1$ 
 *
 * where  $a$  and  $b$  are given.
 *
 * @param {Integer} a
 * @param {Integer} b
 *
 * @returns {Integer[]} [x, -y]
 *
 * @api public
 */

curve.prototype.ext_gcd = function(a, b){
    var lx = 0, ly = 1,
        x = 1, y = 0;

    while(b !== 0){
        var r = this.mod(a, b),
            q = (a - r) / b,
            tmpx = x,
            tmpy = y;

        x = lx - (q*x);
        lx = tmpx;

        y = ly - (q*y);
        ly = tmpy;

        a = b;
        b = r;
    }

    return [ly, lx];
}

```

```

}

/*
 * Computes the solution to equations
 * of the form
 *
 *  $a/b = x \pmod{p}$ 
 *
 * where  $a, b$  are given and  $p = \text{Fp}$ .
 *
 * @param {Integer} a
 * @param {Integer} b
 *
 * @returns {Integer} x
 *
 * @public
 */
curve.prototype.mod_inv = function(a, b){
    var res = this.ext_gcd(b, this.Fp),
        dis = res[1],
        x = (a - (this.Fp*dis*a)) / b;

    return this.mod(x, this.Fp);
}

/*
 * Subtracts two points on the curve.
 *
 * See mod_add below for a description of the
 * algorithm.
 *
 * @param {Point} a
 * @param {Point} b
 *
 * @returns {Point} a - b
 *
 * @api public
 */
curve.prototype.mod_sub = function(a, b){
    return this.mod_add(a, point(b.x, -b.y));
}

/*
 * Adds two points on the curve.
 *
 * @param {Point} a
 * @param {Point} b
 *
 * @returns {Point} a + b
 *
 * @api public
 */
curve.prototype.mod_add = function(a, b){
    if(b.inf) return a;
    if(a.inf) return b;

    var x1 = a.x,
        x2 = b.x,
        y1 = a.y,

```



```

        y2 = b.y;

        if((x1 == x2) && (y1 == -y2))
            return point(Infinity, Infinity);

        if((x1 == x2) && (y1 == y2)){
            var lambda = this.mod_inv((3*(pow(x1, 2))) + this.A, 2*y1)
        } else {
            var lambda = this.mod_inv((y2 - y1), (x2 - x1));
        }

        var x3 = this.mod((pow(lambda, 2) - x1 - x2), this.Fp);
        var y3 = this.mod((lambda*(x1 - x3) - y1), this.Fp);

        return point(x3, y3);
    }

    /*
     * Adds a point on the curve, P,
     * to itself n times.
     *
     * This has been implemented using the Double-and-Add
     * algorithm.
     *
     * @param {Point} p
     * @param {Integer} n
     *
     * @returns {Point} q = np
     *
     * @api public
     */
    curve.prototype.mod_mult = function(p, n){
        var q = p,
            r = point(Infinity, Infinity);

        while(n > 0){
            if(n % 2 == 1)
                r = this.mod_add(r, q);

            q = this.mod_add(q, q);
            n = floor(n / 2);
        }

        return r;
    }

    // Exports
    module.exports = curve;

```

elgamel.js

```

var crypto = require("crypto"),
    point = require("../point.js");

/*
 * Creates an elliptic elgamel instance to
 * facilitate the encryption and decryption
 * of data.

```

```

*
* @class Elgamal
*
* @param {Curve} curve
* @param {Point} point
* @param {Integer} key
*
* @returns {Elgamal} elgamal
*
* @api public
*/

function Elgamal(curve, point, key){
  if(!(this instanceof Elgamal)){
    return new Elgamal(curve, point, key);

    this.ec = curve;
    this.point = point;
    this.key = key;
  }

  /*
  * Computes the public key based on the private key.
  *
  * @returns {Point} public key
  *
  * @api public
  */

  Elgamal.prototype.computePublicKey = function(){
    return this.ec.mod_mult(this.point, this.key);
  }

  /*
  * Encrypts a point using a public key.
  *
  * The callback returns the ciphertext as it's
  * first parameter.
  *
  * @param {Point} plaintext
  * @param {Point} pub_key
  * @param {Function} callback
  *
  * @returns {Point} ciphertext
  *
  * @api public
  */

  Elgamal.prototype.encrypt = function(plaintext, pub_key, callback){
    var self = this,
        curve = self.ec;

    crypto.randomBytes(1024, function(err, buff){
      var str = buff.toString("utf8"),
          k = 0;

      for(var i = 0; i < str.length; i++){ k ^= str.charCodeAt(i) }

      var c1 = curve.mod_mult(self.point, k),
          c2 = curve.mod_add(plaintext, curve.mod_mult(pub_key, k));

      return callback(point(c1, c2));
    });
  }
}

```

```

    });
}

/*
 * Decrypts a point using the given private key.
 *
 * @param {Point} ciphertext
 *
 * @returns {Point} plaintext
 *
 * @api public
 */
elgamal.prototype.decrypt = function(ciphertext){
    var c1 = ciphertext.x,
        c2 = ciphertext.y,
        curve = this.ec;

    return curve.mod_sub(c2, curve.mod_mult(c1, this.key));
}

// Exports
module.exports = elgamal;

```

main.js

```

var curve = require("./curve.js"),
    elgamal = require("./elgamal.js"),
    point = require("./point.js");

var curve = curve(14, 19, 3623),
    s_pt = point(6, 730);

var alice = elgamal(curve, s_pt, 12),
    alice_pub = alice.computePublicKey();

var bob = elgamal(curve, s_pt, 32),
    bob_pub = bob.computePublicKey(),
    message = point(2149, 196);

bob.encrypt(message, alice_pub, function(ciphertext){
    var plaintext = alice.decrypt(ciphertext);
    console.log(plaintext);
    console.log(message);
});

```