

November 2017

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EDUCATION	<p>New York University Stern School of Business, New York, NY USA</p> <p>Ph.D. in Finance, 2018 (expected)</p> <p>Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, Bengaluru, India</p> <p>Post Graduate Diploma in Management (MBA equivalent), 2009</p> <p>Yale School of Management, New Haven, CT USA</p> <p>MBA Exchange Student, Fall 2008</p> <p>National Institute of Technology Karnataka, Surathkal, India</p> <p>Bachelor of Technology, Electrical and Electronics Engineering, 2007</p>
INTERESTS	Financial Intermediation and Regulation, Corporate Finance, Energy Markets
JOB MARKET PAPER	<p>Acquiring Failed Banks</p> <p><u>Abstract:</u> I study the effects of failed bank acquisitions over the last decade. The vast majority of bankrupt banks were sold through a competitive bidding process. My empirical strategy relies on comparing outcomes for the winning bank to those for the bank that came second in the auction. The acquisitions generate positive abnormal returns on announcement. I test whether this value is created from access to new lending opportunities or to the deposit franchise, and find evidence that it is the latter. After the takeover, the lending of the combined entity in areas where the failed bank operated collapses. This does not depend on the acquiring bank's pre-existing presence, holds for loan categories that were not responsible for the bank's failure, and is not driven by local demand shocks. Other lenders do not expand lending in response, leading to an aggregate drop in local lending. However, acquiring banks do maintain their physical presence in the target's markets and are able to retain most of the failed bank's deposit base. Overall, my results suggest that on failure the deposit franchise is transferred seamlessly to the acquiring bank but the loan production technology is not.</p>

WORKING
PAPERS

Foreign Currency Borrowing of Corporations as Carry Trades: Evidence from India (with Viral V. Acharya)

Abstract: We study the causes and consequences of the rise in foreign currency borrowing by non-financial corporates in an emerging market over the last decade. Using detailed firm-level issuance data from India, we show that issuance propensity for the same firm is higher when the difference in short-term interest rates between India and the US are higher i.e. when the dollar ‘carry trade’ is more profitable; a phenomenon that is driven by the period after the global financial crisis. In contrast, most standard firm-level variables, on their own, are not predictive of issuance. Consistent with the carry trade motive, we find that firms with low leverage are most likely to take advantage of these favorable funding conditions; firm cash holdings rise more after a foreign currency debt issue than after an equivalent amount raised through other sources; and firm exposure to foreign exchange risk rises after an issuance implying that the currency risk is not fully hedged. Using the ‘taper tantrum’ episode of Summer 2013 as an unexpected shock to foreign exchange volatility, we find that a market-based measure of FX exposure does a better job in capturing firm exposures than accounting measures. Firms with high FX exposure and a propensity to issue in more favorable funding environments are the hardest hit during the taper tantrum episode. Finally, we also present suggestive evidence that risks spill over to local banks from foreign currency borrowers with whom they have relationships.

Lending to Influence Politicians: County-level Evidence

Abstract: Using changes in the composition of the US House Financial Services Committee as a shock to a region’s political importance, I provide evidence that financial institutions alter lending patterns depending on whether a county is represented by a member of the committee. The effects are asymmetric – on gaining a member, counties see no immediate change but on losing a member, there is a decline in home mortgage loans originated. This asymmetry is consistent with models that emphasize reputation building in the market for political favours. Effects are greater where the politician receives less direct contributions suggesting that these indirect contributions might be substitutes for direct giving. In the presence of limits on campaign contributions, these results emphasize alternate channels that firms may employ to influence politicians.

WORK IN
PROGRESS

Financial Participants in Commodities Markets: Evidence from US Electricity Trading

AWARDS AND
GRANTS

Marcus Nadler Fellowship, NYU Stern, 2016-2017
NYU Stern Doctoral Fellowship, 2012-2016
AFA Student Travel Grant, 2016
PhD Research Grant, Center for Global Economy and Business - NYU Stern, 2015
NYU Stern Teaching Commendation, 2015
Director’s Merit List (Top 5% of class), IIM Bangalore, 2008

TEACHING EXPERIENCE	New York University Stern School of Business , New York, NY USA	
	<i>Instructor</i>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corporate Finance (Undergraduate) Summer 2015 21 students; Instructor rating: 6.8/7.0 	
	<i>Teaching Assistant</i> for Prof. Philipp Schnabl	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corporate Finance (MBA) Fall 2014, Spring 2015, Fall 2015, Fall 2016 • Corporate Finance (Undergraduate) Spring 2015 	
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE	Indian School of Business , Hyderabad, India	
	<i>Researcher, Centre for Analytical Finance</i>	June 2010 - July 2012
	ITC Limited , Kolkata, India	
	<i>Graduate Leadership Program in Sales & Marketing</i>	June 2009 - June 2010
	Accenture , Mumbai, India	
	<i>Summer Analyst, Management Consulting</i>	April 2008 - June 2008
OTHER INFORMATION	<i>Computer Skills:</i> STATA, SAS, Python, C	
	<i>Citizenship:</i> Indian	
	<i>Languages:</i> English, Hindi (native)	
	<i>Non-academic Interests:</i> Trivia, Bat-and-ball sports, Independent cinema	
REFERENCES	Prof. Philipp Schnabl (Chair)	
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