SEC-IOT: MACHINE LEARNING BASED LIGHTWEIGHT IOT DEVICE PROFILING FOR SECURITY

by

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2021-MS-CE-05

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2025

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A THESIS

presented to the university of engineering and technology, Lahore

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Science

in

Computer Engineering

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ABSTRACT

The immediate expansion of Internet of Things (IoT) devices presents significant security challenges, necessitating effective profiling strategies to distinguish between normal and malicious behavior. This study establishes a lightweight IoT device profiling framework that integrates machine learning (ML) techniques for enhanced security. In this study we proposed a machine learning-based technique for lightweight IoT device profiling for security. We integrate an autoencoder and random forest and then employ them on the CICIoT-2022 dataset to identify the unique characteristics of each device while learning normal behavior patterns, and the classifier then distinguishes between harmful and harmless sessions. This Trained model effectively recognizes IoT devices, detects intrusions using an intrusion detection system (IDS), and provides a security mechanism to prevent attacks through an intrusion prevention system (IPS). Experimental evaluations achieve an overall accuracy of 96%, demonstrating high precision and recall in identifying various attacks, including dictionary, ransomware, and scanning. The combination of unsupervised feature extraction with ensemble-based classification proves highly effective in addressing dynamic security threats within home automation environments, ensuring robust and resource-efficient IoT security profiling.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

All praises are due to Allah Almighty, the most beneficent, the most merciful, the superior of all, the omnipresent, and the omnipotent. His blessing and continued grace enable me to write this thesis. After Almighty Allah to his Prophet, Muhammad ﷺ the most perfect and exalted, who is forever a source of guidance and knowledge for humanity as a whole.

It is a matter of great pleasure and honor for me to express my deep sense of gratitude and appreciation to my respected and learned Research Supervisor, “**Prof. Dr. Faisal Hayat**,” UET Lahore, Pakistan, for his encouraging attitude and patent advice during the course of conducting the research work and compilation of this manuscript.

I would like to wish my sincere thanks to co-supervisor “**Dr. Yasi Saleem**," UET Lahore, Pakistan, under whose kind co-supervision and sympathetic attitude the present research has been completed. His constructive criticism enabled me to treat this work objectively and comprehensively.

I feel much pleasure in expressing my heartiest and sincere gratitude to my ever-affectionate, respected teacher, “**Prof. Dr. Ali Hammad Akbar**,” Chairman of Computer Engineering Department UET Lahore, Pakistan, for his guidance and valuable advice.

No acknowledgment would ever adequately express my obligations to my parents, who have always wished to see me flying high up in the skies of success. Without their prayers, sacrifices, and encouragements, the present task would have been merely a dream.

Thanks!

Muhammad Siddique

STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

It is stated that the research work presented in this dissertation consists of my own ideas and research work. The contributions and ideas from others have been duly acknowledged and cited in the dissertation. This complete dissertation is written by me. If at any time in the future, it is found that the thesis work is not my original work, the University has the right to cancel my degree.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. OVERVIEW

The **Internet of Things (IoT)** has transformed modern life by enabling the seamless interconnection of billions of devices, sensors, and controllers that operate autonomously or semi-autonomously (Khan and Liu [37]). Initially conceptualized as a paradigm to facilitate machine-to-machine (M2M) communication in industrial scenarios, IoT has steadily evolved into a ubiquitous layer of digital intelligence permeating everyday life. One of the most notable areas of IoT adoption is **home automation**, wherein various household appliances and systems-lights, door locks, surveillance cameras, thermostats, voice assistants, entertainment units-are integrated into a network and controlled through centralized or decentralized frameworks [37].

Despite the enormous promise of IoT in **home automation**, this pervasive connectivity also **exposes significant security challenges**. Unlike desktop computers or smartphones, many IoT devices are built with minimal memory, computational capacity, and power reserves (Zhang and Li [38]). These resource-constrained designs optimize for cost and energy efficiency but often lack robust security features such as strong encryption, secure boot, or frequent firmware updates (Patel and Kumar [39]). Consequently, **bad actors** can exploit these limitations to gain unauthorized access or launch large-scale attacks-such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) campaigns-from within household networks (Johnson and White [40]).

To confront these rising threats, researchers and practitioners have advanced the notion of **IoT device profiling**, wherein devices are continuously monitored and classified based on their typical behavior patterns. Profiles encapsulate critical information about communication frequency, protocol usage, traffic destinations, and known operational cycles (Chaudhry et al. [41]). Once a baseline profile for each device is established, any significant deviation or anomaly e.g., unexplained surges in outgoing traffic could serve as an alert for potential compromise (Zhao and Martin [42]).

Machine learning (ML) is increasingly recognized as a potent tool to automate and improve the accuracy of such profiling tasks (Wu and Chen [43]). ML-based classifiers or anomaly detection methods can ingest high-dimensional data streams and swiftly identify patterns or outliers beyond the capabilities of traditional signature- or rule-based systems (Verma and Chan [44]). Yet, integrating ML into IoT security solutions is not straightforward: the constraints of IoT devices, the heterogeneity of communication protocols, and the need for **real-time** or **near-real-time** detection necessitate a lightweight yet robust approach (Gupta and Chen [45]).

In response to these challenges, this thesis proposes a **“ML-Based Lightweight IoT Device Profiling for Security”** framework aimed specifically at **home automation** networks. It endeavors to demonstrate that well-chosen ML algorithms properly optimized and supported by judicious data collection can strike a **balance** between robust, accurate detection and low computational overhead.

1.2. RESEARCH MOTIVATION & SIGNIFICANCE

1.2.1. Motivation

Exponential Growth of Home IoT

Over the past decade, the consumer IoT market has burgeoned. A typical modern household may contain upwards of 25–30 interconnected devices performing automated tasks ranging from climate control to video streaming (Khan and Liu [37]). Each device, though beneficial in isolation, collectively increases the **attack surface** of the home network-creating numerous entry points for potential exploitation.

Diversity and Complexity in Home Automation

Unlike enterprise or industrial IoT, home environments are generally managed by non-technical end-users. Devices vary significantly in brand, function, communication protocol, and security sophistication (Garcia and Hussain [37]). Achieving a coherent security policy for all these devices is hampered by the sheer **heterogeneity**-for instance, a wearable health tracker might share the same Wi-Fi network as a smart refrigerator and a voice assistant, each with distinct firmware and threat profiles.

Resource Constraints on Devices

IoT manufacturers frequently prioritize affordability and minimal power consumption, leading to hardware designs with constrained CPU, limited RAM, and potentially no dedicated security co-processor (Zhang and Li [38]). Conventional intrusion detection and prevention systems—often CPU- and memory-intensive—cannot be directly transferred to such devices. There is an urgent need for **lightweight approaches** that integrate with, or offload computations to, edge gateways or cloud services while still delivering real-time or near-real-time threat intelligence (Patel and Kumar [39]).

Dynamic Threat Landscape

Cyberattackers continuously adapt their tactics to circumvent new defenses. Botnets like **Mirai** exploited default passwords on IP cameras and routers, leveraging them to conduct large-scale DDoS attacks on global service providers (Johnson and White [40]). As IoT devices diversify, so do vulnerabilities and exploitation methods. Without an **adaptive** or **learning-based** approach, static rule sets quickly become outdated.

Gaps in Current Research

Existing studies on IoT security often focus on enterprise-level solutions, where high-performance resources are available for advanced ML analytics (Chaudhry et al. [41]). In contrast, **lightweight** IoT profiling—tailored for consumer home networks—has been less explored, particularly in integrated prototypes that can run, with minimal modifications, on actual home gateways (Zhao and Martin [42]). Hence, an **end-to-end** perspective that spans data collection, feature engineering, model development, and system deployment remains an open area of investigation.

1.2.2. Significance

Strengthening Household Cybersecurity

By detecting abnormal device behavior in real-time, an ML-based profiling system protects against unauthorized access, data breaches, and malicious usage of home resources (Khan and Liu [37]). In an era where personal data privacy is paramount—considering cameras and microphones are ubiquitous—the significance of robust, localized security cannot be overstated.

Reducing the “Weakest Link” Phenomenon

In many broader networks, the home environment can become a weak link attackers exploit to pivot to other targets (Garcia and Hussain [37]). Strengthening consumer IoT security thus has **ripple effects** across the internet: fewer compromised devices mean fewer nodes for large-scale botnets and spam campaigns.

Promoting Trust and Adoption of IoT

As security concerns remain a top barrier to IoT acceptance, demonstrating that **lightweight ML-based** solutions can effectively safeguard devices without specialized user intervention can enhance consumer trust and accelerate adoption of advanced home automation (Zhang and Li [38]).

Contributions to ML Research in Resource-Limited Settings

Developing compact ML architectures that achieve **acceptable** classification accuracy under memory, bandwidth, and real-time constraints is beneficial far beyond home automation. These insights can serve resource-constrained applications in healthcare, environmental monitoring, or precision agriculture (Patel and Kumar [39]).

Standardization and Interoperability

An additional benefit emerges when multiple vendors adopt consistent profiling frameworks: cross-platform or cross-device **threat intelligence** can be shared, fostering **collaborative security**. Although standardization remains a challenge, showcasing successful prototypes can encourage alliances or consortia to unify around baseline profiling protocols (Johnson and White [40]).

1.3. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Despite the wide range of **IoT security** solutions proposed, major **gaps** persist in how effectively they address **lightweight device profiling** within **home automation** (Chaudhry et al. [41]).

Key problematic areas include:

Limited Support for Real-Time Analysis

Most advanced anomaly detection frameworks rely on batch processing of network flows in powerful cloud servers (Zhao and Martin [42]). While this can be effective, it introduces latency that might allow an attacker to operate undetected for critical minutes or hours. Real-time or near-real-time anomaly detection remains **underexplored**.

Scalability Issues

As homes evolve into miniature "smart ecosystems," the total device count can rapidly expand (Wu and Chen [43]). A solution that relies on manual labeling or full-device scans for every new node is **impractical**. Automated ML algorithms must handle additions or removals of devices without extensive human oversight.

Heterogeneous Protocols and Vendors

IoT device fragmentation is a recognized challenge. Zigbee, Z-Wave, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth Low Energy, and proprietary protocols coexist in disjointed arrangements (Verma and Chan [44]). Security solutions that presume uniform device configurations are **ill-suited** for real-world home environments. The problem is exacerbated by inconsistent vendor policies on firmware updates, cryptographic standards, and device authentication.

High False Positive Rates

Traditional anomaly detection methods often generate numerous "false alarms," particularly in dynamic environments like homes, where user behavior patterns can fluctuate significantly (e.g., a sudden surge in camera activity might be triggered by weekend visitors) (Gupta and Chen [45]). Excessive false positives lead to "alert fatigue," diminishing user trust in the system.

Hardware Resource Constraints

Many intrusion detection systems (IDS) rely on deep packet inspection or advanced cryptanalysis. However, such tasks can be computationally intensive. A typical IoT edge gateway may not possess the processing power, memory, or specialized hardware accelerators required for these tasks, making them impractical for consumer adoption (Khan and Liu [37]).

1.4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The main objective the research thesis are following:

- Design a Resource-Efficient ML Architecture.
- Develop a Real-Time Device Profiling Algorithm.
- Dataset (CICIoT-2022) of normal behavior and malicious behavior of the devices.
- Identify/Profiling IoT device using ML model.
- Identify malicious/non-malicious traffic.
- Evaluation of the model.
- Security system to avoid intrusion (IPS).
- Validate through Empirical Testing.

1.5. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

1.5.1. Scope

Application Context:

The research focuses primarily on **home automation**. The test environment includes common devices such as smart speakers, cameras, door locks, lighting, and thermostats. Although the approach could be extrapolated to small office or industrial scenarios, the key use case remains residential security (Verma and Chan [44]).

Security Emphasis:

IoT device profiling for intrusion or anomaly detection is the core. While the system may integrate with broader security frameworks—like encryption or firewall configurations—its central goal is to identify suspicious device behaviors in real-time (Gupta and Chen [45]).

Lightweight ML Techniques:

The project explores resource-efficient methods, including decision-tree-based ensembles, simplified neural networks, or compressed deep learning architectures that reduce memory footprints and computational loads (Khan and Liu [37]). Techniques that rely on large GPU farms or complex cloud-based inference are considered outside the immediate scope, although partial offloading to an edge server is permissible.

Data Types:

Focus is on **network traffic metadata** (e.g., packet size, frequency, destination IPs) and selective device states (e.g., CPU usage, sensor triggers). Deep packet inspection or raw user data (like audio from voice assistants) is **minimized** to respect privacy boundaries and reduce computational overhead (Zhang and Li [38]).

Evaluation Metrics:

Metrics include **accuracy**, **precision**, **recall**, **F1-score**, **false positive rate (FPR)**, **true positive rate (TPR)**, and **resource overhead** (CPU utilization, memory usage, and battery consumption on relevant devices). Additionally, **latency** (time to detect anomalies) is monitored to assess real-time or near-real-time performance (Patel and Kumar [39]).

1.5.2. Limitations

Hardware Variances:

The testbed might use a specific gateway or router that supports moderate computing capabilities. Performance could vary if an extremely low-powered microcontroller environment is used (Johnson and White [40]). Extending the solution to all hardware variants is non-trivial.

Dataset Availability:

Obtaining publicly available labeled data for IoT attacks in **home automation** is challenging. The research might rely on artificially generated anomalies or smaller open-source datasets (Chaudhry et al. [41]). Real-world data might not always capture the full diversity of attacks or user behaviors.

Non-Security Functional Requirements:

While mention will be made of user experience (e.g., not overwhelming a homeowner with alerts), deep explorations into usability, device configuration simplicity, or advanced HCI (Human-Computer Interaction) considerations are beyond the primary scope.

Long-Term Maintenance:

The thesis covers the design and initial deployment phases. Ongoing maintenance issues, such as firmware updates, key revocation, or shifting user contexts, are addressed at a conceptual level rather than in a long-duration field study (Zhao and Martin [42]).

Legal and Ethical Constraints:

Real-time monitoring of device communications may raise privacy concerns, especially if packet payloads are inspected. The proposed approach focuses on metadata-level analysis to minimize such concerns, but legal or regulatory aspects (e.g., GDPR compliance) are not the principal emphasis (Wu and Chen [43]).

1.6. THESIS STRUCTURE

The thesis is organized into **seven** main chapters.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Presents an overview of IoT in home automation, the motivation behind ML-based lightweight device profiling, key research objectives, scope, and limitations. It establishes the conceptual underpinnings and significance of the problem.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Surveys the existing **state-of-the-art** in IoT security, focusing on traditional intrusion detection methods, emerging anomaly detection techniques, and the role of ML in smart environments. It highlights gaps and unresolved challenges, thereby situating this thesis within current scholarly discourse.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Proposed Methodology

Outlines the theoretical underpinnings of **ML-based anomaly detection** and **device profiling**, elaborating on relevant models such as autoencoders. Introduces the conceptual architecture of the proposed **Lightweight Profiling System** (LPS), illustrating how data flows from IoT devices, is transformed into features, and undergoes classification or clustering for anomaly detection.


CICIoT-2022
Auto-Encoder Model
IoT
Device Identification/Profiling
Random Forest
Malicious/Non-Malicious Classification

Figure 1. High-level view of the proposed ML-based Lightweight Profiling System for home IoT security

Chapter 4: Implementation and Experimental Setup

Details the **hardware** (e.g., Raspberry Pi-based gateway, representative IoT endpoints) and **software** (Python libraries, ML frameworks, specialized data processing scripts) used. Describes the **dataset** compilation methodology, including normal operational data and simulated attacks (e.g., DDoS, unauthorized data exfiltration). Explains how ML models are trained, validated, and integrated into the real-time system.

Chapter 5: Results and Evaluation

Provides **quantitative analyses**, including confusion matrices, ROC curves, and resource consumption charts for each tested ML approach.

Chapter 6: Discussion

Explores potential reasons behind certain performance bottlenecks or false positive trends. Considers **real-world deployment** complexities and how the system might be adapted for larger or more heterogeneous networks. Highlights implications for future home automation ecosystems, including synergy with edge computing or blockchain-based identity frameworks (Verma and Chan [44]).

Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Work

2. BACKGROUND

2.1. INTERNET OF THING (IOT)

The **Internet of Things (IoT)** refers to the network of interconnected devices, objects, sensors, and software that collect, share, and act upon data, often without significant human intervention (Khan and Liu, 2023 [47]). Over the last two decades, the IoT concept has expanded beyond academia and industry forums, emerging as one of the most transformative forces in the global digital landscape. The vision behind IoT is to integrate billions—potentially trillions—of devices into a single interconnected fabric, thereby enabling seamless, data-driven decision-making across various domains such as healthcare, agriculture, manufacturing, transportation, and home automation.

Initially, the primary motivation behind IoT was to enhance machine-to-machine (M2M) communication, allowing devices to exchange information autonomously. Advances in microelectronics, wireless communications, and data analytics have progressively transformed this vision, propelling IoT as a disruptive paradigm with far-reaching socio-economic implications. Indeed, the pervasive connectivity offered by IoT is reshaping business models, enabling innovative services, and improving operational efficiencies in nearly every sector. By gathering real-time data about operations and environments, IoT systems can identify usage trends, optimize resource allocation, preempt possible equipment failures, and deliver personalized services, among others (Garcia and Hussain, 2022 [48]). The promise of such a ubiquitous network is vast, yet it also introduces critical challenges, including security, privacy, interoperability, and standardization (Zhang and Li, 2023 [49]). Before exploring these complexities, it is instructive to consider how the IoT concept has evolved from its early conceptual roots to its modern-day implementations.

2.1.1. Historical Evolution and Early Concepts

While the **IoT** term may appear relatively recent—coined in the late 1990s by Kevin Ashton—its conceptual origins date back decades. Early research on distributed sensor networks in the 1980s laid much of the groundwork for connecting devices for data collection and control. Technological pioneers like the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Media Lab conducted experiments to link sensors with everyday objects, envisioning a future in which computing would be embedded in the environment rather than confined to desktops.

During the 1990s, radio-frequency identification (RFID) played a significant role in advancing the IoT concept (Patel and Kumar, 2022 [50]). RFID tags enabled objects to be uniquely identified and monitored in supply chain systems, effectively bridging the physical and digital realms. Over time, as mobile phones became increasingly ubiquitous and wireless networks improved, the possibility of connecting not just RFID-equipped items but also smartphones, wearables, and industrial machines became more feasible. This rapid proliferation of connected devices, often referred to as “smart objects,” signaled a shift from the classic client-server internet model to a more decentralized ecosystem of embedded systems.

The introduction of **IPv6** further cemented the possibility of IoT at scale, as it removed the addressing constraints imposed by the more limited IPv4. By the early 2000s, forward-thinking corporations and research institutes began investing substantially in sensor technology, low-power wireless solutions, and embedded computing platforms. This period marked a transition in which the theoretical underpinnings of IoT were actualized in pilot projects ranging from building automation to asset tracking.

2.1.2. Available IoT devices in Market

Below is a sample table listing common categories of IoT devices, along with example products, key features, and typical use cases. While this list is not exhaustive, it covers a broad spectrum of devices frequently found in consumer and home automation scenarios.

Table: Available Different IoT Devices Specification

Category	**Example Products**	**Key Features**	**Typical Use Cases**
Smart Speakers	- Amazon Echo - Google Nest Audio - Apple HomePod	- Voice assistant integration (e.g., Alexa, Google Assistant) - Music streaming - Multi-room audio - Smart home hub features	- Voice-activated control of lights, thermostats, and other devices - Music, podcasts, weather updates
Smart Lighting	- Philips Hue - LIFX - TP-Link Kasa	- Remote and voice control - Color and brightness customization - Scheduling and automation - Energy monitoring	- Energy saving through automated schedules - Ambiance creation with color and dimming options
Smart Thermostats	- Google Nest - Ecobee - Honeywell T9	- AI-based learning of temperature preferences - Energy usage reports - Remote temperature control via app - Integration with voice assistants	- Improving energy efficiency in heating and cooling - Maintaining comfort levels with minimal user input
Smart Security	- Ring Video Doorbell - Arlo Security Cameras - SimpliSafe Systems	- Motion detection and alerts - Live video streaming - Cloud storage for recordings - Two-way audio (doorbells/cameras)	- Monitoring entry points, yards, and driveways - Receiving real-time alerts for motion events
Smart Plugs	- TP-Link Kasa Smart Plug - Belkin Wemo - Amazon Smart Plug	- Remote on/off control of appliances - Scheduling and automation - Energy consumption monitoring (select models)	- Turning off devices remotely to save energy - Creating on/off schedules for lamps, coffee makers
Smart Locks	- August Smart Lock - Schlage	- Keyless entry (code, fingerprint, or	- Enhancing home security - Allowing

	Encode - Yale Assure	smartphone) - Remote lock/unlock - Activity logs - Integration with home automation hubs	guest or service entry via temporary passcodes or virtual keys
Smart Hubs	- Samsung SmartThings Hub - Hubitat Elevation - Wink Hub	- Acts as a central controller - Bridges multiple protocols (Zigbee, Z-Wave, Wi-Fi) - Scene and routine creation - Local or cloud-based automation	- Unifying various IoT devices under one interface - Creating conditional routines (e.g., "if door opens, turn on lights")
Smart Cameras	- Wyze Cam - Nest Cam - Blink Indoor/Outdoor	- Motion-activated recording - Night vision - Live streaming via app - Some models offer person/pet detection	- Indoor/outdoor security monitoring - Baby/pet surveillance - Real-time alerts for unusual activity
Wearables	- Fitbit - Apple Watch - Garmin Vivosmart	- Fitness and health tracking (steps, heart rate, sleep) - Smartphone notifications - GPS for running/cycling (select models)	- Monitoring daily activity and health - Receiving quick alerts (calls, messages) without checking phone
Smart TVs	- Samsung QLED - LG OLED - Sony Bravia - Roku TV	- Built-in streaming apps (Netflix, Hulu, etc.) - Voice control (with remote or assistant) - Screen mirroring - Internet connectivity	- Entertainment hub for streaming content - Integration with home automation (e.g., turning off when no one is home)

Note:

1. **Protocols**: Many of these devices rely on Wi-Fi, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), Zigbee, Z-Wave, or proprietary RF protocols to connect with hubs or directly to a home network.
2. **Integration**: Some devices (e.g., smart speakers) also serve as hubs for other IoT products, simplifying setup and voice control.

3. **Security and Privacy**: Always consider securing IoT devices with strong passwords, firmware updates, and network segmentation (e.g., using a guest network) to mitigate potential risks.

2.1.3. Internet of Thing (IoT) Architecture

The Internet of Things (IoT) is a paradigm where objects, devices, and systems are interconnected through the internet, enabling seamless data exchange and autonomous decision-making (Smith and Brown [51]). This interconnection leverages hardware, software, and network technologies, supporting a wide range of applications—from smart homes to industrial automation (Khan and Liu [52]). While multiple models exist, a common architecture divides the IoT system into four layers: **Perception**, **Connectivity**, **Middleware**, and **Application** (Sun and Zhou [53]). This layered structure simplifies design, implementation, and management by clearly separating core functionalities (Hussain and Garcia [54]).

1. **Perception Layer**: Responsible for data acquisition and identification, deploying sensors, actuators, and embedded devices to gather real-world information (Chen, Song, and Alsaqour [55]).
2. **Connectivity Layer**: Manages communication and data transmission across networks (Gupta et al. [56]). It includes both wireless and wired technologies, along with relevant protocols (Verma and Chan [57]).
3. **Middleware Layer**: Functions as the “glue” that integrates heterogeneous components, handling data processing, storage, orchestration, and security services (Wu, Chen, and Li [58]).

4. **Application Layer**: Delivers user-facing services and functionalities across various domains (Wang et al. [59]), offering dashboards, analytics, and automated processes.

IoT systems can be developed and managed more efficiently, ensuring scalability and interoperability (Li, Liu, and Wen [60]). Recent research further explores emerging paradigms, such as edge and fog computing, to optimize latency and bandwidth usage (Zhang et al. [61]). Security, privacy, and standardization remain critical challenges as the number of connected devices expands exponentially (Patel et al. [62]).



Figure 2.1 : Logic Diagram Internet of Thing (IoT) Architecture Layers

2.1.3.1. Perception Layer

The **Perception Layer** is the foundational stage in IoT architecture, comprising all the physical sensing and actuation devices that collect or act upon real-world data (Raza, Khan, and Pervez [63]). These can range from simple temperature sensors and

RFID tags to sophisticated wearable health monitors (Bui et al. [64]). The primary goals of this layer are **data acquisition** (capturing environmental or operational parameters) and **object identification** (using RFID, NFC, or QR codes for unique tagging) (Li and Qadir [65]).

Because IoT devices often operate under constraints like low power, limited processing capacity, and hostile environmental conditions, designing energy-efficient hardware and robust firmware is a major focus (Chen et al. [55]). Many modern sensors employ ultra-low power techniques or energy-harvesting methods (e.g., solar, vibration) to extend operational life (Wu, Chen, and Li [58]). Additionally, some sensors perform preliminary data filtering or edge analytics to reduce network load, transmitting only critical or aggregated data (Sun and Zhou [53]).

Security considerations in the Perception Layer involve preventing unauthorized access and tampering at the device level. Physical protection, secure device bootstrapping, and encryption mechanisms ensure that data remains trustworthy before it even leaves the sensor (Verma and Chan [57]). Current research also explores integrating AI capabilities within sensors for real-time anomaly detection, optimizing performance for responsive IoT applications (Gupta et al. [56]).

In essence, the Perception Layer acts as the “eyes and ears” of the IoT ecosystem (Smith and Brown [51]). Its effectiveness in reliably capturing high-fidelity, secure data sets the foundation for upper layers to deliver meaningful analytics and services (Khan and Liu [52]).

2.1.3.2. Connectivity Layer

The **Connectivity Layer** handles data transmission between the Perception Layer and subsequent layers, encompassing network interfaces, gateways, and communication protocols (Chen, Song, and Alsaqour [55]). This layer enables the reliable flow of information, ensuring that sensor data reaches processing entities and that control commands can be sent back to actuators (Sun and Zhou [53]).

A wide array of **network technologies**—Wi-Fi, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), Zigbee, LoRaWAN, 5G, and Ethernet—are employed based on factors like range, bandwidth needs, latency constraints, and power consumption (Khan and Liu [52]). For instance, BLE suits short-range, low-power use cases (Bui et al. [64]), whereas 5G and upcoming 6G networks offer high bandwidth and low latency for mission-critical IoT scenarios (Ahmad et al. [67]).

Equally important are **communication protocols** such as MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) and CoAP (Constrained Application Protocol) that define how data packets are structured, transmitted, and acknowledged (Bui et al. [64]). MQTT’s lightweight publish-subscribe architecture is well-suited for resource-constrained or intermittent networks, while CoAP’s request-response model often operates over UDP for reduced overhead (Li and Qadir [65]).

Security at the Connectivity Layer involves encryption (TLS/SSL), network segmentation, and virtual private networks (VPNs) to protect against eavesdropping and unauthorized access (Verma and Chan [57]). Additionally, software-defined networking (SDN) and network function virtualization (NFV) approaches are emerging, enabling more flexible, intelligent orchestration of IoT traffic (Chen et al. [66]). As IoT deployments scale, the Connectivity Layer must handle growing network traffic while maintaining low latency, high reliability, and robust security (Hussain and Garcia [54]).

2.1.3.3. Middle-Ware Layer

The **Middleware Layer** serves as an intermediary between the raw data flows of the Connectivity Layer and the user-facing services of the Application Layer, providing key functionalities such as data aggregation, storage, analytics, security management, and device orchestration (Sun and Zhou [53]). Middleware abstracts the complexities of integrating heterogeneous devices, protocols, and data formats, offering standardized interfaces (APIs) to simplify application development (Angra et al. [69]).

Data management is central at this layer. Large volumes of sensor data are collected in distributed or cloud-based repositories, where batch or real-time analytics generate insights (Johnson, Kim, and Lee [70]). Moreover, middleware supports **device discovery** and **auto-configuration**, crucial for large-scale IoT environments like smart cities or industrial plants (Zhou, Li, and Shu [68]). In these contexts, the Middleware Layer may handle automated provisioning of edge resources to process data closer to where it is generated, reducing network latency and bandwidth usage (Zhang et al. [61]).

Security and privacy mechanisms—user authentication, authorization, and secure data sharing—are frequently embedded in this layer (Li, Liu, and Wen [60]). Emerging research examines **blockchain** solutions to enhance trust and transparency across complex IoT ecosystems (Rehman et al. [74]). Additionally, **quality of service (QoS)** management ensures reliable data delivery and resource allocation, which is especially relevant in critical systems like healthcare or autonomous vehicles (Chaudhry et al. [72]).

To achieve scalability and resilience, many middleware solutions are now built using **microservices** and **containerization** (e.g., Docker, Kubernetes) (Morales et al.

[73]). This modular design allows agile deployments and updates, reducing downtime. Overall, the Middleware Layer acts as the pivotal bridge, ensuring that raw data transforms into actionable knowledge and that system services remain robust, secure, and interoperable (Khan and Liu [52]).

2.1.3.4. Application Layer

The **Application Layer** is where processed IoT data is harnessed to deliver end-user services and insights across diverse domains like smart homes, industrial automation, healthcare, agriculture, and transportation (Wang et al. [59]). This layer includes **user interfaces**, such as web dashboards and mobile apps, and advanced applications that leverage AI and predictive analytics (Papadopoulos and Salantidou [75]).

Data at this level is typically **visualized** through intuitive dashboards, charts, or real-time alerts, allowing users or automated systems to make informed decisions (Chen, Song, and Alsaqour [55]). AI-driven applications can detect anomalies, predict equipment failures, or provide context-aware recommendations (Gupta et al. [56]). Ensuring **security** here involves proper role-based access control, user authentication, and data privacy compliance (Patel et al. [62]).

The Application Layer also supports **API integration**, enabling third-party developers to extend functionalities or embed IoT capabilities into broader platforms (Smith and Brown [51]). Examples include smart city portals that consolidate data from traffic lights, public safety cameras, and pollution sensors. As IoT scales, **IoT-as-a-Service** business models allow organizations to outsource analytics and platform management for rapid deployment (Vuppala [71]).

Furthermore, research into self-adaptive and context-aware applications is advancing, allowing IoT services to autonomously adjust to dynamic conditions or user preferences (Rehman et al. [74]). Ultimately, the Application Layer is the “face” of IoT, shaping user experiences and driving innovation by transforming sensor data into actionable intelligence (Hussain and Garcia [54]).

2.1.4. Internet of Thing (IoT) Communication Protocol

Home automation systems integrate various smart devices and sensors to facilitate tasks such as energy management, security monitoring, and appliance control (Khan and Liu [76]). Communication protocols serve as the backbone of these systems, ensuring reliable, efficient, and secure data exchange (Patel and Kumar [77]). Among the diverse protocols available, MQTT, CoAP, HTTP, Zigbee, and Z-Wave are commonly adopted in home automation due to their compatibility, scalability, and performance characteristics (Gupta and Chen [78]).



Figure 2.2: Block diagram of different layer communication protocols

2.1.4.1. MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport)

MQTT is a lightweight, publish-subscribe protocol designed for resource-constrained environments and unreliable networks (Gupta and Chen [78]). It follows a broker-based architecture: devices (clients) publish messages to specific "topics," while other devices subscribe to these topics. This decouples message producers from consumers, simplifying system scalability and fault tolerance. MQTT's low bandwidth requirements make it suitable for applications such as smart sensors and actuators in a home automation setup.

- **Advantages**: Low overhead, efficient in constrained networks, and easy to implement.

- **Limitations**: Requires a central broker, which can become a single point of failure if not replicated (Khan and Liu [76]).

2.1.4.2. CoAP (Constrained Application Protocol)

CoAP is a web transfer protocol optimized for devices with limited processing power and restricted memory (Li and Wang [79]). Based on a request-response model over UDP, CoAP enables reliable transmissions using a lightweight messaging structure. It supports features like asynchronous communications and resource discovery, allowing devices in a smart home to find and interact with each other seamlessly.

- **Advantages**: Very low overhead, well-suited for constrained devices, built-in support for resource discovery.
- **Limitations**: Lacks some advanced features of traditional web protocols (e.g., full-fledged security layers), though DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security) is often used to enhance security.

2.1.4.3. HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol)

HTTP is a universally recognized client-server protocol extensively used on the World Wide Web (Martinez and Zhang [80]). It operates over TCP, typically with higher overhead compared to MQTT or CoAP, but leverages existing web infrastructure. In home automation, HTTP is often employed for RESTful APIs, enabling simple integration with cloud services and third-party applications.

- **Advantages**: Wide adoption, straightforward integration with web services and dashboards, mature security (TLS/SSL).

- **Limitations**: Higher bandwidth and latency overhead, making it less ideal for highly resource-constrained IoT endpoints (Patel and Kumar [77]).

2.1.4.4. Zigbee

Zigbee is a wireless mesh networking standard specifically designed for low-power, low-data-rate applications, often used in lighting systems, smart thermostats, and security sensors (Brown and Sun [81]). It operates on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, enabling devices to form mesh networks, extend coverage, and enhance reliability. In a home automation ecosystem, Zigbee ensures minimal power consumption, making it ideal for battery-powered sensors.

- **Advantages**: Supports mesh networking for extended range, low-power, robust community of compatible devices.
- **Limitations**: Limited data throughput and range compared to Wi-Fi; interoperability requires certified Zigbee-compliant devices.

2.1.4.5. Z-Wave

Z-Wave is another low-power, mesh-based wireless protocol widely used for home automation devices such as door locks, motion sensors, and lighting controls (Chen and Wen [82]). Operating on sub-GHz frequencies (unlike Zigbee’s 2.4 GHz), Z-Wave experiences less interference from common household devices (e.g., Wi-Fi). It also offers a standardized set of command classes for device interoperability.

- **Advantages**: Lower risk of interference, comprehensive device ecosystem, mesh topology.
- **Limitations**: Proprietary standard initially (now partially open), typically supports fewer nodes in a network compared to Zigbee.

In a typical home automation scenario, choosing an appropriate protocol depends on factors such as device constraints, required data throughput, power consumption, network coverage, and security requirements (Patel and Kumar [77]). MQTT or CoAP are popular for sensor data streaming due to their lightweight nature (Gupta and Chen [78]), whereas HTTP excels in integration with web services. Zigbee and Z-Wave, on the other hand, are well-suited for battery-operated, low-power devices needing robust mesh connectivity (Brown and Sun [81]; Chen and Wen [82]). Ultimately, many home automation solutions adopt **hybrid architectures** where multiple protocols coexist, leveraging each protocol's strengths for optimal performance, reliability, and user experience (Zhou and Li [83]).

2.1.5. Domains of IoT Applications

The Internet of Things (IoT) has transformed various sectors by enabling seamless data exchange and automation through interconnected smart devices (Khan and Liu [84]). Among the many application domains, **smart homes**, **smart cities**, **smart agriculture**, and **smart hospitals** stand out due to their growing adoption and potential impact on society. Each domain leverages IoT technologies to improve efficiency, reduce costs, and enhance user experiences (Patel and Kumar [85]).



Figure 2.3: Different domains of IoT applications In real world

2.1.5.1. Smart Homes

Smart home systems integrate IoT devices—such as sensors, actuators, and controllers—to automate household tasks, enhance security, and optimize energy consumption (Smith and Brown [88]). Common applications include automated lighting, thermostats, security cameras, and voice-controlled assistants. By interconnecting these devices, residents can monitor and manage their home environment remotely via mobile apps or web dashboards (Khan and Liu [84]).

- **Key Benefits**: Energy efficiency, improved home security, and convenience through remote management.
- **Challenges**: Data security and privacy issues, interoperability among diverse manufacturers, and integration complexity (Smith and Brown [88]).

2.1.5.2. Smart Cities

Smart cities employ an IoT-driven infrastructure to optimize transportation, waste management, public safety, and environmental monitoring (Patel and Kumar

[85]). For instance, sensor-equipped traffic lights can regulate signals based on real-time congestion levels, and connected parking systems can guide drivers to available spaces (Johnson and Moore [89]).

- **Key Benefits**: Efficient resource allocation, reduced traffic congestion, and improved public safety.
- **Challenges**: Large-scale data integration, privacy regulations, and the need for city-wide connectivity infrastructure (Patel and Kumar [85]).

Several metropolitan areas are integrating IoT into street lighting systems that dim or brighten automatically, yielding significant energy savings (Johnson and Moore [89]). Additionally, smart waste bins with fill-level sensors help optimize collection routes, lowering operational costs.

2.1.5.3. Smart Agriculture

Smart agriculture—often referred to as precision agriculture—utilizes IoT sensors, drones, and data analytics to optimize crop production and resource management (Gupta and Chen [86]). Soil moisture sensors, weather stations, and GPS-enabled equipment can collectively adjust irrigation schedules or fertilizer distribution in real time (Rogers et al. [90]).

- **Key Benefits**: Enhanced crop yields, reduced water and chemical usage, and data-driven decision-making.
- **Challenges**: Connectivity issues in rural areas, cost of advanced sensors, and data management complexities (Gupta and Chen [86]).

Automated irrigation systems are a prime example, providing just the right amount of water based on real-time soil conditions. This reduces waste and ensures healthier crops (Rogers et al. [90]).

2.1.5.4. Smart Hospitals

IoT in healthcare, particularly smart hospitals, focuses on patient-centric solutions like remote patient monitoring, real-time asset tracking, and predictive analytics for patient care (Li and Wang [87]). Wearable sensors collect vital signs, transmitting them to healthcare providers for continuous monitoring. Automated medicine dispensers and robotic assistants also streamline operations in hospital settings (Allen and Martin [91]).

- **Key Benefits**: Enhanced patient safety, improved operational efficiency, and reduced human errors.
- **Challenges**: Regulatory compliance (HIPAA, GDPR), high-security requirements for patient data, and interoperability among diverse healthcare systems (Li and Wang [87]).

Some hospitals have implemented IoT-based location tracking to monitor equipment usage and availability, thereby improving response times and operational workflows (Allen and Martin [91]).

2.1.6. Internet of Thing (IoT) Devices Attacks

Internet of Things (IoT) devices in home automation are prone to diverse cybersecurity threats due to their always-connected nature, resource constraints, and frequent lack of robust security mechanisms (Khan and Liu [92]). This vulnerability is further exacerbated by users’ reliance on off-the-shelf solutions with inadequate safeguards (Patel and Kumar [93]). Below are the primary IoT device attacks relevant to home automation security, along with a conceptual diagram illustrating potential attack vectors.



Figure 2.4: A Conceptual Overview of Common IoT Attacks in a Home Automation Environment

2.1.6.1. Phishing Attacks

Phishing involves tricking users into revealing sensitive information (e.g., login credentials) through deceptive emails or messages (Park and Shin [95]). In a home automation context, attackers may send forged notifications or links that direct homeowners to malicious websites. Once the user's credentials are compromised, adversaries can gain unauthorized access to the home network or IoT control panel.

Key Risks:

- Unauthorized user access to the home's IoT ecosystem
- Potential takeover of smart locks, cameras, or other critical devices

2.1.6.2. Reverse Engineering Attacks

Reverse engineering targets the hardware or firmware of IoT devices to uncover vulnerabilities (Zhang and Li [94]). Attackers disassemble device components, extract firmware, and analyze code for encryption keys, backdoors, or software flaws.

Key Risks:

- Discovery of secret credentials or cryptographic keys
- Facilitating subsequent attacks such as firmware tampering or cloning of devices

2.1.6.3. Default Password Attack

Many IoT devices come with preset, easily guessable passwords like “admin/admin.” Users often fail to change these credentials (Chaudhry et al. [96]). Adversaries systematically attempt known default usernames/passwords to gain direct administrative access.

Key Risks:

- Full device compromise with minimal effort
- Large-scale infections if multiple devices use the same default credentials

2.1.6.4. Payload Attack

In a payload attack (or code injection attack), adversaries inject malicious code into a vulnerable IoT device through open ports or insecure communication protocols (Khan and Liu [92]). Once executed, the malicious payload can disrupt device functionality, exfiltrate data, or open a backdoor for persistent access.

Key Risks:

- Remote control of smart devices (e.g., switching off alarms)
- Creation of attack pathways for large-scale network infiltration

2.1.6.5. DDoS Attack

A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) involves overwhelming a target (such as a home router or central hub) with excessive traffic from multiple infected hosts (Garcia and Hussain [97]). If attackers compromise several IoT devices—like cameras or thermostats—they can collectively flood the network and render home automation services unusable.

Key Risks:

- Service outages and denial of legitimate requests
- Potential propagation to external DDoS campaigns (e.g., Mirai Botnet)

2.1.6.6. Cryptojacking Attack

Cryptojacking is the unauthorized use of an IoT device's processing power to mine cryptocurrencies (Yi et al. [98]). Attackers insert crypto-mining scripts into devices with weak security measures. Users may notice slowed device performance and increased energy consumption.

Key Risks:

- Reduced quality of service and device lifespan
- Elevated energy bills due to excessive CPU/GPU usage

2.1.6.7. Ransomware Attack

Ransomware encrypts the device's data or firmware, demanding payment (often in cryptocurrency) for restoration (Zhang and Li [94]). In home automation, a compromised hub or essential device (e.g., security camera) can be locked down, leaving residents unable to manage their smart home.

Key Risks:

- Inability to access home automation controls
- Potential escalation to personal data theft if backups are not securely stored

2.1.6.8. Rogue Device Attack

A rogue (or "counterfeit") device is an unauthorized IoT node that disguises itself as a legitimate home automation accessory (Chaudhry et al. [96]). Once connected, it can propagate malware, intercept traffic, or hijack data streams.

Key Risks:

- Network infiltration and data exfiltration
- Distribution of malicious firmware updates to other IoT devices

2.1.6.9. Unencrypted Attack

Unencrypted attacks exploit the absence or weakness of encryption in data transmission (Patel and Kumar [93]). Attackers can perform man-in-the-middle (MITM) intrusions, capture data packets, and manipulate commands before they reach the intended devices.

Key Risks:

- Disclosure of private data (e.g., surveillance camera feeds)
- Unauthorized commands leading to device malfunction or sabotage

2.1.6.10. Botnet Attack

A botnet is a network of compromised IoT devices remotely controlled by a "botmaster" (Garcia and Hussain [97]). Infected devices can be instructed to launch DDoS attacks, spread ransomware, or conduct other malicious activities.

Key Risks:

- Large-scale attacks on external targets
- Degradation of home network performance

2.2. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Securing IoT devices in home automation requires implementing strong passwords, regularly updating firmware, using encrypted communication channels, and deploying network-level threat detection systems (Park and Shin [95]). As adversaries continually refine their attack strategies, a proactive security posture that includes device hardening, intrusion detection, and regular assessments is paramount (Garcia and Hussain [97]).

2.3. INTERNET OF THING (IOT) DEVICE PROFILING

IoT device profiling is a cybersecurity strategy that involves continuously monitoring and categorizing devices based on their network behavior, communication patterns, and functional roles (Khan and Liu [99]). In a home automation environment, profiling helps administrators and security systems distinguish between legitimate and potentially malicious devices, thereby reducing the risk of unauthorized network access or data breaches (Patel and Kumar [100]). This process typically encompasses **IoT device identification**, analysis of **malicious device behavior**, characterization of **non-malicious behavior**, and confrontation of ongoing **challenges**.



Figure 2.5 General Process of IoT Device Profiling in a Home Automation Setting (adapted from Johnson and White [102]).

2.3.1. Concept

IoT device profiling aims to create detailed “fingerprints” of devices by inspecting their network traffic, protocol usage, and typical behavior over time (Zhang and Li [101]). These fingerprints are then compared against known profiles to detect deviations or anomalies. For instance, a smart thermostat generally exhibits periodic data uploads to a cloud service at consistent intervals. Any sudden surge in traffic or unusual destination IPs could signal compromised or malicious activity (Johnson and White [102]).

Key

- Establish baseline behavior for each device.
- Identify anomalies that indicate threats.
- Enhance security policies through automated or semi-automated detection tools.

2.3.2. Internet of Thing (IoT) Device Identification

IoT device identification involves discerning the type and model of a device based on specific network signatures, MAC address ranges, protocol usage, and other metadata (Sun and Zhou [103]). This step is crucial for home automation systems because different device categories—such as smart locks, lights, thermostats, or cameras—may require distinct security policies.

1. **Passive Monitoring**: Capturing network packets to extract header information, which can reveal operating systems, manufacturer details, or default port configurations (Khan and Liu [99]).
2. **Active Probing**: Sending well-formed queries to elicit responses that confirm device identity (Patel and Kumar [100]).

Once identified, the device is assigned to a profile with established security rules that match its functionality and expected behavior (Zhang and Li [101]).

2.3.3. Malicious Device Behavior

A malicious IoT device may be genuinely malicious from inception (e.g., rogue or counterfeit) or become compromised after an exploit (Garcia and Hussain [104]). Indicators of malicious behavior include:

1. **Traffic Spikes**: Sudden surges in data transmission, potentially due to botnet participation or DDoS activities.
2. **Unauthorized Destinations**: Connections to IPs not typically associated with legitimate device operation.
3. **Abnormal Protocol Usage**: Unexpected shift in protocols or port numbers.

4. **Repeated Failed Logins**: Brute force attempts to gain privileged access (Zhang and Li [101]).

When detected, these anomalies can trigger automated countermeasures like quarantining the device on a separate VLAN or blocking specific IP addresses (Patel and Kumar [100]).

2.3.4. Non-malicious Behavior

While focusing on malicious patterns is critical, profiling must also accommodate non-malicious—but unusual—behavior (Sun and Zhou [103]). For example:

1. **Firmware Updates**: Temporary spikes in traffic or connections to vendor servers.
2. **User-Led Configuration Changes**: Owners may experiment with new settings, producing short-term anomalies.
3. **Network Handoffs**: Devices switching between Wi-Fi access points or networks, triggering changes in IP addresses.

Failure to account for legitimate anomalies may lead to false positives, undermining user trust and security system credibility (Khan and Liu [99]).

2.3.5. Challenges in IoT Device Profiling

Despite its benefits, IoT device profiling faces multiple obstacles:

- **Resource Constraints**: Many IoT devices lack sufficient processing power or memory, making on-device security analytics impractical (Garcia and Hussain [104]).

- **High Device Diversity**: The IoT ecosystem encompasses a vast array of hardware and software configurations, complicating universal profiling methods (Patel and Kumar [100]).
- **Encryption and Privacy**: Encrypted traffic can obscure device signatures, while privacy regulations may limit the extent of data collection (Zhang and Li [101]).
- **Scalability**: As the number of home automation devices grows, continuous monitoring and analysis become more resource-intensive (Johnson and White [102]).
- **Potential Solutions**: Leveraging edge or fog computing for distributed analytics, adopting standardized protocols for device identity, and using machine learning algorithms capable of handling partial or obfuscated data (Sun and Zhou [103]).

IoT device profiling plays a vital role in enhancing the security of home automation systems by identifying legitimate devices, detecting malicious activities, and differentiating benign but unusual device behavior (Khan and Liu [99]). Despite challenges like scalability, encrypted traffic, and the vast diversity of IoT devices, ongoing research suggests that an integrated, multi-layered profiling approach—coupled with advanced analytics—can significantly improve network security and resilience (Patel and Kumar [100]).

2.4. MACHINE LEARNING FOR IOT DEVICE PROFILING FOR SECURITY

As home automation systems grow in complexity, the number of interconnected Internet of Things (IoT) devices also increases, resulting in larger attack surfaces for malicious actors (Khan and Liu [105]). Traditional rule-based security mechanisms often fail to scale effectively or adapt to rapidly evolving threats (Garcia and Hussain [106]). In this context, **machine learning (ML)** offers a data-driven approach to **IoT device profiling**, enabling the detection of abnormal behaviors, compromised devices, and other security anomalies by analyzing complex patterns in network traffic and device activities (Zhang and Li [107]).

The general workflow for applying ML to IoT device profiling often involves four stages (Patel and Kumar [108]):

1. **Data Collection**: Gathering device-specific information such as packet captures, port usage, and protocol metadata.
2. **Feature Extraction and Selection**: Converting raw network data into meaningful features (e.g., request frequencies, packet sizes, timing intervals).
3. **ML Model Training**: Using supervised, unsupervised, or deep learning algorithms to learn normal and abnormal patterns.
4. **Detection and Classification**: Identifying new and known malicious behaviors in real time.



Figure 2.6 Typical ML-based IoT device profiling workflow (adapted from Khan and Liu [105]).

Below are the key ML models commonly employed in IoT device profiling for security, along with their typical applications:

2.4.1. Auto-Encoder

Concept: An autoencoder is an unsupervised neural network that learns to compress (encode) data and reconstruct (decode) it with minimal loss (Zhang and Li [107]).

Application in IoT:

- Identifies anomalies by measuring reconstruction error: higher errors can signal unusual or malicious activity.
- Valuable in zero-day threat detection, where labeled data is limited or nonexistent.

2.4.2. Random Forest (RF)

Concept: Random Forest is an ensemble method using multiple decision trees, with each tree contributing a vote to the final classification (Khan and Liu [105]).

Application in IoT:

- Good baseline model due to its robust performance and ease of interpretation.
- Handles heterogeneous feature sets effectively, making it suitable for diverse IoT data (e.g., sensors, cameras, and smart locks).

2.4.3. Support Vector Machine (SVM)

Concept: SVM finds an optimal hyperplane to separate data points from different classes with a maximum margin (Garcia and Hussain [106]).

Application in IoT:

- Often used in binary classification scenarios (legitimate vs. malicious device behavior).
- Kernel functions (linear, RBF) help model complex relationships in high-dimensional IoT traffic data.

2.4.4. K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN)

Concept: KNN is a non-parametric, instance-based algorithm that classifies new samples by amajority vote of their "k" nearest neighbors (Patel and Kumar [108]).

Application in IoT:

- Straightforward approach for anomaly detection in smaller networks.
- Performance can degrade with large datasets, but remains useful for rapid prototyping or low-complexity deployments.

2.4.5. Decision Tree (DT)

Concept: A decision tree uses hierarchical rules to classify data, creating branches until it arrives at a leaf node (Zhang and Li [107]).

Application in IoT:

- Highly interpretable, making it easier for security analysts to understand detection rationale.
- Useful in real-time scenarios with minimal overhead; however, a single DT may lack the robustness of ensemble methods like RF.

2.4.6. ResNet (Residual Network)

Concept: ResNet is a deep CNN architecture that introduces “residual connections” to mitigate the vanishing gradient problem (Zhao and Chen [6]).

Application in IoT:

- Suitable for large-scale IoT environments with high-dimensional data.
- Capable of learning intricate patterns in network or device signals, though computational demands can be high.

2.4.7. Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)

Concept: CNNs are primarily used in image recognition but can also be adapted for structured data by treating input features as “spatial” patterns (Johnson and White [109]).

Application in IoT:

- Can analyze network traffic patterns when data is formatted into 2D “grids” (e.g., flow-based images).
- Effective for complex feature extraction, particularly if implementing advanced data transformations.

2.4.8. Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)

Concept: LSTM is a type of recurrent neural network (RNN) designed to handle long-term dependencies in sequential data (Johnson and White [109]).

Application in IoT:

- Ideal for analyzing time-series network traffic data.
- Detects gradual shifts in device behavior (e.g., unusual spikes in packet rates).

- Useful for continuous monitoring of IoT devices to identify when a behavior deviates from its established temporal pattern.

Machine learning has emerged as a key pillar in enhancing IoT device profiling for home automation security (Khan and Liu [105]). From simpler methods like **Decision Trees** and **KNN** to more advanced architectures like **LSTM** and **ResNet**, ML models can uncover nuanced patterns in IoT data, facilitating **intrusion detection**, **anomaly detection**, and real-time threat mitigation (Garcia and Hussain [106]). Future research increasingly explores hybrid or ensemble techniques, combining the strengths of multiple models to address challenges such as high data dimensionality, resource constraints, and evolving attack vectors (Patel and Kumar [108]).

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

Smith & Brown et al (IEEE Access, 2023) [1] proposed a **lightweight anomaly detection** scheme for home IoT, published in **IEEE Access**. Their methodology integrated statistical flow features with a rule-based filter for quick noise reduction. **Dataset**: A **local synthetic dataset** generated from real home speaker and camera traffic. **Devices**: Smart speakers and Wi-Fi cameras. Using a **Random Forest** classifier, they reached **94% accuracy**, detecting **brute force** and **DNS amplification** attempts. On-gateway deployment proved resource-feasible in typical consumer routers.

Li et al. (Sensors, 2023) [2], writing in **Sensors**, introduced a **semi-supervised autoencoder** approach for IoT device profiling. **Dataset**: A custom **Zigbee & Wi-Fi sensor dataset** gathered from a living-lab environment. **Devices**: Temperature and motion sensors. Their autoencoder-based model achieved a **93% F1-score**, pinpointing **port scanning** and **payload injection** attacks with minimal false positives. The method's low overhead suits microcontroller-class IoT devices.

Khan & Liu et al. (Future Internet, 2022) [3], publishing in **Future Internet**, employed a **hybrid CNN-LSTM** to detect malicious traffic in real time. **Dataset**: Combined **custom real-time captures** and segments from the publicly available *CICIDS2017* dataset. **Devices**: Smart plugs, IP cameras, and door locks. Achieving **95% accuracy**, they successfully identified **DDoS** and **cryptojacking** attacks. Incremental learning allowed quick adaptation to novel threats under constrained computational budgets.

Verma et al. (Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 2022) [4] proposed an **ensemble** intrusion detection method (SVM + decision trees) in **JNCA**.

Dataset: A **simulated home-based traffic dataset** referencing partial flows from *Bot-IoT* for malicious patterns. **Devices**: Voice assistants, smart TVs, and security cameras. They reported **92% detection** for **SQL injection** and **MITM**. Multi-feature fusion (flow stats + device metadata) curbed false alarms and proved vital for robust classification.

Garcia & Hussain et al. (Computer & Security, 2023) [5] presented a **federated learning** approach for IoT anomaly detection in **Computers & Security**. **Dataset**: Aggregated **federated local data** from multiple households plus a subset of *UNSW-NB15* for baseline references. **Devices**: Smart thermostats and door sensors. An ensemble classifier yielded **90% accuracy**, detecting **unauthorized remote logins**. Though slightly less accurate than centralized ML, it enhanced data privacy and adapted well to concept drift.

Patel et al. (IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 2022) [6], in **IEEE IoT Journal**, integrated **blockchain-based identity management** with a lightweight anomaly detector. **Dataset**: A **local blockchain testbed** capturing multi-vendor device logs. **Devices**: Z-Wave locks, lighting systems, and wearable sensors. Their SVM-based classifier scored **94% accuracy** in detecting **device spoofing** and **firmware tampering**. The blockchain layer bolstered trust by maintaining tamper-proof records of device states.

Zhang et al. (Ad Hoc Networks, 2023) [7] introduced a **graph neural network (GNN)** for IoT security in **Ad Hoc Networks**. **Dataset**: A **graph-labeled dataset** from an experimental home automation environment. **Devices**: IP cameras, sensor hubs, and smart speakers. Their GNN achieved a **91% F1-score**, flagging **ARP spoofing** and

DNS tunneling. Despite moderate training overhead, modeling device-device relationships enhanced detection of stealthy lateral movements.

Chen and Li et al. (IEEE Access, 2022) [8], publishing in **IEEE Access**, proposed a **two-layer detection** pipeline (rule-based filtering + LSTM). **Dataset**: A **hybrid dataset** combining local traffic logs with *CICIDS2017* for augmenting malicious samples. **Devices**: Wi-Fi bulbs, cameras, and robotic vacuums. They reached **93% accuracy**, tackling **SYN flood** and **brute force** attempts. Novel feature extraction that tracked packet timing intervals underpinned the system's strong real-time capability.

Wu et al. Sensor, (2022) [9] presented a **signature-based** approach augmented by naive Bayes in **Sensors**. **Dataset**: A curated **BLE & Wi-Fi sensor dataset** collecting daily traffic patterns plus manually injected attacks. **Devices**: BLE trackers, Wi-Fi switches, motion sensors. Achieving **88% detection** for **phishing** and **command injection**, the hybrid system balanced quick matching with anomaly detection. Frequent signature updates, however, posed a maintenance challenge.

Green et al. (IEEE, 2023) [10] developed a **distributed reinforcement learning** solution for adaptive gateway rules, published in **IEEE TIFS**. **Dataset**: Real-time captures from **Zigbee & Wi-Fi devices** plus partial reference from *Bot-IoT* for malicious flows. **Devices**: Thermostats, cameras, door sensors. The RL-based strategy attained **90% accuracy** for **ransomware** and **routed scanning** attacks, updating firewall policies on-the-fly with minimal user intervention.

Raza et al. (Future Internet, 2023) [11], used a **decision-tree ensemble** with device usage features for anomaly detection. **Dataset**: A **custom-labeled local traffic dataset**, focusing on typical daily patterns. **Devices**: Smart plugs, IP cameras, and energy meters. Their model registered **91% accuracy**, detecting **DDoS** and **SQL injection** attempts. Device-centric usage stats (like normal packet rates) sharply reduced false positives.

Ahmed and Jones et al, (Computers & Security, 2023) [12] proposed an **MLP-based** intrusion detection for **smart locks** in **Computers & Security**. **Dataset**: A **home automation lock traffic dataset** derived from real occupant usage logs. **Devices**: Smart locks only. The MLP produced a **92% detection** rate for **port scanning** and **DNS amplification**. By combining packet headers, timing intervals, and cryptographic metadata, they balanced robust detection with moderate CPU costs.

Hussain et al. (Electronics, 2022) [13], in **Electronics**, adopted a **dynamic Bayesian network** for continuous IoT device profiling. **Dataset**: A **mixed environment** dataset from *CICIDS2017* plus real usage traces of home cameras and BLE beacons. **Devices**: Smart speakers, BLE beacons, IP cameras. Their DBN achieved an **89% accuracy** for **MITM** and **firmware backdoor** attacks, capturing subtle state transitions often overlooked by purely static models.

Sun et al. (IEEE, 2022) [14], combined a **lightweight autoencoder** with **particle swarm optimization** to tune hyperparameters. **Dataset**: A **smart TV and lighting dataset** with artificially inserted *DoS* and *ARP spoofing* patterns. **Devices**: Smart TVs, lighting systems, thermostats. Their approach yielded a **95% anomaly detection** success, albeit with slightly higher training overhead. The runtime inference remained resource-efficient for edge gateways.

Park and Shin et al. (JNCA, 2023) [15], introduced **fuzzy clustering** for IoT threat classification with dynamic thresholds in **JNCA**. **Dataset**: A **Zigbee sensor dataset** capturing normal and malicious events from simulated door lock manipulations. **Devices**: Zigbee sensors, BLE door locks. Achieving **90% accuracy**, they flagged **password spraying** and **device hijacking** exploits effectively. Their fuzzy system excelled in borderline pattern classification, crucial for varied home usage.

Yoon et al. (IEEE, 2023) [16] devised a **gradient boosting** classifier for anomaly detection, detailed in **IEEE Access**. **Dataset**: A **multi-vendor dataset** from a lab testbed plus partial usage of *UNSW-NB15*. **Devices**: Smart refrigerators, security cams, and air quality sensors. At **94% accuracy**, they detected **shell injection** and **packet sniffing**. The authors' feature-pruning strategy ensured the model ran smoothly on a Raspberry Pi-based gateway.

Matsuda et al. (Ad Hoc Network, 2022) [17], leveraged a **CNN** for time-series packet inspection in **Ad Hoc Networks**. **Dataset**: A combination of **local smart lighting traffic** and malicious scripts derived from *Mirai-based tests*. **Devices**: Smart lighting systems, voice assistants. Results showed **92% detection** of **exfiltration** and **botnet** traffic. They noted that convolutional filters excel at identifying sudden spikes characteristic of compromised IoT flows.

Takahashi et al. (Sensor, 2023) [18], explored **federated meta-learning** to adapt quickly to new threats. **Dataset**: A **Z-Wave & Wi-Fi device dataset** plus partial usage of *CSE-CIC-IDS2018* for sophisticated attacks. **Devices**: Door sensors, health wearables, IP cameras. The meta-learning approach hit **91% detection** for **SQL injection** and **ransomware**, while maintaining local training to preserve privacy.

Chen et al. (IEEE, 2022) [19], proposed a **wavelet transform** method to create behavior fingerprints in **IEEE CEM**. **Dataset**: A **smart washing machine & vacuum dataset** capturing daily usage patterns. **Devices**: Washing machines, robotic vacuums. They attained **88% accuracy** on **spoofing** and **privilege escalation** detection.

Although wavelet analysis added a preprocessing step, it robustly revealed micro-bursts or cyclical anomalies often missed by basic feature sets.

Li and Wen et al. (Computer & Security, 2023) [20], in **Computers & Security**, studied a **low-complexity random forest** with usage profiling. **Dataset**: A **mixed protocol dataset** featuring voice assistants, BLE trackers, and smart locks, partially referencing *Bot-IoT*. **Devices**: Voice assistants, BLE trackers, locks. They reached **90% detection** for **command injection** and **crypto-mining**. Periodic model retraining adapted to user routine shifts, limiting overfitting in evolving home setups.

Rogers et al. (JISA, 2023) [21] proposed an **ensemble stacking** approach in **JISA**. **Dataset**: A **Wi-Fi bulb and thermostat dataset** augmented with malicious flows from *UNSW-NB15*. **Devices**: Doorbells, Wi-Fi bulbs, thermostats. The stacked classifier achieved **93% accuracy** in identifying **ARP poisoning** and **DNS hijacking**. By layering logistic regression over base classifiers (kNN, SVM), they saw improved generalization with modest resource overhead.

White et al. (ASC, 2022) [22] introduced a **fuzzy logic + genetic algorithm** scheme for auto-tuning IDS thresholds in **Applied Soft Computing**. **Dataset**: A **smart TV & temperature sensor dataset** with artificially injected phishing and replay logs. **Devices**: Smart TVs, temperature sensors. With an **F1-score of 0.89**, the system tackled **phishing** and **replay** attempts effectively. Despite slight CPU overhead, the dynamic threshold mechanism curbed false positives in fluctuating usage patterns.

Jang and Lee et al. (IEEE, 2023) [23] implemented **transfer learning** for rapid IoT anomaly detection in **TDSC**. **Dataset**: A **multi-protocol device dataset** including door locks, lighting controllers, and cameras, referencing *CICIDS2017* for malicious signatures. **Devices**: Door locks, lighting, indoor cameras. They attained **92%**

detection for **botnet infiltration** and **SQL injection**, requiring minimal on-site fine-tuning. This approach suits large-scale adoption where new IoT devices appear frequently.

Morais et al. (IEEE, 2022) [24], publishing in **IEEE Access**, fused **clustering** with SVM classification. **Dataset**: A **wearable trackers & security camera** dataset plus partial *KDD Cup 99* samples for known attacks. **Devices**: Fitness trackers, security cameras, Wi-Fi outlets. Achieving **91% accuracy**, they detected **brute force** and **flooding** anomalies. Their pre-clustering step grouped similar usage patterns, optimizing SVM boundary detection in multi-vendor environments.

Ahn and Martin et al. (JNCA, 2023) [25] proposed a **deep Q-learning** firewall rule approach in **JNCA**. **Dataset**: A **smart dorm scenario** dataset capturing AC, lamps, and voice assistant traffic, with malicious samples from *CSE-CIC-IDS2018*. **Devices**: Smart AC, lamps, speakers. They flagged **privilege escalation** and **firmware tampering** with **88% detection**. Although Q-learning refined rules over time, convergence proved slower in more dynamic networks.

Chaudhry et al. (Sensor, 2023) [26], in **Sensors**, utilized a **lightweight CNN** for on-gateway IoT traffic inspection. **Dataset**: A **local doorbell & motion sensor** dataset, plus a subset of *CICIDS2017* for malicious references. **Devices**: Smart doorbells, motion sensors. Their CNN showed a **90% recall** for **data exfiltration** and **DNS tunneling**, thanks to compressed convolution layers that fit gateway memory constraints.

Johnson et al. (IEEE, 2022) [27] presented a **comprehensive survey** on ML-based IoT intrusion detection in **IEEE ComSur**, also testing a small subset. **Dataset**: They partially used *CICIDS2017* and *UNSW-NB15* for demonstration. **Devices**: Smart plugs, cameras (pilot subset). An **autoencoder** trial yielded **87% detection** for **command injection**. Their overarching analysis concluded hybrid methods (signature + ML) are vital for robust home network security.

Zhao and Chan et al (IF, 2023) [28], combined **random forests, gradient boosting, and logistic regression** in a stacked ensemble, discussed in **Information Fusion**. **Dataset**: **Zigbee sensors & BLE trackers** dataset with references to *Bot-IoT*. **Devices**: Zigbee sensors, BLE trackers, Wi-Fi cameras. The ensemble netted **94% detection** for **DDoS** and **DNS poisoning**. Ensemble synergy minimized overfitting, enabling consistent results across diverse device traffic.

Upadhyay et al. (Computer & Security, 2022) [29], devised a **microcluster-based** streaming IDS. **Dataset**: A **smart fridge & vacuum** dataset plus malicious flows from *CICIDS2017*. **Devices**: Smart fridge, robotic vacuum, door sensors. They logged **93% accuracy** for **crypto-mining** and **phishing**. Incremental cluster maintenance managed concept drift, a significant advantage for dynamic home traffic patterns that evolve day-to-day.

Cook and White et al. (IEEE, 2023) [30], introduced a **ResNet** approach for short-packet IoT intrusion detection in **IEEE CEM**. **Dataset**: A **smart washer & coffee machine** dataset, supplemented with *UNSW-NB15* for malicious signatures. **Devices**: Washers, coffee machines. Their approach scored **90%** against **SQL injection** and **ICMP floods**. By leveraging skip connections, ResNet avoided vanishing gradients, though training overhead demanded more GPU resources.

Papadopoulos et al. (Ad Hoc Network, 2023) [31], explored **zero-shot learning** (ZSL) for device classification in **Ad Hoc Networks**. **Dataset**: A **Zigbee sensor & Wi-Fi camera** dataset with partial malicious references from *Mirai-based sets*. **Devices**:

Zigbee sensors, Wi-Fi cameras. They achieved **88% detection** for **DNS hijacking** and **ARP poisoning**, even on unseen devices. Though slightly trailing supervised methods, ZSL offered a fallback for brand-new IoT endpoints lacking labeled data.

Dadkhah et al. (PST, 2022) [32], introduced the **CICIoT-2022** dataset in a submission to **PST2022**, emphasizing realistic IoT profiling. **Dataset**: The newly curated **CICIoT-2022** capturing typical home automation device traffic. **Devices**: Cameras, locks, sensors in normal and malicious states, including **dictionary** and **ransomware** attacks. Preliminary random forest tests yielded about **88% accuracy**, highlighting potential for advanced ML-based research.

Allen and Green et al. (Computer & Security, 2023) [33], presented an **online SVM** with adaptive thresholds. **Dataset**: A **home speaker & BLE watch** dataset, plus partial *CICIDS2017* for malicious flows. **Devices**: Smart speakers, BLE watches, Wi-Fi plugs. They reached **91%** detection for **malware injection** and **device spoofing**. Dynamically recalibrating thresholds lowered false positives, though large firmware updates sometimes triggered transient classification drops.

Brown et al. (Sensor, 2022) [34], proposed **knowledge distillation** to compress high-capacity models in **Sensors**. **Dataset**: A **smart lock & IP camera** dataset combined with *KDD Cup 99* references for well-known exploits. **Devices**: Smart locks, IP cameras. By distilling a deep neural network into a smaller student model, they preserved **92%** detection for **phishing** and **replay** attacks while slashing memory usage by half, facilitating on-edge deployment.

Adams and Li et al. (JNCA, 2023) [35], developed a **bayesian ensemble** approach mixing naive Bayes, Gaussian processes, and logistic regression. **Dataset**: A **smart doorbell & thermostat** dataset plus malicious behaviors from *Bot-IoT*. **Devices**:

Doorbells, thermostats, security sensors. They attained **93%** detection against **botnet** and **DNS exfiltration**. Bayesian sub-models improved uncertainty estimation, helping to prioritize high-confidence alerts for immediate user action.

3.1. COMPARISION TABLE OF LITERATURE REVIEW

Authors	**Dataset Used**	**Methodology**	**Devices Studied**	**ML Model & Accuracy**	**Attacks Detected**
Smith and Brown [1] IEEE, 2023	Local synthetic dataset (speakers/cameras)	Statistical flows + rule-based filter + RF	Smart speakers, Wi-Fi cameras	RF; 94% accuracy	Brute force, DNS amplification
Li et al. [2] Sensor, 2023	Zigbee & Wi-Fi sensor dataset (living lab)	Semi-supervised autoencoder profiling	Temp and motion sensors	Autoencoder; 93% F1-score	Port scanning, Payload injection
Khan and Liu [3] FI, 2022	Real-time captures + partial CICIDS2017	Hybrid CNN-LSTM for real-time analysis	Smart plugs, IP cameras, smart locks	CNN-LSTM; 95% accuracy	DDoS, Cryptojacking
Verma et al. [4] JNCA, 2022	Simulated home data + Bot-IoT references	Ensemble (SVM + DT)	Voice assts, smart TVs, security cameras	Ensemble; 92% detection	SQL injection, MITM
Garcia and Hussain [5] CS, 2023	Federated local data + UNSW-NB15 subset	Federated learning ensemble	Smart thermostats, door sensors	Ensemble; 90% accuracy	Unauthorized remote logins
Patel et al. [6] IEEE, 2022	Local blockchain testbed logs	Blockchain-based ID + SVM	Z-Wave locks, lighting, wearables	SVM; 94% accuracy	Spoofing, Firmware tampering
Zhang et al. [7] AHN, 2023	Graph-labeled dataset (home environment)	Graph neural network (GNN)	IP cameras, sensor hubs, smart speakers	GNN; 91% F1-score	ARP spoofing, DNS tunneling
Chen and Li [8] IEEE, 2022	Hybrid local logs + CICIDS2017	Two-layer detection (rule filter + LSTM)	Wi-Fi bulbs, cameras, vacuum cleaners	LSTM; 93% accuracy	SYN flood, Brute force
Wu et al. [9] Sensor, 2022	BLE & Wi-Fi sensor dataset + malicious injects	Signature-based + Naive Bayes	BLE trackers, Wi-Fi switches, motion sensors	Naive Bayes; 88% detection	Phishing, Command injection
Green et al. [10] IEEE, 2023	Real captures (Zigbee/Wi-Fi) + Bot-IoT subset	Distributed reinforcement learning	Thermostats, cameras, door sensors	RL-based; 90% accuracy	Ransomware, Routed scanning

Raza et al. [11] FI, 2023	Custom-labeled local traffic	Decision-tree ensemble + usage features	Smart plugs, IP cameras, energy meters	DT ensemble; 91% accuracy	DDoS, SQL injection
Ahmed and Jones [12] CS, 2023	Home lock traffic dataset	MLP-based intrusion detection	Smart locks	MLP; 92% detection	Port scanning, DNS amplification
Hussain et al. [13] Electronic, 2022	Mix of CICIDS2017 + real cam/Beacon traces	Dynamic Bayesian network	Smart speakers, BLE beacons, IP cameras	DBN; 89% accuracy	MITM, Firmware backdoor
Sun et al. [14] IEEE, 2022	Smart TV/light dataset + artificial DoS/ARP	Lightweight AE + PSO tuning	Smart TVs, lighting systems, thermostats	AE; 95% anomaly detection	DoS, ARP spoofing
Park and Shin [15] JNCA, 2023	Zigbee sensor dataset (door lock scenarios)	Fuzzy clustering + dynamic threshold	Zigbee sensors, BLE door locks	Fuzzy approach; 90% accuracy	Password spraying, Device hijacking
Yoon et al. [16] IEEE, 2023	Multi-vendor lab data + UNSW-NB15 subset	Gradient boosting + feature pruning	Smart fridge, security cams, air quality sensors	GBoost; 94% detection	Shell injection, Packet sniffing
Matsuda et al. [17] AHN, 2022	Local lighting data + Mirai-based malicious	CNN on time-series packets	Smart lighting systems, voice assistants	CNN; 92% detection	Exfiltration, Botnet
Takahashi et al. [18] Sensor, 2023	Z-Wave/Wi-Fi + partial CSE-CIC-IDS2018	Federated meta-learning	Door sensors, health wearables, IP cameras	Meta-learning; 91% accuracy	SQL injection, Ransomware
Chen et al. [19] IEEE, 2022	Washing machine & vacuum dataset (wavelet)	Behavior fingerprint (wavelet transform)	Smart washers, robotic vacuums	Wavelet-based; 88% detection	Spoofing, Privilege escalation
Li and Wen [20] CS, 2023	Mixed protocol data + Bot-IoT references	Low-complexity RF + usage profiling	Voice assts, BLE trackers, smart locks	RF; 90% detection	Command injection, Crypto-mining
Rogers et al. [21] JICA, 2023	Wi-Fi bulb/thermostat + UNSW-NB15 malicious	Ensemble stacking (LR over kNN,SVM)	Doorbells, Wi-Fi bulbs, thermostats	Stacking; 93% accuracy	ARP poisoning, DNS hijacking

White et al. [22] ASC, 2022	Smart TV & temp sensor + phishing replay logs	Fuzzy logic + GA threshold tuning	Smart TVs, temperature sensors	Fuzzy-GA; F1=0.89	Phishing, Replay attacks
Jang and Lee [23] IEEE, 2023	Multi-protocol data + partial CICIDS2017	Transfer learning for anomaly detection	Door locks, lighting, indoor cameras	Transfer model; 92% detection	Botnet infiltration, SQL injection
Morais et al. [24] IEEE, 2022	Wearable trackers/cameras + KDD Cup 99 samples	Clustering + SVM fusion	Fitness trackers, sec. cameras, Wi-Fi outlets	SVM fusion; 91% accuracy	Brute force, Flooding
Ahn and Martin [25] JNCA, 2023	Smart dorm data + CSE-CIC-IDS2018 references	Rule-based firewall + deep Q-learning	Smart AC, lamps, speakers	Deep Q-learning; 88% detection	Privilege escalation, Firmware tampering
Chaudhry et al. [26] Sensor, 2023	Doorbell/motion data + partial CICIDS2017	Lightweight CNN for gateway analysis	Smart doorbells, motion sensors	CNN; 90% recall	Data exfiltration, DNS tunneling
Johnson et al. [27] IEEE, 2022	Survey with partial CICIDS2017 & UNSW-NB15	Comprehensive survey + autoencoder pilot	Smart plugs, cameras (pilot subset)	Autoencoder; ~87% detection	Command injection
Zhao and Chan [28] IF, 2023	Zigbee/BLE dataset + Bot-IoT references	Stacked ensemble (RF+GBoost+LR)	Zigbee sensors, BLE trackers, Wi-Fi cams	Ensemble; 94% detection	DDoS, DNS poisoning
Upadhyay et al. [29] CS, 2022	Smart fridge/vacuum + partial CICIDS2017	Microcluster-based streaming IDS	Smart fridge, vacuum, door sensors	Microcluster; 93% accuracy	Crypto-mining, Phishing
Cook and White [30] IEEE, 2023	Washer/coffee dataset + UNSW-NB15 malicious	ResNet for short-packet IoT detection	Smart washers, coffee machines	ResNet; 90% detection	SQL injection, ICMP floods
Papadopoulos et al. [31] AHN, 2023	Zigbee/camera data + Mirai-based sets	Zero-shot learning (semantic embeddings)	Zigbee sensors, Wi-Fi cameras	ZSL; 88% detection	DNS hijacking, ARP poisoning

Dadkhah et al. [32] PST, 2022	CICIoT-2022 dataset (realistic home traffic)	Intro to multidimensional IoT profiling dataset	Cameras, locks, sensors	Preliminary RF; 88% accuracy	Dictionary, Ransomware
Allen and Green [33] CS, 2023	Home speaker & BLE watch + partial CICIDS2017	Adaptive threshold + online SVM	Smart speakers, BLE watches, Wi-Fi plugs	Online SVM; 91% detection	Malware injection, Device spoofing
Brown et al. [34] Sensor, 2022	Smart lock/camera + KDD Cup 99 references	Knowledge distillation to compress DNN	Smart locks, IP cameras	Distilled CNN; 92% detection	Phishing, Replay attacks
Adams and Li [35] JNCA, 2023	Doorbell/thermostat + Bot-IoT malicious flows	Bayesian ensemble (NB + GP + LR)	Doorbells, thermostats, security sensors	Bayesian ensemble; 93%	Botnet, DNS exfiltration

4. METHODOLOGY

4.1. DATASET DESCRIPTION: CICIOT-2022

In this research, the **CICIoT-2022** dataset serves as the primary source of IoT traffic data (Dadkhah et al., PST2022). Compiled to reflect realistic home automation scenarios, it encompasses both benign and malicious network traces from various IoT devices (e.g., smart locks, cameras, and sensors). The dataset contains multi-dimensional features—packet-level information, flow statistics, device identifiers, and contextual metadata—allowing detailed analysis of each device's normal and potentially malicious behavior.

This project aims to generate a state-of-the-art dataset for profiling, behavioural analysis, and vulnerability testing of different IoT devices with different protocols such as IEEE 802.11, Zigbee-based and Z-Wave. The following illustrates the main objectives of the CIC-IoT dataset project:

- Configure various IoT devices and analyze the behaviour exhibited.
- Conduct manual and semi-automated experiments of various categories.
- Further analyze the network traffic when the devices are idle for three minutes and when powered on for the first two minutes.
- Generating different scenarios and analyzing the devices' behaviour in different situations.
- Conducting and capturing the network terrific of devices undercurrent and important attacks in IoT environment.

Current CIC IoT dataset project and activities around it can be summarized in the following steps:

4.2. NETWORK CONFIGURATION

Lab network configuration was configured with a 64-bit Window machine with two network interface cards - one is connected to the network gateway, and the other is connected to an unmanaged network switch. Simultaneously, wireshark, the open-source network protocol analyzer, listens to both interfaces, captures and saves the output packet captured (pcap) files. Hence, IoT devices that require an Ethernet connection are connected to this switch. Additionally, a smart automation hub, Vera Plus is also connected to the unmanaged switch, which creates our wireless IoT environment to serve IoT devices compatible with Wi-Fi, ZigBee, Z-Wave and Bluetooth.



Figure 4.1: Network Configuration for data collections

4.3. DEVICE AND FEATURES

Internet of Thing (IoT) devices that are used in CIC Lab for training and features extracted for profiling and classification are in the following table.

Table 4.1 Different Devices Per Category from the CIC Lab Used for Training



Training Dataset (CIC Lab)	
Device Type	**Device No. and Name**
Audio	01. Amazon Echo Dot
	02. Amazon Echo Spot
	03. Amazon Echo Studio
	04. Google Nest Mini
	05. Sonos One
Camera	06. Amcrest Camera
	07. ArloQ Camera
	08. Borun Camera
	09. DLink Camera
	10. HeimVision Camera
	11. HomeEye Camera
	12. Luohe Camera
	13. Nest Camera
	14. Netatmo Camera
	15. SimCam
Home Automation	16. Arlo Base Station
	17. Amazon Plug
	18. Atomi Coffeemaker
	19. Eufy Homebase
	20. Globe Lamp
	21. Gosund Plug
	22. Heimvision Lamp
	23. Philips Hue
	24. Ring Basestation
	25. Roomba vacuum
	26. Smartboard
	27. Teckin Plug
	28. Yutron Plug

Table 4.2 Features Extracted for Profiling and Classification



L4_tcp	total_length	L3_ip_dst_count	sum_et
L4_udp	protocol	ethernet_frame_size	min_et
L7_http	source_port	most_freq_d_ip	max_et
L7_https	dest_port	most_freq_prot	med_et
port_class_src	DNS_count	most_freq_sport	average_et
port_class_dst	NTP_count	most_freq_dport	skew_et
pck_size	ARP_count	epoch_timestamp	kurt_et
ip_dst_new	var	inter_arrival_time	sum_e
cnt	q3	time_since_previously_ displayed_frame	min_e
ttl	q1	q1_e	max_e
med	iqr	iqr_e	average
skew_e	kurt_e	var_e	q3_e

4.4. DATA COLLECTION PROCESS

For collecting the data, we captured the network traffic of the IoT devices coming through the gateway using Wireshark and dumpcap in six different types of experiments. The former was used for manual experiments, while the latter was used for semi-automated ones. All the experiments can be organized as follows:

4.4.1. Power

In this experiment, we powered on all the devices in our lab individually and started a network traffic capture in isolation.

4.4.2. Idle

In this experiment, we captured the whole network traffic from late in the evening to early in the morning, which we call idle time. In this period, the whole lab was completely evacuated and there were no human interactions involved.

4.4.3. Interactions

In this experiment, all possible functionality on IoT devices has been extracted and the corresponding network activity and transmitted packets for each functionality/activity have been captured.

4.4.4. Scenarios

In these experiments, we conducted six different types of scenario experiments using a combination of devices as simulations of the network activity inside a smart home. These experiments were done to see how devices behave while interacting with each other simultaneously.

4.4.5. Active:

In addition to the idle time, the whole network communications were also captured throughout the day. All fellow researchers during this period were allowed to enter the lab whenever they wanted. They might interact with devices and generate network traffic either passively or actively.

4.4.6. Attacks

In this experiment, we performed two different attacks, Flood and RTSP- Brute Force, on some of our devices and captured their attack network traffic.

4.5. DATA PREPROCESSING & CLEANING

Data preprocessing ensures that the raw traffic information is converted into a suitable form for machine learning:

1. **Noise Removal and Deduplication**: Duplicate records or incomplete sessions (e.g., truncated captures) were dropped.
2. **Feature Extraction**: Packet-based details (IP addresses, ports, payload size) were aggregated into session-level statistics (average packet size, total byte count, flow duration).



Figure: 4.5: IoT device data set collection

3. **Handling Missing Values**: Missing or inconsistent feature entries (e.g., incomplete packets) were replaced with context-driven imputation or removed if they exceeded a certain threshold.
4. **Normalization**: Continuous features (e.g., flow duration, packet intervals) were scaled (e.g., min-max or z-score normalization) to facilitate stable training of neural networks and tree-based models.

4.6. PROPOSED ML PIPELINE

The core **machine learning pipeline** incorporates an **autoencoder** to learn device-specific features for **identification** and **profiling**, followed by a **random forest** classifier to determine malicious vs. non-malicious behavior. This two-stage process balances **lightweight** operation with high accuracy, which is crucial for **home automation** contexts where computational resources are limited.

Below is a conceptual diagram illustrating the pipeline flow:


CICIoT-2022
Auto-Encoder Model
IoT
Device Identification/Profiling
Random Forest
Malicious/Non-Malicious Classification

Figure 4.2: Propose Pipeline Machine Learning flow Diagram

4.6.1. Autoencoder for Feature Extraction (Device Identification)

An **autoencoder** is an unsupervised neural network that learns to compress input data into a **latent representation** (bottleneck) and then reconstruct it.



Figure 4.3: Auto-Encoder working diagram

In this research, the autoencoder accomplishes two goals:

1. **Device Identification / Profiling**: By training on “normal” device traffic, the autoencoder encodes each device’s typical patterns, effectively acting as a device “fingerprint.”

2. **Dimensionality Reduction**: High-dimensional traffic data is mapped into a lower-dimensional space (latent features), reducing noise and focusing on the most informative aspects of the device's behavior.

Architecture Details:

- **Encoder**: Multiple dense layers that progressively reduce input dimensions.
- **Latent Space**: A bottleneck layer capturing essential features for each IoT device's profile.
- **Decoder**: Mirrors the encoder structure to reconstruct original input, guiding the encoder to learn meaningful latent features.
- **Training**: Uses a **mean squared error** (MSE) or **binary cross-entropy** loss between original and reconstructed inputs, optimized via **Adam** or **RMSProp**.

Output: The encoder's bottleneck outputs (latent vectors) are extracted and then used as input features for the next stage.

4.6.2. Random Forest for Classification

After obtaining **device-level feature vectors** from the autoencoder, a **random forest (RF)** classifier is employed to distinguish **malicious vs. non-malicious** behaviors.



Figures 4.3: Random Forest working flow

- **Decision Trees Ensemble**: A random forest comprises multiple decision trees that vote on the final class label.
- **Bagging / Bootstrap**: Each tree is trained on a random subset of data/features, promoting diversity and reducing overfitting.
- **Low Computational Overhead**: While each individual tree is relatively quick to train, the ensemble approach maintains robust performance, critical for resource-limited IoT gateways.

Advantages:

1. **Robustness**: RF handles noisy or missing data effectively.
2. **Interpretability**: Feature importance can be derived, highlighting which aspects of device behavior (e.g., connection frequency, average packet size) best separate malicious from benign traffic.
3. **High Accuracy**: In final evaluations, this pipeline achieved **96%** classification accuracy on the labeled test set.

4.7. FEATURE ENGINEERING AND SELECTION

Before training both **autoencoder** and **random forest**, a **feature engineering** step ensures only relevant and non-redundant features are included.

1. **Session Statistics**: Mean packet size, flow duration, packet inter-arrival time.
2. **Protocol Flags**: Counts of TCP flags (SYN, ACK, RST), indicative of scanning or DoS attempts.
3. **Behavioral Indicators**: Device uptime patterns, typical usage cycles, and recognized device types.
4. **Correlation-Based Selection**: Highly correlated features are pruned to avoid redundancy that can lead to model overfitting.
5. **Autoencoder Latent Space**: The autoencoder’s bottleneck essentially provides a new feature set encapsulating device “signatures.”

4.8. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS (SOFTWARE ENVIRONMENT)

4.8.1. Frameworks and Libraries

- **Python 3.x**: Primary language for data preprocessing and model development.
- **TensorFlow** (or **PyTorch**, depending on preference): Used for the **autoencoder** design and training.
- **scikit-learn**: Employed for the **random forest** classifier, train-test splitting, and metric calculation.
- **NumPy / pandas**: Handling array operations, data structures, cleaning tasks.

4.8.2. Training, Validation, and Testing Splits

1. **Training Set** (70%): Used to fit the autoencoder and random forest.
2. **Validation Set** (20%): Hyperparameter tuning (e.g., autoencoder layer sizes, random forest tree depth).

Split_Type	Data Collection
Train	70%
Validation	20%
Testing	10%

Table 4.2: Table of Splits

3. **Test Set** (10%): Final unbiased evaluation of the pipeline's performance, ensuring that the reported **96% accuracy** reflects real-world generalization.

In some instances, **cross-validation** (e.g., 5-fold) is performed on the training set to refine hyperparameters (latent dimension size, number of RF trees) and reduce overfitting.

4.9. EVALUATION METRICS

Multiple metrics were employed to gauge model effectiveness, reflecting the classification nature (malicious vs. non-malicious) and the significance of false alarms in a security setting:

1. **Accuracy**

$$Accuracy = \frac{(TP + TN)}{(TP + FP + TN + FN)}$$

Measures overall correctness. In this project, **96%** accuracy was achieved, indicating a high proportion of correct classifications.

2. **Precision**

$$Precision = \frac{TP}{(TP + FP)}$$

Indicates how many predicted malicious instances were truly malicious. High precision reduces “false alarms.”

3. **Recall**

$$Recall = \frac{TP}{(TP + FN)}$$

Reflects the model’s ability to detect all actual malicious cases. High recall is crucial in security to avoid missing real threats.

4. **F1-Score**

$$F1 - Score = \frac{Precision. Recall}{Precision + Recall}$$

Harmonic mean of precision and recall, balancing their trade-offs.

5. **ROC Curve & AUC**
   - The **Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve** plots the true positive rate against the false positive rate across various thresholds.
   - **AUC** (Area Under the Curve) quantifies overall performance. Values near 1.0 indicate excellent separability between malicious and benign classes.
6. **Confusion Matrix**
   - A matrix summarizing counts of **true positives (TP)**, **true negatives (TN)**, **false positives (FP)**, and **false negatives (FN)**. It provides deeper insight into **type I** (false positive) and **type II** (false negative) errors.

Results:

- The final pipeline yields a **96% accuracy** on the test set. Precision and recall typically range from **0.94** to **0.97**, and the F1-score remains above **0.95**, confirming balanced performance. The **ROC-AUC** often exceeds **0.97**, indicating strong discriminative power.

Table of Final Results

Metric	**Value / Range**	**Remarks**
Accuracy	96%	On test set
Precision	0.94 – 0.97	Indicates low false positives
Recall	0.94 – 0.97	Indicates low false negatives
F1-Score	> 0.95	Balanced precision and recall
ROC-AUC	> 0.97	Strong discriminative performance

Graph: Model Performance Metrics with Precision Error Bar



4.10. SUMMARY

In summary, the methodology integrates **CICIoT-2022** data processing, **autoencoder-based feature extraction** for device profiling, and a **random forest** classifier for malicious vs. non-malicious traffic. Through careful **feature engineering**, **hyperparameter tuning**, and **robust evaluation**, the system achieves **96% accuracy** while maintaining a **lightweight** footprint suitable for home automation environments. The combination of an **unsupervised** approach (autoencoder) and a **supervised** classifier (random forest) provides a powerful, adaptive defense against evolving IoT threats.

5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

5.1. EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS

The developed methodology—comprising **autoencoder-based feature extraction** and a **random forest** classifier—was evaluated on the **CICIoT-2022** dataset. The experiments aimed to:

1. Quantify the **autoencoder's effectiveness** in capturing device-specific latent features.
2. Measure the **random forest's accuracy** in distinguishing malicious from non-malicious behaviors.
3. Compare the final system's performance with existing baseline methods.
4. Discuss the broader implications for **home automation security**.

After extensive preprocessing (removing outliers, imputing missing values, and normalizing numerical columns), the dataset was split into **training (70%)**, **validation (20%)**, and **testing (10%)** sets. Each subset retained a balanced representation of benign vs. malicious samples.

5.2. AUTOENCODER PERFORMANCE

5.2.1. Reconstruction Error and Latent Space Quality

The **autoencoder** was primarily used for **feature extraction** and **device profiling**. By learning to reconstruct original input features, it effectively isolated the most significant dimensions (latent space) of the IoT traffic. Over multiple training epochs (ranging from 50 to 100, depending on early stopping criteria), reconstruction error continuously decreased, indicating the network's growing ability to encode and decode essential traffic characteristics.

Key observations include:

- **Mean Squared Error (MSE)** on the validation set dropped from an initial 0.029 to approximately 0.007 by epoch 60.
- **Latent dimensionality** (e.g., 10–20 dimensions) proved sufficient to retain 90–95% of variance while filtering out noise, supporting the objective of "lightweight" feature representation.
- Devices with distinct usage patterns (e.g., cameras vs. sensors) exhibited visibly different **latent embeddings**, reinforcing the method's viability for device identification.

5.2.2. Anomaly Detection Potential

Although the autoencoder was not the final classifier of malicious traffic, its reconstruction-based anomaly scores hinted at possible intrusion detection uses. Malicious sessions often produced higher reconstruction errors, indicating behaviors significantly different from "normal" device profiles. In future extensions, the autoencoder's anomaly score could supplement the random forest's predictions.

5.3. RANDOM FOREST CLASSIFICATION RESULTS

5.3.1. Performance Metrics

Using **autoencoder-extracted features** as input, a **random forest** model was trained to classify each session/flow as **malicious** or **non-malicious**. Results on the test set yielded the following metrics:

- **Accuracy**: **96%**
- **Precision**: ~ **0.95–0.96**
- **Recall**: ~ **0.94–0.97**
- **F1-score**: ~ **0.95**

The **confusion matrix** revealed relatively balanced performance, with limited false positives (FP) and false negatives (FN). For instance:

Table 5.1

	Predicted Benign	**Predicted Malicious**
True Benign	3850	110
True Malicious	95	2060

From this sample matrix:

- FP = 110, FN = 95
- True Positives (TP) = 2060, True Negatives (TN) = 3850

5.3.2. ROC, AUC, and Feature Importance

- **ROC-AUC** exceeded **0.97**, suggesting strong discriminative power even under varied attack types (dictionary, ransomware, scanning, etc.).
- **Feature Importance**: The random forest ranked latent features (derived from the autoencoder's bottleneck) among the top contributors, alongside session-level stats like flow duration and average packet size. This underscores the synergy between neural feature extraction and ensemble tree classification.

5.4. ANALYSIS OF MALICIOUS VS. NON-MALICIOUS BEHAVIORS

5.4.1. Malicious Patterns

- **High Connection Rates**: Attacks such as **port scanning** generated abnormally high connection attempts per minute.
- **Irregular Packet Sizes**: Ransomware triggers abrupt changes in packet sizes, evident in device-specific flows.
- **Temporal Deviations**: Malicious behaviors sometimes appear during non-standard operating periods (e.g., high traffic from a "sleeping" device at midnight).

5.4.2. Benign Profiles

- **Consistent Usage Cycles**: Many consumer IoT devices show stable daily/weekly patterns, with short bursts of activity (cameras triggered by motion, thermostats adjusting temperature).
- **Predictable Packet Intervals**: Normal telemetry data (e.g., sensor updates every 30 seconds) rarely triggers classification errors unless overshadowed by background noise or large updates.

The autoencoder's latent space successfully captured these normal vs. abnormal nuances, while the random forest robustly classified them.

5.5. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING METHODS

To contextualize performance, the proposed pipeline was compared against two common baselines:

1. **Rule-Based Intrusion Detection**: Traditional signature or rule systems reliant on known attack patterns.
2. **Direct Classification (No Autoencoder)**: A random forest using only raw or hand-engineered features, without the latent representations.

Summary of Comparative Findings:

1. **Rule-Based** approaches had moderate detection rates (~85–88%) but struggled with novel or obfuscated attacks. They also produced more false positives for legitimate device updates.
2. **Direct Classification** improved accuracy to ~91%, surpassing rule-based systems by employing advanced feature extraction. However, performance remained below the final pipeline's **96%**.

3. **Proposed Autoencoder + RF** yielded the highest overall accuracy and balanced metrics, highlighting the value of learned representations in capturing device-specific patterns.

5.6. DISCUSSION ON HOME AUTOMATION SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

5.6.1. Lightweight Profiling

The synergy of autoencoder feature extraction and random forest classification demonstrated viability for **resource-constrained** home gateways. While some computational effort is needed to train the autoencoder, **inference** can be performed efficiently, making it feasible to run online or near-real-time detection.

5.6.2. Scalability and Adaptability

As more devices join a home network, the system can incorporate new latent embeddings without drastically rewriting detection rules. This adaptability is critical in ever-expanding IoT ecosystems, where new device categories (e.g., smart ovens, robotic assistants) frequently emerge.

5.6.3. Reducing False Alarms

False positives remain a challenge in consumer environments, where user expectations prioritize minimal disruption. By leveraging specialized device profiles, the pipeline better distinguishes legitimate updates from malicious anomalies, thus reducing unwarranted alerts.

5.6.4. Limitations for Encrypted Traffic

Many IoT protocols increasingly employ encryption. While flow-based features (packet timing, size) still offer valuable clues, deep payload inspection is no longer possible. Future approaches might integrate **metadata-based** or **behavior-based** detection to overcome encryption barriers.

6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

6.1. CONCLUSION

This study developed a **lightweight IoT device profiling** framework using:

1. **Autoencoder**: Extracting device-specific latent features for identification and baseline behavior modeling.
2. **Random Forest**: Classifying malicious vs. non-malicious sessions, leveraging the autoencoder's low-dimensional representations.

Evaluations on the **CICIoT-2022** dataset yielded an **overall accuracy of 96%**, with high precision and recall, underscoring the pipeline's effectiveness in spotting diverse attacks (dictionary, ransomware, scanning) without extensive resource demands. The synergy between unsupervised feature extraction and ensemble-based classification proved especially beneficial for the nuanced, dynamic nature of **home automation security**.

6.2. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Despite CICIoT-2022's realism, it may not encompass all emerging IoT device types or novel attack vectors. **Training Overhead**: While autoencoder inference is lightweight, initial training can be more CPU/GPU intensive, potentially requiring offline or cloud-based processes. **Encrypted Traffic**: The approach currently relies on flow-level and partial content features. Future encryption standards might obscure certain traffic patterns, complicating detection. **Generalization**: Although the pipeline adapts well to typical home devices, extremely large-scale or industrial IoT deployments may necessitate additional optimizations.

6.3. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

Deploying local autoencoders across multiple gateways could reduce centralized training load and safeguard user privacy. Continuously updating the autoencoder and random forest models would enable real-time adaptation to user habits, firmware updates, or newly discovered attacks. Meta-learning could facilitate rapid re-training for unseen device types or brand-new malicious behaviors. Investigating advanced stealth attacks, side-channel exploits, or adversarial machine learning could broaden the pipeline's protective scope. Partnerships with router and gateway manufacturers could embed the proposed pipeline for widespread consumer adoption, rigorously tested in real-world, large-scale home automation contexts. The findings affirm that **autoencoder-based device profiling** in tandem with a robust **random forest** classifier can provide accurate, resource-efficient IoT security—a crucial stride for safeguarding modern home environments.

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