

Quantum Communication Advantage

in TFNP

Sid Jain

joint with


Mika Göös

Tom Gur

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Communication Complexity

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


Communication Complexity

Why study it?


Alice
 x

Bob
 y



Communication Complexity

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


→ expressive

circuits, streaming,
property testing,
time-space trade-offs,
query complexity

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
→ tractable

unconditional lower
bounds for problems
of interest

Communication Complexity

Alice
 x

Bob
 y



Models:

↳ Type

- Deterministic
- Randomized
- Quantum


↳ Interactivity

- SMP
- 1-way
- 2-way

Simultaneous Message Passing

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Alice Bob
x y




Referee

$$f(x, y)$$

Simultaneous Message Passing

Alice Bob
x y



Referee

$$f(x, y)$$

SMP \leq 1-way

Bob pretends to
be the Referee.

Quantum Advantage

Goal : Design an experiment to demonstrate unconditional quantum advantage using communication complexity.

Quantum Advantage

Two flavors:

Partial problems → promise on input

Total problems → NO promise

Quantum Advantage

Two flavors:

Partial problems \rightarrow promise on input

Total problems \rightarrow NO promise

Remark. Few separations for total problems

Impossible for every complexity of boolean fns

TFNP

A relation $R \subseteq X \times Y \times O$ is in **communication**-TFNP if

Totality: for all (x, y) there is a z s.t.
 $(x, y, z) \in R$


Verifiability: given (x, y, z) Alice and Bob can
verify in $\text{polylog}(|x|, |y|)$ communication if
 $(x, y, z) \in R$

Our Result

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$$n = \text{polylog}(N)$$

There is a TFNP relation R s.t.




$$\#\text{qubits} = \text{poly}(n)$$


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$$\#\text{qubits} = \text{poly}(n)$$



$$\#\text{bits} = 2^{n^{\text{poly}}}$$

Candidate problem	Reference	Quantum u.b.	Classical l.b.	f / R	Totality
Vector in Subspace	[Raz99, KR11]	one-way	two-way	function	partial
Gap Hamming Relation	[Gav21]	SMP	two-way	relation	partial
FORRELATION \circ XOR	[GRT22]	SMP	two-way	function	partial
Hidden Matching	[BJK04]	one-way	one-way	relation	total
Lifted NULLCODEWORD	[YZ24a, GPW20]	two-way	two-way	relation	total
Bipartite NULLCODEWORD	This work	SMP	two-way	relation	total

Table 1: Several notable exponential quantum–classical separations. **Green text** indicates a strong result and **red text** indicates a weak result.

What's the problem?

Null Codeword

Yamakawa-Zhandry's relation

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Fix a code $C_n \subseteq \Sigma^n$

Notation: $H(x) = H_1(x_1) \dots H_n(x_n)$, $H_i : \Sigma \rightarrow \{0,1\}$

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Then

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Null Codeword}_n^C &\subseteq \{0,1\}^{n|\Sigma|} \times C \\ &= \{(H,c) \mid c \in C_n, H(c) = 0^n\}\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{matrix} c_1 & c_2 & \cdots & c_{\frac{n}{2}} & c_{\frac{n}{2}+1} & \cdots & c_n \\ \downarrow & \downarrow & & \downarrow & \downarrow & & \downarrow \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \end{matrix}$$

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“Invert H on some codeword in C ”

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Yamakawa-Zhandry if C is a certain folded Reed-Solomon code
H is uniform random

$$Q^{\text{dt}}(\text{Null Codeword}) = O(n) \text{ yet } R^{\text{dt}}(\text{Null Codeword}) = 2^{n^{2/3}}$$

Bipartite Null Codeword

$$\underbrace{H_1 H_2 \cdots H_{\frac{n}{2}}}_x \quad \underbrace{H_{\frac{n}{2}+1} \cdots H_n}_y$$

$$\underbrace{H_1 H_2 \cdots H_{\frac{n}{2}}}_x \quad \underbrace{H_{\frac{n}{2}+1} \cdots H_n}_y$$

AKA

Alice
Knows

$c_1 \cdots c_{\frac{n}{2}}$	$c_{\frac{n}{2}+1} \cdots c_n$
\downarrow	\downarrow
0/1	0/1

Bob
Knows

$$\underbrace{H_1 H_2 \cdots H_{\frac{n}{2}}}_x \quad \underbrace{H_{\frac{n}{2}+1} \cdots H_n}_y$$

Alice

Bob

$$|\phi_1\rangle \otimes \cdots \otimes |\phi_{\frac{n}{2}}\rangle$$


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Referee

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
Bob




Referee

$$|\phi_i\rangle \propto \sum_{\substack{a \in \Sigma : \\ H_i(a) = 0}} |a\rangle$$

Yamakawa-Zhandry algorithm



Yamakawa-Zhandry algorithm



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Intuition

A good code is pseudorandom.

Moreover, $\Pr[H(c) = 0^n] = 2^{-n}$.

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- Every codeword is unlikely to be a sol.ⁿ
- Querying one codeword does not reveal much information about many other codewords.

Classical LB

List-Recoverability, Simplified

$C \subseteq \Sigma^n$ is l. or.

if for any $S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n \subseteq \Sigma$ s.t. $\sum_i |S_i| \leq l$,

$$|\{(x_1, \dots, x_n) \in C : |\{i \in [n] : x_i \in S_i\}| \geq 0.4n\}| \leq 2^{\text{o}(n)}$$

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$\sum_i |S_i| \leftarrow$ number of inputs
bits revealed

Subcube Protocols

Defn $X \subseteq \{0,1\}^N$ is a **subcube** if $\exists I \subseteq [n]$

$$X_I := \{x_I \in \{0,1\}^{|I|} : x \in X\} = \{d\}$$

and X_I contains all possible strings

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and $X_{\bar{I}}$ contains all possible strings

Defn A protocol Π is a **subcube protocol** if
for every $\sigma \leftrightarrow R_\sigma = X \times Y$
 X, Y are subcubes

Subcube Protocols Decision Trees ?

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No, they are more expressive.

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Bob

$$\text{length} = \log(N+1)$$

N+1 subcubes

$$i \in [N] \text{ s.t. } x_i = 1$$
$$x_j = 0 \forall j < i$$

Subcube Protocols Decision Trees?

No, they are more expressive.



$$\text{length} = \log(N+1)$$

$N+1$ subcubes

Can't be efficiently simulated by queries / decision trees!

Lower Bound for Subcube Protocols

Any subcube protocol solving BiNC has complexity $\Omega(l)$

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$$\# \text{dangerous } x \in C \leq 2^{o(n)}$$

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 x has at least $O(\ln \text{unfixed bits})$ in Bob's half of R_v

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$$\Pr[H(x) = 0^n \mid H \in R_v] \leq 2^{-O(\ln n)}$$

Lower Bound for Subcube Protocols

Any subcube protocol solving BiNC has complexity $\Omega(l)$

By list-recoverability, if $|\pi| = o(l)$ then

$$\#\text{dangerous } x \in C \leq 2^{o(n)}$$

By union bound, the chance of any dangerous x solⁿ

$$\Pr[\exists \text{dangerous } x, H(x) = 0^n \mid H \in R_o] \leq 2^{-O(\ln n)} 2^{o(n)} \\ = 2^{-\Omega(n)}$$

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YZ code

- * we generalize to a δ -biased input distribution
to trade off upper and lower bounds

Lower Bound

- how can we *lift* the lower bound for Subcube Protocols?

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↑ Structure -vs- Randomness

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↑ Structure -vs- Randomness

- how do we convert to a total relation?

Lower Bound

- how can we lift the lower bound for Subcube Protocols?

↑ Structure -vs- Randomness

- how do we convert to a total relation?
employ trick: find short certificates \rightarrow TFNP

Thanks
for your
attention!