

# **Trade Liberalization and Labor Monopsony: Evidence from Chinese Firms**

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# A Great Paper!

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- **Important Question:** Significant concerns about labor shares when countries open to trade.
- **Critical Insight:** Aggregate labor supply is essential for understanding markdown responses.
- **Rich Empirics:** Diverse variations and novel results provide robust insights.

# Theory

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- Firm labor supply elasticity:  $\epsilon_k^{-1}(\ell_i) \equiv \eta + (\nu - \eta) \frac{\ell_i^\phi}{\mathcal{L}_{-i}^\phi + \ell_i^\phi}$ 
  - Larger  $\epsilon_k^{-1}(\ell_i)$  means greater monopsony/oligopsony power
  - $\eta$ : across-firm substitution cost
  - $\nu$ : across-market substitution cost
- Condition for lower markdown in response to lower input tariffs:  $\kappa > \frac{\frac{\tilde{\mu}}{1-\tilde{\mu}}}{\frac{1-\tilde{\mu}-\lambda}{1-\tilde{\mu}} + \nu}$ 
  - $\kappa$ : across-market substitutability
- Mechanism: With symmetric firms, if  $\kappa = 0$ , fewer firms would operate in response to increased labor demand arising from lower input prices and labor market power will rise. When  $\kappa$  large enough, more number of firms in a market decreases oligopsony power.

# Number of Firms

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- Number of firms expansion is the key mechanism
  - Why not directly test this?
  - Conceptually labor supply expansion does not necessarily mean firm expansion
  - Table 3: 3-to-5-year difference estimators significant:  
Maybe firm number / aggregate labor adjustment takes time?
  - How are employment and firm numbers expansion correlated cross-sectionally and over-time?
  - Are there some location-sectors where we see employment expansion but not firm number expansion? Are markdown responses different?
  - Felix (2022): trade liberalization reduced number of firms, employment, and wages in local labor markets more exposed to import competition relative to less exposed markets.

# Role of Input Tariffs

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- Equilibrium Condition:  $(N_k)^{\frac{(\nu-\eta)}{\varphi}} \left(1 + \eta + (\nu - \eta) \frac{1}{N_k}\right) \left(\frac{L_k}{N_k}\right)^{(1+\nu)-\frac{\tilde{\lambda}}{1-\tilde{\mu}}} = \frac{\tilde{\lambda}}{1-\tilde{\mu}} [\tilde{z}]^{\frac{1}{1-\tilde{\mu}}} B(r_k)$ 
  - Aggregate labor supply elasticity:  $\frac{\partial \log L_k}{\partial \log((1+\tau_k)\tilde{r})} \triangleq -\kappa.$
  - Productivity and market condition:  $[\tilde{z}]^{\frac{1}{1-\tilde{\mu}}} B(r_k) \triangleq [\tilde{z}]^{\frac{1}{1-\tilde{\mu}}} (1 - \tilde{\mu}) \left[ \tilde{\mu}/r_k^{\frac{\tilde{\mu}}{1-\tilde{\mu}}} [A]^{\frac{1}{1-\tilde{\mu}}} \right].$
- Is there any difference between  $r_k, \tilde{z}, A$ ?
  - $r_k$  is good exogenous variation and useful for testing;
  - But maybe  $\tilde{z}, A$  also respond?  
 Large literature on how firm productivity, quality, etc., respond to input tariffs.
  - Can help us understand what happened in China better.

# Skill Heterogeneity

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- Skilled labor markets are more subject to monopsony power frictions
  - Skilled labor might also have greater mobility.
  - Do we see level difference in firms of different skill intensity to begin with?
- $\frac{\partial^2 \log N_k}{\partial \log r_k \partial \lambda} > 0$ : What's the exact role of  $\lambda$ ?
  - In theory:  $\theta_\ell(\ell, m) = \lambda$ , both elasticity and share.
  - In data: the fraction of employees who completed college.
  - A bit more discussion on the mechanism and the parameter constraint condition:  
 $\left(\frac{\tilde{\mu}}{1-\tilde{\mu}}\right) > \kappa \left(\frac{\nu-\eta}{\varphi}\right)$  and  $\log \frac{L_k}{N_k} + \frac{1-\tilde{\mu}}{\tilde{\lambda}} > 0$ .

# Robustness

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- Processing trade firms: exempt from input tariffs, should not be affected.

# General Equilibrium

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- Differential effects of trade policy across firms
  - Does not estimate level effects
  - If China's aggregate labor supply does not expand, the aggregate markdown should increase?
- Aggregate labor share counterfactual:  $\frac{1}{\eta_L} = \sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{k=1}^K \sum_{n=1}^{N_{ki}} \left[ \frac{\mu_{nki}^L}{\mu_{nki}^M} \frac{\mu_{nki}^M - \theta_{nki}^M}{\theta_{nki}^L} \omega_{nki}^L \right]$ 
  - Compute counterfactual labor markdown without tariff changes using estimation coefficients;  
More about what if labor expansion exactly cancels tariff induced firm number change.
  - A more careful exercise would specify what parameters change, and recompute everything.



# In the Future

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- Trade liberalization on labor markdowns is novel and interesting.
  - Yet quantitatively, not the first-order driver of declining labor share.
- What are the other parts, and how these channels might be related.
  - E.g., aggregate labor supply from agri to manuf.
- I learnt and enjoyed reading this paper a lot!

Look forward to the next iteration and future works!