

# The knowledge argument and the colour of ripe tomatoes

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## ABSTRACT

The

## Introduction

## Conclusions

[Ravenscroft\(2005: 172\)](#) reached a similar conclusion; by describing Mary's lack of knowledge as that she did not understand what other knew about red tomatoes, Ravenscroft evaded the objection to his argument described above.

## References

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