

Embedded

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Side-Channel Attacks

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Overview

- What is Side-Channels Analysis (SCA)?
- Timing Side-Channels
- Power analysis
 - Simple Power Analysis (SPA)
 - Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
 - Correlation Power Analysis (CPA)
- Electro-magnetic




Side-Channel Analysis

- Side-Channel: Indirect source of information about a system
- SCA: Leaking private information by side-channels
- Some side-channels:
 - Timing
 - Power use
 - EM/RF emissions
- General purpose computing:
 - Meltdown/Spectre target cache side-channels
 - Timing analysis against naïve crypto implementations
- Embedded devices may be exposed to invasive physical threats



Side-Channel Analysis

- When a processor is executing instructions, it draws power
- This power draw is related to the operations it is performing
- Further, the power draw is related to the operands (i.e. values) being manipulated
- Additionally, there will be data-dependent EM/RF emissions





Power Side-Channels



RSA Primer

- Alice wants to send a message to Bob that only Bob can decrypt
- Bob distributes a public key (e, n) and retains a secret key d
- Alice pads her secret message to produce m such that m < n
- Alice produces the ciphertext $c \equiv m^e$ (mod n)
- Bob can recover the message $c^d \equiv (m^e)^d \equiv m$ (mod n)
- Observe that decryption involves using the secret key d as an exponent




A simple algorithm to compute r = xⁿ is as follows:

```
r = 1
while n > 0:
    if n is odd:
        r = r * x
        x = x * x
        n = n // 2
```




```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
r = 1
while n > 0:
  if n is odd:
      r = r \times x
  X = X \times X
  n = n // 2
```






```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
r = 1
while n > 0:
  if n is odd:
     r = r * x
  X = X * X
  n = n // 2
```





```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
                                       r \leftarrow 1
r = 1
                                       x ← 2
while n > 0:
                                       n \leftarrow 5
  if n is odd:
      r = r * x
  X = X * X
  n = n // 2
```



```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
r = 1
while n > 0:
  if n is odd:
     r = r * x (2)
  X = X \times X
  n = n / / 2
```

```
\begin{array}{c}
r \leftarrow 1 \\
x \leftarrow 2 \\
n \leftarrow 5
\end{array}
```




 $r \leftarrow 2$

x ← 2

n ← 5

```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
r = 1
while n > 0:
  if n is odd:
     r = r * x (2)
  X = X \times X
  n = n / / 2
```




```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
                                    r \leftarrow 2
r = 1
                                    x ← 2
while n > 0:
                                    n ← 5
  if n is odd:
     r = r * x
  x = x * x (4)
  n = n / / 2
```



```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
                                       r \leftarrow 2
r = 1
                                       x \leftarrow 4
while n > 0:
                                       n ← 5
  if n is odd:
     r = r * x
  x = x * x (4)
  n = n // 2
```



```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
                                           r \leftarrow 2
r = 1
                                           x \leftarrow 4
while n > 0:
                                           n \leftarrow 5
   if n is odd:
      r = r * x
   X = X \times X
   n = n // 2 (2)
```



```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
                                           r \leftarrow 2
r = 1
                                           x \leftarrow 4
while n > 0:
                                           n \leftarrow 2
   if n is odd:
      r = r * x
   X = X \times X
   n = n // 2 (2)
```



```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
r = 1
while n > 0:
  if n is odd:
     r = r * x
  X = X * X
  n = n // 2
```



```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
r = 1
while n > 0:
    if n is odd:
        r = r * x
        x = x * x
        n = n // 2
```

$$\begin{array}{cccc}
r & \leftarrow & 2 \\
x & \leftarrow & 4 \\
n & \leftarrow & 2
\end{array}$$



```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
                                        r \leftarrow 2
r = 1
                                        n \leftarrow 2
while n > 0:
  if n is odd:
      r = r * x
  x = x * x (16)
  n = n / / 2
```



```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
                                    r \leftarrow 2
                                    x ← 16
r = 1
                                    n ← 2
while n > 0:
  if n is odd:
     r = r * x
  x = x * x (16)
  n = n / / 2
```



```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
                                       r \leftarrow 2
r = 1
                                      x ← 16
while n > 0:
                                      n \leftarrow 2
  if n is odd:
      r = r * x
  X = X * X
  n = n // 2 (1)
```



```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
                                       r \leftarrow 2
r = 1
                                      x ← 16
while n > 0:
                                      n \leftarrow 1
  if n is odd:
      r = r * x
  X = X * X
  n = n // 2 (1)
```



```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
r = 1
while n > 0:
  if n is odd:
     r = r * x
  X = X * X
  n = n / / 2
```

```
\begin{array}{ccc} r \leftarrow 2 \\ x \leftarrow 16 \\ n \leftarrow 1 \end{array}
```



```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
r = 1
while n > 0:
    if n is odd:
        r = r * x
        x = x * x
        n = n // 2
```

$$r \leftarrow 2$$

$$x \leftarrow 16$$

$$n \leftarrow 1$$



```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
r = 1
while n > 0:
  if n is odd:
     r = r * x (32)
  X = X * X
  n = n // 2
```

```
\begin{array}{ccc}
r & \leftarrow & 2 \\
x & \leftarrow & 16 \\
n & \leftarrow & 1
\end{array}
```




```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
                                     r \leftarrow 32
r = 1
while n > 0:
  if n is odd:
     r = r * x (32)
  X = X * X
  n = n // 2
```

```
x ← 16
n ← 1
```



```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
                                    r \leftarrow 32
                                    x ← 16
r = 1
while n > 0:
                                    n ← 1
  if n is odd:
     r = r * x
  x = x * x (256)
  n = n / / 2
```



```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
                                       r \leftarrow 32
r = 1
                                      x ← 256
while n > 0:
                                       n \leftarrow 1
  if n is odd:
      r = r * x
  x = x * x (256)
  n = n / / 2
```



```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
r = 1
while n > 0:
  if n is odd:
     r = r * x
  X = X * X
  n = n // 2 (0)
```



```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
                                    r \leftarrow 32
r = 1
                                    x ← 256
while n > 0:
                                    n ← 0
  if n is odd:
     r = r * x
  X = X * X
  n = n // 2 (0)
```



```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
r = 1
while n > 0:
  if n is odd:
     r = r * x
  X = X * X
  n = n // 2
```

```
r ← 32
x ← 256
n ← 0
```



```
- Computing 2<sup>5</sup>
r = 1
while n > 0:
  if n is odd:
     r = r * x
  X = X * X
  n = n // 2
- We have r = 32 = 2^5, as
  desired
```

 $r \leftarrow 32$



- The algorithm is correct, but it has a serious issue
- Recall that the decryption key d is Bob's exponent
- The algorithm performs an extra step for each 1 bit in the exponent:

```
if n is even:
    r = r * x
```


- If we could watch the execution path over time, we could see if each bit of the key is a 0 or 1



Simple Power Analysis

- Well, different instructions may have different power characteristics
- Simple Power Analysis (SPA) refers to visually inspecting a power trace to leak secrets
- For exponentiation by squaring, the n is even condition corresponds with an additional multiply step

```
while n > 0:
    if n is even:
        r = r * x (multiply)
        x = x * x (square)
        n = n // 2
```



Note: the square and multiply steps are reordered in this example



Simple Power Analysis

- SPA is great when your power traces have obvious features
- However, hardening against these obvious features isn't very difficult
- A constant-time AES implementation is unlikely to reveal key material visibly in the power trace



Advanced Power Analysis

- Instead, we can gather many power traces of encryption/decryption over different inputs
- Each trace on its own isn't useful
- However, let's assume that the device's power consumption depends on the data being processed
 - hamming weight model (more 1 bits, more power)
 - hamming distance (more bits flipped, more power)
- It then follows that some function of the key material and input data is correlated with power consumption



Advanced Power Analysis

- For example, let's say encryption takes your input byte a and a secret byte b to compute some intermediate value c
 - i.e. $c = a \wedge b$
- Hamming weight model would suggest that more bits being set in c would draw more power
 - e.g. c = 0xff is heavier than c = 0x00 so it draws more power
- Therefore, when all bits of a and b match, we would have the lowest power draw in setting c





Differential Power Analysis

- Based on our understanding of how processors consume power when performing operations, each bit involved in a computation should contribute slightly to the power trace
- Therefore, if we have two idealized (non-noisy and aligned) power traces only differing in a single bit, we would expect a spike at some point in the differential
 - i.e. the power traces are equal except at one point due that bit differing
- Averaging many traces with uncorrelated noise in other positions will approximate this ideal

Differential Power Analysis

- Differential Power Analysis (Kocher, et al.) is the first work to take advantage of these observations
- It focuses on recovering an intermediate DES key
- Hypothesizes that each value for the key may be taken
- Using the key guess and the ciphertext, we compute some intermediate value that influences the power trace
- Separate the traces into buckets for each bit of the intermediate





Correlation Power Analysis

- Benefitted from the earlier work of DPA and further research
- Introduces a more advanced statistical technique
- Instead of using single bit differences, we can use a correlation coefficient with a leakage model
- Introduces the more advanced hamming distance model to model power draw from bits transitioning from one value to another
- Additionally, the method overcomes some issues observed in DPA
 - DPA assumes wrong guesses give indistinguishable buckets (resulting in false detections)
 - DPA often requires many more samples to converge



Power Analysis Recap

Simple Power Analysis

- Use when you have clear features in your power trace

Differential Power Analysis

- First sophisticated statistical attack on power traces
- Makes guesses for key values and buckets traces accordingly


Correlation Power Analysis

- More useful in practice
- Uses a more advanced statistical method to overcome limitations of DPA



How to perform SCA?






ChipWhisperer (CW)

- The ChipWhisperer is a platform for carrying out hardware attacks
 - Anything from side-channel analysis to voltage glitching
- Platform meaning:
 - Attacker hardware
 - Target instrumentation
 - Software library








Oscilloscope

We can also use an oscilloscope to measure and capture power traces!





Next Meetings

2025-11-03 • Next Monday

- Fault Injection Lab with ChipWhisperer Nano!
- We'll be explaining fault injection as well as letting you use a CW-Nano to perform a voltage glitching attack!





Meeting content can be found at sigpwny.com/meetings.

