IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE SUPREME COURT

ACCRA – A.D. 2025

CORAM: BAFFOE BONNIE, AG. CJ (PRESIDING)

LOVEVELACE – JOHNSON (MS.), JSC

AMADU, JSC

KWOFIE, JSC

ADJEI-FRIMPONG, JSC

CIVIL MOTION

NO. J5/31/2025

20TH MAY, 2025

THE REPUBLIC

VRS

HIGH COURT (LAND DIVISION 4) , ACCRA …….. RESPONDENT

EX PARTE: MASUD IBRAHIM …….. APPLICANT

GOLDEN EXOTICS LIMITED …….. 1ST INTERESTED PARTY

SUMMERTIDE COMPANY LTD …….. 2ND INTERESTED PARTY

SAMUEL ATSU FORSON …….. 3RD INTERESTED PARTY

RULING

ADJEI-FRIMPONG, JSC:

This application is a progeny of land suit No. LD/0165/2023, intituled GOLDEN EXOTICS LIMITED VRS NAA KORDEI II a.k.a. OPHELIA ASHAMI SAI AND OTHERS pending in the High Court, Land Division, Accra (the Trial Court). Following an allegation that certain persons, including the Applicant and the 3rd Interested Party, aware of the pending suit, were on the land using heavy equipment and armed guards to win sand, a contempt application was mounted in the trial court. The 1st Interested Party filed the said application. Events subsequent to the filing of the contempt application, have resulted in this application invoking this Court's supervisory jurisdiction.

According to the applicant, he was never served with the contempt application. In fact, he was not specifically named in the application. He appeared to have been described in the title of the application as *"Director of Operations of Commanex Investment Ltd"*. This designation was listed as the 5th Respondent in that application. When the application came on for hearing, Lawyer for the 1st Interested Party, in his absence mentioned his name as the 5th Respondent based on which the trial Judge issued a bench warrant for his arrest.

The bench warrant, according to the applicant, was issued against representation of Lawyer for the 3rd Interested Party who was present in court at the time albeit not as Lawyer for the applicant. The Lawyer's representation was that it was required to amend the title of the contempt application to include the name of the applicant and have him served before the issuance of the bench warrant if he failed to appear. This, the trial Judge was said to have disregarded. In any event, the applicant was arrested on the bench warrant, detained in the police cells for two days and brought before the trial court on 18th November 2024. On the said day, the bench warrant was rescinded. The applicant was made the 3rd Respondent in the application after the names of three others had been struck off the application.

The applicant claims that in the course of the proceedings on both the 18th November 2024 and 2nd December 2024 he suffered hostility from the trial Judge. For fear of being convicted and jailed on the contempt application, he filed an application to request the Judge to recuse himself (the Recusal application). In the end, not only did the Judge dismiss the recusal application but he also proceeded summarily to convict him and the 3rd Interested Party for allegedly scandalizing the court by certain depositions contained in the affidavit in support of the recusal application. He was sentenced to 31 days in prison whereas the 3rd Interested Party was made to pay a fine. After serving his jail term, he filed the instant application praying this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction to grant the following reliefs:

1. An order of certiorari directed at the High Court, Land Division (4), Accra to remove and bring to this Supreme Court for the purpose of being quashed, the proceedings of the said High Court in the case entitled *The Republic v. Summertide Company Ltd & Ors; Ex parte Golden Exotics Ltd (suit No. LD/0165/2023*) dated 20th December 2025, wherein the learned trial Judge committed the Applicant and the said 3rd Interested Party to prison without just cause;
2. An order of certiorari directed at the High Court, Land Division (4), Accra to remove and bring to this Supreme Court for the purpose of being quashed, the ruling of the said High Court in the case entitled *The Republic v. Summertide Company Ltd & Ors; Ex parte Golden Exotics Ltd (suit No. LD/0165/2023*) dated 20th December 2025;
3. An order of prohibition restraining his Lordship, Kenneth Edem Kudjordjie J., from continuing to adjudicate both the land case entitled *Golden Exotics Ltd v. Naa Kordei II a.k.a. Ophelia Sai & 5 Ors* and the contempt application in the High Court, Land Division (4), Accra entitled *The Republic v. Summertide Company Ltd & Ors; Ex parte Golden Exotics Ltd (suit No. LD/0165/2023*);
4. An order directed at the High Court, Land Division (4), Accra to stay proceedings in the land case entitled *Golden Exotics Ltd v. Naa Kordei II a.k.a. Ophelia Sai & 5 Ors* and the

contempt application entitled *The Republic v. Summertide Company Ltd & Ors; Ex parte Golden Exotics Ltd (suit No. LD/0165/2023*) and refer the suits to the Registrar of the High Court, Land Division (4) for reassignment to another Judge, and

5. Any further or other reliefs as to this Supreme Court may seem fit in terms of the accompanying supporting affidavit.

The grounds on which the application have been brought are:

1. That the High Court, Land Division (4), Accra committed a fundamental error of law patent on the face of the record when it committed the Applicant herein and the third Interested Party herein to prison without just cause;
2. That the High Court, Land Division (4), Accra committed a fundamental error of law patent on the face of the record when it declined jurisdiction in the Applicant's pending motion in the case and proceeded to give its ruling dated 20th December, 2024;
3. That the High Court, Land Division (4) Accra violated the rules of natural justice when it failed to give the Applicant herein and the 3rd Interested Party herein an opportunity to be heard before sentencing them for asking for the recusal of the presiding judge from their case;
4. That the learned High Court Judge violated the rules of natural justice when he sat on his own case against the Applicant herein and 3rd Interested Party herein; and
5. That comments passed by the learned High Court Judge in Land Division (4), Accra in the said suit on 12th November 2024 and in his ruling dated 20th December, 2025 create a real likelihood of bias against the case of the Applicant.

Preliminary Observation

Apart from the slip in the date (20th December, 2025) which at the hearing Counsel's attention was drawn to, which was corrected, the manner in which reliefs (1) and (2) have been couched are unsatisfactory. This Court has had cause to direct that an application invoking the

supervisory jurisdiction in the nature of certiorari is to remove and bring the impugned order/ruling/proceeding to the Court for the 'purpose of being quashed and for quashing'. The relief does not end at "for the purpose of being quashed". The Court's admonition is contained in its decision in REPUBLIC VRS HIGH COURT, COMMERCIAL DIVISION, ACCRA; EX PARTE KWABENA DUFFOUR (ATTORNEY-GENERAL & 8 ORS INTERESTED PARTIES) [2021-2022]1 SCLRG 88 at 93:

> *"Another point of concern is the manner in which the applicant has couched his grounds. In the first ground for the application, the applicant prays the Court for an order of "Certiorari directed at the High Court…to bring into this Court for the purposes of being quashed the decision…dated the 30TH JULY, 2020 and subsequent proceedings dated the 12th, 13th and 14th October, 2020…" as a matter of practice, the relief is usually phrased to say that the applicant prays the court for purposes of quashing the decision, the subject matter of the application. It usually does not end with the prayer to bring up into the court for purposes of quashing. The purpose of quashing is usually accompanied by an additional prayer to proceed to quash after the decision is brought into the court for purposes of quashing."*

We need to reiterate and emphasize that, the requirement to include both prayers in the relief of certiorari (quashing order) ought to be complied with. They involve two continuous but separate engagements. In practice at common law, certiorari is issued first, to call up the records for examination before if, there was error, it would be quashed. See *Judicial Remedies in Public Law*, Clive Lewis 1992, Sweet & Maxwell, p.144 where reflective of the practice, it is authored: *"Certiorari is technically an order bringing a decision of a public body to the High Court so that Court may determine whether the decision is valid. Where the decision is ultra vires, certiorari will issue to quash the decision. By quashing the decision, certiorari confirms that the decision is a nullity and is to be deprived of all effect. In modern time certiorari is the means of controlling unlawful exercise of power by setting aside decisions reached in excess or abuse of power."*. See also SMITH'S CASE (1670)1 Vent 66 cited in *administrative Law,* H.W.A. Wade &C.F. Forsyth, (11th ed., P.510)

wherein it was decided that failure to return the record on its own constituted punishable contempt.

Another observation we make is about relief (2) which appears to lack clarity. In relief (1) what is sought to be brought up in this Court are the "proceedings" of the High Court in the case intituled *The Republic v. Summertide Company Ltd & Ors; Ex parte Golden Exotics Ltd (suit No. LD/0165/2023*) dated 20th December 2025 wherein the learned trial Judge committed the Applicant and the said 3rd Interested Party to prison allegedly without just cause.

In relief (2) what is sought to be brought up is the ruling of the said High Court in the same suit and on the same date. However, the particular ruling is not specified. Unless there are two sets of proceedings of the court for the said day, that ruling must form part of the proceedings for the day and ought to be clarified. It takes a further reading of the second ground of the application and the statement of case to see that the ruling in question is referable to the decision of the trial court to proceed to rule on the recusal application without first determining the Applicant's pending motion to file supplementary affidavit in support of that application.

Having said that, we note that the application was filed with the ruling/proceedings sought to be quashed as required by Rule 61 subrule (1)(b) of C.I 16 (as amended). The essence of the rule is to make certain and give particulars of the subject ruling/proceedings to the court and the opposing party. Having attached the entire proceedings in compliance of the rule, we think the defect identified ceases to be fatal to the application. We shall therefore proceed to consider the merits.

Settled Principles

The principles governing the exercise of this Court's supervisory jurisdiction are well settled. The case now considered locus classicus in this Court is REPUBLIC VRS HIGH COURT, ACCRA; EX PARTE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE (ADDO INTERESTED PARTY) [2003-2004]1 SCGLR 312 per hold (4) of the headnote:

> *"The court would re-state the law governing exercise of judicial review as follows: Where the High Court (or for that matter the Court of Appeal) has made a non-jurisdictional error of law, which is not patent on the face of the record (and by the 'record' was meant the document which initiated the proceedings, the pleadings, if any, and the adjudication but not the evidence nor the reasons unless the tribunal chose to incorporate them), the avenue for redress open to an aggrieved party was an appeal, not judicial review. Therefore, certiorari would not lie to quash errors of law which were not patent on the face of the record and which had been made by a superior court judge who was properly seised of the matter before him or her. In that regard, an error of law made by the High Court or Court of Appeal, would not be regarded as taking the judge outside the court's jurisdiction, unless the court had acted ultra vires the Constitution or an express statutory restriction validly imposed on it."*

In REPUBLIC VRS COURT OF APPEAL, ACCRA; EX PARTE TSATSU TSIKATA [2005-2006] SCGLR 612 at 619 Wood JSC reaffirmed the above position in the following words:

> *"The clear thinking of this court is that, our supervisory jurisdiction under article 132 of the 1992 Constitution, should be exercised only in those manifestly plain and obvious cases, where there are patent errors of law on the face of the record, which errors either go to jurisdiction or are so plain as to make the impugned decision a complete nullity. It stands to reason then, that the error(s) of law alleged must be fundamental, substantial, material, grave or so serious as to go to the root of the matter."*

It is apparent from the foregoing authorities that not all errors stand to suffer the wrath of this Court's supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the issuance of prerogative orders. The starting point will therefore be to identify the alleged error in the impugned decision and assess its nature by subjecting it to the standards laid down by the authorities.

As the proceedings and/ruling of the trial court are *casus belli* of the application we shall reproduce same in extenso as contained in Exhibit K annexed to the applicant's affidavit:

> *"Counsel for the Respondents: My Lord, the substantive counsel is absent as he travelled up North and due to flight difficulties he was not able to return this morning. My limited instructions are that he caused to be filed a Motion on Notice to arrest the Ruling and for leave to file supplementary affidavit in support of recusal of the Judge same was filed on 18/12/24 with a return date 13/01/2025. My Lord instructions this morning is to pray the Court that the matter be adjourned to the return date for the application. That is my prayer this morning.*
>
> *By Court: When a party filed an application for recusal of a Judge on the ground of apparent byass [sic] and placed it before the Court, the Court is disable [sic] from entertaining any Motion or any Application until the application for recusal of a Judge is determine [sic].*
>
> *Mr Teriwajah, Counsel for all the Respondents filed a Motion for recusal of a Judge on the ground of apparent byass [sic] on 30/12/2024 that the matter was slated for Ruling today. The parties to the application were directed by the Court to file their written submissions by last Wednesday. This morning, the Court attention [sic] has been drawn to a Motion on Notice to arrest Ruling and for leave to file supporting affidavit for recusal of Judge. I cannot determine even this Motion to arrest until I give my ruling. Therefore the Ruling will be delivered today.*
>
> *By Court: Before I deliver my Ruling, I want to ask the 1st Respondent in the box if he knows the application before the Court today?*
>
> *1st resp in person: Yes*

By Court: Mr Masud Ibrahim deposed to an affidavit, has he seek [sic] your consent before deposing to the affidavit before the Court?

1st resp in person: My Lord I am a layman so I do not know the legal implications.

By Court: Mr Forson has been given an opportunity to answer the question but he is being evasive.

RULING READ IN OPEN COURT

By Court: Mr Masud Ibrahim you have scandalise [sic] this Court by swearing to an affidavit in which you have made unsubstantiated allegations against the Court with reackless abaundance [sic]. You have not been able to substantive [sic] your reackless [sic] allegations which… the Court therefore find you liable for Contempt.

XXXXX

By Court: The Court fines Masud Ibrahim GHC10,000.00 and also serve 31 days in prison. If he defaults, he will also serve another 31 days in prison.

XXXXX

By Court: Mr Forson you are also fined GHC15,000.00 in default you serve 31 days in prison."

The applicant contends that on the face, the above orders are riddled with fundamental errors law and breaches which warrant the quashing orders of this Court. His arguments are summed up in the following outline:

1. By proceeding to convict and sentence the applicant and 3rd Interested Party for contempt without giving them a hearing, the learned trial judge breached the rules of natural justice.
2. The trial judge committed fundamental error of law patent on the face of the record when he sentenced them without just cause.

3. The trial judge committed an error of law patent on the face of the record when prior to the delivery of the ruling in the recusal application, he failed to exercise his jurisdiction to hear and determine the applicant's application to arrest the said ruling and file a supplementary affidavit in support of that application.

Stripped of all the factual details contained in the 1st Interested Party's 62-paragraph affidavit in opposition to the application, what we consider as positive responses to the above are captured in two paragraphs:

> *"56. That the Learned Judge did not commit any jurisdictional error or fundamental error which goes to the root of the matter to warrant the present application from the Applicant and the 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties for Judicial Review.*
>
> *57. The Learned Judge also did not breach any rule of natural justice because the Learned Judge afforded the Applicant and the 3rd Interested Party to defend themselves but all that the Interested Party said was that he was a layman."*

The learned judge convicted the applicant and the 3rd Interested Party of contempt of court in the following orders:

> *By Court: Mr Masud Ibrahim you have scandalise [sic] this Court by swearing to an affidavit in which you have made unsubstantiated allegations against the Court with reackless abaundance [sic]. You have not been able to substantive [sic]your reackless [sic] allegations which… the Court therefore find you liable for Contempt.*

In the case of the 3rd Interested Party, he was merely asked whether the applicant deposed to the affidavit with his consent and when he answered that he was a layman and did not know the legal implications, the Judge said he was being evasive and proceeded to order:

By Court: Mr Forson you are also fined GHC15,000.00 in default you serve 31 days in prison.

It is not clear what the imposition of the fine on the 3rd Interested Party was for, especially when on reading the order holding the applicant liable for contempt of court (as captured in Exhibit K) and the ruling on the recusal application (Exhibit L) the charges of contempt and perjury appear to be mixed up.

Contempt of Court vs Perjury

The charges of contempt and perjury are conceptually related and may sometime overlap in the sense of both being offences against the administration of justice. They are nevertheless distinguishable, and the distinction becomes crucial to draw when a court decides to proceed against a party. Contempt generally understood, refers to any act or publication calculated to bring a court or judge of the court into disrepute or lower their authority. Not only that, any act or publication calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the court amounts to contempt of court. R VRS GRAY [1900]2 QB 36.

Perjury on the other hand is an assertion upon an oath administered in a judicial proceeding before a competent court, of the truth of some matter of fact material to the question depending in that proceeding, which assertion the assertor does not believe to be true when he makes it, or on which he knows himself to be ignorant. See STROUD'S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY OF WORDS AND PHRASES, 10th ed., Vol. 3, page 1998. Whilst like contempt, perjury ultimately prevents undue interference with the administration of justice, its primary essence is to instill in litigants and witnesses the sense of credibility and politeness of coming clear before the court and stating true facts concerning the subject matter of the dispute. See also REPUBLIC VRS HENRY NUERTEY KORBOE [2014] DLHC 4200.

In this case, the trial Judge decided to charge the applicant and the Respondent with contempt and deal with them summarily even though we think, perjury would have been more appropriate. Indeed, the law allows the court to exercise the option as happened in SOLICITOR-GENERAL VRS COX [2016] EWHC 124. In that case it was recognized that using a specific criminal offence (such as the CJA 1925 s.41 forbidding photography in court) might sometimes not sufficiently capture the potential gravity of the conduct in question and that the court retained the power to proceed on the basis of common law contempt in such a case which carries a longer maximum penalty.

That said however, we at once point out that the summary procedure embarked upon by the trial court, which for fair trial reasons should be sparingly deployed, did not in any way excuse the requirement of making the charge distinct and clear to them. And certainly, it did not excuse also the critical obligation of affording them the opportunity to answer to the charge and show cause. The standard and settled practice is that, when a court decides to charge a party with contempt and deal with the matter summarily, the charge even if not already prepared in a written form must be well stated and explained to the party. He must thereupon be afforded the opportunity to answer to the charge. This is worth insisting upon.

For reasons why the summary procedure should be deployed sparingly, Mustill L.J explained with profound vividness in R VRS GRIFFIN [1989]88 CR. APP. R. 63 at 67 thus:

> *"…In proceedings in criminal contempt there is no prosecutor, or even a requirement that a representative of the Crown or of the injured party should initiate the proceedings. The judge is entitled to proceed of his own motion. There is no summons or indictment, nor is it mandatory for any written account of the accusation made against him to be furnished to the contemnor. There is no preliminary inquiry or filtering procedure, such a committal. Depositions are not taken. There is no jury. Nor is the system adversarial in character. The judge himself enquires into the circumstances, so far as they are not within his personal knowledge. He identifies the*

ground of the complaint, selects the witnesses and investigates what they have to say (subject to the right of cross-examination), decides on the guilt and pronounces sentence. This summary procedure, which by its nature is to be used quickly if it is to be used at all, omits many of the safeguards to which an accused is ordinarily entitled, and for this reason it has been repeatedly stated that the judge should choose to adopt it only in cases of real need."

And where the need arises to deploy the summary procedure, the following principle from the esteemed authors of HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND is found instructive:

"In the case of contempt in the face of the court, the offender may be committed at once, and no notice or formal institution of proceedings is necessary. The contempt must be stated distinctly, and an opportunity of answering given." Vol. 9(1), 4th ed., (reissue), para 494, p.307.

In COWARD VRS STAPLETON [1953] 90 C.L.R. 573 at 579-580 the Australian High Court emphasized the point this way:

"…It is a well-recognized principle of law that no person ought to be punished for contempt unless specific charge against him be distinctly stated and an opportunity of answering it given him. In re Polland (1868) L.R. 2 P.C. 106 at p. 120; R. v Foster; ex p. Isaacs (1941) V.L.R. 77 at p. 81. The gist of the accusation must be made clear to the person charged, though it is not always necessary to formulate the charge in a series of specific allegations; Chang Hang Klu v Piggot (1909) A.C. 312 at p. 315… Resisting as it does upon accepted notions of elementary justice, this principle must be rigorously insisted upon."

We believe it is this universal common law practice that the learned S.A Brobbey has articulated in his seminal work in the following words:

"The summary powers of the court allow the judge to proceed against the suspect summarily and without a formal charge of contempt of court. The power implies that the court can order

contempt proceedings to be conducted instantly where it forms the view that the respondent may be liable for contempt. This procedure is often adopted where the contempt is committed in facie curiae…Summary trial entails the trial judge framing the charges from the facts leading to the decision to commit for contempt. Formal written charges do not need to be preferred and served on the respondent and there is no need for a full dressed trial. In such situations, the court should take the trouble to state the terms of the exact action, omission or conduct giving grounds for the allegation of contempt. Secondly, the contempt charged should be explained to the respondent who should be called upon to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of the court. Thirdly, whatever explanation is offered, or the refusal of the respondent to offer any explanation should be apparent on the record of proceedings. Lastly, the reasons for convicting the respondent and punishing him should be patiently recorded. All the proceedings on contempt should be carefully recorded and form part of the record of proceedings."

We have examined the record contained in Exhibit K which we have reproduced earlier in this delivery. Nothing therein contained points to even the least attempt on the part of the trial Judge to state in specific terms and explain the charge of contempt to the applicant and the 3rd Interested Party. The record is also graphic that the trial Judge did not afford them the required opportunity to answer to the charge. Without any doubt in our minds, there is a clear fundamental error of law patent on the face of the record and a wanton breach of their right to fair hearing. On these grounds, the application praying that the ruling and/or proceedings of the trial court held on 20th December 2024 for which the applicant and 3rd Interested Party were convicted and sentenced be brought up in this Court for the purpose of being quashed and for the quashing of same hereby succeeds. The said ruling and/or proceedings are accordingly quashed.

Another decision the applicant wants quashed as already noted is the trial Judge's decision to proceed to deliver the ruling in the recusal application without determining the pending application for the arrest of the ruling and to file a supplementary affidavit. The reason for the trial Judge's said decision was, since there was a decision to make on the recusal application, he had no jurisdiction to determine any other application until the ruling on the recusal application had been delivered. This is what he meant by: *This morning, the Court attention [sic] has been drawn to a Motion on Notice to arrest Ruling and for leave to file supporting affidavit for recusal of Judge. I cannot determine even this Motion to arrest until I give my ruling. Therefore the Ruling will be delivered today*.

The trial Judge failed to recognize that the said application boarded on the very application for recusal he was in the haste to rule on. He therefore had jurisdiction to make that determination before proceeding to deliver the ruling in the recusal application. The law is that where a court has jurisdiction in a matter but for whatever reason fails to assume such jurisdiction, that decision is amenable to the orders of certiorari. See THE REPUBLIC VRS HIGH COURT, ACCRA; EX PARTE PETER SANGBER-DERY (ADB BANK LTD-INTERESTED PARTY) [2017-2018]1 SCLRG 552 at 578. Consequently, the said decision/order as contained in Exhibit L is also brought is also brought up for the purpose of being quashed and is hereby quashed.

The applicant further seeks an order prohibiting the trial Judge His Lordship Kenneth Edem Kudjordjie J from proceeding to determine the contempt application intituled *The Republic v. Summertide Company Ltd & Ors; Ex parte Golden Exotics Ltd (suit No. LD/0165/2023*) as well as the substantive land suit intituled *Golden Exotics Ltd v. Naa Kordei II a.k.a. Ophelia Sai & 5 Ors*. This is on the ground of real likelihood of bias.

We have carefully considered the sequence of events and various orders made by the trial Judge including the manner in which he issued the bench warrant for the arrest of the applicant and for what we see, the bizarre conviction and sentence of the applicant and the 3rd Interested Party. We have also considered some of the comments the trial Judge made in the ruling in the recusal application including the repeated castigation of Counsel representing the applicant and the 3rd Interested Party. We are convinced that there are grounds sufficient to establish real likelihood of bias in the subsequent proceedings. At first blush, we considered restricting the order of prohibition to the contempt proceedings. We have however taken into account the fact that throughout the entire proceedings, the respondents in the contempt application have been considered as the grantees/assigns of the Defendants in the substantive suit who stand to suffer the same risk of the likelihood of bias. And given that all that the order of prohibition entails is the placement of the suits before another judge, we think it better serves the justice of the case if we, in the good exercise of our discretion extended the order to the substantive suit.

In the event we grant the relief of prohibition as prayed and order the trial Judge Kenneth Kudjordjie J from proceeding to determine both the contempt application and the substantive land suit. We order proceedings to be stayed pending the transfer of the suits to be placed before another Judge under the warrant of the Chief Justice. The application therefore succeeds.

(SGD.) R. ADJEI-FRIMPONG
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) **P. BAFFOE-BONNIE**
(AG. CHIEF JUSTICE)

(SGD.) **A. LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.)**
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) **I. O. TANKO AMADU**
(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) **H. KWOFIE**
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