























RANKED-CHOICE VOTING SYSTEM

VOTERS	CANDIDATE RANKING		
	1ST	2ND	3RD
			
			
			
			
			


BORDA COUNT (2-1-0)
WINNER: CANDIDATE B 




CONDORCET MAJORITY
NO WINNER



INSTANT RUNOFF VOTING
WINNER: CANDIDATE A 




PLURALITY
CANDIDATES A & B TIE



ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM:

NO RANKED-CHOICE VOTING SYSTEM CAN SATISFY ALL FAIRNESS CRITERIA SIMULTANEOUSLY



INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES
RELATIVE RANKING OF TWO CANDIDATES CANNOT DEPEND ON
THE RANKING OF AN IRRELEVANT THIRD CANDIDATE




PARETO UNANIMITY

IF ALL VOTERS PREFER CANDIDATE B TO CANDIDATE A,
THEN THE RESULTS SHOULD RANK B HIGHER THAN A



NO DICTATORSHIP
OUTCOME CANNOT BE DECIDED
BY A DISTINGUISHED VOTER



COMPLETENESS

EVERY PAIR MUST BE COMPARABLE- EVERY CANDIDATE
SHOULD RANK STRICTLY HIGHER OR LOWER THAN ANY OTHER