






















RANKED-CHOICE VOTING SYSTEM


	CANDIDATE RANKING		
VOTERS	1ST	2ND	3RD
			
			
			
			
			

BORDA COUNT (2-1-0)

WINNER: CANDIDATE B 




CONDORCET MAJORITY
NO WINNER




INSTANT RUNOFF VOTING

WINNER: CANDIDATE A 




PLURALITY
CANDIDATES A & B TIE



ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM:

NO RANKED-CHOICE VOTING SYSTEM CAN SATISFY ALL FAIRNESS CRITERIA SIMULTANEOUSLY



INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES

RELATIVE RANKING OF TWO CANDIDATES CANNOT DEPEND ON THE RANKING OF AN IRRELEVANT THIRD CANDIDATE





PARETO UNANIMITY

IF ALL VOTERS PREFER CANDIDATE B TO CANDIDATE A, THEN THE RESULTS SHOULD RANK B HIGHER THAN A



NO DICTATORSHIP

OUTCOME CANNOT BE DECIDED BY A DISTINGUISHED VOTER



TRANSITIVITY

IF CANDIDATE A IS RANKED HIGHER THAN CANDIDATE B AND B IS RANKED HIGHER THAN C THE RANKING MUST HAVE A HIGHER THAN C